Kuhn and cognitive psychology: Reply

KUHN AND COGNITIVE BRADLEY Department I would

like

commentary

to thank and criticism.

PSYCHOLOGY:

REPLY

S. GIBSON

of Psychology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523, U.S.A. Roy

Lachman

and

Eric

Amsel*

for

their

insightful

Both Lachman and Amsel have pointed out putative “The Convergence of Kuhn and Cognitive Psycholo-

weaknesses in my paper, gy.” However, because Amsel’s critique is the more negative of the two, I will confine this rejoinder to rebutting his claim that my paper represents a radical version of psychologism. Lachman’s on the other hand, is unfortunately

disappointment in my use of schema theory, beyond immediate comment as I am not yet

sure (or convinced) analysis. For instance,

that schema theory is outside Smith & Medin’s the notion of a script (which is essentially equivalent

(1981) to the

notion of a schema) formation by Medin

was recently called “promising” in a review of concept SC Smith (1984). At any rate, I will now confront Amsel’s

contention. I must admit before proceeding that I did not intend to make the claim that my paper provided evidence for the reduction of philosophy to (cognitive) psychology; indeed, I have generally been opposed to any form of radical reductionism. Evidently, however, I have preach, for Anise1 contends in his opening

not been able to practice remarks that my approach

“psychology of science” approach) ism or the view that “philosophical requiring cognitive psychological

is consistent with strong psychologcan be completely reduced to ones (1~. 265). As such, my approach is

based on the assumption by cognitive psychological for normative standards fine-grained psychologism,

in general questions analyses”

“that questions

of justification

are ultimately

what I (or the

answered

analyses” (p. 265) and “that [the] philosopher’s search of scientific inquiry w;li be ultimately derived from

cognitive explanations of scientist;” (p. 265). This brand of he then argues, is implausible; but that is not to say that

psychology is irrelevant to philosophy. On the contrary, Anise1 suggests that a more plausible account of the relation between philosophy (and in particular epistemology) and psychology is called mainstrea~l psychologism. Specifically, Amsel advocates a version of psychologism which “does not suppose that philosophy

of science

is reducible

evidence is relevant in justifying bulk of Amsel’s argumentation

to cognitive normative is directed

psychology,

but that psychological

propositions” (p. 266). In short, the against the notion that normative

propositions can be successfully derived from cognitive psychological analyses in favor of the more tenable view that cognitive psychology is (in some way) relevant to logic and epistemology. *All references to Lachman and Amsel come from their respective articles which immediately precede this one. A11 references to myself are contained in Gibson ( 1985). 277

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B. S. Gibson

As I see it, Amsel’s claim that the “psychology of’ science” approach represents a strong version of’ psychologism is to misconceive the approach. Nowhere in the relevant literature [see, e.g. Tweney pt al. (1981)] IS such a pretention made. In my view, Tweney Pt al. (198 1) are quite emphatic that the aim of the “psychology of science” approach is not the reduction of philosophical analyses to cognitive psychological advocates (1981)

analyses, but rather namely, mainstream

something more like what psychologism. For example,

Amsel himself Tweney cl al.

write: Let us be absolutely clear about what is proposed. It is not that philosophical considerations should be ignored in formulating normative models of science. It is rather that empirical evidence, including the appropriate use of historical evidence, is crucial to certain fundamental problems of philosophical import. What is being proposed is that useful normative models of science will result from the interpenetration and mutual fertilization of the philosophy of science and the newly emerging sciences of science. The science of the cognitive activity of individual scientists will be one of the keystone sciences of this new joint [my italics] venture (pp. 416-417).

Thus, science”

I am in disagreement approach, as proposed

with Amsel’s claim that the “psychology by Tweney et al. (1981), is a strong version

of of

psychologism. However, although Tweney et al. ( 198 1) have been explicit about the scope of their program perhaps I have not. What I intend to show, then, is that my approach is consistent with the “psychology of science” approach as conceived by Tweney et al. (198 l), that is, I intend to show that while normative standards may be derived from cognitive psychological analyses, such analyses are not synonymous with radical psychologism. In meeting this end, I intend to show that Kuhn’s conception of the scientific enterprise lends itself to such an approach. I will begin by briefly summarizing the main point of my paper. In “The Convergence of Kuhn and Cognitive Psychology” I alluded to the assertion that Kuhn was practising armchair psychology and that as such the offspring of this practice should be checked against empirical cognitive psychology. I then proceeded to argue that the notion of exemplar and learned perception of similarity (i.e. two offspring of Kuhn’s armchair psychology) in Kuhn’s philosophy of science were conceptually compatible with-were making the same sort of claim as - cognitive psychology, particularly schema theory. Finally, I argued that when viewed as an instance of schema theory and checked against the relevant evidence, the notion of exemplar and learned perception of similarity contained an ambiguity which called into question the unproblematic nature of scientific communities. Thus, my original intention was merely to show that inasmuch as Kuhn was practising armchair psychology when he described his descriptions could be reduced to the cognitive apparatus of scientists, cognitive psychology and consequently tested in a more direct manner than the history of science was capable of providing. On the basis of this work, I concluded that two of Kuhn’s descriptive concepts, namely, exemplars and learned perception of similarity, could be reduced to cognitive psychology (see notes 1 and 2). The questions which need to be asked now are, first, does this analysis make the claim that the normative standards for science can be derived from studying

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Kuhn and cognitive psychology

the cognitive apparatus of its practioners. 7 And second - the one which Amsel apparenty assumes -does such an analysis preclude the derivation of normative standards

from

the philosophy

of science,

not to mention

from

the history

of

science, the sociology of science, and so on. The answer to these two respective questions, I believe, is yes and no. In this way, Amsel is correct in identifying my analysis as consistent with the “psychology of science” approach (i.e. that normative standards can be derived from cognitive psychology); however, he goes astray when he claims that such an approach rubs out philosophical considerations and consequently closer attention.

leads to radical

psychologisms.

All of this needs

That normative standards can be derived from cognitive psychological analyses is apparent in Kuhn’s conception of the scientific enterprise if one rephrases such statements and asks instead of the relationship between description and prescription. For instance, Kuhn (1970a) writes: If I have a theory of how and why science works, it must necessarily have implications for the way in which scientists should behave if their enterprise is to flourish. The structure of my argument is simple, and, I think, unexceptional: scientists behave in the following ways; those modes of behavior have (here theory enters) the following essential functions; in the absence of an alternative mode that would serve similar&unctions, scientists should behave essentially as they do if their concern is to improve scientific knowledge (p. 237). In short,

it is to me apparent

in this remark

that Kuhn

himself

concedes

the

derivation of normative standards from the history, sociology and psychology of science (to name a few) in virtue of their being concerned with describing the scientific enterprise. Such remarks then corroborate with the “psychology of science” approach as described earlier. Thus, Amsel’s charge that my paper represents

a strong

version

of psychologism

is misdirected.

precisely because Kuhn is also employing descriptive of exemplar and learned perception of similarity,

concepts, to make

It is misdirected such as his notion normative claims

about science. My contention, as mentioned earlier,‘is merely that the notion of exemplar and learned perception of similarity derived from Kuhn’s historical analyses are making cognitive psychological claims and as such should be validated against empirical cognitive psychology. This contention involves the move from one descriptive discipline (i.e. history) to another (i.e. cognitive psychology) such that the plausibility of my paper rests not so much upon the claim that the “psychology of science” approach ignores philosophical considerations as it does upon the relation between description and prescription. Another way to make the point that Amsel’s arguments against my paper are misdirected is to point out that these arguments reveal a more fundamental disagreement with Kuhnian philosophy of science. In other words, Amsel’s arguments have already been rendered otiose by Kuhn (1970a, b, 1977a). For example, Kuhn has already argued that theory choice need not (defucto does not) proceed by normative criteria per se (e.g. accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness, etc.) but rather by how these criteria are valued by scientists (1977b); that to study the validity of sound knowledge generated by science is to study, at least, the

B. S. Gibson

280

cognitive apparatus of scientists (1977~); and finally that the boundary science (i.e. normal science) and non-science (i.e. abnormal science) structed” in virtue of what scientists themselves render virtue of normative standards (1970b). Thus, Amsel’s fundamental disagreement with Kuhnian philosophy

between is “con-

unproblematic and not in plaint may reflect a more of science.

Having said all of that, I would now like to touch briefly on the second of the two questions and merely emphasize that the “psychology” of science approach as well as Kuhnian philosophy of science does not amount to the obliteration of philosophical methods (e.g. logic) in the analyses of science. Rather, what is being suggested is that theories of science or rationality or whatever must be constructed from an interdisciplinary approach which utilizes the tools of each trade.

Once

again,

in the words

of Kuhn

(1970a):

Existing theories of rationality [presumably derived solely deliberation] are not quite right and we must readjust explain why science works as It does. To suppose that of rationality which are independent of our understanding the scientific process [derived from descriptive disciplines] to cloud-cuckoo land (p. 264). In conclusion, I have tried to show represents a strong version of psychologism

from philosophical or change them to we possess criteria of the essentials of is to open the door

that Amsel’s claim that my paper is unwarranted and is really more in

line with a more favorable version of psychologism which he calls mainstream psychologism. Namely, I have tried to show that while normative standards may be derived from descriptive disciplines such as cognitive psychology (not to mention

history

or sociology),

such

practice

does

not

preclude

philosophical

considerations. NOTES 1. In

my

opinion,

Amsel

gives

only

one

argument

which,

in

principle,

questions the reduction of Kuhn’s descriptive concepts to cognitive psychology. Specifically, Amsel distinguishes two types of representation: conceptual and conceptual representations function as cognitive psychological. Apparently, backdrops in that they determine, for instance, the psychological representation In other words, conceptual representations are of perceptual information. analogous of rabbits

to Kuhn’s notion of paradigm and cause us to see, say, ducks instead (which apparently are examples of psychological representation).

Moreo\:er, conceptual representations are limited in their scope, which is to sa)’ that while one particular conceptual representation causes us to see ducks it simultaneously precludes us from seeing rabbits. On the other hand, psychological representations rnu~ !W unlimited in their scope, that is, barring conceptual representations to the contrary, a duck is as easily represented - psychologically as a rabbit. If indeed psychological representations are unlimited, then “research on the cognitive psychology of scientists can never provide evidence for the existence of limits on conceptual representations”. In other words, because psychological representations hypothetically have no limits and because different paradigms are incommensurate (which implies contraints or limita-

281

Kuhn and cognitive psychology tions on conceptual representations) evidence for the other. However,

the evidence for the one is irrelevant to the even if cognitive psychologists discover that “it is unclear whether cognitive psychological representations are limited psychologists could ever demonstrate that the limits or constraints on the adaptability of conceptual representations causes or are caused by the limits or constraints on psychological representation”. Finally, insofar as conceptual representations are limited, at least across different that it is incorrect to view the evolution of a novice

paradigms, conceptual

Amsel asserts representation

into an expert conceptual representation as being one of modification, expansion, or differentiation. There are at least two reasons why I disagree with Amsel on these points. First, I question the plausibility of his distinction, namely that between conceptual and psychological representation. I do concur that concepts like “paradigm” function as cognitive backdrops, but I disagree that such concepts are outside the bounds of cognitive psychology. For instance, the evidence which suggests that humans employ “top-down” information processing - otherwise known as “conceptually driven” processing - seems to capture what Amsel’s conceptual representations represent, namely their influence on perception (e.g. Norman & Bobrow, 1976). Secondly, what if Amsel calls conceptual representations were really as limited as he suggests, then how could the historian of science-who would presumably be “directed” by a particular conceptual representation in his/her perception of the world - come to give us any impression of what an out-of-date scientific theory (i.e. an overthrown conceptual representation) would be like? Kuhn (1970b) himself offers advice both in this regard and in regard to the communication between scientists from incommensurate paradigms: If’ they [i.e. the incommensurate parties] can sufficiently refrain from explaining anomalous behavior as the consequence of mere error or madness, they may in time become very good predictors of each others behavior. Each will have learned to translate the other’s theory and its consequences into his own language and simultaneously to describe in his language the world to which that theory applies (p. 202). Thus, I disagree with Amsel’s narrow interpretation of Kuhn’s

conceptual-psychological distinction as I do his notion of incommensurability. Consequently, I

am not convinced that the “expert/novice paradigm” is incompatible with Kuhn’s view of science. For example, the following excerpt from Kuhn (1970b) seems to dictate an expert/novice paradigm: As the student proceeds from the freshman course to and through his doctoral dissertation, the problems assigned to him become more complex and less completely precedented. But they continue to be closely modeled on previous achievements as are the problems that normally occup) him during his subsequent independent scientific career (p. 47). 2. Another

potential

incompatibility

between

Kuhn and mainstream

cognitive

psychology which I foresee sparking debate centers on the “knowing how/ knowing that” distinction. It may be argued that whereas mainstream cognitive

282

B. S. Gibson

psychology is committed to “knowing that” (cf. Fodor, 1968), Kuhn’s learned perception of similarity represents a type of “knowing-how.”

notion of My only

reply to this argument, at the present, relies on the very ambiguity Kuhn presents issues of mind in his writings. For instance, compare:

to which

That process of learning by finger exercise or by doing [nly italics] continues throughout the process of professional initiation (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 47).

With, About that [computer] program I shall have nothing to say here, but even mention of it should make my most essential point. When I speak of knowledge embedded in shared exemplars, I am not referring to a mode of knowing that is systematic or less analyzable than knowledge embedded in rules, laws or criteria of identification (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 192).

Such ambiguity conclude cognitive

has, I am afraid,

that Kuhnian psychology.

descriptive

led critics like Dreyfus concepts

are outside

(1972)

to erroneously

the scope of mainstream

REFERENCES Amsel E. (1985) Psychologism and the psychology of scientists. New Zdeus in Psychology, 3, 265-272. Dreyfus H. L. (1972) What computer.\ can’t do. New York: Harper. Fodor J. (1968) Representutions. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. Gibson B. S. (1985) The convergence of Kuhn and cognitive psychology. New Ideas in Psychology 2, 2 1 l-22 1. Kuhn T. S. (197Oa) Reflections on my critics. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds). Critici.rm and the growth of knowledge (pp. 231-248). New York: Cambridge University Press. Kuhn T. S (1970b) The structure of scientfic revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kuhn T. S (1977a) The essentiul tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kuhn T. S. (1977b) Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice. In The essential tmsion (pp. 320-339). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kuhn T. S. (1977c) Second thoughts about paradigms. In The essential tension (pp. 293-319). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lachman R. (1985) Kuhn and cognitive psychology. Nrro Ideu.\ itl Psychology, 3, 27%275. Medin D. L. 8c Smith E. E. (IY84) Concepts and concept formation. Annual Review of PJycholog, 35, 1 13-138. Smith E. E. 8c Medin 1). L. (1981) Categories and concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. II‘weney R. I)., Doherty M. F. 8c Mynott C. R. (1981) On .srie,rti/ic thinking. New York: Columbia University Press.