Is adaptive co-management ethical?

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Journal of Environmental Management 88 (2008) 62–75 www.elsevier.com/locate/jenvman

Is adaptive co-management ethical? David Fennella, Ryan Plummerb,, Melissa Marschkec a

Department of Tourism and Environment, Brock University, 500 Glenridge Avenue, St. Catharines, Ont., Canada L2S 3A1 Department of Tourism and Environment, Brock University, 500 Glenridge Avenue, St. Catharines, Ont., Canada L2S 3A1 c York Centre for Asian Research, 270 York Lanes, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ont., Canada M3J 1P3

b

Received 25 March 2006; received in revised form 17 January 2007; accepted 26 January 2007 Available online 27 March 2007

Abstract ‘Good’ governance and adaptive co-management hold broad appeal due to their positive connotations and ‘noble ethical claims’. This paper poses a fundamental question: is adaptive co-management ethical? In pursuing an answer to this question, the concept of adaptive co-management is succinctly summarized and three ethical perspectives (deontology, teleology and existentialism) are explored. The case of adaptive co-management in Cambodia is described and subsequently considered through the lens of ethical triangulation. The case illuminates important ethical considerations and directs attention towards the need for meditative thinking which increases the value of tradition, ecology, and culture. Giving ethics a central position makes clear the potential for adaptive co-management to be an agent for governance, which is good, right and authentic as well as an arena to embrace uncertainty. r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Ethics; Adaptive co-management; Collaboration; Environmental governance; Cambodia; Uncertainty

1. Introduction Governance, and especially environmental governance, has gained recognition during the past 15 years. Governance emerges from the interactions of actors (e.g., state, civil), encompasses the structures and processes through which societal decisions and the manner that power is exercised, and may be formally expressed through institutions or more subtly articulated by norms (Weiss, 2000; Sampford, 2002; Lebel et al., 2006). Kofi Annan declared that, ‘‘good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development’’ (as cited in Graham et al., 2003, p. 1). With such a powerful statement, there is little wonder that good governance has gained considerable currency and is central to many international donors such as the Canadian Corresponding author. Tel.: +(905) 688 5550x4782; fax: +905 984 4843. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D. Fennell), [email protected] (R. Plummer), [email protected] (M. Marschke).

0301-4797/$ - see front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2007.01.020

International Development Agency, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Woods, 2000). Saner and Wilson (2003, p. 6) explain that positive connotations are inherent in the concept of (good) governance because it offers ‘noble ethical claims’. Lebel et al. further observe that this notion of ‘good’ includes attributes of ‘‘yparticipation, representation, deliberation, accountability, empowerment, social justice, and organizational features such as being multilayered and polycentric’’ (2006, online). Co-management is strongly connected to the notion of governance and similarly reflects strong positive connotations (see Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). Considering co-management as a governance system consisting of relational webs or networks among heterogeneous sets of actors challenges the presumption of formal (and often dualistic) power sharing agreements and directs attention to the process of problem-solving indicative of adaptive management (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). Berkes (in press) subsequently identifies ‘good governance’ as one of the seven faces of adaptive co-management. Embedded in the discourse of environmental governance and the approach of adaptive co-management is an

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important question for environmental policy makers and resource managers: is adaptive co-management ethical? In this paper we pursue answers to this question by summarizing and critiquing adaptive co-management and examining the connections between it and ethics in grappling with uncertainty. Major ethical perspectives (deontology, teleology and existentialism) are presented and the potential role for ethics in adaptive comanagement is developed through the perspective of ethical triangulation and the approach of comprehensive ethical decision-making. The case of adaptive co-management in Cambodia is considered through this integrative lens to illuminate important considerations and direct attention to the need for meditative thinking. In the conclusions we reflect upon the potential for adaptive comanagement to act as a mechanism for governance (good, right and authentic) as well as an arena to embrace uncertainty. 2. Adaptive co-management Adaptive co-management combines multiple stakeholders (e.g., the State, civil society, industry), the cooperative spirit required to address environmental challenges, and the complex systems view of the world (Berkes, 2004). Attention is directed at management that is adaptive. Adaptive management considers policies as experiments from which knowledge is incrementally gained through the feedback mechanism of social learning (cycles of action and reflection); consequently flexibility to respond to changes is enhanced (Lee, 1993; Berkes and Folke, 1998; Jiggens and Ro¨ling, 2000; Folke et al., 2002). Armitage, Berkes and Doubleday (in press, p. 2) observe that ‘‘as an emergent outcome of these conceptual frameworks, adaptive co-management represents a potentially important innovation in natural resource governance under conditions of change, uncertainty and complexity’’. Adaptive co-management is an evolving process that responds to feedback from socio-ecological systems. It occurs when responsibilities for a resource are shared by actors who participate in a process which is flexible, dynamic, and oriented towards social learning (Ruitenbeek and Catier, 2001; Folke et al., 2002; Berkes, 2004; Olsson et al., 2004). According to Plummer and FitzGibbon (in press), adaptive co-management is a process characterized by:



 

Pluralism and linkages. Multiple types of actors (government, resource users, industry) represent diverse interests and perspectives on the issue or task across various scales. Communication and negotiation. Shared understand and/or agreement develops via information sharing in which perspectives are exchanged and modified. Transactive decision-making. Decisions are reached through dialogue among diverse inputs and/or claims to multiple knowledge systems.



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Social learning. Actors undertake actions together and share the consequences of those actions (experimentation). Modifications (responses) are made as part of an ongoing and active process of reflection and reflexivity. Learning consequently may correct errors in routines (single loop), prompt examination of values and policies responsible for those routines (double loop), and bring about critical questioning of governing norms and protocols (triple loop). Knowledge accumulates and becomes engrained as part of social memory.

Enthusiasm surrounding adaptive co-management stems from the predominately positive expectations of comanagement. Plummer and FitzGibbon (2004) synthesize these outcomes to include: enhanced decision-making which encourages efficiency and promotes equity, especially through the integration of multiple knowledge systems; greater legitimization and credibility of objectives; and, enhanced capacity and empowerment at the local level. Carlsson and Berkes (2005) ask the question, what is co-management good for? While not a panacea, they assert that co-management is useful for allocating tasks, exchanging resources, linking different types and levels of organization, reducing transaction costs, sharing risks, and resolving conflict and sharing power. Adaptive co-management further increases expectations as it aims to orientate socio-ecological systems towards sustainable trajectories (Folke et al., 2002) and increase their robustness (Olsson et al., 2004). Caution has also been expressed regarding the (over) optimism of co-management as such agreements may fail to promote efficiency or equity (see Jentoft, 2000; Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004), not result in greater compliance and actually exacerbate potential conflicts (Jentoft, 2000; Zimmerer, 2000), and contribute to further social and economic marginalization which results in little power sharing (Berkes, 1994; Keller et al., 2000; Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Bryan, 2004). In a critical examination of co-management involving the Kluane First Nation, Nadasdy (2003) draws attention to subtle and non-coercive exertion of state power using Foucault’s concept of ‘‘power/knowledge’’. Nadasdy argues that land claims, and resulting co-management processes, are inherently biased because of the manner in which knowledge (largely through language) is generated and how such processes are framed or politically contextualized. His subsequent commentary cautions that if we are to take seriously the merits of adaptive management we must critically question the broader socio-political context, the stakes involved, and whose interests are being served (Nadasdy, in press, p. 16). 3. Ethics While the field of adaptive co-management has made great strides in a very short period of time, we argue that there is a critical absence of a conceptual/theoretical core

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that ought to serve as a foundation for the nexus of theory and practice in this area. What has tended to obstruct the realization of this core has been the propensity to search for new innovative terms in natural resource management that mitigate the gamut of human interaction dilemmas. Such terms include management, complexity, negotiation, prevention, mandates, consultation, homogenization, restoration, rights, rules, regulations, and the list goes on. Commenting on the manufacturing of new terminology in academe, Saul (1995) points to the creation of countless impenetrable and defensive dialects in the social sciences that suggest obscurity and importance. In cutting through the vernacular of adaptive comanagement, we argued in a companion paper (see Plummer and Fennell, in press) that at its most basic level adaptive co-management is based on a continuum of cooperation and self-interest. In constructing a metatheoretical or foundational explanation of co-management, we make a case through the sociobiological theory of reciprocal altruism that ‘‘y adaptive co-management is an evolutionary strategy tied to the very foundation of who we are, not just in terms of the organization of socially derived systems like economics’’ (Plummer and Fennell, in press). This means that cooperation, and by extension adaptive co-management, is an evolutionary strategy to insure individual fitness, as theorized by Trivers (1971) via the theory of reciprocal altruism, based on the work of Hamilton (1964). Ethics are a function of human nature. Employing the theory of reciprocal altruism, Pinker (2002) writes that emotions such as sympathy, trust, gratitude, loyalty, guilt, shame, anger, and contempt all evolved to make us both social and moral—observations not lost on Mayr (1988) who noted that reciprocal altruism is the basis of both emotions and ethics. And yet biology (nature) is only part of the dialogue when seeking to explain human behaviour. Keiffer argues that ‘‘systems of ethics are the product of human wisdom and experience of human beings living together and not the expression of genes. Though a rational system of ethics cannot be independent of evolution, neither can a system of ethics be derived directly from evolution (1979, p. 21). It is knowledge from the new sciences (e.g., evolutionary psychology, behavioural genetics) that have established the intricate link between genes and culture and therefore the need to recast the debate in terms of nature via nurture (Ridley, 2003; Fennell, 2006). Both cooperation and ethics are fundamental to human nature. Therefore we explore the close connection between adaptive co-management and ethics as we grapple with the contemporary realities of environmental management. Rapid change, inherent complexity, substantial uncertainty, and frequent conflict are pervasive realities of the environmental management domain (Gunderson, 2003; Mitchell, 2004, 2005). Dealing with complexity and uncertainty (as outlined by Gunderson, 2003) is the raison d’eˆtre for adaptive co-management. It aims to address different types of uncertainty (e.g., social uncertainty,

technical uncertainty) by dynamic learning, foster collaboration among groups that usually tackle each type (e.g., technical and expert, political, stakeholder-citizen) and integrate their activities via cooperative management (Olsson et al., 2004; Folke et al., 2005; Armitage et al., in press). Adaptive co-management therefore offers an arena in which uncertainty might be successfully embraced, as called for by Gunderson (2003). Despite these attempts to address uncertainty, serious dilemmas remain in adaptive co-management. Should dynamic learning be fostered through active and careful experimentation (Garaway and Arthur, 2004; Walker et al., 2006), permitted to emerge from complex systems (Ruitenbeek and Cartier, 2001) meaningfully attempted at less then ecosystem scales (Schindler, 1998), or risked in the absence of institutional memory (Olsson et al., 2004)? The social and cultural settings in which heterogeneous actors are embedded prompts questions about multiple knowledge systems, varied institutions, underlying means of communication and so on (Nadasdy, 2003; Olsson et al., 2004; Natcher et al., 2005). As opposed to conventional or state centered resource management, adaptive co-management stresses the sharing of power (vertically and horizontally) and can therefore be considered as governance (Folke et al., 2005; Berkes, in press). Folke, Hahn, Olsson and Norberg emphasize that ‘‘issues of legitimacy and accountability are stressed in the literature on governance, and good governance of ecosystems has be interpreted as solving the trilemma characterized by tensions between effectiveness, participation, and legitimacy (2005, p. 449). Ethics is central to dealing with uncertainty because it demands that we live with uncertainty, even though it is often thought to be difficult and inconvenient. This was identified by Saul (2001), who observed that corporatist societies have managed to marginalize ethics through the certainty that what they have or what they offer is correct. It is helpful to live in this comfortable existence, and the associated certainty that all is well, because it is convenient to live within the walls of conformity. Social systems concerned with the management of natural resources are not immune from this marginalization of ethics. Gunderson provides a compelling account of the inflexibility of institutions because ‘‘ythey utilize (directly or indirectly) ambiguities and uncertainties of resource issues to maintain a status quo’’ (2003, p. 42). He also documents how influential social and political interests utilize, and even manipulate, uncertainty to influence policy prescriptions. Understanding without ethics, therefore, is both a destructive and demobilizing force. If adaptive co-management is to successfully embrace uncertainty it must move beyond understanding its root dilemmas to accept and examine their inherent ambiguities. Ethics provides a pro-active mechanism for navigating the often uneasy tensions that exist between policy and application on the one hand, and various autonomous, self-interested groups on the other. To form this argument

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we summarize three ethical domains and discuss how ethical triangulation and comprehensive decision-making can be incorporated into adaptive co-management. 3.1. Deontology: right behaviour Deontological or non-consequentialist theories of ethics are those which are based upon following duties, rules, or principles—the means—as opposed to the ends, consequences or outcomes. The chief advantage of the deontological perspective is that it gives us guidance in reference to how we should behave, i.e., effective moral reasoning is founded on a sense of obligation tied strongly to such duties. It is therefore the moral principle (not necessarily the weighting that goes into moral value and non-moral value) and the importance of upholding these rules that is most important to the deontologist. Three main perspectives of the deontological domain include religious sources of ethical behaviour, secular ones, and intuition. In the case of the first, the Bible and the Koran, for example, provide followers with the guidance needed to live morally successful lives. Secular sources of deontological guidance come in the form of social contracts and include codes of ethics and various Charters and Bills of Rights, all of which exist as norms that can be adopted by the group. The adoption of these societal norms is premised on the requirement of the citizenry to do so in a voluntaristic and consentual way, and by individuals who are acting in rational ways. Reasoned intuition was championed by Immanuel Kant, who argued that ethical rules should be rendered universal. By following well founded rules or ‘imperatives’, good outcomes would quite naturally unfurl. As rational beings, Kant argued, we have the ‘intuitive’ ability to reason and perform complex tasks, along side the need to do what is deemed best for society on the whole. The disadvantages of following a uniquely deontological pathway are that rules, principles, and duties may simply be outdated or wrong. This leads to the question of the origination of the rules and what these rules are intended to accomplish. For example, norms adopted by corrupt regimes may serve the aims of those in charge (e.g., Hitler and Stalin), but these rules fail to have the best interests of society at large. Also, restricting behaviour only to the letter of the law removes the ability to act for the purpose of achieving desired ends. Laws and rules, therefore, are not uniformly based on what is moral or ethical, but merely a function of special rules or guidelines that serve specific individuals or rather restricted purposes. 3.2. Teleology: good behaviour While deontology focuses on the proper means in achieving ethically ‘right’ decisions, teleology, stemming from the Greek word for goal or completion, focuses on the ends of our actions. While the deontologist elects to follow pre-established rules for determining what is ethically right the teleologist chooses to act according to

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what would lead to the best (‘good’) consequences.1 Two main approaches have emerged in teleology categorized as objective and subjective. Objective teleology or virtue ethics is based on behaviour that seeks good ends through the pursuit of excellence of a number of virtues (e.g., generosity, courage, and justice). In striving to be virtuous we enhance our capacity to flourish, what Aristotle termed eudaimonia. When we flourish we are not simply satisfying basic pleasures such as sex or eating desired foods, drives we share with lower animals, but rather attempting to realize our full potential as rational beings. This element of rationality was important to Aristotle, who argued that our ability to reason allows us not only to make decisions but also to make good decisions that lead to the establishment of excellence in character. Bad decisions take away from our ability to flourish. The subjectivist realm of teleology, or the pursuit of happiness as an end, is based on decisions that maximize pleasure for the individual (hedonism) as well as for the group (utilitarianism). In the case of the former, individuals strive to maximize pleasure or happiness (defined in many different capacities) and minimize pain or unhappiness. As such, the choice to participate in one activity over others, therefore, becomes a function of the level of happiness (as an end) that may be derived by comparison. In contrast, utilitarianism seeks the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number of people. How this group pleasure is measured is the subject of much debate. Jeremy Bentham argued that group happiness should be measured not on the basis of quality but rather quantity. Options were thus selected for the group on the basis of some hedonistic cost-benefit calculus consistent with our contemporary rational decision-making processes, where alternatives get weighed against selected criteria. Alternatives that maximize the intended goal (i.e., the greatest good for the greatest number) are those that represent the best choice (Fennell and Malloy, in press). Conversely, John Stuart Mill argued that decisions for the collective could not be morally ‘good’ unless they were based on a consideration of a broader social value. Two tourist attractions could be compared on the basis of the amount of pleasure they generated. Distinguishing between quantities of pleasure was left to those who were able to appreciate the value of both places. Teleological theories have been criticized by theorists on the basis of the vagueness of the ends sought. What represents the greatest good and for whom? If happiness is maximized for the majority, it must be done so in the face of minorities. This means the mild happiness of the majority may exist in the face of the severe misery of a few. Focussing too much on the ends instead of the means 1 The polarity of ‘good’ and ‘right’ is derived from the question of whether moral goodness and praiseworthiness can be understood in the context of what is right or wrong. The former is a function of the achievement of the good (e.g., through virtuous behaviour); while the latter as function of obligation. Both concepts, therefore, are said to work in opposite directions.

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places us in a position of treating people in ways that eliminate their rights. 3.3. Existentialism: authentic behaviour Being true to oneself (authentic behaviour) is the principal concern of existentialists. Although being true to oneself is arguably a subjective way of approaching the world, existentialism has broader appeal in the sense that in making decisions for ourselves we often do so for humanity and the natural world in general too. Subjectivity provides us with the ability to be free to choose outside the bounds of entrenched reason and intellect, as noted by Guignon (1986), who observes that existentialists are, ‘better equipped to evaluate different ethical standpoints and applicability to different contexts of action than the slavish rule-follower [deontologist] or the cool cost-benefit calculator [teleologist]’ (p. 88). Important in this discussion is the relevance of adhering to our own authentic beliefs in good faith and as a function of good will, instead of from some other extrinsic rationale. In this way existentialism stands apart from deontological decision making which is based on the following of rules and teleological decision making which is only concerned with the ends of consequences of actions. So in deciding to save someone who is caught in a burning building the deontologist may do so only in response to fulfilling a duty; the teleologist may do so in order to be recognized as a hero; whereas the existentialist acts in order not to violate a personal notion of human welfare. Standing outside the realm of normative ethics means that individuals can make no excuses for their own personal conduct. This means that the individual needs to be armed with sufficient knowledge in acting authentically. Existentialism has been criticized on the basis of this radical freedom. Decisions made without any tie to normative conventions suggests that the agent has little guidance in making the best choice. We are free to choose, but we might not have the necessary knowledge or information in order to choose correctly. There is also the belief that in choosing wrongly, we fail to take responsibility for our actions; an unfortunate reality that continues to pervade society. Hodgkinson (1996) stresses that existentialism has not been favoured by decision makers in business and government for fear that it breeds chaos and individualism in climates which demand solidarity, efficiency, and productivity. Agency theory posits that centrally positioned decision makers mould the preferences of employees over time. What has been characterized as ‘moulding’ includes cheating, deception, withholding information, and bounded rationality. In this regard, Jos (1988) argues that organisations erode an individual’s ability to think independently. What is at stake is the worker’s autonomy and status, independent of the mindset of the organization itself, as a chooser. Being authentic within the organization involves the willingness to act morally on the basis of one’s

own beliefs. In this way, Fennell and Malloy (in press) argue that room should be made for existentialism in institutions because even though rules and procedures are necessary components of the organization, what matters, especially to the existentialist, is if they are followed in good faith as a function of an individual’s good will. 3.4. Ethical triangulation Precedence has long been set for the integration of traditionally segregated normative ethical theories. Those who commit purely to one theoretical approach over others rule out the acceptance of decision-making that is premised on multiple perspectives. As Reidenbach and Robin (1990) have demonstrated, decision making rarely takes place from one ethical domain. It is more likely that agents employ a diverse mix of ethical views in deciding on what is the ethically correct path to follow. This perspective corroborates other research claiming that the nature and degree of contemporary interpersonal stress on individuals demands complex ethical strategies for survival (Best and Kellner, 1991). The following few examples serve to emphasize the importance of ethical integration. Not surprisingly, integration of ethical theories has tended to include deontological and teleological approaches where comprehensively ethical decisions are those which seek the best means as well as the best ends. Examples in the literature include Denhardt (1988), Hitt (1990), Guy, (1991), Chandler (1994), and Frederickson (1997). Increasingly, however, researchers have diversified attempts to arrive at truly ethical decision making by incorporating other ethical theories into models of integrated moral action. Grofalo and Geuras (1999) propose a model of comprehensive ethical decision making based on deontology (means), teleology (ends), with emphasis on virtue ethics (character) and intuitionism (humans sharing an intuitive moral sense). Their framework is designed to help practitioners unravel the moral mysteries of their environment and detect ethical clues that lead to superior policy and management clarity. Schumann (2001) has devised a moral principles framework based on five ethical theories, including utilitarianism, rights, distributive justice, an ethic of care, and virtue theory. Each theoretical perspective affords the agent an opportunity to examine ethical dilemmas from a different perspective for the purpose of arriving at morally acceptable outcomes. Although people may be generally unaware of these various theoretical domains, people quite naturally use these approaches in their day-to-day practices in seeking fair and equitable exchanges with others (Schumann, 2001). (See Fennell, 2006, for a detailed account of why sex tourism is morally wrong, through the Schumann framework.) In this paper we adopt the ethical triangulation perspective of Fennell and Malloy (1995) and the comprehensive ethical decision-making approach of Malloy et al. (2000) to adaptive co-management. As illustrated

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in Fig. 1, the outermost portion of the model is designed to stress the importance of a dynamic tension between the normative theories of deontology and teleology as well as the more introspective existentialism. In this way it is essential for decision makers to acknowledge the importance of following universal principles and duty, in addition to cultural and ecological norms. This would occur in accordance with the ability to express behaviour that seeks good ends through the pursuit of excellence in character (virtues), for the greatest good for the greatest number (utilitarianism), and for the greatest good for the individual agent (hedonism). At the same time, however, notions of what is ethical should be examined by the agent against a backdrop of what is morally correct based on one’s own beliefs. So while rules and procedures and good ends for the collective are important, decisions must be made in good faith and as a function of good will. This freedom to choose, however, must come packaged with self-awareness and knowledge, as it is essential that existentialists take responsibility for their actions or inactions.

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The comprehensive approach to ethical decision-making recognizes the importance of moderators (Malloy et al., 2000; Fennell, 2006). Moderators intercede the three ethical perspectives outlined above, present an array of influences that act on the decision making process of individuals, and highlight the cognitive process of moral reasoning (Fennell, 2006). As illustrated in Fig. 1, moderators include: external contextual factors which frame the situation; organizational surroundings and climate in which the individual participates; significant other moderators (e.g., family, friends, etc.) which hold meaning to the individual; issue-specific considerations which temper the severity to the individual (e.g., magnitude and immediacy of consequences, distance, normative consensus); and, individual characteristics and values (Malloy et al., 2000; Fennell, 2006). In adapting the comprehensive ethical decision-making approach to adaptive co-management it is important to recognize that the three ethical perspectives and the nested moderators apply uniquely to all actors involved in the adaptive co-management agreement. For this reason,

External moderators Organization moderators Significant other moderators Issue-specific moderators de

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Fig. 1 incorporates the conceptualization of adaptive comanagement as a governance system involving networks of multiple heterogeneous actors across various scales which solve problems, make decisions and initiate actions (see Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). In following the conventions established by Carlsson and Berkes (2005), we use different lines (solid, dashed, dotted) to illustrate how actors (several actors within one type and multiple types) may be connected to one or more of the central features of adaptive co-management (experimentation, collaboration, power sharing), the potential for each actor to play a different role or function at specific times within the network, and the possibility for the content and intensity of these relations to vary. It is through the process of interaction that actors involved in the governance system may consider each of the ethical perspectives, the specific circumstances surrounding the issue and ultimately gain an appreciation for ambiguities from experimentation, collaboration and power sharing. 4. Adaptive co-management in Cambodia through the Lens of Ethics In this section of the paper we present experiences with adaptive co-management in Cambodia as a reflective narrative and examine ethical considerations therein. Specifically, we focus on the decisions and actions associated with adaptive co-management made within a governance system, and the situational circumstances surrounding those involved. We then employ the lens of ethical triangulation to examine the Cambodian case study from the perspectives of deontology, teleology, and existentialism. This case highlights the challenge of employing just one ethical perspective and the need to foster reflective thinking. 4.1. Adaptive co-management in Cambodia Cambodia is a (post)conflict society, transitioning towards a market-based economy (EIC, 2005). Its relatively tumultuous history is punctuated by the Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s and the Vietnamese occupation in the 1980s. Cambodians continue to be impacted by these events, including living with disabilities resulting from landmines and other weapons (de Walque, 2006) and experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder. The Cambodian government began working on state reconstruction after the first democratic election in 1993. Nonetheless, only 20 years after the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge have administrative reforms began to emphasize decentralized, local democracy (Blunt and Turner, 2005). Ranked 130 (of 177) on the Human Development Index (HDI, 2005), the latest (2004) national household survey found that approximately 35% of Cambodian’s live under the poverty line, with the highest poverty rates occurring in rural areas (World Bank, 2006). Just over 70% of the population over 15 years old pursues agricultural activities

which include forestry and fisheries-related activities (MoP, 2002) that are critical livelihood strategies for most rural Cambodians (Marschke, 2005). Cambodia’s once plentiful natural resources have drastically declined during this ‘transition phase’ due to government policies of ‘extracting maximum economic rent’, exploiting timber and fish exports, and often converting forests for agriculture (rice or rubber) production (Sunderlin, 2006; Ratner, 2006). Rice, fish, timber and rubber are among Cambodia’s few major exports. Partially in response to such declines (by 1997 only 450,000 ha of flooded forest habitat remained compared with one million ha of flooded forest found in 1973), a handful of donors and non-governmental organizers (NGOs) worked with government departments and villagers to introduce resource management pilot projects in the 1990s (Marschke, 2005; Sunderlin, 2006). By 2000 the notion of community based management (initially with an emphasis on forests) appeared to be a ‘good idea’ (perhaps a combination of technical and budgetary constraints confronting government departments, the emergence of protests over resource loss, and a pervasive donor culture that emphasizes ‘the local’) (Marschke, 2005; Ratner, 2006; Sunderlin, 2006). Other than through project documents, the successes and failures of these initial pilot projects were never carefully monitored by government agencies, NGOs or researchers. In addition to other reforms, the Royal Government of Cambodia initiated substantial policy reforms aimed at community-based approaches in forestry, fisheries and protected areas. In a series of subsequent decisions (acknowledging that existing codes were outdated), community fishery and forestry policies were approved (2005 and 2003 respectively). Under these policy decisions degraded forest areas were designated to communities; the 2001 Fisheries Reform lead to the release of 56% of fishing lots in the Tonle Sap Lake for community management (Sunderlin, 2006; Evans, 2002); and technical departments were to be restructured. In the case of the Department of Fisheries, a Community Fisheries Development Office was created along with provincial Community Fisheries Units (Levinson, 2002; Ratner, 2006). There has also been a proliferation of community-based initiatives that have taken form, e.g., from a handful of local fisheries committees in the 1990s to more than 500 in 2006. Community based approaches fit within an overall development context that supports good governance, decentralization and poverty reduction processes. For example, while the fisheries reform resulted from a directive from the PM rather than wider fisheries policy dialogues (Sokhem and Sunada, 2006), this directive was in line with other administrative reforms. In Cambodia, processes involving multiple actors including community members and state agencies are given various names i.e., community fisheries, community based management, or co-management (Ratner, 2006; Marschke and Berkes, 2006; Resurreccion, 2006). We argue that the Cambodian experience with

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community-based management can be understood within the rubric of adaptive co-management. Our argument follows from Marschke and Nong (2003) whose analysis of one community-based resource management project suggests that the ability to be adaptive may be a key ingredient in successful resource management practice. Resource management processes may include cross-scale governance (both horizontal and vertical), and include various community strategies to deal with dynamic resource issues. This is particularly true for those resource management committees that are deemed ‘successful’: they have connections to provincial and national organizations (technical departments and/or NGOs) (Marschke and Berkes, 2006). Throughout Cambodia, villagers and technical staff do negotiate and work on a variety of resource management issues, although experiences and practices vary greatly. Lessons from one inter-governmental team working within mangrove estuary communities for nearly a decade on the Thai-Cambodian border shed insights into the practice of resource management2 This team supports villagers in addressing their resource management issues—villagers began in the late 1990s by discussing key problems, considering various options, and formulating tentative management plans. Formal elections at the village level lead to the selection of managerial committees, who subsequently facilitate (initially with outside support, now on their own) a more refined discussion of the management plan (Marschke and Nong, 2003). Specific plans lead to implementation of actions: a strategy was adopted to start with less controversial activities to garner broader community acceptance (e.g., mangrove replanting, mangrove nursery, environmental education-related activities). Mangrove replanting takes place annually, and areas have been selected to protect critical breeding grounds for aquatic species and to protect sea grass beds. In addition, older committees are in the process of working with other villages in the area to solve resource conflicts through various ecosystem management approaches (for detailed information on this approach, see Marschke (2005)). More controversial actions (e.g., patrolling activities, lessening illegal harvesting, changing waste management practices) were slowly introduced by committee members. In the case of patrolling and lessening illegal harvesting activities near a village, the committee has asked those partaking in these illegal activities to shift their livelihood strategies. This takes time, and is sometimes met with resistance by government officials supporting illegal activities through rent-seeking. Instituting a new system of waste management—in essence changing the norms of the community—has also been a function of time, but also innovation through the implementation of an environmental education campaign (Marschke and Sinclair, under 2

Canada’s International Development Research Center has supported this inter-governmental team through three project phases. This is quite rare, and most likely contributes significantly to the success of this work.

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review). Fuelled by ever-declining resources and a successful mangrove replanting campaign that has resulted in an increase in crabs in the area, it appears that ‘buy-in’ for this approach from many villagers, local officials and police is mounting (Marschke and Berkes, 2006). It also helps that Cambodia’s shifting policy context supports decentralization and local resource management work.3 Longer-term analysis of this process suggests that resource management committees, local officials and government counterparts need to have a degree of autonomy and flexibility in deciding how to implement their work if it is to be successful4 (Marschke, 2005). For example, according to management regulations, committee members need to stand for re-election every three years. In the case of the aforementioned committee (the most active committee in the area), it has been argued that they could not afford to risk holding a village-wide election as rentseeking officials and villagers partaking in illegal activities would nominate and elect villagers with less of an environmental ethic. Elders and villagers concerned about village enhancement currently sit on this committee (this committee is seen as the ‘big brother’ in the area since they are able to resolve inter and intra village conflict) (Marschke field notes, 2006). An open-forum village meeting was held, with committee members explaining their rationale and asking for objections. Of the seven committee members, two were replaced through a nomination and election process, while the rest continued on for another term (the village head approved this process) (Marschke field notes, 2006). Examples of ‘practice’ that differ from the rules and regulations found in management plans are abundant. Committee members are faced with this dilemma time and time again when working on resource management issues. Rather than being concerned with the violation of blueprint plans and programme rules of fisheries management, a more iterative way of implementation has been developed to work within existing capacities and balance the need for authority (Resurreccion, 2006). In the case of fishers, there is often a rule related to how much thieves should be fined for steeling gear. Consider how the committee solved the following problem:

3 Most of these committees fall within a protected area, yet the community-based protected areas sub-decree is only in draft form. For now, these committees are connected to provincial and national actors which secure them informal rights to local resource management (the Provincial Governor and Minister of Environment have signed off on local management plans). Nonetheless, these are fishing communities so while they fall outside of the fisheries domain, they tend to loosely adhere to community fisheries regulations and network with other fishing communities (and in this sense take advantage of the 2001 Fisheries Reform). 4 It is beyond the scope of this paper to present an analysis of why this one area has been afforded such autonomy. Three factors include strong local leadership, strong technical support within the national Ministry of Environment, and consistent funding.

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A fisher lost traps, on the other side of the estuary [mangrove area across from the village]. We tried to solve this with the police. The person who stole the traps lived outside the community. We wanted to fine this person but they did not have any money. So, we went to their home and brought back some luggage and some cups since he is a thief. Everyone agreed that this was fair (Committee Member, April 2004 as noted in Marschke and Sinclair, under review). According to local norms, the decision to take a few belongings from the thief was more ethical than the regulations which stated that the thief should be fined 500 B (USD 12.5) per trap. Committee members felt that the thief could not afford to pay the entire fine as this would significantly increase their debt. Taking a few belongings was felt to be the right punishment by all. It appears that committees that are actively negotiating their resource management practices may be the exception rather than the rule. We suggest this given the mounting critique of community based management practices in Cambodia (e.g., Ratner, 2006; Resurreccion, 2006; Sunderlin, 2006). While there is no doubt that many paper committees exist, it is also possible that many examples of committees resolving resource management issues remain undocumented or discussed in formal texts. The examples presented in this paper illustrate how complex reality is, and why negotiation is necessary (by all stakeholders involved). Policy often becomes managerial (Mosse, 2005) and engages in simplifications (Li, 1999, 2002). In Cambodia, as elsewhere, community based management practices have been translated into legal frameworks and program initiatives which make rights conditional upon particular forms of social organization (i.e., a formal resource management committee, management plans, managing a bounded area) and conservation outcomes (i.e., creating fish sanctuaries, tree replanting). There is an assumption that people will observe ‘rules and regulations’ once these are articulated and approved despite existing practices and norms (Resurreccion, 2006). Moreover, cultural dimensions are often glossed over in the name of good governance and participation. Social relations in Cambodia occur within an authoritarian and hierarchical power structure where social stratification remains an important basic cultural value (Ebihara, 1968; Marston, 1997; Ayres, 2000). In this sense, planning may be meaningless if people do not believe that their plans are supported by a neak thom (big person), regardless of the quality of the plan or what the law says (Marschke, 2005). Recent commentaries on the Cambodian experience question the utility of such policy reforms for solving resource issues without appropriate support at provincial or local levels (Sunderlin, 2006). This suggests that (although critics continue to argue that if the policy context is ‘right’ the rest will follow) key actors at multiple levels need to ‘buy in’ to supporting resource management practices, as the case of the mangrove-estuary committee illustrates.

Some critics argue that the Cambodian government is not genuinely committed to supporting local resource management practices, lacking administrative capacity and political will (Sunderlin, 2006; Ratner, 2006). Blunt and Turner (2005) go further and observe that decentralization in Cambodia is often pragmatically motivated to procure short-term gains by responding to the agenda of donors. An intricate set of rules, roles and rights with competing sets of claims exists in fisheries management (Resurreccion, 2006), not only in the Tonle Sap with its significant commercial interests but also in coastal waters. This is true in forest areas too. Unless the ‘adaptive’ part is integrated more often, resource governance as often practiced in Cambodia may remain blind to the nature of complex, social dynamics and conditions in resource allocations (Resurreccion, 2006). Given the lack of systematic analysis of local resource management practices, it remains unclear if policy reforms and associated processes are enhancing livelihoods or addressing resource issues. In the case of mangrove-estuary communities, the general perception of most community members in this process is that working on resource management issues does enhance daily life (Marschke and Berkes, 2006). Yet, for other communities the introduction of resource management rules and regulations has created confusion and challenged ongoing ‘norms’ and ‘rules-inuse’ (both in terms of drawing on local ecological knowledge or the continuation of rent-seeking and illegal practices). Some argue that policy reforms have lead to a proliferation of illegal activities (Ratner, 2006), although it is nearly impossible to trace this. Outcomes of decentralized resource policies and experiences with adaptive co-management experiences in Cambodia are just beginning to emerge. In addition to the few detailed papers focused on committee practices (e.g., Marschke and Berkes, 2005; Marschke and Sinclair, under review), analysis of community based management appears to be policy oriented (granted there is plenty to critique here), drawing on short field visits or reports (e.g., Ratner, 2006; Sunderlin, 2006; Resurreccion, 2006), practitioner focused (e.g., CBNRM LI case studies; GTZ reports; FAO-Siem Reap material) or ‘quick and dirty’ evaluations (e.g., FACT, 2002; Oxfam reports). However, what is never questioned is if such a policy approach could ever meet its intended outcomes and really support local practice (Mosse, 2005). This is where practitioner reports and ethnographic research could be insightful. 4.2. Ethical perspectives of adaptive co-management in Cambodia The purpose of implementing adaptive co-management is presumably to increase the well-being of people in association with the communities in which they live, and secondarily to conserve natural resources. Here we examine the above case of adaptive co-management in Cambodia from the ethical perspectives of deontology, teleology and existentialism.

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Right behaviour in Fig. 1 is characterized as action that is subject to universal principles and duty, cultural and ecological norms, as well as law. In Cambodia there is a strong reliance on policy largely to the exclusion of other deontological perspectives. Policies, often influenced by international donors, are enacted without an appreciation for the varied social-ecological characteristics found throughout Cambodia. In part, this is because of security issues which, until the late 1990s, made it nearly impossible for policy-makers to travel around much of the country. As such, newly created resource management policies tend to be managerial and too simplified to adequately handle the ‘on the ground’ reality of overlapping rules and responsibilities found in many social-ecological systems (e.g., Tonle Sap, coastal waters, and forested regions). Especially pronounced in the Cambodian case is the disjuncture between formal laws and cultural norms; a disjuncture found throughout the Global South. While policy directions are aimed at fostering decentralization, social relationships in Cambodia remain authoritarian and hierarchical (this is not to suggest that culture is static; culture is constantly being (re)negotiated and (re)imagined). All moderators (external, organizational, significant other, issue-specific, individual) appear to hold influence as appropriate support is critical for adaptive co-management practices, such as in the example of the mangrove-estuary committee. Consequently, practice differs considerably from the rules and regulations set forth. The propensity to subscribe to local norms is illustrated in the case of stolen fishing gear. Here, committee members subscribed to local norms (ignoring the rules and regulations) and tailored consequences to the specific situation with an appreciation for the reality of the individual (thief) in question. We should also recognize that policies, and the fetish behind an over-reliance on policy, are merely documents that have no memory; while the people who must live by them do (Saul, 2001; Fennell, 2006). This is a rather blunt way of suggesting that laws and policies are not always moral, and why ethics needs to stand apart as a benchmark for what is deemed morally acceptable in society. Questions should also be raised here about relativistic notions of morality. It might also be that there are universal rights that must be considered in the development of regional policies in ensuring the best for the people these directives supposedly serve. The UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a social contract, provides clear leadership in this area5 The necessity of an examination of rights at the outset of human socio-economic interactions is discussed by Schu5 Rights can be discussed in the context of a duty owed, from an intrinsic standpoint, to an agent (the right-holder) in supporting the agent’s important interests. Rights are often supported by social contracts, where there is a duty or burden that should be assumed by a duty-bearer (e.g., such as government). Rights may also be considered from a utilitarian perspective where duties are owed to individuals not necessarily from an intrinsic standpoint, but rather from an extrinsic perspective in maximizing group utility (happiness), where rights may be ignored or rejected depending on the desired consequences of institutional action.

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mann (2001), who poses the following key question: What action does one have the moral right to take that protects the rights of others, and that furthers the rights of others? This is further broken down into the following subquestions: (1) Do you have the moral right to take the action in question? (2) What moral rights do other stakeholders have? (3) Are there conflicts between your moral rights and others? (4) Which take precedence? Clearly there may be conflicts between the rights of outside influencers and the rights of local people. Even if policies developed by the former have been implemented with concern for the protection of the latter, they may actually be harmful. An intriguing example is how the resource management committee is not willing to hold elections after their threeyear term is complete, as mandated in their management regulations. An issue-specific moderator (the risk of electing individuals who would support illegal activities) influenced the committee to forego the agreed upon management regulations and in turn limit the rights of others to stand for election. Approval for this process by the head of the village (along with the fact that other moderators chose to turn a blind eye to the committee not following their own regulations (e.g., the government team working with this committee)), further underscores the challenges of adaptive co-management in Cambodia from the deontological standpoint. A dedicated approach to the examination of the spectrum of principles and norms would prove useful in helping to decide which policies are appropriate for adaptive co-management in Cambodia. The second dimension of Fig. 1, teleology, suggests that good behaviour is a function of virtue, the greatest good for the greatest number, and the greatest good for the individual—all of which lead to the supposed best consequences. In deciding what is the most virtuous (i.e., the pursuit of excellence manifested through decision making that allows us to flourish) course of action, decision makers must ask: what actions display the most virtuous character traits over others? In this regard, the virtuous decision maker would, for example, take policy actions that are seen to be more benevolent than malevolent, or based on the interests of the public good rather than themselves or their colleagues. This case study is illustrative of a situation whereby the achievement of the greatest good for the greatest number and the greatest good for the individual may be both supported and seriously challenged. The substantial policy reforms and experimental program initiatives undertaken by the Royal Government of Cambodia may represent a genuine commitment to emphasizing local democracy and a concerted attempt to foster decentralization. Here the greatest good for the individual could be strengthened as individuals have a greater amount of influence (power) over resources via participation in the resource management committee, such as in the example of the mangrove estuary community. Placing a strong emphasis on conservation (not preservation) outcomes (e.g., fish sanctu-

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aries, tree replanting, considering various livelihood options) is vitally important for the majority of Cambodians who pursue livelihood strategies involving these resources, the nation in terms of exporting capacities of these products, and the ecosystem functions to which they contribute. However, compelling evidence from the case study seriously challenges the idea that adaptive co-management in Cambodia increases the greatest good because attempts at decentralization and conservation have come packaged with the wrong set of values and motives. If we are to achieve something close to the proper ends from the utilitarian perspective, Schumann (2001) argues that the following questions must be examined: (1) Who are the stakeholders? (2) What are the alternative courses of action? (3) For each alternative, what are the benefits and costs? (4) Which alternative creates the greatest level of benefit and least costs? The truth behind these questions may be constrained by the deep-rooted powers that decide on alternatives, the weighting of costs and benefits, along with the methods of evaluation. As foreshadowed in the synopsis of this case, what is fronted as the greatest good for the greatest number in practice might simply be a guise—over the short term—for the purposes of covering past practices (extracting maximizing economic rent), overcoming technical and budgetary shortfalls and procuring more international support. Paramount among external moderators appears to be the influence of donor support on policy decisions by the Cambodian government. Organizational moderators also appear to hold considerable sway. Despite the restructuring of technical agencies described in the case, the capacity and political will therein has been critically questioned (Ratner, 2006; Sunderlin, 2006). The climate within the government itself is uncertain towards this end; as illustrated in the example of officials rentseeking via illegal activities. Considering the low salaries of government workers, US$ 40 per month, it is hardly surprising that rent seeking is nearly an accepted norm! Further challenges arise from the teleological perspective as these experimental policies do not create the greatest good for the individual. For example, Ratner (2006) documents the frustrations of a local village leader who explained that under the old lot system he knew who to pay to fish but the new community system has lead to a proliferation of rent seekers with questionable legitimacy. In some cases, power has shifted to new actors through such policies (i.e., a resource management committee) leading to frustration for certain individuals (i.e., those whose power has been diminished or those that are marginalized by such processes). The third ethical perspective in Fig. 1, existentialism, has important implications for adaptive co-management in Cambodia because practice has tended to proceed in an iterative fashion which displaces authority for authenticity. Throughout the above case study examples are given (e.g., election processes, punishment for lost traps) where

self-determination prevails and serves an important adaptive and learning function. Organizational moderators (committee members, in this case) are critical here in terms of their ideology (environmental ethic) as well as subscription to local ethical norms. This also raises cautions about the ability of individuals to exercise free-will within such resource committees. Perhaps the one person to potentially exercise free-will is the committee leader whose vision and leadership qualities appear to make the difference of a committee that is seen as doing the right thing compared to a committee that is not accepted by villagers (Marschke, 2005). Policy reforms and the accompanying proliferation of regulations are challenged from the existential standpoint because they restrict an individual’s right or freedom to choose. In translating management practices into laws and programs, free choice fades and rights become a provision of prescribed organizational forms (e.g., resource management committee) and outcomes (e.g., conservation measures). In the example of the mangrove estuary community attempts to control behaviours are overt and include patrolling and educational campaigns. Concerted efforts to shift livelihood strategies raise questions about the denial of free will. The decision to accept or abide by policies and laws can be made in good or bad faith. In good faith, the individual will consider the policies or norms, assess both their validity and resonance by their own value set, and follow them if s/he can: (1) be true to her- or himself, and (2) act as an agent of the body who has set forth these directives. Reflecting upon the lessons from the mangrove estuary adaptive co-management experience, we see that accepting actions (e.g., replanting, changing waste management practices) and changing norms takes time (Marschke and Sinclair, under review). Significant other, issue-specific and individual moderators influence the extent to which individuals are willing to act as agents for the resource committee; reinforced in this example by increases in the amount of crabs, reductions in illegal activities and resolution of conflicts. In bad faith, however, an individual may abide by the directives outside the authentic self, but only because they have been instructed to do so. It is conceivable, therefore, that individuals may have chosen to follow the guidelines in bad faith or simply elected not to follow them at all, because of incongruence with the authentic self. This is evidenced by the fact that illegal fishing continues, with the justification around maintaining or improving the well being of one’s family (Ratner, 2006). To be true to oneself (and family), therefore, it is necessary to fish illegally. Poverty sometimes forces choices that would otherwise not be made. The problem with adhering to just one ethical perspective, and thus ignoring the possibility of triangulating ethical thought, is that it creates the false illusion of certainty. Ethical triangulation helps us to think in more of a meditative fashion through the examination of an issue from many different perspectives. Heidegger (1966, as

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discussed in Fennell and Malloy, in press) contrasted meditative or reflective thinking (perceived to be less functional—not so obsessed with productivity and the end product—and more difficult, demanding that we look outside the very narrow and flattened options that are possible within an agency), with calculative thinking (based on efficiency, logic, productivity, functionality, and science). By thinking reflectively, we open the possibility of appreciating the importance of tradition, ecology, and culture beyond the immediate short-term cost-benefit calculation inherent in utilitarian thought. The tool becomes even that much more powerful in the hands of several stakeholders working together towards a desired goal. In comprehensive ethical decision-making actors who constitute the governance system identify the dilemmas of adaptive co-management (policy experiments, power sharing, and collaboration), discuss their different perspectives on these issues, and ultimately arrive at informed actions. The comprehensiveness and interactive nature of this process is the critical hinge because it assures consideration of multiple perspectives and situational circumstances (Malloy et al., 2000; Fennell, 2006). Experiences gleaned from Cambodia provide evidence that this process takes time, but when the consortium of actors who constitute the governance system incorporate ethics into their approach to decision-making (e.g., the mangrove estuary communities along the ThaiCambodian border) governance that is good, right and authentic can be achieved. Experiences documented in the case study (Section 4) also demonstrate that in the absence of such consideration, the ambiguities and tensions between policy and autonomous groups remain extensible and the effectiveness of adaptive co-management as a resource strategy remains unclear. Ultimately, adaptive co-management as a system of governance is richly textured and caution should be exercised in arriving at a priori judgements about its goodness, rightness or authenticity. 5. Conclusions In looking beyond the vernacular of adaptive comanagement we come to understand that human nature (biology and culture) compels us to cooperate and to be ethical (Plummer and Fennell, in press). Politics and economics are, to use Aldo Leopold’s phrase, formats of ‘‘advanced symbiosis’’ because they add ethical content to cooperative undertakings. Leopold (1966) astutely predicted that cooperative mechanisms would increase in complexity with greater population density and efficiencies, a point which Saul (2001) reinforces on a considerably grander scale. Adaptive co-management is receiving considerable attention because it purports to deal with complexity and uncertainty by learning from experimentation, fostering collaboration and sharing power. And yet, much uncertainty remains (as outlined in Section 3) around each of these root dilemmas. The implicit and limited treatment of ethics in comanagement is perplexing given that governance is a

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function of human nature, and de facto subject to a wide range of ethical considerations. Nadasdy (2003, in press), a noteworthy exception in this dearth of literature, starts to ask important questions concerning the social-political context in which co-management operates and the specific interests being served. In this article we have extended the breath and depth of this discourse by clarifying the connection between adaptive co-management and ethics and conceptually integrating their functions, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Applying the lens of ethics to the case of adaptive comanagement in Cambodia illuminated numerous specific challenges. It also highlighted the problem of adhering to only one ethical perspective. In this particular case utilitarian, i.e., ‘good’ reasoning, which is also highly democratic, might simply contribute more to the calculative thinking mindset and an overemphasis on legalized mechanisms in the absence of a genuine commitment to proper means and the free will (authenticity) of individuals. Consequently, adaptive co-management, without ethics, may simply be window dressing for well-established dilemmas of power and ultimately livelihoods. Gunderson (2003) asserts that few arenas exist that appear to successfully embrace uncertainty. Adaptive co-management has the potential to be such an arena if the ambiguities inherent in the approach are acknowledged and examined by the actors involved. Our main assertion in this paper is that ethics needs to be a fundamental concern for adaptive comanagement. Arriving at a proper (ethical) decision or action requires examining various perspectives and making an informed choice in light of the alternatives and situational circumstances. As a governance system, adaptive co-management provides a promising mechanism by which multiple perspectives (ethical triangulation) could be considered by many different actors. As participants discuss these fundamental ethical questions through meditative or reflective thinking, adaptive co-management becomes an agent of governance which is good, right, and authentic as well as an arena in which uncertainty can be embraced. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions. Marschke’s research began at the NRI, University of Manitoba and is supported by the International Development Research Center (IDRC) and the Challenges of the Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia project (SSHRCMCRI). References Armitage, D., Berkes, F., Doubleday, N., (in press). Moving beyond the critiques of co-management: theory and practice of adaptive co-management, In: Armitage, D., Berkes, F., Doubleday, N. (Eds.), Adaptive Co-Management: Collaboration, Learning and Multi-Level Governance. UBC Press, Vancouver, BC.

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