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Liberal aviation agreements – New Zealand
Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 177 — 180
Liberal aviation agreements — New Zealand Chris Kissling* Department of Transport Studies, Lincoln University, PO Box 56, Canterbury, New Zealand
Abstract New Zealand has embraced enthusiastically moves to liberalise aviation both domestically and internationally. It has relaxed limitations on foreign ownership of domestic airlines, entered into very liberal agreements with much larger and economically more powerful economies, and has concluded an agreement with Australia that puts in place a single aviation market which permits airlines in either country to fly domestic services in the other as well as international services between themselves and beyond to other countries. There remains limitations on the number of beyond flights, but New Zealand seeks that restriction to be removed as well. Quality of service within New Zealand improved dramatically with liberalisation. Strategic alliances and code-sharings have characterised international developments ( 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Aviation; Liberalisation; New Zealand
1. The liberalising philosophy in New Zealand New Zealanders have for the last 10 years enjoyed the benefits brought about by increased competition for domestic aviation services. When the Air New Zealand monopoly of services was effectively broken upon the introduction of trunk route air services by Ansett New Zealand, quite profound changes took place. Ansett New Zealand built new airport terminals with aerobridges, and introduced club lounges forcing Air New Zealand to provide similar facilities. On-time departure statistics improved. Air fares dropped. Some analysts did not think the domestic market was big enough to sustain two trunk route operators going head to head. Indeed, Ansett New Zealand took some five years to show any profits, a reminder that new entrants in this business need to have a strong financial backing if they are to withstand the efforts of incumbent operators to fly them out of the skies. As a fully foreign owned carrier (the parent company Ansett Australia was owned 50% TNT/50% News Corporation) Ansett New Zealand did have that necessary backing to look to develop market share and eventually profitability. It is a measure of the New Zealand Government’s resolve to
* Fax: 0064 3325 3603; e-mail: [email protected]. 0969-6997/98/$19.00 ( 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 6 9 - 6 9 9 7 ( 9 8 ) 0 0 0 2 0 - 9
encourage competition in the provision of transport services that it rewrote the law to allow Ansett New Zealand to have foreign interests in control.
2. Sub-regional effects within New Zealand Air New Zealand withdrew from many regional air services leaving them to the smaller regional carriers like Air Nelson, Eagle Air and Mount Cook Airline, the latter a fully owned subsidiary of Air New Zealand. This move saw the replacement of F27 aircraft with Metroliners, Banderainte and the old HS748s. Service frequencies to regional airports increased. However, the contrast in level of comfort between trunk operators using B737 (Air NZ) and Bae146 (Ansett NZ) and the regional operators was a negative factor that had to be addressed and is still being addressed. Saab Fairchild and ATR72 aircraft have been introduced. The HS748s were withdrawn. Air New Zealand repositioned Mount Cook Airline and acquired controlling interests in other regional carriers to put together Air New Zealand Link, in effect rebranding the local carriers and integrating them into a national regional feeder service for the hub airports of Wellington, Auckland and Christchurch. Ansett New Zealand has also developed Tranzair to service selected regional centres in similar fashion, but has not attempted to match Air New Zealand’s domestic coverage.
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C. Kissling / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 177—180
3. Parallel schedules and congestion Another corollary arising from the domestic liberalisation and privatisation of Air New Zealand, has been the development of parallel schedules between the two main carriers on the trunk routes as each vie to service the same market and that market’s preferred travel times. Also, the hub and spoke regional developments using smaller aircraft and higher frequencies of service, has lead to air traffic congestion at critical times at key airports like Wellington which is the centrally located capital city. Studies are underway to see what can be done to overcome this bunching of flights. Published flight schedules cannot possibly be adhered to in these circumstances. Airways Corporation, the State Owned Enterprise (SOE) that supplies state-of-the-art air traffic control, is often blamed unfairly for the delays when pilots inform passengers that they (the pilots) are not allowed to start engines and that they have to sit on the airport apron waiting for their position in the queue, or that they have to hold and circle at a waypoint. There is still plenty of capacity in the airspace either side of the prime times in which the airlines seek to schedule services and little prospect of voluntary shifts if competitors would be left with the favoured slots. Given that the flight times are mostly of an hour or less in New Zealand, the knock-on effects of congestion at a central hub like Wellington can be significant. Bad weather can magnify the problem and disrupt schedules for the whole day. One can say that the experience of liberalisation in the provision of air services domestically in New Zealand has conditioned operators and travellers alike to think of service quality factors and how the system delivers those service qualities. There is no doubt that the majority of New Zealanders and managers of airlines and airports would not wish to have government as owner—operator in the aviation business. They have seen the huge improvements that have accompanied government divesting itself of ownership and operational roles, with government interest concentrating on providing the necessary safe environment and facilitating the procurement of liberal international air service agreements. New Zealand carriers are expected to be competitive with the best internationally. Government is not interested in propping them up as high cost operators.
4. Tourism interests Other businesses are looking for airlines to provide air services that attract visitors. Tourist interests in New Zealand must compete with alternative destinations and attractions. If international air services for New Zealand cost too much, the whole economy suffers. Therefore, if foreign carriers can provide services reliably and relatively cheaply, they should not, according to New Zealand
Government policy, be shackled by restrictive clauses in air service agreements simply to protect a New Zealand carrier. New Zealand expects the same philosophy to become the accepted norm in other countries. This must be the case in the APEC region. The economies of APEC have set themselves the goal of open regionalism and free trade by 2010 for developed member economies and by 2020 for the rest. Free trade must embrace trade in services including aviation. The agenda is set. The question is how fast can it be implemented? Are there advantages to be gained from expediting the liberalisation process for air service agreements? Hufbauer and Findlay (1996) are convinced that the answer is yes. New Zealand thinks that there are benefits that outweigh any reservations. As a small nation we could be expected to fear being swamped by our larger trading partners in any liberal air service agreements. The simple fact is that we have concluded very liberal air service agreements with a number of countries all of whom are economically powerful relative to New Zealand, and strategically located better when it comes to linking into the world aviation network.
5. Competition in the Australia – New Zealand single aviation market We have a special single aviation market agreement with Australia, our nearest neighbour and biggest trading partner. Even so, our big brother next door is wary about granting further beyond rights to New Zealandbased carriers as they see that the flow of benefits might favour the smaller player (New Zealand) operating through the larger domestic market of Australia to points beyond. Now that Air New Zealand and Ansett Australia have joined together, with Air New Zealand buying a 50% stake in Ansett Australia, we are seeing the two carriers rationalising their systems and coordinating their activities. Qantas is facing and will face strong competition from the Air New Zealand/Ansett Australia relationship in its own backyard besides the competition both face from other international airlines that fly to the region. But Qantas is not facing that threat without significant support. Their relationship with British Airways and others places them in one of the big global consortia vying for international aviation superiority. Minnows and niche players like Air New Zealand likewise have sought and gained alliances with other significant regional and global players like Singapore Airlines and United Airlines. Market forces are compelling international airlines to seek ways and means of overcoming the restrictions that abound in the maze of existing interlocking bilateral air service agreements. Governments in some cases are encouraging the process, in others moving reluctantly to endorse business management lead initiatives, still others
C. Kissling / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 177—180
remaining unmoved by the trend, holding to the brief that governments must retain control of this form of trade. Why? They fear adverse flow-on effects within their own domestic economies, social disruption, and external dictation of developments. New Zealand seemingly has no such qualms provided there is no return to previous monopoly situations. Such a danger, brought about by the new relationship between Ansett Australia and Air New Zealand, could have seen Air New Zealand exerting undue influence over its domestic rival, Ansett New Zealand, had not the New Zealand Commerce Commission taken steps to ensure that Ansett New Zealand’s ownership structure was ring-fenced from Air New Zealand (Findlay and Kissling, 1997). It would be fair to consider, however, whether New Zealand would change its stance on liberalisation of air service agreements were it located near one of the major aviation hubs in East Asia? We might be more concerned about being swamped. As it is, our relative isolation, three hours flying time by jet aircraft to our nearest neighbours, and few practical beyond destinations, makes it easy for New Zealand to embrace the liberal open skies philosophy. We stand to gain most from such arrangements.
6. Open capacity/open routes/open skies The process of liberalisation of air service agreements leads to situations wherein bilateral parties agree they will not attempt to restrict the capacity offered between their territories, nor the choice of route designated carriers will opt to fly. These matters are left to the commercial decisions of carriers. Governments that follow this approach, tend not to be beneficial owners of national airlines and therefore beholden to ensure their survival. Rather, these governments are more interested in providing for fair competition and delivery of quality airline service for both nationals and visitors. Another term for this approach is ‘open skies’. That does not include access to domestic traffic (cabotage), but true open skies might suggest that could be the ultimate expression of liberalisation in aviation.
7. Substantial ownership and effective control These were once the watchwords of all international bilateral aviation agreements. Designated airlines of the contracting parties had to be substantially owned by national interests, and effective control of those airlines had likewise to be beyond foreign dictate. With so much leasing of aircraft, and increasing cross-over of equity interests, it is no longer easy to distinguish just who the beneficial owners may be of specific carriers. Keeping track of the domicile of shares and ensuring that a set
179
limit on foreign ownership is not breached in regular trading becomes difficult. As a result, countries that are adopting more liberal stances on international aviation agreements, are moving away from adherence to strict limits on foreign ownership and substituting terms such as ‘principle place of business’ to determine the geographical affiliation of airlines. Wording of memoranda of understanding retain mention of effectiveness of control and principle place of business as a means of testing where the allegiances lie. An airline might be largely or principally foreign owned, but if the locus of decisions and focus of operations is clearly identified with one sovereign nation, then such airlines are for all practical purposes domiciled in that nation regardless of any profit repatriation that takes place. However, even the liberally inclined USA does not fully espouse such openness, retaining a limit of 25% on foreign ownership — ostensibly for defence reasons and the need to have control of capacity in times of crisis. There are other ways to ensure sequestering of resources when needed without resort to limitation of foreign ownership. Surprisingly, given the desire to ensure ‘national’ control of what are very mobile assets, a number of countries do not have in place any protection against the on-selling of national shareholdings to third parties. Here again, an accent on determining ‘the principle place of business’ rather than rigorously checking share trading, can highlight the true intent of a company’s operations.
8. Slots and curfews as barriers Even if countries adopt more liberal air service agreement philosophies, there can remain other forms of barriers to trade in air services. Perhaps foremost of these is and will be availability of ‘slots’ at airports. Insufficient capacity at key hub airports in the Asia Pacific region potentially can negate the strategies of ‘open skies’. Another significant inhibitor is the presence of curfews at those same key airports. Should curfews arise and persist and be present at either end of long-haul routes, the available windows for conducting air services can be narrowed dramatically. This will cause further bunching in schedules and further headaches for air traffic control systems and managers. New Zealand is located at ‘the end of the line’ rather than as a strategic hub from a global perspective. Many of our air services are longhaul. We can be particularly affected by lack of slots and by airport curfews in other countries.
9. Liberalising partners Those economies currently building significant new airport capacity, as in Malaysia, might be expected to
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C. Kissling / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 177—180
move towards more liberal policies if they are to compete with established Asian hub airports like Singapore and Hong Kong. This will help New Zealand to conclude more liberal bilateral agreements with Malaysia. New Zealand has concluded very liberal agreements with Singapore and the USA. These are expected to deliver commercial opportunities and contestability with the benefits having to be won by the airlines involved (Bradbury, 1997). Quite liberal agreements have been concluded with South Korea Taiwan and Malaysia with another expected with Brunei that could deliver further contestability on the Auckland—Hong Kong sector. New Zealand has an excellent relationship with Japan and a process of incremental liberalisation is evident, somewhat circumscribed by Japan’s infrastructural problems. New Zealand would like to pick up some unused USA cargo slots at Narita airport.
Overall, New Zealand is clearly in the camp of those economies who wish to see international air service agreements liberalised and believes APEC economies will continue to move in that direction.
References Bradbury, J., 1997. Ministry of Transport, New Zealand, personal communication. Findlay, C.C., Kissling, C.C., 1997. Flying towards a single aviation market across the Tasman. In: Findlay, C., Sien, C.L., Singh, K. (Eds.), Asia Pacific Air Transport, Challenges and Policy Reforms, ch. 11. Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore, pp. 181—191. Hufbauer, G.C., Findlay, C.C. (Eds.), 1996. Flying High Liberalizing Civil Aviation in the Asia Pacific. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.
Liberal aviation agreements — New Zealand Chris Kissling* Department of Transport Studies, Lincoln University, PO Box 56, Canterbury, New Zealand
Abstract New Zealand has embraced enthusiastically moves to liberalise aviation both domestically and internationally. It has relaxed limitations on foreign ownership of domestic airlines, entered into very liberal agreements with much larger and economically more powerful economies, and has concluded an agreement with Australia that puts in place a single aviation market which permits airlines in either country to fly domestic services in the other as well as international services between themselves and beyond to other countries. There remains limitations on the number of beyond flights, but New Zealand seeks that restriction to be removed as well. Quality of service within New Zealand improved dramatically with liberalisation. Strategic alliances and code-sharings have characterised international developments ( 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Aviation; Liberalisation; New Zealand
1. The liberalising philosophy in New Zealand New Zealanders have for the last 10 years enjoyed the benefits brought about by increased competition for domestic aviation services. When the Air New Zealand monopoly of services was effectively broken upon the introduction of trunk route air services by Ansett New Zealand, quite profound changes took place. Ansett New Zealand built new airport terminals with aerobridges, and introduced club lounges forcing Air New Zealand to provide similar facilities. On-time departure statistics improved. Air fares dropped. Some analysts did not think the domestic market was big enough to sustain two trunk route operators going head to head. Indeed, Ansett New Zealand took some five years to show any profits, a reminder that new entrants in this business need to have a strong financial backing if they are to withstand the efforts of incumbent operators to fly them out of the skies. As a fully foreign owned carrier (the parent company Ansett Australia was owned 50% TNT/50% News Corporation) Ansett New Zealand did have that necessary backing to look to develop market share and eventually profitability. It is a measure of the New Zealand Government’s resolve to
* Fax: 0064 3325 3603; e-mail: [email protected]. 0969-6997/98/$19.00 ( 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 6 9 - 6 9 9 7 ( 9 8 ) 0 0 0 2 0 - 9
encourage competition in the provision of transport services that it rewrote the law to allow Ansett New Zealand to have foreign interests in control.
2. Sub-regional effects within New Zealand Air New Zealand withdrew from many regional air services leaving them to the smaller regional carriers like Air Nelson, Eagle Air and Mount Cook Airline, the latter a fully owned subsidiary of Air New Zealand. This move saw the replacement of F27 aircraft with Metroliners, Banderainte and the old HS748s. Service frequencies to regional airports increased. However, the contrast in level of comfort between trunk operators using B737 (Air NZ) and Bae146 (Ansett NZ) and the regional operators was a negative factor that had to be addressed and is still being addressed. Saab Fairchild and ATR72 aircraft have been introduced. The HS748s were withdrawn. Air New Zealand repositioned Mount Cook Airline and acquired controlling interests in other regional carriers to put together Air New Zealand Link, in effect rebranding the local carriers and integrating them into a national regional feeder service for the hub airports of Wellington, Auckland and Christchurch. Ansett New Zealand has also developed Tranzair to service selected regional centres in similar fashion, but has not attempted to match Air New Zealand’s domestic coverage.
178
C. Kissling / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 177—180
3. Parallel schedules and congestion Another corollary arising from the domestic liberalisation and privatisation of Air New Zealand, has been the development of parallel schedules between the two main carriers on the trunk routes as each vie to service the same market and that market’s preferred travel times. Also, the hub and spoke regional developments using smaller aircraft and higher frequencies of service, has lead to air traffic congestion at critical times at key airports like Wellington which is the centrally located capital city. Studies are underway to see what can be done to overcome this bunching of flights. Published flight schedules cannot possibly be adhered to in these circumstances. Airways Corporation, the State Owned Enterprise (SOE) that supplies state-of-the-art air traffic control, is often blamed unfairly for the delays when pilots inform passengers that they (the pilots) are not allowed to start engines and that they have to sit on the airport apron waiting for their position in the queue, or that they have to hold and circle at a waypoint. There is still plenty of capacity in the airspace either side of the prime times in which the airlines seek to schedule services and little prospect of voluntary shifts if competitors would be left with the favoured slots. Given that the flight times are mostly of an hour or less in New Zealand, the knock-on effects of congestion at a central hub like Wellington can be significant. Bad weather can magnify the problem and disrupt schedules for the whole day. One can say that the experience of liberalisation in the provision of air services domestically in New Zealand has conditioned operators and travellers alike to think of service quality factors and how the system delivers those service qualities. There is no doubt that the majority of New Zealanders and managers of airlines and airports would not wish to have government as owner—operator in the aviation business. They have seen the huge improvements that have accompanied government divesting itself of ownership and operational roles, with government interest concentrating on providing the necessary safe environment and facilitating the procurement of liberal international air service agreements. New Zealand carriers are expected to be competitive with the best internationally. Government is not interested in propping them up as high cost operators.
4. Tourism interests Other businesses are looking for airlines to provide air services that attract visitors. Tourist interests in New Zealand must compete with alternative destinations and attractions. If international air services for New Zealand cost too much, the whole economy suffers. Therefore, if foreign carriers can provide services reliably and relatively cheaply, they should not, according to New Zealand
Government policy, be shackled by restrictive clauses in air service agreements simply to protect a New Zealand carrier. New Zealand expects the same philosophy to become the accepted norm in other countries. This must be the case in the APEC region. The economies of APEC have set themselves the goal of open regionalism and free trade by 2010 for developed member economies and by 2020 for the rest. Free trade must embrace trade in services including aviation. The agenda is set. The question is how fast can it be implemented? Are there advantages to be gained from expediting the liberalisation process for air service agreements? Hufbauer and Findlay (1996) are convinced that the answer is yes. New Zealand thinks that there are benefits that outweigh any reservations. As a small nation we could be expected to fear being swamped by our larger trading partners in any liberal air service agreements. The simple fact is that we have concluded very liberal air service agreements with a number of countries all of whom are economically powerful relative to New Zealand, and strategically located better when it comes to linking into the world aviation network.
5. Competition in the Australia – New Zealand single aviation market We have a special single aviation market agreement with Australia, our nearest neighbour and biggest trading partner. Even so, our big brother next door is wary about granting further beyond rights to New Zealandbased carriers as they see that the flow of benefits might favour the smaller player (New Zealand) operating through the larger domestic market of Australia to points beyond. Now that Air New Zealand and Ansett Australia have joined together, with Air New Zealand buying a 50% stake in Ansett Australia, we are seeing the two carriers rationalising their systems and coordinating their activities. Qantas is facing and will face strong competition from the Air New Zealand/Ansett Australia relationship in its own backyard besides the competition both face from other international airlines that fly to the region. But Qantas is not facing that threat without significant support. Their relationship with British Airways and others places them in one of the big global consortia vying for international aviation superiority. Minnows and niche players like Air New Zealand likewise have sought and gained alliances with other significant regional and global players like Singapore Airlines and United Airlines. Market forces are compelling international airlines to seek ways and means of overcoming the restrictions that abound in the maze of existing interlocking bilateral air service agreements. Governments in some cases are encouraging the process, in others moving reluctantly to endorse business management lead initiatives, still others
C. Kissling / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 177—180
remaining unmoved by the trend, holding to the brief that governments must retain control of this form of trade. Why? They fear adverse flow-on effects within their own domestic economies, social disruption, and external dictation of developments. New Zealand seemingly has no such qualms provided there is no return to previous monopoly situations. Such a danger, brought about by the new relationship between Ansett Australia and Air New Zealand, could have seen Air New Zealand exerting undue influence over its domestic rival, Ansett New Zealand, had not the New Zealand Commerce Commission taken steps to ensure that Ansett New Zealand’s ownership structure was ring-fenced from Air New Zealand (Findlay and Kissling, 1997). It would be fair to consider, however, whether New Zealand would change its stance on liberalisation of air service agreements were it located near one of the major aviation hubs in East Asia? We might be more concerned about being swamped. As it is, our relative isolation, three hours flying time by jet aircraft to our nearest neighbours, and few practical beyond destinations, makes it easy for New Zealand to embrace the liberal open skies philosophy. We stand to gain most from such arrangements.
6. Open capacity/open routes/open skies The process of liberalisation of air service agreements leads to situations wherein bilateral parties agree they will not attempt to restrict the capacity offered between their territories, nor the choice of route designated carriers will opt to fly. These matters are left to the commercial decisions of carriers. Governments that follow this approach, tend not to be beneficial owners of national airlines and therefore beholden to ensure their survival. Rather, these governments are more interested in providing for fair competition and delivery of quality airline service for both nationals and visitors. Another term for this approach is ‘open skies’. That does not include access to domestic traffic (cabotage), but true open skies might suggest that could be the ultimate expression of liberalisation in aviation.
7. Substantial ownership and effective control These were once the watchwords of all international bilateral aviation agreements. Designated airlines of the contracting parties had to be substantially owned by national interests, and effective control of those airlines had likewise to be beyond foreign dictate. With so much leasing of aircraft, and increasing cross-over of equity interests, it is no longer easy to distinguish just who the beneficial owners may be of specific carriers. Keeping track of the domicile of shares and ensuring that a set
179
limit on foreign ownership is not breached in regular trading becomes difficult. As a result, countries that are adopting more liberal stances on international aviation agreements, are moving away from adherence to strict limits on foreign ownership and substituting terms such as ‘principle place of business’ to determine the geographical affiliation of airlines. Wording of memoranda of understanding retain mention of effectiveness of control and principle place of business as a means of testing where the allegiances lie. An airline might be largely or principally foreign owned, but if the locus of decisions and focus of operations is clearly identified with one sovereign nation, then such airlines are for all practical purposes domiciled in that nation regardless of any profit repatriation that takes place. However, even the liberally inclined USA does not fully espouse such openness, retaining a limit of 25% on foreign ownership — ostensibly for defence reasons and the need to have control of capacity in times of crisis. There are other ways to ensure sequestering of resources when needed without resort to limitation of foreign ownership. Surprisingly, given the desire to ensure ‘national’ control of what are very mobile assets, a number of countries do not have in place any protection against the on-selling of national shareholdings to third parties. Here again, an accent on determining ‘the principle place of business’ rather than rigorously checking share trading, can highlight the true intent of a company’s operations.
8. Slots and curfews as barriers Even if countries adopt more liberal air service agreement philosophies, there can remain other forms of barriers to trade in air services. Perhaps foremost of these is and will be availability of ‘slots’ at airports. Insufficient capacity at key hub airports in the Asia Pacific region potentially can negate the strategies of ‘open skies’. Another significant inhibitor is the presence of curfews at those same key airports. Should curfews arise and persist and be present at either end of long-haul routes, the available windows for conducting air services can be narrowed dramatically. This will cause further bunching in schedules and further headaches for air traffic control systems and managers. New Zealand is located at ‘the end of the line’ rather than as a strategic hub from a global perspective. Many of our air services are longhaul. We can be particularly affected by lack of slots and by airport curfews in other countries.
9. Liberalising partners Those economies currently building significant new airport capacity, as in Malaysia, might be expected to
180
C. Kissling / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 177—180
move towards more liberal policies if they are to compete with established Asian hub airports like Singapore and Hong Kong. This will help New Zealand to conclude more liberal bilateral agreements with Malaysia. New Zealand has concluded very liberal agreements with Singapore and the USA. These are expected to deliver commercial opportunities and contestability with the benefits having to be won by the airlines involved (Bradbury, 1997). Quite liberal agreements have been concluded with South Korea Taiwan and Malaysia with another expected with Brunei that could deliver further contestability on the Auckland—Hong Kong sector. New Zealand has an excellent relationship with Japan and a process of incremental liberalisation is evident, somewhat circumscribed by Japan’s infrastructural problems. New Zealand would like to pick up some unused USA cargo slots at Narita airport.
Overall, New Zealand is clearly in the camp of those economies who wish to see international air service agreements liberalised and believes APEC economies will continue to move in that direction.
References Bradbury, J., 1997. Ministry of Transport, New Zealand, personal communication. Findlay, C.C., Kissling, C.C., 1997. Flying towards a single aviation market across the Tasman. In: Findlay, C., Sien, C.L., Singh, K. (Eds.), Asia Pacific Air Transport, Challenges and Policy Reforms, ch. 11. Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore, pp. 181—191. Hufbauer, G.C., Findlay, C.C. (Eds.), 1996. Flying High Liberalizing Civil Aviation in the Asia Pacific. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.