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Let's Not Forget the Organization in Organizational Justice: It Just Wouldn't Be Fair
Journal of Vocational Behavior 58, 273–278 (2001) doi:10.1006/jvbe.2001.1799, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on
EDITORIAL COMMENT Let’s Not Forget the Organization in Organizational Justice: It Just Wouldn’t Be Fair Paul E. Levy The University of Akron The theoretical suggestions of Cropanzano et al. are summarized and evaluated in this paper that also attempts to integrate the lead article with the six responses. Criticisms, concerns, and suggestions espoused in the responses are considered in light of the author’s own view of the justice area and especially in light of their relevance to studying justice in organizational contexts. °C 2001 Academic Press
The Presidential Election of 2000 will be recorded in the history books, will be talked about at the water coolers of our corporations, and will become one of those stories about which we will tell our children and grandchildren. Although this election will be debated and argued about for years, one thing it is sure to do without debate is to raise justice issues to a new level of prominence in our national consciousness. Whether listening to friends and colleagues debate these issues or watching the “focus groups” of Florida voters on the various news programs, it is clear that individuals are affected by their perceptions of justice. Does my vote count? Did I have the same opportunity to vote my preference as did others? Was the ballot actually fair in all of the Florida precincts? These may be a new set of questions or questions raised in a slightly different context, but the justice issues underlying these questions are not new. Was my performance review fair? Am I paid what I deserve? Did I have a fair chance at that promotion? These are typical justice-related questions framed in the organizational context in which justice has been examined for many years. Regardless of the context—politics, work, school, family, or community—justice is important in the thinking, sensing, and behaving of individuals. Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, and Rupp (2001) have done a terrific job reviewing the justice literature and suggesting some theoretical adjustments that have the potential to enhance our understanding of justice operations. I have always been struck by the fine line between theory and applications that applied psychologists are asked to walk, and perhaps none more than those who work in the areas of industrial/organizational and counseling psychology. Given Address correspondence and reprint requests to Paul E. Levy, Department of Psychology, The University of Akron, Akron, OH 44325-4301. E-mail: [email protected]. 273 0001-8791/01 $35.00 C 2001 by Academic Press Copyright ° All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
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the importance of this walk and the ease with which we can end up on one side (e.g., theory) or the other (e.g., applications) while virtually ignoring the side we have left behind, I use this opportunity to integrate the ideas raised in this special issue around applications or, in this case, organizational implications. Cropanzano et al. use three questions as a way of organizing their review and synthesis of the literature, and I use those same three questions as a framework. HOW DO WE MAKE FAIRNESS JUDGMENTS? The authors ask “how do we make fairness judgments?” and suggest a few theories (i.e., equity theory, fairness theory, and fairness heuristic theory), each of which has benefits and weaknesses. Using an information-processing continuum, they argue that the three major process theories discussed here fall at various points along this continuum. The respondents raise other issues. For instance, van den Bos argues that we know very little about the “how” of justice and that we need much more empirical work using laboratory experiments to help answer the “how” question. Lind views the three process theories as being different enough that they should not be integrated in any particular way and he seems uncomfortable with the use of cognitive processing as a mechanism to attempt this integration. These are important issues and provide some thought-provoking suggestions. It seems, however, that the assumption of Cropanzano et al.’s unified theory is that there are different domains that favor a particular type of information processing along the continuum discussed. If we accept the authors’ arguments, it becomes imperative that tests of this unified theory be conducted in applied settings. Manipulated or existing situations that seem to favor controlled processing, automatic processing, or something in between could be used to examine the “how do we make fairness judgments?” question for employees in these varying situations. In other words, an employee who does not have time or resources to carefully evaluate a great deal of information may rely on fairness heuristic theory in arriving at fairness judgments. For instance, an employee who receives negative feedback in the course of a typical work day from his supervisor may have to make justice judgments and respond to that feedback almost instantaneously and without the use of resources allowing for careful deliberation. On the other hand, when time and resources are available, a more controlled approach relying on equity judgments may be more likely to be used. That is, an employee who has been coached thoroughly in the company’s performance appraisal system and receives a year-end performance review in writing prior to a face-to-face appraisal interview with his or her supervisor may have the time and resources to think through the information more carefully in making justice judgments. Following from the theoretical arguments of Cropanzano et al., the first employee would be more likely to rely on fairness heuristic theory and the second employee would be more likely to rely on equity concerns in making justice judgments. Not losing sight of the organization in organizational justice suggests that research begin examining these processes in these kinds of real-world situations. Because Cropanzano et al. have articulated very well the unified theory of how
ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE
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justice judgments are made and because the respondents have helped to communicate some of the relevant concerns about this theory, it is incumbent on justice researchers to test this theory using careful experimental laboratory methodology as suggested by van den Bos, but also by conducting field studies in organizations where the “how” question can be asked of employees in diverse situations. WHY ARE WORKERS CONCERNED WITH ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE? In answering this question, Cropanzano et al. describe three descriptive models (i.e., instrumental model, relational model, and moral virtues model) in the literature and propose an integrated model they call the multiple needs model derived from Williams’ (1997) discussion of four basic psychological needs. Their argument is that justice is driven by multiple motives and that these motives can be integrated into a more comprehensive model that is based on these four needs. Further, the three models of justice discussed by Cropanzano et al. map onto the four needs presented by Williams: instrumental (need for control), relational (need for belonging and self-esteem), and moral virtues (need for meaningful existence). Greenberg questions whether all of the motives for justice eventually come back to some form of self-interest. Although this is an interesting idea and I would agree that many of the motives for justice may be related to self-interest at some level, in their rejoinder, Cropanzano et al. raise some empirical and theoretical inconsistencies with this notion that suggest that not all justice motives are based on self-interest. Taylor suggests that measures of psychological needs be included in studies of organizational justice as a way of testing the ideas proposed in the multiple needs theory. These suggestions are consistent also with the response by Lind who argues that we do not know quite as much about the “why” of justice as Cropanzano et al. suggest (van den Bos takes a similar stand in his response). Lind believes that answering the “why” question will reveal a great deal about what employees want from their jobs, fear about their jobs, and I would add, dislike immensely about their jobs. He also suggests that rather than getting caught up in some of the justice details, organizations would be better served by studying organizations and employees in this way because of the great potential to contribute to an understanding of behavior in organizations that goes beyond justice theory alone. I see the work of Peter Warr as offering a potential way to integrate some of these ideas. Warr has spent years developing his model of the environmental determinants of well-being (Warr, 1987) and has applied this model to job-related well-being (Warr, 1999). Warr argues that the workplace is central to mental health and presents a model of 10 factors that when present lead an employee to have a sense of job-related well-being. These include factors like opportunity for control, opportunity for skill use, variety, environmental clarity, valued social position, physical security, supportive supervision, opportunity for interpersonal contact, and others. I concur with Taylor that needs should be measured in justice research,
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but I suggest that we include measures of Warr’s job-related well-being factors in justice research using employees in field settings. For instance, it would be interesting to examine whether a computer programmer perceives procedural injustice at work because she is overqualified and does not have the opportunity to use her skills. Perhaps we could examine the role played by a nurse’s perception of his value to others in the organization in affecting his beliefs about distributive justice. Field studies which investigate the relationships among Warr’s factors and various elements of justice theories have great potential to enhance our understanding of the role of these factors as well as the role of justice variables in organizational functioning and employee health and well-being. This approach would move us in the direction called for by Lind and result in broader knowledge and understanding of organizational dynamics. WHAT IS JUSTICE? Cropanzano et al. carefully review the literature regarding the different types of justice and take the reader through the history of these concepts in a very clear way. They conclude that justice can be divided into three or four related, yet different, constructs. Also in this section, Cropanzano et al. make it very clear that when we make justice judgments we make them about people (e.g., supervisors and coworkers) and about the organization as an entity. They even go one large step further by distinguishing between fair events (the event paradigm) and fair people/entities (the social entity paradigm) arguing that we make justice judgments about both. Figures 3 and 4 of the Cropanzano et al. article summarize the novel and exciting approach that the authors bring to the existing thinking about justice. I expect that future research will begin to test some of the paths that are proposed in their model and I think that the heuristic framework is very beneficial for accumulating, organizing, and interpreting both research and theory. Taylor, in her response, notes the lack of qualitative research in the justice area and she encourages greater use of this research technique. Using interviews and other qualitative techniques that gather data from real-world employees in their natural context will help to make more explicit the links between some of the theoretical notions suggested by Cropanzano et al. and workplace behaviors and processes. In short, qualitative research methodologies could help answer the question about what justice really is about for real-world employees as well as how some of the important elements of the social entity paradigm and event paradigm interact to determine attitudes and behaviors of organizational employees. Greenberg’s response takes a slightly different approach, arguing that the justice research is potentially stymied by a lack of clear conceptual definition of what justice is. He suggests that researchers need to come to some agreement on the conceptual meaning of justice or else our research falls prey to circularity with justice being simply what justice researchers measure. This is somewhat consistent with Shapiro’s belief that justice researchers do not consider the voices of those who have been victims of injustice. Shapiro’s concern can be interpreted as
ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE
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suggesting that justice is really what those who experience and live injustice say it is, rather than what researchers say it is. Similarly, I suggest it is the victims of justice who potentially can shed more light and clarity on the various elements of the Cropanzano et al. model (Figures 3 and 4) and how those elements fit together to determine affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses. This is consistent as well with Meara’s response in which she posits that the least powerful are likely to have the most important role in building just organizations and in doing organizational justice research. These arguments by Taylor, Greenberg, Meara, and Shapiro suggest that future research needs to broaden its scope in terms of methodological approaches and research participants so that we can narrow in on what justice really is, and then determine the specifics of the role it plays in organizational functioning. In other words, ironically, these respondents are calling for justice researchers to take a more participative approach to justice research with voice being shared in different ways by different constituents. It is especially important that organizational employees take a leadership role in the advancement and application of justice theories through being research participants and through providing researchers with information about how elements play out in the organizational context. In conclusion, Cropanzano et al. have provided an excellent review of the justice literature, an integration of different models of justice, and a suggestion for a twoparadigm model that has potential as a heuristic framework to guide future justice research. I now go back to the beginning of this essay. Did my vote count? Was the ballot actually fair? Was my performance review fair? Did I have a fair chance at that promotion? Justice is about my answers, attitudes, beliefs, cognitions, ideas, and perceptions regarding these questions. Shapiro is concerned that we keep inventing and reinventing theory and tend not to ask the right questions of the right people—the victims of injustice. Greenberg thinks we need to figure out what justice is before we can move the justice literature further along. Taylor wants to see qualitative research with real-world employees and warns of three potential biases that affect justice judgments. Van den Bos thinks that we need carefully designed laboratory studies to allow us to better answer the “how” and “why” questions. Lind believes that we seldom focus on trying to figure out why justice matters so much to people, but that if we do take this focus a much clearer and brighter picture of organizational functioning will come into view. Meara reminds us that justice is a virtue, but that our hope is that those who make decisions and have power are virtuous in ways other than justice. Together, the work presented in this special issue by Cropanzano et al. and the respondents outlines a clear research agenda and a heuristic framework to follow. If this agenda for organizational justice is pursued vigorously, and we do not lose sight of the organization and its employees in our endeavors, we will, as Taylor suggests, make justice a permanent and important part of organizational science. One small step toward a more just world will follow from a better understanding of both just and unjust organizational practices.
278
PAUL E. LEVY
REFERENCES Cropanzano, R., Byrne, Z. S., Bobocel, D. R., & Rupp, D. E. (2001). Moral virtues, fairness heuristics, social entities, and other denizens of organizational justice. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 164–209. Cropanzano, R., Byrne, Z. S., Bobocel, D. R., & Rupp, D. E. (2001). Self-enhancement biases, laboratory experiments, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the increasingly crowded world of organizational justice. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 260–272. Greenberg, J. (2001). Setting the justice agenda: Seven unanswered questions about “what, why, and how.” Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 210–219. Lind, E. A. (2001). Thinking critically about justice judgments. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 220–226. Meara, N. M. (2001). Just and virtuous leaders and organizations. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 227–234. Shapiro, D. L. (2001). The death of justice theory is likely if theorists neglect the “wheels” already invented and the voices of the injustice victims. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 235–242. Taylor, M. S. (2001). Reflections on fairness: Continuing the progression of justice research and practice. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 243–253. van den Bos, K. (2001). Fundamental research by means of laboratory experiments is essential for a better understanding of organizational justice. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 254–259. Warr, P. B. (1987). Work, unemployment, and mental health. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Warr, P. (1999). Well-being and the workplace. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwartz (Eds.), Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Williams, K. D. (1997). Social ostracism. In R. M. Kowalski (Ed.), Aversive interpersonal behaviors (pp. 133–170). New York: Plenum Press. Received: January 3, 2001
EDITORIAL COMMENT Let’s Not Forget the Organization in Organizational Justice: It Just Wouldn’t Be Fair Paul E. Levy The University of Akron The theoretical suggestions of Cropanzano et al. are summarized and evaluated in this paper that also attempts to integrate the lead article with the six responses. Criticisms, concerns, and suggestions espoused in the responses are considered in light of the author’s own view of the justice area and especially in light of their relevance to studying justice in organizational contexts. °C 2001 Academic Press
The Presidential Election of 2000 will be recorded in the history books, will be talked about at the water coolers of our corporations, and will become one of those stories about which we will tell our children and grandchildren. Although this election will be debated and argued about for years, one thing it is sure to do without debate is to raise justice issues to a new level of prominence in our national consciousness. Whether listening to friends and colleagues debate these issues or watching the “focus groups” of Florida voters on the various news programs, it is clear that individuals are affected by their perceptions of justice. Does my vote count? Did I have the same opportunity to vote my preference as did others? Was the ballot actually fair in all of the Florida precincts? These may be a new set of questions or questions raised in a slightly different context, but the justice issues underlying these questions are not new. Was my performance review fair? Am I paid what I deserve? Did I have a fair chance at that promotion? These are typical justice-related questions framed in the organizational context in which justice has been examined for many years. Regardless of the context—politics, work, school, family, or community—justice is important in the thinking, sensing, and behaving of individuals. Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, and Rupp (2001) have done a terrific job reviewing the justice literature and suggesting some theoretical adjustments that have the potential to enhance our understanding of justice operations. I have always been struck by the fine line between theory and applications that applied psychologists are asked to walk, and perhaps none more than those who work in the areas of industrial/organizational and counseling psychology. Given Address correspondence and reprint requests to Paul E. Levy, Department of Psychology, The University of Akron, Akron, OH 44325-4301. E-mail: [email protected]. 273 0001-8791/01 $35.00 C 2001 by Academic Press Copyright ° All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
274
PAUL E. LEVY
the importance of this walk and the ease with which we can end up on one side (e.g., theory) or the other (e.g., applications) while virtually ignoring the side we have left behind, I use this opportunity to integrate the ideas raised in this special issue around applications or, in this case, organizational implications. Cropanzano et al. use three questions as a way of organizing their review and synthesis of the literature, and I use those same three questions as a framework. HOW DO WE MAKE FAIRNESS JUDGMENTS? The authors ask “how do we make fairness judgments?” and suggest a few theories (i.e., equity theory, fairness theory, and fairness heuristic theory), each of which has benefits and weaknesses. Using an information-processing continuum, they argue that the three major process theories discussed here fall at various points along this continuum. The respondents raise other issues. For instance, van den Bos argues that we know very little about the “how” of justice and that we need much more empirical work using laboratory experiments to help answer the “how” question. Lind views the three process theories as being different enough that they should not be integrated in any particular way and he seems uncomfortable with the use of cognitive processing as a mechanism to attempt this integration. These are important issues and provide some thought-provoking suggestions. It seems, however, that the assumption of Cropanzano et al.’s unified theory is that there are different domains that favor a particular type of information processing along the continuum discussed. If we accept the authors’ arguments, it becomes imperative that tests of this unified theory be conducted in applied settings. Manipulated or existing situations that seem to favor controlled processing, automatic processing, or something in between could be used to examine the “how do we make fairness judgments?” question for employees in these varying situations. In other words, an employee who does not have time or resources to carefully evaluate a great deal of information may rely on fairness heuristic theory in arriving at fairness judgments. For instance, an employee who receives negative feedback in the course of a typical work day from his supervisor may have to make justice judgments and respond to that feedback almost instantaneously and without the use of resources allowing for careful deliberation. On the other hand, when time and resources are available, a more controlled approach relying on equity judgments may be more likely to be used. That is, an employee who has been coached thoroughly in the company’s performance appraisal system and receives a year-end performance review in writing prior to a face-to-face appraisal interview with his or her supervisor may have the time and resources to think through the information more carefully in making justice judgments. Following from the theoretical arguments of Cropanzano et al., the first employee would be more likely to rely on fairness heuristic theory and the second employee would be more likely to rely on equity concerns in making justice judgments. Not losing sight of the organization in organizational justice suggests that research begin examining these processes in these kinds of real-world situations. Because Cropanzano et al. have articulated very well the unified theory of how
ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE
275
justice judgments are made and because the respondents have helped to communicate some of the relevant concerns about this theory, it is incumbent on justice researchers to test this theory using careful experimental laboratory methodology as suggested by van den Bos, but also by conducting field studies in organizations where the “how” question can be asked of employees in diverse situations. WHY ARE WORKERS CONCERNED WITH ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE? In answering this question, Cropanzano et al. describe three descriptive models (i.e., instrumental model, relational model, and moral virtues model) in the literature and propose an integrated model they call the multiple needs model derived from Williams’ (1997) discussion of four basic psychological needs. Their argument is that justice is driven by multiple motives and that these motives can be integrated into a more comprehensive model that is based on these four needs. Further, the three models of justice discussed by Cropanzano et al. map onto the four needs presented by Williams: instrumental (need for control), relational (need for belonging and self-esteem), and moral virtues (need for meaningful existence). Greenberg questions whether all of the motives for justice eventually come back to some form of self-interest. Although this is an interesting idea and I would agree that many of the motives for justice may be related to self-interest at some level, in their rejoinder, Cropanzano et al. raise some empirical and theoretical inconsistencies with this notion that suggest that not all justice motives are based on self-interest. Taylor suggests that measures of psychological needs be included in studies of organizational justice as a way of testing the ideas proposed in the multiple needs theory. These suggestions are consistent also with the response by Lind who argues that we do not know quite as much about the “why” of justice as Cropanzano et al. suggest (van den Bos takes a similar stand in his response). Lind believes that answering the “why” question will reveal a great deal about what employees want from their jobs, fear about their jobs, and I would add, dislike immensely about their jobs. He also suggests that rather than getting caught up in some of the justice details, organizations would be better served by studying organizations and employees in this way because of the great potential to contribute to an understanding of behavior in organizations that goes beyond justice theory alone. I see the work of Peter Warr as offering a potential way to integrate some of these ideas. Warr has spent years developing his model of the environmental determinants of well-being (Warr, 1987) and has applied this model to job-related well-being (Warr, 1999). Warr argues that the workplace is central to mental health and presents a model of 10 factors that when present lead an employee to have a sense of job-related well-being. These include factors like opportunity for control, opportunity for skill use, variety, environmental clarity, valued social position, physical security, supportive supervision, opportunity for interpersonal contact, and others. I concur with Taylor that needs should be measured in justice research,
276
PAUL E. LEVY
but I suggest that we include measures of Warr’s job-related well-being factors in justice research using employees in field settings. For instance, it would be interesting to examine whether a computer programmer perceives procedural injustice at work because she is overqualified and does not have the opportunity to use her skills. Perhaps we could examine the role played by a nurse’s perception of his value to others in the organization in affecting his beliefs about distributive justice. Field studies which investigate the relationships among Warr’s factors and various elements of justice theories have great potential to enhance our understanding of the role of these factors as well as the role of justice variables in organizational functioning and employee health and well-being. This approach would move us in the direction called for by Lind and result in broader knowledge and understanding of organizational dynamics. WHAT IS JUSTICE? Cropanzano et al. carefully review the literature regarding the different types of justice and take the reader through the history of these concepts in a very clear way. They conclude that justice can be divided into three or four related, yet different, constructs. Also in this section, Cropanzano et al. make it very clear that when we make justice judgments we make them about people (e.g., supervisors and coworkers) and about the organization as an entity. They even go one large step further by distinguishing between fair events (the event paradigm) and fair people/entities (the social entity paradigm) arguing that we make justice judgments about both. Figures 3 and 4 of the Cropanzano et al. article summarize the novel and exciting approach that the authors bring to the existing thinking about justice. I expect that future research will begin to test some of the paths that are proposed in their model and I think that the heuristic framework is very beneficial for accumulating, organizing, and interpreting both research and theory. Taylor, in her response, notes the lack of qualitative research in the justice area and she encourages greater use of this research technique. Using interviews and other qualitative techniques that gather data from real-world employees in their natural context will help to make more explicit the links between some of the theoretical notions suggested by Cropanzano et al. and workplace behaviors and processes. In short, qualitative research methodologies could help answer the question about what justice really is about for real-world employees as well as how some of the important elements of the social entity paradigm and event paradigm interact to determine attitudes and behaviors of organizational employees. Greenberg’s response takes a slightly different approach, arguing that the justice research is potentially stymied by a lack of clear conceptual definition of what justice is. He suggests that researchers need to come to some agreement on the conceptual meaning of justice or else our research falls prey to circularity with justice being simply what justice researchers measure. This is somewhat consistent with Shapiro’s belief that justice researchers do not consider the voices of those who have been victims of injustice. Shapiro’s concern can be interpreted as
ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE
277
suggesting that justice is really what those who experience and live injustice say it is, rather than what researchers say it is. Similarly, I suggest it is the victims of justice who potentially can shed more light and clarity on the various elements of the Cropanzano et al. model (Figures 3 and 4) and how those elements fit together to determine affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses. This is consistent as well with Meara’s response in which she posits that the least powerful are likely to have the most important role in building just organizations and in doing organizational justice research. These arguments by Taylor, Greenberg, Meara, and Shapiro suggest that future research needs to broaden its scope in terms of methodological approaches and research participants so that we can narrow in on what justice really is, and then determine the specifics of the role it plays in organizational functioning. In other words, ironically, these respondents are calling for justice researchers to take a more participative approach to justice research with voice being shared in different ways by different constituents. It is especially important that organizational employees take a leadership role in the advancement and application of justice theories through being research participants and through providing researchers with information about how elements play out in the organizational context. In conclusion, Cropanzano et al. have provided an excellent review of the justice literature, an integration of different models of justice, and a suggestion for a twoparadigm model that has potential as a heuristic framework to guide future justice research. I now go back to the beginning of this essay. Did my vote count? Was the ballot actually fair? Was my performance review fair? Did I have a fair chance at that promotion? Justice is about my answers, attitudes, beliefs, cognitions, ideas, and perceptions regarding these questions. Shapiro is concerned that we keep inventing and reinventing theory and tend not to ask the right questions of the right people—the victims of injustice. Greenberg thinks we need to figure out what justice is before we can move the justice literature further along. Taylor wants to see qualitative research with real-world employees and warns of three potential biases that affect justice judgments. Van den Bos thinks that we need carefully designed laboratory studies to allow us to better answer the “how” and “why” questions. Lind believes that we seldom focus on trying to figure out why justice matters so much to people, but that if we do take this focus a much clearer and brighter picture of organizational functioning will come into view. Meara reminds us that justice is a virtue, but that our hope is that those who make decisions and have power are virtuous in ways other than justice. Together, the work presented in this special issue by Cropanzano et al. and the respondents outlines a clear research agenda and a heuristic framework to follow. If this agenda for organizational justice is pursued vigorously, and we do not lose sight of the organization and its employees in our endeavors, we will, as Taylor suggests, make justice a permanent and important part of organizational science. One small step toward a more just world will follow from a better understanding of both just and unjust organizational practices.
278
PAUL E. LEVY
REFERENCES Cropanzano, R., Byrne, Z. S., Bobocel, D. R., & Rupp, D. E. (2001). Moral virtues, fairness heuristics, social entities, and other denizens of organizational justice. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 164–209. Cropanzano, R., Byrne, Z. S., Bobocel, D. R., & Rupp, D. E. (2001). Self-enhancement biases, laboratory experiments, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the increasingly crowded world of organizational justice. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 260–272. Greenberg, J. (2001). Setting the justice agenda: Seven unanswered questions about “what, why, and how.” Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 210–219. Lind, E. A. (2001). Thinking critically about justice judgments. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 220–226. Meara, N. M. (2001). Just and virtuous leaders and organizations. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 227–234. Shapiro, D. L. (2001). The death of justice theory is likely if theorists neglect the “wheels” already invented and the voices of the injustice victims. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 235–242. Taylor, M. S. (2001). Reflections on fairness: Continuing the progression of justice research and practice. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 243–253. van den Bos, K. (2001). Fundamental research by means of laboratory experiments is essential for a better understanding of organizational justice. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 58, 254–259. Warr, P. B. (1987). Work, unemployment, and mental health. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Warr, P. (1999). Well-being and the workplace. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwartz (Eds.), Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Williams, K. D. (1997). Social ostracism. In R. M. Kowalski (Ed.), Aversive interpersonal behaviors (pp. 133–170). New York: Plenum Press. Received: January 3, 2001