Introducing nuclear power in Turkey: A historic state strategy and future prospects

Energy Research & Social Science 10 (2015) 273–282

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Original research article

Introducing nuclear power in Turkey: A historic state strategy and future prospects Jessica Jewell a,∗ , Seyithan Ahmet Ates a,b a b

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria School of Business and Management Sciences, Istanbul Medipol University, Istanbul, Turkey

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 6 January 2015 Received in revised form 15 July 2015 Accepted 24 July 2015 Keywords: Nuclear power Nuclear energy Energy security Turkey

a b s t r a c t Turkey is currently in the middle of its sixth attempt over the last 60 years to introduce nuclear power. This paper analyzes Turkey’s past and present motivation, capacity and strategies to identify the factors which influence deployment of nuclear power and draw lessons for other nuclear newcomer countries. While existing literature points to a correlation between nuclear power, strong state involvement, centralized energy planning and the rhetoric linking energy to national prestige and security, we show that these factors are not sufficient for a successful nuclear program. We also show that autocratic rule and nuclear weapons aspirations can undermine rather than support the development of civilian nuclear power as it is often presumed in the literature. Turkey’s current strategy based on intergovernmental agreements with Russia and Japan is laced with irony since it is motivated by energy security considerations and yet relies on foreign entities for construction, ownership and operation of nuclear power plants as well as the development of human capacity. Although Ankara intends to build the third nuclear power plant with own resources this seems unlikely based on the South Korean and Japanese experience, both of which needed much more time and effort to localize the industry. © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Nuclear power is often hailed as a technology which is important for mitigating climate change while providing energy necessary for economic development [1,2]. At the same time, global nuclear power capacity has stagnated over the last two decades and some argue that the growth of renewable energy could be a harbinger of the nuclear’s coming decline [3] especially in light of the Chernobyl and Fukushima–Daichi nuclear disasters when the safety of nuclear energy has been underminded. Whether nuclear power will expand or contract largely depends on whether individual nations will have motivations and capacity to promote this technology.1 Thus, understanding the future of nuclear power in a post-Fukushima world means understanding how nuclear power will play out in different national contexts. Currently, 30 countries use nuclear power with another 45 considering starting a national nuclear power program [4]. An addi-

∗ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Jewell). 1 While nuclear proponents have argued that small-medium reactors could be a game-changer for the “nuclear renaissance”, there is little evidence that this rhetoric will become a reality [6], which underlines the importance of understanding the development of traditional, large-scale nuclear power programs as we do in this article. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.07.011 2214-6296/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

tional four countries (Italy, Kuwait, Senegal, and Venezuela) were planning the introduction of nuclear power but abandoned plans following Fukushima [5]. Of the remaining so-called Newcomers to nuclear energy, only two (Belarus and United Arab Emirates) have started construction of their first nuclear power plant and a third, Turkey has signed contracts with vendors. Turkey is a particularly interesting case for three reasons. First, Turkey is one of ten nuclear Newcomers which has most of the basic capacities and motivations historically observed in countries introducing nuclear energy: a large economy, an adequate electricity grid, and rapidly-growing electricity demand combined with energy dependence concerns [7]. These factors explain why the Turkish state has pursued nuclear power program for over five decades. However, Turkey continues to be perceived as one of the 30 most politically unstable countries in the world [8]2 which historically complicated deployment of nuclear power [7]. The Turkish state’s strategies to overcome its challenges can provide valuable insights for understanding nuclear power development in similar

2 ¨ We follow Kaufmann et al.’s definition as political instability as the perception of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism” (2008, 7). See Theoretical Framework for more discussion on why this particular definition, the indicator associated with it and the underlying political phenomenon which it measures is relevant for nuclear power development.

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newcomer countries with large growing economies but political instability. Second, Turkey’s strategy is the first case of a build-own-operate (BOO) agreement meaning the donor country (in this case Russia) will pay for and own a majority stake in the first nuclear power plant. Additionally, since Turkey’s first nuclear power plant is likely to be a design (VVER-1200) which is not yet operational anywhere in the world (currently only under construction in Russia), Turkey will also be dependent on Russia for human resource capacity and regulatory expertise. For Turkey, this approach leads to a disparity between the energy security rhetoric surrounding nuclear power in the country and the actual strategy. With over 60% of electricity generation coming from imported fuels and rapid electricity demand growth, the government cites energy security as one of the main reasons for introducing nuclear energy and goes so far as to call nuclear energy a “national energy” [9]. But Turkey is developing its nuclear infrastructure with an unprecedented degree of foreign involvement in terms of financial support – arguably higher then any other national historical example.3 Why is Turkey pursuing such a high level of foreign participation even though it claims nuclear energy will contribute to its energy independence? And what does this strategy portend for other nuclear Newcomers? Finally, examining the case of Turkey complements the literature on institutional drivers of nuclear energy from Sovacool and Valentine [10] which only takes cases of successful nuclear power introduction4 and allows us to ask the question, under what conditions are the institutional drivers which Sovacool and Valentine sufficient for the successful introduction of nuclear power? We answer these questions by exploring the interplay between the Turkish state’s motivation, strategy and capacity to launch a nuclear power program. We add to the literature on the development of nuclear energy in Turkey which has covered the engineering [11,12] and energy market [13] implications of introducing nuclear energy in Turkey; the historical relationship between nuclear proliferation and nuclear power in Turkey [16,17] and a comparison between Turkey and South Korea’s nuclear power policies [18]. The next section discusses the theoretical framework which guides our analysis. Sections 3 and 4 covers Turkey’s motivation, strategy and capacity for nuclear power development historically and today. Section 5 discusses the practical implications of the Turkish strategy and connects the Turkish case to the existing literature on the preconditions and “drivers” of national nuclear programs. We conclude with a brief summary and comment on the broader implications for what the Turkish experience means for understanding nuclear power deployment in other nuclear Newcomers. 2. Theoretical framework and case selection This article builds on and contributes to the recent literature on preconditions to deploying nuclear power. Much of the literature (e.g. [7,19]) has used a large or medium-n comparative approach and focuses on easily-measurable aggregate indicators (such as the size and wealth of the economy, energy import dependence, and electricity demand growth) which are influenced by many factors beyond government control but which may set up ¨ nuclear power development. This is in contrast to ¨ preconditions for the earlier literature on nuclear power which used detailed case

3 The one exception to this statement which we know of is the development of nuclear power in the Soviet Bloc countries, some of which received significant foreign investment from the U.S.S.R. in starting their nuclear power programs [14,15,7]. 4 We follow the literature and define “successful nuclear power introduction” as when a country connects its first nuclear power plant to the grid.

studies to investigate how nuclear power developed in different political contexts [20,21]. More recently, Sovacool and Valentine [10] follow a case study approach and look at the politics and state strategies which facilitate nuclear power introduction. Since the two traditions build on different kinds of data, the conclusions they come to are not always directly comparable. One exception is the conclusion related to nuclear weapons. For example, Fuhrmann [19] found that variables related to nuclear weapons motivations were statistically insignificant in relation to when countries build nuclear power plants. In contrast Sovacool and Valentine [10] argue that a military weapons program strengthens commitment to nuclear power. In this article, we draw on both traditions and conduct a detailed case study on one of the most likely nuclear energy entrants. Thus, we use the Turkish case to test historically how nuclear weapons perceptions have shaped the development of its program. Our study design and case selection are informed by four insights from the literature. The first insight is that whether and when a country introduces nuclear power is a combination of its motivation and capacity to do so [7,19,22]. The second insight comes from Poneman and Sovacool and Valentine [20,10] who argues that certain institutional design and governance approaches are the key facilitating factors in nuclear power introduction [55,69]. In other words, an important determinant of a when a government is successful in nuclear power introduction depends on its strategy. For example, for Poneman [20], there are two main governmental strategies to introducing nuclear: the “independent” approach when a state pursues nuclear power for national prestige and political leverage and the “dependent” approach when a state is focused on rapid deployment of nuclear power plants with foreign help. Thus our research is structured by three questions: why does a country pursue nuclear power? (motivation), which financial, technical and institutional tools does a country have at its disposal? (capacity) and what approach is the state using to introduce nuclear power? (strategy). Analysed together, these three questions can shed light on the potential for success in a given national context. The other two insights inform our case-selection. Gourley and Stuhlberg [22] argue that to understand the future of nuclear energy, we need to understand the process of nuclear power development in countries where it is most likely to expand including Turkey, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Gourley and Stuhlberg’s argument contrasts that of Jewell [7] who observes that while Turkey is a sufficiently large economy with strong motivation to introduce nuclear power it lacks necessary political stability. Why is political stability important in nuclear power development? The literature on political instability5 shows a clear link between economic development and domestic unrest [23,24]. In terms of nuclear power, political stability influences both internal factors such as program constancy and reliability as well as external factors such as investor confidence.6 Within the nuclear power literature, Jewell [7] was the first to observe that politically unstable countries (as measured by a historical violent regime change from the PITF [25] database introduced nuclear power only in conjunction with developing nuclear weapons, i.e. through mobilizing unprecedented political will and resources. Through this lens, the perception of Turkey as among the 30 most politically unstable countries in the world [8], could inhibit investor confidence as

5 We follow Kaufmann et al.’s [39] definition and define political instability as “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism”. 6 Allard et al. [26] document the relationship between political unrest and firm investment in innovation while Braithwaite et al. [27] document the influence perceived domestic tension and instability has on foreign direct investment.

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well as vendor commitment and ultimately undermine the nuclear power program. In this sense, Turkey is what Levy [28] would call a “most likely case” of a particular political phenomenon. In Gourley and Stulberg’s [29] model it is among the most likely successful entrants to the nuclear club. In Jewell’s [7] model, it is a case where strong motivation of a large economy contrasts with political instability, making the outcome of nuclear power deployment uncertain.7 Finally, Turkey provides a complementary case to Sovacool and Valentine’s [10] study of factors associated with successful nuclear power programs. Since Sovacool and Valentine [10] only cover countries with successful nuclear industries – see a critical observation by Darrow [29] – they are not in the position to establish whether the identified factors are sufficient or merely necessary for the successful deployment of nuclear power, or whether they indeed are consequences and not the drivers of success. Examining similar factors in Turkey which has so far failed to introduce nuclear power may help to answer this question. We analyze Turkey’s six attempts to introduce nuclear power (including the current one) around the framework described above and in Table 1. For each period we ask three questions: • Motivation: Why did Turkey pursue nuclear power? • Capacity: What was Turkey’s overall capacity and why did each attempt fail? • Strategy: How did Turkey try to achieve its goals in the past and today? The analysis is based on a review of academic and grey literature as well as published plans on nuclear power in Newcomer countries and Turkey in particular. 3. The history of nuclear power in Turkey The Turkish state has always had a strong motivation for nuclear power. Since 1960 electricity consumption in Turkey grew on average 9% per year as compared to 7% for the world as a whole [30]. As a country poor in fossil resources, Turkey has been increasingly dependent on imported energy to meet its electricity needs and in recent decades energy security was cited as one of the main reasons for pursuing nuclear power.8 The pursuit of nuclear energy is also a subset of a broader ideology of a growth-oriented, state-centric development paradigm which has dominated Turkish politics. Modernization in Turkey has, throughout history been focused on economic development through a hegemonic state and subordination of civil society [31]. Thus in Turkey, the question which some environmental scholars ask as to why “energy megaprojects continue to hold such allure despite their inherent drawbacks?” [32] is embedded in a larger social history of glorification of big projects and subordination of public opinion to state imperatives. In fact, some argue that throughout most of modern Turkey’s history, even the concept of citizenship has been conceptualized as “duties” rather than “rights” [33]. Turkey has had six attempts at introducing nuclear power (Table 2). While all the attempts were backed by similar and equally strong motivation the strategy which the Turkish state has pursued and the reasons for failure have changed over the decades. The country’s interest in nuclear power started in the 1950s when nuclear power held the promise of cheap electricity for develop-

7 In Jewell’s model, there are also nine other countries with similar economic, energy and political profiles. 8 Turkey does posess lignite reserves, a low-quality form of coal, but the reserves to production ratio for this resource is only 33 years [34].

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ment [35]. The Turkish Atomic Energy Commission (TAEC) was established in 1956 to oversee nuclear research and civilian nuclear power development [17]. During the 1960s, TAEC established two research and training centers and a feasibility study for the first nuclear power plant was launched in 1967 with the plan to start nuclear generation in the 1977 [18].9 However, the country’s economy with a GDP under $20 billion was too small to support a nuclear power program.10 The plans stalled following a military coup and political instability in 1971 [17]. Turkey’s second attempt began in 1972 with a feasibility study for a nuclear power plant and selection of Akkuyu and Sinop sites. A license for building a nuclear power plant was issued in 1976 and negotiations for financing and construction were started with two Swedish firms [17]. These negotations, led by the center-left Republican People’s Party (CHP) were interrupted by another military coup in 1980 [36]. After two-years in office, the military administration tried to restart the state’s nuclear power program but it was unable to gain momentum [36]. By the third attempt, which began in the 1980s under the right wing government led by Turgut Ozal [36], Turkey had become a sufficiently big economy to support nuclear power with a GDP over $60 billion. At this time nuclear power administration in Turkey was reorganized with the abolishment of the TAEC and the formation of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), reporting directly to the prime minister. This also ushered in the build-own-transfer approach under which a vendor would pay for construction, recoup its expenses by operating the plant for a specific amount of time and then ultimately transfer the plant to the Turkish government [37]. Following the re-arrangement, bids were invited from seven nuclear energy vendors and a Canadian, East German and American firm were selected to construct three nuclear power plants [17]. But the 1980s were also characterized by suspicions about Turkey’s role in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program through transfer of nuclear material. Additionally, fears grew that if Turkey developed nuclear power it would soon use the technology to pursue nuclear weapons as Pakistan had. Kibaroglu [17] finds that it was these suspicions, held by Western suppliers that led to Canada’s withdrawal of its support for nuclear power in Turkey. Another type of diplomatic tension – between East and West Germany – ultimately led the East German withdrawal from the agreement [17]. The Chernobyl disaster in 1986 also led to a rise in domestic opposition for the program [18]. These political factors combined with the conflicts with vendors ultimately doomed the third attempt. The fourth attempt began in the 1993 when an international tender was issued for a turnkey project. Led by a right-left coalition government [36], the state received bids from 3 companies, however the project became mired in corruption lawsuits, proliferation concerns and ultimately ran into financial difficulties from an IMFbacked economic program and no purchase guarantee was ever issued [38]. Later, George W. Bush commented that the U.S.’ reticence to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with Turkey was due to proliferation concerns [39].11 Reflecting on the 1990s attempt, an article from 1997 argued that “Turkey has learned little from its past failures [to introduce nuclear power] and has not taken measures to alleviate fears of Western nuclear supplier countries” [17]. Additionally, it was during this attempt that the “Anti-Nuclear Platform”, a public movement against nuclear energy, was organized which is still active today [40]. While the Akkuyu movement against

9 The first plant was planned to have a generating capacity between 300 and 400 MWe [17]. 10 Pakistan is the only country with a GDP less then $50 billion which was able to successfully introduce nuclear power which Jewell [7] argues is because it was accompanied by a nuclear weapons program. 11 Though other scholars argue that proliferation did not play a large role in Turkey’s thwarted nuclear power attempts [44].

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Table 1 Framework for analysis. Aspect

Key question

Aspects considered

Motivation

Why is a country pursuing nuclear power?

Nuclear weapons Energy security, particularly import dependence and electricity diversity Electricity demand growth to support economic growth Climate concerns Desires to export indigenous nuclear technology National prestige

Capacity

Why is a country succeeding or failing in its pursuit of nuclear power?

Financial capacity Institutional capacity to attract investment and manage a nuclear power program Technical capacity to integrate in grid Human resource capacity to run program State capacity for economic and energy planning (including the degree of centralization)

Strategy

How is a country pursuing nuclear power?

Development of domestic technical capacity versus importing foreign technologies Containing or suppressing public opposition Putting scientists or military officials rather than politicians in charge of the nuclear power program Centralized nuclear energy planning and regulation

Note: Aspects compiled from [38,27,29,80].

Table 2 State-led attempts to introduce nuclear power in Turkey: a historical overview. Phase

Years

Strategy and actions

Outcome

I. Initial interest and plans

1953–1971

Conventional purchase

discontinued following military coup (1971) and accompanying political and economic instability

– Turkish Atomic Energy Commission established (1957) – first research reactor commissioned (1961) – plan to start nuclear electricity generation by 1977 II. First site selection and license issued

1972–1980

Conventional purchase

discontinued following military coup (1980) and accompanying political and economic instability

– feasibility studies and site selection at Akkuyu and near Sinop – license issued negotiations for financing and construction with vendors (1976) III. Negotiations under proliferation concerns

1982–1988

Build-operate-transfer – bids invited from seven major suppliers – letters of intent issued to three firms

IV. Another failed negotiation

1993–2000

Build-operate-transfer

vendor negotiation failure exacerbated by proliferation concerns and doubts about the appropriateness of the Sinop site

vendor negotiation failure combined with proliferation concerns

– international tender issued for a turnkey project – bids received but tender eventually cancelled V. Return of nuclear power amidst growing dependence on Russian gas

2002–2009

VI. Era of intergovernmental agreements

2010–present

Build-own-transfer

international tender only resulted in one bid (from Rosatom) which was deemed to be too expensive

– plan to connect the first nuclear power plant by 2015 – Sinop chosen as the initial site for a nuclear power plant Intergovernmental agreements (IGA) – IGA signed with Russian Federation for the construction of a Build-Own-Operate nuclear power plant in Akkuyu (2010) – IGA signed with Japan on the construction of a NPP at Sinop (2013)

Table is compiled from: [41], [66], [72,78,79].

in progress

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nuclear power has attempted to undermine the state’s nuclear power program [31], the opposition has been cast as “uncivil” and therefore excluded from the decision-making process [41]. The fifth attempt was initiated by Prime Minister Ergodan, part of the conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi – AKP) in 2002, following the so-called constitutional crisis [42]. This attempt was also the first attempt which was partly, if not primarily motivated by concerns over Turkey’s growing Russian gas imports [38]. In fact, an article on the history of Turkey’s nuclear power from the late 90s doesn’t even mention energy security [17]. Turkey only began importing gas from Russia in 2003 after the completion of the Blue Stream pipeline [43]. However, since then the majority of Turkey’s energy demand growth has been met by growing natural gas imports [39]. TAEK and the Energy Ministry began working on preparing the legal and institutional infrastructure for starting a nuclear power program. A 2007 law established the rules and regulations for the tender process which was issued in 2008. While six vendors had planned to participate, ultimately the state received only one bid from the Russian state-owned Rosatom corporation which was deemed to be too expensive [36]. To conclude, the state nuclear power program in Turkey is among the oldest yet still unsuccessful nuclear power programs in the world. Nuclear power has been pursued under virtually all political regimes in Turkey – from the center-left administration of the late 70s to the conservative AKP government of the 2000s. In spite of the unflagging interest, the motivation for nuclear power development has varied over time though it has always been a subset of a broader ideology of modernization through economic growth and with hegemonic state control. Initially the state pursued nuclear power to meet its growing electricity demand. It wasn’t until the early 2000s that energy dependence was cited as a major justification of the program.12 In the 1960s, the country was essentially too small and unstable to deploy nuclear technology. Political and economic instability also disrupted the second attempt. In the 1980s, even after Turkey became more politically stable, the government’s negotiations with vendors failed amidst changing tender conditions. These negotiation failures were exacerbated by proliferation concerns which led to waning support from Western countries. Most recently, following an international tender Turkey received only a single bid – from Russia which was judged to be too expensive. The next section will discuss Turkey’s plans and its new strategy for building a nuclear power program. 4. Current context and plans Today Turkey has plans for two nuclear power plants – one in Akkuyu and one in Sinop – the same sites which were selected in the 1970s. The justification for nuclear power is similar to what it has been historically: a mixture of economic development and energy security concerns. But the strategy represents a distinct departure from past approaches, which may address some of the historic challenges but could also create new ones (Table 3). 4.1. Still a strong motivation Turkey is plagued with electricity blackouts and still faces rapidly growing electricity demand combined with a lack of domestic energy sources. Electricity demand is growing at 6–7% per year which amounts to an additional 8–10 TWh of required electricity

12 One of the most widely cited articles on the history of nuclear power in Turkey ¨ does not even mention energy security, though it does allude to the fact that Turkey’s ¨ hydro-power and thermal energy sources will not be sufficient to meet. . .growing electricity demand ([17], 34).

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each year [37]. In other words, every 10 years, the country will require an equivalent to 3 average-sized (1 GWe) nuclear power plants in new generation capacity. In 2011, Turkey imported over 60% of its fuels for electricity production and the hydropower resources are virtually tapped out [38]. Currently, 44% of the electricity is generated from natural gas, over 95% of which is imported [30]. Turkey’s rapid growth in electricity generation from natural gas followed the construction of the Blue Stream pipeline in 2002 to carry Russian gas to Turkey through the Black Sea. Today, Turkey imports about two-thirds of its natural gas from Russia [39]. And while the growth in gas imports from Russia has been part of a broader rapproachment with Russia, which is now Turkey’s largest trading partner [43], there are growing concerns about the country’s gas dependence. As of 2012, the natural gas bill climbed to $26 billion [45]. According to the Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yıldız, the commissioning of two nuclear power plants would reduce the natural gas bill by $7.2 billion per year [46]. Nuclear energy is also presented as central to the country’s economic plans. The ruling AK Party recently declared the Vision 2023Agenda which includes a series of ambitious economic goals, such as becoming one of the world’s ten largest economies combined with a target GDP of two trillion dollars, foreign trade volume over one trillion dollars, per capita income of $25,000/year, and an unemployment rate below 5.0% by the year 2023 [47]. However, the party argues that Turkey needs to decrease its dependence on ‘foreign’ energy sources and increase the share of domestic energy generation alternatives rapidly in order to achieve these goals. Thus, the Vision 2023Agenda envisions the construction of at least two nuclear power plants in the next decade. Under the current plan, nuclear energy would replace a little under 10% of the total electric generation capacity – or about 20% of the gas and coal plant capacity. These pressures are also reflected in much of the rhetoric which links nuclear power in Turkey to energy security and national prestige. Mustafa Öztürk, an AKP member of parliament went so far to say that “to prevent darkness, nuclear power plants are urgent” [38]. The government generally speaks of nuclear energy as a “national energy” which would decrease dependence on imported natural gas [48–51] Himler Güler, former energy minister, argued that nuclear power plants can help the country diversify away from imported natural gas for electricity production and that they “have exclusive characteristics to provide for energy supply security” [52]. Additionally, some Turkish columnists and politicians have argued that joining the nuclear energy club would increase the country’s prestige [53], which is be important for the country which aims at “regional energy leadership” [54]. However, critics of the plan argue that the Turkish government’s strategy paves the way for double-dependence [55].13 Nuclear power has also been hailed in Turkey for its low greenhouse gas emissions by politicians, business groups and columnists [56]. However, given over four decades of the Turkish state’s interest in nuclear power before climate change even even was a policy issue, it’s unlikely that climate concerns are playing a major role in motivating the state’s pursuit of nuclear power. Furthermore, even though Turkey did ratify the Kyoto Protocol, it did so late – in 2009 which was 12 years after the initial signature and only three years before expiration. And while Turkey has pledged it will be part of any post Kyoto agreement as a candidate of the European Union, none of these pledges are binding.

13 See the Future prospects for nuclear power in Turkey section for elaboration and analysis of this concept.

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Table 3 Turkey’s nuclear power program and the literature on facilitating conditions of nuclear power. Aspect

Factors observed in the case of Turkey

Motivation

Nuclear power in Turkey is framed as central to energy security and as the only “national energy” and necessary to meet growing demand. The ruling party’s economic plans frame nuclear power as central to the Turkey’s economic goals. Several commentators have also hailed it for increasing Turkey’s prestige. Currently, there is controversy as to the proliferation risk in Turkey; historically, proliferation concerns caused several western vendors to abandon negotiations.

Capacity

Turkey’s economy and electricity grid are both large enough to absorb a nuclear power plant though there are concerns about the capacity of the grid operator to regulate frequencies from the NPPs. In spite of the long-standing interest, Ankara has been unable to attract investment over the last five decades partly due to proliferation concerns and political instability. Turkey also has limited human resources capacity with one main research reactor. Furthermore, the program was abandoned following military coups.

Strategy

In Turkey the same organization (TAEK) has been both the promoter and regulator of nuclear energy and reports directly to the prime minister. Ankara has signed intergovernmental agreements with both Russia and Japan. In Turkey, the secrecy surrounding the program in the 1980s and 90s was cited as one of the reasons for Western opposition. Today Ankara’s nuclear energy program is still subject to public opposition, which it has cast as “uncivil”.

4.2. Remaining challenges

4.3. New strategy

In many ways, Turkey has sufficient capacity to introduce nuclear power including a large economy (GDP over $700 billion in 2014) and a large grid which can absorb electricity produced from a nuclear power plant. Nevertheless, there are still barriers to nuclear power. Most problematic, Turkey still ranks in the top quintile of perceived political instability– in other words among the 30 most unstable countries in the world [8]. While the country has seemed to escape the decadal military coups, given the centrality of the state in the nuclear power plan, even the perception of political instability can undermine investors’ trust in the program. Exacerbating this is the general citizen opposition to nuclear power in Turkey, which was documented even before Fukushima [58]. There is also public opposition arguing that the government has failed to deal with the risk of accidents or propose a viable plan for waste disposal [59,60]. While civil society in Turkey is marginalized in state policy-making (see Section 3), its opposition could increase the likelihood of program failure. The second challenge Turkey faces is achieving sufficient technical and human resource capacity. Even though the Turkish power system is large enough to accommodate a large nuclear power plant, there are concerns about the ability of the grid system operator to regulate the frequencies between nuclear energy and other sources [61]. Turkey also faces a human resource challenge. While the country has had a research reactor program for over 50 years, the human resource requirements for a nuclear power plant are far greater than for a research reactor. Additionally, running a national nuclear energy program requires not only plant operators but also regulators who can oversee implementation and safe operation. The final challenge which Turkey faces is gaining confidence of the international community. Two of the state’s nuclear power program attempts were mired by proliferation concerns. Most proliferation experts argue that Turkey represents a low proliferation risk given its strong ties to the West and ambitions for European Union accession [62]. They posit that Ankara wouldn’t want to jeopardize its status as a cooperative non-proliferation risk [37] and would be unlikely to proliferate even in the face of an Iranian nuclear weapon [63] Of course proliferation concerns extend beyond weapons development to inadequate control of nuclear materials, such as earlier allegations regarding Turkey’s role in Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons through transfer of nuclear materials (Section 3). Today this continues to raise eyebrows in the West as the AKP races toward its own plant [65] especially in the context of the presence of armed opposition groups inside the country and the turmoil in Syria and Iraq.

The current approach to introducing nuclear power in Turkey differs from historical arrangements. In the past, Turkey issued tenders for bids from international companies, whose involvement was limited to the construction and time-limited operation of nuclear power plants. This time, rather then issuing open tenders, Ankara is relying on intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) which allow vendors and the government to sidestep certain competition rules [44]. Thus, Law No. 5710, which regulates nuclear energy investments paves the way for foreign companies and their respective governments to take a more active role in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Turkey and enables them to actually own the plant after construction. The new strategy also may inoculate Turkey against political opposition. While historically, parties and coalitions from different parts of the political spectrum pursued nuclear power, today two of the three main opposition parties oppose it. Under the current approach, the IGA with Russia has been ratified by the Turkish parliament and cannot be easily withdrawn in the case that the AKP loses power.14 4.3.1. Agreement with Russia Turkey’s first nuclear power plant will likely be built, owned and operated by Russia. The Cooperation Agreement on Nuclear Power Plant and its Operation in Akkuyu Field in the Republic of Turkey was signed between Ankara and Moscow in 2010 [66]. This build-ownoperate (BOO) intergovernmental agreement is the first of its kind. It established Akkuyu NGS A.S¸., a subsidiary of the Russian stateowned nuclear power company Rosatom, which will own 100% of the shares. Under the “build-own-operate” agreement with Russia, the vendor will pay for the nuclear power plant as well as provide fuel, waste management, and human resources in exchange for a guaranteed electricity price of 12.35¢/kWh for 15 years [67].15 The over 5000 page Environmental Impact Assessment report was approved by Turkey’s Ministry of Environment and Urban

14

The ratification of the Japanese deal is still pending. The IGA with Russia seems to be the main strategy for waste management so far. In fact in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report for the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project, which was aproved by the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning in December 2014, the disposal, the control, management and storage of the nuclear wastes and has been left out of the scope of the EIA. The report indicates that detailed information on the disposal, control and management of nuclear waste is still being prepared which is normal since countries with small nuclear power programs often formulate long-term nuclear waste management strategies years after the program has been in place. In fact in several countries (Hungary, Bulgaria, Argentina, Lithuania and Romania), radioactive waste management organizations were founded over twenty years after the nuclear power program’s initation [68]. 15

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Planning at the end of 2014 [69]. The plan is to build a nuclear power plant at Akkuyu with four 1200 MWe units. The operator will be obliged to sell to the Turkish electricity market; the electricity purchase guarantee in the agreement covers 70% from the first two units and 30% from the third and fourth. The remainder of the electricity produced will be offered to the Turkish electricity market without a governmental guarantee. All four units will be VVER-1200 reactors manufactured by Rosatom subsidiaries. These reactors are intended for both the domestic and export markets but at the moment there are only a few of them under construction in Russia. Rosatom plans to start construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in 2016 and to connect the first unit to the grid by 2020 with the other units connected each following year [70]. Rosatom says it will take responsibilty for the whole fuel cycle including manufacturing fuel elements and taking the spent fuel back to Russia. The agreement also includes a provision to send 600 Turkish students to Russian universities for training and develop additional human resource capacity in the field of nuclear energy.

4.3.2. Agreement with Japan Turkey also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan in May, 2013 for exclusive negotiating rights for the Sinop plant. Under the agreement, Japan will build a nuclear power plant with an installed capacity of about 4.5 GWe. The project is estimated to take 10 years and cost 22 billion dollars. The agreement also lays the groundwork for nuclear cooperation on everything from training and capacity development to spent fuel and radioactive waste management [71]. Unlike the Russian deal, according to the information from the government, the share of Turkish Electricity Generation Company (EUAS) in the investment could reach up to 49% with the other 51% owned by the Japanese-led consortium [46]. Political statements indicate that this consortium will include Japan’s Mitsubishi and Itochu, France’s GDF Suez and Areva, and EUAS from Turkey. Similar to the Russian agreement, the Japaneseled consortium is guaranteed an electricity rate of 11.80¢/kWh [72].

5. Future prospects for nuclear power in Turkey Turkey has a strong motivation to introduce nuclear power. It has been framed as central to the country’s energy security and able to address blackouts, rising electricity demand and scarcity of domestic fossil resources. This makes Turkey similar to existing nuclear countries, most of which introduced nuclear power during times of high electricity demand growth [7] and in connection with national prestige and security [10]. In spite of the Turkish state’s long-standing interest in nuclear power, it has faced and continues to face institutional challenges. Though it is a large economy with a sizeable grid, the state has struggled to successfully negotiate with vendors and to attract sufficient investment. Political instability may have been a factor explaining this lack of success. Turkey’s current strategy for nuclear power development is an attempt to overcome the twin challenges that have proved insurmountable in the past. On the one hand, political instability and proliferation concerns have deterred commercial investment and support from Western governments. On the other hand, Turkish’s own state capacity to introduce a nuclear program has been insufficient. Turkey has pursued an institutional strategy which Sovacool and Valentine [10] associate with successful nuclear power development: establishing a single powerful organization (TAEK) as both the promoter and the regulator of nuclear power [73], reporting directly to the Prime Minister since 1982 [17]. However, in spite of this centralized institutional structure, Turkey has been unsuccessful in introducing nuclear power, which means that even this strategy is not a silver bullet to overcoming insufficient capacity.

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The IGAs with Russia and Japan may help Turkey overcome its challenges but these agreements are laced with irony because they undermine one of the main motivations for nuclear power. In the IGAs, the vendor pays for the nuclear power plants and in exchange is guaranteed a certain electricity price. Using Poneman’s [20] distinction between “dependent” and “independent” strategies of pursuing nuclear power, in Turkey’s case, the rhetoric (combined with Anakara’s insistence on retaining the right to enrich uranium) would imply Turkey is an “independent” but in its strategy, the government is pursuing one of the most dependent strategies ever seen. In the case of the IGA with Russia, this approach paves the way for what some have called a “double-dependence” between natural gas and nuclear technology [55]. In fact in the Russian deal, Turkey will rely on the donor not just for nuclear power construction but for the whole fuel cycle as well as human capacity to run the nuclear power plant. Westinghouse, one of Rosatom’s main competitors has recently highlighted this same risk for Central and Eastern European countries from relying on nuclear fuel which can only be fabricated in Russia [74] and one of the Europen Union’s energy security strategies has recently become to reduce dependence on Russian nuclear fuel [75]. Thus, rather then being a “national energy” source, as Turkish officials promise [9], the deals seem to prioritize diversity of energy sources as a key strategy in increasing security of supply. This diversification can help protect against natural gas price spikes or technological problems related natural gas production and transmission.16 It’s also clear that the deal with Russia (which is more advanced than the agreement with Japan) sets up human resource dependencies which haven’t been seen yet in the nuclear power industry. The agreement with Russia includes a provision which pays for and provides nuclear engineering training for Turkish students in Russia [76].17 While this strategy does offer a good opportunity to train Turkish students in the specific Russian technology, by outsourcing training Turkey risks becoming dependent on Russia for its human resource capacity as well. Furthermore, this training approach leaves the door wide open for how the country will solve the human resource problem of setting up an independent regulator. In fact, some argue that establishing a regulator with the capacity to oversee the construction and operation of the Russian reactors will be the biggest human resource challenge that Turkey faces since the country has no experience in domestic civilian nuclear power regulation and since the Russian reactor technology (VVER-1200) is a new design which is not yet in operation anywhere [76]. Thus, there is not a pool of experts experienced with dealing with this design. In fact it is likely that the only engineers with experience with the VVER-1200 will be from technical support organizations (TSOs) which have a close relationship with Rosatom. As the operator of the nuclear power plant, using such a TSO could lead to a conflict of interest [76] and possibly regulatory capture. However, doing otherwise may put Turkey at risk for inferior plant oversight due to insufficient technical knowledge. Turkish officials explain away the dependency created by the BOO model and IGAs saying that the country will build the third one on its own as South Korea did [46]. Members of the governing AK Party have emphasized that, during the construction process, Turkish companies will act as sub-contractors and work together with the leading contractor by providing construction

16 For example even during the recent Russia-Ukraine gas dispute, although Ukraine was cut off from Russian gas supplies, it did not suffer a nuclear power shut-down during these periods since nuclear fuel is easier to store and stockpile than natural gas. 17 Turkey’s agreement with Japan also includes provisions related to training and educational cooperation but the details are still forthcoming.

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materials and support. The head of the Nuclear Energy Project and Implementing Department of the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, argues that the BOO model will help Turkey “ascend. . .the steep learning curve that a newcomer country faces when implementing its first nuclear power plant” [77]. Indeed, South Korea started their national nuclear power in the late 1950s with a turnkey plant in 1971 during a period of rapid economic growth. Sirin et al. [18] provide a full description of the similarities and difference of the nuclear programs in Korea and Turkey arguing that while the socio-economic environment and energy security concerns are similar in the two countries, Turkey lacks a long-term nuclear energy policy that integrates social, economic, technical and political aspects of nuclear energy. But even in South Korea, it took 20 years to construct a plant with a domestic entity as the prime contractor [78]. Furthermore, Turkey’s twovendor approach may undermine its strategy to rapidly develop domestic capacity. In Japan, each significant change in reactor supplier, design and/or size had to go through a new localization process with the first one or two examples of each design as turnkey [79]. In other words, each time Japan switched reactor designs, it bought at least one and usually two foreign-supplied plants. Thus if Turkish policy-makers want to deliver on their promise, they would be advised to pick one plant design and stick with it. All in all, in light of Japan’s and Korea’s experience, the Turkish state’s plan to build the third nuclear power plant on its own does not seem entirely realistic.

6. Conclusions This article examines the Turkish state’s motivation, capacity and strategy for implementing nuclear power. Nuclear power has been pursued in Turkey since the 1950s by virtually all political regimes and parties. In spite of this unflagging commitment, the program has been unable to attract sufficient investment first due to the small size of the economy and later due to political instability and proliferation concerns. By studying Turkey’s five failed attempts we are able to reflect on national attributes which have been identified as “drivers” or “preconditions” of nuclear power to determine whether these factors are sufficient for explaining nuclear energy development. For most of its post-war history Turkey pursued nuclear power to address rapidly and steadily growing demand for electricity, which has been a strong motivation factor for nuclear power in other countries. In the 1960s the government could not garner sufficient resources due to the small size of the economy. This, combined with military coups in 1971 and 1980, undermined the first and second attempts. The Turkish case thus provides an interesting counterpoint to the assertion in the literature that democratic regimes have a harder time building a national nuclear power program than autocratic ones [35,10]. In fact in Turkey, it was not democracy that undermined achieving the nuclear dream but rather the violent overturn of democratic regimes by the military. Thus while Sovacool and Valentine [10] argue that dictatorial rule and the placement of military officials in positions of power facilitates nuclear power introduction, in Turkey it was the exact opposite: except for a brief attempt in 1982 to restart the Turkish nuclear power program under a military administration, nuclear power was abandoned during military rule. The disruption of Turkey’s nuclear power program during military rule highlights the way political stability – violent or otherwise – undermines investor and vendor confidence. Even though some find that in aggregate, political instability does not have a measurable impact on nuclear power development [22], others point out that politically-unstable countries were only able to introduce nuclear power when they accompanied nuclear weapons programs

i.e. when there is a very strong securitized motivation to mobilize resources [7]. In Turkey (and elsewhere), the state is central to nuclear power, thus even mild and non-violent political instability such as the so-called constitutional crisis of 2002 stunted progress in Turkey’s nuclear energy program. Finally, the Turkish case allows for reflection on what some in the literature call “drivers” of nuclear energy [10,80,22]. In particular it highlights the competing effects nuclear weapons aspiriations and perceptions have on a nuclear power program. While nuclear weapons aspirations are commonly cited as fostering nuclear power development [10,80] particularly in small, poor and/or politically-unstable economies [7], the two large-n correlational studies on nuclear power preconditions have found that variables related to nuclear weapons development are not statisticallysignificant vis-à-vis nuclear energy development [19,22]. The case of Turkey highlights the reason for this conflicting result: while the pursuit of weapons may mobilize domestic commitment, it can also undermine international support to the point that the nuclear power program fails. Similarly, Turkey has two of the key institutional “drivers” which Sovacool and Valentine [10] find facilitate success of nuclear programs: (1) coordination between energy and economic planning and (2) political subordination of opposition. Turkey’s ruling party puts nuclear power front and center in its economic plan. Even though this type of centralized nuclear energy governance helped facilitate its introduction in a wide range of countries including France and South Korea [10], in Turkey it has been insufficient to ensure success. Likewise, marginalization of anti-nuclear opposition did not ensure successful introduction of nuclear power. Thus the term “driver” needs to be re-considered in relation to national nuclear power development. As such, it connotes a linear one-way causal relationship and disregards positive and negative feedback loops critically important in nuclear energy politics. For nuclear weapons aspirations, while a nuclear weapons program supports domestic commitment (positive feedback loop) it undermines international support (negative feedback loop). In terms of institutional “drivers” it’s clear that in Turkey, these have not been sufficient to overcome the challenges of implementing nuclear power. The most recent attempt to pursue nuclear power through IGAs has been designed to counteract the lack of institutional and financial capacity as well as concerns over proliferation and instability which have plagued the country’s nuclear power program. Under the “build-own-operate” agreement with Russia, the vendor will pay for the nuclear power plant as well as provide fuel, waste management, and human resources in exchange for a guaranteed electricity price. While this approach helps Turkey overcome some challenges, it creates new ones. In particular, Turkey will become dependent on Russia for nuclear power construction, fuel, and even manpower and training. Thus, Turkey is exchanging dependence on Gazprom (the Russian gas company) for dependence on Rosatom (the Russian nuclear power company). This is particularly true since the proposed reactor model has been developed in Russia and thus even the regulators would need to be Russian-trained. The Japanese deal is also expected to lead to a vendor-financed and electricity-price assured agreement but is still under negotiation. Perhaps responding to this controversy, Turkish officials claim that it will build its third nuclear power plant on its own. But experience from other countries suggest that this promise is unlikely to be easily fulfilled. Korea, which introduced nuclear power in the 1970s, was only able to build its ninth nuclear power plant with its own resources and Japan, its sixth. The outcome of Turkey’s strategy will have reverberations beyond the country’s borders. Of the more then 40 countries wishing to introduce nuclear power, very few, if any, have the capacity and motivation exceeding those of Turkey (cf. [7]) and thus will

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not be able to move forward without significant foreign involvement. The build-own-operate deal which Turkey has signed with Russia is the first agreement of its kind and how this strategy plays out could be instructive for other countries with similar capacity challenges. Will Rosatom facilitate the development of Turkey’s indigenous capacities or lock Ankara in perpetual dependence? Rosatom clearly has big ambitions to expand nuclear power to more countries as evidenced by its presence around the world [81], and whether or not these dreams are realized will be influenced by how the deal plays out in Turkey. From an academic perspective, this paper shows that more research is needed on nuclear governance beyond the national level. The future of nuclear energy is clearly going to be shaped through bilateral relations between countries and understanding these dynamics will be key to ensuring the safe and secure development of nuclear power.

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