Latin America: How much do the Chinese care?

S. FREDERICK D'IGNAZIO I I I AND DANIEL TRETIAK

Latin America: How Much Do the Chinese Care?

This paper examines Chinese interest toward Latin America over the period 1959-1970 by means of a quantitative analysis of the major Chinese international periodical Peking Review. The foci of Chinese interest varied during those years. Before the Cuban Revolution, the Chinese attempted to become familiar with Latin America by traveling to various countries there and by inviting Latin Americans of varying backgrounds to visit China. Concurre=tly, but independent of the success of the Cuban Revolution, China's relations with Latin America increased substantially. In certain respects, Chinese policy toward Latin America resembled that of the U.S.S.R., but unlike the Russians the Chinese encouraged Latin Americans to follow the Cuban example of launching ruralbased armed struggles in various countries. During ,the period 19581964, for example, the Chinese engaged with some success in "cultural diplomacy " in Latin America: trade relations increased sharply; contacts with non-Communists of various persuasions first widened, then narrowed; and efforts were made to influence several governments (Brazil, Mexico, and Chile) to establish diplomatic relations with China. The Chinese also cultivated groups advocating revolutionary change in Latin America. At first ,they attempted to work through

LATIN AMERICA:

H O W MUCH DO THE CHINESE CARE.9

37

existing Latin American Communist parties, but they found the parties overly responsive to Soviet policies in Latin America. Next, the C lfinese ,tried to work with the Castroite groups tha~ sprang up throughout Latin America in the early 1960s, but the Cubans and their Latin American followers promptly proved unwilling to accept w haft they saw as an effort to dominate their revolutionary aotivity. By 1965, Chinese a~tempts to match the Soviet Union and to cooperate (and at times apparently even to compete) with the Cubans had failed. As a result, China lost all but symbolic interest in Latin America, appearing to maintain good relations only with proChinese factions of otherwise pro-Soviet Communist parties, while criticizing the policies of both the Cubans (e.g., Che Guevara in Bolivia) and the Soviets (for trading wi~h and giving aid to Latin American non-Communist governments). As Chinese foreign policy emerged after the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1968), Latin America was the developing area slowest to benefit from a more accommodating Chinese foreign pokey.

Chinese Attentiveness to and Contacts with Latin America, 1959-1966 We shall Cry to assess Chinese attentiveness to Latin America by examining the amount of space devoted to this part of the world in the columns of the Peking Review, the most prominent o f Clduese pubhcations designed for circulation abroad. More specifically, we shall analyze ,the amount of press coverage given to revolutionary activity in Latin America, as well as to contacts between the Chin"ese and Latin Americans. Before presenting our data, however, we shall comment briefly on Chinese pohcy in Latin America during the 1950s. Until ,the Cuban Revolution in 1959, China's pohcies toward Latin America were similar to those followed by the U.S.S.R. : both major Communist powers were pursuing what might be called "cultural diplomacy "---a non-revolutionary foreign pohcy. The U.S.S.R. made efforts to improve its diplomatic and ~rade ties with the various L a t ~ American regimes, to promote contacts with Latin American ehtes, and to encourage the local Communigt parties to gain more mass support (especially among university students and trade unionists in urban areas). The opposition of the Sovietsupported Latin American Communist paledes and the U.S.S2~. itself to the status quo was often explicitly sta~ed, but it was essentially rhetorical after the downfall of the Guatemalan revolution in 19542 Chinese pohcy toward Latin America during this period coincided

38

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

with that of the Soviet Union. The Chinese sought to increase their contacts w i ~ Latin American elites, ,to raise their diplomatic and trade staVas in Latin America, and to improve their relations with and position among several Latin American Communist parties. Reports of Ghinese-La,tin American contacts rose sharply during the 1950s, peaking in 1960.1 Bu¢ this trend did not continue. As seen from Table 1 and Fig. 1) by 1966 there were only 33 percent as many I"AnLB 1.

ANNUAL CH]NF-.SE R I ~ F ~ C . E S TO LATIN AMERICA, REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA, CONTACTS B~['V¢][~ CHINESB AND LATIN AMERICANS, AND CHINESE DECISION'MAKER ACTIVITY WITH RESPECt TO LATIN AMERICA, 1959-1966; AND RELATED ANNUAL PERCENTAGES

Year

to Latin

% of

America~ Total

2959

References to References Revolu- % of Decision- % of to %of tionary Total maker Total Chinese Total Activity ~ Activitf Contacts4

References to

References

59 103 63 53 53 71 51 34

12 21 13 11 11 15 10 7

6

2½

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966

37 12 32 36 57 37 43

14 4 12~ 14 22 14 17

Total

487

100~

260

lO0~

35 64

8½

113 67

16 28 16½

50

12½

42 31

10it 7~

2 4o4

½ 100%

36 91 73 20 18 9 3 2 252

14 36 29 8 7

4 1 1 100~o

a That is, the number of articles in Peking Review which mention Latin America. b The number of references to "guerrilla warfare, .... armed struggle," and the like in Latin America. c The number of references to the activity of the eight top Chinese decisionmakers with respect to Latin America: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yi, P'eng Te-huai, Kuo Mo-jo, and Ch'u T'u-nan, Chairman of. the Chinese-Latin American Friendship Assoc!ation. ~ The number of contacts between Chinese and Latin Americans both in China and in Latin America. 1, According to William Ratliff, Chinese-Latin American contacts rose from 75:in the period'1953-1954, to 155 in 1955-1956, to 235 in 1957-1958, and to 900 in. 1959-1960. William RatlLff. "Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy Toward Latin America; 1949-1960," Hispanic-American Historical Rev~iew, XLLX, 1 ffebruary 1969),'pp. 57-5S. 2. The data for this Section are derived from Frederick D'Ignazio's senior honors thesis at Brown University, "Chinese--Latin American Relations: Policy

LATIN AMERICA" HOW MUCH DO THE CHINESE CARE?

,0] ~

,

39

Latin America .................... Revolutionary activity Contacts ' Deeisionmaker activity :

\

30

b

I

20

•

10

0 1959

/-

/

-,

1960

........ \..---'--a"

......... ~

1961

1962

............ -...

-...

..~...c'~.

1963

1964

""

1965

1966

Fig. I. Annual Percentages of Chinese References to Latin America, Revolutionary Activity in Latin America, Contacts Between Chinese and Latin Americans, and Chinese Deeisionmaker Activity with Respect to Latin America, 1959--1966.

references ¢o L a ~ America as there were in 1960. By contrast, the Peking Review reports a sharply rising amount of revolutionary activity in l_~tin America, reaching its peak in 1964. Yet Ghinese eo~taets with ~ America, after a hi'~h in 1960 and 1961, dwindled down to practically nothing by 1965 and 1966. Two alternative explanations can be offered for this behavior: first, that during this period the Chinese were s h i ~ n g from a relatively peaceful "cultural= diplomacy" phase to a revolutionary phase because they recognized the opportunities which " t h e rising tide of revolution" presented to them; and, second, that al,though Chinese policy may have been initially revolutionary (after the • Cuban, Revolution), i t became increasingly non-revolutionary after 1961 owing to setbacks received in imports.n.t areas.. China-watchers writing in the early 1960s felt ,that China's inter~¢~ in Latin America, as evidenced by contacts m a d e w i t h Latin:Americans and references to Latin Amexiea .in Chinese periodicals, was correlated with the rising tide of revolution which the Chin~,.0 perand Perceptions" (May 1970), which was based on an examination of every issue of the Peking Review from 1959 to 1966. : : , .

40

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE C O M M U N I S M

ceived in Latin America. 8 They paid more attention to the fiery quality of Chinese rhetoric (culminating with Lin Piao's "People's War" speech in 1965) than to the more substantive indicators such as the frequency and country concentration of references, and references to contacts and decisionmakor activity. Thus, as our indicators from the Peking Review show, China's "real interest" in Latin America (i.e., contaots with Latin Americans) declined aRer 1960." Chinese

TABLE 2. CHINESE

R~F.R~CE.S T O INDIVIDUAL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY, AND CONTACTS WITH CHINESE, 1959-1966

Country Cuba Brazil Venezuela Dominican Republic Chile Colombia Peru Panama Guatemala Ecuador . Argentina " Bolivia Nicaragua Mexico , , Paraguay Honduras

Total.

References to References to References to Individual % o f Revolutionary ~ o f to Contacts % o f Countries Total Activity Total with Chinese Total 167 70 32

35 15 6½

60 19 39

23 7½ 15

105 38 13

42 15 5

30 25 23 22 20 17 16 14 13 10 9 8 .7

6 5 5 4} 4 3} 3 3

1½..

11 6 30 26 2 24 12 6 3 9 1 8 4

4 2½ 11½ 10 1 9 4} 2} 1 3½ ½ 3 1½

3 20 5 9 4 7 6 12 13 3 6 5 3

1 8 2 4 2 3 2 5 5 1 2 2 1

lOO%

26o

100%

252

100%

~483

2}

2 2 , I}

3~ See, e.g.~ such sources as China Topics, YB 356 (IR-LA 3), December 1965; Dorothy Dillon, "International Communism and Latin America--Perspectives and Prospects," Latin American Monographs, Nos. 17-20 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1951-1962), p. vii; Joseph Lee, "Communist China's Latin American Policy," Asian Survey, IV, 11 ('November 1964); Rollie E. P6ppino, International Communism in Latin America (London: The Free Press ~of Glencoe, 1964); Shen-Yu Dai, "Sugar-Coated Bullets for Latin America," Current Scene, I, 21 (December 23, 1961). 4. D'Ignazio, op. cit., pp. 4-10, 23-39, 44-87, 132-174, Appendix; Michael Godley, "Peking's Employment of Informal Diplomacy---Some Reflections on a Neglected' Aspect of ~ Chinese Foreign Policy," unpublished manuscript, January 1969; Robert Blum, The'United Siates and China in World A~airs

41

LATIN AMERICA: HOW MUCH DO THE CHINESE CARE.9

real interest after 1960 lay in C u b a ; it was not c o r r e l a t e d with the rise of r e v o l u t i o n a r y activity in L a t i n A m e r i c a b u t with Ghinese C u b a n policy (see T a b l e s 2 a n d 3, showing o v e r w h e l m i n g Chinese p r e o c c u p a tion with Cuba).

TABLE 3. CHINESE REFERENCES TO CUBA AS A PERCENT OF ALL CHINESE REFERENCES TO LATIN AMERICA COMPARED WITH CHINESE CONTACTS WITH CUBA AS A PERCENT OF ALL C m N E S E CONTACTS W I T H LATIN AMERICA, 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 6

Cuban References

Cuban Contacts

Chinese Contacts with Cuba

Chinese Contacts with Latin America

Latin American Contacts

References to Cuba

References to Latin America

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966

18 38 34 26 24 17 6 4

59 103 63 53 53 71 51 34

31 37 54 49 45 24 12 12

7 32 34 12 12 5 1 2

36 91 73 20 18 9 3 2

19 35 41 60 67 56 33 I00

Total

167

487

--

105

252

--

Year

Latin American References

T h e success of the C u b a n R e v o l u t i o n , however, was n o t the only factor in C_he drastic a l t e r a t i o n of Chinese policies t o w a r d L a t i n A m e r i c a . T h e widening split between the U.S.S.R. a n d C h i n a from 1960 f o r w a r d was a n o t h e r such factor. A s the rift between C.he two nations e x t e n d e d to a g l o b a l level, the Soviet U n i o n was no longer willing to p r o v i d e the Chinese with an entree to L a t i n A m e r i c a n society, political figures, a n d local C o m m u n i s t parties. T h e Chinese, for t h e i r part, were no longer willing to s u b o r d i n a t e their goals in L a t i n A m e r i c a to Soviet goals, n o r to concede to the U.S.S.R. the (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); William E. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964--65 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), and The SinoSoviet Rift (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1964); Ernst Haiperin, "Peking and the Latin American Communists," China Quarterly, No. 29 (January-March 1967); Bruce D. Jackson, Castro, the Kremlin and Communism in Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969); Ratliff, op. cit.; Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, World Strength of Communist Party Organizations, 21st Annual Report, 1969 ed.

42

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE C O M M U N I S M

loyalty of Latin American Communist parties. Thus, the Chinese struck out on their own to wrest control of the Latin American Communist partie~ from the U.S.S.R., arguil~ that violent revolution was necessary in Latin America. They were unable to accomplish this goal, however, and after the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 they increasingly engaged in splittist politics, encouraging dissatisfied Communist Party members to leave pro-Soviet Party organizaC.ions and establish new ones ,that proclaimed allegiance to the Chinese. The Chinese ~nability to wean away Latin American Communists is suggested by the decline in visits by Latin American Communist Party delegations to China. In 1959 there were thirteen references ¢o Latin American Communi.'st Party "cultural missions" to Peking. In 1960, there were only four references. After 1960 there were praetieaUy none. Moreover, after 1960 there were few references to Latin American Communist parties at all. After the triumph of the Cuban Revolution and the rise of Fidel Castro in early 1959, ,the political situation in Latin America changed substantially. The change occurred in two stages. In the first, as the Cuban Revolution and its leaders turned to the left, they became ~the inspiration and ideal for Lafdn American nationalists and leftists. The Chinese quickly realized ~ a t the idealization of the revolution, and its catalytic effeot on leftist revolutionary groups, held profound significance for the Latin American revolutionary movement. Hence, they moved very early imo Cuba to see what part they could play in the continental revolutionary process, either in providing direction at the center (Havana) or in encouraging revolutionary activity in individual Latin American cotmtries. In turn, the Chinese 'hoped that the Cubans would help them gain more support from the pro-Soviet Communist parties in Latin America s; would lend support for Chinese global ideological and policy positions at international Communist conferences and meetings; and, failing that, would oppose Soviet positions or at least remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute. What the Chinese did not expect was the autonomy of the Cuban revolutionary nation-sta~e. This autonomy was due ¢o the leadership of Fidel Castro and to the unique appeal of the Cuban Revolution for L a ~ American leftist-nationalist groups. From 1959 on, Castro 5. Daniel Tretiak, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: The Growing Accommodation," Rand Memorandum RM-4935-PR (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, July 1966); Halperin, op. cil.; Jackson, op. cir.; A]nin Joxe, ".Sine-Soviet Dispute and Revolutionary Movements," in Claudio Veliz (ed.), Latin America and the Caribbean (New York: Pmeger, 1968); Lee Lockwood, Cash'o's Cuba, Cuba~s Fidel (New York: Vintage Books, 1969); Martin Kenner and James Petras (eds.), Fidel Castro Speaks (New York: Grove Press, 1969).

LATIN AMERICA: HOW MUCH DO THE CHINESE C_.ARE?

43

was determined not to allow .his movemem, and the forces that it unleashed, to be subordinated to or manipulated by another power, whether it be the United States, China, or the Soviet Union. The second and perhaps deci.~ive stage followed on the heels of the October 1962 missile crisis. Castro, intent upon reasserting his leadership among the Latin Amerieaa activist left a~ter the damaging missile episode, stepped up his efforts to promote the continer~tal revolution. But while Cuban policy during the initial part of the second stage seemed ¢o run parallel with Peking's mi].itant position, the Chinese had little suceess in gaining an influential role in the ~delista-sponsored revolutionary movement. In part this was attributable to the uniquely Latin American appeal of ]idelismo. Additionally, however, it was due to Havana's eventual rapprochement with Moscow, which signified Cuba's alignment with C.he latter in the Sine-Soviet dispute. This was signaled by Ca~'o's two visits to the U.S.S.R., in May 1963 and January 1964, and was confirmed by the November 1964 conference of Cuban, Soviet, and Latin American Communist represematives, which supported Moscow and the pro-Soviet Latin American Communist parties in their quarrel with Peld'ng. Hence, as Table 3 dramatically illustrates, there was a sharp falling off of Peking Review referenees to and contacts with Cuba in 1964 and ~hereafC~r. If the Chinese goals in Latin America (as translated through their relationship with the Cubans) depended on their suceess in gaining control of the real revolutionary movements, one would expeot them to show interest in areas of significant revolutionary activity and to establish contact with local revolutionary groups. From Fig. 1 above, however, one can see that the Chinese leaders' interest in and activity with respect to Latin America dropped at the very time they perceived revolutionary aotivity to be increasing .in the area. Likewise, it appears (see Table 2) that on a country-by-country basis ,there is little correlation between Chinese interest in Latin America and revolutionary activity in the area as the Chinese perceived it. The revolutionary activity is reported to have taken place mostly in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Guatemala (in that order); Chinese contacts were in Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Venezuela, it mig,h¢ be noted, is the only country on both lists; but while it accounted for 15 percent of revolutionary activity, Venezuela had only 5 percent of the contacts. Chinese interest in Latin America after 1960 focused on Cuba and was maintained only as long as the Chinese felt that they were influencing or had a reasonable chance to influence Cuban foreign policy vis-d-vis China itself, the Soviet Union, and Latin America, in that order. When Chinese polieymakers saw their, chances to influence Cuba rapidly fade, beginning .around 1963, they lost interest in Cuba,

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

44

and as a result in the rest of Latin America. By the time the Cultural Revolution began (1965-1966) the Chinese were at odds with the Cubans, and their interest in the rest of Latin America was negligible.

Chinese Policy T o w a r d Latin America, 1967-1970

Chinese policy toward Latin America during the period 19651970 was markedly different in substance and style from that of the U.S.S.R., which was quite flexible in certain respects. The U.S.S.R. began to have economic and diplomatic dealings with antiCommunist regimes after flae mid-1960s, and with such militarynationalist regimes as those in Peru and Bolivia in the late 1960s. Throughout this period, Soviet state-to-state relations were relatively normal not only with a number of Latin American governments hostile co Communist parties, but also with ones closely aligned with the United States (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela). The Chinese, on the other hand, theoretically and practicaUy demonstrated little if any tolerance or amity for any Latin American government, presumably as a resuk of the inward reorientation caused by the Cultural Revolution. Trade relations were kept at a minimum during .the Cultural Revolution, and no efforts were made to improve state-to-state relations. Of the Third World areas, Latin America as a whole received less attention than either Africa or Asia from mid-

TABLE

4.

CmNESE ATTENTION TO ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA,

Area

1966 Jan.- JulyJune Dec.

1967 1968 Jan.- July-- Jan.- JulyJune Dec. June Dec.

1966-1969

a

1969 Jan.- JulyJune Nov.

Asia

(excluding the Middle East) Africa Latin America

35.27 24.27 24-35 43.90 27.53 30"98 22.71 32.35 3.62 3.27 3.30 5.60 7.44 5.12 3.09 6.36 7.20 3.18 0.40 1.30 4.15 2.82 6.37 2.31

a This table is derived from data in D. Tretiak's article "Is China Preparing to 'Turn Out '? Changes in Chinese Levels of Attention to the International Environment," Asian Survey (March 1971), pp. 219-237. Figures are the percent of total attention over a six-month period to the international system devoted to each area. Totals amount to less than 100 percent because other categories are not included.

LATIN AMERICA: HOW MUCH DO THE CHINESE CARE.9

45

1966 to 1969, as Table 4 shows. For example, only during JanuaryJune 1969 was Chinese attention to Latin America gre~ter than its attention to Africa. As the 1960s drew to a close, Chinese lack of interest was evident in the fact that when milittary nationalist governments emerged in Peru (1968) and Bolivia (1969), the Chinese were reluctant to view these events favorably. Only in late 1970 did the flexibility characteristic of post-Cultural Revolution foreign policy begin to become manifest vis-a-vis Latin America, Chinese relations with Cuba warmed somewhat, and the Chinese responded favorably to the election of Salvador Allende as President of Chile. ° If the Chinese response to the events in Chile, and to a lesser extent in Bolivia, presages a new and more accommodating policy toward Latin American political and economic trends, such a development may mean ,that in some ways Chinese policy toward Latin America has gone full circle during the past fifteen years. China's initial efforts with respeot to Latin America were apparently aimed ~t attaining Latin American backing for the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China as the government of China, rather than at advocating radical changes in Latin America's political order. After the complex but essentially fruitless relationships which China attempted to develop during the 1959-1965 period, present Chinese policy may be a repetition of ~ha~ enunciated in the mid-1950s. However, in contrast to what occurred then, China's foreign policy toward Latin America today may meet with a responsive audience in several Latin American states. Trade and political relations are likely to develop with non-Communist governments and with Cuba. From 1965 to 1970, the Chinese stressed a policy line toward Latin America which emphasized the main elements of what might be called the Chinese model for revolution in the developing world: armed struggle launched in rural areas by men willing to be guided by Mao's thought in gaining peasant support for their effort. Nevertheless, as we have pointed out, despite their rhetoric, pro-Chinese Latin American Communists have been loath to launch rural-based struggle. Postscript

Since 1970, Chinese policy toward Latin America has fi~ed rather nearly into the general Chinese foreign policy pattern. China has successfully established diplomatic relations with several Latin 6. John Gittings, "The Road to Peking," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 31, 1970, p. 17.

46

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

American nations (Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Argentina--and barely missing with Bolivia) and has begun to redevelop trade relations with Brazil. Additionally, the Chinese have correctly sensed that the Latin Americans were angry at both the United States and the Soviet Union over the matter of fishing rights in their territorial waters. Hence, Ghina has ardently supported Latin American nations in their quarrels with both super-powers, undoubtedly gaining political capital in Latin America in the process. As for the Latin American pro-Peking Communist parties, they seem to have been virtually lost in the rearrangement of Peking's foreign-policy priorities. References in the Chinese media to their activities have dropped markedly in the past two years. In sum, the Chinese are evincing interest once again in advancing China's diplomatic, political, and economic---rather than revolutionary ---objeotives in Latin America. Cuba is no longer singled out for special treatment. The goals of Chinese foreign policy toward Latin America of the middle 1950s seem to be finally being realized in the early 1970s.

S. FREDERICK D'IGNAZIO III (M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy) is a law student at the Washington College of Law, American University, Washington D.C. DANIEL TRETIAK is Lecturer in Political Science at York University, Toronto, Canada. During the summer of 1971 he was a visiting Research Associate at Cornell University, working with the Project on the International Relations of East Asia. He has published extensively on various aspects of Chinese relations with Latin American, particularly Cuba. In early 1972, as co-chairman of the U.S. Committee for New China Policy, he traveled to the People's Republic of China. There, members of his delegation, as guests of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Atfairs--the first American group so honored--met with many Chinese officials, including Premier Chou En-lai.