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Law reports
252
Law
Reports
~eubn¢ Health
LAW REPORTS. HIGH
COURT
OF J U S T I C E .
KING'S BENCH DIVISION.
November llth, 1901. BEFORE THE LORD C H I E F JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE DARLING, AND ]~'R. JUSTICE CHANNELL. ~UEEN ANNE RESIDENTIAL MANSIONS AND HOTEL COMPANY V. MAYOR~ ETC., OF WESTMINSTER
Smoke-Nuisance--Public Health (London) Act, 1891. THERE were three summonses for separate alleged violations of th~ Act. The building consists of three hundred sets of residential chambers or flats, none of which is provided with a chimney, there being a general kitchen in which all the cooking is done for the residents. There is a general dining-room in which the residents m a y have their meals instead of in their own rooms. In the basement there are five boilers used for generating steam, for cooking in the kitchen, for warmi~ag the building, for generating electricity for lighting, and also for the laundry. The boilers are connected with a chimney 168 feet high. On behalf of the appellants it was contended that no offence had been committed under Section 24 of the Act, the chimney being the chimney of a private dweUing-house. Every reasonable precaution had been taken to prevent any black smoke being emitted, but this, the respondent said, formed no defence to their action. The magistrate held, as a mixed question of law and fact, that the chimney was not the chimney of a private dwelling, and he ordered the appellants to pay a fine of £5 and £5 5s. costs on the first summons, and a fine of 10s. on each of the other two summonses, and the question for the court was whether this decision was correct in law. The court dismissed the appeal with costs, looking at the fact that there were three hundred fiats with five boilers in the basement for electric lighting, cooking, warming, and other purposes for the benefit of the residents in these fiats, and that, in truth, a large trade establishment was carried on, the decision of the magistrate was right.
November 22nd, 1901. SMITH V. WISDEN AND OTHERS.
Glucose in Marmalade--Appeal allowed--Conviction quashed~ This was an appeal by Mr. George Smith, a grocer, from the confirmation by the Horsham Quarter Sessions of a conviction under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 a~ad 39 Viet., e. 63), Section 6, whereby the appellant was convicted of selling, to the prejudice of the purchaser, a pot of marmalade which contained 13 per cent. of starch glucose, and which was not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded. I t was proved before the Court of Quarter Sessions that starch
January. 1902~
Law Reports
253
glucose is composed of 40 per cent. of dextrose, 40 per cent. of dextrine, and 20 per cent. of water. That dextrose is sugar to all intents and purposes. That dextrine is a gummy substance and has not any sweetening property whatever, and is a substance largely used for the gumming of labels and other similar purposes. That glucose, though classed as a sugar for purposes of taxation, was not a sugar as understood by the general public. I t was proved that glucose had been used in the manufacture of marmalade (for a period which commenced fifteen years before the date of this case) by a large number of manufacturers, but was not so used by all and never has been used by all. That there was a general and common understanding that~ marmalade, was a preserve composed of fruit boiled with cane or beet sugar, but that there was no legal standard for the making of marmalade and that manufacturers v~ried in the recipes they used. Tha~ the use of glucose to the extent contained in the analysed article was not injurious to health. That the use of glucose prevented the marmalade from crystallizing and had a tendency to prevent mildewing and fermenting. The LOaD CHIEF JUSTICE,in giving judgment, said he had arrived at the conclusion that there was no evidence in support of the magistrates' decision in reference to one of the points it involved. As to what the respondent asked for they were precluded from considering by the finding of Quarter Sessions, and he could only say he should not have come to the same conclusion--viz., that when a man asked for marmalade he thought he was going to obtain only oranges and sugar--because there were a number of other ingredients which might very properly be put into it. He thought, however, that in order to support this conviction the magistrates must go further, and there must be evidence not only that the article was not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded, but that it was to the prejudice of the purchaser to sell it to him. Looking at this matter fairly, and not seeking to construe this Act as a weapon of oppression or otherwise than as a protection of the purchaser, it appeared to him that the respondent got an article which, if it was different at all, was different in that it was rather better. He agreed that if they thought the magistrates had come to the conclusion from general experience, based on their own knowledge, they ought not to interfere, but he thought from the way they had stated the case they desired to have the opinion of the court upon the question of whether, upon the facts stated, they might come to the conclusion they did. I n his judgment there was no evidence of any inferior quality or adulteration in the ordinary sense of the word, and the appeal ought to be allowed and the conviction quashed. Mr. JUSTICE DARr.ING and Mr. JUSTICE CHANNELLconcurred. Conviction quashed.
November 20th, 1901. PEAlgt~S, GUNSTON AND TEE (LIMITED) V. RICHARDSON.
Im2ro2er Service of Summer,s. The appellants were summoned at Canterbury under Sections 3 and 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, for offences in connection with the sale of butter. They are a limited joint-stock company incorporated under the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1898, with a registerea
2 54
Law
Reports
~P~bncHeath
office at 6, Bayer Street, Golden Lane, in the City of London. I n the present instances the summonses were served to the appellants' assistant at their premises in Canterbury. The LOl~D CHIEF JUSTICE, in giving judgment, said it seemed to him in the absence of legislation or rules upon the subject that the service of a summons on a corporation under the Companies Acts should be in accordance with Section 69 of the Companies Act, 1362. He thought it was not immaterial to note that in the case of friendly societies a special power was given by the Friendly Societies Act, 1896, permitting service at a branch office. It seemed quite clear that both in the Superior Court and the County Court a writ must be served in the way indicated in Section 62. H e saw no reason why, in criminal proceedings, there should be a more lax rule than in civil proceedings. He thought, therefore, that the point taken was good, and that the summons had not been properly served. H e was also of opinion ~hat when a person attended before the magistrates to bring to their notice an irregularity - - w h i c h he need not have done--aud ~hen withdrew from the case, that could not constitute an appearance, and did not waive the irregularity in the service of the summons. Mr. 5USTICE DARLI~ and ~[r. JusTICE C~A~NEr~n concurred, and the appeal was allowed. T H E " C H L O R O S " CASE. To THE EDITOR OF " PUBLIC HEALTH."
Sll~, We beg to point out a sentence in your law report onpage 190 of ~he December number of PUBLIC tIEALTH which conveys a false impression. The report says: " I t was admitted that the United Alkali Company had no monopoly in the word ' Chloros,' and that if the defendants made it they could legally sell it." Now this fact was never admitted by the United Alkali Company. The right to use the word " C h l o r o s " for any disinfectant appertains solely to the United Alkali Company, and may not be used by anyone else. Sodium hypoehlorite, however, in~ solution testing less thau 5 per cent. available chlorine, is a chemical common to the world, and may therefore be manufactured and sold by anyone as sodium hypochlorite, but not as " Chloros." Further, if anyone succeeds in producing sodium hypoehlorite in solution testing even 10 per cent: available chlorine, he may not sell it under the name of " Chloros." Yours truly, ~[AX ~ U SPI{ATT, For the United Alkali Co., Ltd.
30, James Street, Liverpool, D e c e m b e r 1 8 t h , 1901.
REVIEWS. SANITATION IN THE UNITED STATES. By Charles V. Chapin, Superintendent of Health of the City of Providence. P. S. King and Son, Westminster, 1901. Price £1 5s. This is a ponderous volume of 970 pages, devoted to a description of the details of sanitary administration in different parts of the United States. I t is, as the author says, not so much intended to advise what I~UNICIPAL
Law
Reports
~eubn¢ Health
LAW REPORTS. HIGH
COURT
OF J U S T I C E .
KING'S BENCH DIVISION.
November llth, 1901. BEFORE THE LORD C H I E F JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE DARLING, AND ]~'R. JUSTICE CHANNELL. ~UEEN ANNE RESIDENTIAL MANSIONS AND HOTEL COMPANY V. MAYOR~ ETC., OF WESTMINSTER
Smoke-Nuisance--Public Health (London) Act, 1891. THERE were three summonses for separate alleged violations of th~ Act. The building consists of three hundred sets of residential chambers or flats, none of which is provided with a chimney, there being a general kitchen in which all the cooking is done for the residents. There is a general dining-room in which the residents m a y have their meals instead of in their own rooms. In the basement there are five boilers used for generating steam, for cooking in the kitchen, for warmi~ag the building, for generating electricity for lighting, and also for the laundry. The boilers are connected with a chimney 168 feet high. On behalf of the appellants it was contended that no offence had been committed under Section 24 of the Act, the chimney being the chimney of a private dweUing-house. Every reasonable precaution had been taken to prevent any black smoke being emitted, but this, the respondent said, formed no defence to their action. The magistrate held, as a mixed question of law and fact, that the chimney was not the chimney of a private dwelling, and he ordered the appellants to pay a fine of £5 and £5 5s. costs on the first summons, and a fine of 10s. on each of the other two summonses, and the question for the court was whether this decision was correct in law. The court dismissed the appeal with costs, looking at the fact that there were three hundred fiats with five boilers in the basement for electric lighting, cooking, warming, and other purposes for the benefit of the residents in these fiats, and that, in truth, a large trade establishment was carried on, the decision of the magistrate was right.
November 22nd, 1901. SMITH V. WISDEN AND OTHERS.
Glucose in Marmalade--Appeal allowed--Conviction quashed~ This was an appeal by Mr. George Smith, a grocer, from the confirmation by the Horsham Quarter Sessions of a conviction under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 a~ad 39 Viet., e. 63), Section 6, whereby the appellant was convicted of selling, to the prejudice of the purchaser, a pot of marmalade which contained 13 per cent. of starch glucose, and which was not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded. I t was proved before the Court of Quarter Sessions that starch
January. 1902~
Law Reports
253
glucose is composed of 40 per cent. of dextrose, 40 per cent. of dextrine, and 20 per cent. of water. That dextrose is sugar to all intents and purposes. That dextrine is a gummy substance and has not any sweetening property whatever, and is a substance largely used for the gumming of labels and other similar purposes. That glucose, though classed as a sugar for purposes of taxation, was not a sugar as understood by the general public. I t was proved that glucose had been used in the manufacture of marmalade (for a period which commenced fifteen years before the date of this case) by a large number of manufacturers, but was not so used by all and never has been used by all. That there was a general and common understanding that~ marmalade, was a preserve composed of fruit boiled with cane or beet sugar, but that there was no legal standard for the making of marmalade and that manufacturers v~ried in the recipes they used. Tha~ the use of glucose to the extent contained in the analysed article was not injurious to health. That the use of glucose prevented the marmalade from crystallizing and had a tendency to prevent mildewing and fermenting. The LOaD CHIEF JUSTICE,in giving judgment, said he had arrived at the conclusion that there was no evidence in support of the magistrates' decision in reference to one of the points it involved. As to what the respondent asked for they were precluded from considering by the finding of Quarter Sessions, and he could only say he should not have come to the same conclusion--viz., that when a man asked for marmalade he thought he was going to obtain only oranges and sugar--because there were a number of other ingredients which might very properly be put into it. He thought, however, that in order to support this conviction the magistrates must go further, and there must be evidence not only that the article was not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded, but that it was to the prejudice of the purchaser to sell it to him. Looking at this matter fairly, and not seeking to construe this Act as a weapon of oppression or otherwise than as a protection of the purchaser, it appeared to him that the respondent got an article which, if it was different at all, was different in that it was rather better. He agreed that if they thought the magistrates had come to the conclusion from general experience, based on their own knowledge, they ought not to interfere, but he thought from the way they had stated the case they desired to have the opinion of the court upon the question of whether, upon the facts stated, they might come to the conclusion they did. I n his judgment there was no evidence of any inferior quality or adulteration in the ordinary sense of the word, and the appeal ought to be allowed and the conviction quashed. Mr. JUSTICE DARr.ING and Mr. JUSTICE CHANNELLconcurred. Conviction quashed.
November 20th, 1901. PEAlgt~S, GUNSTON AND TEE (LIMITED) V. RICHARDSON.
Im2ro2er Service of Summer,s. The appellants were summoned at Canterbury under Sections 3 and 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, for offences in connection with the sale of butter. They are a limited joint-stock company incorporated under the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1898, with a registerea
2 54
Law
Reports
~P~bncHeath
office at 6, Bayer Street, Golden Lane, in the City of London. I n the present instances the summonses were served to the appellants' assistant at their premises in Canterbury. The LOl~D CHIEF JUSTICE, in giving judgment, said it seemed to him in the absence of legislation or rules upon the subject that the service of a summons on a corporation under the Companies Acts should be in accordance with Section 69 of the Companies Act, 1362. He thought it was not immaterial to note that in the case of friendly societies a special power was given by the Friendly Societies Act, 1896, permitting service at a branch office. It seemed quite clear that both in the Superior Court and the County Court a writ must be served in the way indicated in Section 62. H e saw no reason why, in criminal proceedings, there should be a more lax rule than in civil proceedings. He thought, therefore, that the point taken was good, and that the summons had not been properly served. H e was also of opinion ~hat when a person attended before the magistrates to bring to their notice an irregularity - - w h i c h he need not have done--aud ~hen withdrew from the case, that could not constitute an appearance, and did not waive the irregularity in the service of the summons. Mr. 5USTICE DARLI~ and ~[r. JusTICE C~A~NEr~n concurred, and the appeal was allowed. T H E " C H L O R O S " CASE. To THE EDITOR OF " PUBLIC HEALTH."
Sll~, We beg to point out a sentence in your law report onpage 190 of ~he December number of PUBLIC tIEALTH which conveys a false impression. The report says: " I t was admitted that the United Alkali Company had no monopoly in the word ' Chloros,' and that if the defendants made it they could legally sell it." Now this fact was never admitted by the United Alkali Company. The right to use the word " C h l o r o s " for any disinfectant appertains solely to the United Alkali Company, and may not be used by anyone else. Sodium hypoehlorite, however, in~ solution testing less thau 5 per cent. available chlorine, is a chemical common to the world, and may therefore be manufactured and sold by anyone as sodium hypochlorite, but not as " Chloros." Further, if anyone succeeds in producing sodium hypoehlorite in solution testing even 10 per cent: available chlorine, he may not sell it under the name of " Chloros." Yours truly, ~[AX ~ U SPI{ATT, For the United Alkali Co., Ltd.
30, James Street, Liverpool, D e c e m b e r 1 8 t h , 1901.
REVIEWS. SANITATION IN THE UNITED STATES. By Charles V. Chapin, Superintendent of Health of the City of Providence. P. S. King and Son, Westminster, 1901. Price £1 5s. This is a ponderous volume of 970 pages, devoted to a description of the details of sanitary administration in different parts of the United States. I t is, as the author says, not so much intended to advise what I~UNICIPAL