Leadership drift in Hungary: Empirical observations on a normative concept∗

IVAN VOLCYES

Leadership

Drift in Hungary:

Observations

Teacher: “Who Bqx

on a Normative

is your mother,

“Th e party,

comrade

Empirical Concept*

little boy?”

teacher.”

Teacher: “And who is your father, little boy?” Boy: “Our

beloved comrade

Teacher: “Very

Kadar,

comrade

teacher.”

good, little boy, but tell me, what do you want to be when you grow

up?”

Boy: “An orphan,

comrade

teacher.”

The joke is old; indeed, it has been repeated in Eastern Europe with some modification ever since the reign of the late Emperor Franz Josef. While the joke is old, its poignancy has not been lost through the transmogrification of long lines of Hungarian leaders that extended from the honorable but hapless Count Mihaly Karolyi, the ruthless but idealistic Bela Kun, the ever-changing, but continuously authoritarian Admiral Miklos

Horthy, the sadistic murderer, Ferenc Szalasi, and the “finest student of Stalin,” the truly hated dictator, Matyas Rakosi. It also applies to the rule ofJanos Kadar as well, a reign that lasted from November 1956 to May 1988. The story implies the acceptance of both an authoritarian leadership and the rightfulness of pare&&m. Hungarians regard the acts of a strong leader attempting to enforce well-delineated goals as an expected pattern of behavior, just as they reserve for themselves the ultimate right to judge the success or failure of leadership. A leader who has managed to achieve a string of successes, receives the active, or at least the tacit, support of the population, even ifhe has been regarded initially as a traitor: witness the examples of Franz Josef or Janos Kadar. Alternatively, a leader who destroys values held dear by the populace can be unceremoniously Rakosi, and, lately, Janos Kadar.

cast off: witness the fate of Bela Kun,

Matyas

The acceptance of a strong leadership role played by the “elect, ” the “tyrant, ” or the “Maximum Leader” in Hungary is a part of the political culture of authoritarianism, part of a modified “semi-social” contract. Nonetheless, Hungarians demand the leader actually lead the nation, giving clear directions, choosing alternatives, outlining options andplans, and setting goals. While the population may not agree with the goals outlined by the leaders, it feels that the normative mandate of the elite is to give these directions. Communist elitesclaiming that they alone have the key to success contained in the correct interpretation of Communist ideology-generally succeeded in providing that needed sense of direction. The concept of the drift-implying a lack of direction-therefore, is inimical to the basic conception of Communist rule. The present article deals with the contradiction between the principle of active * The author would like to thank Dr. Gyorgy

an earlier draft.

STUDIESIN COMPARATIVE 0039-3592/89/01

COMMUNISM,

0023-19 $03.00 0

Enyedi and Dr. Robert L. Hutchings for their comments on

VOL. XXII,

1989 U nwersity

No. 1, SPRING1989, 23-41 of Southern

California

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

24

Communist leadership as justified in Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the reality of the political drift in Hungary, a political drift that continues even after the dramatic personnel changes of May 1988. Th us, it matches a normative concept, e.g. centrally controlled

and directed

rule,

against

an empirical

reality,

e.g.

the drift so clearly

observable among the top elites in contemporary Hungary.’ Part 1 of this article deals with the theory of centralized leadership in Communist ideology and the resultant praxis; part 2 analyzes the emergence and sources of leadership drift in the twilight of the Kadar era; part 3 examines the types of drifts observable in contemporary Hungary; part 4 analyzes the influence of the USSR on the drifts and cleavages; while part 5 delineates the cleavages that are notable among the leadership. The final part of this study offers some conclusions concerning the possible and potential consequences of the existence

of these drifts.

Communist Communist

Ideology

and Leadership

ideology has long vested the Communist

stitution theory, eventually, the single leader-with needs to be followed. Who else:

party-and defining

through Lenin’s

sub-

the course of action that

could possibly be better fitted for that role than the Communist Party, the avantgarde of the working class, its outspoken defender and its most outspoken segment, the repository of the revelation recorded in the Marxist classics and the tradition of the workers’ struggle towards their present state of socialism?’ Interpreting the events of the moment and evaluating the necessities for the future, it is the party alone that is entrusted with a monopolistic leadership role.3 By relying on the “correct ” interpretation of history through the looking glass of Marxism-Leninism, the decisions made by the party are binding on society not merely because they are “classical examples of the application of Marxist-Leninist theory to life,” but also “because they are the resulting creative advancement of Marxist-Leninist theory.“4 1. The author is keenly aware of the level of analysis problem of this article. Indeed, proper methodology does not seem to exist to analyze the relationship between normative expectation (“leading role ofthe party”) and empirically observable behavior (“the drift”). While the divergence between expectation and behavior can be observed, value-free analysis would require that such observances be tested against a wide variety of normative concepts (levels of expected performance matched against mandated theoretical considerations as emanating from the abstract role of the party), and matched against the unit of analysis (elite or leadership strictly or broadly defined). For some classical leadership studies see J. M. Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); L. J. Edinger, “The Comparative Analysis of Political Leadership,” in Comparative Politics, 3 (1975), 275-69; A. Gouldner, Studies in Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1950); Chung-do Hah and Frederick Bartol, “Political Leadership as a Causative Phenomenon,” World Politics, (1983), 100-120; G. D. Paige, The Scientific Study ofPolitical Leadership (New York: The Free Press, 1977). For studies of comparative Communist leadership see interalia such early and ground-breaking works as Carl Beck, Frederick Fleron, Milton Lodge, Derek Wailer, William Welsh, and M. George Zaninovich, Comparative Communist Political Leadership (New York: David McKay, 1973). Cf. George Schueller, The Politburo (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1951); Jerome Davis, “A Study of 163 Outstanding Communist Leaders,” in Publications ofthe American Sociological Society, May (1930); Robert Bass, “East Daniel Kubat, “Patterns of European Communist Elites,” Journal ofInternational Aflairs, 1 (1966), 101-17; Leadership in a Communist State-Czechoslovakia,” Journal ofCentral European A#airs (October 1961), 305-18; R. Barry Farrell, ed., Political Leadership inEastern Europeandthe Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine, 1969); and Hugh &on-Watson, “The Soviet Ruling Class,” Problems ofCommunism (May-June 1956), 10-16. 2. George H. Hampsch, The Theory ofCommunism (New York: The Citadel Press, 1965), p. 80. 3. V. I. Lenin, “Ekonomicheskoe soderzhanie narodnichestva i kritika ego v knige g. Shtruve,” P&m Sobranie Sochinenii (Moscow: Gos. Izd.-vo Pol. Lit.-ri, 1960), v. 1, pp. 347-534, esp. 349. 4. For the extremist interpretation expressed in the USSR see V. I. Lenin, “Edinstvo teorii i praktiki,” Voprosy Fikzofii, 2 (1954), p. 5.

25

Leadership Drift in Hungary

Enhanced through such tactical tools as “democratic centralism,” the party achieves a monopolistic “leading role”; in essence, it excludes other organizations from playing leadership roles and reduces all other organizations to “transmission-belts” of the party.5 The party supervises, controls, abolishes, or reorganizes them at will. To put it in Western political science terms, in the somewhat outdated Estonian jargon the Communist party reserves for itself the output, input, and feedback functions as well. The theoretical leading role of the Hungarian Communist party was codified relatively early in the dogmatic formulation of Matyas Rakosi: “the party is the leading and monopolistic organ of proletarian rule.“6 It was this philosophy also that was followed by Janos

Kadar when he helped found the Hungarian

Socialist Workers’

Party

on November 1, 1956; ideologically and theoretically, the concept of the leading role of the party has yet to be altered. Per definiendum, the Communist party of Hungary and its elite continue to act as the leader of the Hungarian polity. The party reserves the right to make the final decisions, to select the leadership without regard to popular sentiments, and to establish the rules of the game; in short, it insists on retaining its theoretical leading and power-monopolistic role. As Janos Kadar, during the critical September, 1987, session of Parliament, declared, almost in an offhand, tragicomic manner: “Perhaps, the Comrades think that I am the one who is responsible for what has happened in Hungary [lately], b ecause I have been here for the longest time? Well, then, obviously I am.‘17 We would be remiss if we failed to note the many attacks on the principle of the unbridled rule of the party and its leadership that have taken place during the last decade. In fact, critics have mounted a continuous onslaught on the monopolistic practices of the party, advocating policies that would render the party merely a dispenser of general guidelines, rather than the controller and operator of everything. In contrast to earlier times when the party’s central “function was to assure the stability of reformers argue-the party should be content the regime, ” in a modern society-the with playing a peripheral, guiding role: that of being the “integrator of differentiated demands emanating from society.“s As the reform advocates maintain, the party should continue to play a leading role, but not the only leading and operational role; in fact, they insist that the party must accept a diluted role if it is to survive at all. While the reformers’ critique of the leading role of the party has been openly evident for some time, it is equally obvious that most of the party elite, certainly the vast majority of its true powerholders, has yet to give up on the theoretical correctness of monopolistic interpretations of party leadership. It stubbornly clings to outmoded normative formulations, even as empirical evidence demonstrates that the party has for 5. V. I. Lenin,

“The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky’s Mistakes,” in Collective Works Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960-), v. 32, pp. 19-43, esp. 42, Selected Works (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1943), v. IX, p. 6. 6. Matyas Rakosi, “Partunk a dolgozo nep elen,” Valogatott beszedek es cikkek (Budapest: Szikra, 1950), p. 418; cf. “A Part: elcsapat!“, SzabadNep (April 18, 1948). 1. 7. Widely reported and documented by both Western and samizdat sources: see Laszlo Kasza, “Utoirat,” Irodalmi Ujq, 4 (1987), 2. Interestingly, during the party conference of May 20-22, 1988, while speaker after speaker castigated the party leadership for not acting on crucial problems, no one directly blamed Kadar. In fact, all elderly Politburo members, only Gyorgy Aczel exercised self-criticism for the errors of the leadership. It was probably due to that self-criticism that--unlike most of his fellow gerontocrats-he was able to retain at least his Central Committee seat. Nepszabadsag (May 21, 23), 1988. This situation changed dramatically in February, 1989, when Kadar’s responsibility for the political failures ofthe last decades began to be openly aired. See Istvan Tamas, “Mit Mond Kadar Janos?” Elet a Zroaidom, February 3, 1989, p. 3. 8. Imre Pozsgay, “Gondolatok a part szereperol politikai rendszerunkben,” Politikatudomanyi tanulmanyok (Budapest: Kossuth, 1981), pp. 125, 133 resp. (Moscow:

of

26

STUDIESIN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

many years failed to exercise such leadership functions. It has been adrift for nearly a decade. It is adrift still-even after the dramatic party conference of May, 1988, that swept away the entire Kadar team. The Sources of Leadership Drift To put it simply, the current

drift in the top leadership

stems from the devolution

of

power-sometimes intentional but more often not-that has taken place in Hungary since 1968, when the Hungarian leadership began to implement the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), otherwise known as “the reform. ” Being careful not to present the NEM as an alternative “model” to Soviet development, Kadar and his cohorts had initiated and carried through a set of reform measures with three objectives: (1) to decentralize, and hence modernize, Hungary’s economy; (2) to harness private economic activities without depoliticize societal affairs.

their

threatening

the primacy

of the state;

There is lively debate concerning the very existence of a “blueprint” The reform plan, as we know it today, was drafted originally in 1966-67

and (3) to

for the NEM. as the result of

a large team effort by reform and working groups established after the 1965 party decision concerning the necessity of economic renewal. While accepted in principle, the draft engendered such opposition that the reformers were told not to expect a quick and general introduction of the reform measures, but rather a piecemeal and gradual introduction. Moreover, in 1978, a further blueprint for the “second wave” of the reform wascproduced by the Institute for Coordination and Market Research (KOPINT). In neither case, however, was the blueprint a theoretical document, delineating the ideological elements of envisioned change, nor did they use the term “model,” for that would have presented a challenge to the “universal validity” of the Soviet model.g Especially in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Hungarian policymakers were wary of giving the Soviets any pretext for opposing domestic changes in Hungary and, consequently, until 1980 all of these blueprints dealt only with economic matters without discussing the impact of alteration on the political structures. Although carried out in fits and starts, with frequent halts and temporary retreats, the NEM attained many of its original goals. Most significantly, it created the most liberal Communist economic system, provided the highest level of living, infused increased technical competence as a requirement for economic management positions, and allowed the emergence of one of the most tolerant political systems in Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, the people of Hungary, traumatized by the failure of the 1956 revolution and conscious of the NEMs success relative to the economic performance in the surrounding states of the region, generally approved “the reform.” The economic successes attained by the regime were not only due, however, to the leadership of Kadar and the policies advocated by him and his cohorts. They were also due to the enormous amount of money available on the world market, loaned to nations 9. The recent pronouncements of Soviet leaders from Gorbachev to Bogomolov and Gerasimov indicate that the current Soviet leadership has grave doubts on the “universal validity” of the Soviet model. They seem to suggest that the fault for that “deformation” lies with Stalin who automatically translated “the leading role ofthe CPSU into the realities ofthe 3rd International,” and subsequently into the East European experience. Cf. Martin Sieff, “Soviets’ New Socialism Seen Freeing East Bloc,” Washingk Times uuly 8, 1988), and “Political and Economic Development of East European Countries and East-West Relations: Soviet Viewpoint,” prepared by the Institute for International Relations (Moscow), esp. p. 5.

Leadership Drift in Hungary

27

at rates that were expected to remain very low in an inflation-ridden world. Taking place at a time when world trade processes were very favorable to Hungary, the enormous rise in the level of living for the citizenry did not demand a real restructuring of Hungary’s economy, nor did it demand a wise use of resources borrowed from abroad. From the beginning of 1975, however, Hungary largely squandered the some twenty billion US dollars it borrowed, and managed to attain the largest per capita foreign indebtedness in communist Europe; by 1988, some 80 percent of all foreign export earnings had to be utilized for the simple repayment of interests on loans obtained from the West. The much needed economic restructuring and modernization were not achieved; in fact, state subsidies, largely eliminated from the resurrected consumer market, continued to increase to factories operating with losses! Hungary was tied to COMECON, an economic alliance system whose very existence, outdated production and trade policies, were to a very large extent, systemic causes of the abruptly developing economic crisis. lo Unable to stop producing technological white elephants for COMECON, the industrial, subsidized sector remained dominant. Restricted by the export policies of the Common Market, Hungary could not compete successfully in Western markets. The microchip-technological revolution bypassed Hungary, and, as far as its state economy was concerned, the country remained a largely backward, Soviet-type socialist system. To put it succinctly, the net results of the last ten years of Kadar’s economic policies were (1) a semi-market/semi-socialist economy characterized by constant scarcities; (2) a rate of inflation that is estimated to have halved the average buying power of the citizen between 1980 and 1988; (3) a net Western debt of some US$13 billion;” (4) a huge deficit in terms of trade with the West; and (5) a budget deficit of some 50 billion forints in 1986 (some of which is expected to be made up from the most restrictive income policies and value-added tax in existence in any of the socialist states). Even after the implementation of a major austerity program, entering the ninth year of the “seven-lean-year” period, Hungary’s leaders seemed to have lost both their ability to envision and implement an economic recovery program and the confidence of the people that the leaders actually know what they are doing. In the political arena, the NEM was accompanied by both a general depoliticization of daily life and the reduction of the party’s highly elitist structure; in a sense Kadar’s 1961 policies that welcomed participation by those who were not openly against the party, suggested a national effort at reconciliation. As the standard of living noticeably improved, as goods began to fill the stores, as greater freedom was given to the population, and as greater privatization and secondary activities characterized the polity, people began to concede a grudging political acquiescence to the party’s right to rule. Group interests and interest groups began to appear, representing diverse social and economic concerns; a budding pluralism could be witnessed. 10. See especially the ground-breaking works ofJanos Kornai, notably: A hiany (Budapest: Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado [hereafter KJK] 1980); Elfentmondasok es dilemmak (Budapest: Magveto, 1985); Antiequilibrium (Budapest: KJK, 1971); and “A hiany magyarazo szereperol, ” Kozpdasagi Szemle, 2 (1985). Cf. Mihaly Bihar-i, A politikai rendszeres a szocialista demokracia (Budapest: Politikatudomanyi Fuzetek, 1986), and “Politikai rendszer es innovacio,” Szakszeruezeti Szemle, 7 (1985). Cf. Ivan Peto and Sandor Szakacs, A hazai gazdasagnegy eutizedenektortmete, 1945-1985(Budapest: KJK, 1985); inter&a Ivan T. Berend, “AZ elmult negy evtized a magyar tortenelemben,” V&sag, 1 (1985), and Mihaly Laki,” Kenyszeritett motivacio,” Szociologia, 1-2 (1984-1985), etc. 11. Karoly Grosz, Nepszabadsag (September 17, 1987).

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

28

One of the elements of this pluralism can be called “apparatus-pluralism,” and it resulted in “separate deals” between the apparats and central power. It consisted of the development of plural or multiple apparatuses, some of which-for example, those attached to the financial institutions-supported reforms, while others-for example, those attached to the Ministries of Culture, Industry, or Health-opposed many of the reforms. Another element of pluralism emerged in the development of political representation and was manifest in such forms as the Parliament or the Central Committee. And still another type of pluralism can be seen in the emergence of extralegal or illegal organizations. In all these instances, however, the party grudgingly conceded some rights to organizations (official and unofficial) to aggregate, and to articulate some diverse interests. The Patriotic People’s Front, the Danube Club, the Democratic Forum, the Union of Free Democrats, the Smallholders Party, the Society to Protect the Poor (SzETA), the Kossuth Club, the independent trade unions, the FIDESz, etc., made their appearance as alternative sources of political interest aggregation. In other words, the devolution of some power by the party in the societal sphere has taken place. While the logical conclusion of such a devolution is the diminution of political power, the party elite so far has been afraid of taking that much needed step because the very tendency toward pluralism by the mid-1980s ran smack into the resistance of the party apparat against undertaking further reforms. The demands of the opposition-ranging from the “loyal opposition within the party” to the “dissidents’‘-extended from a plaintive cry for a simple change at the helm all the way to demands for free trade unions and even a multiparty system. l2 The party leadership, however, has been unable to move decisively on most of these demands; it has simply contented itself with providing largely symbolic measures, rather than undertaking in one quick move the much needed extensive reform measures. To put it even more strongly: the party leadership could not move back and would not move forward in a decisive manner. Hence, the drift in political leadership. Finally, on the social front, other sources of the drift in leadership capacity can also be noted. Hungarian society, as noted above, took advantage of the greater freedoms availed to it by the party; it privatized itself to a degree paralleled in Eastern Europe only in Poland. People took on second and third jobs, built their own apartments, and arranged their own affairs through the extensive network of the “second society” and Not only did these developments create a plurality of the “second economy.“13 economic interests, they also created new social cleavages and deepened public alienation. By 1985 Hungary had the highest suicide rate in the world, and scored extremely high on such other negative social indices as heart attacks for active males, divorce, alcoholism, etc. As the lean years began to be leaner still, visible signs of poverty (the homeless,

beggars,

etc.) appeared

in noticeable

numbers,

and by 1988 at

12. Ford&t es Reform, Javaslat a nyilvanossag ~eforn~ara (Recommendations, prepared at the request of so&Political Council of the Patriotic Peoples Front, Budapest, 1986-7), and “Tarsadalmi szerzodes,” Beszelo (June,

1987).

V&sag, 1 (1979); 13. See especially the works of Istvan R. Gabor, “A masodik (masodlagos) gazdasag,” Valosag, 2 (1985), and “Reformok, masodik gazdasag, allamszocializmus,” Valosag, 7 “Masodik gazdasag,” V&sag, 12 (1979); Terez Laky, “AZ uj gazdalkodasi (1986); Sandor Erdelyi, “A masodlagos elosztasrol,” in Munka-g~dasag-tarsadalom (Budapest: MSzMP formak es az illegalis (masodik) gazdasag,” Valosag, 7 (1987); Tibor Tarsadalomtudomanyi Intezet, 1985). and “Eloszlott mitoszok, tetova szandekok,” V&sag, 7 (1987). For the second society see the ground-breaking, brilliant Ku&, “A masodik gazdasag,” studies of Elemer Hankiss, esp. Diagnozisok (Budapest: Magveto, 1982); and “Pongyola tarsadalom,” V&zag, 2 (1986).

29

Leadership Drift in Hungal-y least 40 percent

of all families

lived below the paltry figures of the officially

defined

poverty level (5000 forints per month per family by the end of 1988).14 Threatened

by

unemployment that was expected to reach around 100000 people by 1990 and by an inflation rate of more than 25 percent in 1987 alone, Hungarian society was becoming restless; sabotage, arson, and a near total alienation from everything the party stood for began to characterize the citizenry. Lest we be remiss, we should also note some external contributions to the leadership drift. First, the external calculations of the regime in regards to the developments occurring in the West were extremely faulty. Economically, in the second half of the 1970s the Hungarian leadership adopted a strategy of import-led growth. It expected that Western economies would post continually high rates of stagflation, causing the West to tumble from one economic crisis to another; the oil crisis seemed to portend the future patterns of economic development for the West. Wearing the colored glasses of ideological illusions, thus the Hungarian leadership failed to take other factors-the unprecedented technical-technological leap, the financial policies that led to low rates of interests and high rates of investment, etc.-into its calculation. from the West, expecting to pay the loans back with inflated

It borrowed heavily dollars and cheaper

Hungarian goods, but invested its money foolishly, squandering it away, all the while believing that Western economic failure was just around the corner. Derailed, first, by the undesirable effects of the OPEC crisis, and then by quick Western recovery, Hungarian economic planners were unable to adjust rapidly to the changing international realities. By the time it became clear to the elite that the economic predictions on which regime expectations were based had failed to materialize, the leadership simply could not change tactics and strategies. Second, the events occurring in the USSR also can be considered as major sources of leadership drift. The rapid Soviet succession crises-three new leaders in three yearsencouraged a “do-nothing” or “wait and see” attitude among the top Hungarian elite. It was not just that Kadar and his leadership were left largely alone by Brezhnev, Andropov, or Chernenko. After all, as far as all of these Soviet leaders were concerned, and he ruled over a country where stability had Kadar was an “elder statesman” reigned for nearly thirty years. Kadar’s Hungary even seemed to be an “example” that could be followed by the Soviet Union itself as it attempted, under Gorbachev, to start the reforms that are known today as perestroika.l5 Moreover, as I have noted elsewhere, as long as the reforms in Hungary did not directly threaten domestic stability or the Communist alliance system as a whole, the Soviets were not eager to interject themselves in domestic politics. By 1987, in spite of seeing the real danger signs of the results

14. The data on poverty is contradictory. According to sxne sources, people at poverty level and below include all those having an income of 50 percent or less of the per capita average wage. (Katalin Szikra in Kereskedelmi Szemle, July 1987) and C. F. Agnes Bokor, Szegeyseg a mai Maggarorszagon (Budapest: Magveto, 1987). In 1988, the average wage was around 7000 forints per month; this figure does not include income from the second economy, however. The latter in 1988 accounted for nt 1ea.r~50 percent of additional monthly income for around 63% of all actively employed individuals. 15. See Ivan Volgyes, “Gorbachev and Eastern Europe,” Intemntional R&m (November 1987), pp. 6-10, and “Troubled Friendship or Mutual Dependence? Eastern Europe and the USSR in the Gorbachev Era,” Orbis (Summer 1986), pp. 343-55. Some, of course, may argue that by the Summer of 1987, Gorbachev became quite impatient with the lack of change. Shevardnadze’s trip to Budapest and Gorbachev’s interest in Karoly Grosz assuming the Prime Minister’s position could be cited as signs of Gorbachev’s insistence. I am, however, convinced that such an interpretation ignores the fundamental Soviet unwillingness to “meddle” in domestic power struggles against a sitting First Secretary!

30

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

of half-finished

reforms in Hungary,

Gorbachev

was not willing to halt the drift.16

These, then, were the systemic sources of the drift in the leadership in Hungary. In sum, they were a culmination of events in the domestic economic, political, and social spheres; combined with external sources, they created a serious crisis within the leadership itself.

A Leadership Adrift To observers of the Hungarian scene the events of the extraordinary party conference of the MSzMP held between May 20 and May 22, 1988, at first glance, were astounding. A new generation of leaders replaced a gerontocracy; Kadar and seven of his aging cohorts were summarily

expelled from the Politburo

by a younger leadership.

The new

Politburo, however, appears to be different from its predecessor mostly in age and, perhaps, in its approach to problems. Representing various views and attitudes, trends toward reform or toward the simple management of the existing system, it is a coalition that lacks coherence in regards to policy prescription; in this respect, the new Politburo headed by the new First Secretary Karoly Grosz appears to be a continuation of the previous elite of the party. It certainly is too early to tell if the new Politburo and party leadership will break determinedly with the practices of its predecessors; so far most of its efforts appear to be cosmetic and marginal. There can be little doubt that since the early 198Os, the Hungarian leadership has floated adrift. l7 Constantly baffled by incomprehension as to the causes of successive failures to recover economically, buffeted by divergent internal and external pressures, and split at the very highest levels over a multitude of issues, the top elite has been coasting without apparent direction, without seemingly having anyone at the helm. Adopting first a cautious middle-of-the-road approach, then changing direction slightly from left to right-the “helmsmen” and the “oarsmen” seem to lack the vision, the courage, and the ability to chart a decisive new course. Part of the reason for this drift can be understood from the very management style that characterized Kadar’s rule after 1956, and, parenthetically, continues to characterize the Grosz leadership today. It was always a cautious style based on a fragile consensus that alternated between eliminating opponents once from the “left,” then from the “right. ” As Geza Hofi, regime humorist and satirical critic, explained in a Budapest cabaret, the style was that of the chess master moving his pawns at will: “He strikes first to the left, then to the right, but forges ahead.“‘s As described by Laszlo Gyurko, one-time (1956) revolutionary and later Kadar’s officially sanctioned hageo/ biographer, the course Kadar charted was an ad hoc set of policies that went through stabilization and destabilization, reform, recentralization, and reform again.lg In short, the very style of a leadership that prizes “balance” or “stability,” demands that the leadership always be “in the middle” and never extreme; by definition, however, such a leadership cannot be in the forefront of a real, “consistently reformist” movement. Having adopted the same style of rule, the same manner of conflict resolution at the very top level, neither the Kadar nor the Grosz Politburo can adopt the substance of meaningful reforms. Even if in the new leadership one finds prominent reformers like 16. 17. 18. 19.

Ivan Volgyes, “Troubled Friendship,” note 15, pp. 343-55. Ivan Bajomi, “Egy Tarsadalmi Vita Anatomiaja,” Meduetanc, 2 (1987), 103-23. Mikroszkop Theater, Budapest, 1976. Laszlo Gyurko, Arckepmlat tortenelmi hatted (Budapest: Magveto, 1982), pp. 374-75

31

Leadership Llrift in Hungary

Imre Pozsgay and Rezso Nyers, the essence of the style of rule, the need for seeking bases for continuing consensus among the “players ” in the system, prevents the elite from charting a truly “reformist”, or truly “recentralizing”, course.2o A second reason for the drift lay in the general agreement among the top elite regardPrior to the palace coup by the party ing the direction and nature of governance. apparat on May 22, 1988, that resulted in the wholesale replacement

of the Politburo,

the uncertainty of future policy directions was evident in the debates between the younger (more technocratic?), and the older (more ideologically-minded) members of the ruling elite, and was even more clearly noticeable in the vacillating opinions of Kadar himself. For the purposes of governance, however, this latter uncertainty was even more important than the debates among the rest of the top elite. This was especially true because, in spite of his age (76 and counting!), Kadar remained during his tenure the only one to make all the major personnel decisions. Hence, for historical and systemic reasons, he continued-but in a sense he was also forced-to chart the direction of the country. Partially as a result of a system that always pushed all decisions to be made to one level higher than those decisions actually warranted, he involved himself, not just in charting the course, but also in making decisions even in regards to such minuscule matters as, for instance, which of two individuals should become a member of the Academy of Sciences! As a matter of strictly personal choice, however, Kadar selected for membership in the Politburo, generally, those individuals (a) who were either long-time colleagues and protege’s, or (b) with whose “program” of the moment he happened to agree. The composition of the last Politburo up to May, 1988, reflected-at least partially accurately!-Kadar’s long-standing policies. Hence, the old-timers (Aczel, Gaspar, Lazar, Kadar, Ovari, and Karoly Nemeth) continued to make decisions at the behest of Kadar, with the help of such personal loyalists as, for example, Csaba Hamori. True, Grosz, Hamori, Havasi, Csehak, or Berecz had been members of the Politburo, but they were there on the personal sufferance of Kadar, and were not in any position to advocate strongly, vigorously (or often even with disliked, or might have disliked. By conviction!) any policies Kadar “instinctively” keeping an absolute control over the membership in the fulcrum of power, Kadar thus effectively shunted opposition outside the inner circle, thereby suggesting that such opposition was somewhat “illegal” in his contextual terms. And by keeping the membership of the Politburo in a “balance” he saw as “healthy” for his policies, he allowed only those policies to survive and be implemented that shared the “lowest even if the result of these policies was further drift in the common denominator,” leadership. Such a leadership style reduces the role of secondary influentials/decision-makers, at the very minimum, to messengers or bureaucrats whose tasks are simply to press forward items that may or may not be decided upon. The reputedly sole position of Kadar as the first and last word on personnel appointment in the manner of an autocrat -supposedly, he placed little name cards in front of himself, shuffling them at willnegated

the emergence

of competing

personal

sources of power.2’

In other words, he

20. Just how truly middle-of-the-road, “consensus”-oriented the new leadership is can best be seen by first the announcement of a set of austerity measures to be implemented on July 13, 1988, and then by its postponement by the Central Committee a mere two days later. See Nepszabadsag (May 12, 14, 1988). There are, in fact, several suggestions, however, that perhaps Pozsgay and Nyers have lost a great deal oftheir effectiveness as oppositionists by having been co-opted into the leadership. This, however, as of this writing, does not appear to be the case at all. 21. Laszlo Kasza, “Utoirat,” note 7, p. 2.

32

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

reshuffled individuals autocratically in order to keep his own power secure, rather than to gain support for preferred policies. Those who stayed on the Politburo became “yesmen” (or “yes-woman ” in the case of Judit Kadar against Kadar’s wishes and against

Csehak); they could not hope to succeed the uncertain policies Kadar currently

followed. If they had alternative plans or policies to advocate, they had to do so in the context of Kadar’s own agenda. Thus, individuals who wished to succeed Kadar against Kadar’s wishes could only do so outside Politburo channels; the May, 1988, apparat coup, in fact, had to be orchestrated by Prime Minister Grosz and his personal coterie. From the 197Os, Kadar was not able to prevent the emergence of competing policies, even if he could mask and obfuscate the real differences that the existence of competing policies implied. Partially as a result of having more “technocrats” among the top elite (Csehak, Szuros, Horvath, or Miklos Nemeth, for example), and partially as a result of the pressures emanating from the crisis-ridden world outside party headquarters, by 1977-78 Kadar had been repeatedly warned that a real crisis, indeed, existed. Until the very beginning of the party conference of May, 1988, that removed him from the center of power, Kadar still refused to acknowledge the existence of that crisis, for he had not been willing to accept ideologically the necessity of undertaking reforms that appeared unpalatable to his Marxist consciousness. As a result, he interpreted the briefings on the nature or extent of Hungary’s crisis less starkly than reality demanded. Increasingly, however, pressures forced Kadar to act. The trouble for Kadar, however, was that he feared the potential results of undertaking the necessary, consistent, and significant steps demanded by the “reform” itself: the diminution of party authority. Kadar’s greatest fear was that the consequence of these reforms would be the elimination of the party from its “hegemonic/monopolistic” leadership role, the disappearance of the power of the party apparat, and the subsequent loss of what he perceived to be the parameters of “socialism” as a political system. In retrospect, these fears were probably justified. For Kadar,

such a potential

loss implied both systemic

and personal

threats.

Indi-

viduals cannot help but base their calculations on both learned (reasoned-inculcated) and felt (emotion-based) values. Personal experiences, especially if they are traumatic, serve as the yardstick against which events can best be judged; in fact, sometimes, events can only be judged against those experiences. For Kadar and some of his older colleagues, such as Gyorgy Aczel, Stalinism in Hungary and the tragedy of 1956 were such events. However exaggerated such perceptions might seem to outside observers, Hungarian leaders of Kadar’s generation-unable to judge the impact of changes taking place in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev-feared that the diminution of the party’s role would bring about the “collapse of socialism, ” and the subsequent political and/or military intervention of the USSR. They assumed that the more than 70000 Soviet troops still stationed in Hungary were there to prevent such an event from happening again. In a sense, their fear was well-founded, for such functions of the Soviet army are not to be ignored-even if by the summer of 1988 the Soviet elite announced the removal of a Soviet division stationed in Hungary.22 By constantly playing on that fear and by being gripped with that fear, and thus loath to move ahead with the much needed reforms, Kadar and his coterie also weakened the very system they sought to protect. The “systemic fear” of the elite was also coupled by a personal fear of being disliked, fired, or eliminated by Kadar himself. Should the system collapse, should Soviet inter22. New York Times, May 9, 1988.

Leadership Dr;ft in Hungary

33

vention become necessary, would those who allowed the system to reach a crisis stage be held accountable? Would they-once again, just as in the 1950s-be tried, convicted, or put in jail? As Kadar reputedly told some of his supporters who urged him to step down before he was effectively ousted from power: “Why should I resign? So that you could put me on trial like they (the Rakosi leadership) did it with Rajk?” But this fear was also compounded by the shades of 1956. Would an elemental force freed by increased expectations force their resignation, with the emergence of a newly trusted Gaul&r brought in by Soviet tanks? And then would that have meant, conceivably, the same kind of trial against Kadar and his coterie as the proceedings against Imre Nagy that were held under Kadar’s auspices? And would the losers’ fate be the same as those of Nagy and his fellow accused? And would they, too, lie in some nameless grave? The new leadership that came to power on May 22, 1988, at first glance appeared to many an observer to have reversed the previous drift; a more analytical examination of the events tends to project a different picture. The revolt of the apparat put in guarantees of immunity for Kadar for any role he played in the suppression of the 1956 Revolution, and thus set the stage for making some real changes, especially in the personnel area. Kadar and seven members of the old guard were removed from power, Prime Minister Grosz until November, 1988, also became the First Secretary of the party, the leading reformers-Pozsgay and Nyers-became members of the Politburo and were joined there by other technocratic apparatchiks a generation younger than those they replaced. The impact of these changes upon policy formulation, however, was more apparent than real; “Kadarism without Kadar” as “A. Nicholas” observed in a brilliant essay.23 The events of the first few months of the new leadership ably demonstrated the continuance of such a drift. The Politburo was still balanced between some reformers (Pozsgay, Nyers), some centralizers (Berecz, Ivanyi), and some middle-of-the-roaders (Grosz, Nemeth, Tatai), and consequently, the management style of opting for a consensus, rather than leading a reform movement remained operative. Political infighting within the top elite is still the order of the day as the new Politburo members jockey for power and political position. Separate deals still have to be made with elites of subordinate apparats; the new Politburo appears to lack the strength-and perhaps even the will!-to institute a national program of renewal in a single-minded manner. The bickering over the leading role of the party-its very definition!-continues, though a consensus appeared to exist for its diminution. “Democratization,” to be sure does mean greater liberalization and allowing “societalization,” striving toward a “civil society” within the limits of one-party rule under a limited multi-party system. But “opposition” under Grosz can still be equated with “enemy activity” if it threatened the leading role of the party. As the brutal suppression of the June 16, 1988, commemoration of the murder of Imre Nagy and his fellow prisoners thirty years before has proved, the party elite is willing to use police force to reemphasize the basis of its rule. Nor can it be said that the fear of the top elite disappeared with the removal of Kadar and his coterie. In fact, many members of the new elite have as much to fear from the diminution of power as the members of the previous Politburo. For individuals who have based their power on the renunciation of the revolution of 1956 (Janos Berecz, or

23. “A. Nicholas” (Bennett Kovrig), “Kadarism without Kadar?” RFE/SR7, June 3, 1988, pp. 25-28; on the results ofthe conference see George Schopflin, RudolfTokes, and Ivan Volgyes, “Leadership Change and Crisis in Hungary,” F’roblm of Communism (September-October 1988), 23-46.

34

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE

even

Grosz

himself),

terminology bring

an abrupt

of a “popular

the personal

into

power

removal society

reign

Even

want

danger

acting

power

all too real,

both

major

deadlock adrift

and

the

Helmsman. This

over

separated issues

ship

this

which into

The

include:

(a)

and (c) social

(e.g.,

productivity to attain

on:

(a)

the

extensive

total

such

of

to secondary

personages

“unfortunate

must that

to do nothing, move

who the

events”

at all.

Hungary’s

was particularly

evident

was

or at the

Hence,

top elite

of the

under

the is still

“ever-present

a vastly

further

that

(Change

and under

restrictive

the

several and

to

analytically points

these

of “reform.”

state,

During

a level

They

the party

additional

only

be

versus

type

(b)

(c) the reinstitution enterprises economic

market

was no longer technological

these

resulting

are only

system

in

based

increased

role

accountability

subsidies;

massive

or

system

systems

A new economic a significantly

industrial

197Os,

extensive

of political-economic

of enterprise

and

of heavy

to late

where

from

such improvements;

market;

mid-

factories)

expected

of scarcities.24

of the

the

of development

Soviet

in providing

the original,

limited

circumstances

for

entailing

“temporary”

and (e) the reintegration

processes-these

more

extensive

and

the aegis

part of the suggestions

inducing system

Tursadulmi

of the Patriotic

of the democratic

(a) the party’s

and state apparats;

of the

must

leading

(b) the party

szerzodes People’s

opposition. should

should

or

be

created

has already

perhaps

restructuring even

has been

position

“reform”

recovery,

political/economic

of the political

Reform)

ideal

economic

to undertake-thereby

reforms

on

in regards be

if

and prosper.

current

is willing

may

the question

versus

manpower, could

reproduction

Western

is to survive

are as follows:

The

unprofitable

with

These

although

largely

to tackle.

entered

growth

(d) the abolition

published

party

power

if any,

of

letting

in such

divided.

party

hardest

of additional further

initiatives;

us reiterate

regime

fear

and real powerholders,

components, (the

the

rehabilitation

private

Hungary

requires

personal

“guidance”

deeply

concerned

above,

to be deficient

unemployment;

Let

are

briefly

the constant

closing

external

political

improvements.

able

was

issues

(b)

where

has been judged

course;

of party few,

if one the

brought

leaders

result

without

would

newly

And for all of them,

it was better

steps,

the

1989,

reforms.

utilization

and

Hungary

reasons;

those

base,

very

result

to do anything

and

reforms

as noted

possible,

of

are

and the expected

leadership

economic;

economic

Hungary,

the

might

incremental

domestic

society);

growth

power careers.

for the regime’s

founders

For

the relegation

there

which

inability

the

domestic

overlap.

The

mean

and personal

of state

question.

such as the

28,

’’

deadlock,

issues

reforms

to do next,

into

established

Politburo,

in cosmetic,

on what

on January

the end of political

Hence,

for systemic

be engaged

of that revolution,

by Poszgay

position

elite would

that to happen.

in the evaluation used

a well

mean

in the new

of further,

most

of their

without

would

over the party

importance. would

legitimacy

and

from

change

uprising”

COMMUNISM

greater

outlined

(Societal Front, 25 The

both

even

The

Contract);

the new

the

first

was as

suggestions

by the separation simply

of

es reform

was written

gist of the reform to offer

its

now

necessity

in Ford&t

and the second

be replaced

be relegated

than drift.

run

survival,

of the

“supervision”

24. Jams Kornai, notably: A hiany (Budapest: KJK, 1980); Ellentmondasok es dilemmak (Budapest: Magveto, 1985); Anti-equilibrium (Budapest: KJK, 1971); and “A hiany magyarazo szereperol,” Kozgazdasagi Sremfe, 2 (1985); on a strident condemnation of socialism as a system see Tamas Kolosi, “Eselyeink,” Valosag, 1 (1989), pp. 22-33. 25. Meduetanc, 2 (1987), pp. 5-226.

Leadership Drift in Hungary

35

(rather than operation!) of the control over economic, governmental, or social units; (c) executive power should be vested in the government; and (d) strong legislative power should be vested in a “democratically elected ” Parliament with the participation of several political parties. The reforms proposed in the political sphere call for reducing the party’s direct governing role; they are accompanied by growing public demands to free society from the obsessive controls of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. Best exemplified by the courageous and thoughtful studies of Mihaly Bihari, Laszlo Lengyel, Csaba Gombar, Elemer Hankiss, and others, the reformers contend that Hungary’s development should give greater scope for independent social processes, for the free aggregation and articulation of political interests, and for the general freeing of society from party tutelage.26 The political reforms involving the societal sphere thus seek to encourage the formation of independent social organizations, interest groups, free trade unions, and generally uncontrolled, legally supported, societal units freed from the oppressive and ever-present control of the party. Such activities as the creation of the independent Trade Union of Hungarian Scientists (TDS z ) or the Organization of Young Democrats (FIDESz) are examples of demands for the freeing of society from omnipresent party control. While the supporters of such reforms are often referred to as the “reformintellectuals and economists” who coalesce around the leadership of Imre Pozsgay and Rezso Nyers, in fact, the circle of reformers includes the “democratic opposition” as well as a small but vocal group of workers who would like to destroy the present system of trade unions and create independent, free labor organizations.27 These groups, of course, can operate in a limited manner specifically because of the drift that exists at the top, but their very existence signifies a pluralization that can no longer be ignored. Finally, those demanding social reforms recognize the enormity of the social problems and declare that the party is no longer able to solve them. Impoverishment in contemporary Hungary, for example, has reached an unprecedented extent and, especially if real reforms are to be implemented, it is likely to grow. As noted above, already more than 40 percent of the population exists at or below the poverty level and the prevailing 25+ percent inflation renders ever larger numbers of the population pauperized. Hungary’s negative social indicators-from alcoholism to suicide-also give cause for concern, and the social reformers have lost any confidence in the party leadership’s ability to redress the myriads of contemporary wrongs.

26. In addition to these documents, serious scientific analysis that indicates the necessity for socio-political reform is contained in the studies of Csaba Gombar, Politika-cimsmuakban (Budapest: Politikatudomanyi Fuzetek, 1982); Eo allampolgar gonaihtai (Budapest: Kossuth, 1985), “Mentalitas, ertek es politikai intezmeny,” Tarsadalomkuta~as, 3-4 (1983); “J ovokepek, kepek az orszag jovojerol,” Medoetanc, 4-5 (1985-1986); “Demokratikus rendezoelvek,” A Politikatudomnnyi Tarsasag Eukonyve, 1986, and “Level N.-hez az ideologiarol,” Kritika, 3 (1987), as well as in the works of such reform economists, for example, as Tamas Bauer in his “A masodik reform .” Mozgo Vihg, 10, 1983. While not delineating the studies and recommendations of the democratic opposition tn extenso here, the reader is urged to read their thoughtful criticisms and potential solutions in the pages of such journals as Beszelo, Demokmta, and Magyar Zsido. 27. Csaba Gombar, “A tarsadalmi reform kerdeseihez,” Tarsadalom-kutatas, 1 (1986) and “Idoszeru-e Bibo Istvan?” in Szazadueg, 2 (1986); Cf. Istvan Csillag and Erzsebet &alai, “A monopolellenes politika alapelemei,” V&sag, ‘2 (1985); Istvan Csillag and Law.10 Lengyel, Vallalkorac-allam-tarsadalom (Budapest: KJK, 1985), and for a good summary Las& Lengyel, “Vegkifejlet,” V&sag, 12 (1987). As evidence for the desire to leave the trade unions, see the flyers entitled “Ki a szakszervezetekbol!” that were distributed by the thousands on the occasion of the May Day demonstration in 1987. One of the original flyers was published in facsimile in Demokrata, 5 (1987), p. 1. In December 1988, the independent trade unions accounted for around 7000 members and even had the blessing of the AFL-CIO!

36 The Soviet

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM Factor

While the domestic issues of the drift should be noted first, its external causes can also be identified. The most significant external cause for the drift emanates from the role played by Moscow, where a strange reversal has taken place; instead of being the source of a drift, Moscow now appears to be a stimulant for change. In this connection it should be remembered that for nearly two decades (ever since 1968), the Hungarian leadership has been extremely careful in pressing ahead with reforms in Hungary, lest the “wrath” of the Soviet leadership come down hard upon them. That fear may have been real-as, indeed, was illustrated clearly by the numerous interventions into Hungarian public life during the 1970s-but, until very recently, it was also always a pseudo-legitimating function of the leadership vis-a-vis the Hungarian population; winking at the people, as if saying to them “look, we would like to do more for you, but you-know-who will not let us go any further,” the leadership managed to use the bugaboo of Moscow exceedingly cleverly. When Gorbachev began to undertake his own reforms of Soviet society, however, Kadar’s leadership appeared to take fright. No longer able to use Moscow’s “reticence” as an excuse for not going further down the road to reform, Kadar began claiming that the course of reform in Moscow had not yet been run and that, therefore, Hungarian reforms should not proceed “too fast;” caution had to be exercised. Those seeking speedy, and substantial, reforms-Kadar and his coterie hinted darkly-should be aware of the dangers that too speedy and too extensive reforms in Hungary may bring about: retribution from a Soviet leadership that may fail at home in undertaking its own reform and be forced into retrenchment. It is, indeed, true that prior to May 22, 1988, Gorbachev and company gave ambiguous signals of their intentions; they were also extremely reticent to intervene aggressively in Hungary toward more reforms and this reticence was also responsible for the continuous drift. The Kremlin’s policy in regards to Eastern Europe seems to be based on the Soviet need for stability in its own backyard, and Gorbachev is still not very likely to intervene in East European affairs as long as that stability is not affected significantly. The Grosz coup, however, was accepted without reservations in Moscow, even if the original list of new members of the Politburo, submitted to Moscow on May 17, 1988, following the crucial Politburo meeting of that Tuesday, had to be replaced by a new list on May 22, 1988, when only two of the previous old-timer Politburo members were elected to the new Central Committee, and none to Politburo membership! Gorbachev, in fact, subsequently warmly welcomed Grosz to Moscow on July 7, 1988, and made special mention of his desire to emulate some of the Hungarian reforms.28 It should be noted, however, that precisely because Gorbachev made it clear that Hungary-as other East European states-has autonomy in its internal affairs to proceed, he refused either to push for further reforms, or to place “limits” on what Grosz and his elite however, is not might or might not do. zg The Soviet inaction, the lack of “guidelines,” altogether a blessing for the new elite; divided on policy, they are unable to go forward, and Gorbachev has given little guidance either to the “reformers” who would wish to 28. Pravda (January 21, 1988). 29. New York Times CJuly 10, 1988). Gorbachev repeatedly reiterated the new principles of Soviet foreign policy in Poland: autonomy, nonintervention, but adherence to the basic treaties of the socialist alliance system. New York Times (July 14, 1988).

Leadership

Drift in Hungary

move faster forward, or to “the centralizers” through greater central authority.” Although we have already noted above

37

who would wish to press for “reforms some

of the problems

of interpreting

Moscow’s influence over the Hungarian elite and the policies they are to follow, let us reiterate that securing Moscow’s imprimatur remains a sine qua non for any new leadership, or any “new course.“3o Even though Moscow is not ready to intervene forcibly in internecine rivalries, without Moscow’s support undertaking either real reform or “consolidative” measures is quite difficult. It is difficult, not just because Moscow has traditionally reserved the right of veto over the person of the new General Secretary, but also because economic considerations and security ties are involved. By providing greater economic benefits to Hungary, or by extracting less from Hungary, the Soviet leadership can make it less or more difficult for any Hungarian leader both to come to power and/or to succeed. Similarly, by Moscow’s insistence on more minimal or far greater military spending-as part of Hungary’s “alliance obligations”-it can assist or hinder any course which it may wish to see succeed or fail in Hungary. Moscow’s involvement in Hungary’s affairs and in the selection of a future course for Hungary, however, is in a sense similar to playing a zero-sum game: giving greater benefits to Hungary means receiving less “goods” by Moscow, while extracting greater benefits from Hungary means having fewer “goods” available in Hungary to distribute. Even if Gorbachev seemed to have little or no desire to actively involve himself in the Hungarian power struggle, there were always ways for him to suggest the course that would suit hts interest the most. During the first years of his adoption ofperestroika in the USSR, for instance, the Soviet press frequently cited the successes of the Hungarian reform experiments, especially in relation to agricultural developments. Alternatively, Hungarian decision-makers can just as easily decode Moscow’s smoke signals as they read the Soviet announcement concerning the potential of Soviet unemployment reaching 16 million people by the mid-1990s. 31 For the reform economists in Hungary who have advocated targeting some five percent of Hungary’s full-time employees for unemployment, the thought of having some ten percent of the Soviet labor force unemployed, must have sounded like sweet music coming from the East. But “catching the ambiguous signals from Moscow” and interpreting the events taking place in the USSR correctly are two different things. For example, what if that very article in which the potentiality of having 16 million Soviet citizens among the ranks of the unemployed was planted in Pravda as a pot-shot at Gorbachev and his “wild reformist ideas?” What if one followed some of the Soviet signals, adopted the stance that “structural unemployment is inevitable” and conceded that the “principle of total employment is no longer untouchable,” only to discover that Gorbachev’s programs adopted at the 1988 CPSU Conference have failed, and that he and his erstwhile supporters are in disfavor in some Siberian gulag? Or, alternatively, what if Gorbachev, faced with restrictions on his policies at home, and trying to bolster his program with successful reform policies abroad, suddenly tried to influence the course of events in Eastern Europe toward a more reformist direction ? What would that imply for those who were previously reluctant to follow Moscow’s lead? Clearly, for those who look 30. See the interview by Ya with Ivan T. Berend, President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, June 1, 1987, as quoted in RFE/SR6, 1987 by Karoly Okolicsanyi. For confirmation of Hungary’s informal autonomy see Charles Gati, “Eastern‘Europe On Its Own,” Foreign A&zirs (Winter 1989). 31. The ranks of those advocating unemployment as an incentive include nearly all of the reform economists from Rezso Nyers to Laszlo Antal and Sandor Kopatsy.

38

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE

toward

Moscow

dictated

to provide

course,

emanating For

from

a time,

Moscow’s reform

it appeared

power

taking

continued

drift”

did more topic

any Soviet

“right

drift”

all vie for the claim that are taking

of Hungary’s still seems They

place

between

competing

we now

must

claim

to

with his ideo-

personal

relation-

conviction

Unable

of the

to agree

or incorrectness

on

of the

and in the confused

ability

of Hungary

in the fact that within

conceptions

detrimental

to “catch

and

the political

consideration.

to the leadership

also resulted

1988, USSR,

could

Berecz,

his good

today,

the elite’s

already

in the

become

interpreter.

in Moscow

crises,

place

with his firm

of the correctness

to be an important

contributed

with

of ideological

multiple

else.

were in May,

the new elite

anybody

or Poszgay

regardless

easy dispatch

that

in fact,

Kadar’s

Gorbachev’s

Kadar’s

taking

had,

or Grosz,

reformers,

that

who among than

lot with

the reforms

regarding

But

also argued-and

in Budapest

ties to Moscow,

set of policies,

with

signals

leader.

their

is currently

and better

and the Soviet

cast

opponents

of what

at the helm

and close

that.

to which

Kadar’s

in light

elements

a drift

the

the obscure

perception

of touch”

Kadar

Moscow

than

to following

to catch

European

have

the growing “out

In short,

of events

from

existed

to exploit

to read

who

than

fulcrum

All of these

as Grosz

better

of a next

interpretation

able

Eastern

it is not at all clear

for reform,

confusing

other

Yet,

orthodoxy

the wisdom

managed

any

to his being

presence

ship to Gorbachev necessity

are committed to be

future.

the signals

logical

such

prevailed-that,

Kadar’s read

those

in Moscow.

for Hungary’s

Kadar

than

able

was due

place

ultimately

were

that

better

especially

policies,

from

and who

requirement

the Kremlin.

intentions

opponents,

the signal

it is a minimal

COMMUNISM

as to what

being

adrift.

But they

that leadership

policies

should

there

also

be adopted,

a

turn.

Drifts of a Different Sort: Potential of Overcoming the Cleavages within the Leadership The

most

ceptions

important of the

present

mess.

itself.

For

that

perception

drifts,

leaders what

in

manner

general,

opposing

Simply “traditional,” tionalists

the

the

believe

for the “good

market-oriented, the positions Moreover,

old days,”

imperative.

can

efficient

system

influences

they

traditionalists

if they

have

also

tendencies”

of the regime

development

of socialism

is concerned.

The

“socialists”’

desire

to keep

into

needs

both

the

within

the

regarding

the

alternative

groups

and

of the reform

threaten

to accrue the

operational

rests during

results

supporting

the drift.

The

tradi-

Soviet

the most

of this group

that

stage;

of the crisis

directive-oriented,

are also questionable

the basic

three

to overcome

do not wish the return

managed

suggest

“liberalizing

offering

conof the

ills.

solutions

the ideology

out

a crisis

opinions

each

down

the country’s

even

decentralizing and privileges

the

broken

way

of the crisis,

diverse

for the existing be

the diverse

as the existence

to the surface,

centralized,

serves

Clearly,

or possible

is approaching

in particular, come

stem from

optimal

as important

or “democratic” an

the

and the perception

as a panacea

that

“Stalinist-autarchic” operational

have

opposition

“socialist,”

the leadership

Hungary

is just

leadership

the crises

options

stated,

is that

exists

of the reality

and

of handling

sharply

long

crisis

within

regarding

is clear

a systemic

As a consequence

polity

or cleavages

themselves

style,

adequately. of state

terror

on the notion both

They as an

that the

the system

and

the last few decades.

achieved

to date

by

the

as far as the contemporary

principles

of the system

but to

Leadership Drift in Hungary

39

replace the trappings with workable components. Their model is a “reform-socialism,” (as against the realbut they seem to disagree widely as to what a “reform-socialist” existing!) society is about. Thus, their goals range from strengthening the party’s political directing role to creating a mostly market-oriented, democratic socioeconomic system with the party holding a largely nominal leadership position. The socialists recognize the presence of enormous social problems, but they still seek their solution by strengthening the party’s role, rather than by weakening it, and by moving aggressively toward a system that would combine the theoretical advances of socialism with practical elements of market economies. Finally, those who desire to have a democratic

system, long for the type of bourgeois

democracy that exists in Austria today. They realize-as the bon mot has it-that socialism is the most painful, most slow, most circuitous route between capitalism and capitalism, and they simply state that they have had enough of this “Asiatic” experiment .32 Public opinion surveys indicate that only 17 percent of those surveyed reject “bourgeois democracy” as a political system well-suited for Hungary, while 53 percent accept that proposition fully; alternatively, a huge 65 percent also accept pluralism (versus just 7 percent holding contrary views!) and reject the socialism is superior to capitalism. 33 And even within the party, during discussions that led up to the 1988 party conference, fully 18 percent their opinion expressed a desire to return to a multiparty system!34 are supported by a goodly percentage of the The “traditionalists”

proposition that the preliminary of those voicing party and state

apparats, of the middle level apparatchiks involved in supervision of the daily productive work, and at least a plurality of the some 17 000 full-time trade union functionaries; in other words, all those who would be or currently are the beneficiaries of directed systems. There are very few stellar figures at any level of society, however, who openly advocate undertaking the route backward. One reason why this group has no open and identifiable spokesman is the fact that the views that may be openly espoused by representatives of the traditionalists cut clearly against the opinions of the vast majority of Hungarians today; unpopular or retrograde views are most likely to be implemented than openly advocated in Communist systems. The socialists are generally concentrated around Prime Minister Karoly Grosz and the governmental reformers, on the one hand, newly elected Politburo members Imre Pozsgay, Rezso Nyers, and the “societal” reformers, on the other. From the perspective of Grosz, his personal and professional salvation lies in his ability to balance the power of the party elite with economic reforms that do not endanger the survival of his system. Conversely, the personal and professional salvation of Pozsgay lies in the success of those who advocate far broader reforms than those advocated by Grosz and 32. Throughout much of the 20th century a longing for a “third road” has characterized the oeuvre of a large group of literary figures, social scientists and historians in Hungary. Among them special mention should be given to Laszlo Nemeth, Istvan Bibo, Jeno Szucs, Peter Hanak, Gyorgy Ranki and Ivan T. Berend. 33. “Reszletek Fenyvesi Tamas TDI dolgozatabol: Lakatot a szajukra?” Karima (November 26, 1987), p. 16 (the author is indebted to Dr. Bennett Kovrig for sharing with him this extraordinary issue of the newspaper printed under the aegis of the local organs of the Hungarian Youth League (KISz) at the Architectural Engineering College of the Budapest Technological University. While the survey was taken only among a representative sample of the students in that college, an open survey of the general population is likely to result in even more strident polarization and pessimism concerning the future of socialism.) 34. Discussion with Imre Poszgay, May 17, 1988. Th e return to a type of multiparty system is expected to take place in 1989-1990, but the big question-how to maintain the supremacy of the party in such a system-still remains to be answered.

40

STUDIES

IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

his circle. Both of these groups have their supporters among the intellectuals, the truly skilled, entrepreneurial workers, the technical intelligentsia, and the economists, but the support extended to the reformers by the vast majority of a skeptical population is far less evident. Finally, the support for those who advocate the adoption of a Western-style “democratic” system comes from among the intellectuals, students, and the “democratic opposition. ’ ’ These people are the strongest critics of the existing system. By and large, they are convinced

that the present

system has outlived

its usefulness

and that the

problems of contemporary Hungary can only be solved by a democratic system-change. Together with the newly reorganized political parties, such as the Smallholders, or the Social Democrats and quasi-parties, such as the Hungarian Democratic Forum or the Bajcsy Zsilinszky Circle and the new, independent, trade unions, they seek to lead Hungary back into the fold of the modern and democratic states of Europe. It should be noted, however, that none of the “democrats” seem to desire a return to the type of rampant capitalism the regime always identifies with the interwar era, or to those early years of primitive, highly exploitative capitalist accumulation bemoaned by Marx. It seems that what the “democrats” desire is a market-based, liberal democratic system somewhat similar to the model of contemporary Austria, Sweden or Finland: preferably semi-neutral or inactive while still being a member of the Warsaw Pact, but independent and based upon the sanctity of the principles of law and legality. As noted above, the policies advocated by these groups are widely divergent; their positions in regards to certain issues express their different interests in a distinctly different manner. Alliances among them are formed on an anemic basis-witness, for example, the outpouring of commonalities in regards to the issue of the attempted “resettlement program ” implemented by Ceausescu-and allegiances shift rapidly on different issues. Cleavages are most notable among the traditionalists (centralizers or do-nothings, alike), on the one hand, and between the reformers and “democrats” on the other. Whether these cleavages are noted in the power struggle at the top elite levels, or in the policies that fail to be implemented at the middle level, they are indicative of sharpening

Conclusions:

divisions in contemporary

Drifting

Toward

Hungarian

polity.

Crisis

In short, it seems to be obvious that the Hungarian

leadership

at the very top and the

polity at the very bottom both seem to be suffering from severe crises. One may debate the extent of these crises, the dangers they pose to Hungary, to the leadership, or to the Communist system. What is not debatable is that nearly everyone in Hungary is convinced that the greatest crisis the system has ever witnessed since 1956 is at hand. Under such circumstances, if one is to be able to provide a reasonable prognosis of Hungary’s future at all, one must at the very least analyze the various observable divisions in the Hungarian polity. The crisis stems from (a) a leadership being adrift and unable to make serious and consistent decisions to regain its control, and (b) a leadership rent by serious cleavages both within the elite and between the elite and the population as a whole. From a fairly close reading of the situation, one gets the sense that the drift ofthe leadership, e.g. its inability to act decisively, the “cramp” that inhibits action cannot be resolved without an amelioration of the cleavages within the top leadership itself. In other words, until a decisive, new post-Kadar and maybe even post-Grosz leadership-based on popular

Leadership Drift in Hungary

41

legitimacy that stems from a real multi-party system, endowed with a clear mandate, willing to undertake a certain set of measures and able to implement a well thought-out, relatively consistent program-is able to exercise power, the floundering of the leadership at the top cannot be halted. The consequence of further splits at either level can only result in greater problems for Hungary and her people. It would help, of course, to have clear signals coming from Moscow that the reform measures proposed by Gorbachev will be consistently and irrevocably implemented. Paradoxically, however, stronger pressures emanating from Moscow would be counterproductive and would impair the extent of domestic autonomy Hungary has managed to achieve throughout the past decades. Thus, for either the reformers or the traditionalists, who are desirous of strengthening their own position by securing Moscow’s blessing, ultimately Moscow’s increased input would be against their own interests-as well as against the national interests of Hungary proper. For, in reality, what exists in contemporary Hungary is the crisis of both the system of socialism and the manner in which socialism in Hungary has been administered. The current failures of the system seem to suggest that Communism, given the tools hitherto utilized by Hungary’s “reformist” leadership, cannot be reformed piecemeal or at the margins and thus cannot be made to perform with success in the modern age. Today Kadar and the Kadar leadership is irrevocably gone; an era has ended but Kadarism without Kadar still exists even under the newly elected leadership. It is still an open question today whether a clearly reformist leadership, either with or without a new political program, would be able to halt the various schisms that are evident in Hungary, or stop the skid of the polity. It is clear, however, that without a determined new leadership based on a national multiparty coalition supported by the public and deemed to be a legitimate representative of society, the present drifts cannot be halted. Either way, however, the Communist system in Hungary, as it has been known for four decades, has reached the end of an era.