L = C a simple equation with astonishing consequences

J. theor. Biol. (1990) 145, 13-40

L = C A Simple Equation with Astonishing Consequences ADOLF HESCHL

Institute of Zoology, University of Vienna, A-1090 Vienna, Austria (Received on 5 June 1989, Accepted in revised form on 20 November 1989) At first sight, life and cognition only seem to deal with each other in an indirect way, the former as is perhaps necessary as a precondition for the mere possibility of the latter. However, looking at the question more closely and especially when we include the central problem of the emergence of life from inanimate pre-stages, we arrive at a reasonable conclusion of compIete identity between life process and cognitive act: through the spontaneous formation of living systems, i.e. of exceptionally stable processual structures far from the thermodynamic equilibrium, external influence--which only now can be opposed to internal correlations--is transformed into an adaptive integration or, in cognitive terms, into a meaningful interpretation by a (within limited conditions of stability surviving) living system. Thereby the purely quantitative notion of "information" has to be subjected to a decisive relativization, since it is not before the system formation itself that it makes sense to speak of information. Far-reaching conceptual consequences follow from the possibility of conclusively demonstrating the fundamental equation of life and cognition.

I. Introduction Within the recorded history of man, epistemology or theory of cognition, is understood in the broadest sense as a sort of guidance to "'right" knowledge, and was always a matter of quite controversial ideological questioning. It is even possible to speak of an "epistemological myth", a myth which can be traced throughout all h u m a n cultures and which illustrates the expression of the permanent social engagement for the privilege of "being right". Indeed, there is an impressive intercultural multiplicity of ritual ceremonies which discuss mystical things like "true knowledge", " w i s d o m " , "the way to the (secret) knowledge of the ancestors", "'consecration and initiation into the mysteries of nature ( resp. of the c o m m u n i t y ) " , but also "objective knowledge", "exact science" and so on. It was, and it still is a definite social group which usually claims the unique privilege o f access to these highly valued goals in life. Beginning with Plato's " I d e e n l e h r e ' , one o f the first sophisticated European drafts of an epistemological theory, this field of h u m a n reflection developed into a privileged special subject of philosophy which emerged from, and subsequently replaced, both archaic mythologies as well as religions through a long process of rationalization of their often contradictory contents (Topitsch, 1979). In the early 17th century a fundamental and incisive rupture concerning the ideological interpretation o f the world was realized by the methodological revolution o f the emerging natural sciences which imposed empirical verification of every hypothesis as the central postulate of acceptance. During the following periods of expanding success 13

0022-5193/90/013013+28 $03.00/0

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o f the new type of access to the phenomena o f the world, increasing parts of trad~tionalt philosophy suffered the same fate as the ancient cosmologies and were substituted by a n - - o b v i o u s l y - - m o r e adequate vision o f the surrounding world (Fig.

1).

Mythologies ~ ~__" Religions "~/

BC

~'~---- Philosophies

FIG. 1. Milestones of the "epistemologicalmyth" in transmitted (European) history.

The first subtle advance towards epistemology had been announced in biology, more specifically in Darwin's theory of evolution (Darwin, 1859) which, from one day to another, abolished the idea of an exceptional position of the human race and thereby raised cautious doubts about the special privilege o f true cognition for man (Boltzmann, t905). But Darwin himself shrank from extending his ideas on to behavioral characteristics of the studied species and confined the assumed validity o f his theory mainly to morphological structures. It was only in the 20th century that two important break-throughs were realized after the first tentative attempts by Darwin and his contemporaries (Spencer, 1858; Haeckel, 1905; Wallace, 1891). It is interesting to see that these two provocative "frontier-crossings" happened only in those fields of research which could be characterized by their ambivalent position between the rapidly expanding natural sciences and traditional philosophy, represented by the so-called human sciences. In developmental psychology, the biologist Jean Piaget developed an original "genetic epistemology" based upon countless results from nearly five decades of intensive work concerning the intellectual development of the growing human being. His theoretical efforts relied essentially on recent

t We consciously make a distinction between traditional (non-empirical) philosophical systems and contemporaryversionsof practising philosophybecause--in the sensethat they try to construct fact-bound metatheories about the particular scientific disciplines--the latter clearly have to be reckoned among modern sciences.

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15

outcomes in embryological research (Waddington, 1957) and, in a more general way, his central motivation consisted of elaborating--as he specified in review--a biological theory of cognition (Piaget, 1973). However, Piaget did not succeed in completing his leitmotiv and stopped at a somewhat schizoid position: the cognitive capacities properly separate from the biological structures very early, that means at the stage of the reflexes of the new-born infant, and begin to develop their own, purely mental structures by simply prolonging the most general biological functions, but now without any corresponding physiological equivalents (Piaget, 1967). He therefore formed the metaphor of the "disassociation of the instinct". Another departure to new shores gave rise to a relatively young scientific domain which originated from tendency of biologists to investigate increasingly higher levels of organismic organization. Animal, as well as human behavior, was the preferred subject of interest for animal psychology or ethology whose spiritual father, Konrad Lorenz, had come into close contact with the classical tradition of epistemology by pure chance when he took the chair of human psychology for 2 years at the University of K6nigsberg. Lorenz, from the beginning of his ethological investigations, concentrated his interest on rather rigid, during--as he saw it--phylogenetic evolution ritualized behavior patterns. He formulated a rough draft of a radically new epistemological hypothesis quite early when confronted with the impressive edifice of Kant's transcendental philosophy (Lorenz, 1941)" the famous Kantian a prioris of cognition should signify nothing else but the selective results a posteriori of Darwinian evolution and thus delimit as instinctive pre-conditions the functioning of advanced human reasoning. This idea led to a new current in theoretical biology called "'evolutionary epistemology" which adopted Brunswik's notion of "ratiomorphic apparatus" as an equivalent designation for the entirety of innate cognitive hypotheses in man (Brunswik, 1955; Riedl & Wuketits, 1987; Lorenz, 1973; Riedl, 1981; Vollmer, 1975). However, an essential dichotomy and subsequently an epistemological parallelism has been introduced by the non-reducible opposition between culture-transmitted knowledge and genome-bound information (Lorenz, 1973). Purely analogous functioning was admitted, however, the differences were determined to be of "ontological nature"--in order to use a popular philosophical term which is absent in natural sciences where the essential compatibility of all systems is one of the fundamental working hypotheses. As a consequence of this dichotomization--the corresponding, categorical evolutionary leap--Lorenz called a "fulguration"--the nature/nurture-controversy discharged and provided endless and often dogged ideological debates (Hemminger, 1983; Lorenz, 1978; Lumsden & Wilson, 1983; Skinner, 1971; Bruner, 1960; Dobzhansky, 1971; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I981; Eysenck, 1973; Lewontin, 1986; Liedtke, 1976). Without doubt both approaches, the psychogenetical as well as the ethological, intended to elaborate an unprecedented reinterpretation of cognitive processes by looking for their potential biological bases and starting points. However, in the final analysis they gave up the adopted course. In the present paper we would like to attempt to elaborate a consistent and perhaps radical integration of biology and epistemology.

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2. "Partial Isomorphism Between Organism and Epistemological Subject" (Piaget, 1967) or even "Life Understood as a Cognitive Process" (Lorenz, 1973)? Piaget, as well as Lorenz, anticipated, in a truly unorthodox, tradition-breaking way, close relationships between regulative processes in living systems and certain aspects of cognition. Lorenz tried to make this still vague hypothesis precise and stated that any organism necessarily extracts knowledge or information about the environment through the Darwinian process of adaptation. The adaptive result would be an "Abbildung" or "representation" of the corresponding sector of the outer world. Hence the Lorenzian reflections developed towards a sort of representationist theory of cognition and subsequently the starting hypothesis changed into a theoretical claim called "'postulate of equivalence" (PE) between life and cognition (Wagner, 1983). However, parallel to these definitions which still lack conclusive argumentation, a lot of severe theoretical and unexpected difficulties suddenly arose and partially blocked further constructive development at the moment when a clear reference to Kant's ideology had been consciously intended (Lorenz, 1941, 1973; Riedl, 1975; Vollmer, 1975, 1983). Indeed, this strong approximation to Kant would seem not to have been an advantage to the conceptual refinement of the new ideas and, in addition to that, a detailed analysis of the position of the Kantian epistemology within the entirety of his opus even renders questionable any closer comparison (Topitsch, 1975). For our purpose let us retain the important intuitive idea of Lorenz and Piaget, that is, the idea that there must be perhaps, a profound relationship between life and cognition, and, starting from this basic assumption, we should look for the possibility of tracing its concrete scientific foundation which will agree with actual empirical results. The first logical step will consist of consulting those experimental branches which deal with the delicate problem of defining the nature of living systems and to explain their emergence in the course of terrestrial evolution. Since the provoking experiments of Miller (1953, 1955) on the spontaneous formation of essential organic compounds (e.g. amino acids in a possible primitive atmosphere) many biophysical, biochemical and microbiological disciplines are united in that essentially interdisciplinary question called biogenesis (Kaplan, 1980). By means of simulation experiments, revealing new aspects, and even concrete details about crucial phases in biogenesis were brought to light (Fig. 2). Hence, one could imagine that there should be no problem in determining and explaining the characteristics of living systems. However, an unexpected disillusionment awaits the curious questioner: instead of having a definite and clear specification delivered, we find ourselves confronted with a continuum, which is apparently indissoluble. There are already researchers who speak of "a matter of opinion" concerning such an attempt of separation (Dose, 1982). Indeed, the actual knowledge seems not to allow a comprehensive and logically conclusive definition of a living system. The only information that can be given is a more or less exhaustive list of the most common characteristics which could be attributed to animate organisms. Without taking their order into consideration, at least the following four qualities are required: (1) metabolism (2) regulation of cellular and morphogenetic development, (3) delimitation by means of membranes and (4) reproduction and transmission of genetic information. It is

17

L = C THE EQUATION A N D ITS C O N S E Q U E N C E S

Originofearth Protometabolites

,L

Mocromolecules Polynucle~ides

L: Q.

.5 13..

Proto-cells FIG. 2. Actual ideas about the main steps in biogenesis (* = crucial, system-generating phase; uncommon stability conditions, "'potential immortality").

evident from this enumeration that the purely additive combination of these parameters cannot be the last resort. Could it be that a careful glance beyond the above-mentioned "sacred" boundary between science (biology) and philosophy (epistemology), as already proposed by Lorenz and Piaget, but now by taking the other direction, would be a way out of the blind alley? To try the opposite direction signifies nothing more than testing the potential applicability of epistemological notions in a domain where, normally, nobody would suppose that they could be a matter of interest. In particular, the central concept of cognition itself--in its full meaning--has to be investigated in relation to anything of potential relevance. However, such a purpose immediately poses the not trivial problem of determining the nature of cognitive processes. Speaking of cognition we thereby do not want to confine ourselves to a too elitist philosophical context. During previous decades a rapidly increasing cognitivist current passed through a series of different scientific domains, from ethology and neurobiology to genetic psychology and sociology even to economics and politology with remarkable conceptual changes in the sequel, a development which considerably narrowed the field of purely theoretical speculation. As a result of this emancipation, epistemological

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hegemony has been at least partly overthrown and new areas of research have been opened. It is not improbable that Piaget and-Lorenz were the initiators within this expanding movement, The consequences were considerable and yielded a vast quantity o f new e.pistemological notions or, in other cases, fruitful re-interpretations of traditional concepts in a what is now a more extensive perspective. Instead of enumerating examples out of the enormous diversity of mechanisms, from direction and binocular depth-sensitive neurons inside the visual cortex called detectors, (Hubel & Wiesel, 1970) up to complex behavioral strategies in space and time (Furth, 1969; Piaget, 1975), we prefer to examine the possibility of a concentrated and, nevertheless, stringent definition of cognitive (in contrast to non-cognitive) processes. Or, in other words, any limiting specification concerning the amount of abstractness (vs. concreteness), the extent of the respective field of validity in space and time, the degree of generality (vs. specificity), the symbolic "distance" to primary perceptive processes, the special character (motor or sensory systems), the presence of consciousness (or its absence), the grade of "'truth" (vs. "illusion") and so on, should be avoided. When we abstract from all these subordinate parameters, we arrive at the quintessence of cognition which consists in the process of attribution of significationt to phenomena of the world. Any phenomenon, from a single micro-event to the largest cosmic process potentially can get meaning within the scope of a limited, but coherent system of significations through the dynamic process of cognition. The phenomenon, so to speak, receives a sort of "explication" or meaning by its insertion into a closed entirety of correlative and significative elements. So what would be gained from such a theoretical excursion concerning our initial question about the nature of living systems?--It is just the concept of cognition that will turn out to be the decisive criterion for the "mystery" of life. When we try to apply the definition of cognition to the problem of determining the nature o f life and, therefore, review the actually existing model o f biogenesis, issued from prebiotic simulation-experiments, we then are able to delimit a certain critical area [* in Figs 2 and 3(a)]. The decisive change from inanimate to animate has to be attributed to the integration of the two important types of exo-catalyticly:~ replicating macromolecules, that is, the polynucleotides (primitive nucleic acids) and the proto-proteids (primitive proteins), into one so-called hypercyclic system, a biogenetic model developed by Eigen (Eigen, 197t; Eigen & Schuster, 1977; Eigen & Winkler, 1981). Such a system--and indeed we are only now speaking of a system, which is confronted with its environment, makes proper sense--can be characterized as an environment-stable, closed network of (positive a n d / o r negative) causal correlations or as a closed field of dynamic determination within an area far from the thermodynamic equilibrium [Fig. 3(a)]. A corresponding simple mathematical description is offered by Hamilton's graph model [Fig. 3(b)], though it neglects the embedding into the environment and, therefore, could lead to the false idea of an -t Piaget would speak of assimilation, Lorenz would use the term "Abbildung'" which appears quite static and perhaps too metaphoric. $ Exo-catalyticbecause exogene factors and influences are the motor for replication (Kuhn & Waser, 19821.

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CONSEQUENCES

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isolated or thermodynamically closed system. Actually, the discriminative criterion lies in the capacity for e n d o g e n o u s auto-reproduction in contrast to the still e x o g e n o u s replication o f the preceding polymeric stages. The realization o f such an act o f self-organization d e m a n d s that each constituent sub-unit has to be defined within the s c o p e o f a determinate coherent system o f stabilizing interactions. This criterion n o w complies with the previously advanced d e m a n d for the presence o f

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cognition, understood as a dynamic process of attribution o f signification: only here influences of the environment receive meaning through their interpretative integration or "'enslavement" (Haken, 1983) within a closed system o f regulative feedbacks between the constituents o f a dynamic, but, nevertheless, identity guarding entirety. The complete interpretative system of significations could be called structural autoconservation despite environmental disturbances. Only then when living systems begin to appear in the universe, does the fundamental epistemological dichotomy, i.e. that of subject(system) vs. object(environment), obtain its sense and legitimation. Life and cognition are revealed as truly synonymous notions. To avoid floating in empty space, taking a closer look at the amount of experimental verification of the evolutionary pathways under consideration is recommended. The potential prebiotic processes which probably propeled the evolution of the polynucleotides, capable of replication, are ensured for some cases even though a generally accepted mechanism has not yet been discovered (Kuhn & Waser, 1982; Lohrmann et al., 1983). During this evolutionary phase exogenous factors like regular changes in temperature a n d / o r in concentration of inorganic catalysts, in particular of Zn-'+-ions on mineral surfaces rendered possible matrix-induced replication of the nucleosid-5-phosphoimidazolides, a potential primitive stage of the later nucleotides (Lohrmann & Orgel, 1979). On the other hand the prebiotic formation of proteinoids through thermic polymerization of amino acids could have been proved in numerous simulation experiments. However, in contrast to their ulterior biocatalytic properties, they showed no indices of replicative capacities (Fox & Dose, 1977; Hartmann et al., 1981; Heinz et al., 1981; Nakashima et al., 1977). The crucial point remains undoubtedly the stable integration o f the two categories o f macromolecules into one self-organizing, cognitive and, therefore, living--or vice versat--system. In this field empirical data are rather sparse and not without good reason. It seems understandable that this phase represents a very special and, particularly, critical phase in terrestrial evolution. The most far-reaching advance in this direction was undertaken by Eigen & Schuster who developed a molecular model of the autocatalytic hypercycle where the stable closing of the circle remains the critical and, experimentally not yet realized, event1: (Eigen & Schuster, 1977, 1978b). It is no exaggeration to say that, actually, a major part of research which is engaged in the question of biogenesis circles round this delicate problem. Herein lies a fundamental and yet unresolved issue. Ifi addition, the origin and the fixation of the universal§ genetic code indicates the presence of a truly critical threshold transition which has led to the phantastic characteristic o f potential "immortality", that is, exceptional thermodynamic stability conditions, now already proved for over 4 milliard years. Furthermore, the question of spatial delimitation by means of semi-permeable membranes remains an open point for further investigation t Synonymous notions lead necessarily to a tautology. $ Indeed such a step would signify nothing more than a second, but now artificial creation of life by man. § With the exception of a few slight alterations in some mitochondrial genomes, the genetic code is identical in all organisms (Lewin, 1985), and that probably for about four milliard years.

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although the important role of certain specific proteinoids, whose ability to form so-called micro-spheres could have been demonstrated, is not contested (Fox et al., 1959). Much more relevant for our purpose is the theoretical necessity to postulate the formation of compartments through membranes in order to guarantee the selective advantage of the hypercyclic organization (Eigen et al., 1980; Schuster, 1981 ). The system has to close itself even in the concrete, spatial sense of the word. For reasons necessary to complete the concept, two fundamental scientific notions not yet mentioned must be discussed, that is the notion of "'entropy" and the notion of "information", in order to see their relation to the preceding considerations. In thermodynamic terminology the interesting facts are relatively easy to interpret: We know since the chemist Prigogine's revealing work, which formed the new idea of "'dissipative structures" in irreversible non-equilibrium thermodynamics, that the second thermodynamic principle, the increase of entropy, is not only not a contradiction concerning the existence of living systems--as not a few biologists initially s u p p o s e d - - b u t on the contrary it represents a necessary, even though not sufficient precondition for the emergence of life by introducing time and irreversibility (i.e. break in symmetry) into nature (Glansdorff & Prigogine, 1971; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). As a result of parallel conceptual and mathematical refinements, the apparent contradiction order vs. chaos has been completely abolished and a promising new scientific current called "synergetics'" was born (Haken, 1983). On the other hand "information" as a quantitative parameter was defined in 1948 by the technician Shannon with a statistical approach to theoretical issues in telecommunication (Shannon, 1948). The content of information has been standardized by applying the dual logarithm to the degree of probability for the appearance of a certain symbol or state?. What is the reference to epistemological matters? The concept of information departs from the axiomatic assumption of a sort of omniscient knower who would recognize any new information reaching him and thus represents a notion which is clearly subordinate to the more fundamental notion of cognition. That means that the information-based approach does not even pose the epistemological question, but already pre-supposes its answer. Consequently, picking up of information in a physical ways does not automatically mean its adequate cognitive interpretation understood as attribution of signification by the system. An illustrative example to demonstrate the limitation of this approach represents the persistent debate about the privilege of the two important types of macromolecu!es to "'contain" t I~ = I d

1

p(xi)

= -1 dp(x,)

I = content of information. x~ = s i g n a l (state) x, from (of) a s o u r c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n . 1 d = I o g a r i t h m u s dualis. p = p r o b a b i l i t y o f a p p e a r a n c e ( b e t w e e n 0 a n d 1 ). :~ We see no m e t h o d o l o g i c a l difficulty in p r o v i d i n g an a m o e b a with the n e c e s s a r y i n f o r m a t i o n ( ! ) o f E i n s t e i n ' s t h e o r y of relativity. It w o u l d be sufficient to a l l o w the a n i m a l to m a t r i c u l a t e for a university c o u r s e u n d e r p r o t i s t s - o p t i m a l c o n d i t i o n s : first row, ideal n u t r i e n t s o l u t i o n , no stressing k n o w - a l l s of the s a m e species.

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the so-called "genetic information". The "central d o g m a t of molecular biology" confers this award exclusively to the nucleic acids. Following this reasoning an isolated polynucleotid strand as such should be sufficient for the process of life. In the present view, the cognition-creating reflexive and processual nature of living systems renders completely absurd such an attempt at atomization [Fig. 3(a)]. Nevertheless, the concept of information remains important for the exact quantitative determination of communication and other interactive processes, however, now under the condition that its epistemological relativization will be kept in mind. We are now in a position to recapitulate the preceding reflections which were based both on theoretical elaborations as well as on experimental examinations. The so-called postulate o f equivalence (PE) concerning the relation between life and cognition, mentioned at the beginning of this section, has fallen in the sense that there remains no postulate to claim. On the contrary, the necessity to introduce epistemological notions in order to define the nature of living systems could have been clearly demonstrated. And all the specifications which have normally been used up to now to c o m p r e h e n d the sought after "essence of life", such as for example, metabolism, reproduction, cellular regulation, compartmentation, irritability, intentionality and so on, turn out as logically consequent subfunctions of the basic equation L = C (Life = Cognition). A short excursion into a domain other than biology has to be presented at the end o f this section. The elaborated definition o f living, that is, cognizing systems has to be interpreted as essentially independent of concrete material specifications. That means that other conditions (e.g. different states of aggregation) with other substances involved could also lead to the emergence of animate systems. Now what is the situation in the case of modern computing machines whose enormous capacities even seem to deserve having the considerable distinction of "artificial intelligence"? Are they already on the point of beginning to live? On the basis of the elaborated conceptual framework, a clear-cut answer.can be given: the mentioned apparatus are as yet far from reaching the complete systemic closing o f their functional sub-units. A simple lifetest, for example the cutting-off of the power supply, is sufficient to show us their "lifelessness". Nevertheless, we know since N e u m a n n ' s idea of a self-reproducing Turing apparatus that, at least in a theoretical sense, such a possibility has to remain open ( N e u m a n n , 1966). However, could it be that the directed acting of man upon these machines would block forever their potential change to self-organization? In consideration of these objections it would be more appropriate to speak of high performance machines instead of artificial intelligence. The one thing which could be said in a clearly a n t h r o p o m o r p h o u s way would consist of the statement that these m a c h i n e s - - w h i c h are nothing more than tools, even if a little bit more complex than the first eoliths--are able to "'awaken to life" when being utilized by their inventor man. In such a case a sort of "biotechnocycle" consisting of an a u t o n o m o u s hypercycle, which occasionally can extend its reach, seems to have been closed for a short period. And indeed, confronted with rapidly t It is surprising to see how such a "dogmatic" term could enter into scientific terrain.

L= C THE

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approaching arrows (today: cruise missiles) their "cognizant intention" seems clear t o US.

3. The Controversy About the Evolutionary Mechanisms The result of our reflections in section 2 is not trivial: there is not only an indirect and always limited relationship between life and cognition, as is commonly assumed in actual evolutionary theory of cognition (Riedl & Wuketits, 1987), which is in search of the "biological pre-conditions" of human rationality (Riedl, 1987), but far beyond that it turns out that the two terms can be absolutely equated with justificationt. A thorough elaboration of the most important conclusions, which can be deduced from the basic equation L = C, appears rewarding. Up to now we have confined ourselves .to a relatively static view of the p h e n o m e n a in question, even though we discussed the probable inorganic and exogenic vectors which led to cognitive = living systems in more details. The problem of adaptive change or, in other words, the question about the nature of cognitive gain has not yet been raised. This problem now coincides with the controversy about the evolutionary mechanisms, since cognitive progress represents nothing else but successful evolution of living systems. Consequently, any approach in this direction has to deal with modern theory of evolution developed by many generations of biologists since Darwin's starting signal in 1859 (Darwin, 1859). Apart from the idea of evolution itself, Darwin's great contribution consisted of accentuating natural selection as the main environmental factor which drives evolutionary change by setting new limiting conditions of system stability. This part of the theory has been promptly accepted and has never raised insurmountable difficulties in comprehension, although ample debates about the respective proportion of the different selective submodes (balancing, disruptive, directed, negative or positive etc) has preoccupied the concerned scientific community for a long time (Dobzhansky et al., 1977; Mayr, 1979). On the other hand, the systemic part which represents the necessary precondition for the coming into force of external selection has remained a problematic point from the very beginning of evolutionist considerations, and has retained some of its controversial aspects up to the present day. In particular the question of directiveness divided researchers in evolutionary biology into two separate camps: the neo-Darwinians propagandized the predominance of random disturbing factors called mutations as the main agents of evolutionary change, whereas theorists close to Lamarck's ideas continued to insist on the participation of directive mechanisms (Lamarck, 1809). It is interesting in this context to notice that Darwin himself was partially an adherent of Lamarckian concepts when he admitted the potential importance of use, respectively non-use, of morphological structures for phylogeneticai processes. Today the neo-Darwinian or synthetic theory t Being aware of this fundamental congruence we understand our approach as a--sort of radical-attempt of a unified theory of living systems based upon the integration of biological life and cognitive being.

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of evolution, based upon the interaction of mutation and selection, is widely accepted and dominates other competing currents quite clearly. However, a constant, even though minimal uneasiness with this conception cannot be disregarded and it survived, particularly, in such biological domains which traditionally deal with high levels of organic complexity (cf. Koestler, 1974; Piaget, 1967; Riedl, 1975; Waddington, 1957). It is obvious that this situation represents the result of the quite dogmatic character of the predominant theory. Thus the lack of a higher explanatory frame which would render evident the neo-Darwinian axioms continues to feed the discontent with the actual mutationist paradigmt. Do the unification o f life and cognition, elaborated in the preceding part of this study, add any new perspective to this question? As already indicated, the controversy concerning the evolutionary mechanisms proves to be identical with the question o f cognitive progress or cognitive gain. And once again the controversial point is directiveness vs. randomness. Thereby, it is surprising to notice that, in this matter, traditional philosophical epistemology in its long history never seems to have realized the full importance of that fundamental question. In order to abbreviate long-winded theoretical excursions, we would like to present our approach in a somewhat pointed, and consciously provocative manner: True cognitive gain is not a more or less directed, respectively more or less random process, but, quite to the contrary, it is a process which has to proceed IN PRINCIPLE in a completely undirected and nonregular, that is, chaotic way. Entering new cognitive terrain has necessarily to happen through random, nondirected steps b e c a u s e - - l o g i c a l l y - - n o reference point, no direction of procedure or any other indicator can be given [Fig. 4(a)]. And afterwards, the transitional-phase has to defy any understanding. It is revealing to try the thought experiment of allowing the alternative, that means to imagine cognitive progress through directed, even minimal, advances. The m o m e n t we accept such a possibility we lose every logical reason to limit the extent of such progressive steps and, unavoidably, the system should become "omniscient" (or, in adaptionistic terms, " o m n i p o t e n t " ) , something which could not have been observed until todayS. For adaptive = cognitive progress the self-organizing system disposes o f no other possibility than to b r e a k - - e v e n though to a quite restricted and canalized extent (see following section)--the stable coherence of its internal correlations. The operationally closed field of dynamic determination in space and time, that is the organismic structure is compelled to risk an indeterminate j u m p in form o f a fluctuation-based system destabilization in order to change successfully§ its constitution [Fig. 4(b)]. Hence the undirected mutation finds its full deductive explanation within the scope o f our unified theory and loses its controversial paradigmatic character. However, a different issue would have been problematic in t Perhaps this phenomenon of uneasiness and discontent occurs in every frontier-theory because--by nature--the theory itself has to remain "'inexplicable" unless a higher conceptual frame permits at first glance beyond the transient border. .~ Perhaps with the exception of very few chosen specimens of Homo sapiens. § The sole criterion for the presence of a successful cognitive (=evolutionary) change consists of conservation of stability despite (partial) chaotization. Consequently all actually living systems (as long as they live) are completely equivalent in respect to their ecological adaptedness.

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T H E E Q U A T I O N A N D ITS C O N S E Q U E N C E S

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FIG. 4, The mutationist principle of cognitive gain. (a) Illustrated by an orientation metaphor (b), as a model of system-destabilization within an (ecological) area of "'permitted" ( = stable) and "'forbidden'" ( = unstable) states. The disturbing fluctuation can be either internal or provoked from outside the system.

respect to the theoretical foundation of a large number of biological disciplines which utilize the concept of undirected mutation as one of their basic working hypotheses. In some way the time-honored problem of induction seems to be the most advanced philosophical approach to the question of cognitive gain. Indeed when we abstract from its specific explicitations, for example, Humian, Popperian etc, we finally arrive at the proximity o f our central question: Is it possible that true cognitive gain can be realized through a directed proceeding of any kind, be it logical, deductive,

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rational, mathematical, symbolic, explanative, hermeneutic, intuitive, inductivet, instinctive, reflexlike, automatic, phantastic, halluzinatoric, even crazy . . . . ?

4. Ontogenesis vs. Phylogenesis---Two Separate Ways of Cognitive Gain? Generally the ontogenetical development o f the individual organism and its phylogeny are interpreted as two separate channels of, commonly speaking, information or knowledge gain which could have access to cognitive progress on principle in a different manner (Lorenz, 1961, 1978; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1972; Riedl, 1985; Skowronek, 1984; Tembrock, 1987; Tinbergen, 1951; Vollmer, 1981 ). Whereas phylogenetical evolution is left to slow biostructural changes during large spaces of time, individual development is allowed to change, according to the species, in more or less a quick functional and behavioral adaptation to specific environments through particular forms of information extracting mechanisms. Now considering our mutationist principle of cognitive gain we see ourselves obliged to verify the justification of such a dualistic concept. As we have tried to make clear at the beginning of our unifying reflections, biological evolution which revealed to be identical with cognitive development, is essentially dependent on undirected and not foreseeable, that is, random transitions. From that fact, it is evident that every evolutionary change involves at the same time a chance of new functional adaptation as well as a certain risk of destabilization o f the whole system. Consequently, the dimension and the spatio-temporal limitation of this always risky step itself has had to be subjected to considerable selective pressure. In other words, the "evolutionary mechanisms"$ themselves went through their proper evolution, an evolution which can be hypothetically reconstructed at least in its rough outlines. Actually it is plausible to proceed from very early stages during and after biogenesis where mutative instabilities covered more or less the whole spatio-temporal entity o f the living system in an approximately equivalent manner. Then step by step with every new acquisition, once rewarded and reinforced by selection, specific patterns o f "hopeful" instabilities evolved. That means that emerging successful structures delayed and increasingly narrowed the field of evolutionary gambling, as for example in the case of the irreversible fixation of the genetic code (Kuhn & Waser, 1982). Still independent *'phenotypical'" (concerning changes o f the identity region of a polynucleotide chain, which is reactive to enzymes) and "genotypical" (concerning changes o f the cistronic region, responsible for the encoding of translation products, i.e. of proteins) mutations led to a self-accelerating optimization and thereby to a definitive anchorage of basal metabolic processes in protocellular systems (Schuster & Sigmund, 1982). A further step on an already very complex level consisted of limiting t Contrary to traditional (e.g. Popperian) epistemology we assume that induction represents a regular process with its own logic, that means with its own inherent psycho-logical laws, and that the so-called

"problem of induction" rather lies in its integration into other and higher logical processes in the proper (or narrow) sense (see also Anderson t980b; Simon & Lea, 1974; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). $ We do not want to conceal a certain uneasiness with this common term since the principle itself always remains the same even when the limiting conditions change. The fundamental "blindness" of the evolving systems subsists.

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the incalculable risks of undirected mutative changes to the phase of system reproduction through the intricate mechanism of cell division. By manufacturing a large number o f - - m u t a n t or not--copies, the risk of a total failure could have been decisively reduced. In addition to that, the duplication of the genome as a constant state in diplont organisms and the possibility of gene dominance created new buffer capacities for mutated, however not yet advantageous genes, and thereby allowed and stimulated the full development of important sexual exchange mechanisms. Finally it is only with the critical transition from unicellular to polycellular systems that the ontogenesis/phylogenesis debate is justified. This transition can be characterized by the statement that, despite the emergence of new levels of higher system integration, the cellular principle could not have been really surmounted, since the one cell stage--as a strongly canalizing element of evolutionary success--continued to remain an obligatory developmental phase for metazoan organisms (M6hn, 1984). The so-called "'biogenetic law", formulated by Haecket to express the almost trivial fact that most individual organisms have to start from one single mother cell and therefore have to recapitulate by necessity their own phylogeny, finds its logical explanation within these system conditions. Coming back to our initial question we are already able to foresee that, in order to diminish the risk of mutative changes, an increasing limitation on the mother cells, that is, the germ line, will be the inevitable consequence of selective pressure upon disturbances of the somatic development (Auerbach, 1976; Demerec, 1941; Gottschalk, 1984). This is particularly true for highly complex multicellular systems whereas organisms of lower degrees o f intercellular jarganization and specialization often do not display in this respect and are not forced to show such a clearcut distinction between ontogenetical and phylogenetical phases. Thus in a number of asexually reproducing animal species as well as in plants ontogenetic variation can result in phylogenetic changes and, in some cases, organisms can undergo even adaptive genetic modification when exposed to altered environmental conditions within a single generation, that is, during ontogenesis (Cullis, 1988). However, complex somatic organization in general will be favored by the existence of genetically identical cells which act and react to each other in a system-coherent manner. Nevertheless somatic mutations do occur at a certain frequency and it is revealing to see what they can cause in sophisticated systems. In human genetics, for example, there is increasing evidence that a large fraction of malignant tumors owe their origin to somatic mutations (Vogel & Motulsky, 1986). Therefore, on account o f these and other essentially negativet, or, at best, neutral alterations of the epigenetical system, which has to realize ontogenetical development, higher polycellular organisms were forced to evolve specific control mechanisms, namely, a primitive phagocytose system in invertebrates and an increasingly more flexible cellular and humoral immune system in vertebrates (Keller, 1981; Roitt, 1984). By recognizing body strange antigenes through complex molecular receptor mechanisms on the surface of its cellular constituents, these internal control systems are at the same time charged with the permanent check-up of the right t The chance that a somatic mutation carries an advantage for the metazoan organism goes towards zero because the conservative,unchanged cellsare necessarilyexcluded from realizingthe new acquisition and, therefore, disturbing disco-ordinations are the regular consequences (Auerbach, 1976).

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identity of all somatic cells. A very topical example from human i m m u n e pathology, the viral acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), where the last stages can be characterized as a regular tissue disintegration, shows in a quite convincing manner the vital importance of such a genetic self-control (Malter & Suess, 1987; Vaeth, 1985). An excellent theoretical synopsis of the canalizing internal system-constraints in evolution is given by Riedi (1975). In " T h e order of living organisms" he even tries to extend this question up to the most complex metazoan structures. The conclusion we have to draw from these systematic considerations culminate in the puzzling statement t h a t - - i n contrast to phylogenesis and with an increasing, complexity-dependent p r o b a b i l i t y - - n o cognitive gain should take place during individual ontogenesis. The following section will deal with this paradox. 5. Nature vs. Nurture---A Superseded Dichotomy The solution to this intuitive " p a r a d o x " (actually it has to be taken as a consistent conclusion) that individual life should be strictly excluded from access to cognitive gain will turn out to be much easier than one could expect when confronted with the large n u m b e r of obviously "knowledge gaining" mechanisms, that is, with all kinds of learned and constructive acquisitions occurring during ontogenesis. The polycellular system as a dynamic spatio-temporal integration of genetically identical cells which stay in permanent contact with each other is able to develop quite heterogeneous biological structures through tissue and, later on, organ differentiation. These, nevertheless, do not endanger the overall coherency of the system, but quite to the contrary allow the reaching of increasingly higher levels of internal interaction. Now specific structures dispose of specific functions, thereby the relation between structure and function being not a m b i g u o u s - - a s is often a s s u m e d - - b u t clearly unequivocalt. These short reflections are sufficient to formulate the solution of our initial paradox: different ontogenetical structures accomplish different cognitive = adaptive functions. By means of heterogeneous structures the living system is adapted to corresponding different sectors of the spatio-temporal causal network of its specific environment. This implies that the respective field of epistemological validity (which necessarily equals evolutionary adaptedness) will be different following the regarded ontogenetical structure, and hence cannot be o p p o s e d to another structure in a sort of efficiency comparison as is often tried. As long as the system as a whole persists, epistemological equivalence has to be guaranteed for all its ontogenetical structures~. From a n - - i n space and t i m e m v e r y limited metabolic mechanism or the smallest reflex action up to the most extensive mental construction, a judging better/worse or even true/false-classification lacks any logical foundation. O f course, that does not exclude structural as well as functional comparison in order to better understand both the differences between, as well as the coherent t Even among biologists the cited opinion is widely held, although it conceals a delusive conceptual blurredness concerning the real, that is, definite relation between structure and function. ~+Structures never understood as static morphological forms, but as biological processes in their dynamic spatio-temporal stability.

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integration of, these heterogeneous structures within one supersystem which is individual. The consequences for the innate/learned or nature/nurture dichotomy will be its total relativization, if not abolition, through the determination of epistemotogical equivalence for both cases, expressed by the fact that in none of them true cognitive gain can take place. We pretend that the terms "innate(heritable)" and "qearned(acquired)" were used by researchers in order to designate biological mechanisms which, in reality, are simply referring or, better still, are adapted to different and always limited sectors of the spatio-temporal causal network within a given ecosystem. They have nothing to do with a qualitative difference based upon separate sources of cognitive gain. One concrete example from the behavioral sciences may be sufficient to point out the futility of the innate/acquired-dichotomy as a valid epistemological argument. Let us compare a classic "innate" behavior, the reaction of human, as well as of non-human beings (mammalians, birds), to their respective so-called social releasers which signals mating, fighting, defensive etc motivation of the conspecific, with an equally classic example of "learned" behavior, the conditioned reaction to formerly neutral stimuli. In the first case, conspicuous morphological structures, stereotypic and rhythmically accentuated motor patterns, specific odorous and acoustic signals, or variable combinations of these, are able to elicit more or less prompt and adequate motor responses in the consignee (Eibt-Eibesfeldt, 1972), which, on account of their near machinelike reliability, induced quite a few researchers in both animal and human psychology to postulate a genetic fixedness of these behavioral structures. Subsequently, the hypothetical underlying physiological mechanism has been called "'Innate Releasing Mechanism" or IRM (Tinbergen, 1951). On the other hand the conditioned reaction, as a result of which hitherto "meaningless" stimuli get an obviously new release, that is, "meaningful" effectiveness, immediately makes one think of an epistemologically new acquisition in the sense of a cognitive increase. However, progressive causal analysis of such, and of similar, learning mechanisms revealed a well-contrived system o f pre-existing neuro-physiological rules that define down to the last detail which category of stimuli will be associated with which specific behavior pattern in which temporal and spatial relationship (Black & Prokasy, 1972; Capretta, 1961; Lolordo, 1979; Prokasy, 1965; Rescorla, 1980; Rescorla & Cunningham, 1978; Wagner, 1969). In addition to this, the process of unlearning or learning anew is far from being a simple loss of acquired knowledge, but follows an equally well-defined set of additional rules (Anderson, 1980a; Bittermann, 1965; Laudien, 1977; Oshima et al., 1969; Stockert, 1974). The system, already knows how to proceed step by step, and thus the initial impression of having to do with new cognitive acquisitions that occasionally can re-disappear, turn out to have been precipitated (Garcia, 1984; Gould & Marler, 1987; Kimble, 1984; Resnick, 1984). Now we could even insist upon the justified assertion that every part of any of these learning processes is clearly innate. Conditioning as well as higher learning and constructive mechanisms refer to more complex spatio-temporal relations between classes of stimuli and reactions than do (only certain) stereotypic social behavior patterns, so that it is no wonder that we see different structures with, accordingly, different functions. We

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consciously accentuated this comparison in order to call scientific attention to a concept which can produce a real obstacle for research by assimilating a not inconsiderable amount of creative effort. Fortunately a strong discontent with this dichotomy slowly seems to propagate in an increasing n u m b e r of biological (including psychological)disciplines (Anastasi, 1958; Barkow, 1979; Bateson, 1984; Bolles, t979; Chomsky, t973; Detgado, 1979; Dobzhansky, 1971; G o u l d & Marler, 1987; H a m m o n d s , 1984; Hemminger, 1983; Lehrman, 1953, 1970; Overton, 1973; Piaget, 1967; Skowronek, 1984). Biological structurest represent successful results in an evolutionary process of adaptation to specific environments within a given ecosystem. Starting from the basic physical condition of every living system, that is from its fundamental limitation in space and time, it should be possible to construct for every organism what we would like to call a"cognigram". Such a diagram would illustrate the spatio-temporal proportion of the causal network of the environment for which the system disposes of adequate cognitive = biological structures in order to benefit from the respective external resources for its own stabilization, and even expansion through reproduction. O f course, such a "cognigram'" means nothing more than the whole set of potential ecological system/environment-relations or, in short, the "'ecogram" of a concrete living system. Figure 5 shows an abstract and simplified example of a possible way of illustration which, however, indicates already the limits of a bidimensional graph. Nevertheless this sketch should be sufficient to explain the basic principles. Different cognitive structures cover their proper and differently extensive sectors of the spatio-temporal causal network of the environment. Thereby the internal complexity of a given structure needs to correspond to the extent of covered environmental regularities~. Following the environment and the regarded organism, a multiplicity of structures differing in level of stimulus treatment and stimuli integration is imaginable. Homo sapiens is therefore the best example: from the minutest metabolic mechanism, for example, the enzymatic decomposition of a certain nutritive substance up to highly complex processes, for example, mental concept formation or display of variable social strategies, we see an enormous variety o f transitions. Once again, it is important to r e m e m b e r that there is no sense in contrasting, in a sort of epistemological performance comparison, one structure with another because we are moving on one single scale, namely the ontogenetical scale w h i c h - - a s we have deduced in a conclusive w a y - - i s strictly neutral in respect to cognitive gain. In exchange for such a fruitless undertaking, the study of the integral coherence of the different ontogenetical structures proves to be much more interesting. A hierarchical network o f interactive contact between these structures has to exist in order to guarantee the functioning of the whole system. This does t See second footnote at bottom of page 28. :l:"Isomorphism"--it is preferable to use the terms "'adaptedness" for the static and "adaptation" for the dynamic aspect because, evidently, there is no morphological correspondence in the proper sense of the word--has to be perfect (100%) as long as the system succeeds in remaining alive (i.e. preserving its structural identity) and, consequently, any comparison with a Kantian approach to a "reality in itself", e.g. to a "'thing in itself" has to be rejected, contrary to what is practised in strongly Kant-influenced Evolutionary Epistemology where the concept of a partial isomorphism seems to have been commonly accepted (Riedl & Wuketits, 1987; Riedl 1981; Vollmer, 1983).

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/ / D\

',,

[]

....

/U~F-1

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[]

w

I-1

[]

"',, ",,

FIG. 5. Cognigram ( = ecograrn) of a living system representing the potential range of its spatio-temporal stability conditions (scheme); Sn, substructure n.

not mean that there must be one single, final super-structure which includes and determines all subunits as a central superior instance. Such "centralistic" tendencies exist along certain phylogenetical lines, nevertheless plants show that it need not be a general phenomenon. Without doubt in man, cephalization, one of the most centralistic developments in vertebrate evolution, has reached its highest expression so far. It was to Piaget's credit that the main ontogenetical pathways of this cognitive supersystem in growing human individuals was demonstrated. The detailed analysis of the development of cognitive behavior in a restricted sense pushed him to work out in a brilliantly abstract manner the complete ontogenetic frame of constructive intelligence. Piaget discovered, amongst an immense number of interesting details, the important fact that, despite pronounced differences, the general sequence of the different ontogenetical stages in the development of intelligence was similar in all individuals and that there exists a proper psychogenetic logic which cannot be evaded or abbreviated by the growing infant. Thereby the main cognitive vectors could be circumscribed as--following the order of their appearance--calibration and integration o f correspondent sensory and motor subunits, complex co-ordination o f different motor schemes, increasing interiorization and ensuing reversibility of external behavior, extensive and integral concept formation with emerging formalization into abstract notions, finally mental construction of empirical as well as of mathematico-logical models of reality and their separate as well as reciprocal refinement. It is important to note that each stage has to be built up from the

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preceding one which, concerning the level of integration, is more primitive and additional, in space and time more extensive, functional domains of the organism are opened. Hence it makes no sense to introduce an arbitrary innate/acquireddichotomy which does not contribute any explanative idea o f value. Unfortunately Piaget himself seems to have succumbed to the temptation to draw such a dividing line, when he set an unnecessary cognitive rupture between the first postnatal reflexes, which should be "hereditary" and the totality of the further development which, according to Piaget, has to be interpreted as a potentially infinite sequence of purely functional new acquisitions lacking any material substratum (Piaget, 1959, 1967). With equal justification one could decide to assess this dichotomy at any other level o f organization, be it lower or higher, and indeed not a few theorists, from Skinner (1971) up to Chomsky (1977), made use of this gratuitous occasion. The confusion about the pretended existence of two qualitatively different sources of cognition, emerging during ontogenesis, also has its methodological reasons. The difficulties of an experimental causal analysis increases in proportion to the complexity of the biological mechanism to be investigated, therefore it is not astonishing to see that the first behavioral structures, the functioning of which one thought was understood, especially in ethology and early psychology, were held to be "'innate" and "hereditary". Subsequently methodological progress in empirical research succeeded in adding further elements to this privileged category of so-called instincts. However, in consequence of precipitate ideological debates, the fronts rapidly arrived at a deadlock and only a permanent uneasiness with the controversial dichotomization has continued up to this day. On the basis o f our own theoretical elaborations we now find ourselves confronted with a delicate terminological dilemma. As an imaginable solution we could simplify this problem of definition by insisting in a quite dogmatic manner on the "evident fact" that all ontogenetical structures are "innate, because learning itself does not represent any new cognitive acquisition". We have demonstrated that, on account of specific system conditions in polycellular organisms, no cognitive gain can take place in ontogenesis. Or, in order to express it in an anthropomorphous phrase: There is no doubt that we, as human beings, learn a lot of things during our individual life, but nevertheless we are not allowed to realize cognitive progress. However preferring one of the two alternatives would be inadequate as well since the erroneous dichotomy would be maintained. Without difficulty the two terms could retain a certain minimal value o f classification, for example, to discern further rather rigid behavioral mechanisms from rather flexible ones, i.e. structurally more complex ones. Instead of a fruitless rejection of already popular notions, we now propose the epistemological relativization of ontogenetical structures by insisting upon their characterization as strictly cognitive gain.neutral processes.

6. Some Interesting Re-interpretations (A) COMMUNICATION Communication between living systems, in particular in the form of verbal interaction between human individuals, is often comprehended as a sort o f know-

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ledge mediating process which allows the phantastic possibility of cognitive transfer and exchange (Berger & Luckmann, 1982; Carroll, 1972; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1984; Marko, 1982; Oeser, 1983; Tembrock, 1987; Watzlawick et al., 1982; Wiener, 1971). This common idea is misleading in so far as it ignores the underlying epistemologicai problem. Within the scope of the preceding theoretical considerations it should be possible to specify this problem. In fact there can be no real cognition transfer through communication between individual systems, because an insurmountable break in causaldetermination in form of a simple spatial "gap" separates the internally coherent hypercycles from each other. In this connexion our conceptual difference made between "information" and "cognition" once again turns out to be helpful: Exchange of physical information is not only possible, but is happening all the time, however, its adequate signification attributing interpretation by a living= cognizant system represents quite a different question which can be resolved solely within the context of an evolutionist approach. Being aware that communication between living systems is nothing more than a special, even though very important case amongst the multiplicity of different cognitive system/environment-relations, the scientist engaged in this matter has to trace the potential selective influences during (co-)evolution, which could be responsible for, and thereby explain, the concrete phenomena in question. In this perspective, symbolic communication as the undoubtedly highest level of interaction between living systems, represents a not inconsiderable challenge, just because it seems so evident at first sight that we had to deal with a privileged and exceptional form of human cognition transfer which, however, cannot be the case. Nevertheless, the possibility of a real cognitive transfer from one system to another exists and is realized by the complex mechanisms of sexual exchange processes which already developed during very early phases of evolution, mainly on account of their advantageous buffer capacity in fluctuating environments (Felsenstein, 1974; Maynard Smith, 1978; Moore, 1981). However, these intricate processes of genetic recombination, by taking place after the material fusion of two different cells, never leave the systems boundaries, so that it is more appropriate to speak of an internal re-organization of the system coherency--which of course can also fail (Ehrendorfer, 1978; Gottschalk, 1984)--than to speak of a transfer of isolated particles of information. (B) S C I E N T I F I C

PROGRESS

In view of our theory, so-called scientific progress or, generally, cultural progress are far from being a Popperian construction of an ethereal "world 3"', a "'world of objective knowledge" which serves the members of the community, scientific or not, as a kind of spiritual self-service shop (Popper, 1972). We even doubt the real possibility of comprehending, by means of similar one-word-theories, the not inconsiderable complexity of the social network of not only scientific interactions within human societies where, with increasing numbers of agents, most different individuals participate under most different environmental conditions in most different ways. In addition to that, our mutationist model of cognitive gain is nothing more than

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the exact a n t i t h e s i s to Popper's theory of falsification which claims to know the philosopher's stone, that means the directed way or even a method to arrive at cognitive progress. Processes like falsification, deduction and so on belong to structures developed during ontogenesis, i.e. they represent behavioral strategies which, as we have tried to make clear, are strictly neutral in respect to cognitive gain. Contrary to the opinion of Vollmer, an exponent of evolutionary theory of cognition which likewise claims a special status of progress for science (Vollmer, 1987), we believe that the adequate alternative model of cultural development in its widest sense, that is, including science, politics, religion and technics, will be an evolutionary one, with the "classic" concepts o f mutation and selection. To prevent any precipitate misunderstanding we will complete and make precise the two evolutionist axioms, especially the second one (the systemic limitations o f mutative processes is discussed in section 4). Selection cannot be restricted in an arbitrary manner to a so-called "natural selection" whatever this might be for contemporary theorists or might have been for Darwin himself, but quite to the contrary has to include the whole variability of possible selective as well as permissivet influences upon and within living systems. Hence, it follows a great diversity of different conditions of life, in particular within the expanding ecosystem called human culture, which allow equally different realizations of human life and consequently, it is not possible to establish a scale o f cognitive adaptedness valuable for all individuals. Such a scale rather marks the personal ideological position of its originator than the impartial description of an observer. That means that all individual forms o f human life are equivalent in respect to their cognitive adaptedness and any attempt to make a comparison in relation to a postulated cultural progress is clearly ego-, ethno- or however-centric. Since the sole decisive criterion of cognitive = adaptive validity lies in the fact of living itself, a Popperian classification based upon the philosophical ideal o f "objective knowledge" introduces--consciously or not--its own, even though very subtle selective pressure upon a certain cultural milieu. Nevertheless we would like to finish this paragraph with an avowal: The present work itself, by favoring a determined view o f the matter under discussion, cannot conceal being partial and take sides with a certain cultural movement certain, in our case that of modern natural sciences. And thus culture seems to be a complex network of competitive and co-operative tensions where every participating individual exercises his own selective as well as permissive influence upon others and at the same time is influenced by others. Every personal decision or action, from the choice of a partner to the approval, or even draft of a new bill, is trying to change in different amounts the existing selective frame. And indeed every new individual as a whole potentially is able to establish a new and unforeseeable, be it ever so micro-, evolutionary tendency. t We suspect that, since and perhaps with Darwin and Malthus, a clearly anthropomorphous interpretation--evolution viewed as a sort of animal husbandry--narrowed "selection" upon a negative factor which would eliminate all individuals deviating from an ideal type ("the fittest"). In this regard biology should hasten to adopt the unequivocal term of "'limiting conditions" (or "'stability conditions") from physics, what, if one insists on an anthropomorphous terminology, would be synonymous with "'permission". The "neutral" approach of the Japanese evolutionist Kimura (1983) is one of the first concrete attempts to make allowance for this regularly neglected aspect.

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(C) "'VALUEJUDGMENTS'" Empiristic (e.g. Humian) philosophy introduced and, later on sanctioned, the sharp distinction between "matters of fact" and so-called "value judgments" (Topitsch & Salamun, 1972). The latter are taken to have nothing to do with true cognition, they rather add some new arbitrary elements called "values" to the proper cognitive act and hence they cannot be "objective" and, therefore, "compulsory for everybody". In the present view so-called "value judgments" represent nothing more than special kinds of cognitive capacities, in particular such ontogenetical structures which refer to the animate and, especially, to the intraspecific environment. We are handling here the large field of moral cognitiont to which we could perhaps join the entirety of esthetic judgments according to the more or less narrow definition we accept. Unfortunately, apart from sociobiology which still lacks general acceptance, scientific research in these domains is yet rather sparsely developed so that we have no choice but to hold back with eventually precipitate generalizations (Gombrich, 1960; Kohlberg, 1964, 1976; Piaget, 1932; Topitsch & Salamun 1972; Topitsch, 1975, 1979, 1981).

7. Fundamental Limitedness

Of course the conclusions which can be deduced from our theory hold for the author and the present work itself too. Credibility, if postulated, demands to perform a sort of retro-application of the theory or at least to try its reflective extrapolation. Essentially there are three important conclusions which follow from the theoretical construction sketched out in the preceding parts of this paper. (1) The present study itself represents in no way any form of cognitive gain. Cognitive progress has to be excluded in principle. The author proceeded in a directed, that means "logical" or regular manner, was it intuitive, inductive, deductive or whatever$. The paper just tried to point out potential relations between such seemingly different things as "purely material" living systems and "'purely functional" cognitive structures or capacities. The intention of the author simply consisted in integrating as much as possible separate "facts" into a unified approach in order to perhaps arrive at one single coherent and comprehensive, even though always limited theory. Thereby the avowedly trivial assumption of a possibly much more profound than normally imagined relation between life and cognition served as the initial and principal key-note. However, the author continually "knew", consciously o r not, how to proceed, that means he did not realize any step into true cognitive new ground, a step which he could not have comprehended in any way, not to mention its verbal formulation. In the view o f the constructor of the theory the latter certainly covers a determined, even though limited spatio-temporal sector of the world, nevertheless the question of validity, "trivial" for the author himself, raises t A not inconsiderable part of human verbal communication is devoted to often heated disputes about moral decisions. :~Contradictory, if happened, included.

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FIG. 6. Man in search of cognition gain (cartoon by H. Losert). a completely new problem for an interested recipient and this leads directly to the next point. (2) The publication of this paper has nothing to do with cognitive transfer. What can be said solely is that a certain amount of information is made available. Its cognizant interpretation by other living systems, for example, other human beings, lies out of the author's reach. Thereby the relation author/reader is of course epistemologically equivalent in both directions. The author himself has no possibility of simply assimilating through any form o f communication or similar interaction something like external units of cognitive content in order to perhaps "verify" or render "truer" his own reflections. (3) Last, but not least, a fundamental impossibility of any insight by the individual into his own cognitive limits has to be inferred directly from the mutationist principle of cognitive gain which, for systemic reasons, excludes cognitive progress in ontogenesis. The necessary pre-condition of an eventual understanding of these limits would be nothing more than just their transgression. Since real cognitive gain could be realized only through an undirected, mutative step, the individual--suppose that, just for the moment, we exceptionally allow such a normally excluded possibility--would even be unable to comprehend it. An intangible barrier, even though unyielding yet almost gentle in its imperceptibility, is embracing the unique individual (Fig. 6).

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37

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