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Japanese colonialism and Korean development: A reply
WorldDevelopment,
Pergamon
Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 883-888, 1997 0 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd
All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain
0305-750x/97 $17.00+ 0.00 PII: s0305--750x(97)000094
Japanese Colonialism
and Korean Development: A Reply
Princeton
ATUL KOHLI* University, New Jersey U.S.A.
1. INTRODUCTION Professors Stephan Haggard, David Kang and Chung-in Moon (HKM from here on) enumerate four criticisms of the “revisionist” interpretation of Korea’s development, including that of my earlier essay in this journal (Kohli, 1994). Their efforts provide a welcome opportunity to debate an important topic, as well as to clarify or qualify some issues, reiterate others, and disagree with yet others. The main contention below is that, whereas HKM provide some useful qualifications, the central point of such “revisionist” scholars as Cumings (1984) and Eckert (1991), as well as of my earlier essay in this journal stands: any full explanation of South Korea’s impressive postwar economy must take into account the state, society and the economy that country inherited from a relatively unique Japanese colonial past. In order to deal with HKM’s arguments against this position, I will discuss each of their four criticisms serially.
2. THE ECONOMIC
RECORD AND LEGACIES
First, HKM argue that I overestimate both economic growth in Korea under Japanese rule and the enduring legacy of this growth for postwar years. As to the growth record during the colonial period, HKM focus on agricultural growth. My earlier argument on this issue - based mainly on data generated by the well-known Korean economic historian, Sang-Chyul Suh (1978) - can be briefly reiterated: I argued that rice production in colonial Korea (say, during 1910-40) grew at a respectable rate of some 2% per annum, and that a fair amount of this growth was a result of improved yields per unit of land. Productivity growth, in turn, reflected Japanese government’s deliberate promotion of irrigation, improved seeds and the use of fertilizer.
Irrespective of the unpleasant facts that these Japanese actions were selfishly motivated and that most Koreans did not benefit from such colonial growth, the experience of a steady, “modem” (i.e., productivity-led) agricultural growth was nearly unique in the history of colonialism. This experience set Korea (along with Japan and Taiwan) apart from much of Asia - not to mention other parts of the developing world - and must be taken into account as a contributing factor in that country’s subsequent economic dynamism. HKM wish to dispute this line of thinking, but the exact grounds of their disagreement are not clear. For example, let us consider the issue of agricultural output in the colonial period. According to HKM’s own Table 2, agricultural and related products in colonial Korea grew steadily during 1911-38 at an average, annual rate of 3.17%, a figure substantially higher than anything I ever claimed. It is surprising that HKM never discuss the implications of these data, especially considering that they tend to contradict the tone of their specific discussion. HKM nevertheless provide a few important correctives in this discussion that, taken on their own, would imply some downward adjustment to my already lower estimates, though by how much is not clear. What is further confusing, however, is that HKM use figures for agricultural production as a whole to dispute my more limited claims, based as they were on rice production data. Setting aside these confusions and using the same sources as used by HKM,’ what we know about agricultural and rice production in colonial Korea
*I would like to thank Bruce Cumings, Carter Eckert and Robert Wade for their help in preparing this rejoinder. As usual, they are not responsible for any of my weaknesses. This was written while I was on sabbatical at the Russel Sage Foundation. Final revision accepted: January 25, 1997.
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WORLD DEVELOPMENT
can be clarified: Myers and Yamada (1984) estimate the overall, annual agricultural growth during 192040 to be 1.15% (based on Table 6, p. 447). SangChyul Suh (1978) provides similar figures for total crop production (which is not the same thing as total agricultural production, but it did constitute nearly 85% of the “total” during the colonial years; see Table 32), which by his estimates grew some 45% over the 25 years during 191540 (Table 35, p. 78) and further documents that rice production nearly doubled during 191040 (Table 33, Column 1, p. 73). With such data available, can anyone doubt that, by the standards of colonial economies, overall agricultural production in colonial Korea experienced a fair amount of growth, and that the growth in rice production was substantial? What is even more important are the sources of this growth, especially of rice production.* Both Suh (1978, Table 33, p. 73) and Myers and Yamada (I 984, Table 5, p. 444) document that neither land under cultivation, nor labor input into agriculture increased significantly during the colonial period. This suggests strongly that growth must have resulted from increased productivity. In spite of HKM’s protestations that such increases were only “modest” nearly a 60% increase in land productivity during 191040 (Suh, 1978, p. 73, Table 33) is hardly “modest” - data on changing patterns of paddy cultivation further underline the beginning of a “biological revolution” in Korean agriculture: during colonial years, paddy land using improved seeds doubled, fertilizer input expanded 10 times, and land under irrigation grew annually by nearly 10% (See Suh, 1978, p. 77, Table 34; Ishikawa, 1967, pp. 84-109; and Myers and Yamada, 1984, Table 3, p. 438.) These improvements were a direct result of the deliberate spread of “the Meiji state agrarian policy” from Japan to colonial Korea (Myers and Yamada, 1984, pp. 427-40; also see Suh, 1978, pp. 72-74). As Japanese colonial state sought to transform Korean agriculture, “a modem agricultural revolution began to take place,” and along with similar processes in Japan and Taiwan, “we can say (that) this was the first example of modem agricultural development in Asia” (Myers and Yamada, 1984, p. 446). Moreover, other scholars have documented that practices and institutions associated with this “revolution” continued into the postcolonial phase, contributing to a growing agriculture.3 In face of such evidence, why would anyone refuse to seriously entertain the proposition that unique colonial developments helped pave Korea’s foundation for subsequent economic dynamism? As to industrialization during the colonial period, HKM do not dispute its significant progress (their own Tables 14 document this record, including -in Table 2 - a 10% per annum growth rate in mining
and manufacturing during 1911-38).4 What they assert instead is that all this was largely inconsequential for postwar economic growth. Why? They provide three fairly conventional and mostly untenable - reasons: industry was highly concentrated in the hands of the Japanese; it was mostly located in the North; and, in any case, most factories were run down or destroyed during rapid decolonization and the subsequent Korean War. HKM’s first point about concentration is not persuasive. South Korea’s post-1965 economic growth was also highly concentrated in terms of ownership. Did that make it less real? As to Japanese ownership, the argument that “foreign-investmentdnven-industrialization-is-not-real-industrialization” has not been entertained seriously by development scholars for quite some time now. The northern location of heavy industry - HKM’s second point is an issue I had already discussed in the original essay (Kohli, 1994, p. 1282). Since HKM do not add new information on this point, let me just briefly reiterate the argument: nearly half of colonial Korea’s total industry was still located in the South (HKM’s Table 6). Moreover, much of this was light manufacturing industry - such as textiles (also HKM’s Table 6) that was more likely than Northern heavy industry to mature into a vibrant export sector. HKM’s case that colonial industrialization did not leave much of a legacy thus rests mainly on the subsequent decline and/or destruction of this industry. For three further reasons, this line of HKM’s argumentation is misleading. First, while it is true that rapid decolonization in Korea created considerable economic chaos and decline, it is also the case that the southern economy recovered relatively quickly.5 At minimum, this recovery underlines how much Koreans had learned during the colonial phase about running modem industry. Second, there is no doubt that the Korean War wreaked havoc on Korean industry. But, one cannot conclude from this, as do HKM, that colonial industrialization was inconsequential for further industrial growth. The fairly obvious point that needs to be reiterated instead is that it is easier to rebuild a war-tom, industrializing economy than it is to commence industrialization afresh in a traditional, agrarian society. The rapid postwar recovery of both Germany and Japan come to mind. Theoretically, this assertion rests on the claim that “knowledge” plays a significant role in industrialization, a point strongly stressed by the “new” endogenous growth theory (e.g., see Romer, 1993). It thus follows that, even if most factories were destroyed during the Korean War, the knowledge of industrial technology and management, as well as experience of urban living, a modem educational system and the skills of workers survived, leaving a positive legacy for postwar industrialization.
A REPLY Finally, there was the important institutional legacy: economic growth under the colonial auspices created a political economy model of how to pursue deliberate and rapid industrialization. The core of this “Japanese model” was close cooperation for production between an activist state and the entrepreneurs at the apex, and a highly controlled work force at the bottom. Subsequent South Korean elite could have rejected this model, as did their northern counterpart. They did not however; Park Chung Hee and his colleagues eventually chose to readopt it. The general point is that South Korean elite were among the very few in the developing world to whom such a model of development was readily available from their own historical past.
3. ON THE DEVELOPMENTAL
STATE
HKM’s second criticism can be set aside quickly because it is based on a misreading of my argument. One of my central arguments in the original essay was that Japanese colonial authorities transformed the decrepit Yi state into a fairly effective state capable of both controlling and molding the Korean society. The core of this state, moreover, especially the bureaucratic core, was inherited largely intact by sovereign South Korea, eventually providing the foundation for Park Chung Hee’s considerably more effective “developmental state.” As far as I can make out, HKM do not dispute this central argument, or at least not too vigorously. They demur instead by suggesting that such a formulation is “technocratic,” that it does not pay enough attention to the role of political authorities in setting goals that bureaucrats implement. I fully agree that the role of politics and of political authorities deserves more attention in the study of developmental states. As a matter of fact, this was one of the main conclusions of my original argument. Since HKh4 seemed to have missed this, let me quote from the original: Arguments about “developmental states”... often focus more on explaining a state’s capacity to implement goals and less on where these goals come from in the first place. The latter issue requires an explicit focus on the political process of a society... (s)ince efficacious states can be used by their leaders to accomplish various goals, including nondevelopmental goals, the politics of how developmental goals emerge as a priority must be an important component of any study of “developmental states” (Kohli, 1994, p. 1287). I do not understand how one could read this and yet maintain that my formulation neglected the role of politics. As to the substance of the argument, a simultaneous emphasis on politics and bureaucracy but-
885
tresses the continuity claim. The Japanese in Korea helped establish an efficacious state and, given their own self-serving imperial goals, used state power and coercion to introduce considerable economic change. Sovereign South Korea inherited this state. Since Syngman Rhee’s priorities were anything but developmental, the state structures during his reign atrophied. By contrast, Park Chung Hee sought rapid economic transformation of Korea. He revamped the state structures and utilized them much more effectively to facilitate Korea’s industrialization, this time in Korean interests, though once again, not without the cost of state repression. In retrospect then, generalizing over Korea’s history during the short 20th century - say from, 1910 to 1979 - the phase between 1945 and 1963 now appears to be a chaotic interregnum, with both the beginning and the ending periods dominated by prolonged episodes of state-led economic transformation.
4. ON THE ORIGINS OF KOREAN CAPITALISM Depending mainly on the important work of Eckert (1991), I argued in the original essay that Japanese colonialism provided a framework for the origins of Korean capitalism. HKM do not like this line of thinking. They object that Eckert may have studied a unique case, that the cases of govemmentbusiness cooperation I cite all involved Japaneseowned firms, and that Japanese or no Japanese colonialism, indigenous Korean capitalism would have developed anyhow. These are large and complex issues that cannot be settled in brief, certainly not by someone like me who is depending on the scholarship of Korean specialists to develop an interpretation. Since I am skeptical of HKM’s objections, however, let me outline three brief responses. First, Eckert’s major study (1991) remains unsurpassed. If scholarly evidence is the main ground for accepting an argument, it is difficult to come away from Eckert’s work without seriously entertaining his core proposition: “Korean Capitalism.... came to enjoy its first flowering under Japanese rule and with official Japanese blessing” (Eckert, 199 1, p. 6). If generalizing from limited case material is a problem, subsequent scholarship is beginning to provide further support to Eckert’s thesis. For example, the systematic studies of Korean scholar Ho SWYol have demonstrated that, during the 193Os, both the number of Korean entrepreneurs and the size of Korean-owned firms grew substantially.6 Such evidence documenting quantitative and qualitative changes buttresses the claim that Korean capitalism found a firm footing under Japanese tutelage. Second, HKM’s attempts to speculate about what
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WORLD DEVELOPMENT
may have happened had the Japanese never colonized Korea is a little fanciful. There are ways to use counterfactual reasoning but ima+ning an entirely different past is not one of them. For example, if “what if’ is the intellectual game, instead of HKM’s imagined past of an indigenous, Korean capitalist development, why should one not entertain an alternate scenario: given Korea’s profoundly anticapitalist structures at the turn of the century - both ideologically and, more importantly, in terms of precapitalist interests of both the monarchy and the yangaban that dominated the state - self-propelled capitalist development was not very likely. Left to its own resources, the Korean state in the first half of this century, like the neighboring Chinese state, may well have disintegrated under sustained foreign pressures, leading to rebellions, chaos and possibly a revolution, rather than to a nationalist, capitalist path. I am not arguing this position. I am merely pointing out the variety of “counterfactuals” that can plausibly be argued if one chooses to imagine an entirely different past, and thus am suggesting that this is probably not a very fruitful intellectual strategy. Leaving counterfactuals aside, much of what did happen points in the direction that Korean capitalism took root under colonial auspices. Considerable growth in manufacturing was facilitated by a close cooperation between an activist state and large private firms. Yes, this was a self-interested colonial state and yes, most of these firms were Japaneseowned. Nevertheless, many Koreans worked in both the state and in the factories, and this economic drama unfolded on the Korean soil. In essence, Japanese-style capitalism was slowly but surely transferred to Korea. Moreover, numerous Korean entrepreneurs got their economic start during this period (Eckert, 1991, p. 337, n. 3). Yes, some of the biggest business houses of contemporary South Korea were established only in the postcolonial period. Capitalism, however, never just happens suddenly. Many of these big business houses - such as Samsung, Hyundai and Lucky Star were founded by individuals who first made their economic mark in the colonial era. The general point is this: a substantial strata of Korean entrepreneurs developed during the colonial period, and many of these went on to make significant contributions to Korea’s eventual state-led industrialization.
5. ON THE STATE AND LOWER CLASSES Finally we come to the issue of control of lower classes during the colonial period, especially factory workers. I argued in the original formulation that the Japanese in Korea helped establish a system of labor-
management relations that was highly repressive and, in many ways, resembled their own. Managers hired young Koreans, provided on-the-job training, inculcated loyalty to the firm, demanded grueling, long hours of work, and backed by state power, strictly prohibited any attempts at unionization or political activity. Moreover, the sampo system included the formation of “industrial patriotism clubs,” involving employers and labor “leaders” who were on the employers’ payroll. This strict system of carrot and sticks not only enabled the Japanese to hold wages behind steadily improving productivity, but also freed them to pursue a narrow production agenda without worrying about “politics.” This system of labor management was inherited by sovereign South Korea and, once again, was largely maintained in the subsequent high growth phase. HKM do not disagree with this argument; they even suggest that they are “sympathetic” to it. They again wish to detract from it, however, by suggesting that other policy areas, such as education and land distribution, were marked instead by discontinuity. One could dispute these issues, especially the issue of education,* but they were not central to my early argument. The main original point concerned the fact that the die of South Korea’s labor-management relations was cast during the colonial period; that point stands.
6. CONCLUSION In sum, HKM’s criticisms are not persuasive. Japanese colonial influence on Korea, while ruthless and humiliating, was also decisive in shaping a political economy that later evolved into the highgrowth South Korean path to development. Korean state under the Japanese influence was transformed into an effective institution. Production-oriented alliances involving the state and entrepreneurs evolved, leading up to considerable economic growth, including expansion of manufacturing. A repressive but effective system of labor-management took root during the colonial period. There are hardly any other similar cases of colonial experience. Moreover, subsequent South Korean leaders like Park Chung Hee chose to build on this past, establishing significant continuities. None of this emphasis on continuity is supposed to exonerate the Japanese from their self-interested, brutal colonial acts. South Korea’s postwar economic success, however, is a rather important case; it deserves to be fully understood. Moreover, no understanding of South Korea’s “economic miracle” will be complete without taking into account the contribution of a relatively unique colonial past.
887
A REPLY
NOTES For this discussion HKM cite a 1988 work by 1. Yamada. I use a coauthored essay by Yamada (Myers and Yamada, 1984) that HKM also cite. Moreover, HKM use an unpublished, 1973 “working paper” by Sung Hwan Ban to which, unfortunately, I did not have ready access. HKM seem to suggest that my focus on rice 2. production somehow distorts the overall picture of agricultural growth. For three reasons this is not quite right. First, rice represented nearly half of the total agricultural output; a focus on rice thus helps analyze the crop that dominated agriculture of the period. Second, rice was the main crop of interest to the Japanese; it was export of rice back to Japan that motivated the colonial policy. A focus on rice thus helps get at the main issue of interest, namely, the economic role of the colonial state. Third, whereas rice production clearly grew rapidly, some other important crops were not far behind. For example, if indices of rice output moved from 100 to 165 during 1915-40, that of barley moved from 100 to 132, of cotton, from 100 to 298, and of “total crops,” from 100 to 145 (see Suh, 1978, Table 35, p. 78). Mason et al. (1980) show that agriculture grew 3. steadily during 1945-50. Major sources of this growth were “productivity increases,” facilitated in part by the fact that the “experience with chemical fertilizers and improved plant varieties introduced in the 1930s did not disappear” in the postcolonial phase (Mason et al., 1980, p. 82). As to institutional continuities, Mason and his colleagues again tell us that when South Korea’s rural extension system was rebuilt in the late 195Os, “it was rebuilt on the old foundations and in the same location” (in the City of Suwon) (Mason et al., 1980, p. 82). Wade (1982) also documents the continuity between the colonial and postcolonial phase in the management of irrigation. HKM nevertheless try to minimize the significance of 4. this record by adopting a “yes, but” tone that is clearly evident in such problematic formulations: “Even following the heavy industry drive of the 1930s however, Korea was still predominantly an agricultural country.” - this when nearly a third of Korea’s commodity products by 1940 originated in mining and manufacturing (see HKM’s Table
1). I wonder by what standard the authors judge the progress of industrialization in a colonial economy. HKM similarly exhibit a lack of a comparative historical perspective when they argue that colonial Korea’s exports - that “included processed foods and the output of heavy and chemical industries” resembled a “traditional colonial” model, What “traditional colony” ever exported heavy and chemical industrial goods? 5. Two related points should be noted. First, Jones and Sakong (1980) note that the “enterprises ran quite well for more than a year after the departure of the Japanese” (p. 36) leading them to suggest that labor strife and market disruption were more important reasons of the postcolonial economic decline than the departure of the Japanese. Second, Frank, Kim and Westphal (1975) document that economic recovery following decolonization was “fairly rapid”; during 194649, average production “increased about two and a half times” (p. 8). More specifically, indexes of production of cotton went from 100 to 230, of cement from 100 to 225 and of electric power from 100 to 291. Much of this scholarship is in Korean and thus not 6. readily accessible to me. Eckert summarized some of its main findings to me in a personal communication. For further details on this and on several other related issues, see Eckert (forthcoming), an excellent historiographical essay. 7. Tetlock thus argues that one of the “rules” for using counterfactual logic is the “minimal-rewrite-of-history” rule that instructs us to avoid counterfactuals that require “undoing” many events. See Tetlock and Belkin (1996), introductory chapter. For example, Tsurumi (1984) documents that “by 8. 1940 half of all Korean school-age children were attending elementary school” (1984, p. 305). These children would have matured into working adults of 1960s and beyond, contributing to an educated work force. Nationalistic sentiments aside, very few colonies ever benefited from a similar early spread of education.
REFERENCES Cumings, B. (1984) The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy. InternationalOrganization 38(l), 140. Eckert, C. J. (1991) OfSspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial
Origins of Korean
Capitalism,
1876-1945. University of Washington Press, Seattle. Eckert, C. J. (forthcoming) Economic development under Japanese colonial rule. Cambridge History of Korea/ “Modern” Volume. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Frank, C. R. Jr., Kim, K. S. and Westphal, L. E. (1975) Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea. Columbia University Press, New York.
S. (1967) Economic Development in Asian Kinokuniya Bookstore Co., Tokyo. Jones, L. R. and Sakong, I. (1980) Government, Business
Ishikawa,
Perspective.
and Entrepreneurship Korean
Case. Harvard
in Economic
Development:
The
University Press, Cambridge. Kohli, A. (1994) Where do high growth political economies come from? The Japanese lineage of Korea’s “developmental state”. World Development 22(9), 1269-1293. Mason, E. S. et al. (1980) The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Myers, R. H. and Yamada, S. (1984) Agriculture development in the empire. In The Japanese Colonial Empire,
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1895-1945, eds. R. H. Myers and M. R. Peattie, pp. 42&45 1. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Romer, P. (1993) Idea gaps and object gaps in economic development. Paper presented at the World Bank Conference on “How Do National Policies Affect Long Run Growth” Washington, DC. Suh, S.-C. (1978) Growth and Structural Changes in the Korean Economy, 1910-1940. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Tetlock, P. E. and Belkin, A. (1996) Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Tsurumi, E. P. (1984) Colonial education in Korea and Taiwan. In The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, eds. R. H. Myers and M. R. Peattie, pp. 275-311. Princeton University Press, Princeton, Wade, R. (1982) Irrigation and Agricultural Politics in South Korea. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
Pergamon
Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 883-888, 1997 0 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd
All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain
0305-750x/97 $17.00+ 0.00 PII: s0305--750x(97)000094
Japanese Colonialism
and Korean Development: A Reply
Princeton
ATUL KOHLI* University, New Jersey U.S.A.
1. INTRODUCTION Professors Stephan Haggard, David Kang and Chung-in Moon (HKM from here on) enumerate four criticisms of the “revisionist” interpretation of Korea’s development, including that of my earlier essay in this journal (Kohli, 1994). Their efforts provide a welcome opportunity to debate an important topic, as well as to clarify or qualify some issues, reiterate others, and disagree with yet others. The main contention below is that, whereas HKM provide some useful qualifications, the central point of such “revisionist” scholars as Cumings (1984) and Eckert (1991), as well as of my earlier essay in this journal stands: any full explanation of South Korea’s impressive postwar economy must take into account the state, society and the economy that country inherited from a relatively unique Japanese colonial past. In order to deal with HKM’s arguments against this position, I will discuss each of their four criticisms serially.
2. THE ECONOMIC
RECORD AND LEGACIES
First, HKM argue that I overestimate both economic growth in Korea under Japanese rule and the enduring legacy of this growth for postwar years. As to the growth record during the colonial period, HKM focus on agricultural growth. My earlier argument on this issue - based mainly on data generated by the well-known Korean economic historian, Sang-Chyul Suh (1978) - can be briefly reiterated: I argued that rice production in colonial Korea (say, during 1910-40) grew at a respectable rate of some 2% per annum, and that a fair amount of this growth was a result of improved yields per unit of land. Productivity growth, in turn, reflected Japanese government’s deliberate promotion of irrigation, improved seeds and the use of fertilizer.
Irrespective of the unpleasant facts that these Japanese actions were selfishly motivated and that most Koreans did not benefit from such colonial growth, the experience of a steady, “modem” (i.e., productivity-led) agricultural growth was nearly unique in the history of colonialism. This experience set Korea (along with Japan and Taiwan) apart from much of Asia - not to mention other parts of the developing world - and must be taken into account as a contributing factor in that country’s subsequent economic dynamism. HKM wish to dispute this line of thinking, but the exact grounds of their disagreement are not clear. For example, let us consider the issue of agricultural output in the colonial period. According to HKM’s own Table 2, agricultural and related products in colonial Korea grew steadily during 1911-38 at an average, annual rate of 3.17%, a figure substantially higher than anything I ever claimed. It is surprising that HKM never discuss the implications of these data, especially considering that they tend to contradict the tone of their specific discussion. HKM nevertheless provide a few important correctives in this discussion that, taken on their own, would imply some downward adjustment to my already lower estimates, though by how much is not clear. What is further confusing, however, is that HKM use figures for agricultural production as a whole to dispute my more limited claims, based as they were on rice production data. Setting aside these confusions and using the same sources as used by HKM,’ what we know about agricultural and rice production in colonial Korea
*I would like to thank Bruce Cumings, Carter Eckert and Robert Wade for their help in preparing this rejoinder. As usual, they are not responsible for any of my weaknesses. This was written while I was on sabbatical at the Russel Sage Foundation. Final revision accepted: January 25, 1997.
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WORLD DEVELOPMENT
can be clarified: Myers and Yamada (1984) estimate the overall, annual agricultural growth during 192040 to be 1.15% (based on Table 6, p. 447). SangChyul Suh (1978) provides similar figures for total crop production (which is not the same thing as total agricultural production, but it did constitute nearly 85% of the “total” during the colonial years; see Table 32), which by his estimates grew some 45% over the 25 years during 191540 (Table 35, p. 78) and further documents that rice production nearly doubled during 191040 (Table 33, Column 1, p. 73). With such data available, can anyone doubt that, by the standards of colonial economies, overall agricultural production in colonial Korea experienced a fair amount of growth, and that the growth in rice production was substantial? What is even more important are the sources of this growth, especially of rice production.* Both Suh (1978, Table 33, p. 73) and Myers and Yamada (I 984, Table 5, p. 444) document that neither land under cultivation, nor labor input into agriculture increased significantly during the colonial period. This suggests strongly that growth must have resulted from increased productivity. In spite of HKM’s protestations that such increases were only “modest” nearly a 60% increase in land productivity during 191040 (Suh, 1978, p. 73, Table 33) is hardly “modest” - data on changing patterns of paddy cultivation further underline the beginning of a “biological revolution” in Korean agriculture: during colonial years, paddy land using improved seeds doubled, fertilizer input expanded 10 times, and land under irrigation grew annually by nearly 10% (See Suh, 1978, p. 77, Table 34; Ishikawa, 1967, pp. 84-109; and Myers and Yamada, 1984, Table 3, p. 438.) These improvements were a direct result of the deliberate spread of “the Meiji state agrarian policy” from Japan to colonial Korea (Myers and Yamada, 1984, pp. 427-40; also see Suh, 1978, pp. 72-74). As Japanese colonial state sought to transform Korean agriculture, “a modem agricultural revolution began to take place,” and along with similar processes in Japan and Taiwan, “we can say (that) this was the first example of modem agricultural development in Asia” (Myers and Yamada, 1984, p. 446). Moreover, other scholars have documented that practices and institutions associated with this “revolution” continued into the postcolonial phase, contributing to a growing agriculture.3 In face of such evidence, why would anyone refuse to seriously entertain the proposition that unique colonial developments helped pave Korea’s foundation for subsequent economic dynamism? As to industrialization during the colonial period, HKM do not dispute its significant progress (their own Tables 14 document this record, including -in Table 2 - a 10% per annum growth rate in mining
and manufacturing during 1911-38).4 What they assert instead is that all this was largely inconsequential for postwar economic growth. Why? They provide three fairly conventional and mostly untenable - reasons: industry was highly concentrated in the hands of the Japanese; it was mostly located in the North; and, in any case, most factories were run down or destroyed during rapid decolonization and the subsequent Korean War. HKM’s first point about concentration is not persuasive. South Korea’s post-1965 economic growth was also highly concentrated in terms of ownership. Did that make it less real? As to Japanese ownership, the argument that “foreign-investmentdnven-industrialization-is-not-real-industrialization” has not been entertained seriously by development scholars for quite some time now. The northern location of heavy industry - HKM’s second point is an issue I had already discussed in the original essay (Kohli, 1994, p. 1282). Since HKM do not add new information on this point, let me just briefly reiterate the argument: nearly half of colonial Korea’s total industry was still located in the South (HKM’s Table 6). Moreover, much of this was light manufacturing industry - such as textiles (also HKM’s Table 6) that was more likely than Northern heavy industry to mature into a vibrant export sector. HKM’s case that colonial industrialization did not leave much of a legacy thus rests mainly on the subsequent decline and/or destruction of this industry. For three further reasons, this line of HKM’s argumentation is misleading. First, while it is true that rapid decolonization in Korea created considerable economic chaos and decline, it is also the case that the southern economy recovered relatively quickly.5 At minimum, this recovery underlines how much Koreans had learned during the colonial phase about running modem industry. Second, there is no doubt that the Korean War wreaked havoc on Korean industry. But, one cannot conclude from this, as do HKM, that colonial industrialization was inconsequential for further industrial growth. The fairly obvious point that needs to be reiterated instead is that it is easier to rebuild a war-tom, industrializing economy than it is to commence industrialization afresh in a traditional, agrarian society. The rapid postwar recovery of both Germany and Japan come to mind. Theoretically, this assertion rests on the claim that “knowledge” plays a significant role in industrialization, a point strongly stressed by the “new” endogenous growth theory (e.g., see Romer, 1993). It thus follows that, even if most factories were destroyed during the Korean War, the knowledge of industrial technology and management, as well as experience of urban living, a modem educational system and the skills of workers survived, leaving a positive legacy for postwar industrialization.
A REPLY Finally, there was the important institutional legacy: economic growth under the colonial auspices created a political economy model of how to pursue deliberate and rapid industrialization. The core of this “Japanese model” was close cooperation for production between an activist state and the entrepreneurs at the apex, and a highly controlled work force at the bottom. Subsequent South Korean elite could have rejected this model, as did their northern counterpart. They did not however; Park Chung Hee and his colleagues eventually chose to readopt it. The general point is that South Korean elite were among the very few in the developing world to whom such a model of development was readily available from their own historical past.
3. ON THE DEVELOPMENTAL
STATE
HKM’s second criticism can be set aside quickly because it is based on a misreading of my argument. One of my central arguments in the original essay was that Japanese colonial authorities transformed the decrepit Yi state into a fairly effective state capable of both controlling and molding the Korean society. The core of this state, moreover, especially the bureaucratic core, was inherited largely intact by sovereign South Korea, eventually providing the foundation for Park Chung Hee’s considerably more effective “developmental state.” As far as I can make out, HKM do not dispute this central argument, or at least not too vigorously. They demur instead by suggesting that such a formulation is “technocratic,” that it does not pay enough attention to the role of political authorities in setting goals that bureaucrats implement. I fully agree that the role of politics and of political authorities deserves more attention in the study of developmental states. As a matter of fact, this was one of the main conclusions of my original argument. Since HKh4 seemed to have missed this, let me quote from the original: Arguments about “developmental states”... often focus more on explaining a state’s capacity to implement goals and less on where these goals come from in the first place. The latter issue requires an explicit focus on the political process of a society... (s)ince efficacious states can be used by their leaders to accomplish various goals, including nondevelopmental goals, the politics of how developmental goals emerge as a priority must be an important component of any study of “developmental states” (Kohli, 1994, p. 1287). I do not understand how one could read this and yet maintain that my formulation neglected the role of politics. As to the substance of the argument, a simultaneous emphasis on politics and bureaucracy but-
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tresses the continuity claim. The Japanese in Korea helped establish an efficacious state and, given their own self-serving imperial goals, used state power and coercion to introduce considerable economic change. Sovereign South Korea inherited this state. Since Syngman Rhee’s priorities were anything but developmental, the state structures during his reign atrophied. By contrast, Park Chung Hee sought rapid economic transformation of Korea. He revamped the state structures and utilized them much more effectively to facilitate Korea’s industrialization, this time in Korean interests, though once again, not without the cost of state repression. In retrospect then, generalizing over Korea’s history during the short 20th century - say from, 1910 to 1979 - the phase between 1945 and 1963 now appears to be a chaotic interregnum, with both the beginning and the ending periods dominated by prolonged episodes of state-led economic transformation.
4. ON THE ORIGINS OF KOREAN CAPITALISM Depending mainly on the important work of Eckert (1991), I argued in the original essay that Japanese colonialism provided a framework for the origins of Korean capitalism. HKM do not like this line of thinking. They object that Eckert may have studied a unique case, that the cases of govemmentbusiness cooperation I cite all involved Japaneseowned firms, and that Japanese or no Japanese colonialism, indigenous Korean capitalism would have developed anyhow. These are large and complex issues that cannot be settled in brief, certainly not by someone like me who is depending on the scholarship of Korean specialists to develop an interpretation. Since I am skeptical of HKM’s objections, however, let me outline three brief responses. First, Eckert’s major study (1991) remains unsurpassed. If scholarly evidence is the main ground for accepting an argument, it is difficult to come away from Eckert’s work without seriously entertaining his core proposition: “Korean Capitalism.... came to enjoy its first flowering under Japanese rule and with official Japanese blessing” (Eckert, 199 1, p. 6). If generalizing from limited case material is a problem, subsequent scholarship is beginning to provide further support to Eckert’s thesis. For example, the systematic studies of Korean scholar Ho SWYol have demonstrated that, during the 193Os, both the number of Korean entrepreneurs and the size of Korean-owned firms grew substantially.6 Such evidence documenting quantitative and qualitative changes buttresses the claim that Korean capitalism found a firm footing under Japanese tutelage. Second, HKM’s attempts to speculate about what
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may have happened had the Japanese never colonized Korea is a little fanciful. There are ways to use counterfactual reasoning but ima+ning an entirely different past is not one of them. For example, if “what if’ is the intellectual game, instead of HKM’s imagined past of an indigenous, Korean capitalist development, why should one not entertain an alternate scenario: given Korea’s profoundly anticapitalist structures at the turn of the century - both ideologically and, more importantly, in terms of precapitalist interests of both the monarchy and the yangaban that dominated the state - self-propelled capitalist development was not very likely. Left to its own resources, the Korean state in the first half of this century, like the neighboring Chinese state, may well have disintegrated under sustained foreign pressures, leading to rebellions, chaos and possibly a revolution, rather than to a nationalist, capitalist path. I am not arguing this position. I am merely pointing out the variety of “counterfactuals” that can plausibly be argued if one chooses to imagine an entirely different past, and thus am suggesting that this is probably not a very fruitful intellectual strategy. Leaving counterfactuals aside, much of what did happen points in the direction that Korean capitalism took root under colonial auspices. Considerable growth in manufacturing was facilitated by a close cooperation between an activist state and large private firms. Yes, this was a self-interested colonial state and yes, most of these firms were Japaneseowned. Nevertheless, many Koreans worked in both the state and in the factories, and this economic drama unfolded on the Korean soil. In essence, Japanese-style capitalism was slowly but surely transferred to Korea. Moreover, numerous Korean entrepreneurs got their economic start during this period (Eckert, 1991, p. 337, n. 3). Yes, some of the biggest business houses of contemporary South Korea were established only in the postcolonial period. Capitalism, however, never just happens suddenly. Many of these big business houses - such as Samsung, Hyundai and Lucky Star were founded by individuals who first made their economic mark in the colonial era. The general point is this: a substantial strata of Korean entrepreneurs developed during the colonial period, and many of these went on to make significant contributions to Korea’s eventual state-led industrialization.
5. ON THE STATE AND LOWER CLASSES Finally we come to the issue of control of lower classes during the colonial period, especially factory workers. I argued in the original formulation that the Japanese in Korea helped establish a system of labor-
management relations that was highly repressive and, in many ways, resembled their own. Managers hired young Koreans, provided on-the-job training, inculcated loyalty to the firm, demanded grueling, long hours of work, and backed by state power, strictly prohibited any attempts at unionization or political activity. Moreover, the sampo system included the formation of “industrial patriotism clubs,” involving employers and labor “leaders” who were on the employers’ payroll. This strict system of carrot and sticks not only enabled the Japanese to hold wages behind steadily improving productivity, but also freed them to pursue a narrow production agenda without worrying about “politics.” This system of labor management was inherited by sovereign South Korea and, once again, was largely maintained in the subsequent high growth phase. HKM do not disagree with this argument; they even suggest that they are “sympathetic” to it. They again wish to detract from it, however, by suggesting that other policy areas, such as education and land distribution, were marked instead by discontinuity. One could dispute these issues, especially the issue of education,* but they were not central to my early argument. The main original point concerned the fact that the die of South Korea’s labor-management relations was cast during the colonial period; that point stands.
6. CONCLUSION In sum, HKM’s criticisms are not persuasive. Japanese colonial influence on Korea, while ruthless and humiliating, was also decisive in shaping a political economy that later evolved into the highgrowth South Korean path to development. Korean state under the Japanese influence was transformed into an effective institution. Production-oriented alliances involving the state and entrepreneurs evolved, leading up to considerable economic growth, including expansion of manufacturing. A repressive but effective system of labor-management took root during the colonial period. There are hardly any other similar cases of colonial experience. Moreover, subsequent South Korean leaders like Park Chung Hee chose to build on this past, establishing significant continuities. None of this emphasis on continuity is supposed to exonerate the Japanese from their self-interested, brutal colonial acts. South Korea’s postwar economic success, however, is a rather important case; it deserves to be fully understood. Moreover, no understanding of South Korea’s “economic miracle” will be complete without taking into account the contribution of a relatively unique colonial past.
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A REPLY
NOTES For this discussion HKM cite a 1988 work by 1. Yamada. I use a coauthored essay by Yamada (Myers and Yamada, 1984) that HKM also cite. Moreover, HKM use an unpublished, 1973 “working paper” by Sung Hwan Ban to which, unfortunately, I did not have ready access. HKM seem to suggest that my focus on rice 2. production somehow distorts the overall picture of agricultural growth. For three reasons this is not quite right. First, rice represented nearly half of the total agricultural output; a focus on rice thus helps analyze the crop that dominated agriculture of the period. Second, rice was the main crop of interest to the Japanese; it was export of rice back to Japan that motivated the colonial policy. A focus on rice thus helps get at the main issue of interest, namely, the economic role of the colonial state. Third, whereas rice production clearly grew rapidly, some other important crops were not far behind. For example, if indices of rice output moved from 100 to 165 during 1915-40, that of barley moved from 100 to 132, of cotton, from 100 to 298, and of “total crops,” from 100 to 145 (see Suh, 1978, Table 35, p. 78). Mason et al. (1980) show that agriculture grew 3. steadily during 1945-50. Major sources of this growth were “productivity increases,” facilitated in part by the fact that the “experience with chemical fertilizers and improved plant varieties introduced in the 1930s did not disappear” in the postcolonial phase (Mason et al., 1980, p. 82). As to institutional continuities, Mason and his colleagues again tell us that when South Korea’s rural extension system was rebuilt in the late 195Os, “it was rebuilt on the old foundations and in the same location” (in the City of Suwon) (Mason et al., 1980, p. 82). Wade (1982) also documents the continuity between the colonial and postcolonial phase in the management of irrigation. HKM nevertheless try to minimize the significance of 4. this record by adopting a “yes, but” tone that is clearly evident in such problematic formulations: “Even following the heavy industry drive of the 1930s however, Korea was still predominantly an agricultural country.” - this when nearly a third of Korea’s commodity products by 1940 originated in mining and manufacturing (see HKM’s Table
1). I wonder by what standard the authors judge the progress of industrialization in a colonial economy. HKM similarly exhibit a lack of a comparative historical perspective when they argue that colonial Korea’s exports - that “included processed foods and the output of heavy and chemical industries” resembled a “traditional colonial” model, What “traditional colony” ever exported heavy and chemical industrial goods? 5. Two related points should be noted. First, Jones and Sakong (1980) note that the “enterprises ran quite well for more than a year after the departure of the Japanese” (p. 36) leading them to suggest that labor strife and market disruption were more important reasons of the postcolonial economic decline than the departure of the Japanese. Second, Frank, Kim and Westphal (1975) document that economic recovery following decolonization was “fairly rapid”; during 194649, average production “increased about two and a half times” (p. 8). More specifically, indexes of production of cotton went from 100 to 230, of cement from 100 to 225 and of electric power from 100 to 291. Much of this scholarship is in Korean and thus not 6. readily accessible to me. Eckert summarized some of its main findings to me in a personal communication. For further details on this and on several other related issues, see Eckert (forthcoming), an excellent historiographical essay. 7. Tetlock thus argues that one of the “rules” for using counterfactual logic is the “minimal-rewrite-of-history” rule that instructs us to avoid counterfactuals that require “undoing” many events. See Tetlock and Belkin (1996), introductory chapter. For example, Tsurumi (1984) documents that “by 8. 1940 half of all Korean school-age children were attending elementary school” (1984, p. 305). These children would have matured into working adults of 1960s and beyond, contributing to an educated work force. Nationalistic sentiments aside, very few colonies ever benefited from a similar early spread of education.
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1895-1945, eds. R. H. Myers and M. R. Peattie, pp. 42&45 1. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Romer, P. (1993) Idea gaps and object gaps in economic development. Paper presented at the World Bank Conference on “How Do National Policies Affect Long Run Growth” Washington, DC. Suh, S.-C. (1978) Growth and Structural Changes in the Korean Economy, 1910-1940. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
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