- Email: [email protected]
Irrational beliefs as predictors of anxiety and depression in a college population
AYi3izd
Per.wn.
J
Pergamon 0191-8869(95)00166-2
itrdkki.
Diff.
Vol. 20. No. 2. DD.2 15-2 19. 1996
Copyright ~CI1996 Elk&r Science Ltd Prmted in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0191~8869196 $15.00+0.00
IRRATIONAL BELIEFS AS PREDICTORS OF ANXIETY DEPRESSION IN A COLLEGE POPULATION Edward
C. Chang’,*
and Thomas
AND
J. D’Zurilla’
‘Department of Psychology, Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, KY 41099 and ‘Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794, U.S.A.
Summary~~This study investigated the predictive discriminant validity of the five irrational beliefs scales of the Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB) in assessing depression and anxiety in a college population. The results indicated that one scale (Low Frustration Tolerance) was a unique predictor of both depression and anxiety symptoms. In addition. two scales (Other-Directed Shoulds and Self-Worth) were found to have unique predictive associations with anxiety symptoms. However, the relationship between one of these scales (Other-Directed Shoulds) and anxiety was in the opposite direction to expectations as predicted by RET theory. Implications for theory and the external validity of these findings were discussed.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most popular forms of psychotherapy in America today is Albert Ellis’ Rational Emotive Therapy [RET (Bernard & DiGiuseppe, 1989; Ellis & Bernard, 1985)]. RET is based on the A-BC-D-E model of psychological disturbance and therapy where ‘A’ is some activating stressful life event (e.g. frustration, failure, rejection), ‘B’ refers to irrational beliefs, and ‘C’ refers to the psychological and behavioral consequences of these irrational beliefs-i.e. psychological disturbance and maladaptive behaviors. Within this framework, ‘D’ refers to the therapeutic process of disputing the irrational beliefs. while ‘E’ refers to their replacement with adaptive rational beliefs and the consequent reduction in psychological symptoms and maladaptive behaviors. One of the major assumptions of this model is that a positive relationship exists between the separate constructs of irrational beliefs (B) and psychological disturbance (C). Empirical support for this assumption has been reported in numerous correlational studies (Malouff, Schutte & McClelland, 1992; Muran. Kassinove, Ross & Muran, 1989; Muran & Motta, 1993; Nottingham, 1992; Wertheim & Poulakis, 1992; see also review by Smith & Allred, 1986). The two most widely used measures of irrational beliefs have been the Irrational Beliefs Test [IBT (Jones, 1968)] and the Rational Behavior Inventory [RBI (Shorkey & Whiteman, 1977)]. Smith and Zurawski (1983) compared the convergent correlation between the IBT and the RBI to the correlations between each of these measures and several different measures of psychological symptoms (i.e. anxiety, depression, and anger). After finding that these correlations were all very similar in magnitude, Smith and Zurawski reasoned that the IBT, the RBI, and the different measures of symptoms might all be reflecting a broader underlying variable, namely, negative trait affectivity. According to Smith (1982), one of the problems with measures of irrational beliefs like the IBT and the RBI is that some of the items have emotional content that overlaps with the item content in common measures of psychological symptoms [for example, “I get angr_y when terrible things happen at work” (Demaria, Kassinove & Dill, 1989, p. 330)]. Such overlap may artificially inflate the correlations between measures of irrational beliefs and symptoms (Smith, 1982). Recently, however, the Survey of Personal Beliefs [SPB (Demaria er al., 1989; Kassinove, 1986)] was developed to provide a measure of irrational beliefs that is not contaminated by affectivelyworded items. Test items were initially drawn from Kassinove’s (1986) Personal Beliefs Test (PBT), which was designed to assess the basic irrational beliefs presumed to underlie psychological disturbance. A content validation procedure of these items by Albert Ellis and two associates ensured that
*To whom all correspondence
should be addressed. 215
216
Edward C. Chang and Thomas J. D’Zurilla
they accurately reflected current RET principles and did not contain affective content (Kassinove, 1986). These items were then modified to further improve their representation of the most recent RET formulation of irrational beliefs (Bernard & DiGiuseppe, 1989; Ellis & Bernard, 1985). The product of these procedures, the SPB, is a Likert-type questionnaire which consists of the following five irrational beliefs scales: (1) Self-Directed Shoulds, (2) Other-Directed Shoulds, (3) Awfulizing, (4) Low Frustration Tolerance, and (5) Self-Worth. The Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales focus on uhsolutistic thinking, which is viewed as the core of psychological disturbance in current RET theory (Bernard & DiGiuseppe, 1989; Ellis, 1989; Ellis & Bernard, 1985). According to Ellis, absolutistic thinking consists of irrational beliefs that reflect the tendency of individuals to take their strong preferences for goal achievement (e.g. success, acceptance) and turn them into absolute necessities-i.e. dictatorial ‘should’, ‘oughts’, and ‘musts’. The Self-Directed Shoulds scale focuses on dogmatic shoulds that are directed toward the self, whereas the Other-Directed Should scale concentrates on dogmatic shoulds that are directed toward the environment. The remaining three SPB scales assess what Ellis (1989) hypothesized to be derivatives of absolutistic thinking which also contribute to psychological disturbance. The Awfulizing scale measures beliefs that exaggerate or ‘catastrophize’ negative or aversive life experiences. The Low Frustration Tolerance scale taps unrealistic beliefs that aversive situations cannot be tolerated (also called “I-can’t-stand-it-is”). The Self-Worth scale assesses beliefs that reflect the irrational tendency to make global judgments about a person’s total self-worth (“I am a total fool”), instead of evaluating specific behaviors or actions. The purpose of the present study was to evaluate the predictive discriminant validity of the SPB scales. In particular, we were interested in determining (a) the simple correlations between each SPB scale and outcome measures of depression and anxiety, and (b) the unique relations between each scale and outcome, controlling for the covariation among the scales. Our general hypothesis was that each SPB scale will significantly and uniquely be correlated with the two outcome measures. METHOD Subjects The Ss for this study were 284 undergraduate students, most of them first semester freshman, enrolled in the introductory psychology course at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. All Ss participated in the study in order to fulfill a course requirement. The sample included 99 men and 185 women. Their mean age was 18.7 yr. Measures Survey of Personal Belicfi JSPB). This measure was described earlier. Coefficient CISfor the SPB scales range from 0.57 for Other-Directed Shoulds to 0.72 for Low Frustration Tolerance (Demaria et al., 1989). Test--retest reliabilities (3 weeks) range from 0.65 for Awfulizing to 0.82 for Low Frustration Tolerance (Demaria et al., 1989). The results of confirmatory factor analyses (Demaria et al., 1989) supported a five-factor model that matches the logically-derived five-scale structure. In addition to these factor-analytic results, support for the validity of the SPB has also been reported by Kassinove and Eckhardt (1994) and Nottingham (1992). Lower scores on the SPB scales indicate greater irrationality. Measures qf psychological symptoms. The following measures of psychological symptoms were used in this study: the Beck Depression Inventory [BDI (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961)], and the State Index of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory [SAnx (Spielberger, 1989; Spielberger, Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970)]. The BDI is a widely-used 2 1-item self-report measure of depressive symptomatology. Ss are asked to report whether they have experienced a variety of different depressive symptoms during the past few days. The S-Anx scale is a 20-item State Anxiety scale. All of the above measures have been found to possess good psychometric properties (see references cited above). Procedure The study measures were administered in small group testing sessions held at two different time periods during the same semester. At time 1, all Ss completed the SPB. At time 2, approx. 6 weeks later, the Ss completed the following two measures in the order listed: BDI and S-Anx.
Irrational beliefs, anxiety and depression Table I. Correlations
AWF SDS ODS LFT SW M SD
among the Irratmnal
217
Beliefs Scales
AWF
SDS
ODS
LFT
SW
0. I56* 0.211” 0.487** 0.479** 22.91 5.34
0.167* 0.175s 0.098 30.97 3.59
0.050 0.101 35.74 4.19
0.430** 28.84 6.29
28.86 6.23
N = 284. AWF. Awfulking: SDS, Self-Directed Shoulds; ODS, Other-Directed LFT. Low Frustration Tolerance; SW. Self-Worth. *P < 0.01. **p < 0.001
Table Symptom
2. Correlations
measures
Depression Anxiety
between Irrational
AWF -0.217*** -0.1x9**
Beliefs and Psychological
SDS -0.045 0.035
N = 284. AWF, Awfulizing; SDS. Self-Directed Frustration Tolerance; SW, Self-Worth. *P < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
Shoulds;
Shoulds;
Symptoms
ODS
LFT
SW
0.051 0.128*
-0.240*** -0.257***
ODS, Other-Dwxted
-0.209** -0.2X1**’ Shoulds;
LFT.
Low
RESULTS The means, standard deviations, and the intercorrelations among the five SPB scales are presented in Table 1. As Table 1 shows, Awfulizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Self-Worth share a moderate amount of variance with each other (18.5-23.7%). In contrast, these beliefs have very little variance in common with Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds (0.04.5%). In fact, two of the three nonsignificant correlations in the table are associated with Other-Directed Shoulds, and the third one is associated with Self-Directed Shoulds. These results suggest that absolutistic thinking, especially the other-directed type, is virtually independent of the other three irrational beliefs. The correlations between each SPB scale and the two measures of psychological symptoms are presented in Table 2. As this table shows, Awfulizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Self-Worth are significantly correlated in the expected direction with both depression and anxiety (lower scores on the SPB indicate greater irrationality). In contrast, Self-Directed Shoulds is not significantly related to any of the symptom measures. Other-Directed Shoulds is significantly related only to the measure of anxiety, but in a direction which is opposite to predictions based on RET theory; that is, more ‘irrationality’ is associated with less anxiety. This is further evidence that absolutistic thinking, as measured by the SPB, is different from the other irrational beliefs. In order to investigate the issue of discriminant validity. we first examined the partial correlations between each SPB scale and the symptom measures, controlling for covariation among the scales. These partial correlations are presented in Table 3. Of the six original significant correlations, only four remained significant after partialing out the variance associated with the other four irrational beliefs. Three of the five scales were found to have significant unique relations to symptoms: Other-Directed Shoulds, Low Frustration Tolerance and Self-Worth. Low Frustration Tolerance continued to show significant correlations with both depression and anxiety, while Other-Directed Should and Self-Worth remained significantly correlated only with anxiety.
Table 3. Unique
Symptom Depression Anxiety
relations
measures
between Irrational Beliefs and Psychological ation among beliefs AWF ~ 0.098 ~ 0.047
SDS -0.009 0.066
N = 284. AWF, Awfulking; SDS, Self-Directed Frustration Tolerance; SW, Self-Worth. *P < 0.05. **p < 0.01.
Should?
Symptoms
controlling
ODS
LFT
0.097 0.167**
-0.119* -0.136;
ODS. Other-Directed
for covari-
SW -0.090 -0.189*’ Shoulds;
LFT,
Low
218
Edward C. Chang and Thomas J. D’Zurilla DISCUSSION
Limited support was found in this study for the discriminant validity of the five specific irrational beliefs scales that comprise the Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB). Initially, four scales (Awfulizing, Other-Directed Shoulds, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Self-Worth) were found to be significantly related to depression and anxiety. However, after controlling for the covariation among the scales, only three of the scales (Other-Directed Shoulds. Low Frustration Tolerance, and Self-Worth) were found to have significant unique predictive relations with psychological symptoms, and one of them (Other-Directed Shoulds) was in the direction opposite to the prediction based on RET theory; that is, greater ‘irrationality’ was associated with less anxiety. In general, the results of this study indicate that absolutistic thinking, as measured by the SelfDirected Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales, is virtually independent of the other irrational beliefs measured by the SPB. In addition to the contradictory findings for Other-Directed Shoulds, the results for the Self-Directed Shoulds in this study also failed to support the RET model. This beliefs scale was found to be unrelated to psychological symptoms. even hefbrc partialing out for covariation between the SPB scales. These findings can be viewed to cast some doubt on the construct validity of these two scales. One might expect the Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales to have good construct validity since Albert Ellis and associates participated in a content validation procedure designed to ensure the sampling representativeness of the PBT items on which the SPB is based (see Demaria rt al., 1989). Nevertheless, close inspection of the content of these scales reveals that the items do not reflect the same rigid, driven, dogmatic quality that Ellis emphasizes in most of his writings about absolutistic thinking (Ellis & Bernard, 1985). It may not be the specific ‘shoulds’ and ‘musts’ per se that are dysfunctional, but rather, their demanding, inflexible, obsessive-compulsive nature. This interpretation is consistent with views recently expressed by Robb and Warren (1990). These authors have recommended that test developers use the phrase ABSOLUTELY MUST, instead of the word ‘should’, when writing absolutistic-thinking items. Since this extreme absolutistic quality does not seem to be adequately represented in the items of the Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales, at least some of the items in these scales may be reflecting a sensible or adaptive commitment to values, especially the other-directed items. Such a commitment is one component of a personality triad called ‘hardiness’ (i.e. challenge, control, and commitment), which has been identified as a moderator of stress (Kobasa, Maddi & Kahn, 1980; Kobasa & Puccetti, 1983). This would explain the unexpected direction of the relation found in this study between Other-Directed Shoulds and anxiety. However, another possibility may be that absolutistic thinking is not as important as the other ‘derivative’ irrational beliefs. Evidence supporting this interpretation comes from two recent studies. In one study, Kassinove and Eckhardt (1994) also using the SPB found limited evidence for the Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales in both a Russian and an American college student sample. Noteworthy, these investigators similarly found the Low Frustration Tolerance scale related to depression and the Self-Worth scale related to anxiety in their American sample, thus replicating the present findings. In another study, DiGiuseppe, Leaf, Robin and Exner (1988) using a different measure of irrational beliefs similarly found that low-frustration and awfulizing predicted negative emotions better than absolutistic thinking. Taken together, these findings join those of the present study in raising considerable doubt about that part of Ellis’ (1989) model which presumes that absolutistic thinking is the core causal or maintaining factor of psychological disturbance. Thus, we tend to agree with the conclusion of Kassinove and Eckhardt (1994) that researchers may benefit more by focusing on the possible greater importance of the other ‘derivative’ irrational beliefs (e.g. low frustration tolerance) than on absolutistic thinking (i.e. self-directed shoulds and other-directed shoulds) until further evidence can be found to suggest otherwise. In closing, it is important to note that the results of this study may be valid only for an unselected, non-clinical population, such as the present college student population. In some clinical samples, it is possible that the Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales may be more sensitive to dysfunctional absolutistic thinking tendencies. For example, in a recent correlational study focusing on 1.53 psychiatric inpatients, Nottingham (1992) found modest but significant correlations in the expected direction between the Self-Directed Shoulds scale and measures of depression and
Irrational beliefs, anxiety and depression
219
anxiety (the Beck Depression Inventory and the Beck Anxiety Inventory). However, none of the correlations associated with Other-Directed Shoulds were significant. The latter negative findings cast further doubt on the importance of other-directed shoulds in assessing the relation between irrational beliefs and negative emotions. For example, in clinical practice it is often observed that patients place more extreme and unrealistic demands on themselves than on others. Specifically, other-directed shoulds may play a relatively minor role compared to self-directed shoulds in determining and maintaining psychological disturbance in clinical populations. Acknowled~emenr-We article.
wish to thank
Howard
Kassinove
for his constructive
comments
on an earlier version of the present
REFERENCES Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A. & Garbin, M. G. (1988). Psychometric properties of the Beck Depression Inventory: Twenty-five years of evaluation. Clinical Psychology Review, 8, 77FlOO. Beck, A. T., Ward, C. H., Mendelson, M., Mock, L. & Erbaugh, J. (1961). An inventory for measuring depression. Archives of General Psychiatry, 4, 561-571. Bernard, M. E. & DiGiuseppe, R. (1989). Rational-emotive therapy today. In M. E. Bernard & R. DiGiuseppe (Eds), Inside rutionul-emotive therapy: A critical appraisal of the theory und therapy of Albert Ellis (pp. l-7). New York: Academic Press. Demaria, T. P.. Kassinove, H. & Dill, C. A. (1989). Psychometric properties of the Survey of Personal Beliefs: A rationalemotive measure of irrational thinking. Journal of Personality Assessment, 53, 329-341. DiGiuseppe, R., Leaf, R., Robin, M. & Exner, T. (September 1988). The development of a measure of rational/irrational thinking. Paper presented at the World Congress on Behavior Therapy, Edinburgh, Scotland. Ellis, A. (1989). Comments to my critics. In M. E. Bernard & R. DiGiuseppe (Eds), Inside rational-emotive therapy: A critical apprczisctl qfthr theory and therapy of Albert Ellis (pp. 199-233). New York: Academic Press. Ellis, A. & Bernard, M. E. (1985). What is rational-emotive therapy (RET)? In A. Ellis & M. E. Bernard (Eds), Clinical applications of rational-emotive therapy (pp. I-30). New York: Plenum. Jones, R. (1968). A factored measure of El!is’ irrational beliefs system with personality and maladjustment correlates. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Texas Technological University, Lubbock. Kassinove, H. (1986). Self-reported affect and core irrational thinking: A preliminary analysis. Journal of Rationul-Emotive Therapy, 4, I 19-l 30. Kassinove, H. & Eckhardt, C. I. (1994). Irrational beliefs and self-reported affect in Russia and America. Personality und Individual Dgferences, 16, 133-142. Kobasa, S. C., Maddi, S. R. & Kahn, S. (1980). Hardiness and health: A prospective study. Journal qf Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 168--l 77. Kobasa, S. C. & Puccetti, M. C. (1983). Personality and social resources in stress resistance. Journalof Personality and Sociul Psychology, 45. 839-850. Malouff, J. M., Schutte, N. S. & McClelland, T. (1992). Examination of the relationship between irrational beliefs and state anxiety. Personality and Individual Dqferences, 13,451-456. Muran, J. C., Kassinove, H., Ross, S. & Muran, E. M. (1989). Irrational thinking and negative emotionality in college students and applicants for mental health services. Journal qf Clinical Psycholo,gy, 45, 188-193. Muran, E. M. & Motta, R. W. (1993). Cognitive distortions and irrational beliefs in post-traumatic stress, anxiety, and depressive disorders. Journal qf Clinical Psychology, 49, 166176. Nottingham, E. J. (1992). Use of the Survey of Personal Beliefs scale: Further validation of a measure of irrational beliefs with psychiatric inpatients. Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive Behavior Therapy, 10,2078%2217. Robb, H. B. & Warren, R. (1990). Irrational beliefs tests: New insights, new directions. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 4, 303%311_ Shorkey, C. T. & Whiteman, V. L. (1977). Development of the Rational Behavior Inventory: Initial validity and reliability. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 37, 572-534. Smith, T. W. (1982). Irrational beliefs in the cause and treatment of emotional distress: A critical review of the rationalemotive model. Clinical Psycho1og.v Reviebv, 2, 505-522. Smith, T. W. & Allred, K. D. (1986). Rationality revisited: A reassessment of the empirical support for the rational-emotive model. In P. C. Kendall (Ed.), Advances in co,gnitive-behavioral research and therapy (Vol. 5, pp. 63-87). New York: Academic Press. Smith, T. W. & Zurawski, R. M. (1983). Assessment of irrational beliefs: The question of discriminant validity. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 39, 976979. Spielberger, C. D. (1989). State-Trait Anxiety Inventory: Bibliography (2nd edn). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L. & Lushene, R. E. (1970). Manualfor the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Taylor, J. A. (1953). A personality scale of manifest anxiety. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 48, 285-290. Wertheim, E. H. & Poulakis, Z. (1992). The relationships among the General Attitude and Belief Scale, other dysfunctional cognition measures, and depressive or bulimic tendencies. Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive Behavior Therapy, 10, 219.-223. Zurawski, R. M. & Smith, T. W. (1987). Assessing irrational beliefs and emotional distress: Evidence and implications of limited discriminant validity. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 34, 224-227.
Per.wn.
J
Pergamon 0191-8869(95)00166-2
itrdkki.
Diff.
Vol. 20. No. 2. DD.2 15-2 19. 1996
Copyright ~CI1996 Elk&r Science Ltd Prmted in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0191~8869196 $15.00+0.00
IRRATIONAL BELIEFS AS PREDICTORS OF ANXIETY DEPRESSION IN A COLLEGE POPULATION Edward
C. Chang’,*
and Thomas
AND
J. D’Zurilla’
‘Department of Psychology, Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, KY 41099 and ‘Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794, U.S.A.
Summary~~This study investigated the predictive discriminant validity of the five irrational beliefs scales of the Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB) in assessing depression and anxiety in a college population. The results indicated that one scale (Low Frustration Tolerance) was a unique predictor of both depression and anxiety symptoms. In addition. two scales (Other-Directed Shoulds and Self-Worth) were found to have unique predictive associations with anxiety symptoms. However, the relationship between one of these scales (Other-Directed Shoulds) and anxiety was in the opposite direction to expectations as predicted by RET theory. Implications for theory and the external validity of these findings were discussed.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most popular forms of psychotherapy in America today is Albert Ellis’ Rational Emotive Therapy [RET (Bernard & DiGiuseppe, 1989; Ellis & Bernard, 1985)]. RET is based on the A-BC-D-E model of psychological disturbance and therapy where ‘A’ is some activating stressful life event (e.g. frustration, failure, rejection), ‘B’ refers to irrational beliefs, and ‘C’ refers to the psychological and behavioral consequences of these irrational beliefs-i.e. psychological disturbance and maladaptive behaviors. Within this framework, ‘D’ refers to the therapeutic process of disputing the irrational beliefs. while ‘E’ refers to their replacement with adaptive rational beliefs and the consequent reduction in psychological symptoms and maladaptive behaviors. One of the major assumptions of this model is that a positive relationship exists between the separate constructs of irrational beliefs (B) and psychological disturbance (C). Empirical support for this assumption has been reported in numerous correlational studies (Malouff, Schutte & McClelland, 1992; Muran. Kassinove, Ross & Muran, 1989; Muran & Motta, 1993; Nottingham, 1992; Wertheim & Poulakis, 1992; see also review by Smith & Allred, 1986). The two most widely used measures of irrational beliefs have been the Irrational Beliefs Test [IBT (Jones, 1968)] and the Rational Behavior Inventory [RBI (Shorkey & Whiteman, 1977)]. Smith and Zurawski (1983) compared the convergent correlation between the IBT and the RBI to the correlations between each of these measures and several different measures of psychological symptoms (i.e. anxiety, depression, and anger). After finding that these correlations were all very similar in magnitude, Smith and Zurawski reasoned that the IBT, the RBI, and the different measures of symptoms might all be reflecting a broader underlying variable, namely, negative trait affectivity. According to Smith (1982), one of the problems with measures of irrational beliefs like the IBT and the RBI is that some of the items have emotional content that overlaps with the item content in common measures of psychological symptoms [for example, “I get angr_y when terrible things happen at work” (Demaria, Kassinove & Dill, 1989, p. 330)]. Such overlap may artificially inflate the correlations between measures of irrational beliefs and symptoms (Smith, 1982). Recently, however, the Survey of Personal Beliefs [SPB (Demaria er al., 1989; Kassinove, 1986)] was developed to provide a measure of irrational beliefs that is not contaminated by affectivelyworded items. Test items were initially drawn from Kassinove’s (1986) Personal Beliefs Test (PBT), which was designed to assess the basic irrational beliefs presumed to underlie psychological disturbance. A content validation procedure of these items by Albert Ellis and two associates ensured that
*To whom all correspondence
should be addressed. 215
216
Edward C. Chang and Thomas J. D’Zurilla
they accurately reflected current RET principles and did not contain affective content (Kassinove, 1986). These items were then modified to further improve their representation of the most recent RET formulation of irrational beliefs (Bernard & DiGiuseppe, 1989; Ellis & Bernard, 1985). The product of these procedures, the SPB, is a Likert-type questionnaire which consists of the following five irrational beliefs scales: (1) Self-Directed Shoulds, (2) Other-Directed Shoulds, (3) Awfulizing, (4) Low Frustration Tolerance, and (5) Self-Worth. The Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales focus on uhsolutistic thinking, which is viewed as the core of psychological disturbance in current RET theory (Bernard & DiGiuseppe, 1989; Ellis, 1989; Ellis & Bernard, 1985). According to Ellis, absolutistic thinking consists of irrational beliefs that reflect the tendency of individuals to take their strong preferences for goal achievement (e.g. success, acceptance) and turn them into absolute necessities-i.e. dictatorial ‘should’, ‘oughts’, and ‘musts’. The Self-Directed Shoulds scale focuses on dogmatic shoulds that are directed toward the self, whereas the Other-Directed Should scale concentrates on dogmatic shoulds that are directed toward the environment. The remaining three SPB scales assess what Ellis (1989) hypothesized to be derivatives of absolutistic thinking which also contribute to psychological disturbance. The Awfulizing scale measures beliefs that exaggerate or ‘catastrophize’ negative or aversive life experiences. The Low Frustration Tolerance scale taps unrealistic beliefs that aversive situations cannot be tolerated (also called “I-can’t-stand-it-is”). The Self-Worth scale assesses beliefs that reflect the irrational tendency to make global judgments about a person’s total self-worth (“I am a total fool”), instead of evaluating specific behaviors or actions. The purpose of the present study was to evaluate the predictive discriminant validity of the SPB scales. In particular, we were interested in determining (a) the simple correlations between each SPB scale and outcome measures of depression and anxiety, and (b) the unique relations between each scale and outcome, controlling for the covariation among the scales. Our general hypothesis was that each SPB scale will significantly and uniquely be correlated with the two outcome measures. METHOD Subjects The Ss for this study were 284 undergraduate students, most of them first semester freshman, enrolled in the introductory psychology course at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. All Ss participated in the study in order to fulfill a course requirement. The sample included 99 men and 185 women. Their mean age was 18.7 yr. Measures Survey of Personal Belicfi JSPB). This measure was described earlier. Coefficient CISfor the SPB scales range from 0.57 for Other-Directed Shoulds to 0.72 for Low Frustration Tolerance (Demaria et al., 1989). Test--retest reliabilities (3 weeks) range from 0.65 for Awfulizing to 0.82 for Low Frustration Tolerance (Demaria et al., 1989). The results of confirmatory factor analyses (Demaria et al., 1989) supported a five-factor model that matches the logically-derived five-scale structure. In addition to these factor-analytic results, support for the validity of the SPB has also been reported by Kassinove and Eckhardt (1994) and Nottingham (1992). Lower scores on the SPB scales indicate greater irrationality. Measures qf psychological symptoms. The following measures of psychological symptoms were used in this study: the Beck Depression Inventory [BDI (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961)], and the State Index of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory [SAnx (Spielberger, 1989; Spielberger, Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970)]. The BDI is a widely-used 2 1-item self-report measure of depressive symptomatology. Ss are asked to report whether they have experienced a variety of different depressive symptoms during the past few days. The S-Anx scale is a 20-item State Anxiety scale. All of the above measures have been found to possess good psychometric properties (see references cited above). Procedure The study measures were administered in small group testing sessions held at two different time periods during the same semester. At time 1, all Ss completed the SPB. At time 2, approx. 6 weeks later, the Ss completed the following two measures in the order listed: BDI and S-Anx.
Irrational beliefs, anxiety and depression Table I. Correlations
AWF SDS ODS LFT SW M SD
among the Irratmnal
217
Beliefs Scales
AWF
SDS
ODS
LFT
SW
0. I56* 0.211” 0.487** 0.479** 22.91 5.34
0.167* 0.175s 0.098 30.97 3.59
0.050 0.101 35.74 4.19
0.430** 28.84 6.29
28.86 6.23
N = 284. AWF. Awfulking: SDS, Self-Directed Shoulds; ODS, Other-Directed LFT. Low Frustration Tolerance; SW. Self-Worth. *P < 0.01. **p < 0.001
Table Symptom
2. Correlations
measures
Depression Anxiety
between Irrational
AWF -0.217*** -0.1x9**
Beliefs and Psychological
SDS -0.045 0.035
N = 284. AWF, Awfulizing; SDS. Self-Directed Frustration Tolerance; SW, Self-Worth. *P < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
Shoulds;
Shoulds;
Symptoms
ODS
LFT
SW
0.051 0.128*
-0.240*** -0.257***
ODS, Other-Dwxted
-0.209** -0.2X1**’ Shoulds;
LFT.
Low
RESULTS The means, standard deviations, and the intercorrelations among the five SPB scales are presented in Table 1. As Table 1 shows, Awfulizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Self-Worth share a moderate amount of variance with each other (18.5-23.7%). In contrast, these beliefs have very little variance in common with Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds (0.04.5%). In fact, two of the three nonsignificant correlations in the table are associated with Other-Directed Shoulds, and the third one is associated with Self-Directed Shoulds. These results suggest that absolutistic thinking, especially the other-directed type, is virtually independent of the other three irrational beliefs. The correlations between each SPB scale and the two measures of psychological symptoms are presented in Table 2. As this table shows, Awfulizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Self-Worth are significantly correlated in the expected direction with both depression and anxiety (lower scores on the SPB indicate greater irrationality). In contrast, Self-Directed Shoulds is not significantly related to any of the symptom measures. Other-Directed Shoulds is significantly related only to the measure of anxiety, but in a direction which is opposite to predictions based on RET theory; that is, more ‘irrationality’ is associated with less anxiety. This is further evidence that absolutistic thinking, as measured by the SPB, is different from the other irrational beliefs. In order to investigate the issue of discriminant validity. we first examined the partial correlations between each SPB scale and the symptom measures, controlling for covariation among the scales. These partial correlations are presented in Table 3. Of the six original significant correlations, only four remained significant after partialing out the variance associated with the other four irrational beliefs. Three of the five scales were found to have significant unique relations to symptoms: Other-Directed Shoulds, Low Frustration Tolerance and Self-Worth. Low Frustration Tolerance continued to show significant correlations with both depression and anxiety, while Other-Directed Should and Self-Worth remained significantly correlated only with anxiety.
Table 3. Unique
Symptom Depression Anxiety
relations
measures
between Irrational Beliefs and Psychological ation among beliefs AWF ~ 0.098 ~ 0.047
SDS -0.009 0.066
N = 284. AWF, Awfulking; SDS, Self-Directed Frustration Tolerance; SW, Self-Worth. *P < 0.05. **p < 0.01.
Should?
Symptoms
controlling
ODS
LFT
0.097 0.167**
-0.119* -0.136;
ODS. Other-Directed
for covari-
SW -0.090 -0.189*’ Shoulds;
LFT,
Low
218
Edward C. Chang and Thomas J. D’Zurilla DISCUSSION
Limited support was found in this study for the discriminant validity of the five specific irrational beliefs scales that comprise the Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB). Initially, four scales (Awfulizing, Other-Directed Shoulds, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Self-Worth) were found to be significantly related to depression and anxiety. However, after controlling for the covariation among the scales, only three of the scales (Other-Directed Shoulds. Low Frustration Tolerance, and Self-Worth) were found to have significant unique predictive relations with psychological symptoms, and one of them (Other-Directed Shoulds) was in the direction opposite to the prediction based on RET theory; that is, greater ‘irrationality’ was associated with less anxiety. In general, the results of this study indicate that absolutistic thinking, as measured by the SelfDirected Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales, is virtually independent of the other irrational beliefs measured by the SPB. In addition to the contradictory findings for Other-Directed Shoulds, the results for the Self-Directed Shoulds in this study also failed to support the RET model. This beliefs scale was found to be unrelated to psychological symptoms. even hefbrc partialing out for covariation between the SPB scales. These findings can be viewed to cast some doubt on the construct validity of these two scales. One might expect the Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales to have good construct validity since Albert Ellis and associates participated in a content validation procedure designed to ensure the sampling representativeness of the PBT items on which the SPB is based (see Demaria rt al., 1989). Nevertheless, close inspection of the content of these scales reveals that the items do not reflect the same rigid, driven, dogmatic quality that Ellis emphasizes in most of his writings about absolutistic thinking (Ellis & Bernard, 1985). It may not be the specific ‘shoulds’ and ‘musts’ per se that are dysfunctional, but rather, their demanding, inflexible, obsessive-compulsive nature. This interpretation is consistent with views recently expressed by Robb and Warren (1990). These authors have recommended that test developers use the phrase ABSOLUTELY MUST, instead of the word ‘should’, when writing absolutistic-thinking items. Since this extreme absolutistic quality does not seem to be adequately represented in the items of the Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales, at least some of the items in these scales may be reflecting a sensible or adaptive commitment to values, especially the other-directed items. Such a commitment is one component of a personality triad called ‘hardiness’ (i.e. challenge, control, and commitment), which has been identified as a moderator of stress (Kobasa, Maddi & Kahn, 1980; Kobasa & Puccetti, 1983). This would explain the unexpected direction of the relation found in this study between Other-Directed Shoulds and anxiety. However, another possibility may be that absolutistic thinking is not as important as the other ‘derivative’ irrational beliefs. Evidence supporting this interpretation comes from two recent studies. In one study, Kassinove and Eckhardt (1994) also using the SPB found limited evidence for the Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales in both a Russian and an American college student sample. Noteworthy, these investigators similarly found the Low Frustration Tolerance scale related to depression and the Self-Worth scale related to anxiety in their American sample, thus replicating the present findings. In another study, DiGiuseppe, Leaf, Robin and Exner (1988) using a different measure of irrational beliefs similarly found that low-frustration and awfulizing predicted negative emotions better than absolutistic thinking. Taken together, these findings join those of the present study in raising considerable doubt about that part of Ellis’ (1989) model which presumes that absolutistic thinking is the core causal or maintaining factor of psychological disturbance. Thus, we tend to agree with the conclusion of Kassinove and Eckhardt (1994) that researchers may benefit more by focusing on the possible greater importance of the other ‘derivative’ irrational beliefs (e.g. low frustration tolerance) than on absolutistic thinking (i.e. self-directed shoulds and other-directed shoulds) until further evidence can be found to suggest otherwise. In closing, it is important to note that the results of this study may be valid only for an unselected, non-clinical population, such as the present college student population. In some clinical samples, it is possible that the Self-Directed Shoulds and Other-Directed Shoulds scales may be more sensitive to dysfunctional absolutistic thinking tendencies. For example, in a recent correlational study focusing on 1.53 psychiatric inpatients, Nottingham (1992) found modest but significant correlations in the expected direction between the Self-Directed Shoulds scale and measures of depression and
Irrational beliefs, anxiety and depression
219
anxiety (the Beck Depression Inventory and the Beck Anxiety Inventory). However, none of the correlations associated with Other-Directed Shoulds were significant. The latter negative findings cast further doubt on the importance of other-directed shoulds in assessing the relation between irrational beliefs and negative emotions. For example, in clinical practice it is often observed that patients place more extreme and unrealistic demands on themselves than on others. Specifically, other-directed shoulds may play a relatively minor role compared to self-directed shoulds in determining and maintaining psychological disturbance in clinical populations. Acknowled~emenr-We article.
wish to thank
Howard
Kassinove
for his constructive
comments
on an earlier version of the present
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