Knowing me, knowing you: Self- and collective interests in goal development in asymmetric relationships

Industrial Marketing Management 48 (2015) 160–173

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Industrial Marketing Management

Knowing me, knowing you: Self- and collective interests in goal development in asymmetric relationships Kristin B. Munksgaard a,⁎, Rhona E. Johnsen b,1, Charlotte M. Patterson a,2 a b

University of Southern Denmark, Department of Entrepreneurship and Relationship Management, Universitetsparken 1, 6000 Kolding, Denmark ESC Rennes School of Business, 2 Rue Robert d'Arbrissel, 35065 Rennes Cedex, France

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 15 December 2013 Received in revised form 12 October 2014 Accepted 27 October 2014 Available online 7 April 2015 Keywords: Self-interest Collective interest Asymmetric relationships Relationship characteristics Goal development

a b s t r a c t This paper investigates how self-interests and collective interests in goal development are manifested in the context of asymmetric customer–supplier relationships. Taking an interaction approach (IMP Group, 1982), a conceptual structure highlighting possible patterns of characteristics of the asymmetric customer–supplier relationship and approaches to self- and/or collective interests in goal development has been created. Based on a multiple case study approach, the findings suggest that smaller suppliers who deliberately pursue selfinterest in their business activities with larger customers experience better outcomes. Larger customers recognise that the creation of collective business goals enhances the outcome of joint efforts in terms of market impact and profitability. The findings also highlight that trust is perceived as a necessity for the development of collective interests in asymmetric relationships and that the power of the larger customer is not perceived as a constraint. A key conceptual contribution is the identification of two distinct types of asymmetric relationships: ‘product/technology-oriented’ in which self-interest dominates by focusing on one party's resources for developing new products or technology and ‘complementary competencies-oriented’ in which collective interests link the competencies of the larger and smaller party for new joint business ambitions. © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction The paper takes an interaction approach (IMP Group, 1982) to understanding how self- and collective interests in goal development are manifested in the context of asymmetric relationships. Specifically, we aim to contribute to the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group (IMP) theory by investigating self- and collective interests in goal development in relationships between larger customers and smaller suppliers. Research on dyadic customer–supplier relationships has been a longstanding focus of research by the scholars of IMP (e.g., Alajoutsijärvi, Möller, & Rosenbröijer, 1999; Anderson, Håkansson, & Johanson, 1994; Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Ford, Håkansson, & Johanson, 1986; Hakansson & Gadde, 1992; Wilson, 1995). The subject has often been approached through a focus on relationship characteristic concepts that have formed the basis of frameworks that have attempted to define the nature of customer–supplier relationships. Conceptual foundations have been created to permit the examination and analysis of dyadic customer–supplier relationships

⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +45 6550 1467. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (K.B. Munksgaard), [email protected] (R.E. Johnsen), [email protected] (C.M. Patterson). 1 +33 (0)2 99 54 63 63. 2 +45 6550 1466.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2015.03.016 0019-8501/© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

and their structural characteristics, most notably, Ford et al. (1986) and Alajoutsijärvi et al. (1999). Characteristics have been developed that enable the description and classification of the structure of relationships. However, as Holmlund (2004) suggests, as relationships are complex phenomena and therefore describing their characteristics meaningfully proves difficult without simplifying reality, focusing on some aspects whilst leaving others in the background. Consequently, different theorists have focused on distinct individual characteristics or one or two characteristics of these relationships. Some researchers have chosen to focus on one characteristic or element, such as power, often linked to differences in company size and a corresponding imbalance in influence between smaller suppliers and larger customers (Cox, 1999; Fairhead & Griffin, 2000). Other examples are commitment (Mummalaneni & Wilson, 1986; Tellefsen, 2002), conflict (Duarte & Davies, 2003; Vaaland & Håkansson, 2003), and trust (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Sako, 1992). Indeed, each of these areas has developed substantial bodies of literature around their individual influences on dyadic relationships (Blomqvist, 2002). Other studies have attempted to capture the inter-relatedness of relationship characteristics and have described the connectedness and impact of these characteristics on the dynamics of business relationships (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 1999; Ford et al., 1986; Wilson, 1995). However, it has been highlighted that existing models and classifications do not adequately capture the complex balance and interplay of characteristics in customer–supplier

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relationships (e.g., Halinen, 1994; Holmlund, 2004). Therefore, more research is required to fully understand the structures and processes involved in customer–supplier relationships. For several decades, a number of researchers in the field of industrial marketing have been interested in understanding the dimensions of ‘asymmetric’ customer–supplier relationships. These relationships are considered to be associated with an imbalance in the size of the customer and supplier and to include situations where one firm invests more into, and gains less from, a relationship (e.g., Harrigan, 1988; Holmlund & Kock, 1996). Asymmetry has been understood in terms of the links between size difference (based on the number of employees of the total organisation) and certain individual relationship characteristics (Johnsen & Ford, 2008). The study of symmetry and asymmetry in customer–supplier relationships has been developing as researchers began to consider not simply interaction in generic relationships, but also how imbalances between a customer and supplier could affect and influence their interaction (Tu, 2010). Knowledge in the field of asymmetric customer–supplier relationships indicates that smaller suppliers may need to decide how to capitalise on their potential in asymmetric relationships by ensuring that their own interests come to the fore (Johnsen & Ford, 2008), whilst simultaneously making certain that their larger customer's requirements are taken care of and that an atmosphere that encourages joint interests is nurtured. Essentially, firms will engage in relationships guided by self-interest (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995), thus providing the basis for formulating business goals. However, developing relationships for the purpose of achieving a business goal is also derived from a collective effort of the firms in the relationship (Medlin, 2006). The focus of this study is an investigation of the ways in which self-interest and collective interest are manifested in asymmetric relationships as part of pursuing business goals and building fruitful collaborations. It is the complex issue of balancing self- and collective interests in asymmetric relationships that we will turn to in this study by addressing the following research question: How are self- and collective interests in goal development manifested in asymmetric relationships? In the following sections of the paper, the theoretical and empirical focus of the study is established. We focus on a literature review encompassing relationship asymmetry and self- and collective interests in goal development in asymmetric relationships. The findings from the empirical study are discussed and conclusions and conceptual and managerial lessons are presented. 2. Literature review: relationship asymmetry 2.1. Asymmetry in customer–supplier relationships To date, a number of conceptual and empirical foundations and contributions to understanding asymmetric customer–supplier relationships have been made in the literature. Knowledge of the dynamics of customer–supplier relationships has evolved through conceptual developments on the nature and characteristics of asymmetric relationships (Ford et al., 1986; Söllner, 1998; Johnsen & Ford, 2008), power and dependence in relationships (Emerson, 1962; Frazier & Antia, 1995; Hingley, 2005; Kumar, 2005; Meehan & Wright, 2012; Wilkinson, 1981) and relationship development in asymmetric relationships (Andersen & Kumar, 2006; Dwyer et al., 1987; Lee & Johnsen, 2012; Wilson, 1995; Zerbini & Castaldo, 2007). Asymmetry has sometimes been considered an immutable condition that smaller firms have to accept to survive in relationships with larger customers and to benefit from their experience and network connections (Harrison, 2004). However, some studies have shown that smaller firms often have strengths and capabilities relied upon by

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the more powerful party in the relationship, such as technological or cultural expertise (Johnsen & Ford, 2006). Smaller firms may therefore influence the characteristics of their relationship towards a more balanced position by focusing on certain customer priorities in key relationships and developing a reputation for strength in a key area of expertise (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). Thus, the smaller party is often not powerless but benefits from a certain domain of power that can extend from its dyadic relationships further into the network (Frazier & Antia, 1995). However, smaller firms in asymmetric relationships may have to focus all their energies on developing the relationship with their most important counterparts and may therefore sometimes lack the resources to look further afield in networks for growth and opportunities (Lee & Johnsen, 2012). By focusing on their own individual interests and those of their most important customers, smaller firms may lack the experience to take part in collective developments in their network. Most studies to date have sought to understand asymmetry from only the perspective of one side of the relationship — either the smaller supplier's or the larger customer's viewpoint (Claycomb & Frankwick, 2010). However, customer and supplier perceptions may differ widely in relationships (Claycomb & Frankwick, 2010). Recent research has built on this limitation by contributing findings that identify the areas that buyers and sellers seek to influence and the relative priorities of these areas for both parties (Meehan & Wright, 2011). Power has been found to differ in its underlying origins, depending on the experience of different companies. In addition, power in buyer–seller relationships has been deemed a pluralistic concept. As argued by the Guest Editors of this special issue, our present understanding of the scope of power is seen to be too narrow (Hingley et al., 2015) and researchers need to seek a more integrated perspective that is inclusive of the reality underlying the multiple experiences and relationships resident in power structures (Meehan & Wright, 2012). The findings from this recent research therefore point to a weakness in our understanding of asymmetry, of which power structures in relationships form part. Therefore, the scope of understanding of the influences of asymmetry on relationships may be argued to be too narrowly focused and require further investigation. 2.2. Asymmetric relationship characteristics Previous studies on asymmetric relationships have shown that the configuration of a set of relationship characteristics is an important determinant of the nature of asymmetry and that a better understanding of a firm's asymmetric relationship characteristics may facilitate suppliers or customers in achieving their desired outcomes in their relationships (Johnsen & Ford, 2008). The theory of asymmetric customer–supplier relationships has developed through the creation of typologies and conceptual structures linking asymmetric customer–supplier relationship characteristics with relationship development stages and interaction capabilities that may influence the nature of asymmetric relationships. The premise of much of the research on asymmetric relationships has been that a better understanding of smaller supplier–larger customer relationships could be gained by examining asymmetry in a set of characteristics of these relationships, and that the development of more symmetry in these relationships could be influenced by suppliers' capabilities (Johnsen & Ford, 2008). 2.3. Power and asymmetric relationships As argued in the beginning of this section, power is but one characteristic for understanding asymmetric relationships. Power asymmetries have been found to be influential in determining the direction of relationships and the positioning of a customer and supplier vis à vis their position in ongoing interaction in longterm relationships (Johnsen & Ford, 2008). In relationships with

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Table 1 Self- and collective interests in goal development in asymmetric relationships. Adapted from Johnsen & Ford, 2008. Relationship characteristic

Definitions and sources

Indicators of asymmetry

Approaches to self- and collective interests in development of goals

Particularity

Direction, uniqueness and commitment in a relationship, when compared to other relationships of the companies, or the extent of standardisation/adaptation of interaction (Ford et al., 1986).

- What is the extent of dedicated exclusive efforts of one party, e.g., production processes or designs of suppliers geared towards our specific needs? - To what extent is the other party committed to us in comparison with other relationships in its portfolio?

Cooperation

Extent of working together towards a shared aim or direction for the relationship (Ford et al., 1986).

- To what extent is the relationship characterised by co-operative rather than contentious interaction?

Conflict

Extent of perceived differences between parties, causing friction and disputes, but also the potential for creativity (Ford et al., 1986).

- What is the extent of disagreement or disputes over, e.g., specifications, or nature of orders or agreed designs?

Intensity

Extent of contact and resource exchange between firms in a relationship (Ford & Rosson, 1982).

Interpersonal inconsistency

The personal expectations and individual interests influencing interactions and the extent of perceived variations in the other actor's approach to interaction between individuals or departments (Ford et al., 1986; Johnsen & Ford, 2008).

- What is the number of staff or groups involved in relationship? - How frequently do we meet face-to-face? - What is the extent of senior manager involvement in this relationship? - Are there great differences between how individuals or departments interact with the other party? - To what extent do we send or receive mixed messages from different parts of company or different individuals? - What is our ability to persuade other party to do something they do not want to do? - Are we in a position to influence decisions and actions of the other party? - What is the proportion of our business with the other party? - To what extent are we reliant on the other party's technology or knowledge, e.g., where the other party's technology or capability is unique or unmatched? - Are we confident that the other party will adhere to the contract? - Are we confident that the other party will perform tasks in excess of agreed terms and conditions? - Are we confident that the other party has competence to be able to produce what the contract requires?

- To what extent do one or both parties give up their goals completely for the other's benefit? - Has goal-setting developed the same or differently in this relationship as in the others? - How does cooperation around goal-setting evolve? - How are goals negotiated? - Are goal-setting discussions ever contentious? - How do the parties manage disagreements about goals? - What is the extent and frequency of interaction about goals? - What is the role of different managers/individuals in goal development/negotiation of goals? - How consistent is goal setting in this and other relationships? - Do the outcomes of goal setting depend on certain individuals or parties?

Power/dependence Extent to which an actor—implicitly or explicitly—can get another actor to do something that they would not otherwise have done (Dahl, 1961; Hausman & Johnston, 2010). Dependence is the obverse of power as the more dependence of one party on another the less power the former has within that relationship (Emerson, 1981; Ford, 1980; Hingley, 2005).

Trust

The expectation held by one actor about another that the other responds in a predictable and mutually acceptable manner. Importance of contractual, competence and goodwill trust at different stages of relationship (Huemer, 2004; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Sako, 1992).

- What are the domains of self-interest and shared interest that influence goals? - How is power in different domains handled in developing goals? - Do one or both parties have more influence over how goals develop? - Are self-interests ever over-ridden by one party? - Are goals set by personal agreement or by contract? - To what extent does agreement of goals rely on the personal integrity of one or more individuals? - Is there a need to check whether own requests have been taken into account by the other party?

Possible network outcomes of goal development in asymmetric relationships -

Links to indirect relationships in the network and extension of goals into other activities (Munksgaard & Medlin, 2014; Ritter & Ford, 2004) Achievement of joint goals leads to increased levels of collaboration, effectiveness and innovation (Corsaro & Snehota, 2011), (Gadde & Hakansson, 1992; Tidström, 2006) Relationship impacts from third parties may push a customer and supplier to achieve joint goals (Corsaro & Snehota, 2011)

power asymmetries the most powerful actor may dictate and govern the behaviour of its counterpart and control the direction of interaction (Dwyer & Walker, 1981). Self-interests are therefore more difficult for the less powerful party to develop in relationships when one party has excessive control over the direction of the other. So, the gains and rewards for the more powerful party will predominate (Munksgaard & Medlin, 2014) and the benefits for the more dependent firm will be difficult to capture (Easton, 2002). Thus, an indicator of power asymmetry is the extent to which one party can persuade the other to do something the partner would not have done or the position to influence others' decisions (see Table 1). The position of a less powerful party and the associated dependence incurred by this position may be a price that some firms may be willing to pay for the benefits accruing to working with a powerful counterpart (Easton, 2002). The more dependent on a partner, the less powerful is the firm (Emerson, 1981; Ford, 1980).

Therefore, an indicator of power asymmetry is the proportion of a firm's business done with a partner, where one party is able to dictate the extent that it is prepared to work with another and so demonstrate its power to select and decide on a counterpart. However, the dependence can also be from the larger customer to the smaller suppliers due to their unique, focused capabilities (Lee & Johnsen, 2012). Another indicator of power asymmetry is hence a partner's reliance on e.g., the capabilities, technology or niche knowledge of its counterpart (see Table 1). Power asymmetries therefore shape potential outcomes and possibilities in relationships between customers and suppliers (Lee & Johnsen, 2012) and may influence the potential of the long-term relationship development process. Power asymmetry may therefore have wider network effects as a compelling factor in the development and dissolution of network relationships, as power extends beyond a dyadic relationship into the wider network (Harrison, 2004; Havila, 1996).

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However, although research on asymmetric relationships has looked at structures and processes to date (e.g., power structures, sets of characteristics, relationship development processes), it has so far failed to encompass the impact of experiences of firms in asymmetric relationships on activities linked to their relationships. It is this limitation that we seek to address in this paper by investigating the influence of asymmetric relationships on self- and collective goal development in customer–supplier relationships. In the next section, the literature on self- and collective interests is developed before we present the conceptual structure underpinning the paper.

2.4. Self- and collective interests in goal development in asymmetric relationships In relationships, it may be considered that effectiveness and positive outcomes are dependent on the behaviour and actions of the parties involved (Eisenhardt, 1989; Heide, 1994). As long as the parties' interests related to the relationship are aligned, few conflicts will ensue. However, when the parties perceive or experience potential conflicts, they will, to an increasing degree, monitor each other's behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the strategy literature, it is argued that interest and business goal alignment is desirable because it will lead to effectiveness and connectivity in relationship activities. Further, alignment is claimed to be even more important as complexity increases (Corsaro & Snehota, 2011). In the previous section, it was argued that an understanding of the complex interplay of the characteristics of asymmetric relationships may facilitate asymmetric partners to achieve desired outcomes (Johnsen & Ford, 2008). Thus, the alignment of goals between a customer and supplier in a complex context such as an asymmetric relationship can be considered even more challenging and important. In the traditional strategy literature, one way to approach the complexity of alignment in interest and goal development is through agency theory that discusses various forms of governance models for the principal monitoring and influencing the behaviour of agency partners (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Heide, 1994). Another way to approach this complexity is to discuss actors' self-interest and collective interest in relationships (Medlin, 2006). Self-interest can be defined as the act of pursuing one's own right and is related to economic performance. Collective interest is the conjoint self-interest of partners in a relationship vis-à-vis other interests in a network (Medlin, 2006). The collective interest of collaborating partners is formed by their joint intentions to achieve superior economic goals and relationship performance. Following the presented definition of Medlin (2006), we follow an interaction perspective on firms' interest in engaging in relationships and how these relate to business goal development, which is relevant and important when studying asymmetric relationships. The development of self- and collective interests is an important consideration for both parties in an asymmetric relationship, as the larger party will seek to influence the smaller party and vice versa. The self-interest of each party and its related actions may contribute to the creation of the firm's identity in the wider network. Furthermore, the way in which self- and collective interests entwine may provide a better understanding of the possibilities and limitations for strategic business goal development. This is linked to how selfand collective interests contribute to improved relationship performance. That is, the partners' perception of economic performance in the relationship relative to perceptions of performance in the wider network. It has been shown that achieving firms' selfinterest comes through successful joint action (Medlin, 2006). The development of joint business goals will motivate firms to reach higher levels of relationship performance. But in the process, it is important to have resource fit between the partners.

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To make a relationship work effectively, firms need a certain level of partial alignment of their goals. Since IMP literature claims that interaction between business actors is influenced by their differences, alignment cannot be pre-determined or be considered definite in nature (Hakansson & Snehota, 1998). Still, alignment is generally claimed to be an important driver in customer–supplier relationships, linked to perceptions of available resources and interpretations of critical events, as shown by Corsaro and Snehota (2011). In asymmetric customer–supplier relationships in particular, we can expect the customer and supplier to have different expectations of their joint business due to the differences in their resource bases. However, misalignment can have the positive effect of forcing the parties to make greater efforts to achieve joint goals (Corsaro & Snehota, 2011), leading to increased levels of collaboration, effectiveness and innovation (Gadde & Hakansson, 1992; Tidström, 2006). The extent to which misalignment leads to conflict is often related to the parties' perceptions of the problem (Jameson, 1993) and can be solved through effective communication. Furthermore, misalignment in interests has been shown to have network implications, as relationship impacts from third parties may push a customer and supplier to achieve joint goals (Corsaro & Snehota, 2011). Thus, perceptions of self- and collective interests are to be found on several levels: the firm, in customer–supplier relationships and in the network. Actions related to specific business goals will not necessarily be perceived as having the same impact on every level (Corsaro & Snehota, 2010; Medlin, 2006). For the purpose of this study, it is important to acknowledge that business goal development will not only be influenced by the self- and collective interests of the customer and supplier in the relationship but also by the network in which they are embedded. In other words, the customer and supplier must not only handle differences in their joint interests but also vis-à-vis the interests of other counterparts in the network (Medlin, 2003; Ritter & Ford, 2004). 2.5. Conceptual developments We adopt an interaction approach (IMP Group, 1982) to understanding how self- and collective interests in goal development are manifested in asymmetric relationships. Table 1 has been derived from a literature review and highlights the characteristics of asymmetric relationships. We focus on a chosen set of relationship characteristics; namely, particularity, co-operation, conflict, intensity, interpersonal inconsistency, power-dependence and trust, adopted from Johnsen and Ford (2008). This set was originally developed to focus on asymmetrical or more symmetrical manifestations and approaches of larger customers and smaller suppliers to a set of relationship characteristics. Following Johnsen and Ford (2008), we define asymmetry as an imbalance in the size and characteristics of a relationship. Asymmetry needs to be considered as an imbalance not only in the size of a customer and supplier firm, but also in the characteristics of a relationship. For example, a supplier may be smaller than its customer and have less power, but more trust in the relationship than its larger counterpart. This comprehensive view of multiple relationship characteristics is important in understanding the totality of an asymmetric relationship rather than its individual characteristics. For the purpose of this study, we use the set of relationship characteristics in Table 1 to examine how asymmetry across the characteristics may influence approaches to self- and collective interests in the development of goals in customer–supplier relationships. Our conceptual structure set out in Table 1 identifies the set of characteristics which include power and dependence as part of the set. In our review of power and asymmetric relationships we have elaborated on the indicators of power and dependence in asymmetric relationships. However, we have chosen to investigate the influence of asymmetric relationships within a wider base of

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Table 2 Case study companies. Firm Number of employees/International experience

Relationship counterpart Number of employees/Internationalisation experience

Size of firm relative to relationship counterpart

1) Vadehavsbageriet Supplier 7 employees Exports to the German market

Easyfood Customer 75 employees Production in Eastern Europe Exports within two categories: Luxury products for Western Europe and more basic convenience products for China, Russia and Eastern Europe

Small

2) Espersen Customer 300 employees 85% of production for export markets in Europe 3) Arla Foods Customer 1000 employees Production in 12 countries Exports to more than 100 countries, primarily Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Holland, Great Britain 4) Is fra Skarø Supplier 2 employees Exports to Holland, Germany, Greenland, Ukraine 5) Sweintya Customer 15 employees Exports to range of international markets 6) Dansk Honninga Supplier 2 employees Export to Germany 7) Gram Slot Supplier 45 employees No export 8) Petersen Fiskekonserves (requested pseudonym) Customer 130 employees Owns NielsensFiskeeksport, which exports to Germany a

Small Supplier NN (requested anonymity) Approx. 1000 employees Family-owned with subsidiaries in USA and Europe Supplier TT (requested anonymity) Approx. 5 employees

Singapore Airlines Customer Approx. 14,000 employees Global network covering six continents Dansk Honning Supplier 2 employees Export to Germany Sweinty Customer 15 employees Export to international markets 8) REMA1000 Customer More than 34,000 employees Represented in Scandinavia and The Baltic Countries

Large

Small

Large

Small

Small

Large Supplier YY (requested anonymity) 7 employees Exports one specific product to five continents, e.g., Europe, Africa, Asia

Sweinty and Dansk Honning represent two separate case studies. For these cases, both the customer perspective and the supplier perspective were investigated.

relationship characteristics rather than only power and dependence in order to determine how the varying experiences of firms in asymmetric relationships may influence their approaches to self- and collective interests in goal development. In so doing, we seek to achieve a more integrated understanding that is inclusive of the reality underlying the complex and differing experiences of firms in asymmetric relationships. Table 1 has been designed to inform the empirical study by creating indicators and questions that link to the empirical data collection. Table 1 builds on previous conceptual structures from Johnsen and Ford (2008) for the set of characteristics and definitions, and Lee and Johnsen (2012) for the indicators of asymmetry. Our contribution to the conceptual structure for this paper lies in the addition of the approaches to self- and collective interests in development of goals, building on Medlin (2006) and Munksgaard and Medlin (2014). The conceptual developments are designed to enable the identification of patterns of asymmetry and goal development in interaction in customer–supplier relationships. The adoption of an interaction approach enables the focus on one particular asymmetric relationship experienced by each company in the study. A focus on certain asymmetric relationships may enable firms to better understand and manage self- and collective interests in goal development in asymmetric relationships. The experience of firms in asymmetric relationships may influence their approaches to self- and collective interests in goal development. Through the establishment of collective goals, firms may be more likely to have influence at the network level rather than only the dyadic

relationship level. However, an imbalance in the size and characteristics of firms in asymmetric relationships may mean that a customer and supplier are more driven by their own individual interests. Asymmetric relationships have sometimes been considered to be ‘atavistic’ or self-centred in the literature (e.g., Harrison, 2004) as the party with more power and influence seeks to control the weaker partner and firms fight to hold on to their areas of influence and priority in the asymmetric relationship. So, individual interest may take priority in situations of asymmetry. However, to benefit from the opportunities resident in their relationships and network, firms in asymmetric relationships may have to be prepared to give up some control and commit to the wider goals of a network of symbiotic interests. Shared decisionmaking and a belief in reciprocity are central tenets of effective interaction (IMP Group, 1982). To approach relationships with a positive outlook and to benefit from opportunities, conflicts may have to be forgiven and trust offered, even though a firm does not feel totally ready to trust in its counterpart. Power may have to be relinquished in certain areas and shared more within a relationship to enable the possibility of collective goal development and the reaping of the common rewards of collective action. 3. Research methodology 3.1. The Danish food industry context This research developed from the basis of a funded project involving firms in the Danish food sector and their relationships to asymmetric

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Table 3 Overview of case studies. Company

Vadehavsbageriet

Espersen

Arla Foods

Is fra Skarø

Relationship

Easyfood Produces different kinds of bread products—collaborates or passes on orders when better suited for partner's production Complementary competencies (in production)

Supplier TT (requested anonymity) Dairy and technology supplier (for dairy production equipment) Draws on partner's resources for technology development

Singapore Airlines Developing and producing gourmet ice cream customised for the airline From joint product development to co-branding

Size re partner

Small

Supplier NN (requested anonymity) Producer of convenience fish products and ingredient supplier Draws on partner's resources for product development and related sales Large

Large

Small

Strategic approach for supplier involvement in product development

Strategic approach since Arla wants to access technology at the supplier Goal for joint technology development is based on Arla's interests

Is fra Skarø seeks to build close customer relationships through customised development and co-branding Over time, the partners reach a mutual interest in co-branding

Engaged in supporting the supplier to reach technology superiority Mutual dedication, but relationship is still in a development stage

Perception of joint ownership of the product Customers' requests are given high priority High degree of dedication

Very strategic approach to suppliers (runs supplier programmes) Uses resources only on strategic supplier relationships

Joint development is built on Singapore Airlines' requirements but based on Is fra Skarø's specific organic and gourmet profile Do co-branding and the customised ice cream is also sold to others No conflict experienced so far.

Self- and collective interests in asymmetric relationships Self- and collective Vadehavsbageriet seeks to interests expand and grow their business Joint ambitions for servicing joint customers, but no written statement of joint goals

Characteristics of (well-functioning) asymmetric relationships Draw on each other's Particularity Mutual knowledge exchange on knowledge and resources, markets and customer trends also to strengthen High mutual dedication relationships to third-parties One amongst other important Dedication varies, depending partners on ongoing projects Cooperation Joint focus on high product quality One of selected suppliers Cooperative interaction Close strategic relationship

Conflict

Intensity

Interpersonal inconsistency

When facing capacity problems, the bigger part facilitates development. Perceives partner to be bigger in terms of decision processes by taking more time (more hierarchical structure). Ongoing and frequent contact

Personal and frequent contact Perceive open dialogue to be the means to avoid conflicts. is considered important for avoiding conflicts. Formalised agreements on mutual processes for joint product development Close contact, more frequent in periods of product development

Rather close contact. Arla's relationship mantra is ‘connecting for growth’.

Personal relationships between owner managers Since Vadehavsbageriet is very small contact is rather consistent.

Contact is mostly at product developer level.

Personal relationships are considered relatively important. Daily contact at technology developer level, also meetings at top management level. Arla is a very powerful customer.

Power/dependence Easyfood suggests mutual agendas and Vadehavsbageriet follows. Trust Mutual and regarded as very important for being in business

Mutual Mutual building on personal relationships Long-term relationship (20+ years)

Network outcomes from goal development in asymmetric relationships Strengthen bargaining power Network Access to building relationships regarding larger retail outcomes/effects with new customers customers Access to new markets, and when joining forces the product portfolio offered is more complete from a customer perspective (exports).

Meetings not so frequent Owner-managers at Is fra Skarø have primary contact with the country manager at the airline company. New manager at Singapore Airlines has requested further developments. Personal relationships mainly to one country manager at the Airlines

Customer gives seal of approval.

Trust is built as both parties are involved Trust and no contract for deliveries in the joint development of technology. Increasing dependency as Is fra Skarø's production is growing due to the cooperation with Singapore Airlines Resources are tied to a degree that Is fra Skarø sometimes have to turn down demands from other/new customers.

Limited since Arla seeks to keep the new Seal of approval to co-brand with other technology to itself customers Strengthen bargaining power re: Singapore Airlines' other suppliers (catering supplier at the airport)

Company

Swienty

Dansk Honning

Gram Slot

Petersen Fiskekonserves

Relationship

Dansk Honning Produces and sells equipment for honey production Complementary competencies for entering new market

REMA1000 Organic farmer (and cultural institution and conference centre) Co-branding

Supplier YY (requested anonymity) Produces and sells a variety of branded as well as private-label fish products Draws on partner's technology for production and related onward sales

Size re partner

Large

Swienty Production and resale of honey Complementary competencies for entering new market Small

Small

Large (continued on next page)

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Table 3 (continued) Company

Swienty Vadehavsbageriet

Self- and collective interests in asymmetric relationships Self- and collective Swienty seeks to expand their interest product portfolio. The joint effort is to penetrate a new market.

Dansk Honning Espersen

GramFoods Slot Arla

Petersen Fiskekonserves Is fra Skarø

Dansk Honning's objective is to turn downward prices up on the Danish market to be able to build a profitable business. The joint effort is to penetrate a new market.

Gram Slot aims for developing products of high quality and a long product life time. Together the partners seek unique storytelling related to joint development and sales.

Petersen do continuous incremental innovation on own branded products. Cooperation is seen as inputs for internal developments. The joint effort with Supplier YY is initialised to give each partner a basis for reaching own goals.

Mutual use of partner's resources. REMA1000 is exclusive retail customer to Gram Slot. The mutual dedication is formalised in a contract.

Several short-term cooperative relationships with various customers and suppliers for strengthening own brand No particular dedication to any partner.

Joint trend spotting and idea development. REMA1000 holds financial resources to support Gram Slot's development of branded flour and dairy products.

Petersen uses a production technology developed by Supplier YY. This also expands the portfolio of Petersen. Supplier YY does not have the capacity to serve the market itself, so the cooperation gives access to the large retail market.

None reported.

Further developments by Supplier YY have given the partner the opportunity to also licence the technology to Petersen' competitor with access to the foodservice market. This is a conflicting issue affecting Petersen and Supplier YY's relationship. Infrequent and related to concrete issues of development

Characteristics of (well-functioning) asymmetric relationships Particularity Mutual knowledge exchange and Mutual knowledge exchange and business discussions business discussions Swienty is rather dedicated to this Dansk Honning is very attentive to the partner's partner. expertise and professional suggestions. Cooperation In mutual business, Swienty takes Dansk Honning takes charge on production related issues care of negotiations with third parties and related administrative of mutual business. The cooperation is very work. complementary as they tend Special customer–supplier relationship since they both need to deal with different tasks to make the mutual business each other. effective. Personal commitment Conflict Personal contact and dialogue is overshadows conflicting considered important to reduce issues since Dansk Honning is conflict. determined to continue the relationship. Intensity

Daily contact and frequent joint meetings and business trips characterise the personal relationship between owner-managers. Interpersonal Mostly personal and even familiar Personal relationship between owner-managers is inconsistency contact between considered very important to owner-managers Dansk Honning's business. Dansk Honning perceive the Power/dependence Since the partners are partner as very professional complementary in specialisation in business and to a great the relationship is perceived as extend relies on advise given. very balanced in power and dependence.

Trust

Close and daily contact at management level

The cooperation builds on trust and the mutual business is not formalised in any sense.

Strong mutual trust as a basis for fixed division of mutual business task

Network outcomes from goal development in asymmetric relationships Network Are successfully penetrating an Through joint exports, the outcomes/effects export market partners have succeeded in turning around the price development on the Danish market.

counterparts in Denmark or abroad. The food sector has traditionally played a significant role in the Danish economy, and today it still accounts for a large part of total industrial output (employment and export). Historically, this sector has been strongly influenced by a co-operative movement and traditions of joint ownership. This is claimed to have led to a focus on specialisation and concentration in every link of the chain from ‘field to fork’ (Hansen, 2005; Strandskov, 1991). Furthermore, as a countermove to the increasing market influence of retailers, actors in many parts of the Danish food sector have merged to counterbalance the growth in retail power. This has led to the dominance of a number of very large players in the market, e.g., in beverages, dairy and meat processing. However, the Danish food sector is also characterised by a substantial supply base of smaller firms. For

Daily and frequent contact and joint meetings. The daily cooperation is very informal and straight forward.

Personal relationship between CEOs and REMA1000's marketing manager and purchasing manager are members of Gram Slot's board. Gram Slot acknowledge that they are a small player in a larger business landscape and accordingly perceives cooperation as vital to success.

Few contacts across partners

Petersen is dependent on Supplier YY, since the smaller partner owns the unique production technology. Supplier YY is dependent on Petersen to reach the retail market. However, Supplier YY is building other relationships to access other markets. Mutual trust is considered the most vital Trust is believed to build over time and an basis of the relationship. important element if to do joint innovation.

The relationship strengthens Gram Slot's Limited although both parties reach a bargaining power re potential investors. larger part of their market Since REMA1000 is an exclusive customer, Gram Slot has deliberately deselected other retail customers and their resources for participation in some networks are limited.

the purpose of this project, our focus is on the asymmetric relationships between these smaller and larger firms. The data collection for this study was supported by funding from the project ‘FoodNetwork’ directed by VIFU-Videncenter for Fødevareudvikling (centre for knowledge and development in the Danish food sector). 3.2. Multiple case studies Here, we study self- and collective interests based on managerial perceptions. A phenomenological perspective was accordingly adopted for this study as the most appropriate way to investigate how self- and collective interests develop in interaction in situations where firms are

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working in asymmetric relationships. In addition, the study was conducted using an abductive approach, as advocated by Dubois and Gadde (2002) to reflect the iterative process of reflections on the literature and empirical findings as the study evolved. The steps of the iterative process between theory, data and analysis are explained in detail in the ‘data collection’ section. These methodological choices have assisted us in outlining differences and similarities in self- and collective interests across the cases. A multiple-case approach was adopted to derive general conclusions from a limited number of cases and to allow for retaining a holistic and meaningful characterisation of real-life events such as organisational and managerial processes and relationships (Yin, 2003). Case studies have been used frequently in IMP research to investigate situations where only little is known about the phenomenon (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Halinen & Tornroos, 2005), also in studies related to business goal development (e.g., Cantù, Corsaro, & Snehota, 2012) and asymmetric relationships (Johnsen & Ford, 2008; Lee & Johnsen, 2012). Qualitative data collection techniques were used to enable the researchers to increase their understanding and knowledge of the studied phenomenon, rather than seeking statistical representativeness (Halinen & Törnroos, 2005). By adopting this overall approach the researchers aimed to elicit generalisations based on a limited sample of case studies and focus groups. 3.3. Case company selection Eight cases were chosen from the food sector in Denmark. The researchers identified four small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in relationships with larger customers, one SME in a relationship with a larger supplier, as well as three larger customers in relationships with smaller suppliers. Differences in size between the SMEs and the larger customers were examined in terms of the number of employees of the entire organisation. The unit of analysis was the relationship between the smaller and larger firms. Some of the firms were accessed through contacts with the funding body that supported the research, whilst others were found through snowballing techniques by asking already-interviewed firms about their knowledge of other asymmetric relationships. Table 2 identifies the companies that took part in the eight cases and describes their size and activities in comparison with those of their counterparts that were chosen as the focus of discussions around the research themes of self- and collective interests in goal development in asymmetric relationships. 3.4. Data collection The data collection process included four steps reflecting the chosen iterative abductive process as advocated in the ‘multiple case studies’ section. The initial step of data collection involved three pilot case studies comprising face-to-face interviews with one SME and two larger firms. The pilot cases enabled the researchers to explore themes related to self- and collective interests in relationships and to refine the research questions for the main stage of data collection involving in-depth case studies. The findings from the pilot case studies enabled the researchers to subsequently adapt the conceptual structure relating to the ‘self- and collective interests in goal development in asymmetric relationships’ (Table 1), thereby helping to ensure construct validity and reliability. As a second step, five additional case studies involving face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were conducted during the main body of data collection. Semi-structured interview guides with open-ended questions were used to elicit the firms' experiences of approaches to goal development in their relationships (see Appendix A for an abbreviated version of the interview guide for interviews and focus groups alike, which were operationalised based on Table 1).

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Following the cases, the third step included two focus group interviews that were planned and completed to discuss in more depth the general experience of negotiating and developing self- and collective interests in goal development in asymmetric relationships. As the cases in general reflect well-functioning asymmetric relationships, we wanted to discuss our case findings as well as to engage with more nuanced issues related to self- and collective interests. Two groups were chosen for interviews. One group consisted of eight SMEs engaging in relationships with larger customers (none of the SMEs from the cases participated). Another group consisted of seven consultants working with and advising SMEs engaging in asymmetric relationships. As expected, the consultants, in particular, were able to supplement and nuance our understanding of self- and collective interests in goal development in the context of less well-functioning asymmetric relationships. The first three steps of data collection involved a total of eight semi-structured interviews. In all cases, the interviewee was the person directly involved in the asymmetric relationship in question and a person with business goal decision authority (owner manager or middle manager). Each interview lasted approximately two hours and was conducted face-to-face during a visit to the firms by the researchers. Detailed case reports including selected quotes have been accepted by every respondent. Quotes have been carefully translated from Danish to English. The two focus group interviews lasted approximately three hours each and were conducted by the researchers in a neutral meeting location. In essence, the fourth and final step of data collection was rolled out in parallel with the first three steps. We have drawn upon company archives and documents, published statistics, reports, marketing information and details from the companies' websites and the Internet for the study. These sources of secondary data were used to familiarise the researchers with the case companies' situations and environments prior to conducting the interviews, or to confirm certain facts about the companies and their business partners following the interviews. Thus, the case studies comprised data collection from a number of sources within each case. Some company names are fictitious for reasons of confidentiality, as the interviews concerned sensitive issues about the companies and their relationships. In three of the cases, the respondents asked for the partner to be anonymous.

3.5. Analytical techniques The semi-structured case interviews and the focus group interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. The transcripts were annotated to provide a first-level coding (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The resulting transcripts were then read numerous times and notes were taken by the researchers, followed by meetings where the researchers discussed and compared interpretations of the data. The conceptual structure in Table 1 was used as a basis for classifying the data into meaningful themes and categories to enable the display, reduction and interpretation of the data. Individual and cross-case analysis was conducted by use of role-ordered matrices which summarised the findings from each case study. The researchers also used large-scale matrices for the cross-case analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994), which provided external validation of the individual case study findings (Järvensivu & Törnroos, 2010). The findings were triangulated across the data sources and crosschecked with the transcripts. Construct validity was strengthened through a chain of evidence that included note-taking by the researchers, gaining feedback on the transcripts from respondents and exchanges with respondents following the interviews and throughout the analysis stages. The reliability of the findings was assured through the presentation of the pilot case study results to a selection of firms and through inviting comments from other researchers in the field at workshops to strengthen the logic of the conclusions.

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4. Cases of asymmetric relationships in the Danish food industry 4.1. Self- and collective interests in goal development in asymmetric relationships The findings from the focus groups showed that, in many situations, it is necessary to develop the confidence of smaller firms engaging in asymmetric relationships. The smaller firms often had strong competencies in product development, design and manufacturing, but felt themselves to be at a disadvantage when it came to expressing their preferences about their individual desires and goals in asymmetric relationships. This sometimes meant that the smaller firm gave up on trying to build cooperation in the asymmetric relationship because of a lack of confidence, and sometimes abandoned the relationship altogether because it felt inferior or incapable in its personal interactions with managers from larger firms (lack of business knowledge, experience, communication skills etc.). The larger party was frequently dominating the relationship, with the smaller party being very flexible towards its larger counterpart's needs and interests, setting aside its own goals in negotiations, as put by one firm: ‘It is important to be on top of knowing the partner's need; downplaying our own interests, while focusing more on their goals and the joint interests’. An overview of the findings from the case studies is presented in Table 3. Across the eight cases of ongoing and ‘well-functioning’ asymmetric relationships, we found a somewhat different picture from the focus groups. In this case, the companies' collective goals enabled them to do together what they could not achieve alone. Both the smaller and the larger parties tended to be very much aware of the necessity of building collective interests in their relationships. One larger customer stated: ‘It has to be a win–win situation, where both parts do something to make it work. If you don't try to make it work, you are going to fail. Everything we try to do in these collaborations is to ensure, we win, they win’. In same vein, a smaller supplier reflected: ‘This is one of the advantages of collaboration—as the smaller party you think different than the larger party. This is how we use each other and discuss and exchange experiences.’ In general, the self-interest and related business goals of each case firm varied—from building closer customer relationships, growing the business to developing new products or strengthening the production technology of the firm. The larger parties were characterised by having a strategic approach to relationships overall. Several of the asymmetric relationships presented here developed by chance. In these cases, we found examples of joining competencies to enter new markets, servicing selected customers with specific demands, developing new technology and putting it into use or co-branding. To reach these joint goals, the larger party sometimes helped its smaller counterpart, as illustrated in the two following quotes by smaller firms: ‘I made contact to get help. And they were very helpful and nice in giving me contact details on potential joint customers all over Europe. We succeeded immediately’. ‘We were guided in every way. If it hadn't been for them—it would have been much more complicated.’ Whereas the collective interests can be characterised as emergent, most of the case relationships were considered an important part of the firm's business and were strategically used for obtaining their own business goals. In some of the cases, collective goals were built on complementary competencies held by the smaller and larger parties. This was the situation in the cases of Swienty, Vadehavsbageriet, Gram Slot and Dansk Honning, where the parties' joint competencies (e.g., complementary products in the case of Vadehavsbageriet) provided a basis for jointly entering a new market with a complete product portfolio to offer to

new customers. In other cases, the joint effort of the asymmetric relationship was considered a potential vehicle for tapping into the specific resources of the other party. In the cases of the larger firms, Petersen and Arla, the smaller party offered access to, e.g., specific market knowledge or a technology. In these cases, it was found that collective interests were built in order to reach each of the partner's own business goals. One larger firm stated: ‘Strategic partnerships are not only built on trust. We also have to generate revenues.’ Thus, there were identifiable differences in the collective interests across the eight cases. One type of collective interest was related to combining and aligning the parties' goals to reap mutual business benefits. Another type of collective interest did not lead to joint business as such, but was supporting the business of each of the parties. 4.2. Characteristics of ‘well-functioning’ asymmetric relationships From the focus groups, it was found that a commonly understood way of developing goals with a larger counterpart was difficult to achieve because of imbalances in power and dependence and a lack of confidence in speaking out about what a small firm wanted from its relationship. The smaller firms had the potential to develop strong exclusive relationships with larger customers that sought out their product/technical competencies, but they found it difficult to relax in a cooperative situation with a larger party. Amongst the focus group members, it was perceived that independent network players, such as government bodies, could be important in intervening and facilitating asymmetric relationships to encourage more positive cooperation for both parties and a more intense dialogue between the smaller and larger party. Another way for smaller firms to cope in relationships with a larger party was for the smaller party to consistently specify and articulate what its larger partner gains from the cooperation. This was one way to persuade the larger party to prioritise the mutual and/or collective interests of the relationship. In the eight cases, we perceived ‘well-functioning’ asymmetric relationships where the imbalance in the size of the parties was recognised as an important consideration in designing and handling cooperation. However, in these relationships the imbalances were not perceived negatively or as a hindrance to obtaining the firms' own business goals, as illustrated in this quote from a larger customer: ‘You have to see the value of collaborations—and then it actually doesn't matter whether you are big or small.’ The smaller as well as the larger firms in the asymmetric relationships were reflective about how both parties gained from mutual efforts. In every case, there was a clear understanding of how the firms' own interests were met, but also how collective goals could contribute to the overall interests of the counterpart. Furthermore, it was found that an awareness of particularity or exclusivity was important to the positive functioning of the asymmetric relationships, as stated by a smaller party: ‘At the exhibition they came to our stand, saying ‘that is our product’—then we felt our job was done. That they get this sense of ownership for the product we developed for them.’ Trust was seen as an implicit condition in asymmetric relationships, as illustrated in the following quote from a large customer: ‘Joint and open development requires mutual trust. We feel that every time we open up, then we get something in return.’ The power balance in the relationships was generally not perceived as strongly influencing cooperation. Although the parties were very aware of the degree and specific character of dependencies in their asymmetric relationship, there was a strong attention to how both parties could contribute to collective efforts. Since the smaller firms were mostly owner-managed, there was not much inconsistency in the interpersonal relationships across the parties. The owner of the smaller firm took care of most business and, in several instances, the

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asymmetric relationship built on his/her personal relations. This could also relate to why the case-firms experienced very low degrees of conflict. If conflicts arose, they could generally be solved through intense dialogue, as argued by a larger customer: ‘The discussions are very open. They are sometimes intense, sometimes even difficult. But, the value it brings to a relationship is amazing. And it demands openness, trust and honesty’. A key variation between the eight case studies of ‘well-functioning’ asymmetric relationships was the intensity of cooperation. In the cases of Vadehavsbageriet, Swienty, Gram Slot and Dansk Honning, the parties had frequent, even daily, personal contact. In these relationships, goals were related to growing the business of the parties. Collective interests were seen as closely linked to the ability to reach the self-interest and business goals of each party. Thus, the self- and collective interests were intertwined. For these firms, asymmetric relationships were mostly built on complementary competencies, where the partners joined forces to reach a collective goal not otherwise achievable. This was the situation in the cooperation between Gram Slot and REMA1000, as the parties' investments in developing retail products was only achievable through their joint effort. In the cases of Espersen, Arla Foods, Is fra Skarø and Petersen Fiskekonserves, the relationship intensity was characterised by project-related contact. The partners met when joint projects required it, e.g., related to the development of new products or technology development. One smaller firm stated: ‘During those three months of development we had only a couple of meetings. This was mostly related to our performance. They had very little to say on the actual product.’ These asymmetric relationships were based on the collective interests of developing specific technologies or new products as a means to achieve the self-interests of the parties. Also interesting was the finding that in these ‘product and technology development-oriented’ relationships personal contact seemed less important than in the ‘complementary competencies-oriented’ relationships. Across these two different types of asymmetric relationships—the ‘product/technology-oriented’ and the ‘complementary competenciesoriented’—we found that in most cases (except Gram Slot and Dansk Honning), the partner of the asymmetric relationship under investigation was not the most important or strategic business partner. Although the partner was perceived as important, the dedication to this relationship was not exclusive. Other partners were considered equally important. 4.3. Network outcomes from asymmetric relationships From our study, we found that smaller as well as larger parties engaging in asymmetric relationships viewed these relationships as an important means to reach specific business goals, benefitting both partners individually, as well as collectively. Besides these relationship-specific business outcomes, we also found traces of related network outcomes: some negative and some positive. The positive network outcomes, as perceived by the case firms, were threefold: (1) access to new customers and the penetration of new export markets, (2) a seal of approval from prominent partners and (3) a strengthening of the bargaining power relative to other business actors. The latter two were mostly experienced by the smaller firms. One smaller firm declared: ‘This relationship gives a seal of approval. And it has become an important sales argument for developing with other customers. Because if this customer approves of what we do, then it must be good.’ Another small supplier reflected: ‘This is a relationship that opens doors; when you engage with such a partner you are invited into his space. New doors are opened.’ A third potential network outcome was the general strengthening of a business, e.g., through the development and adaptation of improved production technology. This was suggested by a larger customer: ‘Linking projects is important, so we can use knowledge

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from one partnership for our further development’. But these effects were more indirect and thus will not to be discussed further for the purpose of this paper. Negative network outcomes were experienced by only the smaller firms. These negative effects related to time and resources tied to the development and servicing of the relationship with a specific larger partner, leaving no resources for engaging with others, i.e., other potential customers. Scarce resources in production were also prevalent. Such negative effects could prevent business opportunities spreading in ever-widening circles in the network. 5. Concluding discussion Building on an interaction approach, we set out to explore how selfand collective interests in goal development are manifested in asymmetric relationships. This study has built on previous research that has discretely examined asymmetry in customer–supplier relationships (Johnsen & Ford, 2008; Lee & Johnsen, 2012) and self- and collective interests (Medlin, 2006; Munksgaard & Medlin, 2014). Our study is amongst the first to combine these two areas of research to examine self- and collective interests in goal development in the context of asymmetric relationships. Our development of a conceptual structure, which includes the connection of the set of characteristics of asymmetry and indicators of approaches to self- and collective interests in the development of goals, has provided a new framework to explore goal development in the context of asymmetric relationships. Through the creation and testing of this framework, we have developed both conceptual and empirical contributions in this study, contributing to existing knowledge on the structures and processes involved in customer–supplier relationships. The following paragraphs will reflect on our findings and contributions. Our findings have important implications for both customers and suppliers in relationships. The first and most important contribution offered in this paper is conceptual and focused on the identification of two distinct types of asymmetric relationship: one in which self-interest dominates the relationship by focusing on one party's resources for developing new products or technology—‘product/technology developmentoriented asymmetric relationships’ (cases 2, 3, 4 & 8)—and a second type in which collective interests direct the asymmetric relationship through linking the complementary competencies of the larger and smaller party for new joint business ambitions—‘complementary competencies-oriented asymmetric relationships’ (cases 1, 5, 6 & 7). These are explorative findings which built on data from a limited number of case studies and focus groups, so these findings should be more fully investigated in a future study. Interesting nuances that enable a better understanding of asymmetric relationship characteristics are found in the cases in this study. For example, trust is considered a basic building block for developing collective-interests in asymmetric relationships (Huemer, 2004). Furthermore, power is perceived as an important issue (Hingley, 2005), but not as a hindrance to achieving effective interaction in asymmetric relationships. Conceiving power as one amongst other characteristics of asymmetric relationships thus gives insights on how power perceptions of imbalance might be balanced through consistency in e.g., interpersonal relations and mutual dedication. Although our focus is on smaller suppliers and larger customers used to working in an asymmetric relationship, we found only slight degrees of conflict. Instead, the relationships in the study showed consistency in interpersonal relations and a general mutual dedication. However, it should be noted that these asymmetric relationships in most cases were not considered the most strategically important for the smaller supplier or the larger customer. We acknowledge that other interesting issues could arise in a study including more conflicting relationships.

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Our findings relate to the somewhat similar discussions on heterogeneity raised by Corsaro, Cantù, and Tunisini (2012) showing that the business goals and interests of the larger party influence, to a great extent, the collective interests in asymmetric relationships. This is not an issue of forcing power, but more an issue of bargaining power. For example, in the case of the asymmetric relationship of Is fra Skarø, the larger customer, Singapore Airlines, did not directly dictate or ask Is fra Skarø to fulfil certain demands. However, by simply being a very large customer occupying most of the smaller supplier's production capacity, this customer had a large degree of influence on the collective interest of a co-branding initiative. Besides, it was clearly in the selfinterest of Is fra Skarø to build a close customer relationship with Singapore Airlines, and as such they—as with all of the other smaller suppliers in our eight cases—deliberately pursued self-interest in their asymmetric customer relationship. Further, our study, on one hand, confirms the perception that asymmetric relationships may leave less room for the business goals of the smaller party to develop (Johnsen & Ford, 2008). Sometimes the smaller firms need help and guidance in expressing their own business goals clearly—even from third parties such as consultants to the asymmetric relationship. On the other hand, our study shows how the clear expression of each party's self-interest could be a basis for creating a well-functioning asymmetric relationship. However, this is not considered a task only for the smaller supplier, but also an issue for the larger customer to support the smaller partner in reaching their full potential and their own self-interest in the relationship. This is adding to the work of Munksgaard (forthcoming) and Munksgaard and Medlin (2014) that emphasises not only the need for understanding, but also the collective interest of a joint goal. Indeed, assisting a (small) partner in expressing their self-interest is especially important for goal development in the case of asymmetric relationships. This relates to another important finding which is the fact that larger customers need to recognise that the creation of collective interests and joint business goals to enhance joint outcomes in supplier relationships. As examples, Sweinty actively engaged in developing a joint export market together with its smaller supplier and Arla sought a genuine win–win situation in its strategic supplier relationships. The larger customers are aware of how their strategic approach towards building mutual business and developing relationships with selected suppliers is essential in enhancing revenues. The larger customers are generally very strategic in building relationships with their smaller suppliers. At the same time, this includes an explicit effort to incorporate collective goal developments in asymmetric relationships. It is a characteristic of the asymmetric relationships of our study that the larger customers encouraged the smaller suppliers to openly express their own interests and business goals. This is considered an important part of creating a win–win situation. In some cases, e.g., Dansk Honning and Vadehavsbageriet, the larger party directly helped the smaller supplier in reaching these goals by developing competencies or production equipment. In the cases of Is fra Skarø and Gram Slot, where the smaller party had a very strong competence and profile, the self-interest of the smaller and larger partner and the collective interest of the asymmetric relationship became closely intertwined. These findings are in line with Munksgaard and Medlin (2014) who suggest an additional network competence in the ability to convert collective interests in joint activities to self-interest gains for the firm. The network competence of converting collective interest into self-interest extends the work of Ritter (1999) and Ritter, Wilkinson and Johnston (2002), who proposed network competences as task implementation (relationship specific vs. cross relational) and qualifications (specialist vs. social). In this study, more nuances are gained as we find that this competence may also reside in assisting and supporting a partner in converting or adapting collective interest to the self-interest of the partner.

5.1. Managerial implications This paper has highlighted the importance for customers and suppliers of understanding how self- and collective interests may influence goal development in the context of asymmetric relationships. This is an important issue for both parties in a relationship and we would recommend that managers evaluate current goal development with their partners to assess the nature of their current and potential interests in the goal development process. The framework set out in the paper may guide the focus of analysis of self- and collective interests in the current and future goal developments of firms and point the way to more collaborative approaches that can build new joint opportunities for the parties involved. For smaller suppliers, an awareness of their approaches and those of their larger customers may enable them to achieve a better positioning, in particular, asymmetric relationships and in their networks. In particular, we highlight three recommendations for practitioners: (1) Engaging in asymmetric relationships with a larger customer can be a challenge to a smaller supplier. However, taking a clear stand in the self-interest to be gained from a relationship can help the smaller party in reaping revenues and other benefits. (2) Whereas larger customers may work strategically with supplier relationships in general, reaping benefits from asymmetric collaboration with a smaller supplier can be a challenging task. If the smaller party withdraws from the joint effort due to, e.g., lack of confidence in its own performance or uncertainty of benefits to be achieved, then the larger customer will miss out on potential revenues. The ability of the larger party to clearly develop and express the collective interests of the asymmetric relationship is essential. Furthermore, it will benefit the self-interest of the customer if it assists the smaller partner in converting collective interests into self-interest. (3) A final practical and managerial recommendation to be drawn from our study relates to choice of strategic partner. Since asymmetric relationships can be characterised as either product and technology-oriented or complementary competencies-oriented, managers in smaller and larger firms are advised to carefully consider which type of asymmetric relationship may benefit them the most.

5.2. Contributions, limitations and avenues of further research This paper set out to contribute to IMP theory by integrating two streams of literature from the IMP tradition, namely, asymmetric customer supplier relationships and self- and collective interests in relationships, which have not been considered together before. Our intention in this process was to combine these two perspectives to create a conceptual structure to investigate how self- and collective interests in goal development are manifested in asymmetric relationships. The paper has offered a conceptual structure, developed around asymmetry and self- and collective interests in the development of goals in customer–supplier relationships. The framework has subsequently been tested in the investigation of asymmetric customer–supplier relationships in the Danish food sector, leading to a set of findings on the functioning of asymmetric relationships and the effective development of self- and collective interests for the companies involved in these relationships. Appropriate avenues of further research could include an investigation of the types of strategies employed by smaller suppliers and their larger customers to encourage the development of collective interests in their relationships and an analysis of how the two distinct types of asymmetric relationship identified in the study influence the strategies employed by firms. Following this second stage of the project, we would anticipate the development of a framework that identifies a set of strategies to support the development of self- and collective interests in customer–supplier relationships under the specific conditions of the two types of asymmetric relationships.

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Appendix A A) Interview guide—case study interviews Information on the self- and collective interest in the relationship • Information on the firm (industry, size, value offered to customers…)? • General collaboration with main partners (customers, suppliers, other …)? • Information on a specific joint project with asymmetric partner? • What is your goal in this project? What is the goal your partner? • Do you experience any misfit in goals? How is this dealt with? • What is the role of each partner in the project? How does each partner contribute to the development of the project? • Is the process characterised by specific written plans/standard operating procedures? Information on the asymmetric relationship • Who from each firm is involved in the relationship? How is information and knowledge exchanged? What is the purpose of joint meetings? How often do you meet? • How friendly and personal are you? • What is your specific role in the relationship? • How do you see its role opposite partner? • Do you experience any imbalance in the relationship? • How does this relationship affect relationships with other partners and vice-versa? • Importance of asymmetric relationship • What can your partner do, that you cannot? And other partners cannot? • How important is this partner to the success of joint projects? • Is the investment (time and resources) worth the while? • Do you have examples of incidents of cooperation that has been specifically promoting or impeding to the success of the project? • Have you experience conflicts? How were this solved? • To what extent is this joint project a success on your part? How important is it for the company? And what prospects do you see for the future development of the relationship? B) Interview guide—focus groups Why engage in asymmetric relationships (self- and collective interests)? Firms • Why do you/your firm participate—what is your goal? • Why does your partner engage in the relationship? • Do we pursue common goals or interests? • How, why and in which situations do collective goals develop? • Is there a commonly understood process for developing goals with counterpart(s)? • To what extent do one or both parties give up their goals completely for the other's benefit? • Has goal setting developed the same or differently in this relationship as in others?

Consultants • How, why and in which situations do collective goals develop? • Is there a commonly understood process for developing goals with counterpart(s)? • How does cooperation around goal-setting evolve? • How are goals negotiated? • How, why and in which situations do parties make concessions to individual goals? • Are goal-setting discussions ever contentious? • How do the parties manage disagreements about goals?

If you are to decide, how will the relationship develop (change and development)? Firms • What are the dominant characteristics in the relationship? • Which characteristics would you like to change and why? • How are/can the characteristics be developed (positively)? • How would you like it to develop/change and why? • How does your partner think?

Consultants • What are the main reasons for conflicts in asymmetric relationships? • What characterises such relationships? • What is the extent of disagreement or disputes over, e.g., specifications, or nature of orders or agreed designs? • To what extent is the relationship characterised by co-operative rather than contentious interaction?

Is the relationship successful and why (outcomes and network effects)? Firms • Do you consider the relationship a success? Why (not)? • Have you/are you to reach your own goals for the relationship? • Have you/are you to reach your joint goals for the relationship? • How has this relationship affected your business? • How has this relationship affected other relationships? • How has this relationship affected your business network?

Consultants • What makes asymmetric relationships successful? • How would (have) you help them becoming? • Could there have been any effects and what is your experience on such effects?

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K.B. Munksgaard et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 48 (2015) 160–173 Wilson, D. T. (1995). An integrated model of buyer–seller relationships. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 23(4), 335–345. Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research design and methods (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications. Zerbini, F., & Castaldo, S. (2007). Stay in or get out the Janus? The maintenance of multiplex relationships between buyers and sellers. Industrial Marketing Management, 36(7), 941–954. Kristin B. Munksgaard is associate professor at the University of Southern Denmark. Her research focuses on innovation and business-to-business marketing and especially strategizing and design in inter-organisational relationships and networks. She has published in Industrial Marketing Management, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, European Business Review, Logistics Research, and European Journal of Innovation Management.

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Rhona E. Johnsen is professor at ESC Rennes School of Business in France. Her research focuses on business-to-business marketing with emphasis on asymmetric customer– supplier relationships and the internationalisation of firms in business networks. She has published her research in Industrial Marketing Management, Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research and the European Management Journal. Charlotte M. Patterson is a research assistant at the University of Southern Denmark. Her interests are firm use of design and design management.