Lost in transition? Comparing strategies of electricity companies in Delhi

Energy Policy 78 (2015) 179–188

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Lost in transition? Comparing strategies of electricity companies in Delhi Laure Criqui a, Marie-Hélène Zérah b,n,1 a Laboratoire Techniques, Université Paris-Est, Territoires et Sociétés (LATTS) – UMR 8134 CNRS, 6 et 8 avenue Blaise Pascal – Cité Descartes, F – 77455 Marne-la-Vallée Cedex 2, France b Institute of Research for Development, UMR 245 CESSMA, Paris, France

H I G H L I G H T S







Energy transition in an emerging cities aims at balancing environmental and social concerns. Utilities have distinct transition paths despite similar privatization and regulation framework. Utilities paths depend on spatial, social, managerial and corporate considerations. Utilities' strategies are shaped by urban challenges rather than by energy policies.

art ic l e i nf o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 28 April 2014 Received in revised form 4 August 2014 Accepted 3 November 2014 Available online 20 December 2014

This paper examines the notion of energy transition when implemented by private utilities. In 2000, the Delhi government privatized electricity distribution to three private distribution companies. Most research was concerned with the impact of privatization on energy reliability, tariff settings and regulation issues. This paper looks at two under-researched themes: the expansion of services to poorer neighborhoods and the rollout of clean energy policies. This focus allows to unpack the materiality of sociotechnical systems, to analyze how energy infrastructures are being technically deployed on the ground and to identify which social approach is used. To detail the specific practices of each company provides a more nuanced and accurate understanding of the reform. In-depth analysis of the three private utilities show that they interpret the reform mandate differently: they use a varied range of technical tools; they respond differently to social concerns in poorer neighborhoods; and they have distinctive internal management choices and corporate cultures. All these four factors can strengthen or undermine the transition towards increased access and clean energy. & 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Energy transition Utilities India Electrification Renewable energy Demand side management

1. Introduction: engaging with the privatization reform In 2000, the State of Delhi reformed its power sector to reverse a situation plagued by distribution and management inefficiencies, frequent load shedding, thefts, dilapidated infrastructures, indebtedness of the governmental electricity agency and dissatisfaction from the consumers (Thakur et al., 2006). Production, transmission and distribution were unbundled and in 2002 licenses were granted to three private distribution companies

n Corresponding author. Present address: IRD France-Nord, 32, avenue Henri Varagnat, 93143 Bondy cedex, France. Fax: þ33 1 48 47 30 88. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (L. Criqui), [email protected] (M.-H. Zérah). 1 Marie-Hélène Zérah was deputed to the Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities, 2, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi 110011, India for this research project.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.11.007 0301-4215/& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

(DISCOMs) belonging to two of the largest Indian conglomerates: BSES Rajdhani Power Limited for the South and South-West zone (BRPL) and BSES Yamuna Power Limited for the Central and East zone (BYPL) from Reliance ADAG, and Tata Power Distribution Delhi Limited in the North (TPDDL) from Tata Group (Fig. 1). They all have an exclusive monopoly on their concession zones, i.e. there is neither competition between them nor free choice for the customers. The whole sector is overseen by the Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC). The driving aim of the reform was to reduce technical and commercial losses. From a purely service delivery point of view, electricity distribution has tremendously improved in Delhi: the DISCOMs have expanded service coverage to officially 99% of Delhi (Fig. 2), and drastically reduced distribution losses (Fig. 3). Service quality has also improved by reducing load shedding and meeting increased peak demand.

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Fig. 1. Concession zones of the DISCOMs (www.bsesdelhi.com) (NDPL (North Delhi Power Limited) changed its name to TPDDL in 2012).

Fig. 2. Number of domestic consumers (L. Criqui based on DISCOMs and DERC annual reports).

have analyzed the realignment of institutions and the tensions between the various stakeholders following the reform. Based on these but adopting a complementary approach, this paper examines the wider notion of energy transition in the sense of shifting towards a more sustainable system combining universal access and low-carbon sources (Bridge et al., 2013: 333), with a focus on the less researched environmental and social issues. As conventional as the reform may appear (Wamukonya, 2003), energy transition, as a sociotechnical and environmental reconfiguration of service delivery (Hodson and Marvin, 2012), is deeply socio-political. Indeed, the geography and territoriality of energy transition need to be unpacked to estimate its actual success, including the way ‘social and political power are organized and exercised over space’ (Bridge et al., 2013: 333). To analyze urban energy systems in that perspective moves beyond the privatization debates, and transcends the fault line between social and technical issues (Rutherford and Coutard, 2014). In Delhi, since the three DISCOMs follow uniform regulatory orders and similar targets to improve service delivery, existing analyses of the reform have not considered spatial variations. Nevertheless, differences emerge in the way utilities deal with their socio-political context and engage on a sustainable transition path. Indeed, debates and tensions arise differently within each zone, and are managed specifically by and within each company. Comparing the DISCOMs' approaches in tackling environmental and social challenges reveals concomitant but different ways of interpreting and engaging with energy transition. In planned Northern cities, a shift to more demand-oriented and environmentally friendly service provision has been observed (Marvin and Guy, 1997). But in emerging cities, environmental issues overlap with the challenge of providing access to basic services (Jaglin and Verdeil, 2013) and the observation of the DISCOMs' logics of action on the ground sheds light on the articulation of these two dimensions. The DISCOMs' shift towards new forms of service delivery is analyzed through this two-fold prism: on the one hand, new policies for renewable energy and energy efficiency imply that the DISCOMs distribute a certain amount of electricity produced from renewable energy and develop demand side management programs (Section 3). On the other hand, the DISCOMs also have to extend service coverage towards informal settlements which presents technical and commercial challenges (Section 4). The fifth section proposes an analytical framework to understand why and how the three DISCOMs follow different transition paths: their strategies are examined with a common grid to weigh up the various factors behind policy choices. We argue that it is by analyzing the spatial, social, political and corporate components of utilities, their networks and clients, that the coexistence of diverging interpretations of an initially uniform reform can be understood. This paper thus shows how utilities are embedded, confronted and deal with the diversity of stakes in cities. The last section concludes by replacing these energy transition practices within larger urban challenges of Delhi as an emerging city.

2. Methodology: looking at a socio-technical transition

Fig. 3. Aggregate technical and commercial losses (L. Criqui based on DISCOMs and DERC annual reports).

Financing arrangements (Agarwal et al., 2003), tariff setting (Bhide et al., 2010) and the regulation structure (Dubash and Rao, 2008) have already been widely debated from an institutional, political economy and governance point of view. These studies

This paper abides by the call for geographical, social and political analyses of energy transition. The embeddedness of network reconfiguration in the urban fabric is tackled as a whole, but sociotechnical systems are also unpacked to analyze precisely how infrastructures are being rolled out on the ground. Moreover, this paper does not consider the DISCOMs – and their corporate strategies – as ‘pre-given’ neutral actors (Marvin and Guy, 1997) and makes a case for studying utilities as critical ‘transition actors’ (Hodson and Marvin, 2012).

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The research methodology is based on fifty semi-structured interviews conducted in Delhi from 2011 to 2013 with staff at various political, managerial and technical positions in the DISCOMs, the regulatory commission, the Delhi government, central administrations and civic movements. Official discourses have been triangulated and backed up with regulatory, governmental and civil documentation and DISCOMs communication materials. Participation to events and demonstrations and field visits of ongoing public works have also been conducted. Opening the black boxes of the DISCOMs, this qualitative information permits to reveal the silent and ignored tensions and practices within utilities. This approach brings additional knowledge to the debated aspects of the reform, offering insights on the critical environmental and social developments for sustainable energy transition in Delhi.

3. Renewable energies and energy efficiency: reluctant strategies of small steps Following a long tradition of supporting renewable energies, national energy policies and the solar mission included in the action plan for climate change put forward their importance for energy security in India. Regarding energy efficiency and conservation, the institutional and legislative framework is more recent and less structured but is pushed strongly by the central government. The implementation of these policies is however carried out at the State level. 3.1. Renewable energy: limited and non-stabilized strategies For electricity distribution, national policies enacted since 2003 mandate the state regulatory commissions to define targets for investments in renewable energy through Renewable Purchase Obligations (RPOs). The central regulatory commission pushes this agenda by producing cost calculations and methodological tools for the definition of feed-in tariffs. However, Delhi has been one of the last Indian states to decide on a mandatory minimum purchase of electricity produced from renewable energy on 1 October 2012. The obligation is 3.40% for renewable energies (including 0.15% for solar energy) with a target of 9% (0.35% respectively for solar) for 2017 (Government of India, 2012).2 The DERC has not been proactive in setting up a clear framework, and the recent energy renewable certificates market is still uncertain. The lack of longterm visibility of these instruments and the high cost of renewable energy partly explain why the DISCOMs' strategies are not stabilized (Zérah and Kohler, 2013). The three DISCOMs focus on solar energy and biomass-based plants while the possibility to buy wind energy is still not considered. Nevertheless our interviews highlight different approaches that could lead to distinct trajectories. The portfolio of options for solar RPOs is limited; therefore DISCOMS have a comparable strategy. They have called for tenders from providers of solar energy and aim at maximizing the potential of rooftop availability in their concession zone for installing photovoltaic systems. In their analysis of the solar potential, the three companies underline that there are technical, financial and regulatory constraints. Technically, the availability of rooftops is constrained since property rights are often shared among owners and their usage can be multiple (water tanks, personal usage, satellite towers). BYPL, whose options are limited due to the high density of East Delhi (Fig. 5), has thus entered agreements with bus sheds, hospitals and car parks to put up solar panels. Thanks to a subsidy program for panels, BYPL thus claims to produce 345 KW 2

http://www.derc.gov.in/regulations/dercregulations/dercregulations.html

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of solar power. Though the rooftop solar panel potential is considered important (Greenpeace, 2013), most stakeholders in the sector, abiding with the DISCOMs, are concerned with the inadequate regulatory framework to make these rooftops available. Further, resident welfare associations have generally expressed their diffidence towards the additional responsibilities it puts on consumers: they argue that the government should start by demonstrating the potential of solar energy via pilot projects on public buildings. An additional issue concerns the connection and measurement of the electricity produced for the grid. TPDDL, Greenpeace and the Delhi government have expressed their preference for a net metering system and ask for a clearer regulatory framework, but the DERC has remained silent on financial mechanisms, such as feedin-tariffs. There are no incentives yet for residents and local entrepreneurs to opt for rooftop solar panels. Likewise, TPDDL produces solar energy through a 1 MW plant3 but still does not know the price that the regulatory commission will apply to it. The wait-and-see stand of the DERC creates a major hurdle. The DISCOMs, members of the Chamber of Commerce, government officials and NGOs explain that the DERC lacks both commitment and expertise. Consequently, faced with weak, highly uncertain and quasi-non mandatory obligations (since penalties are not imposed), the DISCOMs progress at a slow pace. Nevertheless, TPDDL's response to the solar obligation appears to be more positive. This can be explained by the fact that the Tata conglomerate invests strongly in the solar sector, particularly through its subsidiary Tata Power Solar.4 TPDDL's solar plant results from collaborating with Tata Solar Power. This is a corporate win-win situation: the requirement for solar energy is a source of business opportunities for other branches in the group and Delhi is used as a testing ground for the implementation of urban solar projects. TPDDL has also looked for support from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency for feasibility studies on rooftop solar energy. The situation is very different in the Reliance group which lags far behind: Reliance develops a more aggressive discourse against the solar agenda, which according to them, is pushed by vested interests. On the non-solar RPO, the strategies of both conglomerates differ. ‘Waste to Energy’ is an important component of the Delhi government's agenda towards climate change and waste management. Both Reliance companies have signed a power purchase agreement from two ‘waste to energy’ plants in Delhi, but their decision is mostly guided by political considerations. Indeed, BRPL and BYPL have an open conflict with the Delhi government for non-payment of dues to the State generating companies. Buying power from the ‘waste to energy’ plants, which the government exhibits as a successful pioneer project, is an appeasement strategy towards the government. In fact, both BRPL's and BYPL's CEOs mention the low efficiency of the plant and the negative environmental externalities of the technology. On its part, TPDDL favors long term power purchase agreements with third-party biomass producers. BRPL and BYPL also look towards these solutions, but their financial difficulties and their conflicts with the government prevent the shift towards a stabilized long term perspective. Both groups, however, lobby to make the solar and non-solar RPO interchangeable for greater flexibility. Because of the weak commitment from the regulator and the DISCOMs, in particular BRPL, Delhi is considered one of the worst performers in the 3 This plant is located in Keshavpuram in the north of Delhi. According to TDDPL's CEO, it could provide power for 1000 households over 25 years. 4 Other actors interviewed corroborate strongly this relationship. The Greenpeace office in Delhi mentioned that the strategy of Tata Power is to achieve 25% of its production through solar energy by 2025.

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implementation of renewable target (Greenpeace International, Infraline Energy, 2013). A validation of this assessment is the 2014 request by utilities to delay the RPO obligations, which was granted by the regulatory commission. 3.2. Demand side management: outsourcing vs. in-house expertise

that sees it as a reluctance to go beyond its contract requirements and has not been approved by the regulatory commission. This outsourcing strategy through transfers of risks via partnerships is mainly due to the unwillingness to invest in non-core functions, and hampers the DISCOMs' capacity and commitment to develop in-house expertise. On the contrary, TPDDL has engaged in load charge studies and direct negotiations with its large consumers which results in a shift in power demand after they agreed to change their production timings (Zérah and Kohler, 2013). This program is sustained via an active DSM cell which attempts to access international funding and partnerships to develop its activities on its own to compensate for the lack of public support. Despite the differentiated practices and engagements of DISCOMs towards energy transition, the three DISCOMs nonetheless agree that they will not extend their programs without subsidies. Without stronger obligations from the regulator, it is doubtful that they will develop further innovative solutions, especially since their main target is primarily to reduce losses. This brings to the fore the complexity of responding to the twin agendas in emerging countries of expanding services and low carbon energy systems (Jaglin and Verdeil, 2013; Rutherford and Coutard, 2014:4) and the limits of voluntary obligations as compared to strongly binding public policies (Fischlein and Smith, 2013).

In the domain of energy efficiency (EE) and demand side management (DSM),5 the differences among DISCOMs are more visible since the framework for action is even less constraining than in the renewable energy domain (DSM regulations are only at the draft stage). No obligations are imposed on DISCOMs, no budget is allocated for energy conservation measures and no decision is taken regarding the way the DISCOMs' investments will be recovered. As the DERC Chairman argued: ‘we do not need DSM since we are in surplus’ (interview, DERC, December 2012). This stand from the commission, despite the strong benefits that DSM measures could bring in a context of high peak load and in avoiding capital expenditure in the long run, does not create an incentivizing and credible framework. In TPDDL, managers of the DSM cell mention that one of their main challenges is buy-in from the staff and the top management within the company. In BRPL, the manager in charge states that ‘DSM is not a business to earn money but we need to try it’ (interview, BRPL, July 2013) and the company has abandoned almost all initiatives considering the non-policy decisions by the regulator. In the residential sector, the three DISCOMs have had similar policies to incentivize the use of energy efficient appliances. The Compact Fluorescent Lamps scheme for example, implemented under the Clean Development Mechanism, has been pursued by Reliance and Tata only when subsidies were available from 2010 to early 2012, and abandoned when it became a loss making venture. Regarding the shift towards better efficient appliances, TPDDL's scheme has been sustained over a longer period, with a claimed objective of long-term decline in consumption patterns, while BRPL's discourse is to use DSM measures to flatten the demand curve and to shift it during the non-peak hours but to increase overall consumption in the long run. Differentiated strategies can also be explained by the customers' profile. In terms of EE and DSM, one main target is the large consumers segment (industrial, commercial and institutional establishments) since potential efficiency gains are higher and can make an overall difference to the amount of energy consumed. In Delhi, the type of large consumer varies among the three zones. In the central-eastern zone of BYPL, large consumers are few and the main one is the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation; BYPL strategy is consequently limited to discussions with the metro authorities to find purely technical solutions to reduce the load. In the western and southern zones covered by BRPL, the strategy is to develop partnership with reputed Energy Service Companies to offer contractual services with an audit leading to a thorough energy conservation program. However, no contract has been signed yet. BRPL's argument for this slow start is that they are still looking for financial arrangements to sustain this model and that its large consumers are mainly the airport, hospitals and five star hotels: the first two cannot drastically change their consumption pattern while five star hotels are not very concerned with energy efficiency since price is passed on to its consumers. Besides, BRPL managers focus on their core job and prefer to enter partnerships with professionals to externalize other functions such as DSM and EE. This is criticized by the Delhi government

According to the DISCOMs, the deficiencies of urban planning in irregular settlements entail three challenges: an institutional one because of the lack of regulatory framework, a technical one to physically lay down infrastructures in irregularly built-up areas, and a social one to integrate vulnerable customers into the client base. To overcome these, managers and engineers have developed new delivery mechanisms and devices (Criqui, forthcoming).6 Electricity DISCOMs are very often the first utilities to enter unplanned settlements. This primacy combined with informality precludes the pre-existence of any information: how to electrify a house which officially does not exist? First, the DISCOMs have simplified the requirements to apply for a connection: identity documents with a letter from the local elected representative or the resident association attesting residency now replace property

5 EE refers to the optimization of energy systems, buildings and equipment. It focuses on the quality of and standards from the supply side. DSM is concerned with the final consumer and aims at altering consumption practices.

6 Even though population and civil movements are critical of other aspects of the reform and DISCOMs' practices, they generally accept these new sociotechnical solutions because of the improvements in access and quality of service they bring.

4. Electrification of irregular settlements: deliberate expansion, various motives Until 2006–2007, the DISCOMs have focused on rehabilitating the inherited infrastructures. Once losses were stabilized (Fig. 3), they have started to expand their market (Fig. 2). Delhi's master plan distinguishes three main kinds of settlements, with different rights to tenure and services (Kundu, 2004): planned areas account for 25% of Delhi and are regularly serviced, and the unplanned Old City and irregularly built-up settlements represent 75% of the city, i.e. approximately 12 million people. These massive irregular settlements are critical areas for the DISCOMs to expand their activity while reducing electricity thefts. Irregular settlements also do not respect planning and building bye-laws, thus presenting unconventional urban, material and social geographies for extending infrastructure networks (Criqui, forthcoming). To electrify them, utilities have to adapt their practices and engage with the socio-politically sensitive issue of access to basic services for the urban poor. 4.1. Common sociotechnical challenges, instruments and practices

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documents. In order to get closer to populations usually relegated outside the reach of public services and to shorten the time and distance for contractualisation, the DISCOMs have also organized mobile connection camps. On receiving applications, the DISCOMs then have to match each customer with the premises to be connected despite the absence of postal address. Therefore, they have created a serial numbering system of buildings and streets, associated with the customer and meter numbers, akin to an informal but effective addressing system. Once formalized the relations with their clients, the DISCOMs could start laying down new infrastructures and technically regularize connections. To do so, they use specific anti-theft devices in order to make hooking7 more difficult and dangerous (Banerjee and Pargal, 2014). The main technological innovation is the High Voltage Distribution System (HVDS): a small transformer directly set up on poles converts high-tension to low-tension for residential connection. This device is instrumental in reducing both commercial and technical losses while electrifying irregular areas: it helps in reducing theft, it requires less space to be deployed, and it improves service quality. HVDS has eased up field engineers' work so much they do not imagine electrifying without it anymore. Nonetheless, security norms impose a 1.2 m safety-distance between high-tension lines and houses. In dense and densifying irregular neighborhoods, it has become difficult to place HVDS transformers. Once again, field engineers have come up with new solutions: they install the transformers on arms at distance from the poles, or they use insulated and rigidified Low Tension-Aerial Bunched Cables for narrow lanes. Besides, 2.5 million new generation electricity meters have been installed in the BRPL and BYPL zones and 1 million in the TPDDL zone. Old metering devices were changed, faulty ones checked, and all have been upgraded and secured from fraud. The DISCOMs also tackled the population's concerns with corruption due to human intervention in meter reading and billing collection by installing automated meterreading and computerized billing systems. Among the 20 DISCOMs' professionals interviewed on the issue, all unanimously agree that there are no technical constraints they cannot overcome. Civil movements have occasionally complained about fastrunning meters; this dispute is however mainly fueled by organized residents from planned areas rather than in irregular settlements where the population accepts meters as a sign of modern access to the network (Pflieger and Matthieussent, 2008). Inhabitants do however keep on illegally hooking, which means that physical danger or difficulty is not a deterrent. The challenge therefore is not so much technical but social and requires actions of ‘soft’ power for mindset and behavioral changes and commercial incentives to reduce ‘pirate practices’ (Banerjee and Pargal, 2014). The issue has been to improve billing efficiency by capturing and transforming informal practices into a regular, conventional and individualized consumer base and by reducing the risk of payment defaults. For that purpose, the DISCOMs have created client services: multiplication of easy payment facilities, simplification of invoices, installments for paying bills, opening of 24/7 call centers for complaints, franchisee systems for collective payment, etc. The DISCOMs have worked at suppressing all the procedural and administrative obstacles to payment, at increasing people's responsibility as well as their own accountability following international recommendations. Engineers and managers acknowledge that these new client relations and social arrangements are more efficient at reducing commercial losses than antitheft raids or disconnections. 7 Hooking is a common practice where a wire with a metal hook is thrown on the electricity network.

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Thanks to these arrangements and devices, the DISCOMs have managed to muddle through spatially and socially unconventional areas, adapting their work practices to the local geographies of the electric network in irregular settlements (Criqui, forthcoming). A virtuous circle of improved quality slowly appears: better accountability and trust increase willingness in the population to pay, thus creating revenue for utilities so that they can improve their technical and commercial services (Caseley, 2006). The costs of new devices and increased accountability are progressively overcome by reduced fraud and increased bill collection: for example, the DISCOMs estimate that HVDS is profitable within three years. It is therefore in their interest to service informal settlements, whatever technical and social challenges they may face. Far from a cherry-picking strategy, the sector's reform has indeed favored the extension of the electrical network to unconventional areas. 4.2. Specific strategies based on thematic priorities These on-the-ground interventions can appear to be neutral and uniform solutions. However, each DISCOM has tackled the question of electrification through a specific lens of interpretation. Their strategies actually reveal broader socio-political values and cognitive factors in managing urban services than strictly technical infrastructure extension. The DISCOMs' communication strategies illustrate particularly well diverging understandings, and shed light on the political choices at stake in servicing Delhi (Fig. 4). The monthly newsletters of each company reveal mindsets and perceptions: progressively, the main issues each DISCOM addresses may shape and reciprocally be influenced by the population's preoccupations. Discourses create an image, publicized by the media (Caseley, 2006). The alignment of priorities and expectations creates a cognitive path-dependency, and imposes a dominating dimension of energy choices: social responsibility and accountability, economic strategy and financial defensiveness or technical challenge articulated with environmental concerns. The DISCOMs are dependent on the tariffs set by the DERC, based on their revenue requirements and capital expenditure. As argued repeatedly by BRPL, around 80% of a DISCOM's cost comes from power purchase cost, which has steadily increased over the years. Through its newsletters, public statements and in the interviews, BRPL is defensive, more concerned with financial issues, and reluctant to take any financial risk. Lobbying for tariff increases, complaining about theft and repressing payment by

Fig. 4. Items per theme in DISCOMs' consumer newsletters (L. Criqui, sources: BRPL, BYPL, TPDDL's newsletters) (Based on 21 BRPL's, 17 BYPL's and 32 TPDDL's one-page newsletters from January 2011 to December 2013, taking into account the headlines of the 3–5 main articles)

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defaulters, the company has a very strong stance against all kinds of non- or insufficient payments. BRPL presents itself as a victim of the DERC for not allowing tariff hikes on the one hand, and of pirates on the other hand. The company's stand is that it is not its fault if service does not improve enough, and there is no real incentive to improve performance or take innovative action towards informal settlements since they are mainly considered defaultpayers: ‘I am private company, I cannot change the world; and I am only a retailer: as per the tariff system, whatever expenditure is done, and whatever profit I make, my profits are regulated… if I make more money, it reduces the tariff for the next year. If I make expenditure, it goes on the tariff. Whatever money I collect, it goes to the consumers. No profit is retained by any DISCOM. DISCOM is only like a retail shop, we do not have control over prices. And we depend on other states for generating power. So if their rates go up, I cannot do anything.’ (Interview, BRPL, 22/08/2013) Apart from anti-theft devices, research and development for technical innovations has remained quite limited considering the window of opportunity privatization usually opens (Dyner and Larsen, 2001). As for energy efficiency options, to elaborate technically and environmentally sound and sustainable strategy requires more pro-active means. Until now, BYPL mainly is involved into research-and-development specifically directed at intervening in dense irregular settlements. With the previous CEO's8 commitment for partnerships with technology institutes and internal innovation, the company has developed intelligent monitoring systems for distribution sub-stations, solar water pumps, and has initiated research for pre-assembled transformers for easy installation and retrofitting in dense areas. Last, TPDDL is today the only company having a Corporate Social Responsibility cell, directly accountable to the CEO, and a ‘special consumer group’ was created in 2005. TPDDL's backbone strategy in extending services to informal settlements has been philanthropic and social intervention. Within informal areas, the CSR team organizes energy clubs in schools, women's literacy classes, professional training centers, life-insurance schemes, medical services, drug rehabilitation camps etc. They work either in partnership with NGOs or hire local residents as intermediaries. These actions are conducted in a double perspective: first, this involvement is a means to redistribute the firms' profits to society – a very entrenched belief and course of action in the Tata group; second, it is part of a ‘social engineering’ policy to enhance ability and willingness to pay. TPDDL's staff is proud of its societal involvement, the beneficiaries acknowledge the increased facilities provided, and in Delhi, TPDDL is known for its involvement towards social action, revealed though media, public statements from civil society movements, and even declarations from government officials. In comparison, BRPL and BYPL's information campaigns on safety and efficiency of energy-use, activities in schools and tree-planting campaigns, are not structured enough to be considered a social responsibility strategy. Thus, there are different ways of dealing with a common urban challenge – informal urbanization – in the context of a uniform governmental reform that shed light on the different directions given to transition and reflect the multiple social, economic and political facets of electricity networks (Rutherford and Coutard, 2014). Likewise, utilities cannot be analyzed solely as profit-driven entities (Hodson and Marvin, 2012): they articulate competing social, technical and economic considerations to develop their business in different ways at different times. Therefore, the meanings they carry are not politically neutral and depend on 8

BYPL's CEO has changed over summer 2013.

some broader sociopolitical stakes that need to be highlighted. In other words, the will and ability to transform the opportunity of the privatization reform into a sustainable environmental and social transition is neither automatic nor independent from the urban context it is embedded in.

5. Discussion: different pressures and adaptation capacities Since the DISCOMs act within the same regulatory framework and use similar sociotechnical solutions, how can we explain their specific socio-political stances? Why does each company justify, defend or lobby for some issues that the others do not endorse? To answer these questions, the urban embeddedness of electricity networks must be explored: the context DISCOMs work in is physical, but also social, political and corporate. 5.1. Spatial constraints: characteristics of the concession zones The co-existence of different strategies reveals that electricity transitions are indeed geographically constituted (Bridge et al., 2013). More precisely in Delhi, several spatial characteristics have undoubtedly influenced the DISCOMs' strategies to translate the reform framework into action plans. The first difference is the size of their concession zones: BYPL's central, North-East and East area is half the size of TPDDL's North and North-West areas or BRPL's West, South-West and South (Fig. 1). Delhi's Western fringes are not entirely urbanized and see declining densities going outwards. BRPL's and TPDDL's forthcoming extension thus remains in lengthening their network to remote areas, through conventional techniques of cable laying. BYPL's area on the contrary is a dense, congested, crowded and completely urbanized area (Fig. 5) engulfed in the urban agglomeration that spreads over Delhi State's frontier to the East. The whole area already being covered by the network, the challenge is not to extend it but to intensify its capacity, which entails several difficulties for BYPL:  Infrastructures have to be deployed in dense built-up areas, with no preserved public space for installing transformers, poles and lines, and frequent encroachments of buildings on infrastructures creating safety hazards;  Population and use of electrical appliances keep growing, so the demand increases exponentially for a given physical network. The load must be enhanced to maintain service quality and satisfy the demand, while the company needs more efficient devices;  Illegal hooking from users in the neighboring State of Uttar Pradesh affects the network's technical and financial equilibrium. BYPL cannot protect its network across the border: administratively, it is out of the DERC's jurisdiction, and the company cannot install equipment further East. Therefore, BYPL pulls wires from its existing transformers on Delhi's territory to connect some clients beyond its concession zone, increasing again pressure on the network.  Congested and intense land use, as well as continuous vertical growth by additional floor building limits the potential for rooftop solar energy. All these geographical and spatial factors can thus explain why and how BYPL engages more in a technical transition than its counterparts, looking for technological devices to increase the efficiency of infrastructures rather than the conventional expansion of its network.

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Fig. 5. No of inhabitants per km² (Census of India 2011, Provisional population totals, NCT of Delhi).

5.2. Social demands: the consumer-base Though all the concession zones are a mix of neighborhoods representative of Delhi's fragmented landscape (Dupont, 2004), some key characteristics influence the composition of consumer bases:  The most deprived districts and the resettlement colonies which house evicted slum-dwellers are mainly in the North and North-West of Delhi (Baud et al., 2008). Built by public authorities, the latter have a regular layout and tenure security. Consequently, there are no legal, physical, or technical difficulties to lay infrastructures. However, the population is mainly from the economically-weaker section; according to TPDDL, it represents 10% of its customer base. The network can technically be extended easily and safely, but the challenge is commercial: without intervention to increase the willingness and ability to pay of these clients, the company would surely face some high theft and non-payment levels. The corporate social responsibility strategy thus targets the urban poor to convert them into regular-paying customers.

 The Delhi South and South-West zones are socially contrasted. On the one hand, the upper and middle-classes live in South Delhi and peripheral Corporate Group Housing Societies. In these neighborhoods, bourgeois environmentalists (Baviskar, 2003) are strongly mobilized on tariff issues (Zérah and Kohler, 2013), and have a very critical stance towards the extension of services to ‘illegal’ areas considered an unbearable burden for the network (Baviskar, 2003). On the other hand, unauthorized colonies, legally acquired from agricultural owners but informally divided and built-up, are widespread on the southwestern fringe (Zimmer, 2012), and constitute ‘high-theft prone areas’. BRPL's ‘world-class consumer’ discourse, condemning thefts and the regulator, could emerge from the tension between irregular consumers and bourgeois environmentalists: to please the ‘honest-paying consumers’, BRPL neglects and puts the blame on poorer neighborhoods and argues its hands are tight by the regulator that does not increase tariffs hence hampering investment.  East Delhi tends to be more homogenous: its core is made of the unauthorized colonies regularized in 1977 (Bhan, 2013), hosting mostly a low to middle-income population. In the Old

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City as well, low-income population prevails (Dupont, 2004) and the mixed land-use favors the presence of petty commercial and industrial consumers with steady and mid-range consumption patterns. As per BYPL's engineers, demand is quite regular and balanced, and they can apply average load estimations with certainty to plan service provision. As to the non-residential demand, the distribution of large consumers, more concerned with their energy bills, varies strongly. They are concentrated in the TPDDL zone and are more responsive to energy conservation discourse and restructuring their industrial production process. In the West and South-West of Delhi, large consumers are mostly commercial and institutional establishments which are more reluctant to change their consumption practices. In the Central-Eastern zone, the lower presence of large consumers undermines rapid gains in energy conservation and change in uses. Combined with the spatial characteristics, the social composition of the customer bases thus reinforces specific tensions and challenges for the DISCOMs, putting on their agenda particular economic, technical or social priorities. 5.3. Internal strategies: corporate governance and management The way each DISCOM deals with these socio-spatial pressures depends also on organizational cultures and firm management techniques that shape a company's vision, performance and functioning. The difference between the Tata and Reliance cultures as to their involvement with human challenges is striking. At privatization, TPDDL engaged in an active human resource management strategy to drive a performance shift (Bhatnagar and Saini, 2007). Both internally and externally, the company has a very positive discourse and incentive system for empowerment and responsibility, taking pride in the ‘people factor’, promoting professional training and career management, encouraging innovative practices and rewarding efficient professionals (Bhatnagar and Saini, 2007). The Tata Review's special issue for TPDDL's tenth anniversary focuses on the human dimension of the reform and is directed towards its own employees (Vemuri, 2012). Internally, the staff is prompted to volunteer for social, cultural and environmental actions, which are actively encouraged by both the corporate social responsibility and the demand-side management cells. They work at changing opinions and practices on the importance of non-technical non-financial issues: for instance, internal positive discrimination recruitment program was implemented in 2012, and among the ‘Tata values’ TPDDL's employees keep referring to is the commitment of the group towards climate change… In that sense, transition towards more socially and environmentally sound practices for TPDDL has happened through internal restructuration, spread of philanthropic values and change in professional and cultural commitment. In BRPL, in the absence of a dedicated strategy to tackle environmental or social issues, ‘business as usual’ prevails in developing the electricity network. Despite privatization, little incentives exist within the firm to change individual opinions, routine practices and more broadly speaking, the company's strategy to engage for new challenges. Interviews9 revealed a discourse that echoes the bourgeois environmentalist positions against irregular settlements: BRPL's engineers and managers, themselves residents of planned colonies and ‘honest-paying consumers’, condemn the infringement informal urbanization represents for 9 Six interviews were conducted with directors and managers on their professional practices, which drifted to more personal opinions on urban development issues and informality in Delhi.

the ‘modernization of Delhi’. Consequently, they consider the electrification of irregular settlements a burden for the proper functioning of the network, imposed by public authorities. Besides, the only comprehensive management reform has been to reduce human intervention in meter manipulation with new technologies, centralization and automation. This ‘management’ change has been implemented to reduce corruption but also, according to some engineers of the firm, to reduce costs and the ‘time-consuming’ complaint management. The reluctance of engineers and managers to engage with social issues is not compensated by the company's values or strategy for change. Personal opinions and the lack of professional injunctions permeate and reinforce the company's position at the political level as to its financially strained situation: conventional and defensive discourses and approaches prevail and prevent to tackle the issues of universal access or energy efficiency in a strategic way. Likewise, BYPL has not had a dedicated human management strategy: though there exist professional training and regular meetings are held between the DISCOM and the population, BYPL's staff does not have much to say on these relations. The Reliance companies have not built a strong identity articulated around a strategic vision. Contrary to TPDDL which has worked specifically at integrating the former public employees and at getting their adhesion to a corporate project, BRPL is a: ‘Hybrid organization with hybrid cultures and hybrid expectations.’ (Interview, BRPL, 27/04/2013) 5.4. Group embeddedness: financial and pro-active positioning Beyond specific factors, the DISCOMs' choices are not totally isolated from the culture of the group they belong to and their financial situation. TPDDL's commitment to engage in a process of long term transition of the energy sector is stronger. Even though its action towards DSM and renewables is still marginal, the company is willing to conduct experiments that go beyond the core job of providing good quality electricity. Some group characteristics are influential here. First, the financially sound Tata Power Company has provided financial support to TPDDL's experiments even though, in one of the interviews, its CEO stated that the support of the group would not be sustained much longer. Second, the Tata group's wide portfolio in the energy sector, including investments in solar power, provides opportunities for synergies within the group and experimentations. Third, the group provides career opportunities for its employees and chairmen10 and is sensitive to building a strong organizational culture and a professional identity. These factors clearly reinforce the very positive image of the DISCOM, an image also inherited from the long-lasting involvement of the Tata group in India's economic development history, and its values of philanthropic and compensatory social action to redistribute wealth to the society (Krichewsky, 2012). The importance of group belonging is symptomatically exemplified by the recent change of name of the company from NDPL to TPDDL to ‘cash in’ on the image of Tata. Reliance ADAG appears as a more fragile group. The strong exposure to debt of its parent company has a negative impact on BRPL and BYPL's operations and capital expenditure capacity. Further, it cannot offer an array of technologies and a pool of expertise that enable a sustainable commitment towards long-term and slow changes. With BRPL and BYPL having no financial back up, their main objective is to maximize their profits, which appears extremely difficult in a context where tariffs are maintained 10 TPDDL's current chairman comes from the Tata group while both BYPL's and BRPL's chairmen have been hired from outside.

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low. Even though prices are low compared to other cities, there is a debate as whether the price can be further reduced to avoid protests and on the level of investments required to expand the services (Kasturi, 2014).11 The two Reliance DISCOMs are thus in a more fragile financial situation than TPDDL, and Reliance ADAG refuses to invest more in its DISCOMs. This apparently strained situation leads to a narrower vision of the sector within the Reliance DISCOMs and reluctance to take financial risks: while TPDDL looks for international funding, the Reliance companies decide not to follow up on some experiments and initiatives unless previously authorized by the DERC and included into tariff calculations. Differences are striking as to energy conservation measures: TPDDL builds in-house data and expertise, while the Reliance companies externalize these functions. Likewise, investment in social and philanthropic actions from TPDDL also illustrates the larger financial room for maneuver or the longer-term calculations from the Tata DISCOM. As the manager from BRPL for the innovation cell summarizes: ‘Reliance lacks institutional building while there is a clearer long term business environment with Tata.’ (Interview, BRPL, 23/07/ 2013) 5.5. Policy implications: first hints and evidences To estimate the impact of such choices requires long-term evaluation, which is in Delhi's case difficult considering divergences have appeared from 2006 to 2007 only. Nevertheless, developments in 2013–2014 point towards an acknowledgement that utilities perform differently. First, tension has mounted between the Reliance companies and the government over unpaid dues from the DISCOMs to the public transmission company claimed by the government on the one hand, and alleged arrears from municipalities asked by the DISCOMs on the other. Besides, an ongoing tussle concerns the truthfulness of the DISCOMs' accounts and their claim to regular losses, especially in the case of Reliance ADAG (Kasturi, 2014). This quarrel escalated between December 2013 and February 2014 when the government asked the regulator to revoke the Reliance licenses and turned towards TPDDL to take over. In early 2014, the new government also instigated an audit of the three DISCOMs, whose results shall inform on a situation where there is no clarity as to whether this reform is costly or profitable for the distribution companies.12 The first conclusions tend to indicate that lower investments from the Reliance DISCOMs have led to a deterioration of power quality while investments by TPDDL have permitted to reduce breakdowns.13 Besides, as disputable such an indicator may be, an SMS number now exists to receive complaints on load shedding. From January to April 2014, the government has received 498 SMS against BRPL, 367 against BYPL and only 178 against TPDDL; this implies either that TPDDL performs better or that Delhiites accept better its shortcomings, but indicates in any case that consumers are more satisfied from TPDDL's service. 11 A thorough analysis of the structure of the power purchase agreements would be necessary to understand the differences between the cost structures of the three DISCOMs. All interviews point to the fact that the average loss per unit produced is high for BRPL while this is not the case for TDDPL. underlines the potential gains of better supply policies by the DISCOMs that could translate into lower prices. 12 This lack of trust between the government, the DISCOMS and the users, who have faced regular tariff hikes, is one of the important debates in Delhi. It is covered extensively in the press (for a good follow up, one can consult: http://www.live mint.com/Search/Link/Keyword/delhi%20power). 13 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-01-29/news/46783733_ 1_tata-power-delhi-distribution-bses-companies-three-discoms

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These recent trends indicate two important potential changes: stakeholders move from an ideological position in favor or against privatization and are concerned with the performance of the companies with an acknowledgement that they can vary; consequently, a close scrutiny of these performances could lead the Delhi government to revise the content of the reform, either by revising the licenses attribution or permit free choice of the utility as civil movements are asking for.14

6. Conclusion: does it make a difference for energy transition? The electricity privatization reform conducted ten years ago in Delhi has produced some contrasting results. Reform is evenly successful as to improved access to electricity in Delhi, the DISCOMs resort to similar sociotechnical devices and the political economy of the sector is debated as a whole. But on second thoughts, sociopolitical positioning and on the ground practices appear to be shaped by the materiality of space, social pressures, as well as corporate governance and management techniques. Different strategies result from the way each utility articulates all these tensions: taking profiles to their caricatured extremes, we observe a mainly conventional economic ‘business as usual’ approach for BRPL, a particularly physically complex situation which focuses BYPL's attention on technical challenges, a more human and socially oriented perspective in TPDDL. The breakdown of various key factors sheds light on how utility firms engage but also shape their own particular transition trajectories that depart from the uniform privatization models. Until now, the active and decisive role of utility firms has been largely ignored: the DISCOMS are considered neutral intermediaries executing political orders while trying to maximize their profits. But an analytical lens focused on privatization is not sufficient to explain the contrasted and tense electrical landscape in Delhi today. Accounts for the DISCOMs' room to maneuver in moving from a basic single reform to possible sustainable transitions, through a political and sociotechnical reconfiguration of the network and the firm, are missing. To engage with a meaningful sustainable energy transition, be it for energy efficiency and/or universal access, supposes the adoption of measures to tackle the sociopolitical stakes of the energy sector. Indeed, different possible paths to transition emerge: a predominantly market-oriented, technological or social approach of the electricity network. In emerging cities where demands for extended quality service networks collide with the green agenda, the choices utilities make impact the acceptability of change, and consequently condition the long-term sustainability of the transition. The reality of these various trajectories highlights the importance of taking into account urban diversity when setting up a policy reform such as energy sector privatization. Utilities have to deal with and adapt to specific spatial and social geographies, in contrast to conventional uniform public policies that usually overlook local implementation contexts. This suggests more generally the need for policymakers in the energy sector to take into account the socially and politically sensitive issues and the multidimensional specificities of urban contexts which will largely influence the paths and options chosen in the implementation phase of a reform towards transition. Last but not least, the embeddedness of the DISCOMs' strategies in public policies also has to be studied. Policy orientations indeed influence the choices and decisions taken by private energy system actors. What is considered a desirable objective for the electricity network at a political level can take over considerations 14 In that case, the shift of clients from Reliance to Tata utilities is highly possible, similarly as the trend observed in Mumbai.

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for sustainability, performance or technical feasibility… As a matter of fact, in Delhi's case, the regularization and servicing of unauthorized colonies has been one of the main urban development policies conducted by the government in the past decade. The political importance of increasing access to basic services clearly trumps the weak environmental agenda: low carbon energy concerns are a recent added feature to the sector reform, and climate change and energy transition are not a constituency for change. The structure of incentives emerging from the urban and energy governance systems has until now favored a social rather than an environmental energy transition. Therefore, all in all, the alignment of utilities' business expansion strategies with the Delhi government's urban agenda for regularization has facilitated the process of electrification. In that sense, urban public policies in emerging cities, beyond privatization reform and through indirect parallel orientation-setting, can and do shape utilities' strategy shifts towards social objectives that go beyond economic considerations, and follow political priorities in implementing energy transition.

Acknowledgment We thank the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. The research was conducted during the deputation of M-H. Zérah to the Centre de Sciences Humaines, New Delhi where L. Criqui was also hosted during her Ph.D. field work. This research was funded by the French National Research Agency, as part of the TERMOS (Energy Transitions in Metropolitan Regions of the South) programme.

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