Kohlberg and Piaget on Stages and Moral Reasoning

Developmental Review 20, 181–205 (2000) doi:10.1006/drev.1999.0500, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on

Kohlberg and Piaget on Stages and Moral Reasoning Jeremy I. M. Carpendale Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada Kohlberg’s theory of moral development has been criticized because it predicts greater consistency in moral reasoning than has been observed. This prediction follows from Kohlberg’s conception of stages, which also entails a view of the process of reasoning as the application of a moral principle to a dilemma to derive a solution. Although Kohlberg emphasized the importance of perspective taking in moral reasoning, his view of stages is inconsistent with this position. A modification of Kohlberg’s conception of stages drawing on Piagetian theory would result in a view of moral reasoning as a process of coordinating all perspectives involved in a moral dilemma. For various reasons this ideal process may be constrained, restricting an individual’s ability to fully consider all other perspectives involved and, thus, leading to inconsistency in reasoning.  2000 Academic Press Key Words: moral development; stages; Piaget; Kohlberg; universality; relativism.

The study of morality within developmental psychology has been dominated by Kohlberg’s (e.g., 1969, 1981) theory of moral development. Kohlberg’s extensive influence has also been accompanied by criticisms of his theory. The criticism I address is the finding that moral reasoning is not as consistent across different content as predicted by Kohlberg’s theory. This expectation of consistency in reasoning follows from Kohlberg’s conception of stages because these assumptions about stages entail a particular view of the process of moral reasoning. Although Kohlberg often emphasizes the importance of perspective taking in the process of moral reasoning, his conception of stages is, I argue, incompatible with such a view of reasoning and, instead, entails a view of reasoning as the application of moral principles to moral dilemmas to generate solutions. If moral reasoning was based on perspective taking consistency in reasoning would not be predicted. Rather, it should be expected that moral reasoning would be influenced by factors I acknowledge the influence of Michael Chapman and Dennis Krebs on the approach taken in this article, and I thank Michael Glassman, Mark Tappan, Bill Turnbull, and James Youniss for comments on earlier versions of this article. Address correspondence and reprint requests to Psychology Department, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, B.C., Canada, V5A 1S6. Fax: (604) 291-3427. E-mail: [email protected]. 181 0273-2297/00 $35.00 Copyright  2000 by Academic Press All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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that either hinder or facilitate perspective taking. Thus, two aspects of Kohlberg’s theory—his conception of stages and his account of the process of reasoning—appear to be incompatible. Kohlberg’s conception of stages and the prediction of consistency in reasoning is based on Piaget’s (1960) theory of cognitive development. This is a common view of the nature of reasoning, and Piaget’s theory of cognitive development is usually interpreted in this way. However, an alternative interpretation of Piagetian theory (Chapman, 1988, 1991), based on Piaget’s insight that thought originates in action, does not lead to a prediction of consistency in reasoning. This approach would modify Kohlberg’s theory in a way that would be consistent with Kohlberg’s emphasis on perspective taking. From a Piagetian perspective, moral reasoning is viewed as a process of coordinating all perspectives involved in a moral dilemma (Davidson & Youniss, 1991, 1995; Youniss & Damon, 1992). Of course, this is an ideal process that can be constrained due to the nature of the situation, restricting an individual’s ability to fully consider all other perspectives and resulting in inconsistency in reasoning. I briefly present some of Kohlberg’s central assumptions, review evidence relevant to these assumptions revealing difficulties with Kohlberg’s theory, and then discuss ways in which Piagetian theory could potentially resolve these problems. I conclude by considering the central issue of universality versus relativism in moral judgment, arguing that employing a Piagetian view of moral judgment as a process of coordinating perspectives, which involves dialogue, does provide a universal process in the preconditions for social interaction and, therefore, does not entail moral relativism. Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development Kohlberg’s influential theory of moral development brought attention to the psychological study of morality after Piaget’s (1932/1965) early work on moral judgment from the 1930s had fallen into neglect. In Kohlberg’s dissertation in 1958, he drew much of his inspiration and methodology from Piaget’s earlier work. Kohlberg followed Piaget in rejecting an explanation of moral development as a simple transmission of moral rules from parents to children as incomplete because this view cannot account for how such moral norms arise in the first place, and it simply equates morality with conformity to moral rules. Both Piaget and Kohlberg argued that moral development is not simply a process of ‘‘stamping in’’ cultural expectations. Instead of being passed on from previous generations, the aspect of morality that goes beyond mere conformity to traditional rules must be constructed by individuals. Beyond this initial level of agreement, however, Kohlberg’s theory of moral development differs considerably from Piaget’s. The aspects of these theories that I focus on are the nature of stages and the process of moral reasoning. These two aspects of theories are intimately intertwined; concep-

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tions of the nature of stages entail views of the process of reasoning. Kohlberg cited Piaget (1960) as the source of his criteria for stages, and Kohlberg’s interpretation of Piaget’s ‘‘structure of the whole’’ criterion as implying consistency in reasoning across different content is the way that Piaget has usually been understood. Kohlberg’s conception of stages based on Piaget’s (1960) theory of cognitive development differs considerably from Piaget’s (1932/1965) view of stages or forms of moral reasoning in ‘‘The Moral Judgement of the Child’’ (Wright, 1983), and Kohlberg (1963; Kohlberg, Higgins, Tappan, & Schrader, 1984, p. 656; Tappan, Kohlberg, Schrader, Higgins, Armon, & Lei, 1987, p. 319) did discuss the ways in which his theory differed from Piaget’s work on moral judgment. Although Kohlberg endorsed the usual interpretation of Piaget’s notion of stages, Chapman (1988) has argued convincingly that this is not, in fact, what Piaget meant by the concept of a structure. This is because Piaget argued that structures develop through the interiorization of action, and since action is content specific we should expect that children would develop at different rates in different domains (Chapman, 1988; Lourenc¸o & Machado, 1996). That is, inconsistency in reasoning should be expected. In contrast, the standard interpretation of Piaget’s stages leads to predictions of consistency in reasoning and is most commonly assumed to entail a view of the process of reasoning as mental logic. From this perspective, reasoning consists of applying logical principles to problems or, in the case of moral reasoning, moral principles. Ironically, this may not be the way Kohlberg wanted to conceptualize the process of moral reasoning. Yet it is this underlying assumption about the nature of reasoning that is tied up with his criteria for stages and results in predictions of consistency in reasoning across different content. I first discuss Kohlberg’s conception of stages of moral reasoning and then turn to the process of moral reasoning. Kohlberg’s Conception of Stages: Predictions of Consistency Kohlberg’s theory provides a description of a sequence of progressively more adequate forms of reasoning about moral dilemmas. According to Kohlberg, in the process of developing moral knowledge individuals progress through this series of stages in an invariant sequence. ‘‘Cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop development, but they do not change its sequence’’ (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 6). The principles that define the stage an individual has reached form a coherent pattern or ‘‘structured whole’’ that provides a general description of his or her moral thought. Thus, ‘‘a given stage response on a task does not represent simply a specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity with that task or tasks similar to it; rather, it represents an underlying thought organization’’ (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 6). In Kohlberg’s transformational model of stages, ‘‘higher stages displace (or, rather, integrate) the structures found at lower stages’’ (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 7); that is, an individual’s pattern of

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thought is reorganized in the development of the next higher stage (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). A clear prediction following from Kohlberg’s view of stages is that once an individual has developed a form of moral reasoning he or she would be expected to apply this way of thinking, or set of moral principles, to all moral conflicts encountered. That is, ‘‘in addition to sequence, stages must meet the criterion of consistency implied by the notion of a ‘structured whole’ ’’ (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 388). Although Kohlberg acknowledged that people do not always use their highest stage of moral reasoning in resolving moral dilemmas, he did expect that ‘‘the thinking exhibited will be quite internally consistent, and with the exception of some very slight decalage, will form a structured whole across widely varying content’’ (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 8). In other words, Kohlberg’s theory predicts considerable consistency in moral reasoning across different content. Although individuals demonstrate consistency in their moral reasoning across the several moral dilemmas in Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), there is considerable evidence of inconsistency in moral judgment on other types of moral dilemmas. People often fail to use their highest stage of moral judgment when reasoning about the moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. For example, in studies comparing moral reasoning on Kohlberg’s dilemmas with reasoning on moral dilemmas set in a business context (Carpendale & Krebs, 1992, 1995) or involving drinking and driving (Denton & Krebs, 1990), participants tend to employ much lower stages of moral reasoning, typically Stage 2. In this series of studies it was possible to classify participants’ responses to non-Kohlberg dilemmas with Colby and Kohlberg’s (1987) extensive scoring manual. Experienced raters found ‘‘criterion judgments’’ in the scoring manual that matched participants’ interview judgments (i.e., the same form of reasoning was used). This finding supports Kohlberg’s classification of forms of moral thought. However, participants often used lower stages of moral reasoning when resolving the non-Kohlberg dilemmas than they used on Kohlberg’s dilemmas (for reviews and detailed descriptions of this research see, e.g., Bartek, Krebs, & Taylor, 1993; Krebs, Vermeulen, Carpendale, & Denton, 1991; Krebs, Denton, Vermeulen, Carpendale, & Bush, 1991). This empirical evidence of inconsistency in moral reasoning across different types of moral dilemmas is inconsistent with Kohlberg’s theory and requires an explanation, and, I argue, a modification of Kohlberg’s view of stages. Kohlberg explained the fact that people do not always use their highest stage of moral reasoning by employing a distinction between competence and performance. That is, although Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview is designed to assess individuals’ highest level of competence in moral reasoning, in actual situations their performance may not reach this level. Lower stages, however, ‘‘are used only in situations with a significant downward press,’’ such as ‘‘convicts living in what may be called the low-level ‘moral

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atmosphere’ of a traditional prison’’ (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 8). This example of a situation in which people may not use their full competence is fairly extreme, and this explanation seems inadequate when we consider the extent of the research evidence of inconsistency in moral reasoning in real-life contexts such as family and business. It is worthwhile, I argue, to consider an alternative approach to this problem with Kohlberg’s theory by reconceptualizing Kohlberg’s view of moral stages drawing on Piaget’s earlier work on moral judgment and interpretations of Piaget’s theory that go beyond the standard view of his theory (e.g., Chapman, 1988; Davidson & Youniss, 1991, 1995; Lourenc¸o & Machado, 1996; Youniss & Damon, 1992). It may appear paradoxical to suggest that difficulties with Kohlberg’s theory can be resolved with insights drawn from Piaget when it is commonly assumed that Kohlberg’s theory is an extension of Piaget’s work on moral development. However, although Kohlberg was inspired by Piaget and he did draw much of his ideas concerning the nature of development from Piaget, Kohlberg (e.g., 1963) explicitly rejected important aspects of Piaget’s theory. In fact, Piaget did not believe that it is possible to characterize an individual as being at one particular stage in the moral domain. Piaget classified forms of moral reasoning, but he argued that both children and adults use different forms of moral reasoning in different situations (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 85). Rather than drawing on Piaget’s work on moral judgment, Kohlberg (1969) based his view of stages on Piaget’s (1960) theory of cognitive development (Kohlberg, 1963; Kohlberg, Higgins, Tappan, & Schrader, 1984; Tappan, Kohlberg, Schrader, Higgins, Armon, & Lei, 1987; Wright, 1983). Kohlberg (e.g., 1969; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) stated that his view of stages, including the notion of ‘‘structures of the whole,’’ was drawn from Piaget (1960). Kohlberg drew on the way that Piaget’s theory of cognitive development is usually interpreted. According to this standard view, individuals progress through stages, which are assumed to be based on general structures that are applied across different content. This standard view of Piaget’s theory predicts consistency in reasoning across content and it has also been criticized because of considerable evidence of inconsistency in reasoning across different content. Although this is a common interpretation of Piaget, Chapman (1988) argued that what Piaget meant by ‘‘structures d’ensemble,’’ or ‘‘structure of the whole,’’ does not imply generality or consistency in reasoning across widely varying content. This is because structures develop through the interiorization of action, which is necessarily content specific. In a footnote, Colby and Kohlberg (1987) acknowledge that although the stage concept is an essential part of Kohlberg’s theory, ‘‘the specific stage model adopted is subject to revision’’ (p. 36). It is this stage model and the model of reasoning that it entails that, I argue, requires revision. I now turn to Kohlberg’s view of the process of moral reasoning.

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Moral Reasoning: Principles or Process? There is some ambivalence in Kohlberg’s position regarding how to describe the process of moral reasoning. It is not clear whether Kohlberg thought of moral reasoning as a process of coordinating conflicting perspectives or as the application of moral principles to generate solutions to moral dilemmas. In an early article, Kohlberg (1963, p. 28) remarked in a footnote that ‘‘it is historically true that all philosophic formulations of moral principles, such as those just mentioned [i.e., ‘the Golden Rule, the utilitarian principle (the greatest good for the greatest number) and Kant’s categorical imperative’], are variations of a basic prescription to take the role of all others involved in the moral situations.’’ Furthermore, an assumption that Kohlberg states he shares with Dewey, Mead, Baldwin, and Piaget is that stages of moral development ‘‘represent successive modes of taking the role of others in social situations’’ (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 134, italics in original, see also Kohlberg, 1969, pp. 398–399). More recently, Colby and Kohlberg (1987, p. 30) described the sociomoral perspective of Stage 6 as ‘‘that of ‘the moral point of view,’ a point of view that ideally all humans should take toward one another as free and equal autonomous persons. This means equal consideration of the claims or points of view of each person affected by the moral decision to be made.’’ Colby and Kohlberg (1987) go on to describe several formalizations of procedures designed to ensure this moral point of view. Rawls’s (1971) ‘‘veil of ignorance’’ is one such formalization, according to which moral decisions must be made without the individual knowing his or her position in society, thus encouraging a decision that should be equally good for all involved. Kohlberg’s conception of ‘‘moral musical chairs’’ is a similar procedure. ‘‘Moral musical chairs means going around the circle of perspectives involved in a moral dilemma to test one’s claims of right or duty until only the equilibrated or reversible claims survive’’ (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 199). Colby and Kohlberg (1987) then mention Habermas’ notion of an ideal communication situation, consisting of dialogue among equals in which all involved state their position and listen to others’ points of view. Ironically, Colby and Kohlberg’s (1987) list of formalizations of procedures fails to include Piaget, the theory on which it is commonly assumed that Kohlberg’s theory was based. Although Kohlberg emphasized the importance of perspective taking, this view of reasoning is, I argue, incompatible with his conception of stages. Instead, Kohlberg’s conception of stages entails a view of moral reasoning as the application of a moral principle or rule to a dilemma in order to generate a solution. This is because if reasoning consists of understanding and coordinating conflicting perspectives in a moral dilemma, consistency in reasoning across different situations should not be expected. Rather, we should expect that situations or relationships that either constrain or facilitate the ability to

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understand others’ perspectives would influence moral reasoning. In contrast, consistency in reasoning would be expected if the process of reasoning is conceived of as the application of principles to problems. Once a child has developed a particular principle we would expect that it would generally be applied in all relevant circumstances. Habermas (1983/1990) also pointed out that some of Kohlberg’s statements are inconsistent with a procedural approach to moral reasoning. For example, Kohlberg (1981, pp. 161–162) states that ‘‘a morality on which universal agreement could be based would require a different foundation. It would require that moral obligation be directly derived from a substantive moral principle which can define the choices of any man without conflict or inconsistency.’’ The nature of stages and the process of reasoning has also been discussed in the area of children’s concrete operational reasoning; therefore, we should consider what can be learned from that earlier debate. I consider Piaget’s conceptions of stages and reasoning in the area of cognitive development before turning to Piaget’s work on moral judgment. Parallels with Theories of Reasoning in Other Domains Piaget’s theory of cognitive development has generally been interpreted as a theory of mental logic. According to this standard view of Piaget’s theory, reasoning consists of the application of a logical rule to a problem to derive a solution. A developmental implication of this view of reasoning is that if a child has demonstrated the development of such a rule he or she should be able to apply this rule to other problems of a similar nature. This assumption about the nature of reasoning also underlies Kohlberg’s theory and results in an expectation of consistency in reasoning across different content. A serious problem with this view of reasoning is that it is difficult to see why children who demonstrate the use of a particular rule on some tasks fail to solve very similar tasks that appear to involve the very same logical principle. For example, children tend to solve transitivity problems concerning length some years before they can solve transitivity problems involving weight, yet both problems involve the very same logical principle (i.e., A ⬎ B and B ⬎ C so A ⬎ C) (Chapman, 1988). There is considerable evidence of this inconsistency in reasoning across different content domains, or ‘‘horizontal decalage,’’ and this evidence has been considered problematic for Piaget’s theory. Evidence of inconsistency in reasoning in both cognitive and moral development has been extensively discussed. For example, Siegler (1996) pointed out that the amount of variability in forms of reasoning observed is inconsistent with most stage theories of development. This rejection of stage theories is, however, based on what has become the standard interpretation of Piagetian theory. In contrast to this standard view of Piaget’s notion of stages, Chapman (1988) argued that evidence of inconsistency in reasoning is only a problem for an interpretation of Piaget’s theory as a theory of mental logic. From the

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perspective of an interpretation that is consistent with Piaget’s underlying constructivist epistemology emphasizing the origins of thought in action, horizontal decalage is not problematic and should actually be expected. The common view of Piagetian stages as overall structures explaining reasoning in different areas may have been partially due to Piaget’s discussion of two performances as involving the ‘‘same’’ structure. However, Chapman (1988) pointed out that structures may be the same in the sense that they are formally analogous, but these structures may be functionally distinct. That is, structures may have the same form but they are not the same structure. For example, children’s reasoning about transitivity problems may involve the separate development of structures involving length and weight. These structures will be separate because they develop through the interiorization of action with the different materials, but the structures will have the same form (Chapman, 1988; Lourenc¸o & Machado, 1996). This point becomes clearer when we keep in mind Piaget’s account of the development of structures as involving the interiorization of action. ‘‘When content-specific actions are interiorized and grouped together as operations, the resulting structures accordingly retain the content specificity of the operations of which they are composed’’ (Chapman, 1988, p. 343). Piaget did consider the possibility of general stages but he stated that he had found no evidence for such general stages. In Piaget’s (1941/1952, p. 204) words, a ‘‘formal structure . . . will not be acquired all at once, irrespective of its content, but will need to be reacquired as many times as there are different contents to which it is applied.’’ Thus, Piaget never did make claims about consistency in reasoning across different content, and expectations of consistency in reasoning do not follow from Piaget’s theory (Chapman, 1988). Chapman (1988, p. 347) concluded that contrary to widely accepted interpretations of his theory Piaget did not believe in general stages of development characterized by developmental synchrony across domains of content and such an interpretation of stage development cannot be derived from the concept of structures d’ensemble. The idea that structures d’ensemble imply developmental synchrony results from a confusion of Piaget’s specific concept of structures d’ensemble as relational totalities with the notion of ‘structural unity’ across domains of content. This latter notion he specifically denied.

Thus, evidence of inconsistency in reasoning is not a challenge for Piaget’s theory (see also Lourenc¸o & Machado, 1996). In contrast to the standard interpretation of Piaget, Chapman (1999; Carpendale, McBride, & Chapman, 1996) emphasized Piaget’s insight that thought develops from action rather than the particular logic used by Piaget to describe reasoning. Instead of considering reasoning as the application of a rule or logical principle to solve a problem, in Chapman’s ‘‘operational semantic’’ theory, reasoning is assumed to consist of the process of combining and coordinating internalized actions, or operations. From this perspective, transitive reasoning about the relative lengths of a series of sticks would

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involve implicitly performing the operations of comparing the sticks by aligning their ends and checking to see if one protrudes beyond the other. These implicit operations would then be combined to generate the solution. In the answer that children generate we can see an instance of a logical rule (i.e., A ⬎ B and B ⬎ C so A ⬎C), but rather than being applied to solve the problem, a particular instance of this rule is created in the process of combining the operations (Carpendale, McBride, & Chapman, 1996; Chapman & Lindenberger, 1992). This interpretation of Piaget theory, based on his underlying constructivist view of the development of knowledge, leads to a view of stages that does not imply consistency in reasoning, as assumed by Kohlberg and others. Rather than being problematic, horizontal decalage should be expected from a constructivist epistemology, according to which thought develops from action, because action is necessarily content specific (Chapman, 1988). This interpretation of Piagetian theory, developed in the area of children’s concrete operational reasoning, is relevant for the parallel problem of inconsistency in reasoning about moral matters. From this perspective, resolving a moral dilemma does not consist of applying a moral principle and calculating an answer (in a manner analogous to the mental logic theory of reasoning). Rather, it is a process of coordinating all the perspectives involved and generating a solution through this process that is fair to all concerned. The solution generated could be described in terms of a moral principle, but it is a particular instance of that principle that was generated by a process of coordinating viewpoints rather than a principle that was applied in order to derive the solution. This view of stages and the process of moral reasoning is consistent with Piaget’s underlying insight that thought originates in action (Chapman, 1988). This position is also clear in Piaget’s (1932/1965, p. 119) work on moral judgment where he states that ‘‘there can be no doubt that verbal thought lags behind active thought.’’ I now turn to Piaget’s view of stages and the process of reasoning in his work on moral judgment. Piaget’s Theory of Moral Judgment: The Role of Social Interaction One of the contexts in which Piaget investigated the development of moral judgment was in children’s understanding of the rules of games, primarily boys playing the game of marbles. Piaget’s (1932/1965, p. 13) justification for this unusual approach was that ‘‘all morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules.’’ The question is how children come to respect rules and how children’s understanding of the nature of rules changes. Social games are an appropriate context for this study because, in contrast to many of the moral rules children learn from adults, the rules of games are passed on and elaborated by children. Although Piaget’s interest in subject–object interaction is well known, his interest in the role of social interaction in development is, unfortunately,

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relatively unknown (e.g, Chapman, 1986, 1988; Piaget, 1923/1955, 1924/ 1928, 1965/1995; Smith, 1995; Youniss & Damon, 1992). In fact, it has been commonly assumed that Piaget completely neglected the role of social interaction in development. Perhaps this partial view of Piaget will be corrected by the recent publication of the first English translation of Piaget’s (1965/1995) ‘‘Sociological Studies.’’ In this book Piaget clearly states that ‘‘human intelligence is subject to the action of social life at all levels of development from the first to the last day of life’’ (Piaget, 1965/1995, p. 278). However, Piaget (1965/1995, p. 278) also refused to ‘‘accept that ‘society’ or ‘social life’ are sufficiently precise concepts to be employed in psychology.’’ This is because social interaction influences individuals in quite different ways at different points in their development. It is also because there are different forms of social interaction. ‘‘In all spheres, two types of social relations must be distinguished: constraint and cooperation. The first implies an element of unilateral respect, of authority and prestige; the second is simply the intercourse between individuals on an equal footing’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 61). Much of the work from a Piagetian perspective on the influence of peers and social interaction on cognitive and moral development has been primarily concerned with peers as a source of social cognitive conflict leading to disequilibrium, which results in further development (e.g., Doise & Mugny, 1984; Forman & Kraker, 1985; for a review see Chapman & McBride, 1992). Kohlberg (e.g., 1969) also acknowledged the importance of social interaction, primarily because opportunities for role taking provide a source of disequilibrium, promoting development of more complete, but still partial, forms of equilibrium. It is less commonly mentioned that as well as social interaction as a source of disequilibrium, Piaget (1932/1965) was also concerned with how the nature of relationships may influence children’s ability to reach an understanding of other’s perspectives (Kruger & Tomasello, 1986; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993; Tudge & Rogoff, 1989). For social interaction to be effective, children must be able to understand the other points of view that conflict with their own perspective. This understanding of other perspectives may be facilitated or constrained by the nature of the relationship. It is this second role of social interaction in the way relationships differentially influence perspective taking and moral reasoning that I am primarily concerned with. From Piaget’s perspective, children construct their social and moral intelligence through managing their social interaction. From this it follows that for the development of social intelligence we should look at the structure of the relationships that children experience because different relationships allow for different forms of development.1 1 Other authors have also emphasized the role of relationships in moral development. In particular, Gilligan and Wiggins (1987) proposed a theory in which the relationships of inequality and attachment, which they suggest are typically differentially experienced by boys and girls, influence the development of two moralities: justice and care. In 1932 Piaget men-

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Of the two general types of relationships that Piaget (1932/1965) described, the first relationship children experience is with their parents, which tends to involve unilateral respect, one-sided authority, and constraint. Adults impose rules on children and, because of the lack of equality, adults may not feel obligated to justify their rules or listen to children’s points of view. Children follow these moral rules due to the respect they feel for adults or older children. According to Piaget, children’s respect for adults is based on a mixture of fear and affection. In this type of relationship children cannot reach an understanding of the purpose of the rules, and, therefore, they see rules as external and unchangeable. Piaget described young children’s understanding of rules as ‘‘sacred’’ and ‘‘untouchable,’’ something passed down from previous generations, and ultimately from God. Kohlberg assumed that Piaget was claiming that young children feel ‘‘a deep reverence for the adult ‘World Order’ ’’ (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 20). Instead, Kohlberg argued on the basis of his own research that it is simpler to characterize young children’s understanding of morality as merely a desire to avoid punishment—a ‘‘basically ‘hedonistic’ view of right or wrong’’ (p. 21)—rather than as a ‘‘deep reverence’’ for adults. What Piaget meant by ‘‘sacred,’’ however, was an understanding of moral rules as completely external to the child and, thus, beyond change by human hands. Young children understand rules in this way because they are in relationships of adult constraint and cannot understand the purpose of the rules. In fact, in Piaget’s (1932/1965) research on children’s understanding of the rules of marbles he found that young children thought of the rules for marbles as sacred (i.e., unchangeable), but at the same time they did, in fact, change them continually because they did not put these rules into practice in any systematic way. That is, even though young children think of rules as external and unchangeable their play does not actually conform to the rules. ‘‘Small children play according to their understanding but consider the rules as intangible and ‘sacred’ ’’ (Piaget, 1965/1995, p. 303). Piaget (1932/1965, p. 74) recognized that ‘‘children very rarely reflect on the original institution of the game of marbles.’’ However, when questioned their answers concerning the adult origin and unchanging nature of the rules indicates that these young children tioned the moralists’ discussion of a conflict between justice and love. Piaget acknowledged that love (or ‘‘care’’) might be in conflict with ‘‘short-sighted justice’’ but he argued that ‘‘between the more refined forms of justice, such as equity and love properly so called, there is no longer any real conflict’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 324). That is, in relationships of mutual respect justice and care would not be in conflict; rather, concerns with equity would involve both justice and care. Gilligan’s distinction between justice and care is part of a wider discussion in the philosophical literature. ‘‘In the past these principles have served as core elements of two contrary traditions in moral philosophy. . . . Hegel was the first to argue that we misperceive the basic moral phenomenon if we isolate the two aspects, assigning opposite principles to each’’ (Habermas, 1983/1990, p. 201). Habermas argued that these two principles are internally connected within moral argumentation and that ‘‘morality thus cannot protect the one without the other’’ (Habermas, 1983/1990, p. 200).

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think that ‘‘the laws of the game must be left alone’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 75). At the same time that children experience relationships of constraint with their parents, they also experience a different form of relationship with their peers. In these relationships they are among equals, and this form of relationship allows for the possibility of cooperation, although there will be ‘‘beginning phases where collaboration among children is not yet possible since children lack the instruments necessary for coordination’’ (Piaget, 1965/ 1995, p. 305). Ideally, interaction among peers cannot be dominated by one child because they are equals, and, therefore, they must cooperate. Piaget argued that morality develops in situations that involve cooperation because it is in these relationships that children are able to take the perspectives of others. In cooperative relationships individuals must understand each other’s perspectives, and this requires listening to others and explaining one’s own position. ‘‘Cooperation alone can shake the child out of its initial state of unconscious egocentrism’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 187). Within such cooperative relationships children develop an understanding of rules as based on mutual agreement. Therefore, rules can be changed as long as everyone concerned agrees. According to Piaget (1932/1965), the two moral worlds of constraint and cooperation coexist in childhood and continue to exist in adulthood, although there is a gradual shift from one to the other. This view of parent–child relationships as involving constraint is not all negative and it may arise from positive motivations because parents must protect young children from trialand-error learning (Davidson & Youniss, 1995). At early ages children may not be able to understand the reason for many rules, but parent–child relationships tend to change with the development of the child (Youniss & Smollar, 1985). Although Piaget introduced the two relationships of constraint and cooperation as a dichotomy, he clearly acknowledged that most relationships consist of some mixture of the two types and the proportions will vary. ‘‘Actually, of course, there are innumerable intermediate stages between these two attitudes of obedience and collaboration, but it is useful for the purposes of analysis to emphasize the real opposition that exists between them’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 138). Relationships among children can also involve constraint and the imposition of power because ‘‘even in the relations between children, the authority of older ones will outweigh equality’’ (Piaget, 1932/ 1965, p. 316). On the other hand, parent–child relationships can vary in the degree of cooperation that is encouraged. This Piagetian view of the differential role of relationships in development provides an explanation for the influence of different parenting styles on development, and Piaget (1932/1965, e.g., p. 137, p. 267) did suggest that different family backgrounds might differentially affect the development of the idea of equality. Piaget (1932/1965) described two types of morality in his investigation of children’s moral judgment that are associated with these two forms of

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social interaction. A morality of constraint and a morality of cooperation: ‘‘relations of constraint, whose characteristic is to impose upon the individual from outside a system of rules with obligatory content, and relations of cooperation whose characteristic is to create within people’s minds the consciousness of ideal norms at the back of all rules’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 395). Piaget did not claim that these two types of moral thought form separate stages; rather, these forms of moral judgment tend to overlap. With respect to children’s understanding of the rules of games, Piaget (1932/1965, p. 85) stated that there are ‘‘no inclusive stages which define the whole of a subject’s mental life at a given point of his evolution.’’ Further, ‘‘the material cannot be said to embody stages properly so called,’’ and ‘‘it may even happen that one and the same child judges sometimes one way, sometimes the other’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 124). ‘‘There can therefore be no question of two real stages. All we can say is that objective responsibility is a phenomenon frequently to be found among the younger children but subsequently diminishing in importance’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 156). Again, when referring to the development of children’s understanding of retributive and distributive justice, Piaget (1932/1965, p. 267) stated that ‘‘there can be no question of clear cut stages in moral development.’’ The gradual shift observed from one morality to the other as children develop is partially due to changes in the kinds of relationships that an individual typically experiences. Piaget (1932/1965) did not, however, claim that the features of morality from relationships of constraint completely vanish in adults. There may be situations involving cooperation in childhood and relationships of constraint experienced by adults. Both forms of morality exist in the child and in the adult; it is ‘‘simply a question of the proportions in which they are mixed’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 85). Piaget argued that adults and children use both types of moral reasoning, only the proportion differs, and the type used depends on the situation or relationship rather than on the individual being in a particular stage. This implies that if social interaction varies in terms of constraint versus cooperation adults would tend to use different levels of moral reasoning. That is, the nature of the relationship individuals experience may influence moral reasoning due to either facilitating or inhibiting the process of perspective taking. Piaget (1932/1965, p. 76) asked, ‘‘how is it that democratic practice is so developed in the games of marbles played by boys of 11 to 13, whereas it is still so unfamiliar to the adult in many spheres of life?’’ His answer was that since the game of marbles was generally dropped by the age of 14, these 11- to 13-year-olds had no seniors to impose rules through weight of authority. Thus, they experienced a relationship of cooperation rather than constraint and were able to develop an understanding of rules as being based on mutual agreement. Within a cooperative relationship among equals these children engaged in dialogue in which they were able to coordinate their interests and reach

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an agreement that was acceptable to all of them concerning the rules they were going to use to coordinate their game. One of Piaget’s research participants [Ross (11)] responded to the question, ‘‘How did these rules begin?’’ by saying, ‘‘Some boys came to an agreement amongst themselves and made them’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 66). After a discussion with three boys about the complexities of the rules and the differences between rules in different districts another research participant, Vua (13), said, ‘‘The fact is that sometimes people play differently. Then you ask each other what you want to do.’’ Piaget asked what happens ‘‘if you can’t agree?’’ and Vua’s response was, ‘‘We scrap for a bit and then we fix things up,’’ which, according to Piaget, means they cooperate (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 49). Stage of moral reasoning is not, however, determined completely by the structure of the relationship. Children also have to develop to the point where they can participate cooperatively and understand others’ perspectives. Piaget described two types of egocentrism that constrain children’s moral reasoning. Egocentrism can be due to the structure of the relationship constraining individuals’ ability to take others’ perspectives as well as due to a lack of knowledge on the child’s part. There can be a combination of egocentrism due to the child’s immaturity of thought as well as egocentrism due to constraint resulting from the structure of the relationship. Young children overcome their egocentrism through participating in cooperative relationships among equals. But the egocentrism due the structure of relationships involving constraint may still influence the moral reasoning of adolescents and adults. Thus, this approach accounts for observed development in moral reasoning as well as inconsistency in reasoning across situations. As mentioned above, Piaget studied children’s understanding of and respect for rules in the context of children’s games, in particular the game of marbles. He concluded that ‘‘psychologically, the same rule is a completely different reality for the child of 7 who regards it as sacred and untouchable and for the child of 12 who, without interfering with it, regards it as valid only after it has been mutually agreed upon’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, pp. 96– 97). Thus, it could be argued that Piaget’s view of moral development was not based on respect for moral rules as external and unchanging but rather based only on respect for rules that all involved have decided are fair and thus really on respect for the persons who agree upon the rules. In cooperative relationships mutual respect for persons will lead to generating solutions by a process of considering all other positions and coordinating conflicting viewpoints. This theoretical perspective considers the nature of the relationship in constraining moral reasoning and, thus, does not predict consistency in stage of moral reasoning regardless of the structure of the relationship (i.e., the extent of equality or cooperation vs constraint). Therefore, this perspective accounts for the evidence of inconsistency in moral reasoning discussed above.

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The emphasis here is on the process through which a decision is reached rather than on structural descriptions of the principles which define forms of reasoning. Although we could describe the outcome of moral reasoning in terms of a moral principle, from this perspective, the actual process of moral reasoning does not involve applying a preexisting principle to a problem. Instead it involves considering all the points of view involved in a moral conflict by listening to the other people concerned, justifying one’s own view, and reaching a solution agreeable to all. This process would generate a particular instance of a moral principle, but it is not a preexisting moral principle that is applied to a dilemma to generate a solution. As Piaget (1932/ 1965) argued, what children need in a changing world is not a set of moral rules defining what to do in particular situations that may no longer be applicable, but a process for resolving moral conflicts. As mentioned above, Kohlberg (e.g., 1969) also wrote that moral reasoning is based on perspective taking. However, this account of the process of reasoning is incompatible with Kohlberg’s conception of stages. If moral reasoning was based on perspective taking, then variability in moral reasoning should be expected due to factors that influence perspective taking by either constraining or facilitating the ability to understand the perspectives of others involved in the conflict. On the other hand, consistency in reasoning across situations would be expected if reasoning involves the application of a principle. One of Kohlberg’s (1969) key criteria for stages from Piaget (1960) is the notion of a ‘‘structured whole,’’ which for Kohlberg implies consistency in reasoning. Kohlberg’s conception of stages appears to entail a view of moral reasoning as the application of a principle to a moral problem, which involves a process of calculating or deriving a solution to a moral dilemma. This conception of reasoning follows from Kohlberg’s transformational model of stage development and it encounters problems because it predicts more consistency than we observe. As I have argued, however, an interpretation of Piaget’s theory that is more consistent with his underlying epistemology leads to a view of stages that does not imply consistency (Chapman, 1988), and a corresponding view of moral reasoning as the coordination of perspectives. This process could be influenced by situations that either constrain or facilitate perspective taking. From the approach proposed here, moral reasoning is assumed to be based on dialogue, but at lower stages it departs to varying degrees from the ideal situation for free and open communication between people. That is, for various reasons the perspectives of some participants in the moral dilemma may not be considered or given equal weight. The distinction between accounts of moral reasoning as either a process of coordinating perspectives or as the application of a moral principle can be illustrated with an example. One way of characterizing Stage 3 in Kohlberg’s theory is in terms of the Golden Rule: ‘‘do unto others as you would have

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others do unto you’’ (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 27). That is, we can describe the justifications people offer for their moral decisions in terms of this moral principle. However, this does not necessarily mean that a decision was reached through a process of applying this moral principle to a dilemma. Another possibility is that the process of reasoning involves understanding and coordinating the conflicting perspectives and, thus, reaching decisions that are reversible. Although the outcome of such a process could be described in terms of the Golden Rule, this is a moment in a process that generates a particular instance of this moral principle rather than a preexisting principle that is somehow present in the mind and applied to problems. This Piagetian view of morality as a process of coordinating perspectives rather than applying a set of moral principles is consistent with Habermas’s view of morality based on discourse ethics. Habermas’s (1983/1990) view of discourse ethics is based on the notion of an idealized form of communication without repression, coercion, and inequality. Within this ideal communication situation everyone with the capacity to take part in moral argumentation should be given the opportunity for equal participation. In this context of ideal or unrestricted communication everyone concerned can speak and express their attitudes, desires, and needs, and everyone can question any assertion. From this perspective, moral norms must be justified through a process of argumentation in which everyone concerned must be free to state their position. Participants in such moral argumentation must reach a common decision that is equally good for all involved. Habermas’s (1983/1990, p. 93) principle of discourse ethics states that ‘‘only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.’’ According to Habermas’s (1983/1990) principle of universalization, all affected by a moral norm can accept its consequences, which will be equally good for all involved. The process necessary to justify moral norms is cooperative argumentation, in which understanding is reached because all involved have a chance to state their position and an obligation to listen to and question others. Habermas argued that the reason that these are not just cultural conventions is that they are universal and necessary presuppositions of argumentation. Piaget’s cooperative relationships approximate Habermas’s idealized conditions for communication. In cooperative relationships among peers everyone is equal. There is no imbalance of power in this idealized relationship, and, due to mutual respect, everyone concerned will listen to others’ points of view in order to understand their concerns and will feel obligated to explain their own position. Of course, just as Piaget recognized that any actual relationship will involve varying degrees of constraint, Habermas (1983/ 1990) realizes that these ideal conditions will rarely be completely met. Although not all actual discourses conform to these conditions, these idealized conditions are presupposed by participants in argumentation to be at least adequately approximated.

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Inclusion of Persons: Who Is Considered a Moral Agent? Viewing moral reasoning as dialogue, either external or internalized, raises the question of whose perspectives, or voices, are given consideration in such a dialogue. Ideally, all points of view involved in the conflict would be considered and given equal weight in the process of coordinating and generating a solution. In actual cases, this ideal perspective taking may not be achieved for various reasons such as the nature of the relationship or, perhaps, emotional factors. The issue of who is considered to be a moral agent or who is considered to be a ‘‘person’’ whose position is given weight has been neglected in the Kohlbergian approach, but the perspective outlined here naturally raises such questions. This approach provides an explanation of racism and other cases in which certain perspectives are ignored. Racism could be characterized as the exclusion of groups of people from consideration as moral agents. From this perspective, moral development could be thought of as progressively broadening one’s concept of a ‘‘person’’ (Davidson & Youniss, 1995, p. 306). The theoretical perspective I have introduced is consistent with research showing that moral reasoning is sensitive to the type of dilemma and the situation. As reported above, people tend to use lower stage reasoning on many moral dilemmas other than those on Kohlberg’s test. For some dilemmas, however, stage of moral reasoning seems to be influenced by the audience to which the participants are directing their responses. For example, on a moral dilemma involving both societal and business implications, Carpendale and Krebs (1992) found that participants directing their responses to a business-oriented audience used lower stage judgments than participants responding to a philosophically oriented audience. This is evidence that the relative salience of the other people involved in the dilemma can influence the form of moral reasoning employed. From the approach outlined here, factors that facilitate the ability to take the perspectives of others involved in a moral dilemma should result in the use of higher stage moral reasoning. For example, in a study on the influence of self-interest on moral reasoning, we found that participants who stood to gain money by concealing defects in an article they were selling actually disclosed more about the defects than participants in a hypothetical condition who had no monetary self-interest involved (Carpendale & Krebs, 1995). This finding appears counterintuitive until it is realized that the manipulation of self-interest in this study was associated with a change in the salience of the other person involved in this ‘‘selling dilemma,’’ that is, the buyer. When money actually changed hands, participants may have been made more aware of the perspective of the person buying the article in question and may have considered the buyer’s potential response to their concealment of defects. All of this would work to more closely approximate the consideration of the various viewpoints involved in this dilemma than the purely hypothetical

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condition in which the other person involved may have seemed less real, and participants may have resorted to more stereotypical responses, considered appropriate in justifying business deals. Universality versus Moral Relativism A final important issue that I briefly address is the question of whether forms of moral thought are merely culturally accepted norms or whether there is a basis for claims concerning the universality of moral judgment. Although this is a very complex issue, it is important to at least counter what might seem to be an automatic assumption that basing moral development on dialogue must lead to moral relativism because dialogue differs across cultures. I argue that this is not so. I frame the problem of moral relativism in two ways. The first is the issue of whether it is possible to evaluate alternative forms of moral knowledge. Piaget’s equilibration theory provides a way of evaluating forms of knowledge and thus provides the possibility of progressive development. A second approach to relativism concerns the source of moral knowledge in either individuals or social groups. Piaget’s third alternative was to focus on social relations. Against the assumption that basing moral reasoning on dialogue leads to relativism, I outline several arguments supporting the view that dialogue is social interaction, that there are universal preconditions for social interaction, and that some of these preconditions for the possibility of social interaction are moral norms. A view of moral reasoning as a process of coordinating conflicting perspectives and, thus, based on dialogue, either external or internalized, is consistent with other positions concerning reasoning in general (e.g., Chapman, 1991, 1993; Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1934/1986; Wertsch, 1991). This approach might appear to converge with Tappan’s (1997) Vygotskian view of moral reasoning as inner moral dialogue. Furthermore, the central role given to discourse in this proposed view of moral reasoning might appear to open the door to relativism. Talk of inclusion of ‘‘voices’’ is often associated with a narrative (Day & Tappan, 1996) or postmodern view of morality in which it is not considered possible to evaluate differing points of view, or ‘‘voices,’’ in moral conflicts. That is, alternative moral perspectives are just different, and they are all equally valid. In Day and Tappan’s (1996, p. 75) words, ‘‘when we take the narrative turn, therefore, moral development ceases to be about higher and more accurate orders of thought that eventually might translate into action. It becomes instead a culturally specific medium for identifying how persons want to relate to one another.’’ Similarly, Tappan (1997, p. 95) claimed that from a Vygotskian perspective ‘‘moral development does not occur in the same way, following the same sequence, for all persons around the globe, but rather it is specific to unique social, cultural, and historical contexts.’’ An assumption that is common to both cultural relativism and postmodernism is that there is nothing universal about moral development and no way

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to judge the relative adequacy of moral arguments. That is, moral judgments are culturally specific and each can be equally appropriate in a given cultural context. We have no way to legitimately judge that one form of knowledge is better than another. This moral relativism seems to undermine the possibility of both development and morality (Chandler, 1997; Lourenc¸o, 1996). Kohlberg argued that the potential for evaluating moral positions is essential for any developmental theory. This issue of how it is possible to evaluate different forms of knowledge, and thus how development rather than mere change is possible, was Piaget’s original goal, according to Chapman’s (1988) reconstruction of Piaget’s intellectual development. Piaget’s solution to this problem was his equilibration theory. The notion of equilibrium makes the evaluation of different forms of knowledge possible because more equilibrated forms take into account more perspectives and, thus, are more complete, coherent, and stable than less equilibrated forms of knowledge. This approach provides a distinction between progressive development and nonprogressive change. That is, development proceeds by a gradual process of including more perspectives. Development proceeds through a series of more complete, but still partial, points of relative equilibrium. The logic of this approach implies movement away from initial points of error and centration on particular perspectives and toward more stable and complete forms of knowledge that coordinate more viewpoints. Thus, the approach proposed here does provide a means for evaluating different forms of moral justification. This involves how closely an ideal speech situation or cooperative relationship is approximated. Solutions considering more perspectives—that is, solutions more closely approximating the moral point of view—are more adequate than those solutions that exclude some perspectives from full and equal consideration. In the process of ontogenetic development, individuals recognize the inadequacy of their moral solutions when they realize that some perspectives are excluded, resulting in disequilibrium and further development. A second way of framing the problem of cultural and moral relativism is to consider the debate concerning whether the individual or the social group is the source of moral knowledge. The influence of the individual and the social group on the development of rationality and morality was a problem that Piaget (1965/1995) struggled with in a series of essays written over a number of years and published as ‘‘Sociological Studies.’’ Piaget criticized approaches that explain development completely in terms of individual factors because this neglects the influence of social factors on development. The alternative would appear to be that morality is derived from the collective. But Piaget also rejected this approach because it offers no account for why individuals can legitimately criticize beliefs endorsed by the culture. As a third alternative Piaget proposed that ‘‘there are neither individuals as such nor society as such. There are just interindividual relations’’ (Piaget, 1965/1995, p. 210; see also p. 136, and the first chapter, section 2). Piaget

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suggested that what follows from taking such an interactionist perspective, where the primary reality is the relations between individuals, is that we must distinguish different types of social relationships. As mentioned above, Piaget described two forms of social interaction: constraint and cooperation. Piaget (1965/1995) argued that cooperation was the form of interaction toward which social relationships tend. ‘‘One may conceive of cooperation as constituting the ideal form of equilibrium toward which society tends when compulsory conformity comes to breakdown’’ (Piaget, 1965/1995, p. 347). According to Piaget (1932/1965, p. 337) ‘‘the germs of [the morality of cooperation] are present in any society.’’ Piaget argued that justice is not just a cultural norm imposed on children by adults. Rather, this idea is inherent in the preconditions for social interaction. The development of the ability to reason is neither individual nor social, but rather, ‘‘reason is an ideal equilibrium immanent in all conscious activity’’ (Piaget, 1965/1995, p. 243). Piaget’s (1965/1995, p. 161) position is that ‘‘the aspiration toward justice characteristic of all human societies is the expression, not of factors prior to social evolution (a ‘human nature’ innate in the individual) but of laws of equilibrium immanent in society.’’ This is ‘‘a permanent tendency toward more equality, more reciprocity, more justice, because all of these are forms of a more complete or advanced state of equilibrium.’’ The concept of justice is not innate nor is it a cultural belief that is passed on to children from adults. Rather, according to Piaget, the idea of justice is reinvented or reconstructed within cooperative interaction. ‘‘In contrast to a given rule, which from the first has been imposed on the child from the outside and which for many years he has failed to understand, such as the rule of not telling lies, the rule of justice is a sort of immanent condition of social relationships or a law governing their equilibrium’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 198). Of course, many actual relationships are not based on the equality from which the idea of justice can be derived, but ‘‘cooperation, indeed, seems rather to be the limiting term, the ideal equilibrium to which all relations of constraint tend’’ (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 90). That is, the preconditions for social interaction require some degree of cooperation and therefore contain the potential for more equilibrated cooperation, which entails equality among participants and thus fairness. Piaget’s focus on relations rather than individuals or social groups is fairly unusual. It is more commonly assumed that if we reject the notion that moral knowledge is already innately given, then the only alternative available is that moral norms must be passed on by cultures. If moral development is shaped by culture and cultures differ, then it would seem that morality must be culturally specific. In other words, if moral reasoning involves the internalization of dialogue, and dialogue is specific to particular cultural groups, then it would seem to follow logically that moral reasoning must also be culturally relative. However, the conclusion that moral relativism follows from an approach

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based on dialogue seems to require the assumption that dialogue is an arbitrary means for encoding and transmitting information. There are, however, a number of problems with an encoding view of dialogue (e.g., Bickhard, 1987), and I suggest instead that dialogue is social interaction (Turnbull & Carpendale, 1999). For example, the encoding view is based on the idea of symbols as dyadic in nature and connected to aspects of the world. One of the problems with such a view is that the same utterance can have different meanings (e.g., Turnbull & Carpendale, 1999; Wittgenstein, 1968). Thus, we have to consider how utterances are used in particular sequences of interaction to convey meaning to others. This suggests that dialogue is better thought of as social interaction based on triadic interaction involving self, others, and the world (Chapman, 1991, 1999; Turnbull & Carpendale, 1999). This approach takes dialogue as embedded in social activity rather than as a conventional and arbitrary system for the transmission of thoughts. The next step in the argument after the claim that dialogue is social interaction is to argue that there are necessary and universal preconditions for the possibility of social interaction. Furthermore, some of these preconditions for interaction are moral norms. Human interaction is not completely culturally relative; rather some of the necessary preconditions for social interaction are moral norms. In other words, there are universal grounds for some moral norms because these norms are required to make social interaction possible. There are universal aspects of the nature of social interaction, and it is these preconditions for the possibility of social interaction that provide a universal basis for morality and moral development. This was Piaget’s (1965/1995) position and it is also consistent with other theorists such as Habermas (1983/ 1990), Garfinkel (1967; Heritage, 1984), Grice (1975), and Wittgenstein (1968). I mention some of these arguments but it is beyond the scope of this article to fully explicate these positions and discuss the controversies over interpretations of these theorists. Habermas (1983/1990) argued that moral norms are not just cultural conventions because they are universal and necessary preconditions for argumentation. Garfinkel (1967; Heritage, 1984) pointed out that, unless people respond to the prior contribution of others there is no social interaction, only a sequence of actions. Thus, there is a moral component to social interaction. Similarly, when Grice (1975) described his ‘‘principle of cooperation’’ and maxims of conversation, he pointed out that these are not just restricted to conversation, but rather they apply to cooperative interaction in general. The same issues of understanding arise whether we are in conversation or in cooperative interaction with goals such as baking a cake or fixing a car. In other words, Grice’s maximums of conversation and his cooperative principle (i.e., the assumption that others in interaction are cooperating at some level) are necessary for an understanding of others’ contributions to conversation and actions in interaction. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, Holiday (1988) argued that some of

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the preconditions required to make language possible are moral in nature. That is, as well as natural regularities such as the fact that objects do not just appear or disappear and our yardsticks do not unexpectedly change in length, moral regularities are also required. For example, Holiday (1988) argued that language would not be possible without some degree of sincerity on the part of people who use and teach language. It could be objected that deception is common, but the point is that deceit is only possible against a background of trust. That is, lying is only possible because there is an assumption that people usually tell the truth. If we try to imagine a language in which speakers uttered true and false statements in a random manner there would be no distinction between truth and falsity and communication would be impossible. Thus, truth telling in general is a requirement for the possibility of dialogue. This is an example of a moral norm, closely related to trust and sincerity, that is a precondition for social interaction and dialogue. Conclusion In conclusion, I have argued that there is an inconsistency in Kohlberg’s theory. Kohlberg’s criteria for stages imply consistency in reasoning and entail a view of reasoning as the application of moral principles, yet Kohlberg wanted to base moral reasoning on perspective taking. I have argued that his conception of stages and his account of the process of reasoning are incompatible. One has to change. I suggest modifying his conception of stages and emphasizing the Piagetian view of moral reasoning as a process of coordinating perspectives rather than the application of principles or rules. This modification of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development accounts for the accumulating evidence of inconsistency in moral reasoning that has been problematic for Kohlberg’s theory, and it is consistent with more adequate interpretations of both Piaget’s work on moral judgment (e.g., Youniss & Damon, 1992; Davidson & Youniss, 1991, 1995) and his theory of cognitive development (e.g., Chapman, 1988; Lourenc¸o & Machado, 1996; von Glasersfeld, 1982). REFERENCES Bartek, S. E., Krebs, D. L., & Taylor, M. C. (1993). Coping, defending, and the relations between moral judgment and moral behavior in prostitutes and other female juvenile delinquents. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102, 66–73. Bickhard, M. H. (1987). The social nature of the functional nature of language. In M. Hickmann (Ed.), Social and functional approaches to language and thought (pp. 39–65). New York: Academic Press. Carpendale, J. I. M. (1997). An explication of Piaget’s constructivism: Implications for social cognitive development. In S. Hala (Ed.), The development of social cognition (pp. 35– 64). London: Psychology Press. Carpendale, J., & Krebs, D. L. (1992). Situational variation in moral judgment: In a stage or on a stage? Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 21, 203–224.

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Carpendale, J. I. M., & Krebs, D. L. (1995). Variations in level of moral judgment as a function of type of dilemma and moral choice. Journal of Personality, 63, 289–313. Carpendale, J. I., McBride, M., & Chapman, M. (1996). Language and operations in children’s class inclusion reasoning: The operational semantic theory of reasoning. Developmental Review, 16, 391–415. Chandler, M. (1997). Stumping for progress in a post-modern world. In E. Amsel & K. A. Renninger (Eds.), Change and development: Issues of theory, method, and application (pp. 1–26). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Chapman, M. (1986). The structure of exchange: Piaget’s sociological theory. Human Development, 29, 181–194. Chapman, M. (1988). Constructive evolution: Origins and development of Piaget’s thought. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. Chapman, M. (1991). The epistemic triangle: Operative and communicative components of cognitive competence. In M. Chandler & M. Chapman (Eds.), Criteria for competence: Controversies in the conceptualization and assessment of children’s abilities (pp. 209– 228). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Chapman, M. (1993). Everyday reasoning and the revision of belief. In J. Puckett & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Mechanisms of everyday cognition (pp. 95–113). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Chapman, M. (1999). Constructivism and the problem of reality. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 20, 31–43. Chapman, M., & Lindenberger, U. (1992). Transitivity judgments, memory for premises, and models of children’s reasoning. Developmental Review, 12, 124–163. Chapman, M., & McBride, M. L. (1992). The education of reason: Cognitive conflict and its role in intellectual development. In C. U. Shantz & W. W. Hartup (Eds.), Conflict in child and adolescent development (pp. 36–69). New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1987). The measurement of moral judgment: Vol. 1. Theoretical foundations and research validation. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. Davidson, P., & Youniss, J. (1991). Which comes first, morality or identity? In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Handbook of moral behavior and development: Vol. 1. Theory (pp. 105–121). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Davidson, P., & Youniss, J. (1995). Moral development and social construction. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Moral development: An introduction (pp. 289–310). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Day, J. M., & Tappan, M. B. (1996). The narrative approach to moral development: From the epistemic subject to dialogical selves. Human Development, 39, 67–82. Denton, K., & Krebs, D. (1990). From the scene to the crime: The effect of alcohol and social context on moral judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 242–248. Doise, W., & Mugny, G. (1984). The social development of the intellect. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Forman, E. A., & Kraker, M. J. (1985). The social origins of logic: The contributions of Piaget and Vygotsky. In M. W. Berkowitz (Ed.), Peer conflict and psychological growth: New directions for child development (no. 29, pp. 23–39). San Francisco: Jossey–Bass. Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Gilligan, C., & Wiggins, G. (1987). The origins of morality in early childhood relationships. In J. Kagan & S. Lamb (Eds.), The emergence of morality in young children (pp. 277– 305). Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. Glasersfeld, E. von (1982). An interpretation of Piaget’s constructivism. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 142–143, 612–635.

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