Land, power and peace: Tenure formalization, agricultural reform, and livelihood insecurity in rural Rwanda

Land Use Policy 30 (2013) 186–196

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Land, power and peace: Tenure formalization, agricultural reform, and livelihood insecurity in rural Rwanda Matthew F. Pritchard ∗ Department of Geography, McGill University, 805 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, QC, Canada H3A 2K6

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 21 October 2011 Received in revised form 10 January 2012 Accepted 14 March 2012 Keywords: Land tenure Property rights Agricultural policy Food security

a b s t r a c t Land tenure and agricultural reforms are essential components of postwar development. The importance of land use and management systems to livelihood stability and economic growth is especially relevant in Rwanda, where eighty per cent of the population depends on subsistence agriculture in a rural system plagued by conflict over holdings and decreasing production. In response to increases in population pressure, soil erosion, and the desire for state-backed tenure security, in 2009 the Government of Rwanda implemented a series of large-scale land and agricultural reforms intended to transform the rural system away from subsistence production to a commercially oriented sector of professional farmers. Beyond the mandatory registration and formalization of informal tenure regimes, agricultural reforms require all farmers to consolidate their holdings and intensify agricultural production by planting only those seeds approved and provided by the Government. While introduced as ‘pro-poor’ policies aimed at increasing production and reducing conflict over holdings, this paper argues that the simultaneous and aggressive implementation of registration and crop intensification has significantly reduced the land tenure and food security of subsistence households. Although decreasing production and increasing conflict over holdings validate the need to reorganize land use and management systems throughout Rwanda, the rapid and forceful implementation of tenure and agricultural policies is unnecessarily undermining the livelihood stability of rural subsistence farmers, as well as the sustainability of government-led reforms. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction Land and land tenure are essential components of post-conflict development. Fundamental to reconciliation, economic rehabilitation, and stability, access to land following conflict can present significant challenges to a peace process (Unruh, 2003). The importance of land to livelihood stability and economic reform is especially relevant in Rwanda, where increasing population pressure has led to the continued fragmentation of holdings, declines in agricultural production, and increased conflict over plots (Clay and Lewis, 1990; André, 1998; GoR, 2004a). Despite substantial and continued reductions in the sustainability of the agricultural sector, approximately eighty per cent of Rwandans depend on subsistence agriculture (Huggins, 2010). Given the overwhelming reliance on household production and extreme pressure on cultivable land throughout the country, immediately following the genocide the Government of Rwanda (GoR) launched a series of short to medium-term reforms targeting the organization and

∗ Correspondence address: Burnside Hall 308, Department of Geography, McGill University, 805 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, QC, Canada H3A 2K6. Tel.: +1 514 291 3746; fax: +1 514 398 7437. E-mail address: [email protected] 0264-8377/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2012.03.012

management of the land tenure and agricultural sectors.1 Beyond these initial policies aimed at peacefully re-settling large populations of refugees and internally displaced peoples, in 2009 the Government implemented a series of large-scale land tenure and agricultural reforms intended to revolutionize the rural system away from subsistence production to a commercially oriented sector of professional farmers (Ansoms, 2009; Huggins, 2010). On the one hand, given increasing population pressure and conflict over holdings, and in an attempt to address the “shortcomings of both customary and statutory regulations” (Pottier, 2006, p. 520), the Government of Rwanda is currently implementing a mandatory land registration and formalization program. On the other hand, in an attempt to maximize production, integrate agriculture into the market economy and drive macro-economic growth, the GoR has also introduced a series of agricultural reforms that require

1 These policies include the Arusha Accords (GoR, 1993), which opened up new lands for settlement in protected areas and placed restrictions on the ability refugees to re-claim previously abandoned holdings, and Imudugudu, a policy that made villagization the only legal form of settlement in Rwanda (Pottier, 2005). A detailed overview of the land policies implemented immediately following the genocide is beyond the scope of this paper and has been provided in significant detail by Musahara and Huggins (2005), Pottier (2005), Bruce (2007) and Pritchard (2010).

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all farmers to consolidate “agricultural production by planting the same government approved crops on adjacent fields” (Huggins, 2010). Although researchers (cf. Landal, 1970; Clay et al., 1998; Musahara and Huggins, 2005), land administrators, and local farmers acknowledge the pressing need to reform land use and management systems throughout Rwanda, the ambitious goals and aggressive, if not forceful, implementation of tenure and agricultural policies are significantly undermining subsistence livelihoods in the short term.2 Drawing on data from one hundred and eight interviews with subsistence farmers, local land administrators, and policy makers, this paper argues three main points. First, the simultaneous and aggressive implementation of registration and crop consolidation has significantly and unnecessarily reduced the land tenure and food security of subsistence households. Second, although the overwhelming majority of farmers interviewed for this study support state-led reform and acknowledge the need to amend current land use and management practices, the aggressive implementation of registration and consolidation has divided rural communities into a series of distinct polities according to what stage specific recipients are at in the overall transformation process.3 On the one hand, where rural reforms have not yet been implemented, farmers eagerly await state intervention in land use and management systems. On the other hand, in areas that have experienced state led registration and crop consolidation, decreasing food and tenure security have increased fears of largescale confiscations, as well as frustration with both the goals and methods of land and agricultural reforms. Finally, while decreasing production (Clay and Lewis, 1990; GoR, 2004a) and increasing conflict over holdings (André, 1998; Bigagaza et al., 2002) validate the GoR’s desire to re-organize land use and management systems throughout the country, the aggressive and forceful implementation of state policies threatens to undermine the livelihood stability of rural subsistence farmers, as well as the durability of government-led reforms. Given the impacts that the aggressive and forceful implementation of registration and consolidation are having on the food and tenure security of rural subsistence households, this paper analyses and critiques the land and agricultural policies from within the GoR’s framework for rural reform. Rather than a tacit approval of the privatization and formalization of land tenure regimes, I focus on ways that land and agricultural policies are being implemented, rather than on the theoretical foundations of the policies themselves, for two main reasons. First, although this project began as a study of how informal land use and management systems are adjusting to large scale registration and consolidation, it quickly became apparent that the overwhelming majority of rural subsistence farmers in Rwanda support and desire formalization through registration and the provision of state-backed security.4 Second, despite recent trends towards land tenure hybridization (e.g.

2 In addition to land tenure and agricultural policies, the Government of Rwanda’s strategy for rural reform includes legislation on housing and infrastructure. Despite the interdependent nature of these policies, in this article ‘rural reform’ refers exclusively to land tenure and agricultural policies (the Organic Land Law and National Agricultural Policy). 3 Data for this article were collected over a three-month period in the summer of 2009, and draw on one hundred and eight semi-structured interviews, ten community meetings, and extensive participant observation. In an effort to capture variations in biophysical geographies, population pressure, (re)settlement trends, climate, farming techniques, and distance from administrative centres, data were collected across research sites in Bugesera, Musanze, Rulindo and Bigogwe Districts, as well as the capital city of Kigali. For a more detailed description of research methods, sampling procedures, and data analysis, see Pritchard (2010). 4 See “Land use and access in Rwanda” section.

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South Sudan, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda)5 and recognition of informal tenure systems (Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994; Toulmin and Quan, 2000; Wily, 2011) in a number of African countries, the GoR believes that it’s unique context as a small, densely populated, post-genocide country allows it to ignore many of the ‘lessons learned’ from other contexts. Here, when we combine national support for registration with the importance of land tenure reform to the GoR’s overall development programme, and it’s repeated use of ‘genocide credit’ (Reyntjens, 2004) to ignore recommendations from bilateral donors and experiences from surrounding countries, a focus on adjusting policy implementation within the state’s framework for reform presents the greatest potential for positive change. From this perspective, I argue that the simultaneous and aggressive implementation of mandatory registration and consolidation are unnecessarily undermining the land tenure and food security of rural subsistence farmers. Beyond the negative impacts on livelihood security at the household level, this paper demonstrates that further marginalizing the largest sector of producers also undermines the potential for land and agricultural changes desired by the GoR (cf. 2002b, 2004a, and 2005), independent researchers (cf. Landal, 1970; Clay et al., 1998; Musahara and Huggins, 2005), and rural subsistence farmers. As such, focusing on potential changes to policy implementation rather than a fundamental reworking of Government legislation offers a realistic and practical way to decrease negative impacts, and therefore increase the sustainability of rural reforms. However, while changes to policy implementation offer an essential means to increase the land tenure and food security of rural subsistence households, this paper also demonstrates that realizing positive and sustainable changes to both household and market-oriented production requires the Government of Rwanda to incorporate a more nuanced view of farmers that includes subsistence production and producers in both the development and implementation of land and agriculture policies. Given the multitude of challenges facing the productivity and sustainability of the agricultural system in Rwanda, the first section of this paper provides a brief introduction to current trends in land use, management, and access throughout the country. With continued increases in population pressure (GoR, 2004a), land fragmentation (Sagashya and English, 2009), and conflict over holdings (André, 1998), as well as a steady decline in overall production (GoR, 2004a; Musahara and Huggins, 2005), the second section follows with an overview of the land and agriculture policies that form the foundation of state intervention in the rural sector.6 Third, drawing on data collected in the summer of 2009, I demonstrate how the simultaneous and aggressive implementation of mandatory registration and crop consolidation are decreasing the land tenure and food security of rural subsistence households, and dividing rural Rwanda into a series of sub-regional polities according to what stage specific communities are at in the reform process. Finally, given the overwhelming reliance on subsistence agriculture and importance of land to the GoR’s programmes for macro-economic growth (GoR, 2002a,b, 2007a), the fourth and final section of this paper highlights the existing and potential threats current policies

5 See Constitution of South Africa (1996), Mozambique Land Act (1997), and Southern Sudan Land Act (2009), as well as Delville (1999), Cotula (2007) and Wily (2011). 6 A comprehensive historical overview of conflict, the genocide, and previous land policies in Rwanda is beyond the scope of this paper and the author’s focus on analysing how current policies are impacting the tenure and food security of rural subsistence farmers. For a detailed overview of conflict and the genocide in Rwanda, see Prunier (1995), Desforges (1999) and Mamdani (2001). For a summary of land tenure policies in Rwanda see Liversage (2003); Musahara and Huggins (2005); Pottier (2005); and Pritchard (2010).

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pose not only to rural subsistence livelihoods, but also to the Government’s long-term vision and strategies for rural reform. Land use and access in Rwanda The most densely populated country in Africa, eighty three per cent of Rwanda’s 9.7 million people reside in rural areas (GoR, 2006). Although the agricultural sector accounts for the largest portion of GDP (thirty nine per cent in 2005), approximately eighty per cent of the economically active population relies on subsistence agriculture (Musahara and Huggins, 2005; GoR, 2009). Unsurprisingly, this propensity towards household production has created extreme pressure on cultivable land, and presented farmers, landless peasants, extension agents, and land administrators with several challenges. First, increasing population pressure has exacerbated land fragmentation and led to continual reductions in the average size of holdings. Mirroring the rise in population density over the last forty years from 121 to over 350 persons per square kilometre, the national average land parcel size has dropped from 2 ha in 1960 to 0.35 in 2007 (Sagashya and English, 2009). Second, as plots are increasingly divided into smaller parcels, land distribution has grown increasingly unequal (Bigagaza et al., 2002; Musahara, 2006). Indeed, by 1984 approximately half of all agriculturally productive land in Rwanda had already been consolidated on sixteen per cent of the country’s 1.1 million farms (Baechler, 1999; Musahara, 2006). The rate at which large swathes of land continue to be captured by a minority of urban elite (Bigagaza et al., 2002; Musahara, 2006) led the GoR to acknowledge that unequal ownership presents a growing problem for rural livelihoods (GoR, 2004b). Third, fragmentation and unequal access have led to increases in both the size of the landless class and propensity of conflict over holdings (Bigagaza et al., 2002; Musahara, 2006), while simultaneously reducing the ability of women and vulnerable groups (i.e. child and female headed households, individuals with HIV/AIDS, etc.) to access lands through family patronage networks. Fourth, population pressure has placed incredible stress on arable land, and forced farmers to avoid fallow periods and expand onto steep and often highly unsuitable terrain (Musahara and Huggins, 2005). Over time, these practices have led to extensive soil erosion, nutrient leaching, and significant declines in overall agricultural production (GoRa, 2004a).7 While subsistence households have been, and continue to be blamed for unsustainable practices (Takeuchi and Marara, 2000), farmers have historically invested heavily in soil conservation through terraces, agro-forestry, water catchments, and living hedges (Musahara and Huggins, 2005). However, despite the traditional importance of soil conservation, the intensive small-scale organic production that predominates throughout the country remains severely limited by a lack of access to both organic and inorganic fertilizers. Fifth, although land holdings in Rwanda were traditionally subdivided amongst male heirs, or gifted through familial patronage networks, decades of failed attempts to unify the dual (formal and informal) land tenure systems introduced by successive colonial regimes and solidified following independence, have led to a highly formalized ‘informal’ market for buying and selling holdings.8

7 According to the GoRa (2004a), “water induced erosion is reducing Rwanda’s capacity to feed 40,000 persons per year” (GoR, 2004b, p. 18). Declining production was a problem in the early 1990s, and was exacerbated by both the war and subsequent large-scale return of old and new caseload refugees. According to Musahara and Huggins (2005, p. 300), “if annual food production was 100 units between 1979 and 1981, it was only 70 units in 1993. Kilocalorie production per farmer fell from 2055 per day in 1984 to 1509 kcal in 1991 . 8 For the purpose of this work, I label all those tenure regimes that exist outside statutory law as ‘informal’. These systems are neither customary nor traditional, but

Currently, the overwhelming majority of subsistence households obtain their plots through a mixture of informal private purchases and inheritance.9 While this market is ‘informal’ in that plots are not registered by a federal body, decades of buying and selling land at the local level have resulted in a highly formalized, regulated, and politically legitimized ‘informal’ system. Finally, despite decades of purchasing and protecting land at the local level, increasing fragmentation (GoR, 2002a; Sagashya and English, 2009) and decreasing production (GoR, 2007a; Ansoms, 2009) within a highly regulated and individually oriented ‘informal’ tenure system have led to significant support for Governmentbacked formalization and registration. Specifically, data from interviews conducted across field sites overwhelmingly confirm findings by Sagashya and English (2009, p. 3) that the majority of farmers see “the Government and statutory law, and not ‘custom,’ as the best guarantor of tenure security.” Indeed, despite the prevalence of community backed tenure regimes and informal purchases, ninety-nine per cent of the subsistence farmers interviewed for this study note that state backed security is the best method to protect their holdings. According to Ingabire (2009), a female farmer and head of household in Bugesera District: There have been many disputes over land in this area. Violence has occurred, people have been attacked and cut because of the land. Under registration I will be more protected than before. This [registration] will solve problems because when you have your land registered you can claim ownership more easily.10 Land tenure and agricultural reforms Given decreasing production and increasing conflict over holdings, reforming land use and management practices throughout rural Rwanda emerged as a central component of the Government’s long-term plans for stability and macro-economic growth after the genocide (GoR, 2007a). As the agricultural sector remained (and remains) the largest contributor to GDP, immediately following the 1994 genocide, the GoR quickly concluded that rapid economic growth could not be achieved without first transforming agriculture away from its reliance on subsistence production, to a fully monetized and commercially oriented sector driven by professional farmers (Ansoms, 2009). Based on the belief that “the peasants are practicing a mediocre agriculture that has no future” (Huggins, 2010, p. 297), and that only economies of scale can provide the springboard for economic growth required to fight against poverty (GoR, 2009), the GoR launched a series of land tenure and agricultural reforms aimed at completely transforming the rural sector. First, in an attempt to increase production and ensure that all lands are used in “an efficient and uniform manner” (GoR, 2005, p. 1), in 2005 the Government of Rwanda introduced a succession of sweeping land tenure reforms under the Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/7/2005 Determining the Use and Management of Land in Rwanda (GoR, 2005). Known as the Organic Land Law (OLL),

constantly evolve in relation to statutory law. However, labeling these systems as ‘informal’ risks concealing the fact that they are (as in Rwanda) often highly formalized and legitimized by regional practices and authorities. Despite the shortcomings of this label, an extensive debate on how to define tenure regimes is beyond the scope of this paper, and is discussed in greater detail by a number of authors (cf. Peters, 2004; Cousins and Hornby, 2006; Cotula, 2007). 9 Seventy one per cent of the farmers interviewed for this study purchased at least one of their plots through the informal market. According to informants, when purchasing a piece of land, all parties involved and their witnesses must sign a title deed. Although not issued by the state, this deed is submitted to the local government for ratification. In order to acknowledge, and therefore guarantee the contract, the individual purchasing the land is required to pay the local administration a ‘registration fee’ worth six per cent of the total purchase price. 10 In an effort to further protect the identity of informants, all of the names included in this work are pseudonyms.

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this series of policies emerged as the first attempt at large-scale tenure reform in Rwanda since 1976, and is rooted in the belief that decreasing agricultural output is a direct result of the shortcomings of informal land tenure systems and subsistence production. Based on the conclusion that informal tenure systems do not and cannot provide sufficient security, and that the practices of subsistence farmers are the main cause of decreasing production, the OLL’s central purpose is to re-organize rural Rwanda by registering and individualizing all holdings, formalizing land use planning, and outlawing informal tenure regimes (GoR, 2005; Pottier, 2005). After completing a series of consultations and four field trials, in 2009 the GoR transitioned out of the preparatory stage and into the full-scale national implementation of registration and formalization, with the goal of registering all plots in Rwanda (over 7,900,000) by 2013 (Sagashya and English, 2009).11 Second, the large-scale tenure reforms required under the Organic Land Law were launched in cohort with a new National Agricultural Policy (NAP). Like the Land Law, the NAP comprises a series of policies that attempt to increase agricultural production, food security, and GDP by moving households away from subsistence to market-based production of export-oriented commodities (GoR, 2004a). Of greatest relevance to the livelihoods of rural subsistence households, is the strategy of intensification. According to the National Agricultural Policy, intensification “aims to increase land and crop productivity through increased use of inputs (selected seeds, organic and mineral fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) and improved agricultural techniques” (GoR, 2004a, p. 13). Specifically, as the NAP stipulates that the “selection of commodities must be economically rational and strictly based on comparative advantages” (GoR, 2004a, p. 9), individual households are required to “join cooperatives and consolidate agricultural production by planting the same Government approved crops in adjacent fields” (Huggins, 2010, p. 297). According to Jean (2009), an agricultural official in charge of registration in Musanze District: The Ministry of Agriculture decides on the crop according to bioclimatic zone. No one should grow crops independently, so the Government entered into land consolidation. In a certain area everyone has to adopt the same crop. The idea is to be able to support each other and buy in bulk. Referred to locally as crop specialization, this ‘strategy’ is currently being deployed alongside mandatory registration as a method of consolidating all aspects of agricultural production and decision making away from subsistence farmers and rural households. Specifically, in accordance with the NAP, the Government selects crops for specific regions according to three groups of priority commodities chosen for their yields, nutritive value, and market potential (GoR, 2004a).12 Once a crop has been selected for a specific region, farmers are “forced to buy particular kinds of seeds

11 Data from field trials of the national land registration process suggest that while fewer parcels were disputed than expected (Sagashya and English, 2009), there is an increasing trend towards intra-family conflict over holdings. Unsurprisingly, this confirms previous findings by Benjaminsen et al. (2009) and Koumé (2010), who demonstrate that registration and formalization often precipitate conflict over holdings as individuals compete for exclusive rights to family or community held lands. 12 The NAP divides priority commodities into three categories. The first category of commodities are labeled ‘Export Products’ and include coffee, tea and pyrethrum, as well as roses, exotic fruits (i.e. gooseberries and passion fruits) and ornamental plants. The second category of products are designated for the ‘Domestic Market’, and include fruits and vegetables, beans, Irish potatoes, rice, maize, wheat and soya beans. Finally, the third category targets new industries of high economic potential, and include Aloe Vera, vanilla, avocados, ginger, lemons, mangos, tomatoes, etc. (GoR, 2004a).

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and fertilizers from the local authority” (Huggins, 2010, p. 300).13 On the one hand, the simultaneous and wide-ranging implementation of registration and intensification demonstrate the state’s commitment to confronting environmental degradation, decreasing production, and increasing conflict over land by transforming the rural sector away from subsistence production. On the other hand, although mandatory registration enables farmers to formalize land rights, crop specialization effectively groups all privately held and newly registered plots within a specific area into a single field. In other words, rather than physically consolidating dispersed and fragmented holdings, under mandatory crop specialization all of the individually held plots in each zone are grouped into a single field planted and harvested by the landowners. Results and discussion While most of the literature on land use and management systems in Rwanda focuses on the need for extensive reforms to address decreasing production and increasing conflict over land (cf. Landal, 1970; Clay and Lewis, 1990; Barrière, 1997; Van Huyweghen, 1999), very little information exists on how rural subsistence farmers understand and interact with the Government-led tenure and agricultural policies, and how the initial implementation of these programmes is impacting rural livelihoods. Although Ansoms (2009) and Huggins (2010) highlight the potential and initial impacts of registration and specialization on rural subsistence households, most publications remain dominated by scientific narratives that quantify levels of erosion and nutrient depletion in lieu of anthropocentric analyses of how these changes are affecting baseline producers and consumers. At no point do I imply that such studies are flawed, or indeed any less accurate than those that focus on the perceptions and practices of rural subsistence farmers. Rather, the purpose of this article is to add another level of data to the literature in an attempt to further triangulate existing results, and present an updated perspective on not only the need to adjust land use and management systems in Rwanda, but also on how Government reforms are impacting rural subsistence households. As such, this section provides an overview of the impacts that the initial implementation of registration and crop specialization are having on rural subsistence farmers. Specifically, despite the widespread desire for registration and state intervention in the agricultural sector, the simultaneous and aggressive implementation of mandatory privatization and intensification are reducing the tenure and food security of rural subsistence households in the short-term.14 On the one hand, mandatory registration and consolidation undermine the theoretical foundation of privatization theory, and therefore the GoR’s justification of state-led formalization. On the other hand, rural households are being forced to consolidate their holdings according to state planting and harvesting directives, and mandatory specialization has resulted in crop destruction and threats of eviction. When combined with a severe lack of off and non-farm employment opportunities (Musahara and Huggins, 2005), as well as the fact that rural subsistence farmers and landless peasants were completely removed from both the development and implementation of land tenure and agricultural policies (discussed in “Nature of policy implementation” section), the concurrent and forceful application of rural reforms are reducing the food and tenure security of

13 According to Huggins (2010), farmers initially obtain the required inputs on credit that is repaid following the harvest. 14 According to the Organic Land Law (Article 30), land registration in Rwanda is compulsory (GoR, 2005), all land arrangements must be regulated through formal legal procedures (Ansoms, 2009), and the costs of registration will be borne by the applicants (Musahara and Huggins, 2005).

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subsistence households. Furthermore, beyond the negative impacts the OLL and NAP are having on food and tenure security, widespread fear that the Government will confiscate household plots, and the loss of the right to plant and harvest private holdings according to personal experience and preference, are dividing rural Rwanda into distinct polities of farmers whose willingness to invest in rural reforms vary according to their stage in the overall transformation process.

Land tenure security While decreasing production and increasing conflict over land has generated significant support for state-backed security, data compiled across research sites demonstrate that the GoR has also reduced the cost of privatization and significantly increased accessibility to formalized holdings. According to interviews with farmers and land administrators, the cost to register one plot of land is a one-time fee of 1000 Rwandan Francs (approximately 1.66 USD). As the average household possesses five plots of land (Musahara and Huggins, 2005), the average cost of registration will be 5000 Francs (approximately 8.31 USD). While paying for multiple plots is difficult for most farmers, the current cost of registration is significantly lower than that required to protect lands purchased through the informal market (six per cent of the total sale price). Furthermore, informants and Government officials note that those households unable to pay the mandatory fee at the time of registration are simply required to go to the District office and collect their titles once they amass sufficient capital. On the one hand, where landholders are required to pay to register their holdings, mandatory formalization risks excluding the poorest households, decreasing tenure security, and increasing the unequal distribution of land, as well as size of the landless class (Delville, 1999; Toulmin and Quan, 2000). However, despite initial fears that mandatory registration in Rwanda would be inaccessible to the rural poor (Musahara and Huggins, 2005; Pottier, 2005), the Government has demonstrated an impressive commitment to ensuring that privatization remains affordable. Indeed, the low cost of registration has significantly increased access to privately held and guaranteed lands. On the other hand, any improvements in tenure security achieved through registration are being directly undermined by mandatory crop specialization. Specifically, while farmers are both willing and able to register their holdings, households are being warned that if they ignore Government planting and harvesting directives, their crops will be ripped out of the ground, and the lands of repeat offenders will be transferred to individuals willing to follow state-requirements. Although the National Agricultural Policy provides very little information on how crop intensification will be (and is being) implemented, data collected for this project confirm initial findings by Ansoms (2009) and Huggins (2010), who conclude that crop specialization is being forced on subsistence households. Ansoms (2009, p. 91) quotes a Government official as stating that “[farmers] are obliged to obey,” either they invest in crop specialization, or they will “have to leave their land and work for someone who is willing to invest.” In a similar vein, Huggins (2010, p. 300) notes that: Security personnel at the sector level told residents that if they did not plant the required crops at the same time as other members of cooperatives, other people would be brought in to cultivate their land. However, beyond confirming initial findings by Ansoms (2009) and Huggins (2010) that crop specialization is being forced on subsistence farmers through overt threats of eviction, interviews for this project also demonstrate that the simultaneous

implementation of large-scale land reform and intensification are reducing tenure security in three ways. First, sixty eight per cent of all farmers interviewed for this study state that mandatory registration and consolidation have increased fears that the Government will confiscate their lands.15 Despite the promise of state-backed security, farmers note that if the Government wants to take your land, there is absolutely nothing protecting you. This feeling of helplessness is captured by Pacifique (2009), a female farmer and head of household in Musanze District: If someone from the community tries to take away our land, then you can go to the leadership [village level] and they can protect you. If the Government tries to take your land, there is nothing you can do. In addition to overt threats of confiscation that are actively decreasing tenure security, local perceptions of the GoR’s ability to confiscate large tracts of land are exacerbated by the long history of pre and post-genocide regimes seizing or re-appropriating vast tracts of land during periods of reform (Gasana, 1995; Prunier, 1997; Jones, 2000),16 as well as the power of the state in postgenocide Rwanda (Prunier, 1997; Pottier, 2002; Reyntjens, 2004). As such, it is not surprising that direct threats of eviction have significantly reduced feelings of tenure security.17 Second, in addition to threats of eviction, crop specialization is undermining tenure security by centralizing all aspects of agricultural decision making away from farmers. Despite having paid to register their holdings and agreeing to formalize local land management systems, with no input into when and how, let alone what crops are planted, land holders are essentially being transformed into agricultural labourers. Although the overwhelming majority of farmers yet to undergo intensification admit that they are looking forward to help from the Government, those that have already experienced registration and consolidation state that “tenure security is non-existent” (Adeline, 2009), and that “tenure security does not matter anymore because all land belongs to the Government” (Agena, 2009). Here, despite extensive formalization and registration designed to increase tenure security, and in turn, incentives to invest in environmentally sustainable and market-oriented production, crop specialization has left large sections of the rural poor feeling increasingly vulnerable. According to two female farmers and heads of household in Musanze District, crop specialization and registration have made them feel that “there is absolutely no

15 Statistics are based on the number of participants that verbally expressed that rural reforms (OLL and/or NAP) have increased the likelihood and their fear of largescale confiscations. 16 Although pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial regimes all confiscated land through different policies (Gasana, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Jones, 2000), the most recent large scale land confiscations in Rwanda (prior to the OLL and NAP) occurred in 2005. In an attempt to “encourage more intensive forms of agriculture to supply new markets”, in 2005 the GoR “passed a new land law which brought all marshes and river valleys under State control” (Veldman and Lankhorst, 2011, p. 8). Having re-appropriated the land rights from the subsistence farmers that traditionally farmed the marshlands, the GoR began leasing large sections of these lands to agribusinesses, ‘tycoons’, and co-ops. While approximately 1100 farmers were hired as outgrowers, the overwhelming majority of local people were dispossessed by the new companies (Veldman and Lankhorst, 2011). Findings by Veldman and Lankhorst (2011) were confirmed by interviews with a number of landless peasants in Bugesera District, who note that they lost their lands in the Nyabarongo marshes when the GoR sold the land to an “Indian Tycoon”. 17 While the GoR successfully stabilized the country following the genocide, the current regime has been criticized for violating human rights (Reyntjens, 2004), restricting political and personal freedoms (International Crisis Group, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2003) and centralizing power in the hands of an RPF party intolerant of political opposition (Prunier, 1997; Jefremovas, 1997; Reyntjens, 2004 and Reyntjens, 2006; Pottier, 2006). As a detailed analysis of power relations in postgenocide Rwanda is beyond the scope of this paper, for a more complete discussion see Prunier (1995), Reyntjens (2004), and Pritchard (2010).

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protection anymore,” (Safie, 2009), and that “the Government gave us titles just to blindfold us” (Honoline, 2009). Third, beyond actively reducing tenure security, the addition of regional crop specialization to mandatory registration and formalization undermines the theoretical foundation of privatization theory. Here, property rights theory is based on the assumption that formalizing existing land regimes will necessarily increase access to credit and incentives to invest in the long-term sustainable management of holdings (Feder and Noronha, 1987a,b; de Soto, 2000; Toulmin and Quan, 2000). Unfortunately, there is no proof that registration will increase access to credit in Rwanda. At 0.35 hectares per capita in 2007 (Sagashya and English, 2009), the average size of plots in Rwanda is too small to provide banks with sufficient collateral. Furthermore, Government control of planting and harvesting practices on ‘privately’ held lands undermines the desire and ability farmers have to invest. Specifically, despite registration and state-backed security, subsistence farmers are unable to invest in their holdings according to their own plans for environmental protection and production. Mandatory intensification, therefore, not only contradicts the theoretical foundation and practical application of the Organic Land Law, but also demonstrates that the Government of Rwanda is using agricultural policies to achieve large-scale land tenure reforms. Although land and agricultural policies are necessarily related, and often developed in concert, the GoR is using a different policy to achieve the largescale consolidation initially outlined by the OLL. In other words, while the goal of dramatically reforming land use and management regimes throughout Rwanda has not changed, the state is simultaneously employing contradictory agricultural and tenure policies. Rather than physically consolidating land through restrictions on sub-dividing plots or registration floors that exclude small holdings, the GoR has shifted its method of reforming the rural system from increasing individual rights over land to completely restricting them. In theory, registration is meant to provide farmers with greater security over their property. In practice, mandatory intensification and the ensuing threats of eviction completely restrict household rights over private lands, and in doing so, undermine any sense of security obtained through formalization. In addition to the contradictions between privatization, mandatory intensification, and threats of eviction, the Organic Land Law and National Agricultural Policy were developed with very different approaches to public participation. As the foundation of land reform following the genocide, and juxtaposed against a history of radical policies characterized by a complete lack of public involvement, the initial development and implementation of the OLL is considered to have been a relatively participatory process (Sagashya and English, 2009; Huggins, 2010). Although non-governmental actors were completely removed from the initial debates surrounding policy goals (Huggins, 2010), a number of national and international stakeholders were involved in discussions about how to realize the GoR’s objectives. Conversely, the specifics of the National Agricultural Policy and its component programmes were completely removed from any discussion and treated as “technical questions,” rather than “socio-economic and political ones” (Huggins, 2010, p. 291). As a result of these divergent methods of policy development, while the Organic Land Law received significant economic and political support from foreign donors, and has been widely discussed in the academic and policy literature (cf. Liversage, 2003; Musahara and Huggins, 2005; Pottier, 2006), no detailed information exists on how crop specialization is to be applied throughout the country.18 The different histories and

18 DFID, USAID, and the European Commission all provided significant financial and technical support for the development and implementation of rural reforms in Rwanda (DFID, 2006; EC, 2007; GoR, 2007c). A breakdown of the financial and

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purposes of these two interdependent yet contradictory pieces of legislation have resulted in the current situation: while formalization remains the legislative foundation of rural reform, the GoR is striving to achieve large-scale land consolidation and economies of scale through alternate means that undermine, if not directly contradict, the purpose of privatizing existing land use and management practices. Food security In addition to a notable decrease in tenure security, data show that the first areas to undergo both registration and crop consolidation have experienced significant reductions in food security.19 Although food insecurity existed in Rwanda prior to 2009 and the national roll out of rural reforms, interviews with farmers and key informants across field sites demonstrate three ways that crop specialization is further undermining the livelihood security of subsistence households. First, in preparation for intensification, farmers are being forced to clear their fields of all crops. In some areas extension agents inform farmers that they are not allowed to plant following a specific harvest, while in others, administrators force households to uproot their crops in the middle of the growing season. On the one hand, despite the detrimental impact forced land clearings can have on the food security of subsistence households, informants across field sites acknowledge the need for reform, and state that they are thankful for Government support. People don’t have the financial means to build terraces or purchase hybrid seeds, but they would do so if they could. It’s good that the Government comes in to support the needs of the people (Mutara, 2009). On the other hand, a large number of farmers express significant frustration with the forceful methods the state is using to clear lands for crop specialization. The Government shows up and says that their goal is to help you, to make your situation better and to make you richer, but then why would they clear the crops that have already been planted? If they take away your food and you have kids, what are you going to feed them? Soil? (Celine, 2009) Second, although large swathes of land have been uprooted in preparation for crop specialization, once cleared, these holdings remain unplanted for several growing seasons. Farmers in districts that have experienced both registration and preparation for consolidation note that while they can only plant the hybrid seeds selected by the state, land administrators have thus far failed to deliver the necessary and required inputs. Indeed, as of September 2009, all of the lands cleared for specialization in Musanze, Rulindo, and Bigogwe Districts remained unplanted after at least one, and up to three, growing seasons. Beyond the one-time loss of the initial harvests cleared for specialization, without the inputs required

technical role of non-governmental and bilateral donors in supporting land and agricultural reform is beyond the scope of this study, but presents an interesting and important avenue for further research. 19 In the interest of simplicity, this paper employs the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organizations’ definition of food security. Specifically, “food security exists when all people, at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Household food security is the application of this concept to the family level, with individual households as the focus of concern” (UNFAO, 2003, p. 29). Furthermore, this study does not attempt to quantify levels of food (in)security amongst rural households. Rather, the issue of ‘hunger’ and food security arose in interviews with subsistence farmers and landless peasants who note increased hunger due to rural reforms, and fear that monocropping will significantly reduce access to nutrients.

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under crop intensification, households remain unable to plant on their fields. We can’t plant what the Government wants because they haven’t given us the seeds, but we also can’t plant our own crops to survive on (Assuma, 2009). Third, in addition to loosing multiple harvests, the land clearings required for consolidation have significantly reduced food security by effectively outlawing the traditional practice of polycropping. Obviously, as the seeds farmers are required to plant have not been delivered, and large areas of the country have yet to undergo registration and preparation for specialization, this aspect of reform has yet to fully impact farmers. Although six per cent of informants note that crop specialization could work if the Government provides sufficient fertilizers, the majority of respondents believe that the monocropping required under intensification will significantly decrease access to both nutrients and household income. Indeed, the intensive organic polycropping that dominates subsistence agriculture throughout Rwanda evolved not only as a result of increasing population pressure, but also as an essential method of risk aversion given significant variations in microclimates, topography, and taxonomy over very short distances. As such, outside of the large valleys and marshlands that have already been taken over by the state and are being distributed to private businesses (Veldman and Lankhorst, 2011), there is little proof that the economies of scale desired by the Government are feasible in Rwanda (Musahara and Huggins, 2005). Rather, in sharp contrast with the large monocrops currently being pursued by the state, polycropping can significantly reduce exposure to disease and drought while enabling households to plant different crops for different purposes, and stagger harvest times across a single growing season. Furthermore, without significant improvements to transportation and market infrastructures, crop specialization risks flooding local markets with a small number of regionally produced commodities, and severely limiting access to a wide range of nutrients. According to Elisa (2009), a female farmer from Bugesera District: I usually grow sorghum and beans, eat the beans and use the sorghum for porridge. . .but the Government wants me to grow cassava. My children will not be able to eat only cassava. Nature of policy implementation Finally, two key features of the Government’s strategy for rural reform are exacerbating the negative impacts that registration and intensification are having on the tenure and food security of rural subsistence households in Rwanda. First, despite claims that land and agricultural policies are ‘propoor,’ and incorporate insights from rural households (GoR, 2009), interviews across study sites demonstrate that subsistence farmers have been completely removed from the decision making process, and purposefully ignored by local and national administrators. Specifically, informants across the country state that they have warned extension agents and administrators that the crop selected for intensification in their region would not grow. For example, Claudine, a female farmer in Bugesera District (2009) states: I used to plant sweet potatoes on this land, but the agronomist arrived and said I must plant maize. We talked to the agronomist and said, “we have been here for a long time and maize does not grow here,” but the agronomist said, “grow maize or we will tear your crops up.” I know that if they grow maize it will never succeed. Without idealizing local knowledge, or prioritizing subsistence practices over the monocropping and export-oriented production

propagated by land administrators, a complete lack of local participation significantly reduces incentives to invest in state-led reforms. While the lack of local participation in public policy emerges as a result of the power narratives and level of control that characterize state–society relations in post-genocide Rwanda (cf. Prunier, 1997; Reyntjens, 2004, 2006), ignoring local insights severely undermines the potential success of current reforms. Specifically, in communities that have already experienced registration and preparation for consolidation, the majority of farmers are concerned that intensification will have significant negative impacts on their livelihoods, while a large number of households remain convinced that crop specialization is bound to fail. On the one hand, while not actively undermining or resisting Government policies, farmers are not only pessimistic of the Government’s ability to realize change, but more so believe that current reforms will destabilize rural subsistence livelihoods. As a result, these individuals note that they are simply waiting for state policies to fail.20 On the other hand, if the state is unable to drive significant reforms throughout the rural system, current levels of population pressure, soil erosion, under production, and conflict over holdings also pose a significant threat to the sustainability of subsistence livelihoods, albeit over a longer time period. While it is important to acknowledge the general logistical challenges that face largescale government reforms to an entire system of production and consumption, the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of subsistence farmers in Rwanda desire state intervention in the rural sector. However, by not incorporating the opinions and practices of the country’s largest sector of producers and policy recipients into the reform process, the GoR is actively reducing incentives for participants to invest in state policies. Indeed, rather than preparing for a new opportunity characterized by greater tenure security, increasing production, and decreasing conflict over land, the complete lack of local participation has caused large numbers of farmers to start preparing for what they see as the inevitable failure of another set state policies. Second, the sustainability of rural reforms beyond the short term is undermined by the aggressive timeline outlined by the GoR. Specifically, the desire to revolutionize the entire rural sector by 2013 (Sagashya and English, 2009) has caused policies to be applied before the supporting requirements (i.e. seed distribution networks, transportation infrastructure, etc.) are met, and resulted in significant disparities in how crop intensification is being applied throughout the country. On the one hand, although both land tenure and agricultural policies acknowledge the need for supporting legislation within and across sectors, the GoR’s desire to rapidly transform agriculture into Rwanda’s “springboard for development” (GoR, 2004c, p. 7) has led policies to be applied without the legislative and practical requirements needed to implement and sustain them. On the other hand, the speed with which the GoR is attempting to realize large-scale national reforms has placed significant pressure on local administrators, and led to differences in how land and agriculture policies are being implemented and enforced between regions. For example, rather than taking the time

20 This notion of ‘waiting for state policies to fail’ was raised across research sites. Rather than depicting an image of a passive peasantry, the notion of ‘waiting for government policies to fail’ raises two key issues surrounding development in Rwanda. First, this response is based on decades of land reforms in Rwanda that were only partially implemented before being abandoned altogether (i.e. Paysannats, Law of 09/76 of March 1976, etc.). Given previous experience with large-scale land reforms, some farmers believe they can simply bide their time until the Government abandons registration and consolidation, and they are able to return to previous practices. Second, the notion of simply watching policies fail is a direct result of the power relations that characterize state–society relations in Rwanda, and belief that individuals (especially rural subsistence farmers) cannot overtly question, let alone resist, state policies (see “Divisions in Rwanda” section).

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to inform households of crop specialization, and allowing farmers to clear their lands at the end of a given growing season, in some regions land administrators are using prison labour to tear up crops before they can be harvested. On its own, the flexible implementation of national policies at the local level is not inherently negative. Rather, the dynamic application of policies can allow local actors to mediate between laws on the books and laws in practice. Unfortunately, despite the GoR’s dedication to de-centralization (GoR, 2007b), power remains highly centralized, and local administrators appear to be kept on a very short leash.21 On the one hand, the speed with which registration and consolidation are being applied (especially when compared to other reforms) is indicative of the power and control the national administration is exerting over the process. On the other hand, the local administrators interviewed for this project repeatedly note that given the importance of registration and specialization to the GoR’s overall development strategy, privatization and consolidation is their most important task. While the central government and local administrators have demonstrated an impressive ability to drive large scale changes, the strict timeline and administrative hierarchy dictating rural reforms have transformed the implementation of land and agricultural policies from an opportunity to mediate between Government and local visions for change, to the rigid and aggressive imposition of policies that are exacerbating existing food and tenure insecurity. Divisions in Rwanda Beyond the ways that registration and crop intensification are decreasing land tenure and food security, responses from the farmers and members of the landless class interviewed for this study can be grouped into distinct categories according to what stage their communities are at in the overall transformation process. Given significant variations in the speed and aggressiveness of policy implementation, in areas not yet reached by registration and specialization, farmers are generally excited to receive Government assistance. Specifically, where lands have not yet been registered or cleared for intensification, farmers are eager to obtain the fertilizers and hybrid seeds promised by the state. Although a number of informants admit that they are apprehensive about registration and specialization, “people are really looking forward to the Government arriving, as they are hoping for greater production and income generation” (Nadine, 2009). Conversely, data collected from field sites that have already experienced registration and consolidation demonstrate two important trends. First, twenty one per cent of farmers interviewed in areas that have already experienced registration and consolidation admit that they are severely frustrated with the ways that the state is attempting to reform the agricultural sector, but continue to support the long-term goals of privatization and intensification. Specifically, respondents from this category are convinced that specialization will lead to a significant loss of diversification, but note that they are simply waiting to see how the new policies are going to affect them. According to Christian (2009), a female farmer from Bigogwe District: Whatever comes from the new regime you have to accept it. We are waiting to see if it [registration and crop specialization] will work out. If it doesn’t work out we will try to see how we can change it, but we don’t know if the Government will listen to us.

21 In an attempt to promote good governance, reduce poverty, and ensure the efficient and accountable delivery of public services, in May 2000, the GoR adopted the National Decentralization Policy (GoR, 2007b). Specifically, this policy “was formulated to ensure political, economic, social, managerial/administrative and technical empowerment of local populations to fight poverty by participating in the planning and management of their development process” (GoR, 2007b, p. 6).

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Second, a large percentage of informants (sixty per cent across all districts included in this study) express significant fear and frustration with both the goals and methods of land and agricultural reforms. Despite overt feelings of fear and allegiance towards the post-genocide Government, farmers are becoming increasingly angry with the negative impacts registration and intensification are having on food and tenure security. This [crop specialization] is not good because it feels forceful. The Government is not planting food crops, but the people are not allowed to plant the food crops they need and have no way to protect themselves (Agena, 2009). Here, I acknowledge that land and agricultural reforms are not the sole cause of existing opinions regarding state intervention in the rural sector, let alone the Government of Rwanda. While this paper demonstrates that different opinions and experiences of land reform are a direct result of the stage communities are at in the rural reform process, it is also essential to acknowledge that these differences can be further contextualized, thought not sufficiently explained, through an understanding of historic and recent settlement patterns.22 However, as land remains an inherent component of social, political, and economic relations, it is not the root cause of existing trends, but brings pre-existing and evolving opinions to the forefront of discussion. As such, as registration and intensification expand throughout Rwanda, increasing feelings of frustration and helplessness within and across regions could significantly undermine the potential success of rural reforms. Furthermore, given that land remains an historical rallying point for socio-political and economic inequalities in Rwanda, the continued erosion of local livelihoods could threaten the hard earned stability achieved by the people and Government. Indeed, in addition to expressing significant fear that the state will confiscate private holdings, informants note that decreasing tenure and food security caused by registration and specialization have precipitated small acts of resistance. Specifically, nine per cent of all subsistence farmers interviewed for this study note that rural reforms have led to increases in food theft, while six per cent report that registration and consolidation have led some households to ignore government restrictions and ‘illegally’ plant their lands. While the prevalence of resistance remains relatively low given the negative impacts land and agricultural reforms are having on subsistence livelihoods, we must ask how long this can and will last. Specifically, while the unique power narratives that characterize state–society relations in postgenocide Rwanda reduce incentives to actively oppose Government policies, continued reductions in tenure and food security leave subsistence households with few options. As it stands, informants note that the lack of large-scale resistance to Government policies that are actively reducing tenure and food security can be explained by two key factors. First, the overwhelming majority of farmers acknowledge the need to drastically reform land use and management systems given decreasing production and increasing conflict over land. As a result, while farmers are becoming increasingly frustrated with the

22 In order to account for potential differences, field sites were selected to capture variations in biophysical geographies, population pressure, climate, farming techniques, and distance from administrative centres, as well as post-genocide settlement patterns. While disaggregating data by ethnic affiliation presents an interesting perspective for further research, this was not part of this study for two main reasons. First, the research team performed interviews with farmers across all ethnicities in Rwanda, as well as with both old and new caseload refugees. Second, research on ethnic identities in Rwanda is severely restricted by the 2003 Constitution (Article 33), which outlaws public references to ethnic identity (Thomson, 2009). Any discussion linking ethnicity to opinions of the GoR presents an unnecessary risk to the research participants and members of the research team. For a further discussion of the potential impact of settlement patterns and interview schedules on the data, see Pritchard (2010).

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methods of reform, a large proportion of respondents note that they are willing to wait and see whether state intervention can eventually stabilize rural livelihoods. Second, the lack of resistance to Government policies that directly undermine local livelihoods emerges as a direct result of state–society relations characterized by feelings of fear and allegiance to the post-genocide Government. On the one hand, a large number of individuals state that they are afraid to comment on, let alone resist, state policies. This feeling of fear and disempowerment was summarized by Nathan, who notes that “When you speak about the government you end up in jail” (Nathan, 2009). While it is difficult to separate these fears from historical experiences tied to ethnicity and the genocide, farmers across the five field sites selected for this project state that the Government simply does what it wants and people cannot resist. On the other hand, in direct contrast with those individuals that express significant fear of the state, a large number of informants note that despite the negative impacts land and agricultural reforms are having on local livelihoods, they cannot and will not question, let alone challenge, policies implemented by the Government that is responsible for ending the genocide. According to Christian (2009), “We are still alive thanks to this Government, so we will do what they tell us.” Unsurprisingly, the unique power narratives that characterize state–society relations in post-genocide Rwanda have significant implications for land and agricultural reforms. Specifically, widespread feelings of fear and allegiance give the GoR significant latitude in both the nature and methods of realizing change. Fear of reprisals by a strong Government capable of mobilizing genocide narratives to restrict human rights (cf. Jefremovas, 1997; Reyntjens, 2004; Thomson, 2009) could give the state more time and power to implement effective policies. Conversely, providing the state with a carte blanche to realize large-scale change risks altering livelihoods to the extent that households will not be able to resume previous practices if this round of land tenure and agricultural policies fail. Here, fear of loosing land, and the facility (real or perceived) with which a very powerful Government can confiscate private holdings significantly restrict individual reactions to the reform process. Although the GoR has passed legislation on land expropriation (GoR, 2007b), local farmers remain convinced that the state can and will do what it wants with private holdings. Although households demonstrate an impressive ability to ‘wait and see’ how rural reforms play out, we can assume that they will be unable to wait indefinitely. Most importantly, without delivering the inputs farmers are required to use under crop intensification, and without significant and immediate increases in off and non-farm employment, we can assume that households will eventually be forced to plant on lands cleared for specialization. As such, without significant changes in the methods of implementing registration and intensification, the question becomes whether the state will allow farmers to plant their lands until the mandatory inputs arrive, or expropriate large areas of privately held and registered plots.

Moving forward As the end goal of rural reform is to establish agriculture as the springboard for macro-economic growth (GoR, 2009), the failure to initiate significant changes to land use and management systems threatens to undermine the short, medium and long-term reform strategies currently being pursued by the Government of Rwanda. The importance of land and agricultural reforms to the state’s overall development strategy, and the unique power narratives that characterize state–society relations in Rwanda raise two important questions. First, will a powerful, highly militarized and hierarchically controlled government focused on driving macroeconomic growth through agricultural development alter policies in response to decreasing tenure and food security amongst a highly

vulnerable population that also comprises the largest sector of producers? Second, what effect would another series of failed land and agricultural reforms have on future legislation and an increasingly unstable rural sector?23 On the one hand, given severe soil erosion, decreasing production, and increasing conflict over holdings, a lack of reform to land use and management systems could significantly reduce tenure and food security in the medium to long-term periods. On the other hand, the preceding sections demonstrate that current tenure and agricultural policies are exacerbating the very problems they were designed to solve. The question that emerges, therefore, is: “to what extent can the Government undermine the food and tenure security of an already marginalized population before decreasing livelihood security starts to inhibit the state’s ability to realize change?” Although this article highlights specific challenges currently facing land and agricultural reforms in Rwanda, the Government has made a number of admirable and successful attempts to improve the livelihood security of rural subsistence farmers. Most notably, large-scale terracing and the provision of state-backed security at an accessible price demonstrate the GoR’s desire to increase both household production and the sustainability of the agricultural sector. However, the deleterious effects registration and crop intensification are having on the tenure and food security of subsistence farmers demonstrate the need to shift from a focus on the nature of rural reforms, to the methods the state is using to realize and enforce them. Specifically, reducing both the speed and aggressive nature of crop specialization could significantly diminish the negative impacts experienced by rural households. In turn, slight adjustments to policy implementation could increase support for reforms, and therefore, the potential for large-scale sustainable change beyond the short-term. Indeed, successful reforms are not measured by the quality of the legislation, but by the penetration and sustainability of state policies. Despite the widespread need for change throughout rural Rwanda, if the Government continues to ignore the recommendations and practices of rural subsistence farmers, it risks further alienating an already highly marginalized community, and completely undermining incentives to invest in both desired and required reforms. While this paper demonstrates the potential impact that slight changes in policy implementation could have on the food and tenure security of rural subsistence households, the success and sustainability of land and agricultural reforms beyond the shortterm requires the state to incorporate subsistence farmers and subsistence production into its vision for rural Rwanda. Although decreasing production, continued erosion, and increasing conflict over land demonstrate the need to reorganize land use and management systems, necessary reforms will not and cannot be sustained if they are achieved by further marginalizing the largest sector of producers. While rapid and dramatic changes to a country’s primary mode of production and consumption necessarily present an overwhelming number of challenges, the extensive desire for Government support, increasing demand for state-backed tenure security, as well as unique climate of fear and allegiance that characterize state–society relations in Rwanda present the Government with an unprecedented opportunity to realize both desired and required reforms. Given Rwanda’s unique political, cultural, and biophysical environments, the need for significant adjustments to land use and management practices, as well as the state’s desire for rapid change, reducing the speed and force of policy implementation will

23 Given decades of increasing population pressure and land fragmentation, successive colonial and post-colonial regimes introduced a number of policies (see supra note 16) that were unable to reverse existing trends. For an overview of previous land tenure policies in Rwanda, see Musahara and Huggins (2005), Pottier (2005), and Pritchard (2010).

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help stabilize tenure and food security in the short-term, while maintaining the state’s overall vision for development. However, the potential to create positive and sustainable changes to both household and market-oriented production requires that the Government of Rwanda incorporate a more nuanced view of farmers that includes subsistence production and producers in both the development and implementation of land and agriculture policies. Acknowledgements Funding support for this project was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and McGill University. Special thanks to Dr. Jon Unruh, Dr. Kathleen Fallon and Dr. Benjamin Forest for their help throughout this project, as well as to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. References André, C., 1998. Rwandan Land: Access, Policy and Land Reform. Working Paper Series. Antwerp University-Centre for Development Studies, vol. 29. Ansoms, A., 2009. Faces of rural poverty in contemporary Rwanda: linking livelihood profiles and institutional processes. Gezichten van armoede in hedendaags Rwanda. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Antwerp. Baechler, G., 1999. Violence through environmental discrimination: Causes, Rwanda Arena and Conflict Model. Kluwer, Dordrecht. Barrière, O., 1997. Cadre juridique de la réforme foncière au Rwanda; analyse et propositions préliminaires. Formulation de la stratégie de développement agricole Mission d’appui (UNDP/FAO). Benjaminsen, T.A., Holden, S., Lund, C., Sjaastad, E., 2009. Formalisation of land rights: some empirical evidence from Mali, Niger and South Africa. Land Use Policy 26 (1), 28–35. Bigagaza, J., Abong, C., Mukarubuga, C., 2002. Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda. Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts. African Centre for Technology Studies & Institute for Security Studies Press, Nairobi and Pretoria, pp. 85–156. Bruce, J.W., 2007. Drawing a Line Under the Crisis: Reconciling Returnee Land Access and Security in Post-Conflict Rwanda. Humanitarian Policy Group Background Briefing. ODI, London. Bruce, J.W., Migot-Adholla, S.E., 1994. Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa. Frank Cass, Portland, OR. Clay, D.C., Lewis, L.A., 1990. Land use, soil loss, and sustainable agriculture in Rwanda. Human Ecology 18 (2), 147–161. Clay, D.C., Reardon, T., Kangasniemi, J., 1998. Sustainable intensification in the highland tropics: Rwandan farmers’ investments in land conservation and soil fertility. Economic Development and Cultural Change 46 (2), 351–377. Cotula, L. (Ed.), 2007. Changes in Customary Land Tenure Systems in Africa. London, International Institute for Environment and Development. Cousins, T., Hornby, D., 2006. The realities of tenure diversity in South Africa. Paper presented at the Colloque International Les frontières de la question foncière—At the Frontier of Land Issues, Montpellier, 2006. de Soto, H., 2000. The Mystery of Capital. Basic Books, New York. Delville, P.L., 1999. Harmonising formal law and customary land rights in Frenchspeaking West Africa. In: Toulmin, C., Quan, J. (Eds.), Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure. London, IIED with DFID and NRI, pp. 97–122. Department for International Development (DFID), 2006. Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes Country Study: Rwanda 2000–2005. EV660. London, UK, January 2006. Desforges, A., 1999. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. Human Rights Watch (HRW), New York, June 1999. European Commission, Department of Development and Humanitarian Aid (EC), 2007. Republic of Rwanda—European Community: Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Period 2008–2013. Lisbon, December 2007. Feder, G., Noronha, R., 1987a. Land rights systems and agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank Research Observer 2 (2), 143–169. Feder, G., Noronha, R., 1987b. Land rights systems and agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank Research Observer 2 (2), 143. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (UNFAO), 2003. Trade Reforms and Food Security: Conceptualizing Linkages. Rome. Gasana, J., 1995. Factors of ethnic conflict in Rwanda and instruments for a durable peace. Paper Presented at the International Conference of Experts, Basel, Switzerland, September 1995. Government of the Republic of South Africa. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa NO. 108 of 1996. http://www.info.gov.za/documents/ constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf (last accessed 4 of January, 2012). Government of Mozambique. Lei de Terras Lei n◦ 19/97 De 1 Outubro. http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/Legisla/legisSectores/agricultura/ LEI%20DE%20TERRAS.pdf (last accessed 4 of January, 2012).

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