Localizing the energy transition: Town-level political and socio-economic drivers of clean energy in the United States

Energy Research & Social Science 62 (2020) 101376

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Original research article

Localizing the energy transition: Town-level political and socio-economic drivers of clean energy in the United States

T

Oksan Bayulgen University of Connecticut, 365 Fairfield Way Storrs, CT 06269-1024, United States

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

Keywords: Clean energy Local government Energy transitions Connecticut towns Energy champions Clean energy task forces

This paper investigates the political and socio-economic drivers of energy transition at the local level in the United States. Using observations, public documents and semi-structured interviews from a sample of Connecticut (CT) towns, it explores why some local governments are more proactive than others in designing and implementing policies that promote renewable energy and greater energy efficiency. The research reveals that the type and configuration of policy champions matter in distinguishing among towns’ clean energy engagement levels. Those towns that can bring together elected, appointed and volunteer leaders who are active and passionate advocates for clean energy are generally more successful than others in carrying out clean energy policies. Leader towns are also those that have organized interest groups and businesses that support and work with the government in designing and implementing clean energy initiatives. The case studies further reveal that a town's wealth and education levels, but not its partisan affiliation, are important in shaping the will and capacity of town officials as well as of interest groups in society. Finally, the paper analyzes the institutional decision-making context and finds that while government type is not determinative, a town's bureaucratic capacity, measured in terms of the availability of specialized energy staff and energy task force, distinguishes leader towns from the rest. Developing a better understanding of the political will, government-society synergy, and institutional capacity is critical to a full accounting of the challenges and opportunities local governments face in clean energy transitions.

1. Introduction An energy transition is undoubtedly unfolding in the world. Climate change concerns, volatility of fossil fuel prices, the geostrategic and economic costs of supply security have been creating a major momentum for a global energy transition away from fossil fuels to renewable energy and increased energy efficiency. Even though national governments have traditionally been the main actors expected to lead this transition, in recent years we have been seeing a proliferation of ambitious clean energy policies and activities at the subnational levels, surpassing in some cases the progress made by national governments. The nation state as the main analytical unit of the transitions literature is increasingly giving way to regional and sub-national governments. Cities and municipalities are becoming the pivotal actors in the global energy transition [1]. Given their multiple roles as decision-makers, planning authorities, managers of municipal infrastructure, and role models for citizens and businesses, local governments are, in many ways, ideal drivers of change [2]. As the layer of government that is closest to the citizens, local governments are, arguably, in a better position than national and

state governments to understand and respond to the unique challenges and needs of their community and frame the clean energy discussion in a way that connects with the values of their citizens [3]. The flexibility and responsiveness of local governments can help with social acceptance and adoption of clean energy technologies, which are increasingly analyzed as key determinants of energy transitions. Local governments also have an important role in leading by example, communicating and creating opportunities for increased energy efficiency and consumption of renewables. They often own or manage substantial amounts of infrastructure, which means that they can improve energy efficiency or increase renewable energy generation in municipal buildings and operations to demonstrate the benefits and feasibility of clean energy projects. They can also affect the behavior of residents and businesses by informing them about choices that are available through public education and awareness campaigns. Furthermore, local governments may have regulatory authority over other areas such transportation, permitting standards, building codes, financial incentives, which can be utilized to make the adoption of clean energy more feasible and widespread. Much of the extant literature on sustainable energy transitions focuses

E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.101376 Received 30 January 2019; Received in revised form 7 November 2019; Accepted 20 November 2019 2214-6296/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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on energy regimes at the national level. Treating national governments as key monolithic actors, many studies analyze the determinants of clean energy policy in individual or comparative country studies [4–16]. At the same time, an increasing number of studies- especially in the United States- have been shifting the focus to subnational, state level analyses of energy governance [17–23]. Yet, despite the increasing reliance on local governments to handle energy issues and the vast variation in local energy performance, very little systematic analysis has been offered at the local government level. The analyses that exist so far tend to focus on individual local government strategies in responding to energy challenges or on processes and struggles around the adoption of a specific energy or energyrelated policy, often in single case studies [24–29]. This is an understudied topic for we know very little about the political and socioeconomic conditions that make towns and cities effective drivers of energy transition and whether or not the variables that explain progress (or lack thereof) at the national level can also account for performance at the local level. Unlike the energy transitions literature, the scholarship on urban sustainability and climate action does, indeed, pay ample attention to factors that influence municipal policymaking [30–47]. Yet, much of the initial focus of this literature has been on the role transnational and national municipal networks play in providing the resources, technical knowledge and space within which local policymakers operate. Studies have also looked at multilevel governance issues, i.e., relations between local, regional and national authorities, to understand the powers and duties of local governments and the extent to which they have autonomy in certain policy areas [33]. While the external pressures and incentives coming from transnational networks, international agreements and national policies are important, there is increasing interest in understanding local government policymakers as actors in their own right with motivation and discretionary ability to contest national and global institutions [48]. Climate action scholars, for instance, are focusing on the internal dynamics of municipal governance, such as bureaucratic capacity, human and financial resources, and government structures to understand the varied climate change mitigation and adaption responses around the world. Since energy policy is part of climate action, it is worth analyzing whether or not the insights generated in this literature can equally apply to the energy policymaking arena. Drawing insights from both literatures, the goal of this paper is to understand why some town governments are more proactive than others in clean energy engagement, which is defined here as the level of clean energy commitment, planning, resourcefulness, outreach and adoption efforts that a town government exhibits. Connecticut (CT), with its 169 autonomous towns and cities, provides an ideal testing laboratory, a petri-dish setting so to speak, to hold national and state level variables constant and focus solely on the local government variation. CT is one of the US states that applies the “home rule”, meaning that the state constitution grants the cities and municipalities the ability to pass laws to govern themselves as they see fit (within the boundaries of state and federal constitutions). Similar to other New England states, Connecticut's towns are fully functioning municipal corporations, possessing powers similar to cities in other states. With no overlaying county governments and a strong New England tradition of participatory government, CT towns have significant autonomy in managing their own affairs as defined by their municipal charters and their legislative bodies. Local municipalities vary significantly in the way they make use of and implement state initiatives and in some cases surpass them with more ambitious efforts. A focus on CT towns also allows us to bring attention to small towns as opposed to large, urban cities that have traditionally received more consideration in the urban governance literature.1 Considering that 97% of all American cities have populations smaller than 50,000, more effort needs to be made toward

understanding the governance of these jurisdictions [49]. Using observations, public documents, and semi-structured interviews from a sample of Connecticut towns, this research identifies and analyzes the drivers of clean energy engagement at the local level. One of the findings is that the type and configuration of policy champions in a town are important factors explaining the variation in clean energy engagement across towns. Those towns that can bring together elected, appointed, and volunteer leaders who are active and passionate advocates for clean energy are generally more successful than others in carrying out clean energy policies. Leader towns are also those that have organized interest groups and businesses that support and work with the government in designing and implementing clean energy initiatives. The case studies further reveal that a town's wealth and education levels are important in shaping the will and capacity of town officials as well as interest groups in society. A town's partisan affiliation, on the other hand, does not seem to matter in explaining clean energy leadership. This is a refreshing corrective to the deep partisan polarization that paralyzes policymaking at the national, and to some extent state, level in the United States. Finally, this research demonstrates that the local government type, i.e. whether it is managercouncil, selectman-town meeting, or mayor-council, does not seem to effect the ability of government officials to translate political will into action. Instead, it is the town's organizational and bureaucratic capacity, measured in terms of the institutionalization of an energy specialist position and/or energy task force, is what distinguishes leader towns from those that are less successful. Towns that have active, resourceful, and well-connected energy staff and volunteer advisors from the community are the ones that are better able to design and implement clean energy initiatives. Developing a better understanding of the local policy environment is critical to a full accounting of the challenges and opportunities in energy transitions. The variation across Connecticut towns can provide insights into why clean energy reforms gain traction in some settings and not in others and as such help us generate hypotheses to test elsewhere. 2. Literature review In understanding the variations in the development of renewable energy markets around the world, the sustainable energy transitions literature, for the most part, focuses on the technical and market-related opportunities and challenges facing the renewable energy sector. Yet, the policy interventions that need to accompany and in many cases precede the technological and market developments, are inherently political processes. As Meadowcroft [50] puts it “politics is the constant companion of socio-technical transitions, serving alternatively (and often simultaneously) as context, arena, obstacle, enabler, arbiter, and manager of repercussions” (p.71). Politics and power are important to how different transition pathways are shaped, which pathway wins out, and why and who benefits from them [51]. A call for greater attention to the politics of socio-technical transitions has produced a small but growing literature in recent years ([52–61], [6], [4,50,62] and [21,63]). Most of the political economy models used in these studies draw attention to the importance of agency such as policy champions, organized societal interests in favor of and against clean energy, as well as the institutional factors that create opportunities and constraints for policymaking. As we shift the focus of analysis away from national governments, we can explore whether the same variables and causal mechanisms can explain energy transitions at the local level. 2.1. Policy champions As Fouquet [64] puts it, there is nothing inevitable about a clean energy transition; it depends on a series of actors and forces creating a new path and path creation requires agency. Most narratives of energy transitions start off with a discussion of policy champions who depart

1

Early research on municipal climate action tended to focus on actions taken by early adopters such as Portland, Seattle, Toronto, Vancouver and members of municipal climate action networks [113]. 2

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from business-as-usual and initiate bold policies to dismantle the old fossil fuel system. For instance, Rabe [65] argues that state level clean energy movements are largely driven by policy entrepreneurs, who are active advocates for renewable energy. Similarly, Aklin and Urpelainen [4] in their analysis of energy transitions in frontrunner countries assert that renewable energy policies have been initially driven by the unusual and creative approaches of certain leaders in finding solutions to the energy crisis in their countries. The literature on municipal climate action also draws attention to policy entrepreneurs and champions as agenda setters and agents of change when it comes to promoting policies that reduce and control GHG emissions within city governments [32,33,45,53,66–68]. According to Kingdon [69], policy entrepreneurs are “people who are willing to invest their resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems, are responsible not only for prompting important people to pay attention but also for coupling solutions to problems and for coupling both problems and solutions to politics” (p.21). In other words, they are individuals who can motivate people, draw attention to specific policy issues, and constantly make sure that the issue is on the agenda. In addition to the existence of policy champions, some draw attention to their type: an appointed or elected official, a lobbyist or an expert who is motivated by values and self-interest [70]. Others focus on the leadership skills and personality of policy champions in nurturing a culture of innovation, collaboration and respect as well as their strategies to resolve conflicts among various departments and individuals in the government [34]. Building on this literature, this study investigates whether (and what type of) policy champions play a similarly effective role in improving clean energy engagement at the local level.

about climate change. The role of political ideology is also extensively studied to understand environmental policy choices of elected officials at the national level. Studies have shown that politicians from left-socialist parties with stronger preferences for environmental protection and larger role for government involvement push for more pro-environmental reforms, and in some cases more pro-renewable policies, than those belonging to parties with right ideologies [77–80]. Given these expectations in the literature, this paper explores whether towns with left/Democratic affiliation are more active and effective in clean energy engagement than towns with right/Republican affiliation. 2.2.2. Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics In addition to its partisan affiliation, the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of a town, such as its wealth, education levels, population size and diversity, may also effect public support for clean energy initiatives. Studies show that in towns with very limited financial resources, climate action, and more specifically energy efficiency programs, may be viewed as luxury expenditures and that ‘not in my term’ attitude of elected officials may constrain action ([32,81–83]). Studies have also found that higher income and education levels increase the level of civic activism and political participation, which arguably could provide both the pressures for reform and the human resources needed by local governments to engage in energy reforms [84]. In addition to its wealth, the size and diversity of a town's population may also affect the policymaking environment. The larger and more diverse a town is, the more varied service demands and pressing issues its government may encounter, limiting the ability of its leaders to prioritize renewable energy and energy efficiency. City size is also assumed to affect citizen participation which may shape the nature and pace of policy reforms [85–87]. In smaller cities social capital development may be easier since people would be more likely to know each other and feel engaged in their community ([49]). In climate action literature, there is some evidence that in smaller cities support for environmental sustainability is empirically linked to contextual characteristics such as population, higher education, socioeconomic status and ethnically homogenous populations [43]. Applying these observations to local energy policymaking, this paper examines whether towns that are wealthier, more educated, smaller, and more ethnically homogenous will have better clean energy engagement than towns that are not.

2.2. Public support Having clean energy champions may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for energy transitions. There is a host of societal actors that have a stake in how energy is produced, consumed and how it intersects with a wide array of local development issues, such as urban planning, infrastructure, transportation, housing, commercial development, etc. As the broader literature on climate change and energy reforms also acknowledges, public support or social acceptance is important to ensure both the design of necessary initiatives and their implementation [67,71–73]. If there is no buy-in from the community or if there is significant opposition to clean energy initiatives, even with committed and resourceful energy champions, it may not be possible to ensure their wide-scale application. The assumption here is that particular energy choices made by local governments can be driven by demands from organized grassroots interests and/or be debated and challenged by them. Clean energy development at the local level fundamentally involves a political process in which a variety of societal actors come into play to determine the extent to which renewables and efficiency standards will be deployed.

2.2.3. Organized societal interests In energy transitions literature, scholars find that progress in accelerating a clean energy transition in a country may also depend on the mobilization of niche coalitions in society supportive of renewable energy and their relative power vis-à-vis incumbent coalitions that prefer the status quo, or namely the conventional energy producers and their supporters [4,14,78,88–91]. Renewable energy supporters at the national level typically consist of renewable energy producers/investors, green energy technology manufacturers, environmental organizations, climate scientists, certain small-scale agricultural producers, and consumer groups- especially in remote areas- that do not have access to a centralized electricity grid, and urban constituencies that support green jobs and for whom environmental sustainability is important. Incumbent coalitions, on the other hand, typically consist of fossil fuel companies, carbon-intensive industries, large utilities that fear losing profits and market share, and consumer groups who object to increases in prices and utility costs. There are also many local groups who may not be necessarily against clean energy but may object to their installations in their ‘backyard’. The literature offers countless case studies of strong local resistance in communities across the world that feel severely limited in their quality of life by renewable technology systems, such as a wind turbine, installed nearby [92–94]. Also known

2.2.1. Ideological/Partisan affiliation One way to gauge the general public support for clean energy in a community is to analyze the ideological and partisan affiliation of its members. People's perception of policy benefits of renewable energy may be shaped by their ideological orientation and in democratic polities the expectation is that politicians will respond to their constituents’ wishes. Those who study environmental policy at the national and state levels find that party identification and ideology are strong predictors of attitudes and policy outcomes [42,74,75]. For instance, in the US, public opinion polls find that Conservatives/Republicans generally support environmental safeguards less consistently and aggressively than Liberals/Democrats. They also are less concerned about the issue of global climate change than Liberals/Democrats and reject the scientific consensus on climate change more often than them. For instance, a survey conducted by Pew Research Center [76] finds that only 24% of Republicans, as opposed to 72% of Democrats, care a great deal 3

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as not-in-my-backyard (NIMBYism), this kind of organized local opposition is regarded as being one of the most serious challenges to renewable energy development. The relative influence of such interest groups and the coalitions they form depends on their organizational strength and resources to mobilize in favor of or against clean energy policies. It may be plausible to assume that most stakeholders are better organized at the national or even state levels as opposed to the local level since most people arguably perceive higher levels of government to have more power in making energy policy decisions. There may also be more financial and human resources available for groups to organize at those higher levels. Yet, strong movements and organizations may nevertheless exist at the local level and pressure local governments to undertake or block certain local energy decisions. Given the emphasis on societal interests in energy transitions literature, this paper explores whether the level of clean energy engagement of towns can be explained by the presence and strength of local interest groups and businesses in favor of or against renewables in these towns.

person it can find to direct the administrative operations of the municipality, a consistently high standard of administrative management is more likely. Additionally, this structure centralizes authority for effective, coherent, and professional administration in one person whose reputation and future career depend on the quality of his work. Some studies have found that appointed managers are incentivized to be more efficient and innovative in government operations [106,108]. In the strong mayor or selectman models of government, on the other hand, policymaking may become more politicized and thus more vulnerable to different interests given the electoral pressures, which can lead to incrementalism or, at worst, paralysis. Elected mayors or selectmen may also have incentives to pursue short-term political gain in their policy choices [102,106]. Finally, these models of government may lack continuity due to electoral turnover, which can threaten policy stability; whoever new is elected to the executive office may dismantle the achievements of the previous administration and pursue completely contradictory policies. The tradeoff to the effectiveness, resourcefulness, fast pace, and professionalism of the manager-council model may be a lack of accountability. Even though the managers are ultimately accountable to the council and serve at their pleasure, in their day-to-day management they may have too much autonomy. They may also be less inclined to rely on the advice and input of voluntary societal groups and more inclined to depend on staff they recruit to provide input, information and policy options to the town council [109]. On the other hand, because the selectmen and mayors are directly elected by the voters, they may represent the interests of the town more accurately and be more responsive and accountable to them. They can, in fact, be more supportive of environmental constituencies and less concerned with operational efficiency in government [43]. It may take selectmen and mayors longer to propose, design and implement a policy but in the long run the deliberation that is needed to build consensus can provide more stability and durability to policies. Given the existing debate on the trade-offs between these government models in the literature, this paper investigates whether or not the type of government structure distinguishes clean energy leader towns from all the others.

2.3. Institutional structure The commitment of policy champions and the strength of their support base are important indicators of political will and public acceptance but are not enough to evaluate how some town governments are able to push for and implement clean energy initiatives when others cannot. The institutional landscape for energy policymaking is traditionally an understudied topic in the transitions literature but in recent years more scholars are paying attention to it with a focus on constitutional and electoral systems, veto players, and/or bureaucratic capacity in explaining the pace and nature of energy policies. [8,14,63,95–99]. The climate governance literature, similarly, acknowledges the institutional constraints and opportunities in translating political will into policy action. Focusing on the local level dynamics, scholars analyze the form of government, its organizational structure, as well as the availability of specialized resources, to explain climate action performance of towns [32,34,43–45,47,100].

2.3.2. Bureaucratic specialization The administrative/bureaucratic capacity to respond to societal demands and implement local policies is also cited in the urban climate governance literature as explaining the variation in local climate action. Dannevig et al. [45] contends that the efforts of policy champions should not be considered in isolation from the administrative capacity of the municipality. Part of the capacity depends on the internal organization of the government, whether or not there is an institutional home for climate change policymaking and what the organizational mechanisms for facilitating inter-departmental collaboration are. Being cross-cutting issues, climate action and clean energy development can create conflicts among various government departments, with diverging interests, priorities and institutional cultures, claiming jurisdictions over it [25,32]. This challenge requires a government position or an office that can manage the coordination across different departments of local governments. Moreover, having a dedicated office to the specific task at hand as opposed to adding new tasks to the existing portfolio of overworked staff in other departments ensures that necessary attention will be given to climate action policies. Burch [34] claims that “climate change mitigation and adaptation must thus become part of the job descriptions and standard operating procedures of municipal employees rather than extras that are pursued if time and budget allow” (p. 294). In addition to a specialized unit in the government, volunteer committees/task forces who advise the government may also help overcome coordination and informational challenges in local policymaking. The availability of staff positions and volunteer taskforces who have the technical capabilities and expertise to collect and analyze data, attend networking events, and learn from best-practices elsewhere are

2.3.1. Government type Studying the effects of government type on policymaking and town expenditures, urban scholars have long debated the merits of managercouncil versus the mayor-council or selectmen-town meeting models used in the US cities ([101–106]). One of the main differences between these government models in terms of policymaking is how consolidated, accountable, efficient, and professional the executive body is [105]. In the selectmen-town meeting model, the board of selectmen is elected into office by voters and the board is headed by a first selectman, who serves as the chief executive and administrative officer of the town. In the mayor-council government, the mayoralty and city council are separate offices. Under a strong mayor system, the mayor acts as an elected executive with the city council exercising legislative powers. In the manager-council structure, on the other hand, the town manager is an official appointed by and responsible to the council for the administration of municipal policies. Since the council is the elected legislative body, it must bear the ultimate responsibility for all aspects of local government – administrative as well as policy-making. In other words, political power is consolidated in a single branch, that is the council [107]. The council hires a manager to administer council policy but, in practice, the extent of the reliance may vary greatly depending upon the municipality and the situation. It is the manager who is the chief executive and who is responsible to the council for the proper performance of virtually all administrative functions. This administrative responsibility is paired with the manager's authority to appoint and remove all department heads who report directly to him. Several advantages are often cited in favor of council-manager government. Since the council is able to choose the best qualified 4

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cited as important factors in explaining why some towns are more proactive in climate action initiatives than others [30,32,34,110]. Given the potential significance of specialization and organizational capacity, this paper analyzes whether or not a sustainability officer/ energy manager position and/or a clean energy taskforce can distinguish towns that have successful clean energy engagement than those that are less successful.

Table 1 Clean energy community criteria. Commitment Planning

Resource Generation

3. Research design

Outreach

Finding comparable and accurate municipal level data on clean energy initiatives is challenging.2 In CT, the only available large-scale data on clean energy engagement is the clean energy communities (CEC) dataset compiled by EnergizeCT, an initiative of the Connecticut Energy Efficiency Fund, the CT Green Bank and local electric and gas utilities.3 EnergizeCT tracks the commitment of town governments to clean energy targets, their level of municipal action planning, their ability to generate resources, the extent of their outreach efforts, and finally the efficiency and renewable energy adoption rates (see Table 1). Based on these metrics, it also groups the CT towns into 3 types of clean energy community categories: bronze, silver, gold.4 A gold energy community is one that commits to the goals of saving energy in municipal buildings and supporting renewable energy and takes steps to fulfill these goals by careful planning, resource generation, and community outreach. A silver energy community can be defined as one that has made a formal commitment to clean energy and has designed some programs to incentivize energy efficiency and renewable energy generation but has been limited, slow or new in the planning, resource generation, outreach and adoption of these programs. The lowest category, a bronze energy community, on the other hand, is a town that has neither officially identified goals to become a clean energy community nor developed any distinct programs to incentivize energy efficiency and renewable energy production. To capture the variation in clean energy engagement, towns were selected from each category for this study.5 From among the 18 gold communities, 5 were picked that have widespread reputation for being clean energy leaders.6 An analysis of the town websites also confirmed their leading status. For instance, Town 3, whose clean energy taskforce has been in existence for over 10 years, won a Green Circle Award from the CT Department of Energy and Environmental Protection in 2017 for its work on educating and encouraging town residents and businesses to

Adoption

Signed the clean energy community pledge Completed the municipal action plan Benchmarked 100% data from municipal and BOE buildings Earned and redeemed Bright Idea grants Engaged in community awareness and energy efficiency Completed the outreach campaign for residential/ business community Reduced municipal energy use Generated municipal clean energy Achieved 20% residential energy efficiency participation Achieved 15% commercial energy efficiency participation

Source: Clean Energy Community (CEC) database (https://ctenergydashboard. com/CEC).

invest in clean energy and energy efficiency projects (27% of its residents have had HES energy assessment compared to the state average of 17%) and for earning grants from the state Green Bank for various projects such as solar arrays for the high school, municipal landfill, electric vehicle chargers, replacement of all bulbs with LED in streetlights etc. Town 1 has, since 2007, spearheaded solarize campaigns to inform residents of the advantages of using solar power, managed the energy efficiency re-lamping of all municipal buildings, implemented measures to reduce energy use in municipal and school buildings by using a federal grant, participated in the Neighbor to Neighbor Energy Challenge and received a grant to install an EV charging station at the community center. Its Clean Energy Commission and the chair of the Commission were awarded Governor's Climate Change Leadership Award in early 2010s for their efforts in promoting clean energy and energy efficiency. Similarly, Town 5 was one of the first towns to establish an energy task force in 2005 and by 2018 had installed 12 solar photovoltaic projects in municipal buildings, generating over a million kwh of electricity a year. The school district in this town was also one of the first in the state to have all of its school principals commit to the CT Green Leaf Schools Program, which promotes increased environmental and sustainability education, health and wellness efforts. Another leader town, Town 4, has tied for 9th place in the state with 22% residential participation and 14th place with 19% commercial/municipal participation in energy efficiency programs initiated by EnergizeCT. This town has also set off a successful solar campaign, which placed it at the top of the rankings in the Yale University Solar Scorecards analysis, which evaluates how each CT municipality supports residential solar photovoltaic deployment. In Town 2, since 2005 over 400 households, small businesses and organizations have selected clean energy through the CT Clean Energy Options program, earning the town seven kilowatts of photovoltaic panels from the CT Clean Energy Fund. At the same time, the town installed photovoltaic solar arrays in municipal buildings, conducted energy audits to phase in energy efficient equipment, installed bike friendly roads, and organized LED bulb swaps. As opposed to the gold community towns, the selection of silver and bronze towns to analyze, however, has been more challenging. Out of the 140 towns that were designated by EnergizeCT as silver and bronze, towns were semi-randomly picked that represented some variation in their size, wealth, and regional location.7 Once the interviews started,

2 This is a challenge faced by researchers of other municipal level performance as well. For instance, even though the study of municipal climate action is much more advanced, scholars complain about the lack of comparable data that captures the scope and nature of climate activities [113]. 3 See https://ctenergydashboard.com/CEC/CECTownData.aspx?ID=townprofile Another attempt at ranking and comparing CT towns was made by [112] report on “Connecticut Municipal Solar Scorecards” (http://www.ctsolarscoreboard.com). While the scorecards provide extensive data comparing municipal performance on 18 indicators, they evaluate the municipalities’ efforts to encourage only residential solar PV deployment and do not consider other clean energy initiatives. A more recent certification program, SustainableCT, on the other hand, tracks municipality progress on a broad range of sustainability activities, some of which are in the clean energy sector (https://sustainablect.org/actions-certifications/actions/). As of January 2019, there was information about only 22 certified towns in the database. 4 56 towns are classified as bronze, 84 as silver and 18 as gold. For the remaining 11 towns, they were not able to award any achievement. In some cases, the towns declined to participate. More recently, EnergizeCT dropped this classification system. The website now just lists the achievements of each town under a town profile. 5 The original goal was to have 5 towns from each category but many of the towns I tried to reach from the Bronze category did not respond to the interview requests. 6 Pursuant to Institutional Review Board (IRB) Protocol X18-006, for confidentiality reasons, I do not divulge the names of the towns but instead use numbers to refer to them.

7 For example, for geographic variation, these towns were selected from 5 different counties and 5 regional planning areas (Western, Capitol Region, South Central, Metropolitan, and Southeastern). They also exhibit variation

5

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however, it became clear that EnergizeCT categories did not always accurately reflect the full scope of energy-related activities in these towns and account for progress over time. In many cases, towns were doing more work on clean energy than their own self-reporting reflected. Moreover, while it is clear that the silver and bronze communities are not as active as the gold communities, the differences between them are harder to discern. Therefore, the focus in this research has been primarily on understanding the factors that are common in the leader towns and that set them apart from other towns that have been less ambitious, effective, and/or slower in adapting clean energy initiatives. Between September 2016 and December 2018, over 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted with town officials, municipal staff, and energy taskforce volunteers who were in charge of or advised their respective town's initiatives on clean energy. In addition, about 10 town energy taskforce meetings and CT Clean Energy Communities Network of Energy Taskforce meetings were observed (for a full list, see Appendix A). Data was gathered to examine the effects of three sets of explanatory variables. Policy champions in each town were determined based on the interviewees’ identification and description. Those identified policy champions were coded as town officials (O), staff (S) or volunteers (V) to discern if they had different impact on clean energy engagement. In order to measure the strength of public support for clean energy, first of all, the 2016 Presidential and 2017 municipal election outcomes, published by the CT Secretary of State, were used in each town. Some towns voted for Democratic (D) or Republican (R) national and local candidates consistently across the two elections and in others party affiliation shifted over time (D/R), reflecting more ideologically divided communities. Next, the CT Economic Resource Center Data Collaborative Town Profiles (https://www.cerc.com/resources/townprofiles/) were used to gather data on population size, wealth (median household income), education (percentage of bachelorate or higher) and ethnic homogeneity (percentage of white alone, non-hispanic population) levels in each town. As another measure of public support, information was gathered about the interest groups and businesses in favor of and against clean energy initiatives in these towns, as perceived and described by the interviewees. The support variable was coded as high if a number of interest groups and/or businesses collaborated with the town government in various clean energy initiatives, as medium if groups had their own sustainability efforts but with no clear interaction and collaboration with the town government, and as low if there were no observable groups mobilizing to support town initiatives. Similarly, depending on the level of organized opposition (nimbyism) to clean energy projects, the resistance variable was coded as high, medium, or low. Moreover, using public information from town websites, information was gathered on the form of government in each town. It was coded as (S) if a town has a selectman-town meeting model, as (M) if it has a manager-council model and (May) if it has a mayor-council model. Town websites were also used to gather data on the level of bureaucratic specialization, which was coded as high if a town had an energy/sustainability task force for more than five years and/or there was an official energy specialist/sustainability coordinator position in the town administration. If such a taskforce and/or position was relatively new or just emerging, it was coded as medium and if a town had neither the task force nor the specialty position, it was coded as low. It is important to note that by comparing towns in the same state, it was possible to focus on town-level socioeconomic and political variables and control for external and multidimensional variables that have been found to influence local climate action in the literature, such as the division of policy authority between national-state-local levels,

utility company influence, as well as the effects of transnational, national, or state-level municipal networks.8 4. Results 4.1. A more nuanced understanding of policy champions A comparison of CT towns reveals that policy champions are necessary for clean energy engagement. In some towns the energy champion is an elected official such as the first selectman/council member, in others it is a municipal staff like the director of public works and yet in others it is a town resident who volunteers in a clean energy taskforce and advises the local government. These individuals use very similar strategies in framing clean energy issues to create awareness in their communities and secure funding for new projects. Most, if not all, of these champions recognize and understand the environmental benefits of switching to clean energy. In some cases, environmental sustainability goal is what drives their involvement in these initiatives. Yet, they all seem to also understand that the most effective way to win the support of the town government and community is by framing clean energy as a local economic development issue and highlighting the economic benefits of engaging clean energy proactively. For example, the director of facilities in Town 11 contends that most elected officials do not know or care much about clean energy but as long as he promises them cost-cutting and savings, they are all supportive.9 Other policy champions have also stated that, in general, town governments are risk averse and unless a return of investment is promised, they are not going to approve clean energy projects. The assistant director of public works in Town 9 put it even more boldly: “We bring projects with solid technology that is good for the economy, and that create private sector jobs. How do you oppose it? It would be like being against apple pie!”10 Evidence from the climate action literature similarly shows that climate adaptation is likely if the proposed changes can be consistent with the other policy priorities of the local government [32–34]. Moreover, most of these policy champions understand that success begets success, in that initial projects with positive effects create new supporters and get ‘locked in’, making them harder to dismantle over time. Many of the energy champions that were interviewed pointed out that the first projects are especially important in setting the stage and building trust and positive feedback that become useful when the next new project is proposed. This is also why information and awareness on nearby towns’ accomplishments matter as well; successful projects get emulated and modeled after. This research, however, points to a more nuanced understanding of the importance of policy champions because the mere existence of any clean energy champion in a town does not explain much of the variation in clean energy engagement across the state. After all, every town that was surveyed in this study has/had a policy champion at some point in time. Instead, what we see is that the type and certain configuration of policy champions are a better determinant of how engaged a town is (see Table 2). For instance, almost all leading towns in the gold community category have at least one government official advocating for clean energy initiatives, which demonstrates that when a 8 In CT, utility companies, Eversource and United Illuminating, serve almost all 169 CT towns (with the majority of towns served by the former) except for 5 towns that have municipal electric distribution companies. Also, there is only one state-wide municipal clean energy network, the Clean Energy Communities. I reference towns’ interactions with this network in the context of discussing the skills and strategies of policy champions and energy task forces in utilizing available resources. 9 Author's interview with Town 11 Director of Facilities Management, June 27 2018. 10 Author's interview with Town 9 Assistant Director of Public Works, July 11 2018.

(footnote continued) across government type, town size, wealth and education levels (see Table 2). 6

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Table 2 Comparison of political and socio-economic characteristics of a sample of CT towns.

Source: Clean Energy Community (CEC) database (http://ctenergydashboard.com/CEC). CT Economic Resource Center Data Collaborative Town Profiles (https://www.cerc.com/resources/town-profiles/); individual town websites and author's interview data. O=town official, S=town staff, V=volunteer, D=Democrat leaning, R=Republican leaning, D/R=Ideologicall divided S=selectman-town meeting model, M=manager-council model, May=Mayor-council model.

government official is a champion for clean energy, the likelihood of a new policy adoption is high. Similarly, we can also observe that in all the leading towns, there are volunteer policy champions, whereas in silver and bronze communities, they rarely exist. Town staff, in some of these cases, singlehandedly shoulder the lion share of the work. This pattern underscores the importance of town resident involvement in government policy planning and implementation. But perhaps even more importantly, in towns where there are volunteer, official, and sometimes staff champions pushing together for clean energy, more gets accomplished. Leaders with different positions and responsibilities bring different skills and resources to the table and working together they create a policy momentum that becomes harder to reverse.

communities as well. Lack of partisanship when it comes to clean energy in these towns is, for the most part, in line with the broader public opinion trends at the national and state levels. Recent public opinion polls show the shrinking gap between Democrats and Republicans when people are asked if they favor expanding solar panels and wind turbine farms. 83% of Republicans support solar compared to 97% of Democrats and 75% of Republicans support wind turbines compared to 93% of Democrats (Pew 2016) Similarly, a 2017 Pew survey shows that 40% of Republicans support increasing reliance on renewable energy sources to Democrats’ 63%. State level analyses also show that partisanship is less significant on clean energy issues than on environmental ones. For instance, Hess et al. [11] find that even in red states green energy laws can easily pass with broad support.

4.2. Public support in certain towns is more likely than others

4.2.2. Importance of town wealth and education Despite the insignificance of partisanship, certain socioeconomic characteristics of towns shape the level of public support for clean energy. For example, except for one, all the leading towns are wealthy, with an average median household income of $118,000. Silver and bronze communities, on the other hand, are closer to the state average of $71,555. The logic for this may be that the more wealth a town has, the more resources it can allocate to new energy initiatives. The wealth of a town may also impact the quantity and quality of staffing in the town administration as well civil society mobilization. There also appears to be a relationship between educational levels and clean energy engagement in a town. In gold communities, the average percentage of population with bachelor degrees or higher is 60 percent whereas in silver and bronze communities it is 43 and 38 percent, respectively. Education level is important in shaping the profile of town officials and volunteer groups that advise the government and the amount of time and resources they can dedicate to this line of work. For instance, a member of the energy commission in Town 1 stated that the town is full of professionals who leave New York with the intention of retiring in a green community. For them the preservation of nature has become the ‘fiber’ of their community. She further stated that many members of this community are also relatively

A comparison of CT towns also reveals that public support (or lack thereof) affects the ability of policy champions to pursue clean energy initiatives. That public support itself is shaped by certain town characteristics such as its wealth and education levels as well as the existence of organized societal interests in favor of clean energy but not by the political affiliation of town residents. 4.2.1. Clean energy is for the most part a nonpartisan issue The partisan affiliation of a town does not seem to affect its level of clean energy engagement (see Table 2). Gold communities that cast more ballots for Republican candidates in recent elections (Towns 1 and 3) have been as ambitious in their clean energy engagement as the Democratic-leaning ones (Towns 2 and 4). For instance, in Town 3, the clean energy task force members confirm this nonpartisanship in their town government by praising the Republican First Selectman for understanding the importance of clean energy for local development and for being a very effective and determined leader in bringing about change.11 Similarly, a partisan variation exists among silver and bronze 11 Author's observation of the Town 3 Energy Task Force meeting on March 12, 2018.

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wealthy, which makes it easier for them to take time off and volunteer for various causes.12 The effects of population size and ethnic diversity on clean energy engagement are harder to discern in the comparison of these particular towns. Most of the gold communities are small and homogenous but so are most of the silver and bronze ones. At the same time, most people interviewed in the larger towns with slightly more diverse populations, such as Towns 5, 7, and 9, indicated that they have a harder time connecting with and educating their communities about clean energy awareness and participation initiatives. They noted that in bigger towns, there are also more numerous and diverse priorities, making it difficult for them to bring attention to a particular cause.13

policymaking process. They stated that they are skeptical of too much community involvement by organizations that challenge them for not doing enough and for asserting that they could do things better. What these cases show is that perhaps more than the existence (or lack) of pro-clean energy groups in these communities, their interactions and synergy with local governments is what makes the difference. It seems that leader towns are the ones that take a proactive approach to develop and harness the energy and support coming from the community groups and turn them into collaborative projects. In other words, the leading towns are the ones that are able to connect energy champions with active communities. Alternatively, towns that have energy champions but do not have or welcome an active and supportive community seem to have more challenges in fully implementing clean energy initiatives and spreading the energy transition. This is in line with the literature that focus on the political opportunity structures that promote social activism and participation [111]. Another finding of this research is that organized local resistance to clean energy projects is low across the board in CT. When asked about NIMBYism, most town officials and/or volunteers stated that they were not aware of any strong mobilization against their initiatives. There are a few exceptions. In Town 12, an ‘open space association’ that promotes conservation was cited as stalling a number of clean energy projects.18 In Town 4, residents in an area in which a 26MW solar farm was to be built opposed the project vigorously (although failed to reverse it). Limited levels of organized local resistance may have to do with the low potential of wind energy development and the relatively new development of solar community farms in CT. Arguably as more of these types of clean energy projects are proposed and become viable, we may see more organized resistance to them as typical in other parts of the country.

4.2.3. Synergy between organized interests and town governments The comparative experiences in these towns also suggest that the level of public support coming from interest groups and businesses in favor of clean energy initiatives does, in fact, matter. All of the leader towns in this study have one or two vibrant community organizations or businesses that adopt sustainable practices themselves and provide additional human capital and resources to policy champions as they design and carry out clean energy initiatives. For instance, a grassroots environmental organization works closely with the clean energy commission in Town 1 to organize community-wide festivals, awareness campaigns, speaker events, and workshops. The goal of this civil society organization, as described in its mission statement, is to develop a range of sustainable initiatives in cooperation with the town and other area nonprofits. While the town energy commission focuses on retrofitting town buildings and educating the town through schools, this organization focuses on educating the general public and raising much-needed revenues with high-visibility programs.14 Similarly, Town 2 benefits greatly from the leadership and support of a university, which is the largest employer in town. The university's own clean energy and sustainability initiatives provide valuable human and technical resources for the town to draw upon. There are also a number of areas where the town and the university cooperate to increase energy efficiency awareness and incentivize the use of renewables among town residents. In the other towns, on the other hand, such societal pressures either do not exist (low) or are not brought into a cooperative relationship with the town government (medium). In Town 7 for instance, the makeup of the local economy is such that there are no big corporations but instead many small to medium-size retail companies that rent their office space. This type of employment structure creates a “leave us alone” attitude among business owners. These types of businesses do not have the time or the resources to fill out the necessary paperwork to participate in town-initiated clean energy projects or campaigns.15 In Town 12, on the other hand, three big corporations and a university exist but the town government seems less interested in engaging them to increase town-wide energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives.16 In Town 8, a town official argued that having a community that is not interested and/or knowledgeable about energy issues helps them proceed more smoothly and faster.17 Similarly, in Towns 7 and 10, town officials that were interviewed stated that they prefer that grassroots organizations and businesses do not get too involved in the

4.3. Mixed institutional impact The analysis of CT towns confirms that the institutional landscape for local policymaking is an important variable that needs to be understood. While the type of government structure and the formal distribution of political power matter less, the existence of staff positions and town committees specializing in clean energy initiatives is what distinguishes leader towns from the rest. 4.3.1. Government type is less important than leadership Interviews with numerous government officials and volunteer groups suggest that government structure does not make much of a difference in clean energy engagement. Among the leader towns (gold communities), 4 of them have selectman-town meeting structure and 1 has manager-council structure. The same kind of variation exists within the silver (2 selectman-town meeting, 1 mayor-council and 2 managercouncil) and bronze communities (2 manager-council) as well (see Table 2). In some towns, having a first selectman who is committed to clean energy development makes clean energy engagement very effective given the institutional powers of the first selectman (e.g. Town 3). However, that kind of engagement can also exist in towns with town managers, who are knowledgeable and professional in their approach to energy development. For instance, the town manager of Town 10, who has been in this position for over two decades, stated that renewable energy has always been an organizational priority for him and the town council has given him some funding and discretion to hire outside energy consultants for specific projects.19 Professional management and flexibility that is possible with the manager-council model can be a great asset only to the extent that the manager is personally interested in and committed to clean energy. Therefore, more than the formal distribution of political power in a local government, the interests and

12 Author's interview with Town 1 Energy Commission member, April 11 2018. 13 Author's interviews with Town 5 Energy Commission Chair, December 10 2018; with Town 7 Budget Director, June 7 2018; and with Town 9 Assistant Director of Public Works, July 11 2018. 14 See fn.12. 15 Author's interview with Town 7 Budget Director, June 7 2018. 16 Author's interview with Town 12 Sustainability officer, May 16, 2018. The argument was that those businesses are doing enough on their own and so there is very little reason for the town government to do more. 17 Author's interview with Town 8 Energy Advisory Committee member, July 12 2018.

18 19

8

See fn.16. Author's interview with Town 10 Town Manager, July 3 2018.

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skills of individuals who are in leadership positions seem to make a difference.

These task force members are also resourceful and skilled in networking. Some of the volunteers serve on other boards and committees in their towns and are able to create synergies to pressure elected officials to pass or expedite energy initiatives. They take part in town workshops and meetings to draft town documents such as the Plan of Conservation and Development (POCD) and they build valuable relationships and coalitions that bring awareness to and support for their missions.21 Some of them are also active in joining state-wide networking events, such as the Clean Energy Communities’ semi-annual energy taskforce workshops or People's Action for Clean Energy (PACE) meetings where they share their experiences, exchange ideas, tackle common energy challenges and stay in the loop on new developments, updates on state policies, funding opportunities etc. It is important to note that almost all of the leading towns also have well-developed, extensive websites that highlight their accomplishments, and inform the community of the new programs and events available. The public can easily follow the minutes of each meeting and track the developments. Some of these towns also have very effective social media presence, which arguably is instrumental in organizing and mobilizing for events and campaigns. Town 5 is a perfect example of such high level bureaucratic capacity. The town has an energy specialist with a professional background and long-term experience. This person also chairs the clean energy commission, providing a seamless, clear channel of communication between the various municipal departments, elected officials, and volunteer groups. The commission, itself, has very experienced members in environmental and energy issues. For example, one member works in the CT Department of Energy and Environmental Protection. Another is an active member of a state-wide civil society organization. The amalgamation of such expertise, institutional power, personal passion, and networking ability empowers the town government to steam ahead in clean energy initiatives. Alternatively, when specialized government positions and committees are limited or nonexistent in a town, clean energy engagement stays limited as well. For instance, officials in Towns 11 and 12 complain that there is no funding available to hire trained staff and that all of the responsibility to research for, design and carry out projects fall on one administrative staff, which leads to a lot of delays and setbacks.22 Some of the energy task forces also lack the necessary expertise, skills, or connections to develop new initiatives or have a have a hard time advancing the agenda because of disagreements among the committee members.

4.3.2. Bureaucratic specialization is needed Another institutional variable that was analyzed in this study was the level of bureaucratic specialization in town governments, measured as the availability of an energy specialist position in the administration and/or an energy task force advising the government. The position of a sustainability or energy officer/manager is a fairly new phenomenon and many of the towns in CT do not actually have it. Town 5 is the only town in this sample that has a formally institutionalized energy specialist position. Interestingly, Town 12 has a sustainability officer but as stated by that officer himself, it comes with very limited powers and almost no discretion on clean energy initiatives. The lack of a specialized position has the potential of slowing down or watering down projects because energy initiatives by their nature are taken on by many different departments in town governments with some overlapping jurisdiction and redundancy. In some towns, interviewees reported that there are tensions between the City Hall and those in charge of operations or between the town government and the school district. For instance, in Town 11, the school district has its own director of facilities, which makes it harder to coordinate with the town's director of facilities, especially when the school district and the town government do not agree on priorities or methods to advance the clean energy goals. Infighting, lack of communication, and conflicting personal agendas among the government departments, were often cited during the interviews in silver and bronze towns as major barriers to designing and implementing any meaningful change. In the absence of a specialized staff position, advisory bodies such as clean energy or sustainability task forces/commissions can help with formulating initiatives, coordinating their implementation across departments and raising awareness in town government as well as the community. Roughly less than half of the 169 CT towns have a clean energy task force (CETF) or similarly-named task forces on paper. These groups have initially been created in the 2000s as part of the Clean Energy Communities program to assist and advise the local governments in all matters related to clean energy policy initiatives and programs. They consist of volunteers who are appointed or elected by the town council or selectmen. Most of these task forces have a staff member or elected town official attending regular meetings to make sure there are clear lines of communication between the town government and the committee. The analysis here shows that the institutionalization of an active and visible task force has a huge impact on the success of a government's energy initiatives. All of the gold communities have pioneer task forces that have been established early on in the 2000s whereas the task forces in the silver communities have been established more recently, e.g. Towns 7 and 10 as recently as the winter of 2019. Energy task forces do not exist in bronze communities.20 It is important to note that all the leading towns have skilled, resourceful, and connected task force members. These volunteers are what [49] calls ‘social capitalists’ who are strongly connected to the social fabric of their communities and despite different backgrounds have a common interest in improving their communities. Some have professional training and expertise in sustainability and clean energy issues, heading environmental organizations, leading specialized centers in educational institutions, consulting businesses, or working in the state or national level environmental agencies and departments. And there are others who take on volunteer work because sustainability and clean energy are a hobby of theirs and they have already made major changes in their personal lives such as installing a solar panel on their roof or purchasing an electric car.

5. Conclusion Energy is increasingly being produced and consumed in a more distributed and decentralized manner and as such the locus of decisionmaking is shifting away from the international and national to local. The sustainable energy transitions literature needs to pay more attention to the local drivers of and barriers to change. Urban climate action literature addresses local governance factors but subsumes energy under climate policy and fails to appreciate some of the potential differences between these policy areas. This research builds on and contributes to both of these literatures by exploring the political and socioeconomic determinants of clean energy policy at the local level. While such an analytical focus can benefit from a comparison of a larger number of municipalities, a small set of case studies offers us a more indepth analysis of local actors, institutions, and the policy mechanisms with which we can better distinguish between communities whose 21

The Energy Commission in Town 1, for instance, reached an agreement with the Board of Selectmen in January 2009 that all town building committees needed to include an energy commission member to ensure that energy efficiency is a major design element. 22 See fn.9 and 16.

20 On paper, Town 12 has an energy task force but the group dissolved itself after a few meetings.

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clean energy initiatives are at different stages of maturity. One of the central conclusions of this study is that a particular configuration of policy champions is key to understanding the success of clean energy engagement in local governments. Yet, interviews with numerous town actors revealed the concern that there is an element of randomness and unpredictability to where and when the skilled and experienced volunteers, municipal staff and elected officials will come together and cooperate with each other to initiate clean energy reforms. For instance, if a town manager/first selectman who has been supportive of clean energy initiatives leaves office, the incoming official may have very different priorities and interpersonal skills which may make it difficult for him/her to cooperate with the champions on the volunteer energy committee or among the staff. Similarly, if a volunteer who has dedicated many years to furthering the cause of clean energy in his town retires or passes away and if there is no one from the community to take his place, the momentum of energy transition in that town may easily be lost. Conversely, if a town official who has been skeptical or cautious about clean energy reforms is replaced with one who has a background and interest in sustainability, the fate of the clean energy initiatives in that town may change dramatically. The analysis here demonstrates that this kind of uncertainty with policy champions can, for the most part, be minimized in towns that have engaged and built synergies with local organizations and businesses to benefit from their expertise and support. It is also avoided in towns that have set up specialized institutions and mechanisms to focus on clean energy priorities. While some broad structural characteristics, such as wealth and education levels, seem to inhibit some towns from realizing these goals, it is reassuring to observe that the size and ethnic make-up of a town, its government type, or the political orientation of its residents do not predetermine success or failure. The nonpartisan attitude toward clean energy at the local level is perhaps one of the factors that distinguishes energy policy from climate action and why a separate focus on it is warranted. Finally, this study finds that the human and financial capital that are needed can be harnessed and the government organization that allows for effective and specialized attention to energy issues can be engineered to ensure that towns properly respond to the climate and energy crises. As such, this research contributes to policymakers’ understanding of what works and what does not. At a time when there are significant concerns about the direction of environmental and energy policy at the national and international levels, studying the bottom-up strategies and mechanisms can provide a more realistic (and perhaps more optimistic) account of the possible trajectory for clean energy reform in the world. Furthermore, understanding the determinants of success at the local level can inform policymakers at higher levels of governance. Even though there may be different opportunities and constraints at each decision-making unit, some of the dynamics of coalition building, institutional structure and leadership at the local level may prove useful to learn from and build on. Energy governance and transitions are multifaceted and multilayered. The local government layer deserves more attention.

Acknowledgements I thank my undergraduate student, Derek Koundakjian, who was instrumental in data collection for this study. I also appreciate the municipal staff, officials and volunteers in CT who took the time to share with me their experiences and insights. Finally, I thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments on the manuscript. Supplementary materials Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.erss.2019.101376. APPENDIX A. Interview and Observation List and Dates 1) Observation of Clean Energy Community (CEC) network of Energy Task Forces (ETFs), Sept 10, 2016 2) Interview with Director of Clean Energy Communities Program, Utility Company X, Sept 14, 2016 3) Interview with Town 2 Sustainability Task Force Chair, September 22, 2016 4) Observation of Town 4 Energy Task Force, November 7, 2016 5) Interview with Town 4 Energy Task Force Chair, November 7, 2016 6) Interview with CT Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (DEEP) Environmental Analyst, November 30, 2016 7) Interview with DEEP Environmental Analyst, and Town 1 Energy Commission member, December 21, 2016 8) Observation of Town 4 Energy Task Force, March 13, 2017 9) Interview with Town 4 Energy Task Force Chair, March 13, 2017 10) Observation of CEC Network of ETFs, Sept 16, 2017 11) Interview with DEEP Environmental Analyst, November 9, 2017 12) Interview with Clean Water Fund, CT Energy Task Force Network Director, Nov 28, 2017 13) Interview with Town 3 Task Force Chair, March 12, 2018 14) Observation of Town 3 Energy Task Force, March 12, 2018 15) Observation of Town 2 Sustainability Task Force, March 14, 2018 16) Interview with Town 2 Sustainability Task Force member, March 20, 2018 17) Interview with Town 2 Sustainability Task Force Chair, March 28, 2018 18) Interview with Town 6 Energy Improvement District Board Chair, April 3, 2018 19) Interview with Town 6 Town Administrator, April 3, 2018 20) Observation of Town 1Energy Task Force, April 11, 2018 21) Interview with Town 1 Energy Commission member, April 11, 2018 22) Interview with Town 5, 4 and 2 Clean Energy Task Force members, April 27 2018 23) Interview with Town 12 Sustainability Officer, May 16, 2018 24) Interview with Town 10 Environmental Group X members, June 5 2018 25) Interview with Town 7 Town Manager, June 7 2018 26) Interview with Town 7 Budget Director, June 7 2018 27) Interview with Town 11 Director of Facilities Management, June 27 2018 28) Interview with Town 10 Town Manager, July 3 2018 29) Interview with Town 9 Assistant Director of Public Works, July 11 2018 30) Interview with Town 8 Energy Advisory Committee member, July 12 2018 31) Observation of CEC Network of Energy Task Forces, Oct 27 2018 32) Observation of PACE panel, Nov 8, 2018 33) Observation of Town 5 Clean Energy Commission, December 10 2018

Funding This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors. Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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34) Interview with Town 5 Clean Energy Commission member and Energy Specialist, December 10 2018 35) Interview with Town 1 Energy Commission member, December 17, 2018

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