It's only funny if we say it: Disparagement humor is better received if it originates from a member of the group being disparaged

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 85 (2019) 103838

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It's only funny if we say it: Disparagement humor is better received if it originates from a member of the group being disparaged

T

Michael Thaia, , Alex M. Borgellab, Melanie S. Sanchezc ⁎

a

School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Australia Department of Psychology, Fort Lewis College, United States of America c School of Applied Psychology, Griffith University, Australia b

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

This paper has been recommended for acceptance by Robbie Sutton.

Three studies investigated whether disparagement humor would be received more positively if the source of the humor is part of the group being disparaged than if they are not a member of the disparaged group. In Study 1, participants examined a straight or gay source making either a disparaging joke targeting gay people or a control joke not disparaging gay people. In Study 2, participants examined a White, Black, or Asian source making a disparaging joke targeting Asian people. In Study 3, participants evaluated how generally acceptable it was for members of different social groups to make certain disparaging jokes. In all three studies, participants evaluated disparagement humor more favorably if the source belonged to the group being disparaged than if they did not. These findings uncover a conventional wisdom in the domain of disparagement humor – it is more permissible for people to make disparaging jokes about their own social groups.

Keywords: Disparagement humor Person perception Group processes Intergroup sensitivity effect

Comedian Chris Rock has built a critically acclaimed career on risqué, off-color humor predominantly centered on, and often poking fun at, Black people. When hosting the Academy Awards in 2016, however, he made a joke about Asian people that was met with backlash and upbraiding from the general public, prompting an official response from the Academy itself (Rich, 2016). For a comedian who is widely renowned and typically praised for his brand of disparaging racial humor, this incident raises the question of why this particular joke did not land quite so successfully. We propose that the answer is simple – Chris Rock may be permitted to make Black jokes, but not Asian jokes, because he is Black, not Asian. The present research explores this proposition. Humor can be a tool used to elicit laughter and amusement, decrease tension, and improve the quality of social interaction (Apte, 1987; Green & Linders, 2016; Lefcourt & Martin, 1986; Wyer & Collins, 1992). Its frequent use in tense intergroup settings (e.g., conversations about racial issues between Blacks and Whites in the U.S.) in an attempt to alleviate stress and anxiety has been long documented (e.g., Burman, 1946), and commonly takes the form of some type of disparagement humor (Zillmann, 1983; Zillmann & Cantor, 1976) – humor targeting a particular social group, typically a marginalized group, and their stereotypical traditions, appearances, and behaviors (Ford & Ferguson, 2004; Mallet, Ford, & Woodzicka, 2016; O'Connor, Ford, & Banos, 2017). ⁎

In line with the benign violations theory of humor (McGraw & Warren, 2010), disparagement humor generally elicits two simultaneous perceptions – one, that the disparaging content constitutes a social and moral violation in which a target group is denigrated, and the other, an interpretation that the disparaging content is benign, devoid of any deliberate prejudice, and intended purely for amusement (O'Connor et al., 2017; Pérez, 2017). However, the line between disparagement humor and outright disparagement is murky, and disparagement humor is sometimes misinterpreted as offensive rather than funny (Saucier, O'Dea, & Strain, 2016). The sensitive and ambiguous nature of disparagement humor incites some controversy and warrants further exploration of the contextual boundaries that determine whether disparagement humor is deemed funny or offensive (Apte, 1987; Barnes, Palmary, & Durrheim, 2001; Goldstein & McGhee, 2013; Green & Linders, 2016). According to benign violations theory (McGraw & Warren, 2010), violations only elicit humor if they are perceived as benign. In the context of disparagement humor, it is possible that certain social cues may increase perceptions of benevolence, tipping the balance to arouse humor rather than offense. The present research proposes that the group membership of the source of disparagement humor may function as such a cue. Specifically, we propose that disparagement humor is better received if the source is from the group targeted by the humorous material, rather than an outgroup member. Congruency between the

Corresponding author at: School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Queensland 4072, Australia. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Thai).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103838 Received 14 November 2018; Received in revised form 1 July 2019; Accepted 4 July 2019 0022-1031/ Crown Copyright © 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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target of the disparagement humor and the humorist's identity may lead the violation of disparaging humor to be perceived as more benign, and thus more humorous, rather than offensive. Although there is little empirical evidence to corroborate this proposition, research on the intergroup sensitivity effect (Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002) can be drawn on to support it. The intergroup sensitivity effect refers to the phenomenon whereby criticisms directed towards a particular social group are responded to more favorably when the source of the criticism is part of the targeted group, rather than an outsider (Hornsey et al., 2002). Hornsey et al. (2002) investigated Australians' responses to negative comments about Australia, varying whether the comments came from Australia (i.e., ingroup) or from another country (i.e., outgroup). Ingroup critics were evaluated more favorably than outgroup critics, and ingroup criticism was perceived as more constructive, thus eliciting less sensitivity and defensiveness than outgroup criticism. Sutton, Elder, and Douglas (2006) replicated this effect with bystanders who were not personally implicated in the criticism. Here, ingroup criticism was again responded to more favorably by bystanders relative to outgroup criticism. Lindner and Nosek (2009) further found that people were more likely to afford free speech protections to critics if they were exemplars of the group they were criticizing than if they were not. These studies suggest that it is more conventionally acceptable for people to pass judgment about groups to which they belong (Sutton et al., 2006). Although disparagement humor may not necessarily entail criticism per se, it is a similar form of intergroup communication that often denigrates or belittles people on the basis of their group membership. It is possible, then, that an effect analogous to the intergroup sensitivity effect operates in the context of disparagement humor, such that a disparaging joke may be received more favorably if it originates from a member of a social group being disparaged than from an outgroup member. Typically viewed as a moral or social violation, such humor may be perceived as more benign, and thus more acceptable, less offensive, and more humorous in this context (McGraw & Warren, 2010). It could be interpreted that the humorist has greater moral license to disparage the group to which they belong. Thai, Hornsey, and Barlow (2016) showed that people interpreted racist statements towards Asians as less malicious if the source of the statements merely had Asian friends than if they did not. It should therefore follow that people would respond more favorably to a disparaging joke if the source of the joke is an actual member of the group targeted by the joke. Preliminary evidence for such an effect of group membership in the domain of disparagement humor emerged in a study by Bourhis, Gadfeld, Giles, and Tajfel (1977), who demonstrated that Welsh participants judged disparaging humor about the English more positively if the source of the humor was English rather than Welsh. The same participants, however, judged disparaging humor about the Welsh similarly whether it originated from a Welsh or an English source, suggesting that those who are part of the group being disparaged may not differentiate between ingroup and outgroup humorists. This is unlikely, however. The analogous intergroup sensitivity effect emerged even in samples comprised completely of members of the group being criticized (Hornsey et al., 2002). Furthermore, Thai et al. (2016) showed that even Asian participants granted a White target greater moral license to make negative statements about Asian people when this target was portrayed as having Asian friends. Given that Bourhis et al.'s (1977) study assigned just 80 participants to a 2 × 2 × 2 between-groups design, it may have simply been underpowered to detect the effect. Thus, their findings would need to be corroborated with further research. A more recent study by Strain, Saucier, and Martens (2015) found that participants perceived a male source expressing an anti-female joke as marginally more sexist and less likeable than a female source posting the same anti-female joke. These effects, however, were only marginal and only demonstrated on one type of disparagement humor (i.e., gender disparagement humor). The present research builds upon the

extant literature by investigating whether disparagement humor is generally received more favorably if it originates from within the disparaged group. Across three studies, multiple types of disparagement humor – sexual orientation humor (Studies 1 and 3), racial humor (Studies 2 and 3), and gender humor (Study 3) – are examined. We also examine how the proposed effect may be qualified by the status relations between the humorist and the target of the humor (Studies 2 and 3). 1. Study 1 To explore the primary research question, Study 1 investigated people's judgments about a gay joke as a function of the group membership of the source of the joke. Gay humor is a subcategory of disparagement humor that typically targets gay people through stereotypes and derogatory labels (O'Connor et al., 2017). Participants were shown a Facebook profile which contained either a disparaging joke targeting gay people or a non-disparaging control joke, ostensibly posted by either a gay or straight source. They were then asked to rate how acceptable it was for the source to make the joke, how offensive and humorous the joke was, and how positively they perceived the source to be on a range of dimensions. It was hypothesized that, in the gay joke condition (but not the control joke condition), participants would perceive the joke and source more favorably if the source was gay than straight. Specifically, the joke would be deemed more acceptable, less offensive, and more humorous, and the source's personality would be evaluated more favorably. 1.1. Method 1.1.1. Participants An a priori power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) determined that 128 participants would be required for an 80% chance of detecting an effect equivalent to the intergroup sensitivity effect (d = 0.50) found by Sutton et al. (2006). We therefore aimed to collect at least this many participants. Participants were first year psychology students who received course credit for participation. A total of 166 students participated in the study. There was no topping up of data after initial collection. Six students failed the manipulation check and were removed from analyses. The final sample consisted of 160 participants (Mage = 21.11, SD = 6.40; 136 females, 24 males). Of the sample, 81.3% self-identified as heterosexual, 14.4% as bisexual, 3.1% as homosexual, and 1.3% as ‘Other’. The study had 80% power to detect an effect size of d = 0.44. 1.1.2. Design and procedure The study used a 2 (joke type: gay vs. control) × 2 (source sexual orientation: gay vs. straight) between-groups design. Using a paradigm similar to Strain et al. (2015) and Thai et al. (2016), participants were asked to evaluate a person based on their Facebook profile. Participants were then shown a mock Facebook profile belonging to a White, male source named Jake Miller. The profile contained limited information about the source, as well as the independent manipulations described below. Participants then evaluated the source and joke on a series of measures. In this study, we report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. 1.1.3. Manipulations Joke type. The Facebook profile contained a joke ostensibly posted by the target. Depending on the condition to which participants were randomly assigned, the joke was manipulated such that it was a disparaging joke about gay people (“Why do gay guys know so much about clothes? They spend the first decade or two of their lives in the closet.”) or a non-disparaging, control joke (“What did the Buddhist say to the hot dog vendor? Make me one with everything.”). These jokes were 2

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Fig. 1. Manipulation of source sexual orientation.

sourced from the internet. Source sexual orientation. The Facebook profile contained visual information pertaining to the sexual orientation of the source of the joke. The main cover photo depicted the source with either a female (i.e., straight condition) or male (i.e., gay condition). In both conditions, a relationship status on the profile indicated that the person pictured with the target was his romantic partner. To strengthen the manipulation, a rainbow filter was also superimposed on the profile picture in the gay condition; see Fig. 1.

judgmental?”; 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Scores were averaged such that higher scores reflected greater perceived offensiveness (α = 0.97). Humor. Four items were created to measure the extent to which participants perceived the joke to be humorous (i.e. “To what extent do you feel that this post is funny/amusing/humorous/entertaining?”; 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Scores were averaged such that higher scores reflected greater perceived humor (α = 0.98). Homophobia. Two items adapted from Thai et al. (2016) were used to measure the extent to which participants perceived the source to be homophobic (e.g. “To what extent do you think Jake Miller is homophobic/prejudiced?”; 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Scores were averaged such that higher scores reflected greater perceived source homophobia (r = 0.66, p < .001). Personality. Eight items adapted from Hornsey et al. (2002) were used to measure participants' evaluation of the source on eight personality attributes (e.g. “To what extent do you think Jake Miller is intelligent/trustworthy/open-minded/likeable/nice/respected/interesting/friendly?”; 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Scores were averaged such that higher scores reflected more favorable personality evaluations (α = 0.95). Source sexual orientation manipulation check. One item was included towards the end of the questionnaire to check whether participants recognized the source manipulation (i.e., “Was Jake Miller straight or gay?”).

1.1.4. Measures The participants provided responses to demographic questions concerning their gender, age, sexual orientation, and racial background, as well as the following measures. Acceptability. Three items adapted from Hornsey et al. (2002) were used to measure the extent to which participants felt it was acceptable for the source to make the joke (i.e. “How acceptable is it for Jake Miller to make this post?”, “How qualified is Jake Miller to make this post?”, “How inappropriate it is for Jake Miller to make this post?”; 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Scores were averaged such that higher scores reflected greater perceived acceptability (α = 0.81). Offensiveness. Four items were used to measure the extent to which participants perceived the joke to be offensive (i.e. “To what extent to do you feel that this post is offensive/insulting/distasteful/ 3

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orientation did not impact on perceived humor when a non-disparaging control joke was made, F(1, 156) = 0.19, p = .662, ηp2 < 0.01, d = 0.10, 95% CI [−0.34, 0.53]. When a disparaging gay joke was made, however, the joke was perceived to be more humorous if it came from a gay source than a straight source, F(1, 156) = 17.24, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.10, d = 0.89, 95% CI [0.43, 1.35]. Homophobia. A 2 (joke type) × 2 (source sexual orientation) between-groups ANOVA on perceived homophobia revealed a significant main effect of source sexual orientation, F(1, 156) = 28.11, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.15, that was qualified by a significant source sexual orientation × joke type interaction, F(1, 156) = 21.89, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.12. Source sexual orientation did not impact on perceived homophobia when a non-disparaging control joke was made, F(1, 156) = 0.20, p = .658, ηp2 < 0.01, d = −0.11, 95% CI [−0.54, 0.33]. When a disparaging gay joke was made, however, a gay source was perceived to be less homophobic than a straight source, F(1, 156) = 49.22, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.24, d = −1.51, 95% CI [−2.01, −1.01]. Personality. A 2 (joke type) × 2 (source sexual orientation) between-groups ANOVA on personality ratings, revealed only a significant main effect of source sexual orientation, F(1, 156) = 50.22, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.24, such that a gay source (M = 4.25, SD = 1.03) was consistently rated more positively than a straight source (M = 3.16, SD = 0.92), d = 1.11, 95% CI [0.78, 1.44]. No significant main effect of joke type, F(1, 156) = 0.01, p = .911, ηp2 < 0.01, nor source sexual orientation × joke type interaction, F(1, 156) = 3.01, p = .085, ηp2 = 0.02, emerged.

Table 1 Bivariate correlations between acceptability, offensiveness, humor, homophobia, and personality ratings (N = 160). Variable

1

2

3

4

5

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

– −0.67⁎⁎⁎ 0.53⁎⁎⁎ −0.55⁎⁎⁎ 0.62⁎⁎⁎

– −0.43⁎⁎⁎ 0.68⁎⁎⁎ −0.55⁎⁎⁎

– −0.29⁎⁎⁎ 0.50⁎⁎⁎

– −0.47⁎⁎⁎

–

Acceptability Offensiveness Humor Homophobia Personality

Note. ⁎⁎⁎

p < .001.

Filler items. The measures above were embedded among other filler items (e.g., “I would like this post.”, “I would report this post to Facebook.”). 1.2. Results Zero-order correlations between all variables are presented in Table 1. Cell means and standard deviations for all variables can be seen in Table 2. 1.2.1. Main analyses Acceptability. A 2 (joke type) × 2 (source sexual orientation) between-groups ANOVA on perceived acceptability revealed a significant main effect of source sexual orientation, F(1, 156) = 57.29, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.27, that was qualified by a significant source sexual orientation × joke type interaction, F(1, 156) = 24.60, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.14. Source sexual orientation did not impact on perceived acceptability when a non-disparaging control joke was made, F(1, 156) = 3.45, p = .065, ηp2 = 0.02, d = 0.39, 95% CI [−0.05, 0.83]. However, it was perceived to be more acceptable for a gay source to make a disparaging gay joke than a straight source, F(1, 156) = 77.57, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.33, d = 2.08, 95% CI [1.53, 2.62]. Offensiveness. A 2 (joke type) × 2 (source sexual orientation) between-groups ANOVA on perceived offensiveness revealed a significant main effect of source sexual orientation, F(1, 156) = 34.93, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.18, that was qualified by a significant source sexual orientation × joke type interaction, F(1, 156) = 13.26, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.08. Source sexual orientation did not impact on perceived offensiveness when a non-disparaging control joke was made, F(1, 156) = 2.60, p = .109, ηp2 = 0.02, d = −0.40, 95% CI [−0.84, 0.04]. When a disparaging gay joke was made, however, the joke was perceived to be less offensive if it came from a gay source than a straight source, F(1, 156) = 45.09, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.22, d = −1.37, 95% CI [−1.86, −0.88]. Humor. A 2 (joke type) × 2 (source sexual orientation) betweengroups ANOVA on perceived humor revealed a significant main effect of source sexual orientation, F(1, 156) = 10.64, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.06, that was qualified by a significant source sexual orientation × joke type interaction, F(1, 156) = 7.00, p = .009, ηp2 = 0.04. Source sexual

1.2.2. Supplementary analyses Given that the joke in Study 1 targeted gay people, we ran a set of supplementary analyses excluding participants identifying as “homosexual” (see Supplementary material). All results remained identical. 1.3. Discussion In line with hypotheses, Study 1 demonstrated that disparaging gay humor was seen as more acceptable, less offensive, and more humorous when made by a gay source than a straight source. This supported the proposition that disparaging humor would be received more favorably if expressed by a member of the group being disparaged than an outgroup member. This distinction was not observed with a control joke that did not disparage gay people. That is, it was only more permissible for a gay source to make a joke about gay people, specifically. Despite supporting the hypotheses, these results could not definitively establish that a gay joke was received more favorably when expressed by a gay man as opposed to a straight man due to the source being a part of the disparaged group alone. An alternative and potentially co-occurring explanation could be that gay men were given more leeway to engage in disparagement humor by virtue of their minority status. This is possible, given that the gay source was generally rated more positively than the straight source in personality in the current study, irrespective of the type of joke they made. Indeed, past research shows that members of low-status groups are often given license to transgress relative to members of high-status groups (Fragale, Rosen, Xu, & Merideth, 2009). In the domain of prejudice, prejudice enacted by minority group members is considered more benign than prejudice enacted by majority group members (Inman & Baron, 1996; Rodin, Price, Bryson, & Sanchez, 1990). Study 2 was designed to account for potential confounding relative status effects and extend the research question to the domain of racial humor.

Table 2 Means and standard deviations for acceptability, offensiveness, humor, homophobia, and personality ratings by joke type and source sexual orientation. Dependent variable

Acceptability Offensiveness Humor Homophobia Personality

Gay joke Gay (N = 40) 4.95 2.11 3.28 1.41 4.38

(1.35) (1.63) (1.72) (0.77) (1.03)

Control joke

Straight (N = 39) 2.27 4.40 1.97 3.12 3.02

(1.20) (1.67) (1.13) (1.39) (0.85)

Gay (N = 39) 3.80 1.90 2.24 1.68 4.13

(1.46) (1.18) (1.51) (1.26) (1.04)

Straight (N = 42) 3.25 2.45 2.11 1.79 3.30

2. Study 2

(1.37) (1.52) (1.15) (0.77) (0.97)

To explore the primary research question, Study 2 investigated people's judgments about a racial joke as a function of the group membership of the source of the joke. Racial humor is another common subcategory of disparagement humor that typically targets racial

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 4

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minority groups through stereotypes and derogatory labels (Galinsky et al., 2013; Saucier et al., 2016). Participants were shown a Facebook profile belonging to a White, Black, or Asian source, who had posted a disparaging joke targeting Asian people. This design resulted in conditions in which the source of the joke was a high-status majority outgroup member (i.e. White), a low-status minority outgroup member (i.e. Black), or minority ingroup member (i.e. Asian). This also allowed for Study 2 to disentangle the proposed group membership effect from other potentially confounding effects of status based on group membership. Participants were then asked to evaluate the source and the joke as per Study 1. In line with the results of Study 1, it was hypothesized that participants would evaluate the joke and source more favorably if the source was Asian, rather than Black or White. Specifically, the joke would be deemed more acceptable, less offensive and more humorous, and the source's personality would be rated more favorably. Study 2 also sought to explore whether evaluations of a Black source making an Asian joke would be more positive compared to a White source doing the same, thus investigating any potential co-occurring effects of the relative status of the source of the disparagement humor.

Table 3 Bivariate correlations between acceptability, offensiveness, humor, racism, and personality ratings (N = 180). Variable

1

2

3

4

5

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

– −0.73⁎⁎⁎ 0.64⁎⁎⁎ −0.63⁎⁎⁎ 0.66⁎⁎⁎

– −0.49⁎⁎⁎ 0.69⁎⁎⁎ −0.51⁎⁎⁎

– −0.44⁎⁎⁎ 0.66⁎⁎⁎

– −0.63⁎⁎⁎

–

Acceptability Offensiveness Humor Racism Personality

Note. ⁎⁎⁎

p < .001.

Acceptability was measured as per Study 1 (α = 0.88). Offensiveness was measured as per Study 1 (α = 0.96). Humor was measured as per Study 1 (α = 0.98). Personality was measured as per Study 1 (α = 0.96). Racism. Two items adapted from Thai et al. (2016) were used to measure the extent to which participants perceived the source to be racist (e.g. “To what extent do you think Jake Miller is racist/prejudiced?”; 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Scores were averaged such that higher scores reflected greater perceived source racism (r = 0.91, p < .001). Source race manipulation check. One item was included towards the end of the questionnaire to check whether participants recognized the source manipulation (e.g. “What was Jake Miller's racial background?”; 1 = White/Caucasian, 2 = Asian, or 3 = Black/African). Filler items were included as per Study 1.

2.1. Method 2.1.1. Participants An a priori power analysis determined that 159 participants would be required for an 80% chance of detecting an effect equivalent to the intergroup sensitivity effect (d = 0.50) found by Sutton et al. (2006). We therefore aimed to recruit at least this many participants. Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and given $0.40 USD credit for their participation, based on an estimated completion time of 5 min. A total of 194 people completed the study. There was no topping up of data after initial collection. Fourteen failed the manipulation check and were removed from analyses. The final sample consisted of 180 participants (Mage = 35.47, SD = 10.65; 101 females and 79 males). Of the sample, 85.0% identified as White/Caucasian American, 7.2% as Asian American, 5.6% as Black/African American, and 2.2% as ‘Other’. The study had 80% power to detect an effect size of d = 0.47.

2.2. Results Zero-order correlations between all variables are presented in Table 3. Cell means and standard deviations for all variables can be seen in Table 4. 2.2.1. Main analyses Acceptability. A one-way between-groups ANOVA revealed that source race had a significant effect on perceived acceptability, F(2, 177) = 53.02, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.38. Planned comparisons confirmed that it was perceived to be more acceptable for an Asian source to post a disparaging Asian joke compared to either a White source, p < .001, d = 1.69, 95% CI [1.27, 2.10], or a Black source, p < .001, d = 1.52, 95% CI [1.11, 1.93]. There was no significant difference in perceived acceptability between the Black source and White source, p = .394, d = 0.16, 95% CI [−0.20, 0.51]. Offensiveness. A one-way between-groups ANOVA revealed that source race had a significant effect on perceived offensiveness, F(2, 177) = 12.26, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.12. Planned comparisons confirmed that a disparaging Asian joke was perceived to be less offensive if made by an Asian source than either a White source, p < .001, d = −0.89, 95% CI [−1.26, −0.51], or a Black source, p = .001, d = −0.62, 95%

2.1.2. Design and procedure The study used a one-way between-groups design with source race as the independent variable. As in Study 1, participants evaluated a person based on a mock Facebook profile. The profile contained a disparaging, racial joke about Asian people (e.g., “China has really impressed me in the Olympics. They use the same person for every event!”). For the purposes of generalizability, participants were randomly assigned to view one of three disparaging jokes about Asian people that were collapsed over for analyses. All jokes were sourced from the internet. The race of the Facebook owner was manipulated, as described below. Participants then evaluated the source and joke on a series of measures. In this study, we report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions.

Table 4 Means and standard deviations for acceptability, offensiveness, humor, racism, and personality ratings by source race.

2.1.3. Manipulation Source race. The race of the source was photographically manipulated to be either Asian, Black, or White in the Facebook profile. The faces for each race were selected from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015), and matched on perceived age, attractiveness, and dominance. The male gender of the source was kept constant. The Asian, Black, and White source were named David Lee, Malik Williams, and Jake Miller, respectively.

Dependent variable

Source race Asian (N = 58)

Acceptability Offensiveness Humor Racism Personality

2.1.4. Measures The participants provided responses to demographic questions concerning their gender, age, sexual orientation, and racial background, as well as the following measures.

4.67 (1.58)a 3.17 (1.82)b 3.16 (1.88)a 1.98 (1.27)c 4.05 (1.26)a

Black (N = 59) 2.33 4.34 2.46 3.62 3.19

(1.48)b (1.95)a (1.79)b (1.72)b (1.25)b

White (N = 63) 2.10 (1.44)b 4.85 (1.95)a 2.04 (1.45)b 4.60 (1.73)a 2.64 (1.29)c

Note. Means within the same row that do not share the same subscripts are significantly different at p < .05. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 5

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CI [−0.99, −0.25]. There was no significant difference in perceived offensiveness between the Black source and White source, p = .142, d = −0.26, 95% CI [−0.62, 0.10]. Humor. A one-way between-groups ANOVA revealed that source race had a significant effect on perceived humor, F(2, 177) = 6.59, p = .002, ηp2 = 0.07. Planned comparisons confirmed that a disparaging Asian joke was perceived to be more humorous if made by an Asian source than either a White source, p < .001, d = 0.67, 95% CI [0.30, 1.03], or a Black source, p = .029, d = 0.38, 95% CI [0.01, 0.74]. There was no significant difference in perceived humor between the Black source and White source, p = .171, d = 0.26, 95% CI [−0.10, 0.62]. Racism. A one-way between-groups ANOVA revealed that source race had a significant effect on perceived racism, F(2, 177) = 41.12, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.32. Planned comparisons confirmed that an Asian source making a disparaging Asian joke was perceived to be less racist than either a White source, p < .001, d = −1.70, 95% CI [−2.11, −1.28], or a Black source, p < .001, d = −1.07, 95% CI [−1.46, −0.69], doing the same. A Black source making a disparaging Asian joke was perceived to be less racist than a White source doing the same, p = .001, d = −0.56, 95% CI [−0.92, −0.20]. Personality. A one-way between-groups ANOVA revealed that source race had a significant effect on personality ratings, F(2, 177) = 18.97, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.18. Planned comparisons confirmed that an Asian source making a disparaging Asian joke was rated more positively than either a White source, p < .001, d = 1.10, 95% CI [0.72, 1.48], or a Black source, p < .001, d = 0.68, 95% CI [0.31, 1.05], doing the same. A Black source making a disparaging Asian joke was rated more positively than a White source doing the same, p = .017, d = 0.43, 95% CI [0.07, 0.79].

humor is better received if it originates from within the group being disparaged, it is necessary to investigate whether it also emerges in observers' perceptions of disparagement humor targeting majority groups. Study 3 was designed to resolve this limitation and provide a full test of the proposed effect. 3. Study 3 To explore the primary research question, Study 3 investigated people's general judgments about a variety of forms of disparagement humor, as a function of the source of the humor. To account for the problems inherent in sourcing majority-directed jokes equivalent to minority-directed jokes, the study employed a different paradigm from that used in the first two studies. Here, participants were asked to evaluate how generally acceptable it was for members of different social groups to make disparaging jokes about their ingroup or various outgroups. The study was divided into three components. First, participants rated how acceptable it was for White, Black, and Asian people to make jokes targeting White, Black, and Asian people. Second, participants rated how acceptable it was for straight and gay people to make jokes targeting straight and gay people. Third, participants rated how acceptable it was for men and women to make jokes targeting men and women. Thus, this study tapped into perceptions of conventional norms regarding which groups in society are permitted to make which jokes. In line with the results of the first two studies, it was hypothesized that participants would find it most acceptable when the source was a member of the group targeted by the joke. First, participants should perceive it to be more acceptable for a White source to make jokes about White people compared to a Black or Asian source, a Black source to make jokes about Black people compared to a White or Asian source, and an Asian source to make jokes about Asian people compared to a White or Black source. Second, participants should perceive it to be more acceptable for a straight source to make jokes about straight people compared to a gay source, and a gay source to make jokes about gay people compared to a straight source. Third, participants should perceive it to be more acceptable for a man to make jokes about men compared to a woman, and a woman to make jokes about women compared to a man. The investigation of perceptions of both minority-directed humor and majority-directed humor also raised the possibility of co-occurring relative status effects. Research demonstrates, for example, that majority-directed prejudice is more permissible than minority-directed prejudice (Inman & Baron, 1996; Rodin et al., 1990). The “David and Goliath” principle (Jeffries, Hornsey, Sutton, Douglas, & Bain, 2012) posits that criticisms directed towards high-status groups are more normatively permissible than criticisms directed towards low-status groups. Thus, it was expected that status relations between the humorist and the target of the humor might qualify the hypothesized group membership effect, such that it would be weaker for majoritydirected humor than minority-directed humor.

2.2.2. Supplementary analyses Given that the joke in Study 2 targeted Asian people, we ran a set of supplementary analyses excluding participants identifying as “Asian American” (see Supplementary material). All results remained identical. 2.3. Discussion In line with hypotheses, Study 2 demonstrated that disparaging racial humor about Asian people was seen as more acceptable, less offensive, and more humorous when originating from an Asian source than either a White or Black source. An Asian source making a disparaging Asian joke was also rated more positively in terms of personality and perceived racism than either a Black or White source doing the same. Furthermore, the Black source was consistently rated similarly unfavorably as the White source in terms of acceptability, offensiveness, and humor. Only on perceived racism and personality was the Black source rated more favorably than the White source, suggesting that racial minority group members are somewhat absolved from imputations of racism and protected from negative judgments of character. Thus, the present study demonstrated again that disparaging humor is received more favorably if expressed by a member of the group being disparaged than an outgroup member, regardless of the relative status of the outgroup member. It should be noted that Studies 1 and 2 focused exclusively on disparagement humor targeting minority groups. This choice was made given that disparagement humor is traditionally and predominantly targeted towards minority groups in society (Apte, 1987). In addition, and perhaps as a result, it is difficult to find disparaging humor targeted towards majority groups that is equivalent to that targeted towards minority groups in terms of severity and impact. Furthermore, unlike minority-directed jokes, jokes about majority groups typically target subgroups rather than the group at large (e.g., “White trash” and “dumb blonde” jokes are more commonplace than jokes about Whites generally). Nevertheless, to fully test the hypothesis that disparagement

3.1. Method 3.1.1. Participants An a priori power analysis determined that 65 participants would be required for an 80% chance of detecting an effect equivalent to the intergroup sensitivity effect (d = 0.50) found by Sutton et al. (2006) using a repeated measures design. We therefore aimed to collect at least this many participants. Participants were first year psychology students who received course credit for participation. A total of 70 students participated in the study. There was no topping up of data after initial collection. Incomplete data from one participant was removed from analyses. The final sample consisted of 69 participants (Mage = 21.25, SD = 7.31; 51 females, 18 males). In terms of race and ethnicity, 68.1% identified as White/Caucasian Australian, 10.1% as Asian Australian, 6

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1.4% as Black/African Australian, and 1.4% as Latino/Hispanic Australian, 7.2% as Middle-Eastern Australian, 1.4% as Indigenous Australian, and 10.1% as ‘Other’. In terms of sexual orientation, 84.1% selfidentified as heterosexual, 11.6% as bisexual, 1.4% as homosexual, and 2.9% as ‘Other’. The study had 80% power to detect an effect size of d = 0.48.

Asian, p < .001, d = 1.15, 95% CI [0.79, 1.51], source. It was also considered more acceptable for an Asian source to make jokes about Black people compared to a White source, p < .001, d = 0.51, 95% CI [0.17, 0.85]. It was considered more acceptable for an Asian source to make jokes about Asian people compared to both a White source, p < .001, d = 1.00, 95% CI [0.65, 1.35], or a Black source, p < .001, d = 0.92, 95% CI [0.57, 1.27]. It was also considered more acceptable for a Black source to make jokes about Asian people compared to a White source, p = .002, d = 0.38, 95% CI [0.04, 0.72]. Relative status effects. To test whether the group membership effect was smaller for majority-directed humor than for minority-directed humor, two sets of analyses were conducted. First, the prediction was tested for the White/Black conditions. A difference score was calculated to quantify the magnitude of the group membership effect for White-directed humor (i.e., by subtracting acceptability ratings for Black-on-White humor from White-on-White humor) as well as the magnitude of the group membership effect for Black-directed humor (i.e., by subtracting acceptability ratings for White-on-Black humor from Black-on-Black humor). A paired-samples t-test indicated that the group membership effect was significantly smaller for White-directed humor (M = 1.16, SD = 1.61) than for Black-directed humor (M = 2.60, SD = 1.94), t = −5.71, p < .001, Mdif = −1.44, 95% CI [−1.95, −0.94]. The prediction was then tested for the White/Asian conditions. A difference score was calculated to quantify the magnitude of the group membership effect for White-directed humor (i.e., by subtracting acceptability ratings for Asian-on-White humor from White-on-White humor) as well as the magnitude of the group membership effect for Asian-directed humor (i.e., by subtracting acceptability ratings for White-on-Asian humor from Asian-on-Asian humor). A paired-samples t-test indicated that the group membership effect was significantly smaller for White-directed humor (M = 1.03, SD = 1.70) than for Asian-directed humor (M = 1.84, SD = 1.83), t = −2.96, p = .004, Mdif = −0.81, 95% CI [−1.36, −0.27].

3.1.2. Design and procedure This study combined three within-participants designs to measure how generally acceptable participants perceived it to be for members of different social groups to make certain disparaging jokes. First, a 3 (source race: White, Black, Asian) × 3 (target race: White, Black, Asian) within-participants design assessed patterns of acceptability for racebased humor. Second, a 2 (source sexual orientation: straight, gay) × 2 (target sexual orientation: straight, gay) within-participants design assessed patterns of acceptability for sexual orientation-based humor. Third, a 2 (source gender: man, woman) × 2 (target gender: men, women) within-participants design assessed patterns of acceptability for gender-based humor. In this study, we report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. 3.1.3. Manipulations and measures The manipulations of the within-participants variables (i.e., source, target) were written into the items themselves. For each combination of source and target, participants responded to two items (e.g., “How acceptable is it for [source] to make jokes about [target]?”, “How offensive is it for [source] to make jokes about [target]? [reverse-coded]”; 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely), which were averaged to form a composite measure of acceptability. 3.2. Results 3.2.1. Race A 3 (source race) × 3 (target race) within-participants ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of both source race, F(2, 136) = 20.73, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.23, and target race, F(2, 136) = 18.59, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.22, that were qualified by a significant source race × target race interaction, F(4, 272) = 81.26, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.54; see Fig. 2. This interaction was followed up by examining the effect of source race at each level of target race. It was considered more acceptable for a White source to make jokes about White people compared to both a Black source, p < .001, d = 0.72, 95% CI [0.38, 1.06], or an Asian source, p < .001, d = 0.61, 95% CI [0.27, 0.95]. There was no difference in acceptability between a Black source and an Asian source making jokes about White people, p = .074, d = 0.22, 95% CI [−0.11, 0.55]. It was considered more acceptable for a Black source to make jokes about Black people compared to both a White, p < .001, d = 1.34, 95% CI [0.97, 1.71], or

7

3.2.2. Sexual orientation A 2 (source sexual orientation) × 2 (target sexual orientation) within-participants ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of both source sexual orientation, F(1, 68) = 45.57, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.40, and target sexual orientation, F(1, 68) = 71.56, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.51, that were qualified by a significant source sexual orientation × target sexual orientation interaction, F(1, 68) = 100.36, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.60; see Fig. 3. This interaction was followed up by examining the effect of source sexual orientation at each level of target sexual orientation. It was considered more acceptable for a straight source to make jokes about straight people compared to a gay source, p < .001, d = 0.77, 95% CI [0.42, 1.12]. Conversely, it was more acceptable for a gay source to make jokes about gay people compared to a straight source, p < .001, d = 1.28, 95% CI [0.91, 1.65]. Relative status effects. A difference score was calculated to quantify the magnitude of the group membership effect for straightdirected humor (i.e., by subtracting acceptability ratings for gay-onstraight humor from straight-on-straight humor) as well as the magnitude of the group membership effect for gay-directed humor (i.e., by subtracting acceptability ratings for straight-on-gay humor from gayon-gay humor). A paired-samples t-test indicated that the group membership effect was significantly smaller for straight-directed humor (M = 1.08, SD = 1.41) than for gay-directed humor (M = 2.43, SD = 1.91), t = −6.75, p < .001, Mdif = −1.36, 95% CI [−1.76, −0.95].

White source Black source

6

Acceptability

Asian source 5 4 3 2

3.2.3. Gender A 2 (source gender) × 2 (target gender) within-participants ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of both source gender, F(1, 68) = 9.04, p = .004, ηp2 = 0.12, and target gender, F(1, 68) = 35.20, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.34, that were qualified by a significant source gender

1 White jokes

Black jokes

Asian jokes

Fig. 2. Acceptability ratings of racial humor as a function of source race and target race. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean. 7

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7 6 Acceptability

Unlike in Studies 1 and 2, the effects observed in Study 3 were not bound to specific jokes. Rather, the present study tapped into people's general perceptions regarding which groups in society are allowed to make which jokes. The study thus uncovered a conventional norm in the domain of disparagement humor– it is most acceptable for people to make disparaging jokes about their own group. This aligns with the intergroup sensitivity effect literature, which demonstrates that it is most conventionally acceptable for people to criticize their own group (Sutton et al., 2006). There were also co-occurring relative status effects at play for each category of humor. As can be observed, minority groups were generally given more license to make jokes about groups they did not belong to than majority groups were. Specifically, it was considered more acceptable for a Black source to make jokes about Asian people and for an Asian source to make jokes about Black people than for a White source to do the same. The group membership effect was also consistently smaller for majority-directed humor than for minority-directed humor across all categories of humor studied. These findings correspond with the “David and Goliath” principle (Jeffries et al., 2012) and other research that shows people are generally more permissive of the criticism and disparagement of majority groups compared to minority groups (Inman & Baron, 1996; Rodin et al., 1990). Despite these relative status effects, however, the group membership effect itself was clearly evident. While it is possible that participants may have been demonstrating expectancy effects in the present study due to the within-participants nature of the design, we argue that their responses reflect their understanding of the conventional norms regarding which groups are permitted to make which jokes. If such norms did not exist, such responses would not have emerged. Furthermore, these results were consistent with those of the first two studies, which were not affected by this issue. Again, this study supported the proposition that disparaging humor is more normatively permissible if expressed by a member of the group being disparaged than an outgroup member.

Straight source Gay source

5 4 3 2 1

Straight jokes

Gay jokes

Fig. 3. Acceptability ratings of sexual orientation humor as a function of source sexual orientation and target sexual orientation. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean.

× target gender interaction, F(1, 68) = 61.88, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.48; see Fig. 4. This interaction was followed up by examining the effect of source gender at each level of target gender. It was considered more acceptable for a man to make jokes about men compared to a woman, p < .001, d = 0.63, 95% CI [0.29, 0.97]. Conversely, it was more acceptable for a woman to make jokes about women compared to a man, p < .001, d = 0.89, 95% CI [0.54, 1.24]. Relative status effects. A difference score was calculated to quantify the magnitude of the group membership effect for male-directed humor (i.e., by subtracting acceptability ratings for female-onmale humor from male-on-male humor) as well as the magnitude of the group membership effect for female-directed humor (i.e., by subtracting acceptability ratings for male-on-female humor from female-on-female humor). A paired-samples t-test indicated that the group membership effect was significantly smaller for male-directed humor (M = 0.83, SD = 1.32) than for female-directed humor (M = 1.47, SD = 1.66), t = −3.01, p = .004, Mdif = −0.64, 95% CI [−1.06, −0.21].

4. General discussion Disparagement humor has the potential to be interpreted as offensive or humorous, depending on the conditions under which it is expressed (Saucier et al., 2016). Previous work on the intergroup sensitivity effect demonstrates that group criticism is responded to more favorably when the source of the criticism is part of the targeted group, rather than an outsider (Hornsey et al., 2002; Sutton et al., 2006). In the present research, we proposed that an analogous effect operates in the domain of disparagement humor, such that disparagement humor is better received if the source of the humor is from the group targeted by the joke, rather than an outgroup member. Findings supported this prediction. In Study 1, a joke about gay people was received more favorably when the source of the joke was gay rather than straight. In Study 2, a joke about Asian people was received more favorably when the source of the joke was Asian rather than either Black or White. In Study 3, disparagement humor in the domain of race, sexual orientation, and gender was evaluated most favorably when there was congruence between the target of the disparagement humor and the humorist's identity. Thus, a robust group membership effect emerged across all three studies, demonstrating that disparagement humor is better received if it originates from within the group being disparaged. These findings extend previous research that has only partially (Bourhis et al., 1977) or marginally (Strain et al., 2015) demonstrated this group membership effect. These findings contribute to the benign violations theory literature (McGraw & Warren, 2010) by showing that the same violations can be seen as more or less benign depending on the group membership of the source. Disparagement humor is perceived as less threatening and more acceptable coming from within the disparaged group, perhaps because

3.3. Discussion In line with hypotheses, Study 3 demonstrated that it was deemed most acceptable for a person to make jokes about a particular social group if they themselves were a part of that social group. This remained true for both minority-directed and majority-directed humor. This pattern emerged consistently for all three categories of humor studied, including race-based, sexual orientation-based, or gender-based humor.

7

Male source Female source

Acceptability

6 5 4 3 2 1 Jokes about men

Jokes about women

Fig. 4. Acceptability ratings of gender humor as a function of source gender and target gender. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean. 8

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the motivations for such humor are perceived to be different. One interpretation could be that self-referential disparagement humor is perceived as being less driven by an intention to harm the group, given that the source is a member of that group themselves. Another interpretation could be that self-referential disparagement humor is perceived as being more driven by an intention to help the group. Previous work shows that minority group members may use disparaging humor selfreferentially with the intent to re-appropriate derogatory stereotypes and slurs, lampooning rather than endorsing them (Galinsky et al., 2013; Saucier et al., 2016). If observers interpret self-referential disparagement humor accordingly, they may not only infer the absence of malign intentions, but also actively attribute positive and constructive motivations for such humor in a way that mirrors how observers positively construe intragroup criticism in the context of the intergroup sensitivity effect (Hornsey et al., 2002; Sutton et al., 2006). Future work should therefore examine both perceived negative and positive intent as mediators of the link between humorist group membership and the reception of disparagement humor to further bridge this work with the intergroup sensitivity effect literature. The possible distinction between perceived negative and positive intentions as qualitatively orthogonal mediators may also be beneficial to explore within the traditional framework of the intergroup sensitivity effect, which has, to date, implicitly assumed they are opposite ends of the same dimension (Hornsey et al., 2002; Sutton et al., 2006). That the group membership effect in the present research so closely resembles the intergroup sensitivity effect suggests they may even be one and the same. This begs the question of whether the intergroup sensitivity effect should be restricted to the domain of intergroup criticism, specifically (Hornsey et al., 2002; Sutton et al., 2006), or whether it is generalizable enough to describe a conventional norm that people adhere to when evaluating any type of potentially “sensitive” intergroup communication. If they are indeed tapping into the same phenomenon, then the findings of the present research may have theoretical implications for the intergroup sensitivity effect literature at large. For one, they would demonstrate that the intergroup sensitivity effect extends to the domain of disparagement humor. In addition, the present findings would suggest that the intergroup sensitivity effect and the “David and Goliath” principle (Jeffries et al., 2012), social conventions that have so far only been examined separately, work in tandem to influence judgments of intergroup communications. Study 2 demonstrated that, although disparagement humor was received most favorably if it originated from an ingroup member, a low-status outsider was perceived slightly more favorably than a highstatus outsider. In Study 3, the effect of humorist group membership, while present, was smaller for disparagement humor directed towards high-status, majority groups than for that directed towards low-status, minority groups. Further research should investigate whether the intergroup sensitivity effect and the “David and Goliath” principle concurrently influence judgments of intergroup criticism in the same way. Doing so may provide further converging evidence that the group membership effect demonstrated in the present research is indeed a manifestation of the intergroup sensitivity effect. Practically, the present work contributes to our understanding of contemporary culture wars over freedom of speech (Alvarez & Kemmelmeier, 2018). Central to these free speech debates is the value conflict between the need to protect people's right to freely express their opinions and the need to protect people from the potential harms of discriminatory speech (Cowan, Resendez, Marshall, & Quist, 2002). Despite the changing norms that prioritize free speech over the prevention of harm (Crandall, Miller, & White, 2018), the present findings add to the burgeoning literature that suggests the permissibility of certain speech acts still depends on contextual factors, specifically those factors that diminish perceptions of the harm caused by such speech acts. Building upon the work of Lindner and Nosek (2009), who found

that people more willingly extend free speech protections to people criticizing groups they are members of than people who criticize across group boundaries, our research suggests that people may apply the same rules to disparagement humor. Disparagement humor originating from within the disparaged group may be dismissed and afforded greater free speech protections, given that it is considered relatively inoffensive and acceptable. Our research also suggests that status relations may govern free speech protections, such that lower-status, minority individuals may be given greater freedoms to comment or joke about higher-status groups. This is consistent with Roussos and Dovidio (2018), who demonstrated that anti-gay hate speech was considered more harmful, less protected by free speech rights, and more deserving of a hate crime charge than anti-straight hate speech, at least for those low in homonegativity. Future research should investigate the downstream consequences of disparagement humor originating from within compared to outside the disparaged group. For example, prejudiced norm theory (Ford & Ferguson, 2004; Ford, Woodzicka, Triplett, Kochersberger, & Holden, 2014) proposes that exposure to disparagement humor can increase tolerance to discrimination or stereotyping of the disparaged group among those already high in prejudice. A disparaged group member making self-deprecating jokes about their own group may exacerbate these negative consequences and promote even greater tolerance of disparagement towards their group. On the other hand, self-referential disparagement humor may provide more opportunities for positive, fruitful discourse on intergroup relations, given humor's role in alleviating anxiety in intergroup contexts (see Borgella, Howard, & Maddox, in press, for a review of this literature). It would be beneficial for further research to test these divergent predictions, and explore other potential implications of the effect of humorist group membership observed in the present study. It would also be important for future work to investigate moderators of the effect of humorist group membership on the reception of disparagement humor. For example, cavalier humor beliefs exemplify a lighthearted and nonchalant approach to disparagement humor that considers such humor largely inoffensive and trivializes the potential harm it can cause to those who are being disparaged (Hodson, Rush, & MacInnis, 2010). Thus, those who endorse cavalier humor beliefs may see disparaging jokes as being unconditionally acceptable, inoffensive, and funny, irrespective of the group membership of the source. Individual differences in prejudice may also qualify the effect demonstrated in the present study. Roussos and Dovidio (2018) found that those higher in homonegativity considered hateful acts relatively harmless, irrespective of whether they were anti-gay or anti-straight. In the same way, those higher in prejudice may consider disparagement humor to be innocuous, regardless of the source of the humor. The present research primarily operationalized disparagement humor in one particular way (i.e., a written joke published on an online social media page). Disparagement humor can manifest in various ways; it can be spoken verbally, represented pictorially, uttered in private company, communicated publicly, or disseminated through a variety of other channels. Although we successfully demonstrated the focal effect by having participants think about disparagement humor in a more abstract sense in Study 3, it would be beneficial to corroborate the present findings with research operationalizing disparagement humor in one of the many other ways it manifests. It would also be interesting to investigate whether the present effects emerge when certain qualities of the humor (e.g., severity, funniness) are varied. The present studies predominantly sampled young university students in a liberal and female-dominated field (Studies 1 and 3, specifically). To establish the present findings as reflective of broader societal norms in the reception of disparagement humor (rather than effects driven by disproportionately left-leaning samples), further research should replicate these effects with more diverse and representative samples, such as that used in Study 2. It may also be beneficial to incorporate participants' own group membership into the design of future 9

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studies to see whether this qualifies the demonstrated effects. Given the intergroup sensitivity effect emerges irrespective of whether observers are part of the group being criticized (Hornsey et al., 2002) or not (Sutton et al., 2006), however, we have no reason to suspect that the group membership effect in the domain of disparagement humor would be qualified by observers' own group membership. In summary, the present research demonstrates a robust group membership effect in the domain of disparagement humor – disparagement humor is better received (e.g., deemed more acceptable, less offensive, and more humorous) if it originates from a member of the group being disparaged than from someone outside the disparaged group. We demonstrate that this effect holds true for observers evaluating sexual orientation humor (Studies 1 and 3), racial humor (Studies 2 and 3), and gender humor (Study 3), and emerges across different group status relations, albeit to varying degrees (Studies 2 and 3). These findings suggest that a disparaging joke will draw the most favorable response if the punchline remains firmly within group boundaries.

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