- Email: [email protected]
Liberal–conservative conflict and consensus in policy making
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
Liberal–conservative conflict and consensus in policy making Carl Grafton ∗ , Anne Permaloff Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Auburn University-Montgomery, P.O. Box 244023, Montgomery, AL 36124-4023, USA
Abstract This study argues that ideology can play a major and positive role in the policy making process. Using the policy areas of civil rights and public education, it demonstrates that when policy initiatives are both ideologically consistent and based on a clear delineation of the dynamics of how the policy will change the current situation for the better, the ensuing debate between liberals and conservatives generally results in effective policy. When both elements are not present, ineffective policy results. © 2008 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction This study presents an approach to evaluating the effectiveness of ideological public policy prescriptions in the United States. We consider only liberalism and conservatism because the U.S. federal government and all state governments are dominated by policy makers who label themselves liberals or conservatives. Part of our thesis is that liberal public policy tends to be effective when liberals are consistent with liberal core values. Similarly, conservative public policy tends to be effective when conservatives are consistent with conservative core values. Both fail when they are ideologically inconsistent. Liberal public policy that is inconsistent with liberal values signals that something is wrong either within the liberal community or the public policy. The same logic applies to the conservative side. Effective liberal or conservative public policy also requires thoughtfulness which means that there is a link between the ideological value base and the empirical world. The idea of relatively stable ideological core values and less central, more changeable public policy positions has been part of the study of ideology, political psychology, public opinion, ∗
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 334 270 0539. E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Grafton).
0362-3319/$ – see front matter © 2008 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2008.09.014
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
581
and related specialities for many years (e.g., Converse, 1964; Stone, 1974). This distinction is also often part of studies of individual ideologies (Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser, & Sulloway, 2003). McCann (1997) defines an individual’s core political values as: “overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship, and· · ·society.” (p. 565) In a functioning ideology, core values are the bases for positions on specific policies (McCann, 1997, p. 565; Feldman, 1988, p. 417). Because core values must sometimes be balanced against each another, an ideological core is more than a list of values; it is the relationships among those values (Feldman, 1988, 420; Jacoby, 2006). There must be logical consistency among core values and between core values and specific public policies (Converse, 1964, pp. 207–211). Nevertheless, ideological adherents often disagree regarding which specific policies best serve core values. This fact suggests that an ideology’s policy positions are more changeable than its core values. In addition, as we will see below, changing circumstances sometimes change an ideology’s policy positions without touching core values (McCann, 1997, p. 567).
2. Ideology and self-interest Self-interest is often the first and frequently the sole explanation of political events offered by scholars and journalists. However, explanations that rely entirely on self-interest are frequently incomplete. We can often do better by adding ideology to self-interest or even substituting ideology for self-interest (Kalt & Zupan, 1984; Segal, Cameron, & Cover, 1992; Richardson & Munger, 1990; Nelson & Silberberg, 1987; Levitt, 1996; Uslaner, 1999). We accept Sears’ and Funk’s (1990) definition of self-interest as confined to the: “(1) short-to-medium term impact of an issue (or candidacy) on the (2) material well-being of the (3) individual’s own personal life (or that of his or her immediate family).” (p. 148) Most studies of the relative impact of self-interest and ideology on policy formulation are based on congressional roll call analysis. They pay little attention to policy content or its changes over time. The present study envisions Congress as the arena of policy-formulation, focuses on change over time, and does not utilize roll call analysis. In a legislature, non-self-interest is often expressed as a concern for the public interest. All significant policy formulation intended to promote the public interest is based on general principles that describe the public interest and prescribe how the public interest can be sought. Such general principles including liberalism and conservatism are ideologies. We define an ideology as an action oriented model of people and society (Parsons, 1951, p. 349; Drucker, 1974, p. 43; Mullins, 1972, p. 510). Virtually all instances of policy formulation that claim to be in the public interest (e.g., civil rights) are based on ideological strictures and not ad hoc judgment.
3. More definitions Our approach to the study of ideology and public policy requires us to define liberalism and conservatism and explain how we intend to detect their policy prescriptions. We must
582
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
also define what me mean by thoughtfulness and describe how we intend to gauge it, and we must define policy effectiveness and show what indicators of policy effectiveness we intend to use. 3.1. Liberalism and conservatism and their policy prescriptions Political ideologies are usually presented as the thoughts of theorists. This is a reasonable approach, but these works devote little attention to the public policy prescriptions of an ideology or the role ideology plays in the formulation of public policy. Similarly, books on public policy ignore ideology except in passing references even when they examine areas of public policy that are highly charged ideologically (Anderson, 2000). Most quantitative analyses of ideology and public policy, including those cited earlier, bypass the problem of defining the terms liberalism and conservatism by utilizing interest group scores (e.g., Americans for Democratic Action) to attribute ideological motives to congressional roll call votes. Interest group scores are ideal for studies utilizing roll call votes, and we use them elsewhere, but they miss important features of ideology by reducing a year’s votes to a single number for each member of Congress. These scores omit important strands of ideological thought and cover only matters brought to a vote in Congress. Our primary indicators of liberal and conservative ideological content are the editorials of the Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and National Review magazine. In previous articles (Grafton & Permaloff, 2004; Permaloff & Grafton, 2006) we validated the Post and Times as measures of liberalism and the Journal and National Review as measures of conservatism by comparing their editorial content to ADA positions. Janda, Berry, and Goldman (1992) (henceforth JBG) developed a theory of liberalism and conservatism consistent with most histories of each (e.g., Dunn & Woodard, 1996, Young, 1996; Schapiro, 1958; Viereck, 1956; Hartz, 1955; Rawls, 1971; Dworkin, 1984). By their reckoning, a liberal tends to favor equality over freedom and freedom over order; a conservative tends to favor freedom over equality and order over freedom (JBG, 1992, p. 175). JBG pay no attention to divisions inside liberal and conservative camps, and their model ignores widely discussed values such as economic prosperity and justice. Nevertheless, their work serves as part of the foundation for our attempt to relate ideology and public policy. Scholars have devoted volumes to exploring equality, freedom, and order individually. Given space limitations we will not define them until specific public policy examples make it necessary. In another study (Permaloff & Grafton, 2003) we validated the JBG model as an economical summary of liberal and conservative core values by comparing the model to characterizations of liberalism and conservatism in all refereed social science, humanities, and history journal articles in a large computerized index in the 10-year period 1992–2001. The largest gap in the JBG model is that it says little about public policy for business and economics. Liberal and conservative thought regarding public policy for business and economics centers on the market economy (Grafton & Permaloff, 2001), but we lack space here to consider this group of public policy areas. We can say only that we have developed a model based on market failure that is comparable to the JBG model.
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
583
3.2. Ideological consistency To gauge ideological consistency over time we have compared the past and present positions of the Times, Post, Journal, and National Review together with the ADA to specific policy proposals. Part of this process is described elsewhere (Grafton & Permaloff, 2001; Permaloff & Grafton, 2003). In most instances we found liberal and conservative policy positions to be ideologically consistent, but when they are not, ineffective policy usually results. 3.3. Thoughtfulness Thoughtfulness or lack thereof is difficult to measure precisely, but thoughtfulness regarding public policy requires theory. We distinguish between policy theory and value theory (Fischer, 1995, p. 18). A policy theory is a generalization regarding how a policy will move from the present to an improved future. A value theory tells us why a policy is morally right/wrong or constructive/destructive. In most areas of public policy both types of theory are required for the policy process to be thoughtful. For the policy process to be thoughtful, there must be a good reason, often based on policy analysis, to believe that a policy will improve our situation (Munger, 2000). Policy analyses supporting one or both ideological positions are common and often constitute substantial literatures; examples can be found later. There is no equivalent validation for a value theory. Demonstrating moral thoughtfulness can only be a matter of showing that policy makers have considered the moral implications of a policy and that values espoused are consistent with the relative priorities of equality, freedom, and order. 3.4. Effectiveness Ingram and Mann (1980) and many others stress how difficult it is objectively to measure public policy success and failure. The process is often subjective and dependent on individual or group goals and needs (p. 12). Oddly, like most other scholars who focus on policy analysis, they virtually ignore the strong ideological element in the policy examples they use (e.g., minimum wage, immigration, and education). Unlike scholars interested in policy analysis in general, policy specialists who focus on only one policy area (such as education) often devote considerable attention to ideology. Part of our thesis here is that the ideological nature of policy debates can be used to facilitate the evaluation of policy success or failure. Often policy analysts and economists using benefit–cost analysis and similar tools provide the main frameworks for evaluating policy success or failure. Under the policy analysiseconomics regime: “Policy goals are expected to be coherent and clear priorities are expected to be set. The choice among alternative means of reaching goals is supposed to reflect careful evaluations of their efficiency and effectiveness. Whether or not policies meet stated goals is taken as the measure of policy accomplishment.” (Ingram & Mann, 1980, p. 16) Ingram and Mann represent many scholars when they write that political scientists: “recognize that policy making is disjointed and not easily amenable to rational models. In fact, its very disjointedness may reflect a consensus that policy making should take place in a disjointed fashion, because that ‘irrational’ process in fact protects important values and is, therefore, quite ‘rational’.”
584
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
(pp. 16–17) Sharkansky (1992, p. 409) agrees, observing that political competition will affect or dominate the policy formulation process throughout. Differing ideological and self-interest perspectives can bias the analysis (Fischer, 1995, p. 6; Munger, 2000, pp. 385–393). Even assuming that an analyst is the soul of objectivity, policy analysis can be methodologically difficult (Fischer, 1995; Munger, 2000). To some degree, we short circuit both problems by determining whether liberals believe that their initiatives have been effective, that is, achieved liberal objectives and how conservatives view liberal initiatives. Conservative initiatives are evaluated similarly. We have observed every combination of liberals regarding their initiatives as effective or not and conservatives disagreeing or agreeing; the same applies to conservative initiatives. We describe such dissensus as well as consensus and movement toward each other’s policy positions elsewhere (Grafton & Permaloff, 2001, 2005). Liberal–conservative agreement does not guarantee that a policy is effective, and one side’s view that the other’s policy is not worth doing and/or ineffective does not necessarily mean that it is not worth doing or ineffective. However, considerable light can be shed on public policy effectiveness by appraising the ideological self-examination and debate surrounding the policy.
4. Initiatives and counter attacks We (Permaloff & Grafton, 2006) have developed an iterative policy-formulation model of initiative, attack, and counter-attack that begins with an initiative usually mounted by liberal activist interest groups (AIGs). Rochon (1998, p. 8) describes AIGs as small groups of critical thinkers formulating new policies. They are sometimes social scientists such as economists, organizations such as Planned Parenthood, or professionals such as social workers. AIGs make their arguments using such devices as policy analysis, media campaigns, and court cases. Sometimes these attempts fail, and the process ends. But, when they succeed, liberals make the initiative their own. We have observed few cases of AIGs changing core values. Instead, AIGs usually change liberal (or conservative) perceptions of political, economic, or social reality. The editorials of the New York Times, Washington Post, and the ADA serve as barometers of the liberal response to AIG activities. At some point a conservative response to the liberal initiative appears in the editorials of the Wall Street Journal and National Review. We have found broad ranges of liberal–conservative consensus in basic principle, if not all details of policy implementation. This should not be surprising because they share a common heritage. But when they disagree and one side advocates what is later found to be an ineffective policy or one that is not worth accomplishing (as viewed by the other side), the resulting cycles of attack and counterattack often improve the quality of the public policy that eventually results. Some agenda setting and policy formulation models are linear, moving from a beginning to an end and then stopping. As they are often used, models associated with Cobb and Elder (1972) and Kingdon (1984) fit this description. McFarland (1990) distinguishes between these unidirectional models and circular models which he regards as more descriptive of most policy formulation cases. He places particular emphasis on cycles of interest group reform, counterreform, and so forth. Circular models appear best suited to describe ideologically based agenda setting and policy-formulation.
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
585
5. The present study The time period for our editorial data is 1961 to April 2007. From 1961 to 1998 we collected samples of editorials (Grafton & Permaloff, 2001, 2005; Permaloff & Grafton, 2003, 2006). When electronically stored editorials became available, we used them instead of sampling. Dates for electronic databases range from the 1980s (the starting date varies among the four publications) to the present. As our earlier discussion suggests, we divide domestic public policy into two major areas: business and economics and everything else. Each of these areas is in turn divided into policy categories defined by our reading of the editorials. Those policy areas appear in Table 1 which is sorted by our two major domestic policy categories and then by our estimates of the liberal view of the effectiveness of liberal policy initiatives. Many of these policy areas can be further subdivided as issue development and editorial treatments dictate. Given space considerations, we will focus on two areas of public policy familiar to most readers in order to show how our approach works.
6. Primary and secondary education Table 1 lists this policy area as producing mixed results as viewed from the liberal perspective. For at least the last half century liberals championed policies to improve public schools, and conservatives were highly critical of public school results (Meyer, Tyack, Nagel, & Gordon, 1979). Nelson, Palonsky, and McCarthy (2007), Finn (1991), Bracey (2004), and many others place ideology at the center of disputes over public education. Ideological differences span pedagogy, religion, and various cultural values. The major policy difference is that liberals solidly support traditional public schools while conservatives are more willing to experiment with alternatives such as vouchers and charter schools. In many areas of public policy AIGs change liberal policy positions, but public school AIGs such as teachers’ unions did not change liberal policy positions. Indeed, there are continuing tensions between education AIGs and liberals probably due to self-interest on the part of the AIGs. A proposition accepted by many liberals and nearly all conservatives is that significant numbers of public schools have been performing badly for several decades; most public school AIGs reject this suggestion. For example, a 2007 New York Times editorial reported that more than one-half of 12th grade students cannot interpret what they read (A bad report card, 2/27/07). Another Times editorial described public schools as a “mess” and blamed “educational bureaucracy and top-down management.” (Wrong surgery for sick schools, 3 July 1990; see also Washington Post, Low scores, higher expectations, 7/24/97; As city leaders dawdle, 2/24/04; and many others). Similar portraits of public school failure regularly appear in the Wall Street Journal and National Review. Indeed, there is little difference between liberal and conservative descriptions of the condition of public education; the disagreements lie in their prescriptions for improvement and the core values underlying the policies advocated. Despite their withering criticism of public schools, the Post and Times consistently favor public school funding increases (443 editorials in our database); we located no liberal editorials advocating funding reductions. The liberal justification for funding increases is that good schools require adequate funding. Another area of liberal public school criticism identifies
586
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
Table 1 Effectiveness of major liberal initiatives/policies. Public policy area Economics and business: International trade Minimum wage Regulation of private sector Tax policy Consumer protection Energy production and distribution Economic growth or inflation Environmental protection Health care Labor relations Transportation Transportation safety Agriculture Immigration Wage and price controls Non-economics and business: Abortion Stem cell research Church-state Civil rights—freedom of expression Civil rights—privacy (excluding abortion) Civil rights—voting Civil rights—racial discrimination Civil rights—racial discrimination Civil rights—other discrimination Crime—rights of accused Education Crime—gun control Crime—basic approaches Crime—law enforcement/police Crime-violence/terror Public housing Welfare funding Welfare structure of programs Crime—rights of guilty Crime—drug abuse Urban policy
Major initiatives/policies
Effectiveness as judged by liberals
Free trade but more restrictions recently Minimum wage Anti-trust Progressive taxation and tax increases Consumer protection laws Variety Variety Environmental protection Medicare, Medicaid, etc. Support labor unions Public transit Air bags, etc. Agricultural subsidies None—shifting and inconsistent positions Wage and price controls
Effective
Legalized abortion Fund stem cell research Separation of church and state Freedom of expression Various protections Voting rights Civil Rights Act Affirmative action Women’s and gay rights Miranda, etc. Budget increases to public schools Gun control laws To some degree, focus on causes None None Public housing programs More money Various federal welfare programs End death penalty Anti-drug laws Various federal urban programs
Effective Effective Effective Effective Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Ineffective Ineffective Ineffective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Moral Ineffective Ineffective
weak administrative leadership as a problem (e.g., New York Times, The school scandals, 11/29/74 and How the board failed, 8/15/61). Here, as with funding, liberals advocate only incremental change. Consistent with the JBG model, the core value motivating liberal support for public schools is equality. Conservatives also emphasize equality as well as the impact of great numbers of
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
587
illiterate graduates on public order. When conservatives invoke the value of equality, it is usually equality before the law or equality of opportunity (Hayek, 1960; Van Dyke, 1995). True to form, a major conservative educational concern is equality of opportunity. At least in the short term, the conservative argument is that a disadvantaged student caught in a bad public school is more likely to succeed by escaping to a charter or private school than by waiting for the gradual improvement of their public school under a liberal prescription of increased funding and administrative change. Conservatives also emphasize freedom (to choose a different school or different type of school) and, as suggested above, order (Wall Street Journal, The Democrats’ agenda, 1/28/92; Polly’s victory, 3/10/92). The central conservative school initiative is the introduction of competition, via charter or private schools, to improve the quality of the public school monopoly (Nathan, 2001, 336–339). Finn (National Review, All aboard the charters? 10/9/06), an early advocate of charter schools, explains that a charter is a kind of contract between the school’s operator and a public body that licenses the school to operate. Charter schools can use textbooks not employed by traditional public schools, adjust teacher pay according to performance, and avoid the cost of unionized ancillary workers (Buchen, 2004, pp. 177, 181–193). The result is competition with traditional public schools. There is evidence that competition improves school quality in both traditional and charter schools (Loveless, 2003; Witte, 2004). Liberals regard charter schools as a last resort in the face of public school failure. The Post, in an editorial that could have appeared in the Journal or National Review, chided the Washington, DC, School Superintendent for seeking a moratorium on new charter schools (No moratorium on charters; better to fix the traditional public schools than to take choices away from parents 6/18/06). The Times’ flirtation with charter schools appears to have ended (Endgame in Albany, 6/13/98; Exploding the charter school myth, 8/27/06). The occasional liberal acceptance of charter schools does not constitute a change in a liberal core value. Liberals explored this option only because public school bureaucracies seemed unable or unwilling to improve school quality. Another conservative school initiative is government aid to private schools through the well-known voucher system proposed by Friedman (1962, 93–94). Vouchers may allow poor families the alternative of a private school that they otherwise could not afford. As with charter schools, the result may be greater competition and higher quality all around (Nelson et al., 2007, 61). With either charter or private schools all civil rights laws would apply. Liberals usually oppose all government aid to private schools or to the parents of children attending them, especially when those schools have a religious affiliation. They oppose vouchers more intensely than they do charter schools. Their objection to vouchers is founded partly on separation of church and state (Washington Post, The politics of education, 6/2/83; and many others). Nevertheless, liberals have shown themselves willing to experiment with vouchers. In 1992 the Post (School choice in Milwaukee, 3/30/92), while strongly opposing government aid in any form to parochial schools, suggested that the efficacy of “carefully crafted choice programs” should be tested (see also Washington Post, Vouchers without politics, 2/12/03). Analysts, often deploying large amounts of data and sophisticated analytical techniques, can be found on both sides of the charter school and voucher debate. Their work often gravitates to the editorial pages of the Times and our three other barometer publications.
588
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
Ideological consistency did not serve liberals well in the field of primary and secondary education. Liberals recognized the shortcomings of public schools, often identifying funding shortfalls, unresponsive bureaucracies, and teachers’ unions as causes, but until challenged by conservatives, liberals failed to see that incremental reforms were not improving schools. Liberal ideological consistency took the form of an apparently thoughtless concentration on equality. Meanwhile, conservatives, uncharacteristically rallying around the banner of equality (along with order and freedom), generated creative ideas. Thus, the part of our thesis that focuses on thoughtfulness is firmly supported by this example. No area of public policy better illustrates the virtues of debate between two ideological sides. Conservatives challenged liberal inertia; liberals in turn subjected conservative initiatives to rigorous criticism.
7. Racial discrimination As shown in Table 1 we divide civil rights into several categories. Here, we focus on two well-known liberal initiatives: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and affirmative action. 7.1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 The history of the civil rights movement is well known and requires no repetition here. Liberal editorials championed efforts to bring about desegregation (New York Times A keynote for the South, 1/15/61 and many more). The liberal position against racial discrimination was entirely consistent with the liberal emphasis on equality and freedom. While the conservative publications did not come close to the liberal newspapers as advocates of the civil rights movement, they evidenced no sympathy for racists (National Review Let them eat civil rights, 2/23/65). As discussed below, however, conservatives often ranked equality below order and freedom (as per JBG). The liberal newspapers pushed for new federal legislation ending segregation in schools, housing, and public places (New York Times, View from Lincoln Memorial, 9/1/63; Washington Post, Jury-trial compromise, 4/25/64; and many more from both newspapers). The Wall Street Journal was more positively inclined toward the Civil Rights Act than National Review, arguing that it was inevitable and in many ways a positive development. The Journal shared National Review’s doubts about the statute’s workability and the enormity of the intrusion by the federal government into people’s lives that it made possible, but it phrased its arguments without a bitterness that National Review often displayed (Force by default, 6/23/64 and others). Similarly, the Journal favored open housing legislation, but, again, worried about its implications for increased federal power (Open housing, 4/19/68). Many conservative editorials ignored the gross abuses of freedom and equality practiced in the South.Liberals and conservatives agreed that racial discrimination was wrong. However, liberals were proactive in combating discrimination. Liberal policy was ideologically consistent. The policy results by the late-1960s, while far from perfect, represented an improvement. Conservatives never took the lead in this area and instead sniped at liberal initiatives and bemoaned the hopelessness of the situation. Conservatives defended the freedom of private property owners to discriminate; they also defended states rights. The conservative position was a mélange of insensitivity to
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
589
the plight of blacks, an attempt to balance order, freedom, and equality among a wider set of interests (including segregationists), and a typical conservative pessimism regarding the possibilities of societal improvement. Conservatives were ideologically consistent only in that order trumped their concerns over equality and freedom, but given the situation in the South, they grossly under weighted freedom and equality.1 On the other side, united liberals deployed straightforward, consistent, and thoughtful value and policy theories. 7.2. Affirmative action Leiter and Leiter (2002) define affirmative action as mandating: “race, ethnic, and genderconscious remedies for the disproportionately adverse effects – the so-called disparate impact – of societal discrimination on protected groups, whether or not specific discriminatory intent on the part of individual defendants can be isolated· · ·.” (p. 1) Affirmative action addresses societal bias, not individual cases of discrimination, and it requires consideration of race, ethnicity, or sex as a factor in hiring, university admissions, and many other areas of life. For purposes of brevity we examine only hiring and university admissions. The 1964 Civil Rights Act states that nothing in the statute shall be interpreted to require employers “to grant preferential treatment” to individuals or groups based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin (Title VII, Sec. 703(j)). In addition, the Act has as its exclusive focus redressing wrongs done to specific individuals who suffered discrimination. The contemporary meaning of affirmative action was developed by an office of the Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Leiter and Leiter (2002, pp. 38–45) describe EEOC staff working in the late-1960s in close association with civil rights groups (see also Graham, 1992, p. 118). Pedriana and Stryker (2004, p. 718) describe the EEOC’s link with such organizations as the NAACP, National Urban League, Congress of Racial Equality, and Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. The combination of civil rights interest groups and staff members of these two agencies constituted a set of AIGs. EEOC and its associated AIGs wanted a way to accelerate reform via “wholesale remedies” that did not seem possible under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the agency’s charter (Graham, 1992, p. 118). To this end the EEOC developed the theory of disparate-impact that required new legislation or court endorsement. Court endorsement came in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), a ruling that liberals embraced and that conservatives never accepted. After Griggs, the EEOC ordered employers and labor unions to develop personnel data that included racial, ethnic, and gender categories. Failure to do so meant that federal agencies could infer that adverse impact was occurring. Percentages of employees or union members in these categories would be compared to the labor market or other relevant pools of potential employees (Leiter & Leiter, 2002, p. 49). A 1963 New York Times editorial saw affirmative action as meaning “reverse discrimination,” which the newspaper opposed (Reverse discrimination, 8/23/63). The Times later reversed itself (When racial quotas are reasonable, 3/7/87; Even so, affirmative action lives, 1/25/89). Conservatives always opposed affirmative action (National Review, Goals or quotas, 1/27/70; Wall Street Journal, Rectifying injustice, 5/8/73; and many others). From the mid-to-late-1980s the U.S. Supreme Court ruled sometimes for, and sometimes against, particular affirmative action plans. Naff (2004, 415) describes this period entirely in ideological terms with liberal and conservative justices on either side. Beginning in 1989 a
590
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
two-decade old conservative counterattack took hold, and the balance of Court rulings shifted against affirmative action. In Adarand Constructors v. Pena (1995) the Supreme Court, now with a conservative majority, ruled that race-based programs would be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. This doctrine resulted in affirmative action advocates falling back to a position called diversity theory. Diversity theory makes no reference to past discrimination; it finds value in racial, social, and gender variety. Diversity theory played an especially important role in university enrollment decisions. The Supreme Court’s position on diversity is that race cannot be the sole criterion for admission decisions, but race, ethnicity, and gender can be considered in admissions decisions along with traditional criteria such as grade point average and standardized test scores with diversity as the justification. By 1977, the New York Times was arguing that: “the only remedy for centuries of discrimination is a shift in resources from majority to minority—if not quotas then at least preferential goals” (Reparation, American style 7/3/77). Conservatives opposed affirmative action in universities as they did everywhere else (National Review, Creeping sanity in Cambridge, 2/20/81; Wall Street Journal, Reactions to racial quotas, 7/22/70; and many more). As with charter school policy studies, sophisticated theory, data, and statistical analyses can be found defending and attacking affirmative action (e.g., Jain, Sloane, & Horwitz, 2003). It is unclear why liberals moved from the long standing civil rights ideal of a color blind society (New York Times, Reverse discrimination, 8/23/63) to affirmative action based on discrimination by race, sex, or ethnicity (New York Times, When racial quotas are reasonable, 3/7/87). An argument made by Leiter and Leiter (2002), Dale (2005) and others that affirmative action flowed naturally from the logic of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not credible on two points. First, affirmative action violated decades of civil rights history and centuries of liberalism with its core value of equality before the law. Second, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly ruled out affirmative action. In the early-1960s, the politics of racial discrimination followed the initiativeattack–counterattack pattern so common in other areas of public policy. Then, suddenly liberals embraced affirmative action which allowed conservatives to adopt what had been the liberal goal of a color-blind society. Conservatives were unified behind this popular position which in any event was a fait accompli, while liberals were favoring unpopular programs that violated their long standing core belief in equality before the law (Romero, 2002). One explanation may be that liberals were interpreting equality to no longer mean equality before the law but instead a variant of equality of outcome. If this explanation is valid, liberalism has experienced a change in a core value. Another possibility is that liberals regard affirmative action as a temporary and disposable device for achieving equality. Liberal and conservative positions during the civil rights movement that culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 vividly demonstrate the virtues of ideological consistency. Liberals were consistent with their centuries-old defense of equality and freedom. The conservative position represented a defense of order and the freedom to discriminate in private transactions, while ignoring equality. The JBG model specifies that conservatives value order, but not at the complete expense of freedom and equality—especially equality before the law. The liberal value theory prior to 1964 was simple and consistent. The conservative value theory verged on the immoral. The liberal policy theory was simple and straightforward: make all discrimination illegal. The conservative policy theory was to delay giving people freedom
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
591
and equality when they had been unfree and treated unequally for over a century and a half. Liberals were thoughtful; conservatives defending the status quo were not. This period featured liberal initiatives, conservative counter attacks, and intense public debate. Conservatives lost. The post-1964 battles over affirmative action demonstrated the virtues of debate. Ironically, the new conservative position defending equality was solid and tested because liberals had occupied it for many years, and it had withstood conservative criticism. Liberal affirmative action initiatives were shaky because they violated centuries of liberalism and decades of liberal civil rights policy. Again, the dynamic of initiative and counterattack worked in the public interest. Affirmative action as quotas and weighted formulas did not stand up.
8. Conclusions The two policy areas examined here follow a pattern that we find in others. It appears that ideological consistency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective public policy. Thoughtfulness via coherent and valid value and policy theories is also necessary. At times, both liberals and conservatives wander from their core value theories and fail to think about their policy theories. The resulting weak policy positions and ineffective policies can be corrected by the resulting debate.
Note 1. We distinguish between conservatives represented in the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal and National Review and most Southern members of Congress who portrayed themselves as conservatives but whose positions reflected self-interest founded on racial politics.
References Anderson, J. E. (2000). Public policymaking. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Bracey, G. W. (2004). Setting the record straight. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Buchen, I. H. (2004). The future of the American school system. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow. Cherry, R. (2001). Who gets the good jobs? New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Cobb, R. W., & Elder, C. D. (1972). Participation in American politics: The dynamics of agenda building. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.), Ideology and discontent (pp. 206–261). London: Collier-Macmillan. Dale, C. V. (2005). Affirmative action revisited: A legal history and prospectus. In J. S. Petersen (Ed.), Affirmative action: Federal laws, regulations and legal history (pp. 1–86). New York: Novinka. Drucker, H. M. (1974). The political uses of ideology. New York: Harper and Row. Dunn, C. W., & Woodard, J. D. (1996). The conservative tradition in America. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Dworkin, R. (1984). Liberalism. In M. Sandel (Ed.), Liberalism and its critics (pp. 60–79). New York: New York University Press. Epstein, R. A. (1992). Forbidden grounds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
592
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
Feldman, S. (1988). Structure and consistency in public opinion: The role of core beliefs and values. American Journal of Political Science, 32, 416–440. Finn, C. E., Jr. (1991). We must take charge. New York: The Free Press. Fischer, F. (1995). Evaluating public policy. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: Phoenix. Grafton, C., & Permaloff, A. (2001). Public policy for business and the economy: Ideological dissensus, change, and consensus. Policy Sciences, 34, 403–434. Grafton, C., & Permaloff, A. (2004). Supplementing Zupan’s measurements of the ideological preferences of U.S. presidents. Public Choice, 118, 125–131. Grafton, C., & Permaloff, A. (2005). Liberal and conservative dissensus in areas of domestic public policy other than business and economics. Policy Sciences, 38, 45–67. Graham, H. D. (1992). Civil rights and the presidency. New York: Oxford University Press. Hartz, L. (1955). The liberal tradition in America. New York: Harcourt Brace. Hayek, F. A. (1960). The constitution of liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hoover, K. (1987). Ideology and political life. Monterrey, CA: Brooks/Cole. Ingram, H. M., & Mann, D. E. (1980). Why policies succeed or fail. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Jacoby, W. G. (2006). Value choices and American public opinion. American Journal of Political Science, 50, 706–723. Jain, H. C., Sloane, P. J., & Horwitz, F. M. (2003). Employment equity and affirmative action. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Janda, K., Berry, J. M., & Goldman, J. (1992). The challenge of democracy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Johnston, D. (1994). The idea of a liberal theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jost, J. T., Kruglanski, A. W., Glaser, J., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 77–90. Kalt, J. P., & Zupan, M. A. (1984). Capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics. American Economic Review, 74, 279–300. Kingdon, J. (1984). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. Koford, K. (1989). Dimensions in congressional voting. American Political Science Review, 83, 949–975. Leiter, S., & Leiter, W. M. (2002). Affirmative action in antidiscrimination law and policy. Albany: State University of New York Press. Levitt, S. D. (1996). How do senators vote? Disentangling the role of voter preferences, party affiliation, and senator ideology. American Economic Review, 86, 425–441. Loveless, T. (2003). How well are American students learning? Washington, DC: Brookings. McCann, J. A. (1997). Electoral choices and core value change: The 1992 presidential campaign. American Journal of Political Science, 41, 564–583. McFarland, A. S. (1990). Interest groups and political time: Cycles in America. British Journal of Political Science, 21, 257–284. Meyer, J. W., Tyack, D., Nagel, J., & Gordon, A. (1979). Public education as nation-building in America: Enrollments and bureaucratization in the American states, 1870–1930. American Journal of Sociology, 85, 591–613. Mullins, W. (1972). On the concept of ideology in political science. American Political Science Review, 66, 498–510. Munger, M. C. (2000). Analyzing policy. New York: W. W. Norton. Naff, K. C. (2004). From Bakke to Grutter and Gratz: The Supreme Court as a policymaking institution. Review of Policy Research, 21, 405–427. Nathan, J. (2001). The birth of a movement. In L. Iura (Ed.), The Jossey-Bass reader on school reform (pp. 335–351). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Nelson, D., & Silberberg, E. (1987). Ideology and legislator shirking. Economic Inquiry, 25, 15–25. Nelson, J. L., Palonsky, S. B., & McCarthy, M. R. (2007). Critical issues in education. New York: McGraw-Hill. Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. New York: Free Press. Pedriana, N., & Stryker, R. (2004). The strength of a weak agency: Enforcement of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the expansion of state capacity, 1965–1971. American Journal of Sociology, 110, 709–760. Permaloff, A., & Grafton, C. (2003). The behavioral study of political ideology and public policy: Testing the Janda, Berry, and Goldman model. Journal of Political Ideologies, 8, 185–208.
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
593
Permaloff, A., & Grafton, C. (2006). ADA policies and the editorial positions of four publications. The Social Science Journal, 43, 303–314. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press. Richardson, L. E., & Munger, M. E. (1990). Shirking, representation, and congressional behavior: Voting on the 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act. Public Choice, 67, 11–33. Rochon, T. R. (1998). Culture moves. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Romero, F. S. (2002). Civil rights policy making in the United States: An institutional perspective. Westport, CN: Praeger. Schapiro, J. S. (1958). Liberalism: Its meaning and history. Princeton, NJ: Anvil. Sears, D. O., & Funk, C. L. (1990). Self-interest in Americans’ political opinions. In J. J. Mansbridge (Ed.), Beyond self-interest (pp. 147–170). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Segal, J. A., Cameron, C. M., & Cover, A. D. (1992). A spatial model of roll call voting: Senators, constituents, presidents, and interest groups in Supreme Court confirmations. American Journal of Political Science, 36, 96–121. Sharkansky, I. (1992). What a political scientist can tell a policymaker about the likelihood of success or failure. Policy Studies Review, 11, 406–422. Stone, W. F. (1974). The psychology of politics. New York: The Free Press. Uslaner, E. (1999). The movers and the shirkers: Representatives and ideologues in the Senate. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Van Dyke, V. (1995). Ideology and political choice. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. Viereck, P. (1956). Conservatism from John Adams to Churchill. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. Witte, J. (2004). Wisconsin charter schools study. Madison: University of Wisconsin, LaFollette School of Public Affairs. Young, J. P. (1996). Reconsidering American liberalism. Boulder, CO: Westview.
The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
Liberal–conservative conflict and consensus in policy making Carl Grafton ∗ , Anne Permaloff Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Auburn University-Montgomery, P.O. Box 244023, Montgomery, AL 36124-4023, USA
Abstract This study argues that ideology can play a major and positive role in the policy making process. Using the policy areas of civil rights and public education, it demonstrates that when policy initiatives are both ideologically consistent and based on a clear delineation of the dynamics of how the policy will change the current situation for the better, the ensuing debate between liberals and conservatives generally results in effective policy. When both elements are not present, ineffective policy results. © 2008 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction This study presents an approach to evaluating the effectiveness of ideological public policy prescriptions in the United States. We consider only liberalism and conservatism because the U.S. federal government and all state governments are dominated by policy makers who label themselves liberals or conservatives. Part of our thesis is that liberal public policy tends to be effective when liberals are consistent with liberal core values. Similarly, conservative public policy tends to be effective when conservatives are consistent with conservative core values. Both fail when they are ideologically inconsistent. Liberal public policy that is inconsistent with liberal values signals that something is wrong either within the liberal community or the public policy. The same logic applies to the conservative side. Effective liberal or conservative public policy also requires thoughtfulness which means that there is a link between the ideological value base and the empirical world. The idea of relatively stable ideological core values and less central, more changeable public policy positions has been part of the study of ideology, political psychology, public opinion, ∗
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 334 270 0539. E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Grafton).
0362-3319/$ – see front matter © 2008 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2008.09.014
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
581
and related specialities for many years (e.g., Converse, 1964; Stone, 1974). This distinction is also often part of studies of individual ideologies (Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser, & Sulloway, 2003). McCann (1997) defines an individual’s core political values as: “overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship, and· · ·society.” (p. 565) In a functioning ideology, core values are the bases for positions on specific policies (McCann, 1997, p. 565; Feldman, 1988, p. 417). Because core values must sometimes be balanced against each another, an ideological core is more than a list of values; it is the relationships among those values (Feldman, 1988, 420; Jacoby, 2006). There must be logical consistency among core values and between core values and specific public policies (Converse, 1964, pp. 207–211). Nevertheless, ideological adherents often disagree regarding which specific policies best serve core values. This fact suggests that an ideology’s policy positions are more changeable than its core values. In addition, as we will see below, changing circumstances sometimes change an ideology’s policy positions without touching core values (McCann, 1997, p. 567).
2. Ideology and self-interest Self-interest is often the first and frequently the sole explanation of political events offered by scholars and journalists. However, explanations that rely entirely on self-interest are frequently incomplete. We can often do better by adding ideology to self-interest or even substituting ideology for self-interest (Kalt & Zupan, 1984; Segal, Cameron, & Cover, 1992; Richardson & Munger, 1990; Nelson & Silberberg, 1987; Levitt, 1996; Uslaner, 1999). We accept Sears’ and Funk’s (1990) definition of self-interest as confined to the: “(1) short-to-medium term impact of an issue (or candidacy) on the (2) material well-being of the (3) individual’s own personal life (or that of his or her immediate family).” (p. 148) Most studies of the relative impact of self-interest and ideology on policy formulation are based on congressional roll call analysis. They pay little attention to policy content or its changes over time. The present study envisions Congress as the arena of policy-formulation, focuses on change over time, and does not utilize roll call analysis. In a legislature, non-self-interest is often expressed as a concern for the public interest. All significant policy formulation intended to promote the public interest is based on general principles that describe the public interest and prescribe how the public interest can be sought. Such general principles including liberalism and conservatism are ideologies. We define an ideology as an action oriented model of people and society (Parsons, 1951, p. 349; Drucker, 1974, p. 43; Mullins, 1972, p. 510). Virtually all instances of policy formulation that claim to be in the public interest (e.g., civil rights) are based on ideological strictures and not ad hoc judgment.
3. More definitions Our approach to the study of ideology and public policy requires us to define liberalism and conservatism and explain how we intend to detect their policy prescriptions. We must
582
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
also define what me mean by thoughtfulness and describe how we intend to gauge it, and we must define policy effectiveness and show what indicators of policy effectiveness we intend to use. 3.1. Liberalism and conservatism and their policy prescriptions Political ideologies are usually presented as the thoughts of theorists. This is a reasonable approach, but these works devote little attention to the public policy prescriptions of an ideology or the role ideology plays in the formulation of public policy. Similarly, books on public policy ignore ideology except in passing references even when they examine areas of public policy that are highly charged ideologically (Anderson, 2000). Most quantitative analyses of ideology and public policy, including those cited earlier, bypass the problem of defining the terms liberalism and conservatism by utilizing interest group scores (e.g., Americans for Democratic Action) to attribute ideological motives to congressional roll call votes. Interest group scores are ideal for studies utilizing roll call votes, and we use them elsewhere, but they miss important features of ideology by reducing a year’s votes to a single number for each member of Congress. These scores omit important strands of ideological thought and cover only matters brought to a vote in Congress. Our primary indicators of liberal and conservative ideological content are the editorials of the Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and National Review magazine. In previous articles (Grafton & Permaloff, 2004; Permaloff & Grafton, 2006) we validated the Post and Times as measures of liberalism and the Journal and National Review as measures of conservatism by comparing their editorial content to ADA positions. Janda, Berry, and Goldman (1992) (henceforth JBG) developed a theory of liberalism and conservatism consistent with most histories of each (e.g., Dunn & Woodard, 1996, Young, 1996; Schapiro, 1958; Viereck, 1956; Hartz, 1955; Rawls, 1971; Dworkin, 1984). By their reckoning, a liberal tends to favor equality over freedom and freedom over order; a conservative tends to favor freedom over equality and order over freedom (JBG, 1992, p. 175). JBG pay no attention to divisions inside liberal and conservative camps, and their model ignores widely discussed values such as economic prosperity and justice. Nevertheless, their work serves as part of the foundation for our attempt to relate ideology and public policy. Scholars have devoted volumes to exploring equality, freedom, and order individually. Given space limitations we will not define them until specific public policy examples make it necessary. In another study (Permaloff & Grafton, 2003) we validated the JBG model as an economical summary of liberal and conservative core values by comparing the model to characterizations of liberalism and conservatism in all refereed social science, humanities, and history journal articles in a large computerized index in the 10-year period 1992–2001. The largest gap in the JBG model is that it says little about public policy for business and economics. Liberal and conservative thought regarding public policy for business and economics centers on the market economy (Grafton & Permaloff, 2001), but we lack space here to consider this group of public policy areas. We can say only that we have developed a model based on market failure that is comparable to the JBG model.
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
583
3.2. Ideological consistency To gauge ideological consistency over time we have compared the past and present positions of the Times, Post, Journal, and National Review together with the ADA to specific policy proposals. Part of this process is described elsewhere (Grafton & Permaloff, 2001; Permaloff & Grafton, 2003). In most instances we found liberal and conservative policy positions to be ideologically consistent, but when they are not, ineffective policy usually results. 3.3. Thoughtfulness Thoughtfulness or lack thereof is difficult to measure precisely, but thoughtfulness regarding public policy requires theory. We distinguish between policy theory and value theory (Fischer, 1995, p. 18). A policy theory is a generalization regarding how a policy will move from the present to an improved future. A value theory tells us why a policy is morally right/wrong or constructive/destructive. In most areas of public policy both types of theory are required for the policy process to be thoughtful. For the policy process to be thoughtful, there must be a good reason, often based on policy analysis, to believe that a policy will improve our situation (Munger, 2000). Policy analyses supporting one or both ideological positions are common and often constitute substantial literatures; examples can be found later. There is no equivalent validation for a value theory. Demonstrating moral thoughtfulness can only be a matter of showing that policy makers have considered the moral implications of a policy and that values espoused are consistent with the relative priorities of equality, freedom, and order. 3.4. Effectiveness Ingram and Mann (1980) and many others stress how difficult it is objectively to measure public policy success and failure. The process is often subjective and dependent on individual or group goals and needs (p. 12). Oddly, like most other scholars who focus on policy analysis, they virtually ignore the strong ideological element in the policy examples they use (e.g., minimum wage, immigration, and education). Unlike scholars interested in policy analysis in general, policy specialists who focus on only one policy area (such as education) often devote considerable attention to ideology. Part of our thesis here is that the ideological nature of policy debates can be used to facilitate the evaluation of policy success or failure. Often policy analysts and economists using benefit–cost analysis and similar tools provide the main frameworks for evaluating policy success or failure. Under the policy analysiseconomics regime: “Policy goals are expected to be coherent and clear priorities are expected to be set. The choice among alternative means of reaching goals is supposed to reflect careful evaluations of their efficiency and effectiveness. Whether or not policies meet stated goals is taken as the measure of policy accomplishment.” (Ingram & Mann, 1980, p. 16) Ingram and Mann represent many scholars when they write that political scientists: “recognize that policy making is disjointed and not easily amenable to rational models. In fact, its very disjointedness may reflect a consensus that policy making should take place in a disjointed fashion, because that ‘irrational’ process in fact protects important values and is, therefore, quite ‘rational’.”
584
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
(pp. 16–17) Sharkansky (1992, p. 409) agrees, observing that political competition will affect or dominate the policy formulation process throughout. Differing ideological and self-interest perspectives can bias the analysis (Fischer, 1995, p. 6; Munger, 2000, pp. 385–393). Even assuming that an analyst is the soul of objectivity, policy analysis can be methodologically difficult (Fischer, 1995; Munger, 2000). To some degree, we short circuit both problems by determining whether liberals believe that their initiatives have been effective, that is, achieved liberal objectives and how conservatives view liberal initiatives. Conservative initiatives are evaluated similarly. We have observed every combination of liberals regarding their initiatives as effective or not and conservatives disagreeing or agreeing; the same applies to conservative initiatives. We describe such dissensus as well as consensus and movement toward each other’s policy positions elsewhere (Grafton & Permaloff, 2001, 2005). Liberal–conservative agreement does not guarantee that a policy is effective, and one side’s view that the other’s policy is not worth doing and/or ineffective does not necessarily mean that it is not worth doing or ineffective. However, considerable light can be shed on public policy effectiveness by appraising the ideological self-examination and debate surrounding the policy.
4. Initiatives and counter attacks We (Permaloff & Grafton, 2006) have developed an iterative policy-formulation model of initiative, attack, and counter-attack that begins with an initiative usually mounted by liberal activist interest groups (AIGs). Rochon (1998, p. 8) describes AIGs as small groups of critical thinkers formulating new policies. They are sometimes social scientists such as economists, organizations such as Planned Parenthood, or professionals such as social workers. AIGs make their arguments using such devices as policy analysis, media campaigns, and court cases. Sometimes these attempts fail, and the process ends. But, when they succeed, liberals make the initiative their own. We have observed few cases of AIGs changing core values. Instead, AIGs usually change liberal (or conservative) perceptions of political, economic, or social reality. The editorials of the New York Times, Washington Post, and the ADA serve as barometers of the liberal response to AIG activities. At some point a conservative response to the liberal initiative appears in the editorials of the Wall Street Journal and National Review. We have found broad ranges of liberal–conservative consensus in basic principle, if not all details of policy implementation. This should not be surprising because they share a common heritage. But when they disagree and one side advocates what is later found to be an ineffective policy or one that is not worth accomplishing (as viewed by the other side), the resulting cycles of attack and counterattack often improve the quality of the public policy that eventually results. Some agenda setting and policy formulation models are linear, moving from a beginning to an end and then stopping. As they are often used, models associated with Cobb and Elder (1972) and Kingdon (1984) fit this description. McFarland (1990) distinguishes between these unidirectional models and circular models which he regards as more descriptive of most policy formulation cases. He places particular emphasis on cycles of interest group reform, counterreform, and so forth. Circular models appear best suited to describe ideologically based agenda setting and policy-formulation.
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
585
5. The present study The time period for our editorial data is 1961 to April 2007. From 1961 to 1998 we collected samples of editorials (Grafton & Permaloff, 2001, 2005; Permaloff & Grafton, 2003, 2006). When electronically stored editorials became available, we used them instead of sampling. Dates for electronic databases range from the 1980s (the starting date varies among the four publications) to the present. As our earlier discussion suggests, we divide domestic public policy into two major areas: business and economics and everything else. Each of these areas is in turn divided into policy categories defined by our reading of the editorials. Those policy areas appear in Table 1 which is sorted by our two major domestic policy categories and then by our estimates of the liberal view of the effectiveness of liberal policy initiatives. Many of these policy areas can be further subdivided as issue development and editorial treatments dictate. Given space considerations, we will focus on two areas of public policy familiar to most readers in order to show how our approach works.
6. Primary and secondary education Table 1 lists this policy area as producing mixed results as viewed from the liberal perspective. For at least the last half century liberals championed policies to improve public schools, and conservatives were highly critical of public school results (Meyer, Tyack, Nagel, & Gordon, 1979). Nelson, Palonsky, and McCarthy (2007), Finn (1991), Bracey (2004), and many others place ideology at the center of disputes over public education. Ideological differences span pedagogy, religion, and various cultural values. The major policy difference is that liberals solidly support traditional public schools while conservatives are more willing to experiment with alternatives such as vouchers and charter schools. In many areas of public policy AIGs change liberal policy positions, but public school AIGs such as teachers’ unions did not change liberal policy positions. Indeed, there are continuing tensions between education AIGs and liberals probably due to self-interest on the part of the AIGs. A proposition accepted by many liberals and nearly all conservatives is that significant numbers of public schools have been performing badly for several decades; most public school AIGs reject this suggestion. For example, a 2007 New York Times editorial reported that more than one-half of 12th grade students cannot interpret what they read (A bad report card, 2/27/07). Another Times editorial described public schools as a “mess” and blamed “educational bureaucracy and top-down management.” (Wrong surgery for sick schools, 3 July 1990; see also Washington Post, Low scores, higher expectations, 7/24/97; As city leaders dawdle, 2/24/04; and many others). Similar portraits of public school failure regularly appear in the Wall Street Journal and National Review. Indeed, there is little difference between liberal and conservative descriptions of the condition of public education; the disagreements lie in their prescriptions for improvement and the core values underlying the policies advocated. Despite their withering criticism of public schools, the Post and Times consistently favor public school funding increases (443 editorials in our database); we located no liberal editorials advocating funding reductions. The liberal justification for funding increases is that good schools require adequate funding. Another area of liberal public school criticism identifies
586
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
Table 1 Effectiveness of major liberal initiatives/policies. Public policy area Economics and business: International trade Minimum wage Regulation of private sector Tax policy Consumer protection Energy production and distribution Economic growth or inflation Environmental protection Health care Labor relations Transportation Transportation safety Agriculture Immigration Wage and price controls Non-economics and business: Abortion Stem cell research Church-state Civil rights—freedom of expression Civil rights—privacy (excluding abortion) Civil rights—voting Civil rights—racial discrimination Civil rights—racial discrimination Civil rights—other discrimination Crime—rights of accused Education Crime—gun control Crime—basic approaches Crime—law enforcement/police Crime-violence/terror Public housing Welfare funding Welfare structure of programs Crime—rights of guilty Crime—drug abuse Urban policy
Major initiatives/policies
Effectiveness as judged by liberals
Free trade but more restrictions recently Minimum wage Anti-trust Progressive taxation and tax increases Consumer protection laws Variety Variety Environmental protection Medicare, Medicaid, etc. Support labor unions Public transit Air bags, etc. Agricultural subsidies None—shifting and inconsistent positions Wage and price controls
Effective
Legalized abortion Fund stem cell research Separation of church and state Freedom of expression Various protections Voting rights Civil Rights Act Affirmative action Women’s and gay rights Miranda, etc. Budget increases to public schools Gun control laws To some degree, focus on causes None None Public housing programs More money Various federal welfare programs End death penalty Anti-drug laws Various federal urban programs
Effective Effective Effective Effective Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Ineffective Ineffective Ineffective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Effective Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Moral Ineffective Ineffective
weak administrative leadership as a problem (e.g., New York Times, The school scandals, 11/29/74 and How the board failed, 8/15/61). Here, as with funding, liberals advocate only incremental change. Consistent with the JBG model, the core value motivating liberal support for public schools is equality. Conservatives also emphasize equality as well as the impact of great numbers of
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
587
illiterate graduates on public order. When conservatives invoke the value of equality, it is usually equality before the law or equality of opportunity (Hayek, 1960; Van Dyke, 1995). True to form, a major conservative educational concern is equality of opportunity. At least in the short term, the conservative argument is that a disadvantaged student caught in a bad public school is more likely to succeed by escaping to a charter or private school than by waiting for the gradual improvement of their public school under a liberal prescription of increased funding and administrative change. Conservatives also emphasize freedom (to choose a different school or different type of school) and, as suggested above, order (Wall Street Journal, The Democrats’ agenda, 1/28/92; Polly’s victory, 3/10/92). The central conservative school initiative is the introduction of competition, via charter or private schools, to improve the quality of the public school monopoly (Nathan, 2001, 336–339). Finn (National Review, All aboard the charters? 10/9/06), an early advocate of charter schools, explains that a charter is a kind of contract between the school’s operator and a public body that licenses the school to operate. Charter schools can use textbooks not employed by traditional public schools, adjust teacher pay according to performance, and avoid the cost of unionized ancillary workers (Buchen, 2004, pp. 177, 181–193). The result is competition with traditional public schools. There is evidence that competition improves school quality in both traditional and charter schools (Loveless, 2003; Witte, 2004). Liberals regard charter schools as a last resort in the face of public school failure. The Post, in an editorial that could have appeared in the Journal or National Review, chided the Washington, DC, School Superintendent for seeking a moratorium on new charter schools (No moratorium on charters; better to fix the traditional public schools than to take choices away from parents 6/18/06). The Times’ flirtation with charter schools appears to have ended (Endgame in Albany, 6/13/98; Exploding the charter school myth, 8/27/06). The occasional liberal acceptance of charter schools does not constitute a change in a liberal core value. Liberals explored this option only because public school bureaucracies seemed unable or unwilling to improve school quality. Another conservative school initiative is government aid to private schools through the well-known voucher system proposed by Friedman (1962, 93–94). Vouchers may allow poor families the alternative of a private school that they otherwise could not afford. As with charter schools, the result may be greater competition and higher quality all around (Nelson et al., 2007, 61). With either charter or private schools all civil rights laws would apply. Liberals usually oppose all government aid to private schools or to the parents of children attending them, especially when those schools have a religious affiliation. They oppose vouchers more intensely than they do charter schools. Their objection to vouchers is founded partly on separation of church and state (Washington Post, The politics of education, 6/2/83; and many others). Nevertheless, liberals have shown themselves willing to experiment with vouchers. In 1992 the Post (School choice in Milwaukee, 3/30/92), while strongly opposing government aid in any form to parochial schools, suggested that the efficacy of “carefully crafted choice programs” should be tested (see also Washington Post, Vouchers without politics, 2/12/03). Analysts, often deploying large amounts of data and sophisticated analytical techniques, can be found on both sides of the charter school and voucher debate. Their work often gravitates to the editorial pages of the Times and our three other barometer publications.
588
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
Ideological consistency did not serve liberals well in the field of primary and secondary education. Liberals recognized the shortcomings of public schools, often identifying funding shortfalls, unresponsive bureaucracies, and teachers’ unions as causes, but until challenged by conservatives, liberals failed to see that incremental reforms were not improving schools. Liberal ideological consistency took the form of an apparently thoughtless concentration on equality. Meanwhile, conservatives, uncharacteristically rallying around the banner of equality (along with order and freedom), generated creative ideas. Thus, the part of our thesis that focuses on thoughtfulness is firmly supported by this example. No area of public policy better illustrates the virtues of debate between two ideological sides. Conservatives challenged liberal inertia; liberals in turn subjected conservative initiatives to rigorous criticism.
7. Racial discrimination As shown in Table 1 we divide civil rights into several categories. Here, we focus on two well-known liberal initiatives: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and affirmative action. 7.1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 The history of the civil rights movement is well known and requires no repetition here. Liberal editorials championed efforts to bring about desegregation (New York Times A keynote for the South, 1/15/61 and many more). The liberal position against racial discrimination was entirely consistent with the liberal emphasis on equality and freedom. While the conservative publications did not come close to the liberal newspapers as advocates of the civil rights movement, they evidenced no sympathy for racists (National Review Let them eat civil rights, 2/23/65). As discussed below, however, conservatives often ranked equality below order and freedom (as per JBG). The liberal newspapers pushed for new federal legislation ending segregation in schools, housing, and public places (New York Times, View from Lincoln Memorial, 9/1/63; Washington Post, Jury-trial compromise, 4/25/64; and many more from both newspapers). The Wall Street Journal was more positively inclined toward the Civil Rights Act than National Review, arguing that it was inevitable and in many ways a positive development. The Journal shared National Review’s doubts about the statute’s workability and the enormity of the intrusion by the federal government into people’s lives that it made possible, but it phrased its arguments without a bitterness that National Review often displayed (Force by default, 6/23/64 and others). Similarly, the Journal favored open housing legislation, but, again, worried about its implications for increased federal power (Open housing, 4/19/68). Many conservative editorials ignored the gross abuses of freedom and equality practiced in the South.Liberals and conservatives agreed that racial discrimination was wrong. However, liberals were proactive in combating discrimination. Liberal policy was ideologically consistent. The policy results by the late-1960s, while far from perfect, represented an improvement. Conservatives never took the lead in this area and instead sniped at liberal initiatives and bemoaned the hopelessness of the situation. Conservatives defended the freedom of private property owners to discriminate; they also defended states rights. The conservative position was a mélange of insensitivity to
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
589
the plight of blacks, an attempt to balance order, freedom, and equality among a wider set of interests (including segregationists), and a typical conservative pessimism regarding the possibilities of societal improvement. Conservatives were ideologically consistent only in that order trumped their concerns over equality and freedom, but given the situation in the South, they grossly under weighted freedom and equality.1 On the other side, united liberals deployed straightforward, consistent, and thoughtful value and policy theories. 7.2. Affirmative action Leiter and Leiter (2002) define affirmative action as mandating: “race, ethnic, and genderconscious remedies for the disproportionately adverse effects – the so-called disparate impact – of societal discrimination on protected groups, whether or not specific discriminatory intent on the part of individual defendants can be isolated· · ·.” (p. 1) Affirmative action addresses societal bias, not individual cases of discrimination, and it requires consideration of race, ethnicity, or sex as a factor in hiring, university admissions, and many other areas of life. For purposes of brevity we examine only hiring and university admissions. The 1964 Civil Rights Act states that nothing in the statute shall be interpreted to require employers “to grant preferential treatment” to individuals or groups based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin (Title VII, Sec. 703(j)). In addition, the Act has as its exclusive focus redressing wrongs done to specific individuals who suffered discrimination. The contemporary meaning of affirmative action was developed by an office of the Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Leiter and Leiter (2002, pp. 38–45) describe EEOC staff working in the late-1960s in close association with civil rights groups (see also Graham, 1992, p. 118). Pedriana and Stryker (2004, p. 718) describe the EEOC’s link with such organizations as the NAACP, National Urban League, Congress of Racial Equality, and Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. The combination of civil rights interest groups and staff members of these two agencies constituted a set of AIGs. EEOC and its associated AIGs wanted a way to accelerate reform via “wholesale remedies” that did not seem possible under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the agency’s charter (Graham, 1992, p. 118). To this end the EEOC developed the theory of disparate-impact that required new legislation or court endorsement. Court endorsement came in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), a ruling that liberals embraced and that conservatives never accepted. After Griggs, the EEOC ordered employers and labor unions to develop personnel data that included racial, ethnic, and gender categories. Failure to do so meant that federal agencies could infer that adverse impact was occurring. Percentages of employees or union members in these categories would be compared to the labor market or other relevant pools of potential employees (Leiter & Leiter, 2002, p. 49). A 1963 New York Times editorial saw affirmative action as meaning “reverse discrimination,” which the newspaper opposed (Reverse discrimination, 8/23/63). The Times later reversed itself (When racial quotas are reasonable, 3/7/87; Even so, affirmative action lives, 1/25/89). Conservatives always opposed affirmative action (National Review, Goals or quotas, 1/27/70; Wall Street Journal, Rectifying injustice, 5/8/73; and many others). From the mid-to-late-1980s the U.S. Supreme Court ruled sometimes for, and sometimes against, particular affirmative action plans. Naff (2004, 415) describes this period entirely in ideological terms with liberal and conservative justices on either side. Beginning in 1989 a
590
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
two-decade old conservative counterattack took hold, and the balance of Court rulings shifted against affirmative action. In Adarand Constructors v. Pena (1995) the Supreme Court, now with a conservative majority, ruled that race-based programs would be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. This doctrine resulted in affirmative action advocates falling back to a position called diversity theory. Diversity theory makes no reference to past discrimination; it finds value in racial, social, and gender variety. Diversity theory played an especially important role in university enrollment decisions. The Supreme Court’s position on diversity is that race cannot be the sole criterion for admission decisions, but race, ethnicity, and gender can be considered in admissions decisions along with traditional criteria such as grade point average and standardized test scores with diversity as the justification. By 1977, the New York Times was arguing that: “the only remedy for centuries of discrimination is a shift in resources from majority to minority—if not quotas then at least preferential goals” (Reparation, American style 7/3/77). Conservatives opposed affirmative action in universities as they did everywhere else (National Review, Creeping sanity in Cambridge, 2/20/81; Wall Street Journal, Reactions to racial quotas, 7/22/70; and many more). As with charter school policy studies, sophisticated theory, data, and statistical analyses can be found defending and attacking affirmative action (e.g., Jain, Sloane, & Horwitz, 2003). It is unclear why liberals moved from the long standing civil rights ideal of a color blind society (New York Times, Reverse discrimination, 8/23/63) to affirmative action based on discrimination by race, sex, or ethnicity (New York Times, When racial quotas are reasonable, 3/7/87). An argument made by Leiter and Leiter (2002), Dale (2005) and others that affirmative action flowed naturally from the logic of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not credible on two points. First, affirmative action violated decades of civil rights history and centuries of liberalism with its core value of equality before the law. Second, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly ruled out affirmative action. In the early-1960s, the politics of racial discrimination followed the initiativeattack–counterattack pattern so common in other areas of public policy. Then, suddenly liberals embraced affirmative action which allowed conservatives to adopt what had been the liberal goal of a color-blind society. Conservatives were unified behind this popular position which in any event was a fait accompli, while liberals were favoring unpopular programs that violated their long standing core belief in equality before the law (Romero, 2002). One explanation may be that liberals were interpreting equality to no longer mean equality before the law but instead a variant of equality of outcome. If this explanation is valid, liberalism has experienced a change in a core value. Another possibility is that liberals regard affirmative action as a temporary and disposable device for achieving equality. Liberal and conservative positions during the civil rights movement that culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 vividly demonstrate the virtues of ideological consistency. Liberals were consistent with their centuries-old defense of equality and freedom. The conservative position represented a defense of order and the freedom to discriminate in private transactions, while ignoring equality. The JBG model specifies that conservatives value order, but not at the complete expense of freedom and equality—especially equality before the law. The liberal value theory prior to 1964 was simple and consistent. The conservative value theory verged on the immoral. The liberal policy theory was simple and straightforward: make all discrimination illegal. The conservative policy theory was to delay giving people freedom
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
591
and equality when they had been unfree and treated unequally for over a century and a half. Liberals were thoughtful; conservatives defending the status quo were not. This period featured liberal initiatives, conservative counter attacks, and intense public debate. Conservatives lost. The post-1964 battles over affirmative action demonstrated the virtues of debate. Ironically, the new conservative position defending equality was solid and tested because liberals had occupied it for many years, and it had withstood conservative criticism. Liberal affirmative action initiatives were shaky because they violated centuries of liberalism and decades of liberal civil rights policy. Again, the dynamic of initiative and counterattack worked in the public interest. Affirmative action as quotas and weighted formulas did not stand up.
8. Conclusions The two policy areas examined here follow a pattern that we find in others. It appears that ideological consistency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective public policy. Thoughtfulness via coherent and valid value and policy theories is also necessary. At times, both liberals and conservatives wander from their core value theories and fail to think about their policy theories. The resulting weak policy positions and ineffective policies can be corrected by the resulting debate.
Note 1. We distinguish between conservatives represented in the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal and National Review and most Southern members of Congress who portrayed themselves as conservatives but whose positions reflected self-interest founded on racial politics.
References Anderson, J. E. (2000). Public policymaking. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Bracey, G. W. (2004). Setting the record straight. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Buchen, I. H. (2004). The future of the American school system. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow. Cherry, R. (2001). Who gets the good jobs? New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Cobb, R. W., & Elder, C. D. (1972). Participation in American politics: The dynamics of agenda building. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.), Ideology and discontent (pp. 206–261). London: Collier-Macmillan. Dale, C. V. (2005). Affirmative action revisited: A legal history and prospectus. In J. S. Petersen (Ed.), Affirmative action: Federal laws, regulations and legal history (pp. 1–86). New York: Novinka. Drucker, H. M. (1974). The political uses of ideology. New York: Harper and Row. Dunn, C. W., & Woodard, J. D. (1996). The conservative tradition in America. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Dworkin, R. (1984). Liberalism. In M. Sandel (Ed.), Liberalism and its critics (pp. 60–79). New York: New York University Press. Epstein, R. A. (1992). Forbidden grounds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
592
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
Feldman, S. (1988). Structure and consistency in public opinion: The role of core beliefs and values. American Journal of Political Science, 32, 416–440. Finn, C. E., Jr. (1991). We must take charge. New York: The Free Press. Fischer, F. (1995). Evaluating public policy. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: Phoenix. Grafton, C., & Permaloff, A. (2001). Public policy for business and the economy: Ideological dissensus, change, and consensus. Policy Sciences, 34, 403–434. Grafton, C., & Permaloff, A. (2004). Supplementing Zupan’s measurements of the ideological preferences of U.S. presidents. Public Choice, 118, 125–131. Grafton, C., & Permaloff, A. (2005). Liberal and conservative dissensus in areas of domestic public policy other than business and economics. Policy Sciences, 38, 45–67. Graham, H. D. (1992). Civil rights and the presidency. New York: Oxford University Press. Hartz, L. (1955). The liberal tradition in America. New York: Harcourt Brace. Hayek, F. A. (1960). The constitution of liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hoover, K. (1987). Ideology and political life. Monterrey, CA: Brooks/Cole. Ingram, H. M., & Mann, D. E. (1980). Why policies succeed or fail. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Jacoby, W. G. (2006). Value choices and American public opinion. American Journal of Political Science, 50, 706–723. Jain, H. C., Sloane, P. J., & Horwitz, F. M. (2003). Employment equity and affirmative action. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Janda, K., Berry, J. M., & Goldman, J. (1992). The challenge of democracy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Johnston, D. (1994). The idea of a liberal theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jost, J. T., Kruglanski, A. W., Glaser, J., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 77–90. Kalt, J. P., & Zupan, M. A. (1984). Capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics. American Economic Review, 74, 279–300. Kingdon, J. (1984). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. Koford, K. (1989). Dimensions in congressional voting. American Political Science Review, 83, 949–975. Leiter, S., & Leiter, W. M. (2002). Affirmative action in antidiscrimination law and policy. Albany: State University of New York Press. Levitt, S. D. (1996). How do senators vote? Disentangling the role of voter preferences, party affiliation, and senator ideology. American Economic Review, 86, 425–441. Loveless, T. (2003). How well are American students learning? Washington, DC: Brookings. McCann, J. A. (1997). Electoral choices and core value change: The 1992 presidential campaign. American Journal of Political Science, 41, 564–583. McFarland, A. S. (1990). Interest groups and political time: Cycles in America. British Journal of Political Science, 21, 257–284. Meyer, J. W., Tyack, D., Nagel, J., & Gordon, A. (1979). Public education as nation-building in America: Enrollments and bureaucratization in the American states, 1870–1930. American Journal of Sociology, 85, 591–613. Mullins, W. (1972). On the concept of ideology in political science. American Political Science Review, 66, 498–510. Munger, M. C. (2000). Analyzing policy. New York: W. W. Norton. Naff, K. C. (2004). From Bakke to Grutter and Gratz: The Supreme Court as a policymaking institution. Review of Policy Research, 21, 405–427. Nathan, J. (2001). The birth of a movement. In L. Iura (Ed.), The Jossey-Bass reader on school reform (pp. 335–351). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Nelson, D., & Silberberg, E. (1987). Ideology and legislator shirking. Economic Inquiry, 25, 15–25. Nelson, J. L., Palonsky, S. B., & McCarthy, M. R. (2007). Critical issues in education. New York: McGraw-Hill. Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. New York: Free Press. Pedriana, N., & Stryker, R. (2004). The strength of a weak agency: Enforcement of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the expansion of state capacity, 1965–1971. American Journal of Sociology, 110, 709–760. Permaloff, A., & Grafton, C. (2003). The behavioral study of political ideology and public policy: Testing the Janda, Berry, and Goldman model. Journal of Political Ideologies, 8, 185–208.
C. Grafton, A. Permaloff / The Social Science Journal 45 (2008) 580–593
593
Permaloff, A., & Grafton, C. (2006). ADA policies and the editorial positions of four publications. The Social Science Journal, 43, 303–314. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press. Richardson, L. E., & Munger, M. E. (1990). Shirking, representation, and congressional behavior: Voting on the 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act. Public Choice, 67, 11–33. Rochon, T. R. (1998). Culture moves. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Romero, F. S. (2002). Civil rights policy making in the United States: An institutional perspective. Westport, CN: Praeger. Schapiro, J. S. (1958). Liberalism: Its meaning and history. Princeton, NJ: Anvil. Sears, D. O., & Funk, C. L. (1990). Self-interest in Americans’ political opinions. In J. J. Mansbridge (Ed.), Beyond self-interest (pp. 147–170). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Segal, J. A., Cameron, C. M., & Cover, A. D. (1992). A spatial model of roll call voting: Senators, constituents, presidents, and interest groups in Supreme Court confirmations. American Journal of Political Science, 36, 96–121. Sharkansky, I. (1992). What a political scientist can tell a policymaker about the likelihood of success or failure. Policy Studies Review, 11, 406–422. Stone, W. F. (1974). The psychology of politics. New York: The Free Press. Uslaner, E. (1999). The movers and the shirkers: Representatives and ideologues in the Senate. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Van Dyke, V. (1995). Ideology and political choice. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. Viereck, P. (1956). Conservatism from John Adams to Churchill. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. Witte, J. (2004). Wisconsin charter schools study. Madison: University of Wisconsin, LaFollette School of Public Affairs. Young, J. P. (1996). Reconsidering American liberalism. Boulder, CO: Westview.