Local politics and depolitisation in Chile

Bull. Latin Am. Res., Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 197-217, 1997 0 1997 Society for Latin American Studies Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. Printed in Great Britain 0261-3050/97 $17.00 + 0.00

Pergamon

PII:

SO261-3050(96)00023-X

Local Politics and Depolitisation

in Chile

DIANA MOSOVICH PONT-LEZICA GRAL (Groupe de Recherche SW lilmkrique Latine), Maison de la Recherche, 5 all&es Antonio Machado, F-31058 Toulouse, France

Abstract-This study focuses on the consequences at the local level of decentralisation and state disengagement policies in Chile. We proceed in two stages. First, we analyse whether the nature of urban collective goods and services has changed from political to economic. Next, we study the effect of these policies on community/ authority relations, and more broadly, on local politics. A case study of the city of Conception serves to explore our questions. We conclude that the local community has adapted to the economic nature of collective goods and has developed the necessary organisation, technical and leadership skills. Power politics however have not disappeared but are now in higher institutional levels. Politicians do not seem to have followed the trend and thus have still to open to democratic participation and legitimate representation as expressed by the citizens’ aggregated interests. 0 1997 Society for Latin American Studies Key wordrxhile, local politics, bottom-up, services, depolitisation, collective action

commoditication

of collective goods and

INTRODUCTION The military authorities who took over the government after the September 1973 coup of public life and the liberalisation of the economy. These decisions can be best understood in the light of the Chilean state’s previous redistributive role, fulfilled in terms of social and political policies often the object of pork barrel and other spurious political transactions. To pursue depolitisation, military authorities smothered political and social organisations. They set up specific public policies to reduce state intervention and regulation of economic and productive activities. Unchecked by representation and participation mechanisms, deregulation, decentralisation, and state disengagement policies penetrated all levels of Chilean society, its economy and its politics. Twenty years after the coup, many scholars are assessing the consequences of the changes ushered in by decentralisation and state disengagement policies. Many studies look at changes occurring at the level of Chilean society as a whole, while there are few studies that deal with more disaggregate levels, such as different sectors of society or of levels of government. This study focuses on the local level and proceeds in two stages. First, I look at the following questions: Have decentralisation and state disengagement policies cornmodified urban collective goods and services, and taken them out of the field of political transactions? That is, are residents delivered to those services strictly when they pay for them, or do politicians continue to use services as political tokens? If so, does the obtainment of collective d’ktat had among their goals the depolitisation

198

Diana Mosovich Pont-Lezica

urban goods and services strictly depend on the ability of the neighbourhood’s leadership to organise residents’ collective action to that end, and on the technical feasibility of delivery? Next, I analyse the effect of decentralisation and state disengagement policies on community/authority relations, and more broadly, on local politics. A case study serves to explore whether the commoditication of public goods and services has indeed changed clientelistic politics and enhanced democratic leadership, participation and representation within neighbourhoods and between residents and local authorities and political parties. To answer these questions, I will briefly go over the institutional background, particularly that related to neighbourhood associations (from now on,juntas de vecinos) in what can largely be considered probluciones (Castells, 1973). Changes in the role of the juntas de vecinos and of their relation with local authorities will be studied over the period starting in 1968-when the government enacted legislation on social organisations-and 1992, following the first elections for local authorities under the new constitution. The analysis will be illustrated and underscored with observations made in October 1992 in the city of Conception, located south of Santiago. In the light of this analysis, the effect of state disengagement and decentralisation policies on local politics will be discussed, and the corresponding conclusions will be drawn.

JUNTAS

DE VECINOS AND LOCAL AUTHORITY

Among the more permanent functions and goals of thejuntas de vecinos, at least ever since the implementation of Law 16,880, in 1966, are delivery of urban goods and services and the improvement of the neighbourhood (Mosovich Pont-Lezica, 1993). As seen in similar cases in other countries, neighbourhood leaders oversee residents’ interests and goals and organise collective actions to obtain the satisfaction of those goals and interests (Mosovich Pont-Lezica, 1993, 1994). Leaders’ functions regarding neighbourhood improvement may not have varied in the last 25 years. What has certainly changed is (a) the way neighbourhood leaders have brokered their fellow neighbours’ interests and goals; and (b) the leaders’ roles and functions. Two periods can be discerned regarding neighbours and local authority’s relations: First, from the implementation of Law 16,880 until the 1973 coup.’ Second, from 1973 to 1991, during which authorities set up Law 18,993 for the organisation of thejuntas de vecinos (in 1989). After the first municipal elections under the new Constitution, in 1992, most of the legislation regarding the privatisation of urban collective goods remained in place. The politisution of demand After Chile became a republic, it was among the nations considered politically modern. Centred in Santiago, the capital city of a strongly macrocephalous country, the modern Chilean political and institutional system coexisted with more archaic economic, political and social forms, mostly found in the rest of the country. The organisation of interests and their political representation at the institutional national level contrasted with the paternalism and under-representation that were the rule in areas removed from Santiago. According to A. Valenzuela (1977), what characterized Chilean politics before the 1973 coup was the existence of political brokers. At the local level it was usually the ulculdes (mayors) who brokered between national and local political levels, bringing together two otherwise incompatible political models. At the national level the predominant model was

Local politics and depolitisation in Chile

199

that of representative political systems, and political transactions involved the interaction of interest groups. At the local level, the goals of political transactions were, as occurs with clientelist relations, the obtainment of goods or personal favours in exchange for political support. The alcaldes organised chains of favours and political loyalties linking representatives (at the national level) to the local population. Gradually delivery of public goods acquired the status of a political exchange good. The municipalities’ permanent lack of means, which politicians did not hesitate to use in their benefit, underscored this feature. In these dealings the leaders of the juntas de vecinos had an important political role. They worked hand in hand with the leaders of political parties and with local authorities. Briefly stated, politicians used urban public collective goods and services as political spoils or exchange tokens. Local authorities decisions concerning the delivery of goods and services were not primarily based on technical or economic feasibility, or social relevance. Actions concerning these goods and services were above all a part of the power politics involving neighbours, party structures and national institutions. Public goods and services had acquired a strong political connotation. At the time of the coup, in 1973, the system had become so corrupt and inefficient that the head of the Confederation National de Municipos (National Confederation of Municipalities) asked the President for financial aid. Many municipalities went bankrupt. Disruption and inexperience

Without doubt, at the grass-root level, fear was the most prominent trait during the years following the coup. Fear spread because of the military regime’s repression and disruption of the social structures that had been the population’s support. In such a context, authorities defined participation as their will to listen to the people’s demands, albeit without engaging themselves in satisfying them. The military authorities appointed the leaders of both the juntas de vecinos and the functional organisations, the only tolerated community associations. On the initiative of the Interior Ministry (through the Departamento de Desarrollo Comunal, Office of Community Development) these organisations, with the comunas (municipalities), were the core of the territorial network for the exercise of political power (Pozo, 1981).2 The 1974 reforma administrativa integral (comprehensive administrative reform), which divided the country into 13 regions, 51 provinces and 335 municipalities, formalised the policy on territorial organisation. The hierarchical power structure corresponding to each level (in decreasing order, from presidente to intendente, to gobernador to alcalde) was not essentially very different from the preceding one. The exception was the municipal level. The designation of the alcaldes was now ‘top-down’, and their functions were increased (Tomic and Gonzalez, 1983).3 The mayor’s authority reproduced the President’s at the local level. As vehicles of local development, municipalities had a central role in social and urban planning. They were to become true utility companies, especially in the fields of public health and education. The adoption of administrative criteria towards a more flexible use of municipal resources accompanied decentralisation policies; the management of public services enabled municipalities to request funds and spend them as befitted their functions. The 1979 Ley de Rentas Municipales (Municipal Revenue Law) (still in effect) endows municipalities with economic means to participate in the decentralisation process and fultil their role of promoting development and urban planning. It awards municipalities the right

200

Diana Mosovich Pont-Lezica

to levy different taxes, and the Fondo Corntin Municipal (Common Municipal Reserve) funnels resources distributed by the national government (Garcia Hurtado, 1991).4 Still, because poorly funded municipal services had to compete with private services, the new municipal duties concerning public services had the effect of polarising the users according to income. In this scheme, neighbourhood leaders had to obtain legitimation from their superiors, rather than from their peers. Neighbours in turn generally did not accept these leaders, whom they feared and despised, and avoided as much as possible, because they saw them as the executors of the alcalde’s decisions, and generally, of the military usurpers’. Also, decrees banned all meetings, and it was necessary to present the carubineros (Chilean police) with a written request to hold a neighbourhood meeting.5 Fear, the authorities’ inaction and, above all, their refusal to listen to the population’s demands, demobilised neighbours. Residents, especially in lower-class neighbourhoods, also knew that, compared to pre-1973 days, they could generally expect very little from the military authorities. These factors, to which should be added the authorities’ and the residents’ lack of experience with the new legislation and the new political-administrative model, contributed to the decrease of the juntas de vecinos’ undertakings and to a lower participation of residents in neighbourhood activities (Gonzalez and Rosenfeld, 1985; Rosenfeld, 1988). The completion of public works ground to a standstill in many neighbourhoods. In some cities (as, for example, in Concepcibn) there hardly was any improvement in urban problems. Nonetheless, de facto authorities needed legitimation, which they fostered by delivering some urban services and improvements. Such behaviour, not infrequent by de facto authorities, falls within the pattern of clientelistic relations, notably after 1988, when the UDI (Union Democratica Independiente, the political party supportive of the military regime and laissez-faire policies) separated from the right-wing alliance and became a political party in its own right (see Note 3). However, the feature of community/authority relations at the time was the lack of bottom-up communication. To conclude, the juntas de vecinos’ activities, with regard to their role described above, were almost non-existent. The resident’s fear and mistrust of the leaders appointed by the military authorities, and the neglect of the latter, paralysed the neighbourhoods. This statement should be qualified, at least concerning Santiago. Here, as a consequence of the pauperisation brought on by the 1982 economic and financial crisis, violent actions and protests broke out, especially in the popular and lower middle-class neighbourhoods (the latter joined in after the unrest had begun). Although these social movements were not very successful, their magnitude surely influenced the government, as witnessed by the economic and political decisions made after 1985.6 Toward the cornmodification

of public services

Under the military regime, the new laws and institutions were put to the test. Chileans became familiar with the new political-administrative system. The greatest difficulties, however, occurred at the local level and were mostly attributed to technical inadequacies. For example, there were no serious methodologies to evaluate the social or public service deficits, and often municipalities lacked technicians or managerial capacity, a situation that facilitated the delivery of goods on an arbitrary basis (Raczynski, 1991,1994). Still, with the help of government- and NGO-organised workshops, most neighbourhood leaders managed to acquire a certain expertise.7 Gradually they learned to deal with the new

Local politics and depolitisation in Chile

201

administrative and financial procedures, to organise residents’ demands, collect their dues, oversee the preparation of projects and present them to the authorities, and apply for and sometimes obtain funds to finance their implementation. Delivery of some public services, and especially of urban collective services (such as pavements, public street lighting, sewers, running water) was privatised or was contracted out to private companies. This mechanism is still in place. To pay for the works necessary to install the services, neighbours can apply for loans from the corresponding organisations (as mentioned above, generally the International Development Bank). Neighbours without funds may request them from the municipality (Gonzalez, 1983). Since utility companies have either become privatised (as in the case of propane gas and electricity utilities) or mixed entities (as with running water networks and sewers) they participate in a system of public bids for adjudication. According to the new legislation, public authorities are only responsible for the initial stage (evaluation of project feasibility) of the delivery of urban collective services. Their responsibility does not include control over works to install the services or over conditions of their actual delivery (quality, regularity, tariffs, and so on). Users have a contractual relationship with the utility companies, and do not participate in their management. Their only safeguard in case the company fails to fullil its obligations is a law suit, a complicated and expensive solution, only envisaged in extreme cases. Once residents of a neighbourhood agree on the need to obtain a certain public service, they sign a contract with a professional who drafts the project and prepares its budget. The neighbours pay the professional’s fee, and to this end neighbourhood leaders organise the collection of neighbours’ dues. At the end of 1992, projects for public services subjected to the approval of the municipal bureau had to conform to very strict technical norms, and not all projects presented were acceptable. The procedure followed by municipal authorities to control and verify the civil engineering projects presented by neighbourhood leaders is as follows: neighbourhood leaders present the project and budget at the municipality, where the corresponding technician in the SECPLAC (Secretaria Comunal de Planificacion y Control, Community Office for Planning and Control, an advisory board created after 1973) checks whether the project conforms to the regulations and is economically feasible. If both requirements are met, the municipal bureau accepts the project and it goes on for approval from the Concejo Comunal and the Consejo Economico y Social (Advisory Board for Municipal Development) and the alcal&. In principle, the municipality bases its decision primarily on technical and economic aspects. Leaders have had to acquire new skills: now they not only understand the problem at hand but also oversee the professional who prepares the project and discuss and defend that project at the municipality. This is why, ever since the reform, neighbourhood leaders are more in need of developing technical expertise than relations with politicians. Clearly, organisations whose leaders do not master these skills are at a disadvantage. It should be noted that the technical skills needed until the presentation of the project are different from those required to apply for and obtain loans. As will be seen later, leaders’ political abilities and contacts with political party machines have not disappeared from the local scene; they have only been shifted on to where the negotiations involving the process of obtaining public service delivery take place. To summarise this first part: with regard to relations among residents, neighbourhood association leaders have become the ‘efficacious subgroup’ whose contribution goes beyond economic participation and includes organisation and other costs (Hardin, 1982).

202

Diana Mosovich Pont-Lezica

At the neighbourhood association level, goods and services have lost their political connotation, and have become economic goods that may be directly purchased collectively by the neighbours. At this point the neighbours’ behaviour can be modelled on the behaviour of rational actors (Olson, 1965; Mosovich Pont-Lezica, 1994).8 Very schematically, neighbours participate in collective action to: (a) decide what urban good or service they will apply for; and (b) raise the funds to pay for the feasibility project. Later on in the process, neighbours’ fees will pay back the loans obtained to do the works. Thus each neighbour’s contribution can be limited to the corresponding fee, and the selective incentive eliciting the contribution is the collective good itself. Negative incentives are weak and consist of fellow neighbours’ eventual hostility toward those who free ride. On the surface, our analysis shows that decentralisation and privatisation policies, and political and administrative reforms, have transformed some aspects of residents’ relations with local public authorities. The organisation of neighbours’ demand now depends on the neighbours’ ability to pay for a feasibility project (and further on, to apply and pay back loans for the project itself) and on an appraisal by the corresponding municipal bureau of that project’s technical feasibility. The procedure apparently excludes political dealings: residents organise collectively as a result of the aggregation of their individual (rational) interests concerning a collective good. Barring applying for funds reserved for neediest members of the population, this collective action also seems the only possible way for neighbours to initiate the process of obtaining urban collective goods. Let us now analyse the effect of state disengagement and decentralisation policies on local party politics after the municipal bureau accepts the project. Is public service delivery strictly decided on technical grounds beyond the SECPLAC? Has public services delivery really been pulled out of the political orbit? What, if anything, has changed since 1973? THE REALITY CHECK Even today, the CODECO ,and the COREDE (Consejo Regional de Desarrollo, or the Advisory Board for Regional Development, where the project is discussed after clearing the communal level) are corporatist institutions created under the Constitution Politica de1 Estado (the National Political Constitution) to organise a top-down link between authorities and society.’ The CODECO advises the alcalde, and the COREDE the intendente. The CODECO members are representatives of neighbourhoods, of functional organisations, and of economic activities. Workers are specifically excluded. The COREDE members represent interests at the regional level. Both boards are also expected to foster community participation in economic, social and cultural development. Note that, as a rule, under the military, members of the CODECO and the COREDE had few links with the community and cared little for its well-being. After democratisation, voters choose board members at large among the population. CODECO members have achieved some bargaining power at the communal level, but the COREDE members interviewed as late as 1994 mentioned that the board was not even informed of the projects being presented at the Intendencia. Political parties prefer to exert their power at the parliamentary (national) level, than risk bearing the brunt of failed promises (Mosovich Pont-Lezica, 1995). The higher evaluating institutions are at the regional level, where the intendente sits (Espinoza, 1986).i” Here decisions are made regarding what projects can apply for funding from the FNDR (National Regional Development Fund). Since 1990, projects that cannot

Local politics and depolitisation

in Chile

203

compete for FNDR funds (which, it should be recalled, are reimbursable loans) may apply for FOSIS (Fond0 de Solidaridad e Inversion Social, or the Solidarity and Social Investment Reserve) subsidies (Raczynski, 1994). Finally, in a last stage, the Intendencia sends the projects to Santiago. Because the members of the COREDE rarely represent the population, neighbourhood leaders show up at the Intendencia and even at the ministry in Santiago to put pressure on the functionaries (‘collerear’). The leaders’ strength comes from their fellow neighbours’ trust and monetary contribution, often more than COREDE members can claim. This is where neighbourhood leaders’ bargaining capacity and power again becomes relevant. Most of the neighbourhood leaders we interviewed stated that they had to follow their project from the municipality to the Intendencia and from there to Santiago, usually at their expense. In each phase they encountered politicians and public authorities vying for one project or another. The general feeling was that their being there improved the project’s chances of obtaining finance. The absence of deliberative bodies at the communal and regional levels, and the fact that the intendente and the SEREMI (ministry delegates at the regional level) are designated by the central government, in principle warrants fencing off political party pressures on decisions regarding which projects merit funding and under what conditions. The same may not be said of the relationship neighbourhood leaders now establish with authorities at the regional and national levels. Our contention is that neighbourhood leaders do have a role in power politics; the groundwork is set for them to organise and represent categorical interests. Rational behaviour at the neighbourhood level develops the conditions necessary to crowd out the political dealings of old. Leaders can now claim a bottom-up representation, which gives them concrete bargaining leverage and also renders them accountable. With specific regard to the neighbours, our observations and interviews showed that activities concerning community-authority relations other than those involving selective material incentives have decreased strongly after 17 years of dictatorship. Many residents have realised that only strictly individual interests provide the motivation to participate in collective action. Besides, the population is neither well-informed nor sufficiently consulted. Only those who have much to lose (large- or middle-sized real estate property owners, for example) will be ready to engage in collective action if their interests are threatened. An example is an event that took place in the late 1980s when the alcalde of Conception called on the population to discuss a project to transform the inner city into a pedestrian promenade. The project’s execution was to be equally paid for by the inner city residents and the municipality. Not surprisingly, only the former, who also would be the most affected by the project, showed up at the meeting. Yet an important part of the municipality’s contribution to the project came from taxes paid by all the population of Conception. Such examples show how hard it has become for authorities to engage residents. In contrast to the more rational, efficiency-oriented behaviour of neighbours, political parties do not seem to have kept pace with the political changes at the local level. It was the political parties who largely carried out the actual democratisation of the juntas de vecinos in 1992. In many cases junta leader candidates earned their nomination mostly on their party affiliation, whether the neighbours backed them or not. That is, often the old political institutions continued to exercise their power top-down. Old-time politicians are back in the party structures, and it is reasonable to expect to find old-time leaders in the

204

Diana Mosovich Pont-Lezica

neighbourhood association steering committees, where they now have to work for their fellow residents’ support. ’’ The endurance of structures and behaviours from the past also could be observed recently on the occasion of the 1992 municipal elections-the first since 1973-that were to bring the democratisation process to the local level. In Conception, interviewees admitted that politicians made the decisions concerning those elections without consulting the electorate’s opinion and without allowing constituents or grass-root social organisations to participate. Instead, top party leaders and the party ‘higher councils’ were responsible for decisions on these elections. The importance of this marginalisation was very great. It intensified the population’s demobilisation and further loss of interest in representative institutions. This situation may seem to contradict the observed high rates of voter participation, due to the fact that voting is obligatory in Chile (Znforme latinoamericano, 1992). Yet it should be remarked that people’s lack of participation was the main complaint of interviewed politicians and functionaries. Interviewed neighbours also expressed little interest in getting involved in party politics, which they saw as time-consuming and pointless. THE CASES To analyse the effects of state disengagement and deregulation policies on demand and delivery of public services, interviews were held with leaders of ten juntas de vecinos in Conception (slightly over 10 per cent of the neighbourhoods), chosen randomly. Functionaries and municipal public authorities and members of the local and national scientific and political communities were also interviewed. Independent of their income level (often very low), most of the residents are homeowners and skilled workers, living in consolidated neighbourhoods, whether these originated as poblaciones or were settled a long time ago or not. The summarised information is in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Before discussing it, a brief description of the city of Conception is in order. The city of Conception is in the VIIIth Region (Region de1 Bio-Bio). The region is the second poorest in Chile, and comprises four provinces. I2 With a little more than 700,000 inhabitants in 1992 (more than 40 per cent of the Region’s total population, and over half of its urban residents), Conception is the second largest Chilean city. As in all relatively large Chilean cities, the forces of the free market have developed strongly. We have only been able to find data for the VIIIth Region. However, we believe that it can be used to illustrate its socio-economic situation in the years just before this study was done. The data are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Tables 1 and 2 show that the Region’s unemployment and lay-off rates started off higher than those of the rest of the country, peaked in 1892, and fell more rapidly towards the end of the decade. Instead, the number involved in government employment aid programs, as a percentage of the economically active population, was, in the case of the PEM (Minimum Employment Program) substantially higher in the Region, peaking in 1983, and tapering off in 1988. The beneficiaries of the POJH (Employment Reactivation Program for Household Heads) as a percentage of the economically active population never rose above the national average. According to a study by CEPAL, in 1987 the overall impression confirms the notion of the VIII Region’s rank as one of the poorest in Chile. From the spatial point of view, Conception, on the Bio-Bio estuary, is part of a vast

rate

11.3 8.7

CT

10.4 7.5

1980

12.2 9.2

CT 11.3 8.7

1981

13.8 19.6 10.2 15.4

CT

1982

10.5 14.6 8.2 11.6

CT

1983

7.7 6.0

CT 13.9 10.8

1984

8.6 6.8

CT 12.2 9.5

1985

6.3 4.8

CT 8.8 7.1

1986

8.8 6.8

7.9 6.5

1987 CT

Unemployment and Lay-off Rate, VIII Region (C) and Totals for Country (T), 1980-1989

6.3 5.1

5.5 4.5

CT 5.3 4.4

1989

of economically

active -

6.6

CT

-

5.2

1980

-

-

10.9 4.8

CT

1981

2.3 2.7

11.1 6.2

CT

1982

2.2

23.1

4.3

16.4

CTCT

1983

2.1

8.3

4.3

4.3

1984

2.2

6.1

CT

4.5

3.2

1985

1.2

3.5

CT

3.3

1.9

1986

0.1

1.4

CT

2.0

0.9

1987

0.05

0.3

CT

0.6

0.2

1988

Source: Data developed by the author based on Banco Central de Chile, Direccicn de Estudios (1991), Indicadores Econdmicos y Sociales Regionales, 1980-1989 (Santiago de Chile).

population assigned to PEM Percentage of economically active population benefitting from POJH

Percentage

Variable

Persons Assigned t.o the Minimum Employment Program (PEM) and to the Employment Reactivation Program for Household Heads (POJH) as a Percentage of the Economically Active Population, VIII Region (C) and Totals for Country (T), 19&X?1988; 1982-1988

TABLE 2

CT

1988

6.6 5.2

Source: Banco Central de Chile, Direction de Estudios (1991) Indicadores Econdmicos y Sociales Regionales 198&1989 (Santiago de Chile).

Unemployment Lay-off rate

Variable

TABLE 1

5 ‘; CD

-’

5;’ m

% ‘d g S. L

,r

206

Diana Mosovich Pont-Lezica

conurbation (Greater Conception), comprising other smaller cities, originally not linked to or dependent on Conception. Each had its own local industries: coal in Lota, textiles in Tome, and others. In the last decades these activities have succumbed to the economic and demographic concentration in and around Conception (Hernindez Gurruchaga, 1983, 1984). The typical phenomenon of older cities, that is, the gradual colonisation of the inner city by service activities and the resulting residential exodus, did not occur in Conception. Its geographic location, surrounded by steep hills, prevented the city from expanding in peripheral rings as occurs with most urban sprawls. Instead, the outcome of demographic growth has been the overpopulation of the inner city, where the upper- and middle-income residents continue to live. As the city’s population increased, the different neighbourhoods hardly benefited from maintenance or renovation projects (Centro Itata, 1992). This contributes to the city’s impoverished and shabby look. Only 60 per cent of Conception is urbanised and has public services, a figure that only refers to the inner-city and to a few adjacent neighbourhoods. Table 3 shows data on drinking water and sewerage network coverage for the VIII Region’s urban areas and compares them to the national average. The situation revealed by the data becomes more dramatic when the city’s densification is considered. In 1973 there were 39juntas de vecinos in Concepcibn, and in 1992 there were at least 85. Neighbourhood overpopulation and the legislation of multiple juntas in a single neighbourhood are responsible for this increase. In many neighbourhoods thejuntas have divided, thus also dividing the neighbourhood movement. As for new urban growth, the lower classes, which historically lacked access to the inner city, have had to compete with productive activities (export industries, lumber factories, and others) for suitable land. They have consequently located in the periphery and along the highways running west and north of Conception, toward Talcahuano and Coronel, the only areas where urbanisation works are economically feasible. The poorest neighbourhoods in Conception developed on the sand-covered, impracticable grounds and slopes to the east and south, where they have not had to contend for the land with other activities. More recently, destitute residents have even settled in old river beds. The juntas studied here represent some of Conception’s neighbourhood associations. Located on one or the other side of the Bio-Bio, such as Chiguayante, La Leonera, Pedro de1 Rio, Paula Molina Cruz, or Viejo San Pedro; on the heights surrounding the rich neighbourhoods in the Universidad de Conception area, as is Agtiita de la Perdiz; or in the valley north of Concepcibn, or isolated in the Nonguen valley, east of the city, these neighbourhoods are typically modest-looking. Their buildings are unpretentious single-family houses or low-rise apartments. The only exception is Villa San Pedro, a model planned garden city built in the 1950s around a natural lake. Today, however, the neighbourhood looks rundown and overcrowded. Public spaces lack maintenance, the environment is downgraded, and a myriad of new constructions is proof of abandoned land use norms. The oldest neighbourhoods (Pedro de1 Rio, Barrio Norte, Paula Molina Cruz, Camilo Henriquez, San Pedro Viejo) bear the scars of poorly maintained roads and of public works carried out under successive urban codes. Residents in the more recently settled neighbourhoods, such as Vegas de Nonguen and La Leonera, have at least a 45minute ride to the public hospital or to the downtown area. Compared to the older neighbourhoods, population is sparse. The dirt roads, scant trees, and fragile houses bear witness to their residents’ humble condition.

85.1 43.1 91.4 67.4

WS

1980 ws 44.6 68.2

1981

Water

87.5 91.5

of Drinking

88.4 45.5 92.1 70.0

ws

1982

45.9 72.9

92.4 95.2

ws 58.9 75.1

1985

(S) Coverage,

1984

89.0 94.3

ws

Network

87.8 45.4 92.7 70.6

ws

1983

( W) and Sewerage

94.6 97.0

ws 61.8 77.2

1986 ws

ws 64.5 80.1

97.3 98.2

ws 65.9 81.5

1989

and Totals for

1988

633.2 96.4 78.8 97.7

1987

Concepcidn

95.5 97.2

Urban Sectors,

recent

far, SE

Neighbourhood age (years)

Distance to inner city and orientation

Population thousands) mixed partial

low partial

low

none

low

none

Socio-economic status

Public service delivery

Source: Author’s interviews with leaders of neighbourhood

none

low

5

close, W

45

Paula M. Cruz

in Concepcidn,

yes

low

3

close, E

34

Agtiita de la Perdiz

1992

partial

low

8

close, N

33

Barrio Norte

yes

low-middle

6

not so far, SW

35

Va. San Pedro

partial

low

3.5

not so far, N

60

Camilo Henriquez

associations and political parties, and local public authorities and functionaries.

5

?

(in

4

8-10

70 close, S

recent

30

P. de1 Rio

not so far, E

Vegas de Nonguen

far, SE

Characteristics

of Ten Neighbourhoods

Chiguayante

Characteristics

La Leonera

Structural

Juntas de vecinosl

TABLE 4

partial

low

?

far, SE

+70

S. Pedro Viejo

Source: Data developed by the author based on Banco Central de Chile, Direcci6n de Estudios (1991), Indicadores Econdmicos y Sociales Regionales, 198&1989 (Santiago de Chile).

VIII Region Total country

Variable

TABLE 3 Percentage Country, 198G1989

_

a_. F

% +. c. G c. 3 ti.

$

E a

g

0

208

Diana Mosovich Pont-Lezica

Regarding their structural conditions, the neighbourhoods vary greatly (see Table 4). Some are very recent, having been settled after 1973; others have been occupied since colonial times. Their distance and orientation with regards to the inner city, and the number of inhabitants differ greatly. Sixty per cent of the observed neighbourhoods are lower-class. The remaining 40 per cent are lower-middle-class. Only one neighbourhood has a mixed socio-economic status: here, during the military’s rule, authorities implanted in this lowermiddle-class neighbourhood a destitute population (CEPAL, 1991).13 Two neighbourhoods out of the ten had received all public services. Six had obtained partial delivery, that is, either delivery was incomplete, or it concerned only a few services.14 It can be inferred that there still are enough incentives for residents to engage in collective action to obtain urban services. Table 5 shows data on neighbours’ social life and on the neighbourhoods’ organisation. Only one out of the ten neighbourhoods had not presented the municipality with projects for public services. The neighbours there were reluctant to contribute their money because of previous bad experiences. What is more, in this neighbourhood the junta had had a hard time getting established and functioning at all, probably because of internal disagreements among the residents. This was one of two neighbourhoods having an active social life. Yet, a sign of the times, a Protestant church and not, as before 1973, the neighbourhood association, was the centre of social activity. In the only other socially active neighbourhood things were different: its initial circumstances (illegal land occupation) and spatial organisation-along a single street-ontributed to daily face-to-face interactions, to the development of strong solidarity ties and to consensus-building. All leaders interviewed in neighbourhoods already settled prior to 1973 emphasised that before that year, neighbourhood life was much more lively, that residents then helped each other out, and that it was possible to organise social activities among themselves (Alvarado et al., 1973; Valenzuela, 1977). As proof of today’s lack of unity all leaders mentioned that, since neighbourhood associations’ activities were limited to the organisation of residents’ demands for public services and the collection of dues, the job was done more efficiently by subdividing the neighbourhood into comith de sector or sub-unit committees, reporting in turn to the junta. The juntas continue to exist because the leaders take on themselves the tasks of organising neighbours’ demand and of dealing with the professionals who draft the project and with public authorities. The structure-the junta oversees and coordinates the comitds de sector-risks leading to a top-down hierarchical organisation and bureaucratisation of neighbours’ voluntary organisation. The trend has been favoured following the establishment of the agrupaciones de juntas vecinales that assemble the juntas of adjacent neighbourhoods. The residents’ lack of social participation in the juntas vecinales is an indication that these bureaucratic trends have met with no. check from the social base. It may be assumed instead that they have contributed to stifle the residents’ reactions. In some cases, neighbours prefer to be socially active elsewhere. Even leaders of Agtiita de la Perdiz, where neighbours have a history of mobilisation and confrontation with the military authorities, discussed the fact that a Lutheran Church NGO in their neighbourhood was jeopardising the junta’s influence. Neighbourhood leaders were interviewed either in their homes or at the Unidn Comunal (Office of Community Affairs) offices in the city hall, after which the neighbourhood was visited. At La Leonera and Agiiita de la Perdiz all the association’s steering committee members participated in the interview. They are middle-aged men and women, probably

yes

no

no

no

no

yes

?

yes

no

no

no

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

Barrio Norte

Concepcidn,

Agiiita de la Perdiz

no

yes

Paula M. Cruz

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

P. de1 Rio

yes

yes*

no

no

Vegas de Nonguen

Social Life and Organisations,

1992

no

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

Va. San Pedro

no

yes

yes

no

no

yes

Camilo Henriquez

no

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

S. Pedro Viejo

*The neighbourhood’s social life is centred around the Lutheran Church, one of the many Pinochet encouraged to settle in Chile. This was a way of annoying the Catholic church whose dignitaries actively opposed the dictatorship. Source: Author’s interviews with leaders of neighbourhood associations and political parties, and local public authorities and functionaries.

junta de vecinos

Neighbours’ participation in the

no

yes

Neighbourhood subdivision into

cornit& de sector

-

-

Did neighbours participate before 1973?

yes

no

no

Neighbourhood social life today

no

no

yes

Chiguayante

of Ten Neighbourhoods’

Project political follow-up

of

Characteristics

Presentation projects

Characteristics

La Leonera

5

Juntas de vecinosl

TABLE

;_. B

g

210

Diana Mosovich Pont-Lezica

blue collar workers or self-employed in service activities. They were full of enthusiasm and pride for their accomplishments in the improvement of their neighbourhood: the school and the pavement at Agtiita de la Perdiz, and the sewage project in La Leonera. Both groups of leaders vaunted themselves as having been the forerunners of the juntas’ democratisation process. In particular, neighbours in Agtiita de la Perdiz had been the first nation-wide to find a loophole in Law 18,695 that allowed democratic elections in the juntas. Leaders of La Leonera had been the first in their area to follow the path of democratisation. Yet, despite their enthusiasm and insightful views on the social and political situation, they complained of their fellow residents’ very low participation in neighbourhood affairs. The leader of the Pedro de1 Rio neighbourhood, with his white hair and deeply wrinkled face, also showed the same pride for his neighbourhood. He had been a leader for 35 years and had received the vecino destacado (outstanding neighbour) award from the democratically elected authorities. After the suffering imposed by the military authorities, and especially following the relocation of illegal occupants in neighbourhood floodplains, this leader had understood that it was necessary to adapt to the times if he had to work successfully for the neighbourhood’s improvement. He had therefore recycled himself and become a dynamic project organiser and manager, as well as a city hall habitue. The steering committee leaders in neighbourhoods Vegas de Nonguen, Paula Molina Cruz and Barrio Norte are all women. The leader of Vegas de Nonguen, an energetic woman in her forties, is also an advocate of women’s rights. At the time of the interview she was organising a meeting of Women’s Rights Groups in Conception. It is interesting that, because the statutes of these neighbourhood associations banned women from the juntas' presidency, she had to accept a secondary role. During the conversation, she proved to have a clear picture of the problems in the neighbourhood. These ranged from youth unemployment to how to prevent mud avalanches (the result of indiscriminate soil extraction and deforestation in the surrounding hills). The other two leaders are older women with hard life experiences. Sitting in her carefully kept living room, from whose window the irregular facades of the neighbourhood’s buildings could be seen, the president of Barrio Norte’sjunta narrated its history. A textile factory had initially bought the land subdivision to house its employees, but had backed out of the project shortly afterward and sold the property to a cooperative. The houses were built gradually, with no concern for building and urban codes. She had herself worked at the factory and became a self-employed seamstress after losing her job. A neighbourhood leader and left wing party militant before 1973, both commitments had earned her physical and mental abuse from the military. The memory of those years had not diminished her vocation to be socially helpful in her neighbourhood. Yet she admitted that, although she had great expectations set on the democratically elected authorities, she had become sceptical of their ability to change things for the better. The leader of Paula Molina Cruz neighbourhood arrived late for her interview, held at her home. She looked tired after having spent the morning pushing papers at the municipality. There had been no improvements in the neighbourhood during the 17 years of dictatorship, she explained. Even leaders appointed by the military authorities had deserted their responsibilities without even leaving a substitute or a forwarding address. Neighbours had grown mistrustful and forsaken their solidarity ties. As for herself, she had never before been a leader or a member of a political party. She had rejoiced in the return of

Local politics and depolitisation in Chile

211

democracy and decided to participate in a list of candidates to the neighbourhood’s steering committee, ‘to help (President) (Patricia) Aylwin’. An unemployed civil engineer, the president of the Villa San Pedro junta also is an enthusiast of the neighbourhood, annoyed by the changes the military introduced when they were in power. Under the auspices of the free market and deregulation policies, the military authorities lifted the urban and building regulations, and the neighbourhood was caught in a real estate speculation spree that altered its architectural and ecological balance. In other circumstances this leader would have supported neo-liberal policies, but he felt things had gone too far and was very upset. Although the neighbourhood has all the public services and the junta de vecinos has little backing from fellow residents (the sentiment in this middle-class neighbourhood is that the juntas de vecinos are ‘poor people’s organisations’) Villa San Pedro’s leaders are pursuing the implementation of a project to restore the lake’s ecological balance and the neighbourhood’s lost recreation areas. The remaining interviewees had never before been neighbourhood leaders. They agreed that the job’s main pre-requisite was efficiency, and underscored the organisational and managerial aspects of their roles. Two of the leaders are in their forties; one of them is a real estate agent and the other drives a taxi cab. The third in this group is an atypical character: a retired railroad worker, he had all the time needed to carry out negotiations with the authorities. He also liked the job. Gradually he had become a professional junta manager and, though he did not get along with many of his fellow residents, his efficiency ensured his reelection. What has changed?

Table 6 summarises information on the junta leaders and on their relationship with public authorities. As mentioned above, only five had not been leaders before 1973. The remaining five were old-timers who were back as neighbourhood leaders or simply backing new leaders. During the interviews, most of them told how the different political parties had presented lists of candidates to the steering committees (though the elected steering committee members were not necessarily members of the same political party). At the time of the first post-1973 steering committee elections the neighbours had accepted this arrangement. Political parties then provided the leverage needed to overcome the obstacles interposed by the alcaldes designados (mayors designated by the military in government). Since leaders in most political parties had scarcely been renewed-partly a consequence of 17 years of dictatorship-it was difficult to make bottom-up changes in the party structures. The negative consequences of leaving neighbourhood politics open to political party influence, according to the interviewees, were now beginning to become apparent to many neighbourhood residents and leaders. For instance, according to the information obtained from residents, leaders and municipal functionaries (not confirmed in this study) the projects presented by neighbourhoods where left wing parties are strong had a harder time passing the Concejo de Desarrollo Comunal than those presented by neighbourhoods dominated by the Democracia Cristiana (the mayor of Conception and most of the aldermen were members of this party). Still, the data show that leaders’ political affiliation at the time of the interviews did not seem related to pre-1973 engagement in neighbourhood politics, indicating that the suspected favoritism is not so easy to prove.

none

no

none

no

none

no

Neighbourhood improvements 1973-1990

Authorities are responsive

%he president is new, the rest are old leaders. Source: Author’s interviews with leaders of neighbourhood

yes

none (worsened) yes

none

yes5

centre

left wing yes+

Paula M. Cruz

P. de1 Rio

no

no

yes

none (worsened)

none

none

yes

yes

none

none

yes

centre

centre

left wing

Camilo Henriquez

Va. San Pedro

Barrio Norte

yes

left wing

Agtiita de la Perdiz

associations and political parties, and local public authorities and functionaries.

mixed

none

none

Leaders’ pre-‘73 experience

*Particularly the Partido Socialista. tParticularly the Demccracia Cristiana. +Newleaders are a front for the old.

centre

centre+

left wing’

Political affiliation

Vegas de Nonguen

Chiguayante

Juntas de vecinosl La Characteristics Leonera

yes

none

none

centre

S. Pedro Viejo

TABLE 6 Characteristics of Neighbourhood Association Leaders in Ten Neighbourhoods in Concepcidn, and Their Relation with Local Public Authorities, 1992

? f rCD !Z. P,

5. ol

0 g

a_. W 2 $

Local politics and depolitisation in Chile

213

All the interviewed leaders regretted that residents were not interested in the junta’s activities (elections, relations with the professionals and with local, regional and even national public authorities) and did not even participate in the neighbourhood’s social activities. In the words of a leader, participation exists when neighbours themselves can make decisions on issues that are vital for the development of the neighbourhood and the municipality. Another condition for participation is that public authorities respect the residents’ decisions. In 1992, conversations with neighbourhood leaders and with neighbours themselves proved that these conditions apparently did not prevail in the neighbourhoods in Conception. In nine neighbourhoods public services had neither been improved nor maintained since 1973. In two, conditions had worsened, either because the military authorities had freed the land intended for green public spaces to the real estate market (as in Villa San Pedro) or because, as mentioned earlier, the neighbourhood became overpopulated after relocation of a makeshift settlement (Pedro de1 Rio). Only one neighbourhood had obtained improvements during the 1973-1990 period. It was the Camilo Henriquez neighbourhood, whose leader at the time of this study was the same man the military authorities had appointed in 1983. Nonetheless, after 1990 neighbours had reelected this leader because of his efficiency. Service delivery here could be due to the de facto authority’s strategic aim of eliciting support from at least some sectors of the population. This proves that clientelism did not disappear under the military. Another indication is that during the interviews many leaders asked themselves what had become of the municipalities’ money during the years of dictatorship.‘5 Finally, half the interviewed leaders considered that authorities today did take heed of their demands. Crossing this information with leaders’ political affiliation and public service delivery (in Table 4) it can be concluded that political affiliation seemingly has little influence on public authorities’ responsiveness or on the improvement of service delivery. Instead, from the interviews, we can glean that neighbourhood improvement is best explained by the leaders’ efficiency and ability to deal with the new conditions, be it the technical aspects of demand or the more compromised bargaining for their financing. To summarise: the data show that, in spite of the neighbourhoods’ structural differences, in the last 20 years certain things have changed for all. For instance, social life around the juntas vecinales has all but disappeared; in contrast, all the juntashave presented projects for their neighbourhood’s improvement. Junta leaders, whether or not their experience went back to the pre-1973 years, have taken on the role necessary to ensure their fellow residents’ economic participation. Because the junta no longer shelters spurious political exchanges, or expectations on them, the leaders’ abilities to engage neighbours on this basis have become superfluous. All seems to suggest that the goal of taking collective goods and services away from the political sphere and subjecting them instead to the free play of supply and demand has been successfully achieved. The losers are social relations in the neighbourhood, and group solidarity. Residents still seem content that they can control and foresee a part of the process of collective service demand and delivery, though only in regard to the organisation of the demand. All persons interviewed-neighbourhood leaders, political leaders, functionaries and public authorities, social scientists-pointed out as very positive the fact that political manipulation had disappeared from the procedures the neighbours followed to request public goods and services. Simultaneously, the same interviewees deplored the populations’

214

Diana Mosovich Pont-Lezica

lack of participation at different levels of public life: neighbourhoods, municipality, political parties. It is interesting that they did not see any relationship between the straightforward nature of neighbours’ contribution to request services and their lack of participation in public events organised by authorities and political parties. Yet it is our belief that the assertion that political considerations are no longer a feature of the public service delivery process applies only to the first leg of that process, i.e. the organisation of neighbours’ demand and of their contribution to financing the feasibility project. Although the project is next processed through economic and technical filters, rather than open patronage as happened before, the focus on the technical and economic filters at the SECPLAC obscures the fact that they are a part of the political process at work, if only because this is a decision-making procedure regarding public services and public authorities. As the neighbours suggested, once the projects are presented, and all other things being equal, not all neighbourhoods have the same access to,the Concejo de Desarrollo Comunal and beyond (SERPLAC, SEREMI), where the outcome of their petitions for project financing is decided. What is more, it is at this level where neighbours’ organised requests can put pressure on politicians’ patronising behaviour. CONCLUSION After 1973, for neighbourhood residents the organisation of demand for collective urban goods and services has come out of the domain of the political patronage system and they have tended to become pure economic goods. Neighbours’ ability to pay determines the quality of the service they can request, as detailed in a feasibility study to which all neighbours contribute. Delivery of services has become the incentive for rational neighbours to engage in collective actions, no matter how limited and targeted these actions may be: to decide what service will be requested first (which entails a campaign of information and polling neighbours’ opinions), and to contribute the money to pay for the draft of the project and eventually beyond (Mosovich Pont-Lezica, 1993).i6 Neighbourhood leaders now must master organisation skills, technical knowledge, ways of dealing with bureaucracy, as well as bargaining skills to argue for neighbourhood projects. Therefore, neighbourhood leaders who before 1973 were political brokers between the constituents and the politicians, have now become technocrats with enough skills to discuss technical aspects of projects and of their execution with their fellow neighbours, authorities and professionals. They have reoriented their interests and abilities and, since there are no great power issues at stake in the organisation of neighbours’ demand or in the presentation of the project to the municipality, neighbours value their leaders for their expertise rather than their political contacts. In this sense, relationships within the neighbourhood as far as public services are concerned have indeed become depolitised. l7 The process of depolitisation is coincident with the demobilisation and disruption of the traditional grass-roots organisations, and has not yet been counterbalanced or reverted. The political parties, who claim their role is to encourage the population’s participation, had not yet begun to do so.” And yet, service delivery does eventually come into contact with power politics. Once the municipality’s technical office accepts the projects and sends them to the Concejo Comunal, for some projects political help is already needed to go on to the next step. The partisan connotation that residents’ demands had prior to 1973 has been shifted on to the Concejo Comunal and beyond, to the corresponding regional and national decision-

Local politics and depolitisation

in Chile

215

making levels. It is here that the leaders’ second role as a capable negotiator becomes important. Political skill is needed to promote the fellow residents’ collective action and interests, in a struggle that, as stated, confronts neighbourhood leaders with politicians and public authorities. This struggle may once again involve an exchange: project support for votes. This assertion is enough to challenge the illusion of a technically-based, depolitised process. The difference is that the conditions now exist for neighbourhood leaders’ accountability in the bargaining for their neighbourhood’s needs and the administration of the neighbourhood’s money. All things considered, there is a large gap between the proclaimed apolitical process to obtain public service delivery and the reality encountered in the different steps of that process. In contrast to the previous situation, residents now must go beyond the organisation stage of collectively identifying their interests and discussing the best means of satisfying them, instead of individually engaging in spurious exchanges of favours for political promises.” Decisions made by public authorities are not only based on technical data but also depend on the political ability of those presenting and backing the projects. If the decision is not favourable, the neighbourhood leaders can organise their grievance and try to consolidate a lobby to represent them. This is in principle positive because, for one thing, neighbours must now organise collectively before addressing public authorities and representative institutions to convey their interests and put pressure on them and on their leaders to obtain their goals. The generalisation of organised, categorical demand (Valenzuela, 1977) means that in administrative and political institutions of a certain level and complexity (such as public ministries, national party committees, and others) there is a trend toward the reinforcement of a model of representative democracy. In principle, because the organisation and representation of interests through public institutions is one of the characteristics of democratic systems, this politisation is not to be regretted (and one wonders why the authorities and social sectors involved go into such pains to proclaim the procedure’s apolitical quality). Yet, in spite of this political content, our observations point to the fact that the larger Chilean political parties had not yet envisaged as part of their program the organisation of interests starting at the grass-root level. The problem in the short term is that, if political parties do not democratise from the bottom up, that is, if they do not open to democratic participation and legitimate representation as expressed by citizens’ aggregation of interests concerning concrete issues (and in the process, end clientelism and exchanges of personal political favours) the grassroots will not have the conditions to develop and to be represented by the political parties. The hard-earned skill of organising collective interests also may be lost. Besides, because the last stage of the decision-making process involving the funding of a project takes place in Santiago, the regionalisation and decentralisation policies risk becoming futile. If political parties do not undergo a bottom-up democratisation, and the central government’s decisions continue to have an incontestable weight, the hardships suffered to attain the country’s regionalisation and decentralisation will have been in vain. As for the residents, they are learning to organise in cost-efficient collective ways to obtain urban collective goods. Once they realise how much strength lies in successful collective actions, they may feel encouraged by their power and efficiency and decide to engage in collective actions whose goals involve broader social and political interests, rather than strictly individual objectives. If this is to be the case, the inclusion in the political scene of grass-roots’ political organisation will be inevitable. This is a development that the traditional party structures will not necessarily welcome, unless they mend their ways.

216

Diana Mosovich Pont-Lezica

NOTES 1. Law 16,880, issued in 1968 by President Frei of the Democracia Cristiana, was the first to relate to neighbour organisations in Chile. The law was not regulated until 1968. The government conceived of this law to promote community participation. ‘2. Repression of political parties favoured the Union Democratica Independiente, a right-wing pressure group supportive of President Pinochet and the free-market policies implemented under his authority. This group is distinct from Renovation National, the traditional right-wing Chilean party, although they share views on many issues. The Union Democratica Independiente tried to take advantage of its condition as the only legal grouping under the military, though it was not always successful. It ran as a party with its own candidates in 1990 and 1992, with scant success, as electoral results show. 3. Before 1973, the population elected the regidores (aldermen), who in turn elected the alcaldes. 4. The goal of the Fondo Corntin Municipal is to effect the redistribution of resources from rich to poor municipalities. Redistribution did take place, but, due to the gap between rich and poor communes, it was practically irrelevant, even as late as early 1990. Most municipalities had never before had such a mass of resources (between two and a half and three times more than before). Still, since most of the resources for the different development plans originated locally (and only were completed with indirect contributions for different socio-economic programs) the gap between rich and poor municipalities broadened. 5. The carabineros are the Chilean armed corps in charge of maintaining domestic order. 6. The decisions included the plebiscite on Pinochet’s continuation as president after 1990, ‘controlled’ parliamentary and presidential elections in 1990 and 1992, and the reintroduction in the economy of state intervention and planning. 7. Among the measures carried out are the courses to form and train the population and its leaders and help them adapt to the new laws and procedures necessary to access funds for planning and urban service delivery. The municipalities and non-governmental organisations taught these courses. It is important to say the training of community leaders was a requisite imposed by the International Development Bank, which was and is a main finance source. 8. Residents thus act as ‘rational actors’. 9. In a way, the CODECO replaced the pre-1973 Consejos de Regidores. Between 1973 and 1990 the alcaldes were appointed by the higher hierarchy. It was only in May 1990 that the executive presented parliament with a project to reform the constitution and enable the election of alcaldes, previously appointed by the President. The reform was only accepted a year later, in combination with a reform for the regional level. It took the form of the Ley Organica Municipal, number 18,695, and the Ley Organica Regional, number 19,175. Today the concejales have replaced the regidores. The population chooses the concejules directly; the alcalde is also chosen directly if he obtains 35 per cent of the votes and if he is on the most voted list. Otherwise, he is chosen by the Concejo (indirect election). 10. Note that it is the intendenciu, two levels above the municipalities-that is, the regional level-where resources are concentrated. This leaves out the gobernaciones or provincial level. 11. Leaders did not simply disappear. During the dictatorship years many of them took refuge in nongovernmental organisations, where they continued to pursue their social and political work. 12. The poorest region is the IXth. This assessment is based on CEPAL (1991). 13. The issue involved the relocation of a group of settlers authorities had evicted from the site they had occupied illegally. 14. The public services observed here are: drinking water, sewers and sewage networks; street lighting and pavement. 15. Public money was also used discretionally when the military were in power. Proof of the existence of resources is the fact that many works were undertaken in that time in the more well-to-do peripheral neighbourhoods and in Conception’s inner city (the pedestrian promenade, for example). The military were evidently interested in securing the support of these groups, rather than in distributing according to need. 16. It should be noted that ties of cooperation, of trust and of solidarity, and neighbours’ interaction are not necessary to organise efficiently the demand for public services. This condition weakens the neighbourhood’s social fabric. 17. The reference here is to party politics rather than to the broader idea entailing power relationships in general, be they institutional as in political parties; or personal interactions within any type of group.

Local politics and depolitisation

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217

18. At least the politicians here interviewed-who belong to centre and left wing parties-have underscored their parties’ interest in reconstructing participation at the grass-root level. 19. The exchanges are qualified as ‘spurious’ because they further the individual quest of particular goals, rather than the collective pursuit of categorical objectives.

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Espinoza, V. (1986) Poder local, pobladores y democracia. Proposiciones 12(6), 5667. Garcia Hurtado, A. (1991) Las orientaciones de la politica social. Coleccidn Estudios CZEPLAN

31, 131-

140.

Gonzalez, R. (1983) El marco de 1~s’trnnsformaciones municipales. Document0 de Trabajo 19, SUR, Santiago de Chile. Gonzalez, R. and Rosenfeld, A. (1985) Estado, municipio y participacidn local. Document0 de Trabajo 3 1, SUR, Santiago de Chile. Hardin, R. (1982) Collective Action. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. Hernandez Gurruchaga, H. (1983) El Gran Conception: desarrollo historic0 y estructura urbana. Primera parte: genesis y evolution: de las fundaciones militares a la conurbacion industrial. Znformaciones geogrcifkas

30,47-70.

Hernandez Gurruchaga, H. (1984) El Gran Conception: desarrollo historic0 y estructura urbana. Segunda parte: estructura e interaction: especializacion funcional, diferenciacion social y movimientos pendulares. Znformaciones geogr@cas 31, 3-3 1. Znforme Latinoamericano (1992) 2 April, p. 8. Mosovich Pont-Lezica, D. (1993) Collective action in an unstable environment: community-authority relations in two Argentine cities, 196551985. Ph.D. Thesis, Washington University in St. Louis. Mosovich Pont-Lezica, D. (1994) Les effets du disengagement de l’etat au niveau local. Le cas des villes moyennes en Argentine. In Transformation de I’Etat: legitimation et integration en Amerique Latine, ed. D. van Eeuwen, pp. 69-92. Karthala-CREALC, Paris. Mosovich Pont-Lezica, D. (1995) Cambios en la politica local en une region periferica. In Seminario international sobre impactos territoriales de 10s procesos de reestructuracion. Pontilicia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Santiago de Chile. Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Pozo, H. (1981) La situacidn de1 municipio chileno y elproblema de la Municipalizacidn. FLACSO, Santiago de Chile. Raczynski, D. (1991) Descentralizacion y politicas sociales: lecciones de la experiencia chilena. Coleccidn Estudios CZEPLAN31,

141-151.

Raczynski, D. (1994) Politicas sociales y programas Coleccidn Estudios CZEPLAN 39, 9974. Rosenfeld, A. (1988) Descentralizacidn yparticipacidn

de combate a la pobreza en Chile: balance y desafios.

en el regimen militar chileno. Document0 de Trabajo 104, SUR, Santiago de Chile. Tomic, B. and Gonzalez, R. (1983). Municipio y estado: dimensiones de una relacidn clave (La reforma al gobierno y administracidn interiores en Chile). Document0 de Trabajo PREALC/l55 S 831. Monografia sobre empleo/27, Olicina International de1 Trabajo (OIT), PREALC (Programa regional de1 empleo para America Latina y el Caribe), Santiago de Chile. Valenzuela, A. (1977) Political Brokers in Chile. Duke University Press, Durham, NC.