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Learning impairment following insoluble problems
OURNAL
OF EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL
Learning Impairment
PSYCHOLOGY
I‘?,
Following
53-68 (1978)
lnsolubte
Problems
Learned Helplessness or Altered Hypothesis Pool?
CHRISTOPHER PETERSON Kirkland
College
Received October 26, 1976 According to the learned helplessness hypothesis, the learning impairment typically displayed by subjects previously given insoluble problems results from the veridical learning of response-outcome independence. This learning is represented as a belief in helplessness which interferes with the subsequent acquisition of adaptive responses. However, this interpretation is suspect since subjects in a psychology experiment tend not to learn that random relationships are random. Instead, an alternative interpretation of these findings attributes the learning impairment following insoluble problems to a hypothesis pool alteration in the direction of (inappropriately) complex hypotheses. This alternative interpretation tended to be supported in Experiment 1, which varied the difficulty of the test task and found the impairment (relative to a no-treatment control) following insolubility to be inversely proportional to the test difficulty. In contrast, Experiment 2 employed a procedure which facilitated the attribution of response-outcome independence and found the impairment following insolubility to be directly proportional to the test difficulty. It was concluded that the results of Experiment 2 represented learned helplessness.
Learned helplessness is currently enjoying much popularity as an explanation for such diverse human behaviors as reactive depression (Miller & Seligman, 197.5), coronary proneness (Krantz, Glass, & Snyder, 1974), academic failure (Dweck & Reppucci, 1973), and the ineffectuality of the lower class (Bresnahan & Blum, 1971). Briefly, this idea asserts that as a result of experience with uncontrollable events, an organism learns that responses and outcomes are independent. This learning is represented as a belief in helplessness which interferes with the acquisition of adaptive responses in situations where such learning is objectively possible. For instance, a child who grows up in an unresponsive environment presumably learns that what happens to him is largely independent of what he does; this learned helplessness later prevents learning in situations where responses do affect outcomes, as in school. This paper is based on a dissertation submitted to the University of Colorado. Various people facilitated this research: R. L. Jackson, Steven F. Maier, and Michael Wertheimer. Requests for reprints should be addressed to Christopher Peterson, Division of Social Sciences, Kirkland College, Clinton, NY 13323. 53
0022-1031/7810141-0053$02.00/0 Copyright 0 1978 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
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PETERSON
Empirical evidence for the learned helplessness hypothesis exists primarily in the animal learning literature (see Maier & Seligman, 1976, for a review). In the typical animal helplessness experiment, a three-group design is employed. In one group, animals are given electric shocks that can be terminated by some behavior such as bar pressing. In contrast to this escapable shock group, other animals are given the same shocks without any control over their termination. Animals in a third group are controls and are given no shock. Testing in a shuttle box 24 hr later reveals that the animals exposed to inescapable shock fail to learn to escape from shock. Animals in the escapable shock group do not differ from naive controls. They learn the escape response with little difficulty. A growing number of studies employing human subjects has been reported which supports the position that experience with noncontingent events results in subsequent learning impairment (see Wortman & Brehm, 1975, for a review; see also Bresnahan & Blum, 1971; Douglas & Anisman, 1975; Eisenberger, Kaplan, & Singer, 1974; Gatchel & Proctor, 1976; Klein, Fencil-Morse, & Seligman, 1976; MacDonald, 1946; Miller & Seligman, 1975; Rodin, 1976). The typical human helplessness experiment is based on the animal paradigm. Subjects are exposed to an event that is either controllable or uncontrollable. The controllable event is usually a soluble concept identification problem (because feedback is contingent on the subject’s responses), while the uncontrollable event is usually an insoluble concept identification problem (because feedback is independent of the subject’s responses). Subsequent testing with a soluble concept identification problem reveals that subjects previously given an insoluble problem do worse than subjects previously given a soluble problem (and worse than naive subjects). While such results are of course consonant with the learned helplessness hypothesis, there exists good reason for not hastily concluding that such data represent an analog of the animal phenomenon. A problem in using the learned helplessness hypothesis to explain the behavior of people in a psychology experiment is the large literature attesting to the difficulty which people have in learning that events in a psychology experiment are noncontingent. Results from lines of research as diverse as clinical judgment (Gelding & Rorer, 1972; Smedslund, 1963), probability learning (Jones, 1971), human superstition (Bruner & Revusky, 1961; Wright, 1962), and concept identification (Levine, 1971), all suggest that people tend not to learn that an objectively noncontingent relationship is noncontingent. Instead, “subjects are inclined to believe there are patterns even when randomness is allegedly explicit” (Jones, 1971, p. 172). Subjects in a psychology experiment do not consider the possibility that the events within it are objectively without meaning (Orne, 1970). That this poses problems for the learned helplessness hypothesis is obvious; if people tend not to learn noncontingent relationships, such learning can hardly be used to explain helplessness effects.
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG
HYPOTHESES?
55
Instead of passively (and veridically) recording the objective relationships among the events in a psychology experiment, the subject actively attempts to discover what is happening. Such active discovery proceeds through the successive formulation and evaluation of hypotheses. As Levine (1971) has shown, if the correct hypothesis is absent from the subject’s pool of potential solutions (to a concept identification task), solution will not occur. One way of removing certain hypotheses from the pool 5f potential solutions is through early trials of noncontingentfeedback. Su$jects employ the noncontingent feedback as if it were meaningful and “logically” discard certain solutions from the realm of possibility. Thus, a rather straightforward application of Levine’s (1971) hypothesistesting theory to the learned helplessness paradigm results in the following alternative interpretation of the typically obtained findings: Subjects given insoluble problems learn, not that the problems are insoluble, but that simple solutions do not suffice. Their subsequent attempts to solve problems draw upon complex hypotheses as potential solutions. When subjects are later given problems with simple solutions, their tendency to seek complex answers impairs performance. If the test tasks following insoluble problems have simple solutions, then the learned helplessness hypothesis and the alternative explanation just proposed both predict impairment. But if the test tasks have complex solutions, then the two positions make different predictions. The learned helplessness hypothesis again predicts impairment following insoluble problems. Indeed, the animal learning literature suggests that the magnitude of impairment is directly proportional to the difficulty of the test task (Maier, Albin, & Testa, 1973). But the interpretation in terms of an altered hypothesis pool predicts that the magnitude of impairment is inversely proportional to the difficulty of the test task. Despite its source in the concept identification theory of Levine (1971), a position based primarily on data gathered within a circumscribed paradigm, this argument has more than metaphorical relevance to the experimental demonstration of learned helplessness in people. A number of human helplessness experiments employed insoluble concept identincation problems explicitly borrowed from Levine (e.g., Bresnahan & Blum, 1971; Hiroto & Seligman, 1975; Roth & Bootzin, 1974; Roth & Kubal, 1975). Other experimenters used tasks that differed in detail from Levine’s problems but still involved concept identification (e.g.,. Dweck & Reppucci, 11973; Eisenberger et al., 1974; Fosco & Geer, 1971; Hiroto, 1974; Thornton & Jacobs, 1971, 1972). If it is the case that insoluble problems result in an altered hypothesis pool and not a general belief in responseoutcome independence, then the empirical underpinning of learned lessness in humans is called into question. The first experiment reported here pitted the learned helplessness explanation of impaired performance following exposure to insoluble problems against the alternative of an explanation in terms of an altered hypothesis
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PETERSON
pool. The second experiment further examined these alternative explanations in a situation which facilitated the attribution of response-outcome independence. EXPERIMENT
1
If the explanation in terms of an altered hypothesis pool is correct, then subjects given insoluble concept identification problems do not readily consider simple hypotheses as potential solutions to subsequent problems. Instead, they consider only difficult hypotheses. If the correct answer is a simple one, then the performance of these subjects (relative to subjects given soluble or no pretreatment problems) is more impaired than if the correct answer is a difficult one. Problem difficulty was operationalized from suggestions by Jones (1971) that a problem whose solution is a simple attribute is not as difficult to solve as a problem whose solution is a sequence of attributes. Method Design. In a 4 x 2 between-subjects design, 64 undergraduates were assigned to one of four pretreatments (no-treatment control or concept identification problems with either attribute, sequence, or no solutions) and one of two test conditions (concept identification problem with either attribute or sequence solutions). For each problem, trials to a criterion of 10 correct answers in a row were recorded. Subjects. The subjects were 64 undergraduates at the University of Colorado whose participation satisfied a course requirement for introductory psychology. Approximately equal numbers of men and women were represented in each condition. Pretreatment problems. Four decks of cards were employed, one for each of the four pretreatment problems. Each card measured 6.5 x 7.5 cm and was either light blue or yellow. On each card, a capital C and a capital D were printed (approximately 1 cm high). On half of the cards, the C was on the left, and the D was on the right; on the other half of the cards, the D was on the left, and the C was on the right. Thus, there were four different types of cards: blue C-D, blue D-C, yellow C-D, and yellow D-C. Within each deck, these four types were equally represented and randomly ordered. Subjects were instructed to say either C or D in response to each card (see procedure below). For the attribute problems, the correct solution, across cards, was simply to respond C or D consistently (which one was predetermined randomly for each problem for each subject). For the sequence problems, the correct solution, across cards, was to respond according to these sequences: for problem A: C-D-C-D, etc., for problem B: C-C-D-C-C-D, etc., for problem C: C-D-D-C-D-D, etc., and for problem D: C-C-D-D-C-C-D-D, etc. For the insoluble problems, four different sequences of answers (C or D) were randomly created and employed as “solutions.” Test problems. A fifth deck of cards, identical to those employed for the pretreatment problems, was used for the test problem, which had either an attribute solution (C or D, randomly predetermined) or a sequence solution (C-D-C-D, etc.). Procedure. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions and individually tested. The following instructions were given to each subject:
I have some problems for you to solve. Each involves cards like these [deck shown to subject], which are either blue or yellow and have either a C and a D or a D and a C [one card of each type shown to subject]. 1’11put a card in front of you and ask you to say C or D. Then I’ll tell you right or wrong. I’ll be saying right or wrong
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG HYPOTHESES?
57
in accordance with some rule, and your task is to figure out what the rule is and to get as many right as you can. There will be five problems, and for each one, there will be 24 cards. Each problem continued until the subject reached a criterion of IQ consecutive right answers or until 24 responses had occurred. Since the literature documents well the tendency of subjects to report complex hypotheses following insoluble concept identification problems (e.g., Fingerman & Levine, 1974; Levine, 1971), formal probing for these superstitious solutions seemed unnecessary. During debriefing, a number of subjects given the insoluble problems did indeed refer to complex soiutions which they felt to be appropriate. For example, one subject reported solutions based on complicated interactions between card color and the speed with which the experimenter placed the card in front of him. Results
Trials to criterion on the test problem were used as the dependent variable. If the criterion was not reached in the 24 trials, then the trial on which the last wrong answer occurred was employed. These data are summarized in Fig. 1. There were large fluctuations in variance across the different conditions, but since these variances were proportional to the cell means, a logarithmic transformation prior to a 4 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA (Le., pretreatment x test) was appropriate (Winer, 1971). This analysis confirmed effects of the pretreatment, F(3,56) = 8.02, p < .OOl, the test task, F(li ,56) = 20.43, p < .OOl, and the interaction, F(3,46) = 4.77, p < ,005. A helplessness effect was present when subjects given insoluble problems and tested on an attribute problem were compared to the other groups of subjects tested on an attribute problem (ps < .05 by Tukey A procedure). The similar comparison for subjects tested on a sequence problem
PRETREATMENT FIG. 1. Means of trials to criterion (Experiment
1).
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CHRISTOPHER
PETERSON
WEB nonsignificant in the case of no-treatment control subjects but sign%cant (ps < .05) in the cases of soluble pretreatment subjects.
AS predicted, relative to a no-treatment control, the response impairment following insoluble problems was inversely proportional to the difficulty of the test task, interaction F(1,28) = 4.66, p < .05. However, contrary to prediction, there were no differential response impairments when this interaction was calculated relative to either the attribute or the sequence pretreatment subjects, interaction Fs nonsignificant. The data from subjects pretreated with soluble problems support the general hypothesis-testing model proposed by Levine (1971,1974). As can be seen in Fig. 1, subjects given sequence problems and then tested on an attribute problem were retarded when compared to subjects originally given attribute problems (p < .05 by Tukey A procedure). No such einstellung effect was evident for subjects pretreated with attribute problems, indicating (at least for these types of proble,ms) that subjects have trouble going from hard to simple problems but no trouble going from simple to hard problems. If problem solvers work through a potential solution hierarchy defined by solution difficulty, such an effect is expected. Recently, using a transfer paradigm and concept identification tasks, Lane, McDaniel, Bleichfeld, and Rabinowitz (1976) found similar results, concluding that “subjects are more likely to change from a simple domain to a more complex domain than vice versa” (p. 495) and directionally qualifying the typical interpretation of the einstehzg effect. Functional fixedness may not be a general blindness but a selective one, obscuring simpler solutions than the one expected but not more difficult ones. Discussion To the degree that this experiment intended to provide data incompatible with the learned helplessness hypothesis, it was successful. When a test task possesses a simple solution, prior experience with insoluble problems results in impaired performance. But when a test task possesses a difficult solution, prior experience with insoluble problems results in nonimpaired performance (relative to a no-treatment control). However, to the degree that the experiment intended additionally to provide data supporting an alternative interpretation in terms of an altered hypothesis pool, it was at times equivocal. Specifically, if subjects given insoluble problems were indeed searching for difficult solutions, then they should have performed better at the sequence test task than did the no-treatment control subjects, who presumably had yet to discover that simple solutions were inappropriate. Instead, there was no difference between these groups. Had a difference occurred in the expected direction, then all of the predicted interactions would have been observed.
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG
HYPOTHESES?
59
The actual data do not disconfirm the altered hypothesis since a plausible, although complicated, explanation of them can be advanced in hypothesis theory terms. That is, it can be argued that some of the subjects given insoluble problems discarded not only inappropriate attribute SOlUtions but also sequence solutions of the type demanded by the sequence test task. These subjects evidenced impairment. The other subjects, who discarded only inappropriate attribute solutions, evidenced facilitation. In support of this analysis are (a) the greater variance of the sequence test scores of the insoluble pretreatment subjects relative to the scores of the no-treatment control subjects (i.e., the greater dispersion of scores indicates that the insoluble subjects tended to do either better or worse than the control subjects, despite the absence of a difference between the mean scores) and (b) the quite bizarre “solutions” reported by some of the insoluble pretreatment subjects during debriefing. However, the difference in variance was only a tendency, and no attempt was made to relate systematically the complexity of superstitious solutions to performance at the test task. The most reasonable conclusion regarding the alternative explanation in terms of an altered hypothesis pool is the one already stated; with respect to this interpretation, some of the present data are equivocal. Further work varying more widely the difficulty of the test task as well as taking into consideration other factors neglected here, particularly motivational variables such as reactance (Roth & Kubal, 1973, is indicated. The necessity for stronger support for the hypothesis pool alteration explanation should not obscure the fact that the present experiment yielded data incompatible with the learned helplessness hypothesis. Particularly in light of the similarity of pretreatment and test tasks, the performance of subjects given the insoluble pretreatment and tested on the sequence task should have been much worse than it was for the learned helplessness hypothesis to have been supported. Yet, it should be explicitly stated that the present results criticize belplessness research more than they do helplessness theory. It is possible that prior helplessness experiments, because they did not rule out the possibility that overcomplicated hypothesis sets were being induced (as opposed to a general belief in response-outcome independence), were inadequately operationalized. In the most recent statement by the theory’s main proponents, it is recognized that “subjects do not always respond to random relationships as if they were random . . . and it is well known that subjective probabilities do not reflect objective probabilities with accuracy. . ~ . We will have to specify the conditions under which the perception of independence develops-only those conditions should lead to learne helplessness” (Maier & Seligman, 1976, p. 40). Such specification has not yet taken place within the context of learned helplessness theory, althQu~b the growing literature on the perception of control (Harvey & Marris, 9975:
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PETERSON
Harvey, Harris, &Barnes, 1975; Langer, 1975; Wortman, 1975) might offer some useful points of departure. One general conclusion from this literature, as well as from related work on judgment heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), is that people base statistical judgments partly on nonstatistical information. If, as has been argued, the (nonstatistical) information available to subjects that they are participants in a psychology experiment tends to preclude a (statistical) judgment of response-outcome independence, then laboratory experiments may be an inappropriate (or at least an unwieldy) means for the investigation of learned helplessness in people. EXPERIMENT
2
On the other hand, it may be possible to alter the typical psychology experiment so that judgments of response-outcome independence are possible. Peterson (Note 1) demonstrated that the veridical attribution of randomness regarding events in a psychology experiment could be facilitated by instructing subjects that random events might occur. The effect of such instructions is to add the concept of randomness to the pool of hypotheses which subjects consider as potential descriptions of the state of affairs in the experiment. Without such instructions, as is the case for the typical psychology experiment, such a concept is usually absent, and the difficulty which people have in learning that events in a psychology experiment are random is easily understood. When an attribution of randomness is available (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), subjects tend to make use of it, more or less veridically. Accordingly, it seems possible to subject the learned helplessness hypothesis to an appropriate laboratory test. If subjects are given instructions that responses and outcomes might be independent, then a veridical belief in response-outcome independence should occur. If such a belief occurs, then the empirical investigation of whether such a belief interferes with subsequent learning is possible. Experiment 2 was a partial replication of Experiment 1, except that subjects were told that the feedback during the concept identification problems might not be correct. This seemed a preferable means of suggesting the possibility that responses and outcomes might have nothing to do with each other than telling subjects that “the feedback might be noncontingent” or that “the problems might be insoluble.” In the former case, there is some question (Wagenaar, 1970, 1972) whether the typical psychology subject understands the meaning of noncontingent, and explanation of the concept would probably have reduced to the statement that “the right or wrong feedback may not be correct. ” In the latter case, there is the possibility that the subject’s motivation to cooperate might have been decreased because of suspicion arousal. Test task difficulty was varied in light of the
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG HYPOTHESES?
1
possibility suggested by the animal literature that learned helplessness is not manifest on simple tasks (Maier & Seligman, 1976). Method Design. In a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, 24 undergraduates were assigned to one of two pretreatments (no-treatment control or concept identification problems with no solutions) and one of two test conditions‘(concept identification problem with either attribute or sequence solutions). For each problem, trials to a criterion of 10 correct answers in a row were recorded. On each trial of each problem, subjects rated whether they believed the feedback. Subjects. The subjects were 24 undergraduates at the University of Colorado whose participation satisfied a course requirement for introductory psychology. Approximately equal numbers of men and women were represented in each condition. Problems. The pretreatment and test problems were identical to those employed in Experiment 1. Procedure. The procedure was the same as that described in Experiment 1, except that the following additional instructions were provided to each subject:
On any given trial, the right or wrong feedback I give you may not be correct. Will you please use this questionnaire [questionnaire and pencil handed to subject] to rate after every trial whether you believed the feedback [the questionnaire consisted of the numbers 1 through 24, each followed by the alternatives: yes, maybe, and no].
Results Belief in response-outcome independence. The ratings the subjects made of the feedback veridicality reflected whether they believed their responses to have anything to do with outcomes. Accordingly, as a manipulation check, the yes, maybe, and no responses were, respectively, scored 2, I-, and 0, and summed over blocks of eight for each problem. Figure 2 presents the means of these scores for the subjects in the insoluble groups. A belief in response-outcome independence is ideally represented in Fig. 2 by a
01
I 123123123123123 A
I1
1, B
I
‘
I
C
I D
I1
I1 TEST
PROBLEMS 2. Means of belief scores for insoluble groups, across blocks of eight trials, for pretreatment (A, B, C, D) and test problems (Experiment 2). FIG.
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PETERSON
score of 8, not by a score of 0. A score of 0 represents a belief in strong (although negative) dependence of outcomes on responses. For those subjects reaching criterion before 24 trials, scores of 2 were assigned to each remaining trial. Since this procedure artificially decreased the variance of the cells associated with the test problems, the analyses reported below were repeated with just the ratings for the insoluble problems. The conclusions reached below regarding the successful induction of a belief in response-outcome independence were not changed. The pattern of results in Fig. 2 provides strong support for the success of the attempted manipulation. After the first insoluble problem and the first block of trials for the subsequent insoluble problems, subjects were more likely to believe that their responses were independent of outcomes. The belief scores did not change for the sequence test problem (which, as will be described shortly, tended not to be solved), but they increased for the attribute test problem (which tended to be solved). These conclusions are supported by a 2 x 5 x 3 ANOVA (i.e., test problem type x problems x blocks) which yielded significant effects of problems, F(4,40) = 7.32, p < .OOl, blocks, F(2,20) = 6.32, p < .Ol, and problems by test problem type, F(4,40) = 5.37, p < .005. The problems effect was due primarily to the relatively high scores for the first insoluble problem and for the test problem (the means for the five problems, collapsed across blocks and test problem type, were 11.13, 9.97, 10.33, 10.53, and 12.75, respectively). The blocks effect was due primarily to the relatively high scores for the first block (the means for the three blocks, collapsed across problems and test problem type, were 11.68, 10.37, and 10.78, respectively). Finally, the problems x test problem-type interaction was due primarily to the divergence on the test problem between belief scores for the attribute and sequence problems. Performance. Trials to criterion on the test problem were used as the dependent variable. If the criterion was not reached in the 24 trials, then the trial on which the last wrong answer occurred was employed. These data are summarized in Fig. 3. A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA following a logarithmic transformation confirmed significant effects of the test task, F(1,20) = 10.00, p < .005, and the pretreatment by test task interaction, F(1,20) = 7.00, p < .025. Subjects tested on a sequence problem performed worse following insoluble problems than did naive controls (p < .05 by Tukey A procedure), while subjects tested on an attribute problem performed better following insoluble problems than did naive controls (p < .0.5). Discussion
It is with some confidence that the results of Experiment 2 are concluded to represent learned helplessness. Several considerations support this
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG HYPOTHESES?
SEQUENCE
TEST
ATTRIBUTE
N&E
TEST
RAtiDDM
PRETREATMENT FIG.
3. Means of trials to criterion (Experiment
2).
assertion: (a) subjects’ trial-by-trial ratings of their belief in the feedback veridicality indicated that the belief in response-outcome independence hypothesized to mediate the learned helplessness effect was induced during the insoluble pretreatment and subsequently associated with the failure to solve the sequence test problem; (b) the magnitude of the impairment following insoluble problems was directly proportional to the difficulty of the test task, as suggested by the animal learning literature, and not inversely proportional, as suggested by the alternative explanation of an altered hypothesis pool; and (c) if anecdotal evidence may be cited, the subjects in Experiment 2 tended to evidence no surprise when told during the debriefing that the insoluble problems were insoluble. On the other hand, those subjects who failed to solve the sequence test problem were surprised when told that it had an answer. These reactions contrasted sharply with those observed in Experiment 1. It will be remembered that subjects in that experiment were given the same problems but no instructions about the possible nonveridicality of the feedback. The subjects in Experiment 1 were surprised when told that the insoluble problems had no answer. Further, those subjects exhibiting learning impairment were surprised, not when told that the problems at which they failed had solutions, but when told of the nature of the solutions. It was not expected that subjects previously given insoluble problems and tested on an attribute problem would do better than naive controls. That these subjects would do no worse than the no-treatment control subjects was considered a possibility, but the learned helplessness hypothesis cannot explain the observed facilitation. Several previous “helplessness” experiments reported similar facilitation following experience with inso
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uble problems (Roth & Bootzin, 1974; Roth & Kubal, 1975; Thornton & Jacobs, 1972), and the reactance interpretation favored in those experiments is likewise plausible here, as are other motivational explanations (e.g., anxiety, anger, frustration). Consistent with the conclusion of Roth and Kubal(1975), the present results suggest a refinement of the learned helplessness hypothesis (see also Wortman & Brehm, 1975). Alternatively (and not necessarily incompatibly), this surprising finding could also be due to retardation of the control group tested on the attribute task. In fact, comparison of Figs. 1 and 3 suggests this as a quite reasonable way of viewing the result. The subjects in Experiment 2 who were given insoluble problems and tested with the attribute problem did not differ from the no-treatment controls in Experiment 1 tested with the attribute problem. In contrast, the no-treatment controls of Experiment 2 differed from the controls of Experiment 1. The special instructions in the second experiment might well have confused the subjects, a confusion that was particularly evident in the performance of the control subjects tested with the attribute task. The other groups, having additional trials with which to gain familiarity with the task, were not so impaired. GENERAL
DISCUSSION
The generality of helplessness is an empirical question, not a definitional one, and while it is legitimate to question the worth of investigating a phenomenon that may prove highly circumscribed, such a question is not the same as questioning the validity of these investigations. Among the criticisms of laboratory studies of human helplessness (e.g., Wortman & Brehm, 1975) is the charge that the typical demonstrations with human subjects are not as dramatic as the typical demonstrations with animal subjects. Specifically, while animal helplessness appears to be manifest across a variety of behavioral domains (e.g., Rosellini & Seligman, 1975), human helplessness (as produced in the laboratory) is obviously quite specific to the laboratory situation; clearly, no researcher to date has reported that helpless subjects were unable to find their way from the experimental room, failed the psychology course for which the helplessness experiment was a requirement, or were over-represented among hospitalized depressives. But the fact that these results have not occurred in no way invalidates the demonstration of laboratory-specific helplessness. While laboratory-produced helplessness may be quite circumscribed, a number of the nonlaboratory examples of helplessness, such as reactive depression, are indeed quite general. Perhaps the present experiments speak most reasonably to these general cases in terms of suggesting the necessary scope for conceptualizing the antecedents of helplessness. As demonstrated, sometimes helplessness may result from an altered hypothesis pool and sometimes from a belief in response-outcome independence
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG
HYPOTHESES?
5
(in which case it is termed learned helplessness). Other researchers have additionally documented the roles of psychological reactance (Wortman & Brehm, 1975) and expectation incongruency (Douglas & Anisman, 1975) in the experimental demonstration of human helplessness. The general thrust of these findings is that laboratory helplessness is not singly determined (Maier & Seligman, 1976, make the same point regarding animal helplessness). Such an expanded view is probably even more appropriate (and important) in conceptualizing the significant nonlaboratory examples of human helplessness. To date, certain theorists have viewed all examples of helplessness as learned helplessness. Such a view is certainly premature and probably wrong. Further nonlaboratory investigations are necessary. Additionally, there are issues that need further exploration within the laboratory. One such issue is the effect of the perceived locus of uncontrollability. A recent study in the helplessness tradition demonstrated that uncontrollability attributed to lack of ability was more stressful than uncontrollability attributed to the situation (Wortman, Panciera, Shusterman, & Hibscher, 1976). Although no performance impairments were obtained in this experiment, it seems that self-attributed uncontrollability is conceptually closer to what is meant by learned helplessness than is situationally attributed uncontrollability. As Wortman et al. (1976) concluded: ‘ ‘It may be important for future research to determine what factors in an experimental setting affect a subject’s attributions of causality” (p. 314). Within another research tradition, attribution theory, a great deal is known about such factors. For instance, successes tend to attributed to the self, while failures tend to be attributed to the situation (Weiner, 1974). Presumably, in those situations in which noncontingent successes lead to later learning impairment (Benson & Kennelly, 1976, demonstrated that this is not always the case; see also Eisenberger, Kaplan, & Singer, 1974), they should lead to a more general impairment than do noncontingent failures. A second issue is the effect of the amount of uncontrolllable experience. No human helplessness experiment to date, including the ones reported here, prolonged the number of uncontrollable trials to a point where subjects gave up in the pretreatment phase. If this were possible to do, would subjects who gave up have done so because they exhausted their pool of potential hypotheses and concluded that the problem was insoluble or because they ceased to consider the problem as worth the effort? According to the learned helplessness hypothesis, loss of incentive is a consequence of the belief that responses and outcomes are independent (Maier & Seligman, 1976). The present analysis suggests the possibility that sue a belief need not necessarily precede the motivational deficit characteristic of helplessness. Klinger (1975) made the similar argument in attributing depression not to uncontrollability but to disengagement from the pursuit
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of incentives. Clearly, much further work, both inside and outside the laboratory, is necessary before the phenomenon of helplessness is well understood. REFERENCES Benson, J. S., & Kennelly, K. J. Learned helplessness: The result of uncontrollable reinforcements or uncontrollable aversive stimuli? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976,34, 138-145. Bresnahan, J. L., & Blum, W. L. Chaotic reinforcement: A socioeconomic leveler. Developmental Psychology, 1971, 4, 89-92. Bnmer, A., & Revusky, S. H. Collateral behavior in humans. Journal ofthe Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 1961, 4, 349-350. Douglas, D., & Anisman, H. Helplessness or expectation incongruency: Effects of aversive stimulation on subsequent performance. Journal of Experimentat Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 1975, 1, 411-417. Dweck, C. S., & Reppucci, N. D. Learned helplessness and reinforcement responsibility in children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 25, 109-l 16. Eisenberger, R., Kaplan, R. M., & Singer, R. D. Decremental and nondecremental effects of noncontingent social approval. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 30, 716-722. Fingerman, P., & Levine, M. Nonlearning: The completeness of the blindness. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1974, 102, 720-721. Fosco, E., & Geer, J. H. Effects of gaining control over aversive stimuli after differing amounts of no control. Psychological Reports, 1971, 29, 1153-1154. Gatchel, R. J., & Proctor, J. D. Physiological correlates of learned helplessness in man. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1976, 85, 27-34. Golding, S. L., & Rorer, L. G. Illusory correlation and subjective judgment. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology,
1972, 80, 249-260.
Harvey, J. H., & Harris, B. Determinants of perceived choice and the relationship between perceived choice and expectancy about feelings of interpersonal control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychoiogy, 1975, 31, 101-106. Harvey, J. H., Harris, B., & Barnes, R. D. Actor-observer differences in the perceptions of responsibility and freedom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 22-28. Hiroto, D. S. Locus of control and learned helplessness. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1974, 102, 187-193. Hiroto, D. S., & Seligman, M. E. P. Generality of learned helplessness in man. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 31 I-327. Jones, M. R. From probability learning to sequential processing: A critical review. Psychological Bulletin, 1971, 76, 153-185. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 1973, 80, 237-2.51. Klein, D. C., Fencil-Morse, E., & Seligman, M. E. P. Learned helplessness, depression, and the attribution of failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 33, 508-516. Klinger, E. Consequences of commitment to and disengagement from incentives. Psychological Review, 1975,, 82, l-25. Krantz, D. S., Glass, D. C., & Snyder, M. L. Helplessness, stress level, and the coronaryprone behavior pattern. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1974, 10, 284300. Lane, D. M., McDaniel, J. R., Bleichfeld, B. E., & Rabinowitz, F. M. Toward the specifica-
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG HYPOTHESES?
67
tion of hypothesis domains and einstellung. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 1976, 2, 489-496. Langer, E. J. The illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 311-328. Levine, M. Hypothesis theory and nonlearning despite ideal S-R reinforcement contingeaties. Psychological Review, 1971, 78, 130-140. Levine, M. A transfer hypothesis, whereby learning-to-learn, the PREE, reversal-nonreversal shifts, and other curiosities are elucidated. 1)~ R. L. Soiso (Ed.), Tkeories in cognitive psychology: The Loyola symposium. New York: John Wiley, 1974. MacDonald, A. The effect of adaptation to the unconditioned stimulus upon the formation of conditioned avoidance responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1946. 36, l-12. Maier, S. F., Albin, R. W., & Testa, T. J. Failure to learn to escape in rats previously exposed to inescapable shock depends on the nature of the escape response. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psvchology, 1973, 85, 581-592. Maier, S. F., & Seligman, M. E. P. Learned helplessness: Theory and evidence. Journal oj” Experimental Psychology: General, 1976, 105, 3-46. Miller, W. R., & Seligman, M. E. P. Depression and learned helplessness in man. Journai of Abnormal Psychology, 1975, 84, 228-238. Ome, M. T. Hypnosis, motivation, and the ecological validity of the psychological experiment. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1970, 18, 187-265. Rodin, J. Density, perceived choice, and response to controllable and uncontrollable ontcomes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 564-578, Rosellini, R. A., & Seligman, M. E. P. Frustration and learned helplessness. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 1975, 1, 149-157. Roth, S., & Bootzin, R. R. Effects of experimentally induced expectancies of external control: An investigation of learned helplessness. Journal of Fersona1it.v and Social Psychology, 1974, 29, 253-264. Roth, S., & Kubal, L. Effects of noncontingent reinforcement on tasks of differing importance: Facilitation and learned helplessness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 680-691. Smedshmd, .I. The concept of correlation in adults. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 1963, 4, 165-173. Thornton, J. W., &Jacobs, P. D. Learned helplessness in human subjects. Journal ofExperimental Psychology, 1971, 87, 367-372. Thornton, J. W., & Jacobs, P. D. The facilitating effects of prior inescapable/unavoidable stress on intellectual performance. Psychonomic Science, 1972, 26, 18.5-187. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. Availability: A heuristic forjudging frequency and probabiliry. Cognitive Psychology, 1973, 5, 207-232. Wagenaar, W. A. Appreciation ofconditional probabilities in binary sequences. Acta Fsychologica, 1970, 34, 348-356. Wagenaar, W. A. Generation of random sequences by human subjects: A critical survey of the literature. Psychological Bulletin, 1972, 77, 65-72. Weiner, B. Achievement motivation and attribution theory. Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1974. Winer, B. J. Statistical principles in experimental design. New York: McGraw-Hiii, 1971. 2nd ed. Wortman, C. B. Some determinants of perceived control. Journal of Personality and Sociul Psychology, 1975, 31, 282-294. Wortman, C. B., & Brehm, J. W. Responses to uncontrollable outcomes: An integration of reactance theory and the learned helplessness model. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. New York: Academic Press, 1975. Vol. 8.
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Wortman, C. B., Panciera, L., Shusterman, L., & Hibscher, J. Attributions of causality and reactions to uncontrollable outcomes. Journal OfExperimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 301-316. Wright, J. C. Consistency and complexity of response sequences as a function of noncontingent reward. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1962, 63, 601-609.
REFERENCE 1. Peterson, C. The nonveridical attribution script, Kirkland College, 1977.
NOTE
of randomness
as artifact.
Unpublished manu-
OF EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL
Learning Impairment
PSYCHOLOGY
I‘?,
Following
53-68 (1978)
lnsolubte
Problems
Learned Helplessness or Altered Hypothesis Pool?
CHRISTOPHER PETERSON Kirkland
College
Received October 26, 1976 According to the learned helplessness hypothesis, the learning impairment typically displayed by subjects previously given insoluble problems results from the veridical learning of response-outcome independence. This learning is represented as a belief in helplessness which interferes with the subsequent acquisition of adaptive responses. However, this interpretation is suspect since subjects in a psychology experiment tend not to learn that random relationships are random. Instead, an alternative interpretation of these findings attributes the learning impairment following insoluble problems to a hypothesis pool alteration in the direction of (inappropriately) complex hypotheses. This alternative interpretation tended to be supported in Experiment 1, which varied the difficulty of the test task and found the impairment (relative to a no-treatment control) following insolubility to be inversely proportional to the test difficulty. In contrast, Experiment 2 employed a procedure which facilitated the attribution of response-outcome independence and found the impairment following insolubility to be directly proportional to the test difficulty. It was concluded that the results of Experiment 2 represented learned helplessness.
Learned helplessness is currently enjoying much popularity as an explanation for such diverse human behaviors as reactive depression (Miller & Seligman, 197.5), coronary proneness (Krantz, Glass, & Snyder, 1974), academic failure (Dweck & Reppucci, 1973), and the ineffectuality of the lower class (Bresnahan & Blum, 1971). Briefly, this idea asserts that as a result of experience with uncontrollable events, an organism learns that responses and outcomes are independent. This learning is represented as a belief in helplessness which interferes with the acquisition of adaptive responses in situations where such learning is objectively possible. For instance, a child who grows up in an unresponsive environment presumably learns that what happens to him is largely independent of what he does; this learned helplessness later prevents learning in situations where responses do affect outcomes, as in school. This paper is based on a dissertation submitted to the University of Colorado. Various people facilitated this research: R. L. Jackson, Steven F. Maier, and Michael Wertheimer. Requests for reprints should be addressed to Christopher Peterson, Division of Social Sciences, Kirkland College, Clinton, NY 13323. 53
0022-1031/7810141-0053$02.00/0 Copyright 0 1978 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
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PETERSON
Empirical evidence for the learned helplessness hypothesis exists primarily in the animal learning literature (see Maier & Seligman, 1976, for a review). In the typical animal helplessness experiment, a three-group design is employed. In one group, animals are given electric shocks that can be terminated by some behavior such as bar pressing. In contrast to this escapable shock group, other animals are given the same shocks without any control over their termination. Animals in a third group are controls and are given no shock. Testing in a shuttle box 24 hr later reveals that the animals exposed to inescapable shock fail to learn to escape from shock. Animals in the escapable shock group do not differ from naive controls. They learn the escape response with little difficulty. A growing number of studies employing human subjects has been reported which supports the position that experience with noncontingent events results in subsequent learning impairment (see Wortman & Brehm, 1975, for a review; see also Bresnahan & Blum, 1971; Douglas & Anisman, 1975; Eisenberger, Kaplan, & Singer, 1974; Gatchel & Proctor, 1976; Klein, Fencil-Morse, & Seligman, 1976; MacDonald, 1946; Miller & Seligman, 1975; Rodin, 1976). The typical human helplessness experiment is based on the animal paradigm. Subjects are exposed to an event that is either controllable or uncontrollable. The controllable event is usually a soluble concept identification problem (because feedback is contingent on the subject’s responses), while the uncontrollable event is usually an insoluble concept identification problem (because feedback is independent of the subject’s responses). Subsequent testing with a soluble concept identification problem reveals that subjects previously given an insoluble problem do worse than subjects previously given a soluble problem (and worse than naive subjects). While such results are of course consonant with the learned helplessness hypothesis, there exists good reason for not hastily concluding that such data represent an analog of the animal phenomenon. A problem in using the learned helplessness hypothesis to explain the behavior of people in a psychology experiment is the large literature attesting to the difficulty which people have in learning that events in a psychology experiment are noncontingent. Results from lines of research as diverse as clinical judgment (Gelding & Rorer, 1972; Smedslund, 1963), probability learning (Jones, 1971), human superstition (Bruner & Revusky, 1961; Wright, 1962), and concept identification (Levine, 1971), all suggest that people tend not to learn that an objectively noncontingent relationship is noncontingent. Instead, “subjects are inclined to believe there are patterns even when randomness is allegedly explicit” (Jones, 1971, p. 172). Subjects in a psychology experiment do not consider the possibility that the events within it are objectively without meaning (Orne, 1970). That this poses problems for the learned helplessness hypothesis is obvious; if people tend not to learn noncontingent relationships, such learning can hardly be used to explain helplessness effects.
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG
HYPOTHESES?
55
Instead of passively (and veridically) recording the objective relationships among the events in a psychology experiment, the subject actively attempts to discover what is happening. Such active discovery proceeds through the successive formulation and evaluation of hypotheses. As Levine (1971) has shown, if the correct hypothesis is absent from the subject’s pool of potential solutions (to a concept identification task), solution will not occur. One way of removing certain hypotheses from the pool 5f potential solutions is through early trials of noncontingentfeedback. Su$jects employ the noncontingent feedback as if it were meaningful and “logically” discard certain solutions from the realm of possibility. Thus, a rather straightforward application of Levine’s (1971) hypothesistesting theory to the learned helplessness paradigm results in the following alternative interpretation of the typically obtained findings: Subjects given insoluble problems learn, not that the problems are insoluble, but that simple solutions do not suffice. Their subsequent attempts to solve problems draw upon complex hypotheses as potential solutions. When subjects are later given problems with simple solutions, their tendency to seek complex answers impairs performance. If the test tasks following insoluble problems have simple solutions, then the learned helplessness hypothesis and the alternative explanation just proposed both predict impairment. But if the test tasks have complex solutions, then the two positions make different predictions. The learned helplessness hypothesis again predicts impairment following insoluble problems. Indeed, the animal learning literature suggests that the magnitude of impairment is directly proportional to the difficulty of the test task (Maier, Albin, & Testa, 1973). But the interpretation in terms of an altered hypothesis pool predicts that the magnitude of impairment is inversely proportional to the difficulty of the test task. Despite its source in the concept identification theory of Levine (1971), a position based primarily on data gathered within a circumscribed paradigm, this argument has more than metaphorical relevance to the experimental demonstration of learned helplessness in people. A number of human helplessness experiments employed insoluble concept identincation problems explicitly borrowed from Levine (e.g., Bresnahan & Blum, 1971; Hiroto & Seligman, 1975; Roth & Bootzin, 1974; Roth & Kubal, 1975). Other experimenters used tasks that differed in detail from Levine’s problems but still involved concept identification (e.g.,. Dweck & Reppucci, 11973; Eisenberger et al., 1974; Fosco & Geer, 1971; Hiroto, 1974; Thornton & Jacobs, 1971, 1972). If it is the case that insoluble problems result in an altered hypothesis pool and not a general belief in responseoutcome independence, then the empirical underpinning of learned lessness in humans is called into question. The first experiment reported here pitted the learned helplessness explanation of impaired performance following exposure to insoluble problems against the alternative of an explanation in terms of an altered hypothesis
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pool. The second experiment further examined these alternative explanations in a situation which facilitated the attribution of response-outcome independence. EXPERIMENT
1
If the explanation in terms of an altered hypothesis pool is correct, then subjects given insoluble concept identification problems do not readily consider simple hypotheses as potential solutions to subsequent problems. Instead, they consider only difficult hypotheses. If the correct answer is a simple one, then the performance of these subjects (relative to subjects given soluble or no pretreatment problems) is more impaired than if the correct answer is a difficult one. Problem difficulty was operationalized from suggestions by Jones (1971) that a problem whose solution is a simple attribute is not as difficult to solve as a problem whose solution is a sequence of attributes. Method Design. In a 4 x 2 between-subjects design, 64 undergraduates were assigned to one of four pretreatments (no-treatment control or concept identification problems with either attribute, sequence, or no solutions) and one of two test conditions (concept identification problem with either attribute or sequence solutions). For each problem, trials to a criterion of 10 correct answers in a row were recorded. Subjects. The subjects were 64 undergraduates at the University of Colorado whose participation satisfied a course requirement for introductory psychology. Approximately equal numbers of men and women were represented in each condition. Pretreatment problems. Four decks of cards were employed, one for each of the four pretreatment problems. Each card measured 6.5 x 7.5 cm and was either light blue or yellow. On each card, a capital C and a capital D were printed (approximately 1 cm high). On half of the cards, the C was on the left, and the D was on the right; on the other half of the cards, the D was on the left, and the C was on the right. Thus, there were four different types of cards: blue C-D, blue D-C, yellow C-D, and yellow D-C. Within each deck, these four types were equally represented and randomly ordered. Subjects were instructed to say either C or D in response to each card (see procedure below). For the attribute problems, the correct solution, across cards, was simply to respond C or D consistently (which one was predetermined randomly for each problem for each subject). For the sequence problems, the correct solution, across cards, was to respond according to these sequences: for problem A: C-D-C-D, etc., for problem B: C-C-D-C-C-D, etc., for problem C: C-D-D-C-D-D, etc., and for problem D: C-C-D-D-C-C-D-D, etc. For the insoluble problems, four different sequences of answers (C or D) were randomly created and employed as “solutions.” Test problems. A fifth deck of cards, identical to those employed for the pretreatment problems, was used for the test problem, which had either an attribute solution (C or D, randomly predetermined) or a sequence solution (C-D-C-D, etc.). Procedure. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions and individually tested. The following instructions were given to each subject:
I have some problems for you to solve. Each involves cards like these [deck shown to subject], which are either blue or yellow and have either a C and a D or a D and a C [one card of each type shown to subject]. 1’11put a card in front of you and ask you to say C or D. Then I’ll tell you right or wrong. I’ll be saying right or wrong
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG HYPOTHESES?
57
in accordance with some rule, and your task is to figure out what the rule is and to get as many right as you can. There will be five problems, and for each one, there will be 24 cards. Each problem continued until the subject reached a criterion of IQ consecutive right answers or until 24 responses had occurred. Since the literature documents well the tendency of subjects to report complex hypotheses following insoluble concept identification problems (e.g., Fingerman & Levine, 1974; Levine, 1971), formal probing for these superstitious solutions seemed unnecessary. During debriefing, a number of subjects given the insoluble problems did indeed refer to complex soiutions which they felt to be appropriate. For example, one subject reported solutions based on complicated interactions between card color and the speed with which the experimenter placed the card in front of him. Results
Trials to criterion on the test problem were used as the dependent variable. If the criterion was not reached in the 24 trials, then the trial on which the last wrong answer occurred was employed. These data are summarized in Fig. 1. There were large fluctuations in variance across the different conditions, but since these variances were proportional to the cell means, a logarithmic transformation prior to a 4 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA (Le., pretreatment x test) was appropriate (Winer, 1971). This analysis confirmed effects of the pretreatment, F(3,56) = 8.02, p < .OOl, the test task, F(li ,56) = 20.43, p < .OOl, and the interaction, F(3,46) = 4.77, p < ,005. A helplessness effect was present when subjects given insoluble problems and tested on an attribute problem were compared to the other groups of subjects tested on an attribute problem (ps < .05 by Tukey A procedure). The similar comparison for subjects tested on a sequence problem
PRETREATMENT FIG. 1. Means of trials to criterion (Experiment
1).
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CHRISTOPHER
PETERSON
WEB nonsignificant in the case of no-treatment control subjects but sign%cant (ps < .05) in the cases of soluble pretreatment subjects.
AS predicted, relative to a no-treatment control, the response impairment following insoluble problems was inversely proportional to the difficulty of the test task, interaction F(1,28) = 4.66, p < .05. However, contrary to prediction, there were no differential response impairments when this interaction was calculated relative to either the attribute or the sequence pretreatment subjects, interaction Fs nonsignificant. The data from subjects pretreated with soluble problems support the general hypothesis-testing model proposed by Levine (1971,1974). As can be seen in Fig. 1, subjects given sequence problems and then tested on an attribute problem were retarded when compared to subjects originally given attribute problems (p < .05 by Tukey A procedure). No such einstellung effect was evident for subjects pretreated with attribute problems, indicating (at least for these types of proble,ms) that subjects have trouble going from hard to simple problems but no trouble going from simple to hard problems. If problem solvers work through a potential solution hierarchy defined by solution difficulty, such an effect is expected. Recently, using a transfer paradigm and concept identification tasks, Lane, McDaniel, Bleichfeld, and Rabinowitz (1976) found similar results, concluding that “subjects are more likely to change from a simple domain to a more complex domain than vice versa” (p. 495) and directionally qualifying the typical interpretation of the einstehzg effect. Functional fixedness may not be a general blindness but a selective one, obscuring simpler solutions than the one expected but not more difficult ones. Discussion To the degree that this experiment intended to provide data incompatible with the learned helplessness hypothesis, it was successful. When a test task possesses a simple solution, prior experience with insoluble problems results in impaired performance. But when a test task possesses a difficult solution, prior experience with insoluble problems results in nonimpaired performance (relative to a no-treatment control). However, to the degree that the experiment intended additionally to provide data supporting an alternative interpretation in terms of an altered hypothesis pool, it was at times equivocal. Specifically, if subjects given insoluble problems were indeed searching for difficult solutions, then they should have performed better at the sequence test task than did the no-treatment control subjects, who presumably had yet to discover that simple solutions were inappropriate. Instead, there was no difference between these groups. Had a difference occurred in the expected direction, then all of the predicted interactions would have been observed.
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG
HYPOTHESES?
59
The actual data do not disconfirm the altered hypothesis since a plausible, although complicated, explanation of them can be advanced in hypothesis theory terms. That is, it can be argued that some of the subjects given insoluble problems discarded not only inappropriate attribute SOlUtions but also sequence solutions of the type demanded by the sequence test task. These subjects evidenced impairment. The other subjects, who discarded only inappropriate attribute solutions, evidenced facilitation. In support of this analysis are (a) the greater variance of the sequence test scores of the insoluble pretreatment subjects relative to the scores of the no-treatment control subjects (i.e., the greater dispersion of scores indicates that the insoluble subjects tended to do either better or worse than the control subjects, despite the absence of a difference between the mean scores) and (b) the quite bizarre “solutions” reported by some of the insoluble pretreatment subjects during debriefing. However, the difference in variance was only a tendency, and no attempt was made to relate systematically the complexity of superstitious solutions to performance at the test task. The most reasonable conclusion regarding the alternative explanation in terms of an altered hypothesis pool is the one already stated; with respect to this interpretation, some of the present data are equivocal. Further work varying more widely the difficulty of the test task as well as taking into consideration other factors neglected here, particularly motivational variables such as reactance (Roth & Kubal, 1973, is indicated. The necessity for stronger support for the hypothesis pool alteration explanation should not obscure the fact that the present experiment yielded data incompatible with the learned helplessness hypothesis. Particularly in light of the similarity of pretreatment and test tasks, the performance of subjects given the insoluble pretreatment and tested on the sequence task should have been much worse than it was for the learned helplessness hypothesis to have been supported. Yet, it should be explicitly stated that the present results criticize belplessness research more than they do helplessness theory. It is possible that prior helplessness experiments, because they did not rule out the possibility that overcomplicated hypothesis sets were being induced (as opposed to a general belief in response-outcome independence), were inadequately operationalized. In the most recent statement by the theory’s main proponents, it is recognized that “subjects do not always respond to random relationships as if they were random . . . and it is well known that subjective probabilities do not reflect objective probabilities with accuracy. . ~ . We will have to specify the conditions under which the perception of independence develops-only those conditions should lead to learne helplessness” (Maier & Seligman, 1976, p. 40). Such specification has not yet taken place within the context of learned helplessness theory, althQu~b the growing literature on the perception of control (Harvey & Marris, 9975:
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PETERSON
Harvey, Harris, &Barnes, 1975; Langer, 1975; Wortman, 1975) might offer some useful points of departure. One general conclusion from this literature, as well as from related work on judgment heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), is that people base statistical judgments partly on nonstatistical information. If, as has been argued, the (nonstatistical) information available to subjects that they are participants in a psychology experiment tends to preclude a (statistical) judgment of response-outcome independence, then laboratory experiments may be an inappropriate (or at least an unwieldy) means for the investigation of learned helplessness in people. EXPERIMENT
2
On the other hand, it may be possible to alter the typical psychology experiment so that judgments of response-outcome independence are possible. Peterson (Note 1) demonstrated that the veridical attribution of randomness regarding events in a psychology experiment could be facilitated by instructing subjects that random events might occur. The effect of such instructions is to add the concept of randomness to the pool of hypotheses which subjects consider as potential descriptions of the state of affairs in the experiment. Without such instructions, as is the case for the typical psychology experiment, such a concept is usually absent, and the difficulty which people have in learning that events in a psychology experiment are random is easily understood. When an attribution of randomness is available (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), subjects tend to make use of it, more or less veridically. Accordingly, it seems possible to subject the learned helplessness hypothesis to an appropriate laboratory test. If subjects are given instructions that responses and outcomes might be independent, then a veridical belief in response-outcome independence should occur. If such a belief occurs, then the empirical investigation of whether such a belief interferes with subsequent learning is possible. Experiment 2 was a partial replication of Experiment 1, except that subjects were told that the feedback during the concept identification problems might not be correct. This seemed a preferable means of suggesting the possibility that responses and outcomes might have nothing to do with each other than telling subjects that “the feedback might be noncontingent” or that “the problems might be insoluble.” In the former case, there is some question (Wagenaar, 1970, 1972) whether the typical psychology subject understands the meaning of noncontingent, and explanation of the concept would probably have reduced to the statement that “the right or wrong feedback may not be correct. ” In the latter case, there is the possibility that the subject’s motivation to cooperate might have been decreased because of suspicion arousal. Test task difficulty was varied in light of the
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG HYPOTHESES?
1
possibility suggested by the animal literature that learned helplessness is not manifest on simple tasks (Maier & Seligman, 1976). Method Design. In a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, 24 undergraduates were assigned to one of two pretreatments (no-treatment control or concept identification problems with no solutions) and one of two test conditions‘(concept identification problem with either attribute or sequence solutions). For each problem, trials to a criterion of 10 correct answers in a row were recorded. On each trial of each problem, subjects rated whether they believed the feedback. Subjects. The subjects were 24 undergraduates at the University of Colorado whose participation satisfied a course requirement for introductory psychology. Approximately equal numbers of men and women were represented in each condition. Problems. The pretreatment and test problems were identical to those employed in Experiment 1. Procedure. The procedure was the same as that described in Experiment 1, except that the following additional instructions were provided to each subject:
On any given trial, the right or wrong feedback I give you may not be correct. Will you please use this questionnaire [questionnaire and pencil handed to subject] to rate after every trial whether you believed the feedback [the questionnaire consisted of the numbers 1 through 24, each followed by the alternatives: yes, maybe, and no].
Results Belief in response-outcome independence. The ratings the subjects made of the feedback veridicality reflected whether they believed their responses to have anything to do with outcomes. Accordingly, as a manipulation check, the yes, maybe, and no responses were, respectively, scored 2, I-, and 0, and summed over blocks of eight for each problem. Figure 2 presents the means of these scores for the subjects in the insoluble groups. A belief in response-outcome independence is ideally represented in Fig. 2 by a
01
I 123123123123123 A
I1
1, B
I
‘
I
C
I D
I1
I1 TEST
PROBLEMS 2. Means of belief scores for insoluble groups, across blocks of eight trials, for pretreatment (A, B, C, D) and test problems (Experiment 2). FIG.
62
CHRISTOPHER
PETERSON
score of 8, not by a score of 0. A score of 0 represents a belief in strong (although negative) dependence of outcomes on responses. For those subjects reaching criterion before 24 trials, scores of 2 were assigned to each remaining trial. Since this procedure artificially decreased the variance of the cells associated with the test problems, the analyses reported below were repeated with just the ratings for the insoluble problems. The conclusions reached below regarding the successful induction of a belief in response-outcome independence were not changed. The pattern of results in Fig. 2 provides strong support for the success of the attempted manipulation. After the first insoluble problem and the first block of trials for the subsequent insoluble problems, subjects were more likely to believe that their responses were independent of outcomes. The belief scores did not change for the sequence test problem (which, as will be described shortly, tended not to be solved), but they increased for the attribute test problem (which tended to be solved). These conclusions are supported by a 2 x 5 x 3 ANOVA (i.e., test problem type x problems x blocks) which yielded significant effects of problems, F(4,40) = 7.32, p < .OOl, blocks, F(2,20) = 6.32, p < .Ol, and problems by test problem type, F(4,40) = 5.37, p < .005. The problems effect was due primarily to the relatively high scores for the first insoluble problem and for the test problem (the means for the five problems, collapsed across blocks and test problem type, were 11.13, 9.97, 10.33, 10.53, and 12.75, respectively). The blocks effect was due primarily to the relatively high scores for the first block (the means for the three blocks, collapsed across problems and test problem type, were 11.68, 10.37, and 10.78, respectively). Finally, the problems x test problem-type interaction was due primarily to the divergence on the test problem between belief scores for the attribute and sequence problems. Performance. Trials to criterion on the test problem were used as the dependent variable. If the criterion was not reached in the 24 trials, then the trial on which the last wrong answer occurred was employed. These data are summarized in Fig. 3. A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA following a logarithmic transformation confirmed significant effects of the test task, F(1,20) = 10.00, p < .005, and the pretreatment by test task interaction, F(1,20) = 7.00, p < .025. Subjects tested on a sequence problem performed worse following insoluble problems than did naive controls (p < .05 by Tukey A procedure), while subjects tested on an attribute problem performed better following insoluble problems than did naive controls (p < .0.5). Discussion
It is with some confidence that the results of Experiment 2 are concluded to represent learned helplessness. Several considerations support this
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG HYPOTHESES?
SEQUENCE
TEST
ATTRIBUTE
N&E
TEST
RAtiDDM
PRETREATMENT FIG.
3. Means of trials to criterion (Experiment
2).
assertion: (a) subjects’ trial-by-trial ratings of their belief in the feedback veridicality indicated that the belief in response-outcome independence hypothesized to mediate the learned helplessness effect was induced during the insoluble pretreatment and subsequently associated with the failure to solve the sequence test problem; (b) the magnitude of the impairment following insoluble problems was directly proportional to the difficulty of the test task, as suggested by the animal learning literature, and not inversely proportional, as suggested by the alternative explanation of an altered hypothesis pool; and (c) if anecdotal evidence may be cited, the subjects in Experiment 2 tended to evidence no surprise when told during the debriefing that the insoluble problems were insoluble. On the other hand, those subjects who failed to solve the sequence test problem were surprised when told that it had an answer. These reactions contrasted sharply with those observed in Experiment 1. It will be remembered that subjects in that experiment were given the same problems but no instructions about the possible nonveridicality of the feedback. The subjects in Experiment 1 were surprised when told that the insoluble problems had no answer. Further, those subjects exhibiting learning impairment were surprised, not when told that the problems at which they failed had solutions, but when told of the nature of the solutions. It was not expected that subjects previously given insoluble problems and tested on an attribute problem would do better than naive controls. That these subjects would do no worse than the no-treatment control subjects was considered a possibility, but the learned helplessness hypothesis cannot explain the observed facilitation. Several previous “helplessness” experiments reported similar facilitation following experience with inso
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uble problems (Roth & Bootzin, 1974; Roth & Kubal, 1975; Thornton & Jacobs, 1972), and the reactance interpretation favored in those experiments is likewise plausible here, as are other motivational explanations (e.g., anxiety, anger, frustration). Consistent with the conclusion of Roth and Kubal(1975), the present results suggest a refinement of the learned helplessness hypothesis (see also Wortman & Brehm, 1975). Alternatively (and not necessarily incompatibly), this surprising finding could also be due to retardation of the control group tested on the attribute task. In fact, comparison of Figs. 1 and 3 suggests this as a quite reasonable way of viewing the result. The subjects in Experiment 2 who were given insoluble problems and tested with the attribute problem did not differ from the no-treatment controls in Experiment 1 tested with the attribute problem. In contrast, the no-treatment controls of Experiment 2 differed from the controls of Experiment 1. The special instructions in the second experiment might well have confused the subjects, a confusion that was particularly evident in the performance of the control subjects tested with the attribute task. The other groups, having additional trials with which to gain familiarity with the task, were not so impaired. GENERAL
DISCUSSION
The generality of helplessness is an empirical question, not a definitional one, and while it is legitimate to question the worth of investigating a phenomenon that may prove highly circumscribed, such a question is not the same as questioning the validity of these investigations. Among the criticisms of laboratory studies of human helplessness (e.g., Wortman & Brehm, 1975) is the charge that the typical demonstrations with human subjects are not as dramatic as the typical demonstrations with animal subjects. Specifically, while animal helplessness appears to be manifest across a variety of behavioral domains (e.g., Rosellini & Seligman, 1975), human helplessness (as produced in the laboratory) is obviously quite specific to the laboratory situation; clearly, no researcher to date has reported that helpless subjects were unable to find their way from the experimental room, failed the psychology course for which the helplessness experiment was a requirement, or were over-represented among hospitalized depressives. But the fact that these results have not occurred in no way invalidates the demonstration of laboratory-specific helplessness. While laboratory-produced helplessness may be quite circumscribed, a number of the nonlaboratory examples of helplessness, such as reactive depression, are indeed quite general. Perhaps the present experiments speak most reasonably to these general cases in terms of suggesting the necessary scope for conceptualizing the antecedents of helplessness. As demonstrated, sometimes helplessness may result from an altered hypothesis pool and sometimes from a belief in response-outcome independence
LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
OR WRONG
HYPOTHESES?
5
(in which case it is termed learned helplessness). Other researchers have additionally documented the roles of psychological reactance (Wortman & Brehm, 1975) and expectation incongruency (Douglas & Anisman, 1975) in the experimental demonstration of human helplessness. The general thrust of these findings is that laboratory helplessness is not singly determined (Maier & Seligman, 1976, make the same point regarding animal helplessness). Such an expanded view is probably even more appropriate (and important) in conceptualizing the significant nonlaboratory examples of human helplessness. To date, certain theorists have viewed all examples of helplessness as learned helplessness. Such a view is certainly premature and probably wrong. Further nonlaboratory investigations are necessary. Additionally, there are issues that need further exploration within the laboratory. One such issue is the effect of the perceived locus of uncontrollability. A recent study in the helplessness tradition demonstrated that uncontrollability attributed to lack of ability was more stressful than uncontrollability attributed to the situation (Wortman, Panciera, Shusterman, & Hibscher, 1976). Although no performance impairments were obtained in this experiment, it seems that self-attributed uncontrollability is conceptually closer to what is meant by learned helplessness than is situationally attributed uncontrollability. As Wortman et al. (1976) concluded: ‘ ‘It may be important for future research to determine what factors in an experimental setting affect a subject’s attributions of causality” (p. 314). Within another research tradition, attribution theory, a great deal is known about such factors. For instance, successes tend to attributed to the self, while failures tend to be attributed to the situation (Weiner, 1974). Presumably, in those situations in which noncontingent successes lead to later learning impairment (Benson & Kennelly, 1976, demonstrated that this is not always the case; see also Eisenberger, Kaplan, & Singer, 1974), they should lead to a more general impairment than do noncontingent failures. A second issue is the effect of the amount of uncontrolllable experience. No human helplessness experiment to date, including the ones reported here, prolonged the number of uncontrollable trials to a point where subjects gave up in the pretreatment phase. If this were possible to do, would subjects who gave up have done so because they exhausted their pool of potential hypotheses and concluded that the problem was insoluble or because they ceased to consider the problem as worth the effort? According to the learned helplessness hypothesis, loss of incentive is a consequence of the belief that responses and outcomes are independent (Maier & Seligman, 1976). The present analysis suggests the possibility that sue a belief need not necessarily precede the motivational deficit characteristic of helplessness. Klinger (1975) made the similar argument in attributing depression not to uncontrollability but to disengagement from the pursuit
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of incentives. Clearly, much further work, both inside and outside the laboratory, is necessary before the phenomenon of helplessness is well understood. REFERENCES Benson, J. S., & Kennelly, K. J. Learned helplessness: The result of uncontrollable reinforcements or uncontrollable aversive stimuli? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976,34, 138-145. Bresnahan, J. L., & Blum, W. L. Chaotic reinforcement: A socioeconomic leveler. Developmental Psychology, 1971, 4, 89-92. Bnmer, A., & Revusky, S. H. Collateral behavior in humans. Journal ofthe Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 1961, 4, 349-350. Douglas, D., & Anisman, H. Helplessness or expectation incongruency: Effects of aversive stimulation on subsequent performance. Journal of Experimentat Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 1975, 1, 411-417. Dweck, C. S., & Reppucci, N. D. Learned helplessness and reinforcement responsibility in children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 25, 109-l 16. Eisenberger, R., Kaplan, R. M., & Singer, R. D. Decremental and nondecremental effects of noncontingent social approval. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 30, 716-722. Fingerman, P., & Levine, M. Nonlearning: The completeness of the blindness. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1974, 102, 720-721. Fosco, E., & Geer, J. H. Effects of gaining control over aversive stimuli after differing amounts of no control. Psychological Reports, 1971, 29, 1153-1154. Gatchel, R. J., & Proctor, J. D. Physiological correlates of learned helplessness in man. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1976, 85, 27-34. Golding, S. L., & Rorer, L. G. Illusory correlation and subjective judgment. Journal of Abnormal
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REFERENCE 1. Peterson, C. The nonveridical attribution script, Kirkland College, 1977.
NOTE
of randomness
as artifact.
Unpublished manu-