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Long-range forecasting within organisations
420
Long-range Forecasting Within Organisations
Methodology
Developments in the techniques employed in research and in the practice of forecasting
LONG-RANGE FORECASTING WITHIN ORGANISATIONS Herve Raynaud
The article describes a method for testing and developing personal and organisational strategies. It suggests the establishment of a group which includes the organisation’s partners and competitors (the author outlines why and how objections to the latter should be overcome) and which would progress through initial “unrealistic” games to more realistic scenarios. When combined with role playing, some “uncomfortable” scenarios can lead to members leaving the group and, where they pinpoint weaknesses, can either strengthen the organisation or hasten its decline. By including the organisations’ decision makers, the exercise can lead to a rehearsal of the future. French administration, centralised over many centuries, was confronted with a considerable task when required to share its power of initiative with its regions; and those regions, divided in a feudal manner, needed to be re-educated out of their total dependence upon Parisian power. With this aim in mind, and at the request of a French region, B. Kirschner and I proposed a getting together of in informal the most influential e’minences grises (the “directeurs de cabinets”) meetings: it was essential to avoid confrontations related to official dogmas. Long-range forecasting seemed a suitable subject for group study: a prerequisite for regional planning, yet expressly concerned with events sufficiently removed from current preoccupations to permit the fairly easy emergence of overcoming rigid preconceptions. Our method was common solutions, developed progressively in a dozen such long-range forecasting groups. A French region is nothing more, fundamentally, than a large political and economic organisation. That is why it was natural to seek to adapt the method The author is with the U&et-site Scientifique et Medicale de Grenoble, and Professeur Visiteur 6. la Fact&C Universitaire Catholique de Mom 38700, Le Sappey par La Tronche, France. The author wishes to thank the research centre of la Facultt Universitaire Catholique de Mans, Belgium, Mr Duquesne de la Vinelle, V. Claustre, H. Duchateau, J. Durand, E. Fontella, A. Guyot, B. Kirschner, R. Marrel, and D. Van den Hove for their help and encouragement.
FUTURES
October lB76
Long-range Forecasting
Within Organisations
421
that proved successful in these regions to other organisations, similarly large and diverse. No real problems were involved in the composition of the above forecasting groups. It is sufficient to observe some standard criteria required for efficient communication (such as no hierarchical connections between participants; more or less similar ages; and not more than 20 participants) in order to obtain a satisfactory group. Problems emerge when one tries to persuade a large organisation to include its competitors in such a long-range forecasting group. A large organisation is very often only concerned with private interests. At least in neoclassical economic theory, its own interest and the competitive environment will prevent it from engaging in informal and sincere discussions, either with its competitors or with any person who, once informed of the strategies projected by the firms, would be able to benefit rivals. Of course, this is something of a caricature: it is well known that important near-competitors often prefer to reach an understanding, to collude, rather than opt for individualist strategies, the practical limitations of which are well-illustrated by the prisoner’s di1emma.l The best way to reduce uncertainty concerning the distant future is to devise psychological tools which allow a negotiated collective interest to emerge between competing participants. On the one hand it is clear that in our liberal economic system, it is very difficult to confide to rivals one’s weaknesses and one’s offensive strategies. On the other hand, between large organisations, and especially in the long run, these secrets are frequently spurious. Furthermore, in the framework of a simulation game, all the possibilities of the future can be imagined, and since it is only a game, the fear of conveying too much information can often be reduced. The situation in which a neutral agent can invite already enthusiastic participants would seem to occur very rarely in industry: large industrial groups wish to initiate long-range forecasting studies while at the same time they fear to lose their secrets and doubt the degree of sincerity of their competitors. If the initiator is so afraid of losing his secrets, it is often because he has developed no valid strategy for the long term. To reassure him one can begin with a group composed only of associates, where the future behaviour of competitors is left to be conjectured. Progressively, the discovery of tactical weapons which he can use in all cases allows the initiator to feel less afraid of a simulation verging upon a negotiation. At the same time the participants become less interested in the intellectual aspects of the simulations and more interested in envisaging future real negotiations. For this reason the group then natural5 invites progressively more “dangerous” new members, and increasingly moves towards negotiated projects.
The typical development
of a group
Long-range forecasting proper can begin as soon as one has succeeded in bringing together suitable participants : they should be able to talk frankly with each other and at the same time represent the principal interests involved and be capable of influencing significantly the course of events. Who shall prompt the group ? The most satisfactory solution, particularly
FUTURES
October 1976
422
Long-range Forecasting Within Organisations
recommended in cases where one must proceed carefully, was found to be a team of three prompters aided by technical staff. The “psychologist prompter” must take note of group phenomena, facilitate free expression, control and aid the resolution of conflicts, and attempt to minimise the mistakes of the “method prompter”. It is the duty of the latter to supervise the faithful application of the method. As for the third, the “technical prompter”, his task is to maintain the quality of the debates; he edits the session’s proceedings; ensures the internal coherence of the scenarios or simulations developed; and he can introduce any information or ask any question likely to increase consistency. He is the head of the technical staff which is responsible for the concrete organisation of the sessions, for assembling all the available information demanded by the participants, and for publishing and distributing the proceedings in due course. The group has to meet at least three times. The intervals between sessions must allow the proceedings to be edited and distributed. In principle it is advisable to allow a full working day for each session. At the beginning of the first session, after the customary introductions and thanks, a minimum of deconditioning must be undertaken. This is as necessary as much for the creative performance of the group as for its general atmosphere, which otherwise would be liable to remain chilled for a long time. Any unusual work method applied to a fairly well-explored subject seems to me to be appropriate. For example, from my own experience, I often suggest a fairly long brain storming designed to draw up a list of relevant “omens” (les faits porteurs d’avenir) 2-and useful later on .s The method prompter proposes to abide by Osborn’s four rules, very different from normal scholarly rules. He specifies that: l l
l l
Criticism (positive or negative) and even self-criticism is prohibited. Free imagination is encouraged-speak everything that comes to mind even if you judge it to be nonsensical. Associate your ideas to those of others: copy your neighbour ! Finally, it is the number and not the quality of ideas that matters the most.
The method prompter we are concerned with sions in the long run. events, and even those
must then continually stimulate the group. As for omens, all those events which might have considerable repercusThis includes anything already accomplished, on-going that are very unlikely to take place.
The problem of publicity Sometimes, at the request of one of the participants, at the end of the brain storming the prompters read the list of omens. It is at this moment, because of the provocative character of certain of these omens, that the general problem of the publication of the group’s work is raised for the first time. I have often witnessed a kind of withdrawal by participants who actively fear that people with the wrong motives will take certain parts of the brain storming and strip them from their context, in order to discredit the work and the participants. However, if the diffusion of proceedings is too restricted, many nonparticipants may have the feeling of being excluded from a conspiracy: furious, they may develop a violent hostility to the group. FUTURES
October IS76
Long-range Forecasting Within Organisations
423
A solution is to make a synthetic and methodological summary for general distribution, and working notes (including the entirety of the brain stormings) for restricted distribution. However, as the work advances, and plausible sketches of the future are described, it always becomes possible to make available to a larger public more and more important sections of the proceedings. Furthermore, one must rely on the publicity given to these simulations to improve the efficiency of the method itself: if certain omens are currently discussed, it is much easier to make them a reality. Contrasting scenarios The next stage requires the group to generate contrasting scenarios. A single present-day trend is developed in an exaggerated fashion up to a previously determined time horizon (1985, . . . , 2000). This allows a scenario to be acted out towards a logically consistent image of the future. Experience has shown that it is both inefficient and inipossible to engage a group directly in realistic simulations, the essential reason is that short-term considerations restrict the group, imprison the imagination, and induce an acutely experienced tension amongst participants, which makes discussion and negotiation in the session ineffectual and jeopardises the survival of the group. Therefore one must seek first of all to adopt an unrealistic perspective.4 The method prompter explains that the future image at the time horizon (the horizon image) serve as a focus for scenario development. One seeks to attain these horizon images by a plausible or logical route from the present. Acting out scenarios, even with unrealistic horizon images, helps to identify the regulating mechanisms that prevent specific types of evolution. After the brain storming to identify omens, it will be easy to conduct another one on the horizon images. When a fairly large number of such images is attained, the psychologist prompter can propose a rearrangement of images in order to obtain about ten containing the greatest contrasts with the present day. If the group is agreeable, he can try to establish a consensus on the best order to develop (or play out) the scenarios towards the horizon images. He specifies that a scenario more or less optimistic must alternate with a scenario which is more or less pessimistic, and that the more realistic scenarios should be played towards the end. If the discussion is too slow or too difficult, and yields nothing, it may be terminated by calling upon the computer to make the choice!5 Let us suppose therefore that by one means or another we arrive at a list of themes for contrasting scenarios, and an order in which they are to be studied. When playing out the scenarios, two interesting possibilities are open to us: l the normal simulation in which time proceeds from day to day (forwardlooking scenarios) ; and l those in which time proceeds in reverse fashion (backward-looking scenarios).
In practice, it is interesting to alternate these two exercises, pessimistic scenarios being often more instructive when pursued forwards, and optimistic scenarios in reverse.
FUTURES
October 1976
424
Long-range Forecasting
Playing
the forward-looking
Within Organisations
scenarios
The method prompter asks the group to identify the economic and human agents likely to interact significantly in the course of the simulation. A list of roles (characters) to be simulated is thus drawn up, which the participants tend to divide among themselves to the best of their ability. The method prompter then goes over the rules of the simulation whereby the group generates a description of what is to happen over two, five, ten, . . . years by speaking in turn. Each participant speaks once only, any possible discussion of his pronouncements being ruled out. Furthermore, the participants are bound by pronouncements already made; it is imperative that they abide by what has been said before and revise their own contribution as appropriate. A little time is set aside for the participants to ask the technical prompter all the questions they need in order to prepare their contribution; they should also be busily interacting with the other role bearers. The contributions of those who fail to do so are very likely to be both improvised and ineffectual, especially if they are some of the later speakers. A preliminary vote is often necessary to decide the speaking order. If a participant contradicts a preceding declaration, the technical prompter should raise an objection and ask him to revise his contribution. Before the first round (in which each participant speaks once) the method prompter generally has to actively stimulate the more inert participants into leaving their seats to consult the others. Later on, on the contrary, he often has to limit the time spent interacting before each round. It is normal to reverse the speaking order on the round which follows, so that those who are last to speak will have the possibility of revenge during the next round. At the completion of each round the method prompter can give the floor to any member of the group to let him formulate more precisely any matters left in the air. Equally, the prompters might synthesise the interim image which must emerge clearly at the end of one round, before the next one can begin. Generally, the image for the year 2000 can only be reached at the price of some fairly silly rounds. It is preferable to halt the group whenever logical blockages manifest themselves and to suggest a few minutes reflection. It often happens, because the group contains a number of dynamic optimists, that the group will want a compensating overoptimistic scenario after a pessimistic one. These “voluntarists” may be contrasted to the “laissez-faire realists” who feel they have no power to influence events, and who tend to hold pessimistic views. It seems preferable to confine the forward-looking games to the pessimistic scenarios, and the backward-looking games to the optimistic scenarios. Playing
the backward-looking
The method coordinator written form : When speaking year .r - t, each tion, and in the the most logical
in permanent
during a round dealing with the period between the year x and the participant shall say “In the year x, I was in such and such a condiyear x - t, in this other condition”, and he shall go on to explain, in manner possible, how this evolution might have come about.
The identification in the previous
scenarios
must present the following instructions
and allocation case. However,
of roles, and the speaking the starting
point,
order are decided
the horizon
image,
FUTURES
as
can be the
October 1978
Long-range Forecasting Within Organisations
425
subject of a round so that each participant can identify the details of his own situation at the beginning of the game. The next step is to let the rounds proceed, each participant speaking in turn, and arrive at a time as close as possible to the present day, while retaining verisimilitude. It should be noted that: l
l
the discussion periods prior to the round will be short because rigorous logic required in this exercise cannot long be sustained; the group will naturally aim at reaching an image approximating porary reality.
the very contem-
At the end, the method promptor asks for a final round in the course of which each participant must use the following formula: In order to reach the state I have just described in the year-y, I must already have done this and that, taken such and such a decision, agents W, X, Y, < must have decided upon such and such an action, etc. This formula attempts to shed more light upon the gap between what is required now in order to reach the horizon image, and the actual present state. Upon the completion of all the scenarios the prompters organise a general discussion on the lessons to be drawn from the game. They should make sure the programme devotes substantial time to these discussions. Realistic scenarios Unless one of the contrasting scenarios turns out to be very realistic or instructive the group will grow dissatisfied with the fiction. As a general rule, interest diminishes as the number of scenarios acted increases. This happens because, as the scenarios progress, the group is surprised to note that quite a large number of events recur at dates which vary only slightly; these bring, so to speak an awareness of the constants of the future, of the theme upon which more contingent variations may be embroidered. The coordinators may then suggest more “realistic” simulation of the future. The method prompter then proposes to play a forward-looking scenario without an horizon image, but retaining over the agreed time span the constants derived from the contrasting scenarios. This scenario will require a longer duration. Naturally prior discussion will be more prominent than before. The simulation will quite naturally focus upon short-term action and certain informal alliances will be cemented between the participants. From this moment, allies will act as kinds of pressure groups promoting the consensus achieved during the game. Obviously at this point the role of the psychologist prompter will become very important. For example, the forecasting of the disappearance or degeneration of one collectivity of interests around the table may disturb some participants. I think that the psychologist prompter can overcome this problem by stressing the “play like” character of the realistic scenario and the serious value of the contrasting scenarios. This will often be sufficient to reassure those affected, whilst the other participants will not be taken in by the ruse. Is it for fun or is it for real? The method is founded on this ambiguity. Without ambiguity, it is clear that most of the actors could not be brought out sufficiently from their shells to participate-and the very success of the method depends on its ability to achieve this.
FUTURES
October 1976
426
Long-range Forecasting Within Organisations
And in practice? Invariably the group organises itself as a pressure group oriented towards the short term, and eventually expands to promote measures which seem unanimously desirable. Often the group decides to disperse into commissions to study how approved measures may be put into practice. After working and consulting for a few weeks, the participants meet again to draw up conclusions, to draw the whole group into an active participation and an exchange of more or less confidential information. T/le fact that short-term developments are not always positive for everybody must be stressed. I have myself come across a case where a regional scenario, thought to be both unacceptable and unlikely came to appear much more probable than initially thought . . . and most of the participants of the group have left the region since ! In these aspects, such a method resembles a psychotherapeutic process. To be more precise, when an organisation sets up a long-range forecasting group, it becomes more aware of its underlying mechanisms, its hidden ambitions-in some sense, of its “unconscious”. That certain therapies can “legitimately” lead to suicide is well known. It can also apply to organisations which can be plunged into decline by a rigorous forecasting, which pinpoints irreparable weaknesses. If, on the contrary, the organisation is sound, it will be normal and natural that the collaboration resulting from the group should accelerate this favourable trend-with many potential conflicts being avoided thanks to consultation and negotiation. As in psychotherapy, the prescription is difficult: organisations with good cause to be worried about their future will call for help from a long-range forecasting group, which will only hasten their decline. As in psychoanalysis, the long-range forecasting operation can only guarantee good news for organisations which are already healthy and would like to become more so. In reducing uncertainties through negotiation and consultation about the future, and in inspiring new ideas, the method will always give satisfaction. To be exact, from the point of view of the participants’ satisfaction, this method differs in kind from other methods. It is powerful because it encourages people to adjust their own behaviour directly through trial and error within the simulation game until a common project can emerge. In any case, for an executive, such a group has always at least a diagnostic interest: all the future possibilities that are thought to be possible, through the progressive resolution of their conflicts, are set out. Difficulties Because group attendance is optional, significant absenteeism sometimes results : certain participants feel themselves threatened and prefer to quit. The others, agreeing upon a coordinated project, will spend less time in internal struggles and will devote themselves to the easy elimination of those who oppose their project. In several groups, on the other hand, we have witnessed an increase in the number of participants-because of the desire of some non-participants not to be
FUTURES
October IS76
Long-range Forecasting
Within Organisations
427
excluded. A natural solution to the problem here is to split the group into subgroups. It can also happen that a long-range forecasting group criticises too explicitly the action of a man in power, makes him vindictive, and therefore causes its activity to be disrupted. These difficulties do affect the method’s efficiency which requires that those who will actually manage the organisation in the future be brought together. The method, by being a game which allows things to be said which otherwise would not be voiced, permits a kind of rehearsal of the future. It might be argued that this rehearsal is acted by the understudies and that reality will undoubtedly be played more professionally. This is so, but by attending a rehearsal one arrives at fair appreciation of the play itself. Furthermore, the group gives the most dynamic participants the opportunity to test their personal strategies and stimulates them into devising new and more efficient ones. This contributes to the value of the forecasts made by these groups. Finally to conclude I should like to say that whilst I may well have indicated a number of problems in this article, in all the cases I have dealt with, the groups were considered by the majority of their participants to be very interesting; furthermore they always succeeded in clarifying an organisational dynamic. In this sense it can be said that they entirely fulfilled their long-range forecasting task. The method has now been widely tested and has proved to be very effective. References
1. J. Aumann, “Course in game theory”, 6th Unesco seminar on the use of mathematics in the social sciences, Jerusalem. 2. A. C. Decoufle, La pros@&ive (Paris, PUF, 1972). 3. A. Osborn, L’imagination conrtructive (Paris, Dunod, 1965). 4. When acting their roles, participants take part in project negotiations which simulate possible future real-life negotiations. For example, in the regional longrange forecasting groups those who wanted to preserve the countryside and those who wanted more roads would often, through the simulated negotiations, reach a realistic compromise. 5. J. Allard, Aide automat&e aux groupes de prospective, Memoire d’Ingtniorat (Fucam, Mons, Belgium 1973). I think Allard’s method is really only satisfactory for choosing the first scenario to be acted out, and only if one uses the variant which posits the individuals as so many equally weighted criteria.
FUTURES
October 1976
Long-range Forecasting Within Organisations
Methodology
Developments in the techniques employed in research and in the practice of forecasting
LONG-RANGE FORECASTING WITHIN ORGANISATIONS Herve Raynaud
The article describes a method for testing and developing personal and organisational strategies. It suggests the establishment of a group which includes the organisation’s partners and competitors (the author outlines why and how objections to the latter should be overcome) and which would progress through initial “unrealistic” games to more realistic scenarios. When combined with role playing, some “uncomfortable” scenarios can lead to members leaving the group and, where they pinpoint weaknesses, can either strengthen the organisation or hasten its decline. By including the organisations’ decision makers, the exercise can lead to a rehearsal of the future. French administration, centralised over many centuries, was confronted with a considerable task when required to share its power of initiative with its regions; and those regions, divided in a feudal manner, needed to be re-educated out of their total dependence upon Parisian power. With this aim in mind, and at the request of a French region, B. Kirschner and I proposed a getting together of in informal the most influential e’minences grises (the “directeurs de cabinets”) meetings: it was essential to avoid confrontations related to official dogmas. Long-range forecasting seemed a suitable subject for group study: a prerequisite for regional planning, yet expressly concerned with events sufficiently removed from current preoccupations to permit the fairly easy emergence of overcoming rigid preconceptions. Our method was common solutions, developed progressively in a dozen such long-range forecasting groups. A French region is nothing more, fundamentally, than a large political and economic organisation. That is why it was natural to seek to adapt the method The author is with the U&et-site Scientifique et Medicale de Grenoble, and Professeur Visiteur 6. la Fact&C Universitaire Catholique de Mom 38700, Le Sappey par La Tronche, France. The author wishes to thank the research centre of la Facultt Universitaire Catholique de Mans, Belgium, Mr Duquesne de la Vinelle, V. Claustre, H. Duchateau, J. Durand, E. Fontella, A. Guyot, B. Kirschner, R. Marrel, and D. Van den Hove for their help and encouragement.
FUTURES
October lB76
Long-range Forecasting
Within Organisations
421
that proved successful in these regions to other organisations, similarly large and diverse. No real problems were involved in the composition of the above forecasting groups. It is sufficient to observe some standard criteria required for efficient communication (such as no hierarchical connections between participants; more or less similar ages; and not more than 20 participants) in order to obtain a satisfactory group. Problems emerge when one tries to persuade a large organisation to include its competitors in such a long-range forecasting group. A large organisation is very often only concerned with private interests. At least in neoclassical economic theory, its own interest and the competitive environment will prevent it from engaging in informal and sincere discussions, either with its competitors or with any person who, once informed of the strategies projected by the firms, would be able to benefit rivals. Of course, this is something of a caricature: it is well known that important near-competitors often prefer to reach an understanding, to collude, rather than opt for individualist strategies, the practical limitations of which are well-illustrated by the prisoner’s di1emma.l The best way to reduce uncertainty concerning the distant future is to devise psychological tools which allow a negotiated collective interest to emerge between competing participants. On the one hand it is clear that in our liberal economic system, it is very difficult to confide to rivals one’s weaknesses and one’s offensive strategies. On the other hand, between large organisations, and especially in the long run, these secrets are frequently spurious. Furthermore, in the framework of a simulation game, all the possibilities of the future can be imagined, and since it is only a game, the fear of conveying too much information can often be reduced. The situation in which a neutral agent can invite already enthusiastic participants would seem to occur very rarely in industry: large industrial groups wish to initiate long-range forecasting studies while at the same time they fear to lose their secrets and doubt the degree of sincerity of their competitors. If the initiator is so afraid of losing his secrets, it is often because he has developed no valid strategy for the long term. To reassure him one can begin with a group composed only of associates, where the future behaviour of competitors is left to be conjectured. Progressively, the discovery of tactical weapons which he can use in all cases allows the initiator to feel less afraid of a simulation verging upon a negotiation. At the same time the participants become less interested in the intellectual aspects of the simulations and more interested in envisaging future real negotiations. For this reason the group then natural5 invites progressively more “dangerous” new members, and increasingly moves towards negotiated projects.
The typical development
of a group
Long-range forecasting proper can begin as soon as one has succeeded in bringing together suitable participants : they should be able to talk frankly with each other and at the same time represent the principal interests involved and be capable of influencing significantly the course of events. Who shall prompt the group ? The most satisfactory solution, particularly
FUTURES
October 1976
422
Long-range Forecasting Within Organisations
recommended in cases where one must proceed carefully, was found to be a team of three prompters aided by technical staff. The “psychologist prompter” must take note of group phenomena, facilitate free expression, control and aid the resolution of conflicts, and attempt to minimise the mistakes of the “method prompter”. It is the duty of the latter to supervise the faithful application of the method. As for the third, the “technical prompter”, his task is to maintain the quality of the debates; he edits the session’s proceedings; ensures the internal coherence of the scenarios or simulations developed; and he can introduce any information or ask any question likely to increase consistency. He is the head of the technical staff which is responsible for the concrete organisation of the sessions, for assembling all the available information demanded by the participants, and for publishing and distributing the proceedings in due course. The group has to meet at least three times. The intervals between sessions must allow the proceedings to be edited and distributed. In principle it is advisable to allow a full working day for each session. At the beginning of the first session, after the customary introductions and thanks, a minimum of deconditioning must be undertaken. This is as necessary as much for the creative performance of the group as for its general atmosphere, which otherwise would be liable to remain chilled for a long time. Any unusual work method applied to a fairly well-explored subject seems to me to be appropriate. For example, from my own experience, I often suggest a fairly long brain storming designed to draw up a list of relevant “omens” (les faits porteurs d’avenir) 2-and useful later on .s The method prompter proposes to abide by Osborn’s four rules, very different from normal scholarly rules. He specifies that: l l
l l
Criticism (positive or negative) and even self-criticism is prohibited. Free imagination is encouraged-speak everything that comes to mind even if you judge it to be nonsensical. Associate your ideas to those of others: copy your neighbour ! Finally, it is the number and not the quality of ideas that matters the most.
The method prompter we are concerned with sions in the long run. events, and even those
must then continually stimulate the group. As for omens, all those events which might have considerable repercusThis includes anything already accomplished, on-going that are very unlikely to take place.
The problem of publicity Sometimes, at the request of one of the participants, at the end of the brain storming the prompters read the list of omens. It is at this moment, because of the provocative character of certain of these omens, that the general problem of the publication of the group’s work is raised for the first time. I have often witnessed a kind of withdrawal by participants who actively fear that people with the wrong motives will take certain parts of the brain storming and strip them from their context, in order to discredit the work and the participants. However, if the diffusion of proceedings is too restricted, many nonparticipants may have the feeling of being excluded from a conspiracy: furious, they may develop a violent hostility to the group. FUTURES
October IS76
Long-range Forecasting Within Organisations
423
A solution is to make a synthetic and methodological summary for general distribution, and working notes (including the entirety of the brain stormings) for restricted distribution. However, as the work advances, and plausible sketches of the future are described, it always becomes possible to make available to a larger public more and more important sections of the proceedings. Furthermore, one must rely on the publicity given to these simulations to improve the efficiency of the method itself: if certain omens are currently discussed, it is much easier to make them a reality. Contrasting scenarios The next stage requires the group to generate contrasting scenarios. A single present-day trend is developed in an exaggerated fashion up to a previously determined time horizon (1985, . . . , 2000). This allows a scenario to be acted out towards a logically consistent image of the future. Experience has shown that it is both inefficient and inipossible to engage a group directly in realistic simulations, the essential reason is that short-term considerations restrict the group, imprison the imagination, and induce an acutely experienced tension amongst participants, which makes discussion and negotiation in the session ineffectual and jeopardises the survival of the group. Therefore one must seek first of all to adopt an unrealistic perspective.4 The method prompter explains that the future image at the time horizon (the horizon image) serve as a focus for scenario development. One seeks to attain these horizon images by a plausible or logical route from the present. Acting out scenarios, even with unrealistic horizon images, helps to identify the regulating mechanisms that prevent specific types of evolution. After the brain storming to identify omens, it will be easy to conduct another one on the horizon images. When a fairly large number of such images is attained, the psychologist prompter can propose a rearrangement of images in order to obtain about ten containing the greatest contrasts with the present day. If the group is agreeable, he can try to establish a consensus on the best order to develop (or play out) the scenarios towards the horizon images. He specifies that a scenario more or less optimistic must alternate with a scenario which is more or less pessimistic, and that the more realistic scenarios should be played towards the end. If the discussion is too slow or too difficult, and yields nothing, it may be terminated by calling upon the computer to make the choice!5 Let us suppose therefore that by one means or another we arrive at a list of themes for contrasting scenarios, and an order in which they are to be studied. When playing out the scenarios, two interesting possibilities are open to us: l the normal simulation in which time proceeds from day to day (forwardlooking scenarios) ; and l those in which time proceeds in reverse fashion (backward-looking scenarios).
In practice, it is interesting to alternate these two exercises, pessimistic scenarios being often more instructive when pursued forwards, and optimistic scenarios in reverse.
FUTURES
October 1976
424
Long-range Forecasting
Playing
the forward-looking
Within Organisations
scenarios
The method prompter asks the group to identify the economic and human agents likely to interact significantly in the course of the simulation. A list of roles (characters) to be simulated is thus drawn up, which the participants tend to divide among themselves to the best of their ability. The method prompter then goes over the rules of the simulation whereby the group generates a description of what is to happen over two, five, ten, . . . years by speaking in turn. Each participant speaks once only, any possible discussion of his pronouncements being ruled out. Furthermore, the participants are bound by pronouncements already made; it is imperative that they abide by what has been said before and revise their own contribution as appropriate. A little time is set aside for the participants to ask the technical prompter all the questions they need in order to prepare their contribution; they should also be busily interacting with the other role bearers. The contributions of those who fail to do so are very likely to be both improvised and ineffectual, especially if they are some of the later speakers. A preliminary vote is often necessary to decide the speaking order. If a participant contradicts a preceding declaration, the technical prompter should raise an objection and ask him to revise his contribution. Before the first round (in which each participant speaks once) the method prompter generally has to actively stimulate the more inert participants into leaving their seats to consult the others. Later on, on the contrary, he often has to limit the time spent interacting before each round. It is normal to reverse the speaking order on the round which follows, so that those who are last to speak will have the possibility of revenge during the next round. At the completion of each round the method prompter can give the floor to any member of the group to let him formulate more precisely any matters left in the air. Equally, the prompters might synthesise the interim image which must emerge clearly at the end of one round, before the next one can begin. Generally, the image for the year 2000 can only be reached at the price of some fairly silly rounds. It is preferable to halt the group whenever logical blockages manifest themselves and to suggest a few minutes reflection. It often happens, because the group contains a number of dynamic optimists, that the group will want a compensating overoptimistic scenario after a pessimistic one. These “voluntarists” may be contrasted to the “laissez-faire realists” who feel they have no power to influence events, and who tend to hold pessimistic views. It seems preferable to confine the forward-looking games to the pessimistic scenarios, and the backward-looking games to the optimistic scenarios. Playing
the backward-looking
The method coordinator written form : When speaking year .r - t, each tion, and in the the most logical
in permanent
during a round dealing with the period between the year x and the participant shall say “In the year x, I was in such and such a condiyear x - t, in this other condition”, and he shall go on to explain, in manner possible, how this evolution might have come about.
The identification in the previous
scenarios
must present the following instructions
and allocation case. However,
of roles, and the speaking the starting
point,
order are decided
the horizon
image,
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subject of a round so that each participant can identify the details of his own situation at the beginning of the game. The next step is to let the rounds proceed, each participant speaking in turn, and arrive at a time as close as possible to the present day, while retaining verisimilitude. It should be noted that: l
l
the discussion periods prior to the round will be short because rigorous logic required in this exercise cannot long be sustained; the group will naturally aim at reaching an image approximating porary reality.
the very contem-
At the end, the method promptor asks for a final round in the course of which each participant must use the following formula: In order to reach the state I have just described in the year-y, I must already have done this and that, taken such and such a decision, agents W, X, Y, < must have decided upon such and such an action, etc. This formula attempts to shed more light upon the gap between what is required now in order to reach the horizon image, and the actual present state. Upon the completion of all the scenarios the prompters organise a general discussion on the lessons to be drawn from the game. They should make sure the programme devotes substantial time to these discussions. Realistic scenarios Unless one of the contrasting scenarios turns out to be very realistic or instructive the group will grow dissatisfied with the fiction. As a general rule, interest diminishes as the number of scenarios acted increases. This happens because, as the scenarios progress, the group is surprised to note that quite a large number of events recur at dates which vary only slightly; these bring, so to speak an awareness of the constants of the future, of the theme upon which more contingent variations may be embroidered. The coordinators may then suggest more “realistic” simulation of the future. The method prompter then proposes to play a forward-looking scenario without an horizon image, but retaining over the agreed time span the constants derived from the contrasting scenarios. This scenario will require a longer duration. Naturally prior discussion will be more prominent than before. The simulation will quite naturally focus upon short-term action and certain informal alliances will be cemented between the participants. From this moment, allies will act as kinds of pressure groups promoting the consensus achieved during the game. Obviously at this point the role of the psychologist prompter will become very important. For example, the forecasting of the disappearance or degeneration of one collectivity of interests around the table may disturb some participants. I think that the psychologist prompter can overcome this problem by stressing the “play like” character of the realistic scenario and the serious value of the contrasting scenarios. This will often be sufficient to reassure those affected, whilst the other participants will not be taken in by the ruse. Is it for fun or is it for real? The method is founded on this ambiguity. Without ambiguity, it is clear that most of the actors could not be brought out sufficiently from their shells to participate-and the very success of the method depends on its ability to achieve this.
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And in practice? Invariably the group organises itself as a pressure group oriented towards the short term, and eventually expands to promote measures which seem unanimously desirable. Often the group decides to disperse into commissions to study how approved measures may be put into practice. After working and consulting for a few weeks, the participants meet again to draw up conclusions, to draw the whole group into an active participation and an exchange of more or less confidential information. T/le fact that short-term developments are not always positive for everybody must be stressed. I have myself come across a case where a regional scenario, thought to be both unacceptable and unlikely came to appear much more probable than initially thought . . . and most of the participants of the group have left the region since ! In these aspects, such a method resembles a psychotherapeutic process. To be more precise, when an organisation sets up a long-range forecasting group, it becomes more aware of its underlying mechanisms, its hidden ambitions-in some sense, of its “unconscious”. That certain therapies can “legitimately” lead to suicide is well known. It can also apply to organisations which can be plunged into decline by a rigorous forecasting, which pinpoints irreparable weaknesses. If, on the contrary, the organisation is sound, it will be normal and natural that the collaboration resulting from the group should accelerate this favourable trend-with many potential conflicts being avoided thanks to consultation and negotiation. As in psychotherapy, the prescription is difficult: organisations with good cause to be worried about their future will call for help from a long-range forecasting group, which will only hasten their decline. As in psychoanalysis, the long-range forecasting operation can only guarantee good news for organisations which are already healthy and would like to become more so. In reducing uncertainties through negotiation and consultation about the future, and in inspiring new ideas, the method will always give satisfaction. To be exact, from the point of view of the participants’ satisfaction, this method differs in kind from other methods. It is powerful because it encourages people to adjust their own behaviour directly through trial and error within the simulation game until a common project can emerge. In any case, for an executive, such a group has always at least a diagnostic interest: all the future possibilities that are thought to be possible, through the progressive resolution of their conflicts, are set out. Difficulties Because group attendance is optional, significant absenteeism sometimes results : certain participants feel themselves threatened and prefer to quit. The others, agreeing upon a coordinated project, will spend less time in internal struggles and will devote themselves to the easy elimination of those who oppose their project. In several groups, on the other hand, we have witnessed an increase in the number of participants-because of the desire of some non-participants not to be
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excluded. A natural solution to the problem here is to split the group into subgroups. It can also happen that a long-range forecasting group criticises too explicitly the action of a man in power, makes him vindictive, and therefore causes its activity to be disrupted. These difficulties do affect the method’s efficiency which requires that those who will actually manage the organisation in the future be brought together. The method, by being a game which allows things to be said which otherwise would not be voiced, permits a kind of rehearsal of the future. It might be argued that this rehearsal is acted by the understudies and that reality will undoubtedly be played more professionally. This is so, but by attending a rehearsal one arrives at fair appreciation of the play itself. Furthermore, the group gives the most dynamic participants the opportunity to test their personal strategies and stimulates them into devising new and more efficient ones. This contributes to the value of the forecasts made by these groups. Finally to conclude I should like to say that whilst I may well have indicated a number of problems in this article, in all the cases I have dealt with, the groups were considered by the majority of their participants to be very interesting; furthermore they always succeeded in clarifying an organisational dynamic. In this sense it can be said that they entirely fulfilled their long-range forecasting task. The method has now been widely tested and has proved to be very effective. References
1. J. Aumann, “Course in game theory”, 6th Unesco seminar on the use of mathematics in the social sciences, Jerusalem. 2. A. C. Decoufle, La pros@&ive (Paris, PUF, 1972). 3. A. Osborn, L’imagination conrtructive (Paris, Dunod, 1965). 4. When acting their roles, participants take part in project negotiations which simulate possible future real-life negotiations. For example, in the regional longrange forecasting groups those who wanted to preserve the countryside and those who wanted more roads would often, through the simulated negotiations, reach a realistic compromise. 5. J. Allard, Aide automat&e aux groupes de prospective, Memoire d’Ingtniorat (Fucam, Mons, Belgium 1973). I think Allard’s method is really only satisfactory for choosing the first scenario to be acted out, and only if one uses the variant which posits the individuals as so many equally weighted criteria.
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