PAID-08421; No of Pages 5 Personality and Individual Differences xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
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Linking longitudinal dynamics of justice sensitivity and moral disengagement☆ Simona Maltese a, Anna Baumert b,⁎ a b
Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Fortstr. 7, 76829 Landau, Germany Max-Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 28 January 2017 Received in revised form 25 June 2017 Accepted 28 June 2017 Available online xxxx Keywords: Justice sensitivity Perpetrator Beneficiary Moral self-regulation Moral disengagement Personality development Longitudinal
a b s t r a c t Despite conceptual overlap between justice and morality, dispositional justice sensitivity (JS) has not been linked to processes of moral self-regulation. In a 1-year longitudinal study with four timepoints (N = 515) we tested how intra-individual changes in JS (from the perpetrator and beneficiary perspectives) and dispositional moral disengagement (MD) were associated. Both JS perspectives were negatively correlated with the inclination to use MD strategies at each timepoint. There was also correlated change. Intraindividual changes in perpetrator and beneficiary JS between T1 and T2 were negatively correlated to intraindividual change in dispositional MD between T1 and T2. Moreover, intraindividual changes in beneficiary JS between T2 and T3 predicted intraindividual changes in MD between T3 and T4. Results are consistent with the proposition that these JS perspectives reflect the strength of internalized justice standards that render MD strategies ineffective for avoiding negative self-reactions. © 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction Individuals differ in their readiness to perceive injustice and in the strength of their emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions. Dispositional Justice Sensitivity (JS) has been differentiated according to the perspectives from which injustice can be experienced, as victim, observer, beneficiary, or perpetrator (Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010). Individuals who are sensitive to injustice from perpetrator, beneficiary, or observer perspectives have been found to act in accordance with justice principles and take other's concerns into account even under conditions when selfish behavior is tempting (e.g., Lotz, Schlösser, Cain, & Fetchenhauer, 2013). Individual differences in perpetrator, beneficiary, and observer JS have been hypothesized to capture the individual concern for justice and represent the psychological strength of justice standards (Baumert, Rothmund, Thomas, Gollwitzer, & Schmitt, 2013; Schmitt et al., 2010). Here, we focus on perpetrator and beneficiary perspectives because those are thought to involve the strength of guilt reactions to own deeds or outcomes. Distinguishing these perspectives, perpetrator sensitive individuals are thought to anticipate feeling guilty about their own potential wrongdoings, whereas beneficiary sensitive individuals feel guilty
☆ This research was supported by a grant to the second author from the German Research Foundation, No. BA3883/4-1. ⁎ Corresponding author at: Max-Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, KurtSchumacher Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany. E-mail addresses:
[email protected] (S. Maltese),
[email protected] (A. Baumert).
about illegitimate advantages that they passively benefit from. Here, we investigated how these perspectives of JS are linked to processes of moral self-regulation in a longitudinal design. Theories of moral agency spell out the psychological processes that determine moral behavior. Because moral and justice-related behavior have a large conceptual overlap (Baumert et al., 2013; Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005), theories of moral agency can provide important insights into how JS shapes behavior. A key mechanism in moral agency is moral self-regulation (Bandura, 1991). We hypothesized that processes of moral self-regulation operate efficiently in perpetrator or beneficiary sensitive individuals, keeping their actions well in line with their internalized justice standards. For this reason, we expected a negative relation between perpetrator or beneficiary JS and dispositional moral disengagement (MD). The latter reflects the inclination to rely on psychological strategies that disable moral self-regulation, allowing the individual to violate his/her own moral standards without negative psychological consequences (Bandura, 1999). Particularly, we investigated how developmental dynamics in the two concepts are related to each other. We hypothesized that enduring changes in JS might precede changes in dispositional MD and tested (lagged) correlated change across four timepoints in young adults who were transitioning to university. 1.1. Moral self-regulation and moral disengagement Moral self-regulation is thought to operate through self-monitoring, self-judgment, and self-reaction processes, which hold behavior in line with internalized moral standards. Bandura (1991) proposed that
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Please cite this article as: Maltese, S., & Baumert, A., Linking longitudinal dynamics of justice sensitivity and moral disengagement, Personality and Individual Differences (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.06.041
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individuals monitor their behavior and evaluate it in relation to their internalized moral standards. By anticipating or experiencing affective self-reactions (self-respect when moral standards are upheld; guilt or self-condemnation when moral standards are violated), Bandura (1991) hypothesized that individuals reinforce the self as a moral agent. However, Bandura (1999) also emphasized powerful psychological strategies that help individuals situationally disengage from their own moral standards. For example, positively reconstruing behavior, denying negative consequences, or blaming the victims of harmful actions serve to avoid self-sanctions that would otherwise follow immoral behavior. Systematic interindividual differences in the inclination to apply such disengagement strategies have been observed, and people high in dispositional MD have been found to be self-oriented, less prone to guilt reactions, and less prosocial (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). There is abundant evidence that high MD is associated with various kinds of antisocial behavior (e.g., Paciello, Fida, Tramontano, Lupinetti, & Caprara, 2008; Shulman, Cauffman, Piquero, & Fagan, 2011). 1.2. Justice sensitivity and moral disengagement Because justice represents a core domain of morality, and, vice versa, a central aspect of justice involves the quality of agency (Baumert et al., 2013; Folger et al., 2005), it seems plausible that mechanisms of moral self-regulation could be involved in shaping justice-related reactions. Based on accumulating evidence that perpetrator and beneficiary sensitivity predict prosocial behavior, Schmitt et al. (2010) proposed that JS captures the strength of individual justice concerns. If this is the case, processes of moral self-regulation should be particularly efficient in high-JS persons. Strong internalized justice standards should make the application of MD strategies unlikely for two reasons. First, these strategies might not be sufficient to enable such people to subjectively live up to their high justice standards. For example, even when one's own responsibility for an injustice is low (i.e., under conditions of diffusion of responsibility), letting this injustice prevail might not satisfy a person's high internalized justice standards. Second, the utilization of MD strategies might itself become the subject of self-monitoring and thus a potential source of self-condemnation. For individuals with strong justice standards, these standards can be expected to play roles in more situations than for individuals with lower standards, and these standards might be applied more consistently to one's own behavior across situations (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007; Bandura, 1991). Based on these arguments, we expected perpetrator and beneficiary sensitivity to be negatively associated with dispositional MD. More important, intraindividual changes in perpetrator or beneficiary sensitivity were expected to trigger (and thus precede) the opposite changes in dispositional MD. To gain insight into the intraindividual dynamics of JS and MD, we adopted a longitudinal design with four timepoints and investigated correlated and lagged correlated change. This design allowed us to disentangle two possible accounts of a psychological association between JS and MD. JS might reflect the strength of justice standards that impede the application of moral disengagement strategies. Alternatively, instead of reflecting the strength of justice standards, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivity might reflect a susceptibility to guilt reactions (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Being prone to react with guilt to illegitimate advantages or to one's own wrongdoings could stem from the ineffective application of MD strategies. If this is the case, intraindividual changes in JS should follow from (and thus be preceded by) intraindividual changes in dispositional MD. 1.3. Development and change Previous longitudinal studies found rank-order stabilities of the JS perspectives and MD between 0.40 and 0.65 across timespans of
6 weeks to 4 years (e.g., Baumert et al., 2014; Bondü, Hannuschke, Elsner, & Gollwitzer, 2016; Paciello et al., 2008; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005). These results indicate that JS and MD can be considered personality dispositions. Additionally, these results highlight the possibility of substantial intraindividual changes in these dispositions across time. So far, we know only a little about the causes of changes in JS and MD. Bondü and Elsner (2015) speculated that maturation and related increases in social-cognitive and moral skills that occur in childhood and adolescence could play critical roles in JS. It also seems likely that socialization through role models and institutional implementations of justice principles shape the strength of internalized justice concerns (Bandura, 1991). Throughout adulthood, and particularly in young adulthood (e.g., McAdams & Olson, 2010) intraindividual changes in JS might be triggered by life transitions and associated changes in social roles and the importance of values (Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008). For example, certain career steps can bring along increased responsibilities for other persons that might make the possibility of one's own wrongdoings salient and particularly aversive (Toegel, Anand, & Kilduff, 2007). On the level of day-to-day experiences, it has been proposed that individual experiences of justice and injustice might have sensitizing effects (Bondü, Rothmund, & Gollwitzer, 2016). So far, longitudinal studies have mainly focused on the influences of changes in victim sensitivity (e.g., Bondü, Rothmund, et al., 2016). For dispositional MD, a general decline in late adolescence has been observed and attributed to processes of maturation characterized by increased self-regulatory capacities. Furthermore, it has been argued that self-justifying mechanisms can become cognitive habits and subsequently increase the probability to misbehave over time (Paciello et al., 2008). However, this might be a lingering process because change is achieved through the gradual diminution of self-sanctions such that people do not fully recognize the changes they are going through (Bandura, 1991). Emphasizing the importance of role models and social learning processes, longitudinal studies of dispositional MD in adolescence have shown that deviant peers and experiences of violence and aggression predict increases in MD (Fagan & Tyler, 2005) and that adolescents' MD increasingly resembles that of their close friends (Caravita, Sijtsema, Rambaran, & Gini, 2014). Enduring changes in reinforcement patterns might also explain intraindividual changes in dispositional MD across adulthood, but longitudinal studies on dispositional MD have usually focused primarily on adolescence. In sum, notwithstanding a certain degree of temporal stability, JS and MD are subject to intraindividual change across the lifespan, and developmental mechanisms are only partly understood. 1.4. Present research Our study involved four timepoints across 1 year, spanning the transition to university. We deliberately invited participants who were about to start their first semester at university and scheduled the first assessment before the start of the semester. As research on personality development has shown, transitions are associated with mean-level personality changes and a substantial amount of interindividual differences in intraindividual change (e.g., McAdams & Olson, 2010; Specht et al., 2014). Thus, we expected only medium-level rank-order stabilities in JS and MD and substantial interindividual differences in intraindividual change across the four timepoints. This design allowed us to test whether JS (perpetrator and beneficiary) would be negatively associated with dispositional MD at each timepoint (Hypothesis 1) and whether intraindividual changes in JS would be negatively associated with intraindividual changes in MD (Hypothesis 2). Most important, we tested for lagged correlated change and expected that intraindividual changes in JS would be followed by intraindividual changes in MD in the opposite direction after the next measurement occasion (Hypothesis 3).
Please cite this article as: Maltese, S., & Baumert, A., Linking longitudinal dynamics of justice sensitivity and moral disengagement, Personality and Individual Differences (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.06.041
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2. Method All materials, data, and syntax are available at osf.io/nbwh6/. 2.1. Sample and design Before the beginning of their first semester, first-year students from different German universities were recruited to participate in a longitudinal study with four timepoints across 1 year. At the first timepoint (T1, 83% female), 515 students participated. Ages ranged from 16 to 35 years (M = 19.6, SD = 2.6). Two months later, at T2, 334 persons (65% of the initial sample) participated again. At T3, scheduled at the end of the semester, 306 participants returned (59% of the initial sample). At T4, one year after T1, 317 students participated again (61% of the initial sample).
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Table 1 Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for JS perpetrator/beneficiary and MD at each timepoint.
JS perpetrator JS beneficiary MD
M (SD) T1
M (SD) T2
M (SD) T3
M (SD) T4
4.45 (0.84) 3.71 (0.91) 2.97 (0.58)
4.23 (0.94) 3.53 (0.90) 2.96 (0.62)
4.23 (0.87) 3.57 (0.89) 2.98 (0.66)
4.38 (0.89) 3.65 (0.89) 2.92 (0.62)
Note. T1–T4: timepoints 1 to 4. JS perpetrator, JS beneficiary, MD: response scale: 1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree). N (T1) = 515, N (T2) = 334, N (T3) = 306, N (T4) = 317.
from r = 0.68 to r = 0.72 for MD. Rank-order stabilities across 1 year were r = 0.61 for JS perpetrator, r = 0.58 for JS beneficiary, and r = 0.70 for MD. 3.3. Latent change analyses
2.2. Materials 2.2.1. Justice sensitivity The Justice Sensitivity Inventory (Schmitt et al., 2010) was used to measure perpetrator sensitivity (e.g., “I feel guilty when I enrich myself at the cost of others”) and beneficiary sensitivity (e.g., “I feel guilty when I am better off than others for no reason”) with 10 items each. Victim and observer sensitivity were also assessed, but not included in the analyses. Response options ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree). 2.2.2. Moral disengagement We employed a German adaptation for adults (Bandura et al., 1996; Rothmund, Bardtke, Drauwe, Holst, & Jeske, 2008) to measure the inclination to employ eight MD strategies moral justification, euphemistic language, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, distorting consequences, attribution of blame and dehumanization with three items each (e.g., “It is alright to fight to protect your friends”). Response options ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree). 2.3. Procedure The assessments at T1–T4 were programmed with Inquisit 4.0.4.0 (Millisecond Software, 2013) and administered via web license. After obtaining informed consent, the JS perspectives and moral disengagement were assessed among other variables. Finally, participants created a personal code that was used to match the data across timepoints. Participants could earn up to 60 Euro and had the chance to win one of two iPads in a lottery after T4. 3. Results 3.1. Attrition analyses We tested whether missing values occurred completely at random (Enders, 2010) with Little's MCAR test (Little & Rubin, 2002) for the variables of interest, χ2(76) = 96.28, p = 0.06. Participants at T4 did not differ from those who dropped out earlier regarding sex, χ2(1, 515) = 0.74, p = 0.40, age, d = 0.06, p = 0.55, JS perpetrator, d = 0.13, p = 0.16, JS beneficiary, d = 0.08, p = 0.45, or dispositional MD, d = 0.03, p = 0.68. Thus, we employed the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) algorithm in our main analyses. 3.2. Descriptives, bivariate correlations, and rank-order stabilities Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 and bivariate correlations between JS and MD in Table 2. At each timepoint, internal consistencies were high (0.80 b α N 0.91). At each timepoint, JS perpetrator and JS beneficiary were negatively correlated with MD. For each time interval, rank-order stabilities ranged from r = 0.58 to r = 0.74 for JS and
We tested whether changes in JS beneficiary or JS perpetrator would be related to changes in dispositional MD. We estimated neighborhood latent change (LC) models (Geiser, Eid, Nussbeck, Courvoisier, & Cole, 2010) in R with the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012). First, we specified separate univariate LC models for JS perpetrator, JS beneficiary, and MD with two indicators per timepoint. We used test halves (even-odd split) as indicators. To model latent change, we specified three latent change variables, each representing change in the true scores between two adjacent measurement occasions (i.e., T2 − T1, T3 − T2, T4 − T3). To account for indicator specificity, we included a method factor (IS-factor) for the second indicator (Geiser et al., 2010). Covariances of the IS-factor with all other latent variables were fixed to zero. The structure of the univariate LC model is depicted in the left part of Fig. 1 (LC model for one construct). To test for measurement invariance across time for each construct, we compared an LC model with strong measurement invariance (i.e., all factor loadings and intercepts equal over time) against an LC model with no measurement invariance constraints (i.e., all loadings and intercepts estimated freely, except for the first indicator to ensure identification). Chi-square difference tests revealed that, for all three constructs, the more restrictive model with strong measurement invariance did not fit significantly worse, Δχ2(6) b 14.87, p N 0.02. In addition, decreases in the CFI were b0.01 for the more restrictive model (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). In sum, the univariate models with strong measurement invariance demonstrated a good fit to the data (see Table 3, upper part). In all univariate LC models, the variances of the latent change variables were larger than zero (all ps b 0.01), indicating substantial interindividual differences in intraindividual change. Next, we specified two bivariate LC models, one for JS perpetrator and MD and one for JS beneficiary and MD, with the same restrictions in the measurement part as in the univariate models (Fig. 1). All latent change variables were allowed to correlate with the initial state (T1) and with each other across constructs. Note, that these correlations are not depicted in Fig. 1. Both bivariate LC models fit the data well (Table 3, lower part). For JS perpetrator, we found that changes across timepoints were significantly negatively related to changes in MD in the same time interval, between T1 and T2, but not between T2 and T3 and between T3 and T4 (Table 4). Furthermore, there was lagged correlated change such that changes in JS perpetrator between T2 and T3 were negatively related to
Table 2 Bivariate correlations between JS perpetrator/beneficiary and MD at each timepoint.
JS perpetrator JS beneficiary
MD (T1)
MD (T2)
MD (T3)
MD (T4)
−0.32⁎⁎ −0.27⁎⁎
−0.31⁎⁎ −0.21⁎⁎
−0.21⁎⁎ −0.12⁎
−0.22⁎⁎ −0.21⁎⁎
Note. T1–T4: timepoints 1 to 4. N (T1) = 515, N (T2) = 334, N (T3) = 306, N (T4) = 317. ⁎ p b 0.05. ⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Please cite this article as: Maltese, S., & Baumert, A., Linking longitudinal dynamics of justice sensitivity and moral disengagement, Personality and Individual Differences (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.06.041
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Fig. 1. Neighborhood latent change model for JS perpetrator/JS beneficiary (JS) and moral disengagement (MD) as latent states for T1–T4 with change between the measurement occasions. Correlations and lagged correlations between changes in JS and changes in MD were estimated but omitted from the figure for clarity.
changes in MD in the subsequent time interval between T3 and T4. However, this lagged correlated change was not statistically significant. For JS beneficiary, changes across timepoints were significantly negatively related to changes in MD in the same time interval, between T1 and T2, but not between T2 and T3 and between T3 and T4. Furthermore, there was significant lagged correlated change such that changes in JS beneficiary between T2 and T3 were negatively related to changes in MD in the subsequent time interval between T3 and T4 (Table 4). 4. Discussion Despite the conceptual overlap between justice and morality, JS had not been linked to processes of moral self-regulation. In this study, we adopted a longitudinal perspective to investigate associations between perpetrator and beneficiary JS and dispositional MD in the dynamics of intraindividual change. Understanding the relation between these JS perspectives and the use of MD strategies is important for conceptual and practical reasons. In line with Hypothesis 1, we found perpetrator and beneficiary JS to be negatively related to the inclination to use MD strategies at each timepoint. These results indicated that highly perpetrator or beneficiary sensitive persons might engage in effective moral self-regulation, keeping their behavior in line with justice standards and inhibiting the use of strategies for situationally disengaging from these standards. Effective moral self-regulation that is not readily disengaged from internalized justice standards might represent a psychological process through
which JS exerts its impact on prosocial behavior (e.g., Baumert & Schmitt, 2016). Moreover, partly consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 3, we found partial evidence for correlated change in JS and dispositional MD. Intraindividual increases (decreases) in perpetrator and beneficiary sensitivity went along with intraindividual decreases (increases) in dispositional MD. The timing of these correlated changes was partly unexpected. We had predicted correlated changes at each measurement interval and additionally hypothesized that changes in JS would precede changes in MD. During the first measurement interval, at the very beginning of the first semester (T1–T2), we found simultaneous change in both concepts. For the second measurement interval (T2– T3) at the end of the first semester and for the third interval (T3–T4) between the end of the first and the start of the third semester, we did not find simultaneous correlated change, but lagged correlated change. This is preliminary evidence that changes in JS might indeed precede changes in dispositional MD, and not vice versa. We speculate that the start of the first semester at university is characterized by frequent social interactions with different unacquainted persons. The exceptional intensity of novel social experiences could contribute to intraindividual changes in personality dispositions. In particular, we suspect that during this phase, changes in JS are translated Table 4 Latent correlations [95% CI] between change variables for MD and JS perpetrator/JS beneficiary. MD
Table 3 Fit indices for univariate and bivariate neighborhood latent change models. Model
JS perpetrator JS beneficiary MD JS perpetrator-MD JS beneficiary-MD
T1–T2
Fit indices χ2
df
RMSEA [90% CI]
SRMR
CFI
31.54⁎ 27.92 30.48 178.63⁎⁎ 136.61⁎⁎
19 19 19 86 86
0.04 [0.01, 0.06] 0.03 [0.00, 0.05] 0.03 [0.01, 0.06] 0.05 [0.04, 0.06] 0.03 [0.02, 0.04]
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99
Note. RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; CFI = Comparative Fit Index. ⁎ p b 0.05. ⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
T2–T3
T3–T4
JS perpetrator T1–T2 −0.31⁎⁎ [−0.45, −0.18] 0.06 [−0.08, 0.20] 0.01 [−0.13, 0.15] T2–T3 0.01 [−0.16, 0.17] 0.06⁎ [−0.09, 0.21] −0.14† [−0.29, 0.00] T3–T4 0.12 [−0.05, 0.29] −0.03 [−0.19, 0.12] −0.05 [−0.19, 0.09] JS beneficiary T1–T2 −0.23⁎⁎ [−0.27, −0.09] −0.06 [−0.21, 0.06] 0.10 [−0.05, 0.25] T2–T3 0.09 [−0.06, 0.25] 0.11 [−0.03, 0.24] −0.23⁎⁎ [−0.37, −0.09] T3–T4 −0.09 [−0.25, 0.07] −0.00 [−0.15, 0.14] −0.02 [−0.16, 0.12] Note. T1–T4: timepoints 1 to 4. N (T1) = 515, N (T2) = 334, N (T3) = 306, N (T4) = 317. † p b 0.10. ⁎ p b 0.05. ⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Please cite this article as: Maltese, S., & Baumert, A., Linking longitudinal dynamics of justice sensitivity and moral disengagement, Personality and Individual Differences (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.06.041
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more rapidly into changes in the inclination to use MD strategies than in other life phases. In contrast to the start of the first semester, in the subsequent months, social relationships with new peers might stabilize (Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). Consequently, intraindividual changes that occur in JS might be slower to trigger changes in dispositional MD, thus resulting in the pattern of lagged correlated change that we found between T2 and T3 and between T3 and T4. Clearly, these speculations need further testing. Still, our results speak in favor of the notion that perpetrator and beneficiary JS might reflect the strength of internalized justice standards (Schmitt et al., 2010). Strong justice standards might render disengagement strategies ineffective for avoiding negative self-reactions. For persons with strong justice standards, the use of MD strategies might even be a reason for self-condemnation. In line with these arguments, intraindividual changes in JS preceded the opposite changes in dispositional MD. By contrast, our findings are inconsistent with reversed causal relationships, such as heightened susceptibility to guilt reactions caused by ineffective use of moral disengagement strategies, or lowering of justice standards to reduce cognitive dissonance experienced after moral disengagement. 4.1. Limitations We investigated how intraindividual changes in JS and dispositional MD were associated across the first year at university. Thus, we revealed change dynamics at a “macro level” of self-reported dispositions. To complement the present study, future studies should zoom in on the “micro level” of everyday experiences. Through experimental designs or ambulatory assessment methodology, we could learn about how processes of moral self-regulation, self-monitoring, self-judgment, and self-reactions unfold and may be modulated by JS. Despite the longitudinal design, due to the correlational approach of the present study we cannot exclude that third variables simultaneously influenced changes in JS and MD. Furthermore, our study addressed intraindividual change in a specific life period, namely, the transition to university. We do not know whether our findings generalize to other life periods or other life transitions. We selected the start of university as a time that allows for substantial interindividual differences in intraindividual change in JS and dispositional MD, as confirmed by our data. Next, it would be interesting to compare patterns of associated change in different life periods to shed further light on the association between JS and MD. On the broader level of personality development, it would be important to determine whether certain life transitions are indeed followed by intensive phases of novel individual experiences that have the potential to catalyze dispositional change. Finally, generalizability of our results could be limited due to the large proportion of women in our sample. 5. Conclusion This research adds to the theoretical understanding of JS as reflecting the strength of internalized justice standards. Results suggest that processes of moral self-regulation, in particular the inclination to use MD strategies, may be modulated by JS and, in turn, can explain how JS shapes justice-related behavior. Our longitudinal results revealed that intraindividual changes in JS partly preceded changes in dispositional MD, indicating a potential developmental mechanism of dispositional MD that has not yet been addressed. By strengthening an individual's concern for justice, it might be possible to shield this person from MD and thus from immoral behavior. References
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Please cite this article as: Maltese, S., & Baumert, A., Linking longitudinal dynamics of justice sensitivity and moral disengagement, Personality and Individual Differences (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.06.041