Japan and The East China Sea Dispute

Japan and the East China Sea Dispute by Sheila A. Smith Sheila A. Smith is Senior Fellow for Japan Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C. This article is a revised version of a paper he delivered at a conference on “Contested Terrain: China’s Periphery and International Relations in Asia. The event was sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Reserve Officers Association in Washington, D.C. on November 4, 2011.

Abstract: This article offers a closer examination of the way in which the 2010 crisis emerged between Japan and China. The debate that it sponsored within Japan suggests that a crisis management initiative between Beijing and Tokyo rather than an overall reconciliation agenda may be what is now needed. The author contents that greater predictability and transparency in these maritime interactions will go a long way to developing confidence in what has to date been a very uneasy and publicly sensitive aspect of the bilateral relationship.

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he September 2010 confrontation between Japan and China over a Chinese fishing trawler’s provocations in the waters of the Senkaku Islands demonstrated how easily seemingly small incidents can spiral into major diplomatic confrontations. Japan and China have had similar tensions over this territorial dispute in the past, but none have escalated so intensely. The Japanese arrest of the captain and his extended detention prompted a strong reaction in China. Japanese nationals in China were arrested for illicit behavior near Chinese military bases, and a reported embargo of Chinese shipments of rare earth metals destined for Japanese ports, only exacerbated the tensions. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the Senkaku Islands fell under the protection of the U.S.-Japan security treaty.1 The crisis blossomed into a major security challenge not only for Tokyo but for Washington as well.

The Senkaku Islands, also known as the Diaoyu Islands by China and the Diaoyutai Islands by Taiwan, are a group of disputed islands in the East China Sea. For the purposes of this article, which

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The incident demonstrates the increasing difficulty Tokyo and Beijing have in managing bilateral disputes. Japan and China have long sought to navigate their diplomatic relationship so as to avoid running up against competing sovereignty claims in the East China Sea. Quiet conversations between diplomats and state leaders previously have been enough to calm popular emotions in Japan. In China, popular emotions have not been as easily calmed, and in 2004 and 2005, outbursts of violence against Japanese in China deeply affected Japanese perceptions of China. Differences in interpretation between these two Asian societies of the history of their relationship and their identity in the history of the region only add to the sensitivity over these disputed islands. Yet this dispute is not simply about the past. It is fundamentally about the future trajectory of Japan’s relationship with a rising China. China’s increasing demand for energy has prompted intense interest in resource extraction from the continental shelf that runs under the East China Sea. Moreover, the growing number of Chinese maritime agencies, including the civilian agencies as well as the PLAN, has increased the interactions in the East China Sea between Japanese and Chinese interests. Territorial claims to the Senkaku Islands are not the only manifestation of this increasingly fractious dynamic. Chinese and Japanese interests have also become increasingly competitive on issues as diverse as managing crime, food security, and trade and investment practices. The competition between Asia’s two largest and wealthiest powers is a very contemporary one, and it is this very contemporary—and contentious—dynamic that has forced the sovereignty claims over the uninhabited islets of the Senkakus to the surface of the Sino-Japanese relationship, and to the forefront of Japan’s domestic politics. The Limits of Japan-China Reconciliation Diplomacy Japan and China have experienced cycles of tension and reconciliation for most of the 40 years since the two nations began to normalize diplomatic relations in 1972. For much of this time, however, the stimulus to periods of difficult diplomacy has not been the territorial dispute. Other issues include the terms of Japan’s economic support for China’s market reforms, as well as ones related to historical memory and interpretation. New Japanese textbooks issued in 2001 were a particular source of tension. During the tenure of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006), the relationship went into a tailspin, as several incidents prompted bad feelings and popular protest. Violent outbursts of Chinese antiJapanese sentiment in 2004 and 2005 were the result of difficult government relations. Indeed officials referred to this era as a “deep freeze,” and it was only focuses on Japan’s role in the East China Sea dispute, the islands will be referred to using the Japanese name as either the “Senkaku Islands” or the “Senkakus.”

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after Koizumi left office in 2006 that diplomats on both sides of the Sino-Japanese dispute could design a new basis for the relationship. The blueprint for a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” was laid out in a series of high level summits that included visit to Beijing by Koizumi’s successor, Abe Shinzo, in 20062, a visit to Tokyo by China’s Premier, Wen Jiaobao3, a visit by Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo in 2007,4 and finally, the culminating summit between China’s President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Fukuda in Tokyo in 2008.5 The final vision for this new Japan-China relationship was articulated in the Hu-Fukuda joint statement. Yet for all of this diplomatic effort, it was only two years later that the Chinese fishing trawler incident shook the foundations of the Japan-China relationship. In contrast to the 2006-2008 diplomatic ambition to reframe the relationship, leaders on both sides sought only to note their willingness to talk. The political relationship has yet to fully recover. Japan’s prime minister and China’s premier met “coincidentally” on the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit in Brussels on October 5, 2010, and this opened the way for a resumption of regular diplomatic consultations. The devastating earthquake of March 11, 2011 interrupted Japan’s ability to pursue the conversation until Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda visited Beijing in December that year. But the disasters also allowed for some healing between China’s leaders and the Japanese public. China responded to Japan’s distress by sending aid, and Premier Wen Jiaobao visited the devastated Tohoku region in May 20126 to encourage stronger relations between the two nations. 2012 marks the fortieth anniversary of the normalization of bilateral relations, and the two governments will want to ensure that the reconciliation effort continues to bear fruit. The territorial dispute remains unresolved, but it is the broader concern in Tokyo about Chinese maritime activities in and around Japan’s territorial boundaries that still rankles. Chinese maritime incursions into Japan’s territorial waters, and even more frequent survey activities in Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), have continued, demonstrating that there is little evidence that either country has backed away from their quite divergent interpretations of their maritime rights in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Japan-China Joint Press Statement,” October 8, 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0610.html. 3 Ibid.,, “Japan-China Joint Press Statement,” April 11, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/china/pv0704/joint.html. 4 ibid.,-, “Visit by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda to the People’s Republic of China (Overview and Evaluation),” December 30, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/china/pmv0712/overview.html. 5 Ibid.,, “Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” May 7, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/china/joint0805.html. 6 The agenda for Wen’s visit to Japan was to improve bilateral relations. See http://english.cntv.cn/20110518/109576.shtml for his agenda, and for photos of his visit to the devastated Tohoku region, see http://english.cntv.cn/20110521/103913.shtml. 2

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East China Sea and beyond. Indeed, the following summer, Japan’s Vice MinLster for Foreign Affairs, Kenichiro Sasae, and then the Foreign Minister himself, Takeaki Matsumoto, formally protested the intrusion into the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands of two Chinese fishing surveillance vessels. These vessels asserted China’s claims to the islands, and conveyed to the Japanese Coast Guard that they were undertaking “enforcement activities” in Chinese waters.7 While the September 2010 incident did not involve the militaries of the two nations, many in Japan saw in it the seeds of a serious challenge to their nation’s security. Japan’s defense concerns about the increasing Chinese military power in Northeast Asia were evident a decade or more earlier. The 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis suggested the possibility of a U..S. China conflict should the cross-strait relationship take a turn for the worse. China’s intentions beyond Taiwan remained unclear, but Japanese security planners were increasingly concerned about Chinese maritime activities in their EEZ and even in their territorial waters. Thus, the incident in 2010 has fundamentally altered the status of this territorial dispute, and has created a new basis for understanding the potential consequences of a future incident. China’s efforts to strengthen its own defenses up to and beyond the first island chain off its coast have significant consequences for Japanese, and by extension U.S.-Japan, defense planning. U.S. defense planners today focus on the new operational challenges posed by the growing reach of Chinese maritime and air capabilities extending into the East and South China Seas, and identifying China as one of the United States’ key defense challenges suggests an even broader mandate of security cooperation for the United States and its allies in the region. Moreover, the overt commitment by Washington to defense of the Senkaku Islands now elevates future incidents into alliance crisis management scenarios. This shifting balance of regional power suggests that Japan and China must develop more reliable and consistent dispute resolution practices if they are to continue to avoid direct conflict along their maritime boundaries. The strategic intent of Japan’s government is to support and promote a regional approach to maritime security, and to work collectively with the United States and others on the development of a shared approach to managing the expansion of Chinese military power in Asia. Likewise, Japan has adapted its maritime strategy to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) extension of the maritime EEZ, and has sought to place its differences with China over the transit of military ships and Chinese survey vessels within the context of the UNCLOS norms. Yet it is clear that China’s growing maritime reach, and the geographical necessity of According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press releases, Vice Minister Sasae lodged his protest with the Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Cheng Yonghua, on August 24, and Foreign Minister Matsumoto protested to Ambassador Cheng on August 25, 2011. See http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/2011/8/0824_01.html and http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/2011/8/0824_html

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transiting East China Sea waters to reach the open ocean, will result in more interactions between these two maritime powers. Efforts at reconciliation in the bilateral relationship have been insufficient to prevent flare-ups in the relationship, and within Japan, the politics of the JapanChina relationship have become increasingly sensitive. For many Japanese, the idea of compromising with China seems less attractive as concerns about Chinese behavior have grown. Confidence in the Japanese government’s ability to manage an increasingly assertive China is also in question, and thus much of the domestic critique of the incident focused on the Japanese government’s handling of the confrontation. Tokyo’s ability to manage any future crisis similar to the Chinese fishing trawler incident will likely have to consider this growing antipathy within Japan for compromise should China —or forces within China—violate Japan’s territorial waters in the future. The Anatomy of the 2010 Senkaku Crisis The diplomatic confrontation between Japan and China in September 2010 instigated a broad debate within Japan about its China diplomacy, but it also raised significant debate over the Japanese government’s ability to defend Japanese interests in the face of a rising China. The incident that set off the diplomatic confrontation between Japan and China revealed how delicate the management of this territorial dispute had been in the past. Yet it also played on the worst fears of Japanese political leaders about what the rise of China could mean for Japan. The Crisis with China. On September 7, 2010 a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrol boats in waters near the disputed Senkaku Islands.8 Three Japanese patrol vessels, the Yonakuni, Mizuki and Hateruma encountered the Chinese trawler, the Minjinyu 5179, about 12 kilometers northwest of the islands, and ordered it to stop for inspection. The Chinese trawler refused, and collided first with the Yonakuni, and then with the Mizuki, after a 40-minute chase. The JCG boarded the vessel, and detained the captain, Zhan Qixiong, and his crew while confiscating the trawler. 9 The Japanese government decided to treat this incident under domestic law, and to prosecute the Chinese captain for the crime of obstructing the JCG in performance of its duty. Chinese reaction was immediate. The day after the boat and its crew were taken into custody, the Chinese foreign ministry called Japanese Ambassador Niwa in, and demanded the release of the captain, his crew, and the trawler. Meanwhile, the JCG handed the Chinese fishing captain over to prosecutors for possible indictment on September 10. The Chinese foreign ministry then announced its first response to the incident—the suspension of the East China Sea negotiations. Three

Associated Foreign Press, “High-Seas Collisions Trigger Japan-China Spat,” September 7, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gfux6suEvEhsCmNJgxMYAYK68ZIQ.

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days later, however, Japan released the 14 crewmembers and the trawler to Chinese authorities. On September 16, Japan’s Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism Seiji Maehara visited Ishigaki Coast Guard station to inspect the damaged Japanese patrol ships. As Japan continued to investigate the incident, the Ishigaki court extended the term of detention of the Chinese captain from September 20 to September 29. At this point the Chinese reaction became more severe. On September 20, China detained four Japanese citizens on charges of entering a restricted military area in Hebei Province. The four Japanese were employees of Fujita Corporation who had been sent to China as part of a Japanese project to reclaim WWII chemical weapons left by Japan’s Imperial Army. Diplomatically, the Chinese government also refused to consider a meeting of Premier Wen and Prime Minister Naoto Kan at the UN General Assembly in New York. At the UN General Assembly meeting, Wen publicly demanded the release of the Chinese fishing captain, and in a private gathering of Chinese-Americans in New York, alluded to China taking “further action” should Japan continue to detain him.10 The role of the United States is also critically important as this escalation of the diplomatic confrontation continued. On September 23, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton assured then foreign minister Seiji Maehara that the United States believed that the Senkaku Islands and nearby waters would be covered by the U.S.Japan Security Treaty should Japan require defense assistance. 11 Moreover, on the same day, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, expressed their support for Japan. Secretary Gates simply stated that the United States would “fill its alliance responsibilities.”12 China was also reportedly using economic instruments to force Japan to release its captain. On the same day that senior U.S. leaders were publicly reminding Beijing of their alliance commitment to Japan, the New York Times reported that China was reducing its rare earth exports to Japan.13 Japan relies on China for 82 percent of its rare earth materials, which are used in high-tech electronics, batteries,

10 New York Times, “China Takes a Sharper Tone in Dispute with Japan,” September 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/world/asia/23chinajapan.html. 11 Secretary Clinton did maintain, however, that the United States does not take a position on the sovereignty dispute between Japan and China. See Remarks to the Press by Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, September 23, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147726.htm. 12 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon,” September 23, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4690. 13 New York Times, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Crucial Exports to Japan,” September 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/business/global/24rare.html?pagewanted+all.

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and green energy technology.14 Although Chinese government officials refused to acknowledge an embargo, customs officials were apparently prohibited from loading rare earth elements on ships at Chinese ports. Tensions were already high, as Japanese and other buyers of Chinese minerals engaged in World Trade Organization adjudication, yet this use of economic instruments of pressure in the midst of a serious diplomatic confrontation dramatically altered Japanese and indeed global perceptions of China’s handling of the incident. The intensifying diplomatic crisis between Japan and China halted abruptly when on September 24 the deputy prosecutor in Ishigaki announced the release of the Chinese fishing captain, stating that the “diplomatic impact” of this case suggested this unprecedented interruption of legal proceedings. The next day, Japanese diplomats were allowed to meet with the Fujita Corporation executives in Beijing. In an unusual outburst, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu called for Japan’s apology, and for compensation to China for the damages incurred.15 Japan’s Prime Minister Kan rejected this demand, and the following day Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku suggested that it was China who needed to compensate Japan for the repairs on the JCG vessels. Within a few days, China released three of the four Fujita businessmen detained in China, and there were some unconfirmed reports of a relaxation on the export of rare earth metals. Public sentiment in China supported the “heroic” Chinese fishing captain, and pressures within China also played a role in shaping the Chinese government response. China released the final Japanese citizen arrested on October 9, but within a week anti-Japanese protests related to the Senkaku incident were reported in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Xian and Zhengzhou.16 Prime Minister Kan reported to the Upper House in Japan that his government had called on China to protect Japanese nationals and businesses in China from these protests, and Japanese Ambassador to China called on Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to echo this request. Throughout October, the Chinese and Japanese governments continued to exchange criticisms. On October 19, the China Daily reported that rare earth exports from China would be cut by 30 percent in 2011 to “protect from exploitation.”17 Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara publicly referred to the Chinese response to the incident as being “hysterical,” prompting a response from Chinese

14 Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), “The Situation Regarding Rare Earth Elements,” March 22, 2011, http://www.tremcenter.org/index.php?option=com_attachments&task=download&id=46 China produces 97 percent of the world’s rare earths and controls approximately 50 percent of the world’s reserves. Also, nearly 50% of its exports go to Japan. 15 New York Times, “Japan Rejects Apologizing to China,” September 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/asia/26japan.html. 16 BBC News, “Protests held in China and Japan over disputed islands,” October 16, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11558882. 17 China Daily, “China to Reduce Rare Earth Exports,” October 19, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-10/19/content_11427356.htm.

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assistant foreign minister Hu Zhengyue, who referred to the remarks as “extreme words that should not come out of the mouth of a foreign diplomat.”18 Chinese claims that Japan had changed course on its handling of these types of incidents were widely cited as the rationale for the tenor of Chinese protest. Japan’s Foreign Ministry, however, cast significant doubts on this interpretation of the bilateral management of the territorial issue.19 Moreover, the JCG had acted similarly in the past when activists had challenged their authority over the Senkaku Islands, but these activists were from Taiwan and Hong Kong rather than mainland Chinese. On October 21, Foreign Minister Maehara openly rejected Chinese claims that Japan and China agreed to shelve the sovereignty debate when the bilateral treaty normalizing postwar relations between Japan and China was concluded, and yet another round of anti-Japanese protests resulted in China.20 By the end of the month, Chinese fishing boats were reported to be back operating in Japanese waters by the JCG, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again lodged a protest to the Chinese government. Yet, at the same time, the METI minister visited Beijing to ask again for China to ease its restrictions on rare metal exports. Competing interests in the East China Sea are only part of the overall Japan-China relationship, and yet the 2010 incident conflated the bilateral agenda in ways that are new. To date diplomats have sought to navigate the territorial dispute over the Senkakus by setting it aside, and this has allowed Japan and China to reach a certain level of accord on broader economic and regional issues. Taiwan and Hong Kong-based activists became much more willing to stir up this issue in the 1990s, but both the Chinese and Japanese governments sought to keep this from occupying center stage in their relationship. It is domestic politics today in both countries that will make that a more difficult challenge for both governments looking forward. The Japanese government’s handling of the September 2010 crisis was not simply a diplomatic crisis, it was also a domestic one. The Crisis at Home. The drama over the incident continued to haunt the Japanese government as it came under intense domestic scrutiny after the release of the Chinese captain. Moreover, the government was criticized for its treatment of a JCG video of the incident that was to have been the primary evidence in the legal case against him. Critics argued that Japan should have publicized the video to show just how provocative the Chinese ship had been. 18 Breitbart, “China Slams Maehara for Using ‘Extreme Words’ to ‘Attack’ Beijing,” October 21, 2010, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9J04EBO0&show_article=1. 19 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement in English and Japanese, entitled Recent Developments in Japan-China relations – Basic Facts on the Senkaku Islands and the Recent Incident in October 2010, as well as a brief timeline of events. See www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/rrelations/major_e.html. 20 On October 25, 1978, Deng Xiaoping, at a press conference during a visit to Japan to celebrate the entering into force of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, suggested that the territorial disputes should be left for the “next generation” to resolve.

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Demands for the video’s release increased, and the management of this domestic phase of the crisis was turned over to Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku. On October 13, the Lower House Budget Committee unanimously voted to request from the Naha special prosecutor’s office the video of the incident. After much debate, the Kan Cabinet agreed to release an edited, and abbreviated, version of the Senkaku incident on October 27 to the Budget Committee, which viewed the tape behind closed doors. Media reports, however, only heightened public interest in the content of the tapes, and calls for a full disclosure of the material grew. On November 4, an Internet user identified as Sengoku38 uploaded leaked video footage of the collision on YouTube, creating a global sensation. The leaked footage contained a total of 44 minutes of footage, clearly taken from on board the Japanese ships that were rammed by the Chinese fishing trawler. The Japanese government called for the removal of the leaked evidence, and while some of the footage remained accessible on alternative sites, the Sengoku38 version was no longer accessible within 24 hours. The leaked video produced a highly charged debate in the parliament over Japan’s postwar diplomacy, and the perceived weaknesses in coping with Chinese pressure.21 The culprit was identified as Masaharu Isshiki, a JCG officer assigned to the Kobe regional headquarters. How he gained access to the video footage, as well as why he decided to post it on YouTube, became the focus of a month-long investigation. His subsequent arrest raised a furor in the Japanese Diet, as conservative critics became outraged at the notion that while the Chinese fishing captain who rammed coast guard ships was set free, a JCG officer would be sent to jail for revealing what they thought the government ought to have made public from the start. In the Diet deliberation, Cabinet Secretary Sengoku and then MLIT Minister Sumio Mabuchi came under intense fire for their handling of the situation. Opposition LDP critics argued that the Kan Cabinet had been weak in their response, while the Kan Cabinet argued for following the rule of law. In a heated exchange, Cabinet Secretary Sengoku blurted out that Japan’s military was an “instrument of violence,” a phrase that conjured up deep domestic divisions over Japan’s postwar constitution and military. In the end, both cabinet ministers were censured in the Upper House where the ruling party did not have a majority, and thus were forbidden to speak in subsequent hearings. Public debate over whether Sengoku38 did the right thing was also heated, as Japanese citizens wondered aloud as to whether their government had the conviction to stand up to the growing Chinese pressure on their society. In an October 2010 survey by Yomiuri Shimbun, 72 percent responded that the Kan cabinet had not appropriately handled the Senkaku incident, with fears that Japan was sending a signal that it would back down to pressure cited as the number one 21Sheila Smith, “Who is Sengoku38?” Asia Unbound, November 5, 2010, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2010/11/05/who-is-sengoku38/; Sheila Smith, “Sengoku 38: Villain or Hero?” Asia Unbound, November 16, 2010, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2010/11/16/sengoku38-villainor-hero/.

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reason.22 An overwhelming majority felt the video ought to have been released by the government. In a November 2010 public opinion survey by Asahi Shimbun, 79 percent responded that it was inappropriate of the Kan cabinet to keep the JCG video from the public.23 A small but vocal minority of conservative critics took to the streets, with demonstrations in front of the Chinese Embassy as well as in downtown Tokyo attracting upwards of 4-5,000 participants. Conservative Diet members joined in these demonstrations, advocating greater Japanese government defense of the Senkaku Islands. Politics, rather than the law, determined the treatment of both the JCG officer as well as the Chinese fishing captain. On January 21, 2011, the Tokyo District Prosecutors Office announced that charges against former JCG official Isshiki for violating Japan’s law by leaking the tapes would be dropped. On the same day, the Naha District Court also quietly dropped all charges against the Chinese fishing boat captain.24 But the furor over the Japanese government’s reaction to the incident did not end there. Isshiki wrote a book about his motives, and at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on February 14, he remained unrepentant of his leak of government footage of the Senkaku clash. The event attracted one of Japan’s most fervent conservative nationalists and a long-time advocate of a tough position in defense of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkakus, Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro.25 Ishihara’s continued interest in the Senkakus was amply demonstrated a year later when he announced during a visit to Washington, D.C. that he intended on purchasing the privately owned Senkaku Islands to ensure they would remain under Japanese control.26 Citing his distrust of the national government’s ability to defend Japan’s sovereignty over the islands, Ishihara said his Tokyo metropolitan government was better able to ensure they would not fall into Chinese hands. Nationalists have long been active in advocating for a stronger Japanese position in defending the Senkaku Islands. For the most part, those most active in this effort have been small, but vocal minorities in Japan. But like the controversial issue of Yasukuni Shrine visits, Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku islands is increasingly drawing more mainstream attention in Japan. It remains to be seen whether or not the defense of these small islands will spur greater Japanese nationalistic sentiment. To date, the Senkakus and Japan’s claims to them have 22 Yomiuri Shimbun, “October 2010 Telephone Public Opinion Poll,” October 1-3, 2010, accessed at: http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/polls/2010/poll-10-31.htm. 23 Asahi Shimbun, “November 2010 Emergency Public Opinion Poll,” November 13-14, 2010, accessed at: http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/polls/2010/poll-10-32.htm. 24 Asahi Shimbun, “Charges Dropped Against Coast Guard Officer,” January 24, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201101230145.html. 25 The Japan Times, “JCG Leak Source: Defend Senkakus,” February 15, 2011, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110215a2.html. 26 Time Magazine, “A Risky Game over Japan’s Disputed Islands,” April 20, 2012, http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2012/04/20/a-risky-game-over-japans-disputed-islands/.

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seemed a peripheral issue in Japan’s broader politics. As China’s power rises, and especially its military power, Japanese national sentiments will be more likely to focus on issues like the Senkakus. Activists like Tokyo’s Governor Ishihara are also willing to use the territorial dispute for their own political purposes, and to critique the national government’s unwillingness to take a more proactive stance towards China. Coupled with the growing sense of national pride in China that accompanies its growing global influence, crises such as these are increasingly likely to incur a titfor-tat, reactive nationalistic tone that will make management of crises even more difficult for the two governments. Japan’s Maritime Boundaries in the East China Sea This recent incident between Japan and China over activities in and around the Senkaku Islands demonstrates the growing sensitivities within Japan about its relationship with a rising China. Sharing a maritime boundary has always been a challenge for diplomats, but it became increasingly so as Chinese resource needs expanded. In the early decades after World War II, the East China Sea was primarily a fisheries region for Japan’s trawlers, and interactions with China were in the form of Chinese arrests of Japanese fishing boats operating too close to its shores. Prior to normalization of diplomatic relations in 1978, Japanese fisheries association delegations would visit Beijing to discuss how to handle these disputes. Once the treaty of friendship and cooperation was concluded, however, the two governments could formalize these understandings in a bilateral fisheries treaty. Chinese concerns over its security needs, as well as over the protection of fisheries stock in the East China Sea, were matched by Japanese concerns over access for its vast trawler fleet. From the 1980s onwards, however, Japan’s trawlers had moved far beyond the East China Sea in search of their catch, and today, most of the Japanese fisherman who fish in the East China Sea do so in Japanese territorial waters rather than in the open seas. Today, it is the potential for energy resources that fuels Japan-China disagreement over the waters of the East China Sea. Ever since the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) survey of the East China and Yellow Seas in the late 1960s suggested that a vast deposit of hydrocarbon resources were to be found on or near the continental shelf that stretches off the Chinese coast in Asia, the waters shared by China, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan have become the focus of dispute. Moreover, the UNCLOS creation of exclusive economic zones renders the interactions of these Northeast Asia powers more contentious as the definition of where territorial waters end and the 200 nautical mile EEZ areas begin depends on who owns the islands that populate the East China Sea. Thus, the status of the Senkaku islands reflects more than a historical dispute over ownership. The territorial dispute, which burgeoning in the 1970s, as the U.S. occupation of the Ryukyu Islands of Japan ended and as Chinese relations

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with both the United States and Japan improved, also reflected the intensification of claims over the potential seabed resources that resided under the East China Sea. The Senkaku Islands were seen as part of the Ryukyu Islands for the purpose of U.S. administration in the wake of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, and yet Beijing challenged this assumption. So too did Taiwan, the most proximate of Japanese neighbors to the south. Diplomatic normalization of Japan-China relations in the 1970s did not offer an opportunity for resolving territorial disputes. In the end, after much friction over forays into Japanese claimed waters by Chinese fishing vessels, the two governments decided to put this issue aside and move ahead with the peace treaty. Even as diplomats negotiated, however, Chinese fishing vessels continued to appear in the waters off the Senkaku islands, suggesting that the Chinese position at the negotiating table did not reflect a national consensus. Yet in subsequent decades, it was activists operating from a British-governed Hong Kong and from Japan’s nominal friend in Northeast Asia, the Republic of China (Taiwan) that presented the most pressure on the Japanese government’s claims over the Senkaku islands. The UNCLOS introduced a new dimension to the territorial claims in the East China Sea. Discussion over how to define the proper demarcation of maritime boundaries raised arguments for basing claims based on the geological characteristics of the seabed below, and all countries of East Asia had a stake in this discussion. Japan’s claims were based on a negotiated median line between the territorial waters of China and Japan. UNCLOS allows for China and Japan’s respective EEZs to extend for 200 nautical miles, but the width of the East China Sea is only 360 nautical miles, necessitating a median line (UNCLOS, Part II, Article 15). China, however, challenged this notion, and instead argued that the natural extension of its continental shelf, which runs up to the Okinawa trough—a deeper channel in the seabed—and perhaps even beyond, should be used to determine each state’s EEZ in the East China Sea (UNCLOS, Part VI, Article 76).27 Thus, for Beijing, its maritime boundaries could be claimed right up to the territorial waters off of Okinawa. Tokyo’s conflict with Beijing re-emerged in the early 2000s as China intensified its oil and gas exploration off shore, and as Chinese research vessels, conducting surveys on the geological formations under the East China Sea, tested the patience of the Japanese. Repeated forays into Japan’s EEZ and territorial waters by Chinese research ships prompted protests by Japan, but little response from Beijing. Irked by China’s lack of response, the Liberal Democratic Party began its own discussions about Japan’s inability to act, and within several years, this resulted in a wholesale revamping of Japanese maritime policy. The new Ocean 27See China’s position on the East China Sea maritime http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2626/2628/t15476.html.

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Law, adopted in 2007, not only articulated a national ocean policy, but also reorganized the responsibility for acting on Japan’s maritime interests. A new bureau, established in the prime minister’s office, brought together for the first time a cohesive set of concerns, including resource development, maritime policing, and national defense, regarding Japan’s maritime interests. Despite differences on their maritime boundaries, Japan and China finally agreed to negotiate on the East China Sea in 2006. Two areas in the East China Sea were identified as attractive for joint development. China’s own resource needs were expanding exponentially, and the gas reserves already identified in the East China Sea were an attractive source of supply for Beijing. Thus, the first was the area surrounding the gas fields, already identified, that lay underneath the median line identified by Japan. Known as Shirakaba by Japan and Chunxiao by China, the gas field is 22,000 square kilometers but only 5 kilometers away from the median line. The second area for joint resource development had yet to be explored. This region, closest to the area Japan and South Korea explored in the 1980s, has deeper water, and technically poses a greater challenge for drilling. Nonetheless, many believe that this region may be the most likely to produce significant oil resources. Japan’s Maritime Defenses and the East China Sea Japanese and Chinese fishermen have shared the East China Sea for over a century, but the recent rising strength of China’s navy has introduced new military challenges for Sino-Japanese relations. Maritime defenses, including the defense of islands and territorial airspace, are now at the top of Japans’ defense planning agenda. Moreover, the status of Taiwan, and of Chinese military operations in the vicinity of Taiwan, raises serious concerns in Tokyo, although there are differences in opinion regarding how much Japan should base its defense planning on a Taiwan contingency. Japan’s alliance with the United States, and the forward deployment of U.S. military forces on Japanese territory, has typically exacerbated Beijing’s sensitivities about a potential Japanese role in a crisis across the Taiwan Straits. Recent improvements in cross-strait relations have made these sensitivities recede somewhat, but the question of Taiwan and its relationship to mainland China deeply informs Japan’s thinking about its future strategy. Japan’s National Defense Planning and China. Japan’s national defense planning has directly acknowledged the growing military presence of China in and around Japanese territory. In the 2004 long-term defense planning vision, the Ministry of Defense noted that China’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities, as well as its naval and air forces, were of concern to Japan. In last year’s revised National Defense Program Outline, the language was similar, and the corrective was to concentrate Japanese attention on developing better intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that would allow Tokyo to monitor Chinese activities. China’s potential for challenging Japan’s defenses are also obvious in the new priorities for the SDF. The main regional focus of attention these days for the

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Japanese SDF is the southwest, and functionally the priorities are identified as the defense of islands and territorial airspace. The behavior of Chinese military in and around Japan is also cause for concern (see below). In addition to the research survey ships noted above, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is also more active in the East China Sea, and throughout the waters between Taiwan and the Philippines. Chinese ships exit the East China Sea to travel to the South China Sea and into the Pacific Ocean through the Okinawan waters, and thus contact between the Chinese and Japanese navies remains high. In addition, there seems to be some interest in testing Japanese naval responses. In 2004, for example, a Chinese Han class submarine moved through the strait near Miyako Island in Okinawa, causing Japan to issue the highest level of maritime defense alert possible. Main Activities of Chinese Navy in Waters Near Japan (2005-2010)

Source: Prepared from data of Japanese Defense Ministry28

28 Figure is taken from National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2011, Japan, February 2012, http://www.nids.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2011_A01.pdf.

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Japan’s submarines also operate in the East China Sea waters, and have shifted their traditional mission of straits protection to a more broadly defined goal of ISR in and around the East China Sea waters. Main Activities of Chinese Navy in Waters Near Japan (2011)

Source: Prepared from data of Japanese Defense Ministry29

China’s navy conducts exercises in international waters just south of the Japanese territorial waters, and as these exercises take place further into the channels between the Philippines and Guam, the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) spends a considerable time monitoring the scale and the qualitative improvements of Chinese naval operations. Japan’s P3C fleet maintains a high level of operations in and around the southwestern maritime region. Japan’s air force also has intensified its surveillance of Chinese aircraft across the East China Sea. The number of scrambles varies annually, but the trend lines show a significant increase in Japanese sensitivity to Chinese aircraft. Recently, China’s Ministry of National Defense that Japanese scrambles were interfering with China’s ability to conduct exercises in its own territorial airspace.30

29 National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2010, Japan, March 2011, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_4C_A01.pdf. 30 “Japan Told to Stop Surveillance of Chinese Forces,” China.org.cn, October 27, 2011. Available at: http://www.china.org.cn/world/2011-10/27/content_23736221.htm.

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The proximity of Japanese and Chinese militaries has thus never been greater, raising serious concerns about the potential for accidents and miscalculations.31 Chinese naval forces seem more interested in testing Japanese responses than in the past. In addition to the Han submarine incident noted above, there are more frequent interactions between the two nations’ navies that give cause for concern. Last year, a fleet departing the East China Sea for exercises beyond in the Pacific Ocean stopped to interact with MSDF destroyers patrolling their movements from Japanese waters, sending a helicopter on a direct line of approach to the MSDF vessel. This new boldness has raised speculation among Japan’s planners about how individual Chinese commanders may react in future. Scenarios for a Japan-China Clash in the East China Sea Without a doubt, Japanese and Chinese militaries are operating in closer proximity than ever before, and the frequency of that interaction is expected to increase. Moreover, the political management of other Chinese maritime activities is becoming more difficult for Tokyo. The diplomatic crisis in the fall of 2010 reveals just how easily small incidents can escalate into major diplomatic confrontations. Finally, the effort to negotiate a shared approach to resource development in the East China Sea seems to have stalled, and China reportedly has moved forward on its own to extract gas from the area once considered a prospect for joint Sino-Japanese cooperation. Diplomatic efforts to navigate around the contentious territorial dispute seem today to be ineffective, although Japan and China continue to advocate a bilateral effort to construct a dispute resolution mechanism that could potentially avoid a repeat of the September 2010 tensions. The agenda for cooperation between Tokyo and Beijing is broad, and the effort to diminish the impact of the territorial dispute on broader bilateral relations remains central to both governments’ diplomatic goals. However, Japan’s defense planners continue to worry about unintended consequences of the increased Chinese maritime activities in and around their territorial waters as well as the potential for these relatively minor incidents near the Senkakus Islands to develop into more intense political and diplomatic crises. This trajectory of greater interactions between Chinese and Japanese maritime interests in the East China Sea, particularly close to or in Japan’s own territorial waters, raises several possible scenarios for thinking about how a conflict between Japan and China might develop. Four scenarios are possible. First, an incident between Chinese fishing vessels in and around the Senkakus could develop into a more militarized standoff. In September 2010, the Japanese MSDF remained far from the area, as did China’s PLAN. The central role of the JCG in defending the Senkakus will remain the norm for Japan, yet the intervention of the MSDF cannot be ruled out should the Chinese 31 For the definitive argument on these interactions and on the need for greater attention to managing crises in the East China Sea, see Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

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decide to up the ante in a similar incident. China’s diverse array of ships in its maritime forces—the “five dragons” of Chinese coastal law enforcement32— cannot be matched by the JCG, and the worry is that should a JCG vessel be endangered or worse, sunk, by a Chinese vessel, the MSDF would then be deployed, pitting the two Asian navies against each other for the first time in postwar history. In the wake of the September 2010 incident, the JCG has announced the deployment of an additional patrol vessel to Japan’s southwestern waters, and discussions are underway to a develop larger and more heavily armed coast guard fleet for deployment in that region. The real challenge for Tokyo, however, is the diplomatic complement to enhanced policing of the Senkakus, developing with Beijing a set of procedures for managing similar incidents in future that will help avoid a similarly heated dispute between the two countries. Second, the potential for a more serious clash also arises simply from the increased interactions between Japanese and Chinese navies. Local commanders at sea could miscalculate the intent of the opposing commander. Naval or air forces in and around the East China Sea as noted above are in more frequent, and proximate, interactions. There is little reason to believe that these interactions will decrease. The Chinese navy depends upon egress from the East China Sea for its broader operations in the Pacific, south to the South China Sea, and beyond to anti-piracy operations off the coast of Africa. Japan too has increased its southwestern deployments, intended mostly for surveillance of Chinese activities but also designed to fortify Japan’s defenses to the southwest. The intensity of Japanese patrols by P3Cs for ISR activities has increased. Japan has also announced its intention to increase its submarine fleet by six additional subs, again for the ISR mission. Finally, the Midterm Defense Plan, announced alongside the National Defense Program Outline in December 2010, allows for the redeployment of an F15 squadron to Okinawa in an effort to step up air defense in the south.33 Unrelated to China-Japan maritime border issues, however, the East China Sea is becoming more crowded with Japanese and other AEGIS destroyers as part of the region’s missile defense efforts aimed at Pyongyang. The trajectory of the April 2012 North Korean satellite launch/missile test was to be over the Yellow and East China Seas, and should these launches continue, they will attract significant naval attention to the region for BMD operations.34 32 Lyle J. Goldstein, “Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities,” Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, No. 5, April 2010 33 The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond, approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010, as well as the accompanying Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011-FY2015), can be found at: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html. 34 The Ministry of Defense announced that three of the Maritime Self Defense Force AEGIS destroyers, equipped with SM-III missiles, would be deployed in waters along the missile’s expected trajectory. One of these was deployed in the Sea of Japan and two were deployed in the East China Sea. Japan also deployed Pac-III defenses to Okinawa, including Ishigaki Island near Taiwan and the main island of Okinawa. For a full description of the SDF’s responses (in Japanese), see

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Third, a scenario beyond the management of the Japan-China bilateral relationship could engage forces from each nation. Here the Taiwan contingency is the most likely instigator of a situation where Japanese and Chinese forces find themselves directly engaged in conflict. In the late 1990s, in the wake of the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, the United States and Japan sought to update their bilateral military cooperation to cope with the changes in Northeast Asian security environment. The North Korean launch of a Taepodong missile two years later increased the need for upgrading military planning as well. Japan has worked closely with U.S. planners to update and develop new guidelines for bilateral defense cooperation that take into consideration conflicts in the “areas surrounding Japan.”35 While these guidelines have clearly been dedicated to a potential contingency on the Korean peninsula, they could easily be construed to provide the basis for cooperation in case of a Taiwan contingency as well. The Japanese government, however, has never indicated a desire to devise formal contingency plans with the U.S. military scenario. Yet, the proximity of U.S. and Japanese military bases in Okinawa—within minutes of Taiwan—and the increased SDF deployments near to the East China Sea clearly suggests that Japan would play a significant supporting role for U.S. forces should such a contingency emerge. Finally, and perhaps least likely but most devastating from Tokyo’s perspective, Japan’s defense planners worry that China in its effort to extend its control beyond the first island chain could decide to occupy Japan’s offshore islands. Most of the hundreds of islands belonging to the Ryukyu island chain, known today as Okinawa prefecture, are small, scarcely populated, and have no defenses. While the scenario of a Chinese invasion of these islands, including the Senkakus, may seem unlikely, it is conceivable that in a wartime scenario involving the occupation of Taiwan, that Chinese interests in the smaller Okinawa islands would grow. Thus, Japan has begun to deploy for the first time in the postwar period its Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) on Yonaguni, the island furthest from the main Okinawa Island and the closest island to Taiwan. The GSDF unit is small (about 100 or so personnel), and is a signals intelligence unit designed to further strengthen Japan’s ability to keep tabs on Chinese military activities in and around the East China Sea. Ultimately, Tokyo worries that a Chinese attempt to take over these small islands would have a tremendous psychological effect. Once the Senkakus, or other islands, were occupied, it would be very difficult for Japan to recover them. U.S.-Japan exercises for island defense operations have begun in the http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201203/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2012/03/30/120330siryou1.p df(accessed April 18, 2012). 35 See a detailed description of the revised US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines (in Japanese), at http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/sisin/index.html. For English versions of the alliance agreements at this time, see Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee and Alliance, available at: http://www/mod.gp/jp/e/d_act/us/index.html.

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wake of Japan’s 2010 confrontation with Beijing, and greater Japanese interest in cooperation between U.S. and Japanese forces in the Western Pacific has been reported. Tokyo would like to avoid all of these scenarios of conflict, of course. The future trajectory of interaction with China’s military remains uncertain, however, and while the growth of maritime presence in and around Japanese territory seems destined to continue at the current pace, the behavior and the ultimate purpose of these forces are not part of a comprehensive dialogue between Japan and China. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs hopes for an opportunity to engage with civilian and military leaders in Beijing to consider how to avoid any future incidents or miscalculations. Japan’s defense planners, however, remain focused on the task of improving their offshore island and air defenses, particularly in areas where Japan’s military presence has been lightest—the southwest. Managing Maritime Conflicts of Interest For the most part, Japan and China have sought to cope with their interactions in the East China Sea through bilateral diplomacy and their interests in the East China Sea to date have been managed for the most part peaceably. The first three decades of the postwar era had no government-to-government discussions, yet a steady stream of opposition Diet members to Beijing allowed for a certain level of informal problem-solving when issues arose. Most of these, as noted above, were incidents involving Japanese fishermen. Claims by China over the Senkaku Islands in the early 1970s complicated bilateral discussion on fisheries and on oil and gas development. Taiwan’s claims on these islands date from the 1970s also, and activists from Taipei and Hong Kong have since sought to land on these islands to claim them in the name of China. Despite cross-Straits tensions between Beijing and Taipei, they are united in their territorial claim of the Senkaku islands. Maritime clashes between Japanese and Chinese fishing vessels continued even after the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China was concluded, and yet these incidents remain less frequent or costly than similar maritime issues with Japan’s other neighbors, including South Korea and Russia. Tokyo and Seoul managed their fisheries difficulties bilaterally, and had little reason to go beyond diplomacy for their resolution. Russia, however, has been a different matter. With no peace treaty and little success in developing trust in a bilateral relationship, Tokyo has had to resort to multilateral venues for dispute resolution. Since the UNCLOS was ratified in 1994, the only cases Japan has taken to international courts for adjudication were with Russia. In contrast, Tokyo has preferred to keep its territorial dispute, as well as broader resource disputes in the East China Sea, within the bilateral channel of negotiation. .Last year’s conflict, however, creates new pressures on the Japan-China effort to resolve disputes in the East China Sea. Following the diplomatic

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confrontation over the Chinese fishing trawler, high level diplomacy remained stalled for some time, although efforts were made to try to resume Japan-China exchanges. The Great East Japan Earthquake that struck on March 11, 2011 offered an opportunity for China to demonstrate its goodwill, much like the Japanese did in the wake of the Szechuan earthquake in 2008. By the summer of 2011, the two governments had finally reached the point where a broad discussion on a host of bilateral interests could take place. Japan’s Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto traveled to Beijing for meetings with Vice President Xi Jinping and State Councilor Dai Bingguo to thank the Chinese government and people for their post-March 11 assistance. One of the many items on the agenda of discussions was maritime issues, and in that category, the two nations agreed to work towards a Maritime Search and Rescue agreement and “to improve communication between the relevant authorities of Japan and China towards development of a multi-layered mechanism for crisis management.”36 Prime Minister Noda reiterated this proposal for crisis management and confidence building on East China Sea issues when he visited Beijing in December 2011.37 The Japanese and Chinese governments agreed in principle to cooperate on Search and Rescue efforts. Tokyo would like to see a high level maritime dialogue that would include both crisis management as well as resource development issues in the East China Sea. To be effective this would need to include China’s various maritime agencies, in addition to its diplomats, and determining who in China should—and will—participate in such a mechanism remains unclear. Beyond this, of course, lies the larger question of how the countries of the Asia-Pacific can agree on a common set of norms for maritime security that will be acceptable to Beijing. East China Sea issues will be informed and affected by the discussions now underway about managing conflicting territorial and resource claims in the South China Sea. The ASEAN Code of Conduct has now been embraced in theory by Beijing38, but the specific content of that Code and the ability 36 See “Overview of the Meetings between Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto and Vice President Xi Jinping and State Councilor Dai Bingguo,” July 4, 2011, available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/meet110704.html. 37 In its summary of the bilateral Japan-China Summit Meeting, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs listed the Prime Minister’s six initiatives for improving the bilateral relationship. Japan and China will celebrate their 40th anniversary of normalizing diplomatic relations in 2012, and the hope is that better political relations can be sustained. Noda’s second initiative is to cooperate with Beijing to make the East China Sea a “Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship” by establishing high level talks on maritime affairs. Noda also urged China to come back to the table on the 2008 agreement for joint oil and gas development. See full text of summary at: www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/china/meeting1112.html (accessed April 18, 2012). 38 In 2010 at the ASEAN Regional Forum, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton shocked China’s Foreign Ministry by offering to “facilitate” multilateral discussion on how to resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea. According to media reports, this surprised China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, but later China initiated talks with the ASEAN neighbors on the Code of Conduct proposed by

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to formalize it into a multilateral commitment may take some time to realize. The East Asia Summit held in November 2011 also offered a venue for discussion of maritime security in the Asia Pacific. U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev joined the meeting as observers, and while territorial disputes were not on the agenda, the rights of transit through the complex array of waters off of continental Asia were discussed. The statement issued by the 18 countries represented in the East Asia Summit recognized the international law of the sea contains crucial norms that contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.39Japan’s alliance with the United States remains its primary vehicle for dispute resolution should China choose to confront Japan militarily.40 U.S. and Japanese military forces stationed in and around Japan have to date proven an effective deterrent against any Chinese military pressure on Japan. Secretary Clinton’s statement clarifying U.S. intentions, should a Chinese action on the Senkakus, occur is the strongest statement made by the United States about Washington’s willingness to defend against a threat to those islands. But a deliberate Chinese military action against Japan is highly unlikely. Rather, it is the potential for an incident or miscalculation by commanders that seems more likely. The sensitivities of both publics will make such an incident difficult to manage should the territorial claims over Senkaku islands be part of the mix. Yet any military confrontation—accidental or otherwise—between Chinese and Japanese navies in the East China Sea would pose significant challenges to the United States, and would bring Washington and Beijing into a crisis that both countries wants to avoid.

ASEAN for maritime affairs in Southeast Asia. See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html for a description of the Secretary’s role at the meeting. For the full text of Secretary of State Clinton’s press remarks after the two-day meeting can be found here: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm 39 For statement issued at the conclusion of the 2011 East Asia Summit, see http://www.aseansec.org/documents/19th%20summit/EAS%20Principles.pdf 40 On June 21, 2011, US-Japan Security Consultative committee meeting attended by Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Minister for Foreign Affairs Takeaki Matsumoto and Minister of Defense Toshimi Kitazawa, issued an update on alliance planning. See Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166597.htm (Accessed April 18, 2012).

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