Managing Workplace Conflict in the United States and Hong Kong

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes Vol. 85, No. 2, July, pp. 360–381, 2001 doi:10.1006/obhd.2000.2944, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on

Managing Workplace Conflict in the United States and Hong Kong Catherine H. Tinsley Georgetown University

and Jeanne M. Brett Northwestern University

We propose that managers have norms (standards of appropriate behavior) for resolving conflict, that these norms are culturally based, and that they explain cultural differences in conflict management outcomes. We confirm that the traditionally American norms of discussing parties’ interests and synthesizing multiple issues were exhibited more strongly by American managers than by their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts. In addition, we confirm that the traditionally Chinese norms of concern for collective interests and concern for authority appeared more strongly among Hong Kong Chinese managers than among their American counterparts. American managers were more likely than Hong Kong Chinese managers, to resolve a greater number of issues and reach more integrative outcomes, while Hong Kong Chinese managers were more likely to involve higher management in conflict resolution. Culture had a significant effect on whether parties selected an integrative outcome rather than an outcome that involved distribution, compromise, higher management, or no resolution at all. Conflict norms explained the cultural differences that existed between reaching an integrative outcome and reaching an outcome involving distribution, compromise, or higher management; however, conflict norms did not

This research was funded in part by a grant from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong, and in part by a grant from the Dispute Resolution Research Center, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208. Address correspondence and reprint requests to Catherine H. Tinsley, The McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. E-mail: [email protected]. 360 0749-5978/01 $35.00 Copyright 䉷 2001 by Academic Press All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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fully explain the cultural differences that existed between reaching an integrative outcome and reaching no resolution. 䉷 2001 Academic Press

When a Western manager in a U.S.–Chinese joint venture asked a Chinese peer manager for some routine data, he received an equivocal response. The Western manager did not pursue the matter, assuming that he and the Chinese manager would discuss the data sometime in the future. A few days later, the president of the joint venture called the Western manager into his office and informed him that his recent request for data was denied. The Western manager was dumbfounded: Why had the president gotten involved in this relatively trivial matter? The Western manager felt that the president’s involvement reflected badly on his and his peer’s ability to manage conflict. His peer, on the other hand, believed that by involving the president in the matter, she was just following protocol. This story, originally told by Jehn (1998) and more recently embellished by Brett (2001), illustrates how norms can affect conflict outcomes. While the Western manager thought the conflict should be resolved through some type of negotiated agreement between peers, his Chinese counterpart thought the outcome should be whatever the boss dictated. Norms are standards for how people should behave (Katz & Kahn, 1966; McGrath, 1984), which arise from common experience in social settings (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). Evidently, the Western and Chinese managers in the example held very different norms for managing conflict. The purpose of this study is to test hypotheses about the cultural basis of conflict management norms and to consider how such cultural norms might lead to different conflict outcomes. Culture can be defined as the unique character of a social group with respect to behaviors, institutions, values, norms, and assumptions (Lytle, Brett, Barsness, Tinsley, & Janssens, 1995). Culture generates variance on norms, which individuals learn through socialization, modeling, and reinforcement by their social groups (Newcomb, 1943). Because national culture provides a common legal and institutional context that socializes, sanctions, and rewards conformity, norms can be expected to vary according to national culture. Our study tests the presumption that because people from different cultures hold different conflict management norms, they reach different outcomes when attempting to manage conflict. We begin with an overview of various outcomes that can result when parties attempt to manage workplace conflict. We then identify norms that may account for differences in these outcomes and generate hypotheses about how those norms might differ between Hong Kong Chinese and American cultures. We chose to focus on Hong Kong Chinese and American managers because we expected these groups to display variance on conflict norms. Based on this expected variance, we hypothesize that certain outcomes will occur more frequently when American managers engage in conflict resolution and that other

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outcomes will occur more frequently when Hong Kong Chinese managers engage in conflict resolution. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for conflict management theory and practice.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT OUTCOMES

Conflict may be managed by (1) joint decision making; (2) third-party decision making; or (3) separate action, including unilateral behaviors such as retreat, withdrawal, and tacit coordination (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Thus, when parties confront their conflict by negotiating face-to-face with the goal of reaching a joint decision, the outcome can be a mutual agreement, a decision to involve a third party, or no agreement at all, which frees parties to take separate action. For example, in an organizational setting, parties may resolve some conflict issues through face-to-face discussion, but turn to a third party for assistance in resolving one or more other issues or even leave some issues unresolved. When managers confront a conflict, they typically generate one of five outcomes, which are described below. The first three outcomes can result when parties reach agreement on an issue: (1) Integrative outcomes occur when the parties create value or expand the potential benefit to both parties (Follett, 1940; Lax & Sebenius, 1986), typically by focusing on their underlying interests (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991) and either bridging these interests or trading priorities (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Interests are the needs, concerns, or fears a party wishes to satisfy during the discussion (Ury et al., 1988). (2) Distributive outcomes occur when the value that already exists is divided between two parties (Walton & McKersie, 1965; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). In this study we define distributive outcomes as the asymmetrical distribution of resources. (3) Compromise outcomes occur when parties agree to distribute resources in relatively equal portions. Compromise outcomes are a special type of distributive outcome. Two outcomes typically result when parties are unable to reach agreement on an issue: (4) Going to higher management is the outcome that occurs when parties ask a third party to intervene to resolve an issue. (5) No resolution is the outcome that occurs when parties leave an issue unresolved, either by “lumping it,” that is, accepting the situation (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988), or by engaging in unilateral action (Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994). When a conflict involves multiple issues, managers may choose to resolve one issue with one outcome and another issue with a different outcome. We propose that different conflict norms will be associated with different conflict outcomes. Because norms guide behavior (Katz & Kahn, 1966), people will tend to reach outcomes that reflect their own normative ideas about the appropriate ways to resolve conflict. Moreover, because norms are at least in part culturally derived, we expect that when cultural profiles predict that conflict management norms should be distinctly different, the outcomes of conflict management will reflect similarities within cultures and differences between cultures.

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT NORMS

Culture is the unique character of a social group (Deutsch, 1973). It is reflected in the cognitive structures of individuals (e.g., members’ norms and values) and in the society’s institutions (e.g., legal, social, and economic structures) (Lytle et al., 1995). Because norms are an element of culture, norms for conflict management should vary consistently with other characteristics of a culture. In this section we begin by discussing three cultural characteristics that are more strongly endorsed by American culture than by Hong Kong Chinese culture: self-direction, egalitarianism, and openness to change (Schwartz, 1994). Next, we explain how these elements of culture allow us to predict cultural differences in four norms for conflict management: discussing interests, synthesizing multiple issues, concern for authority, and concern for collective interests. We chose these norms because they represent different approaches to conflict management and because we believed that American and Hong Kong Chinese cultures would place differential emphasis on them. Elements of Culture American culture is more individualistic, or self-directed, than Hong Kong Chinese culture, which is more collective, or other-directed, than American culture (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). An individualistic culture emphasizes expediency (Schwartz, 1994), autonomy over relationships (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and self goals over collective goals (Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). In an individualistic culture, social identity is a function of individual accomplishment. By contrast, members of collectivist cultures tend to conceptualize themselves not as autonomous units, but as actors in relation to others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). Because the collective serves as a basis for social identity, it is rational for members of collectivist cultures to defer to the interests and survival of the collective. Thus, in collectivist societies, individuals are motivated to safeguard the interests of their collective, to maintain social identity, and to avoid social ostracism. American culture is egalitarian in nature, while Hong Kong Chinese culture is hierarchical (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). In egalitarian cultures, decision making is decentralized rather than centralized and leadership is participatory rather than autocratic (Hofstede, 1980). By contrast, in hierarchical cultures, social status is highly differentiated and implies social power such that social inferiors are expected to defer to the interests of social superiors (Leung, 1997). Social inequalities are less distinct and less acceptable in egalitarian cultures than in hierarchical cultures (Haire, Ghiselli, & Porter, 1966). American culture also is more open to change than Hong Kong Chinese culture, which conforms more to tradition (Schwartz, 1994). Openness to change implies a certain acceptance of new structures or systems; in cultures such as the United States, change is viewed as an opportunity. Cultures like Hong Kong Chinese culture that are less open to change rely on the status quo. Change is viewed as a threat to the stability of the social structure.

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Conflict Management Norms Treatises on conflict management suggest that negotiators should focus on interests, or the concerns and needs that underlie parties’ positions (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988). The American emphasis on self-direction and personal goals seems consistent with a norm that favors discussing parties’ interests in a conflict situation. The norm of discussing parties’ interests refers to the appropriateness of talking about one’s own needs and asking about the needs of others. Egalitarianism may also support this norm because egalitarian values encourage and legitimate the free expression of information about all participants’ needs and concerns. By contrast, because the social divisions of a hierarchical culture imply that differences are resolved based on social status rather than on both parties’ interests, it may be inappropriate for low-status parties to express their underlying interests. Because selfdirection and egalitarianism are more characteristic of American culture than of Hong Kong Chinese culture, discussion of parties’ interests should be more normative among American than among Hong Kong Chinese managers. Research on integrative negotiations emphasizes the importance of identifying multiple issues that negotiators can trade off or synthesize to create value (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). The emphasis of American culture on selfdirection and egalitarianism seems consistent with a norm for synthesizing multiple issues, or dealing with multiple issues in conflict simultaneously through strategies such as bundling, making trade-offs, or bridging. The strong self-interest characteristic of members of individualistic cultures should facilitate the prioritizing of issues and the search for trade-offs that maximize this self-interest. In addition, the expediency of individualistic cultures suggests that managers from these cultures will be motivated to consider means of resolving multiple issues at once. The free expression of information characteristic of egalitarian cultures is also consistent with synthesizing multiple issues because this norm encourages parties to share information equally. While the self-direction and egalitarianism of American culture support a norm for synthesizing multiple issues, several characteristics of Hong Kong Chinese culture clash with this norm. Members of hierarchical cultures tend to defer to those of higher status and authority (Leung, 1997; Tinsley, 1997; Weldon, Jehn, Doucet, Chen, & Wang, 1995; Yang, 1993), and thus may be reluctant to overstep their own authority. Because the process of synthesizing issues often leads to creative or novel outcomes that break new ground, this norm might be beyond the authority of managers in hierarchical cultures. Members of tradition-bound cultures may also be reluctant to take the risk of offering creative trade-offs because of loss of status that might result from failure. The hierarchy and tradition of the Chinese culture suggest that synthesizing multiple issues will be less normative for Chinese than American managers. Hierarchy can be viewed as a structural mechanism for managing conflict in organizations (Brett & Rognes, 1986). The hierarchical nature of the Hong Kong Chinese culture would seem to make concern for authority especially

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normative. Focusing on authorities’ concerns refers to the perceived appropriateness of involving higher level third parties in the conflict. Because members of hierarchical societies typically pay great deference to those of higher status (Leung, 1997; Yang, 1993), they may be fearful of making decisions that do not incorporate the interests of higher status societal members. For this reason, a manager in a hierarchical society may involve an authority figure in a conflict in order to gain power by association over the outcome. Parties might also draw an influential third party into a conflict with the goal of saving face: By deferring a decision to a superior, both parties avoid the need to make concessions. This approach to the management of conflict not only respects status distinctions but also minimizes social friction (Leung, 1997, Tinsley, 1997), another value that would be important in a collective culture such as Hong Kong. Regardless of the motivation, the need to incorporate authority concerns in conflict management is likely to be more normative in Hong Kong than in the United States. Treatises on the Chinese negotiating style emphasize the importance of collective interests to members of this cultural group (Fang, 1999). Strikingly, there is no mention of collective interests in such influential American negotiation books as Getting to Yes (Fisher et al., 1991); the emphasis remains exclusively on the individual interests of the parties at the table. The collectivist, other-directed character of Chinese culture seems consistent with a norm of attending to the needs of the broader collective. Specifically, a norm of concern for collective interests refers to the appropriateness of taking into account the needs or concerns of a collective more broadly defined than the two parties in conflict. In an organizational setting, this may mean considering the interests of the organization as a whole. This norm also corresponds with the hierarchical nature of Hong Kong Chinese culture. In a hierarchical society, high status is accompanied by a responsibility to attend to the needs of those lower in the hierarchy (Tinsley, 1997). Thus, a concern for the interests of those not present at the negotiating table should be more normative for Hong Kong Chinese than American managers. Our reasoning about culture and conflict management norms leads to the following four hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: Discussing parties’ interests will be more normative among American than Hong Kong Chinese managers. Hypothesis 2: Synthesizing multiple interests will be more normative among American than Hong Kong Chinese managers. Hypothesis 3: Showing concern for authority will be more normative among Hong Kong Chinese than American managers. Hypothesis 4: Showing concern for collective interests will be more normative among Hong Kong Chinese than American managers.

We chose to study these norms because we anticipated they would be relevant to the outcomes of confrontational conflict management and because we expected that culture would generate variance on these norms. We do not mean to imply that these four are the only norms relevant to conflict management or the only norms that distinguish American and Hong Kong Chinese cultures.

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NORMS AND OUTCOMES

Assuming that norms guide behavior (Katz & Kahn, 1966) and that parties’ conflict management behavior shapes their outcomes, we can expect that varying levels of cultural norms are associated with different conflict outcomes. This section introduces hypotheses linking culture, norms, and the outcomes of conflict management negotiations. Norms for discussing parties’ interests and synthesizing multiple issues should increase the number of issues that are resolved. The norm discussing parties’ interests should enable managers to pay attention to a range of issues beyond the few major ones. This norm gives legitimacy both to one’s own interests and those of special concern to the other party. The norm synthesizing multiple issues implies that negotiators know how to make trade-offs. Because less important issues are good candidates for trade-offs, this norm should help ensure that they are confronted and resolved. Brett and her colleagues (Brett, Adair, Lempereur, Okumura, Shikhirev, Tinsley, & Lytle, 1998) report that in a deal-making negotiation, Hong Kong Chinese same-culture negotiators were less likely to include a low-priority issue in their agreement than same-culture American negotiators. Because we expect the norms discussing parties’ interests and synthesizing multiple issues to be stronger in American culture than in Hong Kong Chinese culture, we predict that American managers will resolve more issues than Hong Kong Chinese managers. This prediction is consistent with Ding’s (1996) finding that Chinese negotiators focus on consensus to resolve large issues, while smaller issues remain unresolved. Hypothesis 5: American managers will resolve more issues than Hong Kong Chinese managers.

Managers for whom discussing parties’ interests and synthesizing multiple issues are normative should reach more integrative outcomes than should managers for whom concern for collective interests is strong. Integrative agreements are those that create value from the point of view of the focal parties, not the collective (Follett, 1940; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Fisher et al., 1991). Specifically, these agreements add value by satisfying the underlying interests of the parties at the negotiating table, either by bridging these interests or by trading off low-priority interests for high-priority interests (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Parties who share a norm to discuss interests are more likely than parties who do not share this norm to incorporate their preferences and interests into the resolution of an issue (Pruitt, 1981; Weingart, Thompson, Lowenstein, & Bazerman, 1990). Across five cultures in a buyer–seller negotiation, there was a significant correlation between a norm for information sharing about interests and joint gains (Brett et al., 1998). When parties share a norm to synthesize multiple issues, trade-offs and integrative outcomes become more likely (Follett, 1940; Weingart et al., 1990; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993); by contrast, when parties exhibit concern for collective interests, integrative outcomes may be rare. People concerned with collective interests may not be sufficiently motivated to

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search for integrative agreements that will maximize their own interests. In addition, those concerned with the collective may fear that negotiating forcefully will create hostility and threaten the social status quo (Leung, 1997). Hypothesis 6: American outcomes will be more integrative than Hong Kong Chinese outcomes.

If Chinese managers are less likely than American managers to reach integrative outcomes, what types of outcomes do they reach? Consistent with the norm of concern for authority, we can expect that Hong Kong Chinese managers will have a tendency to direct issues to superiors for resolution. When norms supporting a concern for authority are strong, parties may resolve fewer issues on their own than when these norms are weak. Because authority concerns are expected to be more normative among Hong Kong Chinese than American managers, Hong Kong Chinese managers are more likely than American managers to defer issues to higher management. There is some empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that Hong Kong Chinese tend to defer to the decisions of higher management. In one survey study, Hong Kong Chinese students were more likely than their American counterparts to involve higher status individuals in dispute resolution (Tinsley, 1997). In another survey study, Hong Kong Chinese students relied more heavily on a judge for justice than on their own efforts to argue a case (Leung & Lind, 1986). Similarly, Chinese managers participating in a scenario study were significantly more likely than their Canadian counterparts to turn to the boss for the resolution of a dispute (Tse, Francis, & Wall, 1994). Hypothesis 7: Hong Kong Chinese managers are more likely to agree to send an issue to higher management for decision than American managers.

Finally, if conflict management outcomes are linked to culture, and if there are normative differences in conflict management outcomes, then norms should mediate the relationship between culture and outcomes. Hypothesis 8: Norms will mediate the relationship between culture and conflict management outcomes.

METHOD

Overview of the Study We tested our hypotheses in the context of a conflict management simulation called Summer Interns. First, we measured cultural values and conflict management norms via questionnaire. We then gave participants 40 min to try to resolve a multi-issue conflict. Participants audiotaped their discussions, and we coded conflict outcomes from transcripts of the discussions. Simulation We collected the data for this study in conjunction with classes on conflict management in Hong Kong1 and in the United States. In our simulated intraorganizational conflict, one student in each dyad played the role of director of 1

Data were collected in 1996, just prior to the handover of Hong Kong to China.

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engineering and the other student played the role of director of human resources. Both parties were aware that the director of engineering, in immediate need of extra, low-wage help, had hired two summer interns in advance of the human resources department’s program for hiring summer interns. In response to this action, the director of human resources informed the director of engineering that the two people just hired would not be members of the summer intern program. Directors had the same organizational rank and the same alternatives if face-to-face decision making were unsuccessful. Both managers reported to the same boss, and they both understood that either one of them could go to the boss if they were unable to reach an agreement. Alternatively, if no agreement was reached, parties could try to shore up support from other directors in the company or they could act unilaterally. The director of engineering could decide to pay for the two interns he had hired or the director of human resources could decide to accept them into the summer interns program. However, neither party could count on the other to engage in such unilateral problem solving. Each participant’s confidential role information presented positions and interests about the seven issues in the conflict. Two issues dealt with the employees whom engineering already had hired: (1) their status (whether they would be official summer interns) and (2) their payment (whether they would be paid by the engineering department or by human resources). Five issues dealt with the future of the summer interns program: (1) who would hire interns, (2) what intern qualifications should be, (3) what the timing of hiring should be, (4) whether an orientation program would be held, and (5) whether a mentorship program would be continued. This was not a quantified exercise; there was no summary sheet placing values on issues, interests, or options. Rather, participants had to determine their own priorities from the confidential information about their positions. The simulation was based on a three-party exercise by Lewicki and Sheppard (1985), which had been previously adapted to be relevant in German, Japanese, and U.S. cultures (Tinsley, in press). Participants and Procedure Study participants were business students enrolled at private universities in the United States (N ⫽ 94) and Hong Kong (N ⫽ 120) who were a few weeks into their conflict management course, but did not have previous negotiation or conflict management training. Students were chosen so as to minimize variance in major, age, gender, and socioeconomic status across cultural groups. Hong Kong Chinese managers were 30% female and 70% male, their average age was 22, their average work experience was 2 years, and their socioeconomic status ranged from middle to upper middle class. American managers were 25% female and 75% male, their average age was 27, their average work experience was 5 years, and their socioeconomic status ranged from middle to upper middle class. A week before the Summer Interns exercise, participants completed a questionnaire that measured their conflict management norms and then were given

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their confidential role instructions for the upcoming simulation. On the day of the exercise, we told participants that they would have 40 min to discuss the situation, but that they did not have to use the full 40 min. Prior experience with this simulation (Tinsley, in press) indicated that 40 min was a sufficient time span to reach agreement. We selected 30 dyads at random from each culture, gave them a tape recorder, and asked them to record their discussion. As Cantonese was the primary language of the Hong Kong Chinese participants, we instructed them to speak Cantonese in the simulation, thus controlling for the possibility that lack of facility with English would limit the resolution of issues. After 40 min of discussion, we collected the tape recorders and debriefed the exercise. Sampling Check In order to generalize to American and Hong Kong Chinese cultures, the cultural profiles of the participants needed to match cultural group characteristics deduced from the literature, which portrayed American culture as selfdirected, egalitarian, and open to change and Hong Kong Chinese culture as collective, hierarchical, and tradition bound. Participants completed a short form of the Schwartz (1994) cultural values survey. Self-direction was measured by five values: creativity, independence, choosing one’s own goals, curiosity, and self-respect. Hierarchy was measured by five values: social power, wealth, authority, influence, and social recognition. Tradition was measured by nine values: obedience, self-discipline, politeness, honor of parents and elders, respect for tradition, religious devotion, acceptance of one’s position in life, humble, and moderate. These values were rated on a scale from ⫺1 to 7 as prescribed by Schwartz (1994). Analysis of variance (df ⫽ 1,212) confirmed that (1) American students (M ⫽ 5.52, SD ⫽ .78) were significantly more self-directed than their Hong Kong counterparts (M ⫽ 4.76, SD ⫽ .84) ( f ⫽ 51.1, p ⱕ .001), (2) American students were less hierarchical (M ⫽ 3.44, SD ⫽ 1.22) than their Hong Kong counterparts (M ⫽ 3.75, SD ⫽ 1.12) ( f ⫽ 4.39, p ⫽ .04), and (3) American students were less tradition-bound (M ⫽ 3.54, SD ⫽ 1.17) than their Hong Kong counterparts (M ⫽ 3.91, SD ⫽ 1.09) ( f ⫽ 6.24, p ⫽ .01). Conflict Management Norms We measured four conflict management norms: discuss parties’ interests, synthesize multiple issues, concern for collective interests, and concern for authority. Discuss parties’ interests and concern for authority were measured using scales developed by Tinsley (1998), validated across American, Japanese, and German cultures. Discuss parties’ interests was measured by asking participants to imagine that they were managing a workplace conflict and to rate the appropriateness of the following: offering information concerning your side’s goals and concerns, asking questions about the other side’s goals and concerns, and asking the other side for suggestions as to how its goals and concerns could be met. Concern for authority was measured by asking people to rate the

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appropriateness of going to superiors for resolution, consulting an expert, and asking superiors for additional time. Synthesize multiple issues was measured using the polychronic scale developed by Bluedorn, Kalliath, Strube, and Martin (1995), which measures how people manage multiple tasks at once. Participants were asked to evaluate whether they typically complete many tasks at once, do more than one thing at a time, combine routine duties in novel ways, and manage several concerns at once. Concern for collective interests was measured using a collectivism scale, developed by Erez and Earley (1987), that evaluates the perceived appropriateness of collective needs and interests. We asked participants to assess the extent to which they agree with the following: people have to sometimes make sacrifices for the group as a whole, people should be willing to sacrifice for the sake of the group’s well-being, people in groups sometimes have to do things they do not want to do, and people in groups should realize that they are not always going to get what they personally want. All items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale. Although most of these scales had been validated across multiple cultural groups (Erez & Earley, 1987; Tinsley, 1998), prior validation did not include Hong Kong Chinese participants. To test how well these scales performed with our current samples, we did a multisample confirmatory factor analysis, using each sample’s covariance matrix of the norms’ items and a maximum likelihood fit function in LISREL 8. This analysis was confirmatory such that we specified four factors and on which factor each item should load. The analysis was also multisample; we constrained the lambda (factor loadings), phi (construct intercorrelations), and theta-delta (unique item variance) estimates to be invariant across the two samples. The overall fit of this constrained model [␹2(204) ⫽ 278, CFI ⫽ .84, RMSEA ⫽ .05] was compared to the overall fit of the completely unconstrained model (when the lambda, phi, and theta-delta estimates were free to vary across samples) [␹2(84) ⫽ 146, CFI ⫽ .91, RMSEA ⫽ .05]. The difference in fit between these two models [␹2(120) ⫽ 132] is not significant ( p ⬎ .05), thus suggesting that the factor structures [specifically the configural (number of factors), metric (loadings), factor variances (intercorrelations), and uniquenesses (item variances) (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000)] are not significantly different across the two cultural group samples. Given this measurement equivalence, scales were constructed for each manager by summing each factor’s items [discuss interests (␣ ⫽ .71), synthesize multiple issues (␣ ⫽ .86), concerns for collective (␣ ⫽ .71), and concerns for authority (␣ ⫽ .77)]. Conflict Outcomes We coded transcripts to determine conflict outcomes using the following procedures. First, we had the tapes transcribed (except for one U.S. tape that was inaudible). Next, we had the Hong Kong Chinese transcriptions translated into English and then back-translated into Cantonese. A Hong Kong Chinese research assistant then compared the back-translations to the original Cantonese transcriptions and noted discrepancies. A different research assistant,

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with a master’s degree in linguistics, resolved the discrepancies. These passages were then retranslated into English. This back-translation process helps ensure conceptual equivalence (Brislin, 1980). Three coders, two American and one Hong Kong Chinese, who were blind to the cultural origin of the transcripts and to our hypotheses, read the Englishlanguage transcripts. Based on our research question and theorizing, we distinguished five types of outcome—integrative, distributive, compromise, go to higher management, no resolution—for each of the seven issues, and we trained our coders to identify these types of outcome. We had chosen a simulation that we knew from previous experience (Tinsley, in press) contained sufficient information about issues and alternatives that each of these five outcomes were possible. As shown in the Appendix, an outcome was coded as integrative (option c or c⬘) if it bridged both parties’ interests (which were given in the simulation material) or if it was part of a trade between two or more issues. An outcome was coded as distributive (option a or a⬘) if one side won their position or won a greater share of their position than the other party won (positions were given in the simulation material). An outcome was coded as compromise (option b) if parties evenly split the difference between their positions. An outcome was coded as go to higher management (option d) if parties agreed that the issue should be deferred to the opinions of any of the senior executives mentioned in the case. An outcome was coded as no resolution (option e) if it was not settled definitively. The three coders began by coding the same transcripts, independently. Next, they met to compare the codes they had given and to present their reasoning. They discussed a transcript until all three could agree on the same codes for all of the issues. It took nine transcripts of training, during which coders acted separately but compared codes and discussed inconsistencies, before coders were independently assigning the same code to an issue 95% of the time. At this point, the remaining 50 transcripts were divided into four piles. Fifteen were given to the Hong Kong Chinese coder, 10 were given to each of the American coders, and 15 were given to all three coders. After coding 2–3 of their individual transcripts, assistants would select 2–3 of the common transcripts to code separately but compare with each other afterwards to ensure their interrater agreement remained at the 95% level. Double checking transcripts ensured that coders remained consistent throughout the entire coding process (10 weeks).

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

We tested cultural differences in conflict management norms (Hypotheses 1–4) using MANOVA with cultural group as the independent variable and norms as the dependent variables. Conflict norms varied significantly as a function of cultural group [multivariate F(4, 205) ⫽ 5324, p ⬍ .001]. Univariate

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TABLE 1 Cultural Group Differences on Conflict Norms U.S. group (N ⫽ 94)

Chinese group (N ⫽ 120)

Conflict norms

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

F

p

␩2

Discuss interests Synthesize multiple issues Concern for collective Concern for authority

4.31 3.80 3.93 2.80

.49 .67 .72 .79

3.78 2.59 4.20 3.24

.56 .60 .64 .66

54.3 192.0 8.3 19.2

⬍.001 ⬍.001 .004 ⬍.001

.21 .47 .04 .08

F tests confirmed Hypotheses 1 through 4. As Table 1 shows, American participants placed significantly greater emphasis on discussing interests and synthesizing multiple issues than did their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts. Hong Kong Chinese participants placed more emphasis on collective and authority concerns than did their American counterparts. Table 2 shows the frequencies of each type of conflict outcome that was reached for each of the seven conflict issues. We tested for cultural differences in conflict outcomes (Hypotheses 5–7) using a repeated-measures multinomial logistic regression, where the seven issues were the repeated measures, culture was the independent variable, and type of conflict outcome (distributive, compromise, integrative, go to higher management, or no resolution) was the dependent variable. Because issues were nested within dyads, we had 59 level 2 observations (30 Hong Kong dyads ⫹ 29 American dyads) and 413 (⫽ 59 ⫻ 7 issues) level 1 observations. We used a program called MIXNO (Hedeker, 2000), in which one type of outcome is selected as the target outcome and the program calculates whether the independent variable(s) significantly affects the probability of obtaining this target TABLE 2 Frequencies of Each Type of Outcome for Each Conflict Issue Status Payment Who hires Timing Qualifications Orientation Mentorship Hong Kong dyads Distributive Compromise Integrative Higher management No resolution U.S. dyads Distributive Compromise Integrative Higher management No resolution

5 5 5

5 3 2

2 9 4

2 6 3

0 11 4

0 0 1

1 0 2

3 12

8 12

4 11

8 11

6 9

3 26

4 23

7 1 9

2 3 9

0 11 14

3 2 20

0 12 12

0 2 15

1 0 16 2

2 10

8 7

1 3

1 3

1 4

0 12

10

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TABLE 3 The Effect of Culture on Obtaining an Integrative Outcome Rather Than Any Other Type of Outcome

Outcome comparison

Estimated ␤ for culture

Standard error of parameter estimate

z value

Significance ( p value)

Distributive vs integrative Compromise vs integrative Higher management vs integrative No resolution vs integrative

⫺1.97 ⫺1.92 ⫺2.71 ⫺2.58

.56 .43 .49 .43

⫺3.49 ⫺4.45 ⫺5.50 ⫺5.95

.0005 ⬍.0001 ⬍.0001 ⬍.0001

outcome rather than any other outcome. We selected integrative outcomes as our target outcome type for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Integrative outcomes are less likely than distributive outcomes (Thompson, 1998), making them particularly interesting to study as well as more likely to show results due to greater variance.2 The program compared the probability of a dyad reaching an integrative outcome versus each of the other outcomes and calculated whether this difference in outcomes could be explained by differences in our independent variable, culture. Table 3 shows the coefficients for culture, their standard errors, and the significance for each of the outcomes compared to an integrative outcome. The coefficients for culture are all significant: Culture has a significant effect in influencing whether a dyad will settle on an integrative outcome rather than a distributive, compromise, go to higher management, or no resolution outcome. Because culture is coded such that 1 ⫽ Hong Kong and 2 ⫽ American, the negative coefficients indicate that American dyads (unlike Hong Kong dyads) are significantly less likely to reach a distributive ( p ⫽ .0005), compromise ( p ⬍ .0001), higher management ( p ⬍ .0001), or no resolution outcome ( p ⬍ .0001) than they are to reach an integrative outcome. In other words, Hypothesis 6 is supported because American dyads are significantly more likely than their Hong Kong counterparts to reach an integrative outcome rather than any other type of outcome. To test whether Hong Kong dyads are significantly more likely than American dyads to settle fewer issues (no resolution outcome) or to settle for an outcome that goes to higher management, we tested whether the culture coefficients for these outcomes were not only significantly different from integrative outcomes (as demonstrated above), but also different from distributive and compromise outcomes. To test whether the difference between (1) no resolution and distributive, (2) no resolution and compromise, (3) higher management and 2 Additionally, the algorithm comparing integrative outcomes to each of the other outcomes converged with few iterations and the ridge constant was zero: “The listed ridge value is indicative of the degree of computational difficulty that the program encounters” (Hedeker, 2000, p. 15). Computational difficulties arise when, for example, the program encounters a nonincreasing likelihood (Hedeker, 2000, p. 15). This could indicate that the program has not maximized the “true” likelihood ratio but rather has gotten stuck at a local maximum (because the surface of the algorithm has a local optimum); thus, the “final” statistics may be suspect.

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distributive, and (4) higher management and compromise were significantly different, we did a series of pairwise comparison tests.3 These tests divide the difference of the relevant coefficients by an estimate of its standard error and refer to a z distribution to calculate the significance. We calculated the standard error of the difference of two coefficients (c1 and c2) as follows: SE (c1 ⫺ c2) ⫽ sqrt [var (c1 ⫺ c2)] ⫽ sqrt [var (c1) ⫹ var (c2) ⫺ 2 cov (c1, c2)] ⫽ sqrt {[SE (c1)]2 ⫹ [SE (c2)]2 ⫺ 2 [(rc1c2) (SE [c1]) (SE [c2])]}. Thus, for example, the t value for the comparison of no resolution versus distributive was (2.58 ⫺ 1.98)/sqrt [(.43)2 ⫹ (.56)2 ⫺ 2 (.66) (.43) (.56)] ⫽ 1.43, which is not significant ( p ⫽ .08). The t value for no resolution versus compromise was 2.37 ( p ⫽ .01). The t value for higher management versus no resolution was 1.46 ( p ⫽ .08), and the t value for higher management versus compromise was 2.16 ( p ⫽ .02). Because we made eight comparisons (four in Table 2 and four calculated manually), our p values were multiplied by eight (this is equivalent to a Bonferroni correction of the critical p value). Thus, there was no significant difference in how often Hong Kong dyads reached no resolution and go to higher management outcomes versus distributive outcomes. However, there was a marginally significant difference in how often Hong Kong dyads reached no resolution rather than compromise outcomes (with correction p ⫽ .01 ⫻ 8 ⫽ .08) as well as in how often Hong Kong dyads ended with an outcome to go to higher management rather than a compromise outcome ( p ⫽ .02, with correction p ⫽ .16). Therefore, Hypotheses 5 and 7 are partially supported. Hong Kong dyads are more likely than their American counterparts to settle for no resolution or go to higher management than they are to reach an integrative outcome, and they are marginally more likely to reach no resolution or go to higher management than to reach a compromise. We predicted these different outcomes for Hong Kong Chinese and American dyads based on hypotheses about differences in conflict management norms between these two cultures. To test this assumption that differences in norms can explain cultural differences in conflict outcomes, we looked at the relationship between these culturally based conflict norms and the conflict outcomes. Because outcomes were at the dyadic level, we aggregated norms to the dyadic level and ran another repeated-measures multinomial logistic regression with norms as the independent variables.4 Again we used the integrative outcome as the target outcome and had 59 level 2 observations and 413 level 1 observations. As Table 4 shows, lack of discussion of interests explains why dyads 3

We are grateful for the editor’s suggestions and assistance here. Because we do not claim that dyadic partners’ normative profiles will necessarily match, we do not need to show dyadic norm agreement before aggregation. Rather, we expect some withindyad differences based on our random pairing; in addition, we expect that if both parties hold a norm strongly or weakly there will be some amplification of that norm’s effects on outcome, whereas if one party holds a norm strongly and the other weakly there will be some cancellation. 4

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TABLE 4 The Effect of Conflict Norms on Obtaining an Integrative Rather Than Any Other Type of Outcome Outcome comparison 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Distributive vs integrative

Compromise vs integrative

Higher management vs integrative

No resolution vs integrative

Conflict norm

Estimated ␤ for norm

p value

Discuss interests Synthesize issues Concern collective Concern authority Discuss interests Synthesize issues Concern collective Concern authority Discuss interests Synthesize issues Concern collective Concern authority Discuss interests Synthesize issues Concern collective Concern authority

⫺1.51 0.75 ⫺0.01 0.31 0.57 ⫺0.89 0.18 0.01 ⫺2.08 ⫺0.66 0.26 0.62 0.87 ⫺1.16 0.01 0.39

.04 ns ns ns ns .03 ns ns ⬍.001 .10 ns .13 ns ⬍.001 ns ns

reached distributive outcomes more than integrative ones (line 1). Failure to synthesize multiple issues explains why dyads reached compromise (line 6) and no resolution (line 14) outcomes more than often than integrative outcomes. Concern for authority (line 13), failure to synthesize multiple issues (line 10), and little discussion of interests (line 9) explain why dyads go to higher management rather than reach integrative outcomes (though the first two effects are only marginally significant). To test whether these norms fully accounted for the differences in outcomes between our American and Hong Kong Chinese samples (Hypothesis 8), we added an American versus Hong Kong Chinese dummy variable to the equation with norms as the predictors (James & Brett, 1984). If norms fully mediate the relationship between culture and outcomes, adding the dummy variable to the equation will not improve the prediction. We compared the deviance scores of the two equations, which is analogous to comparing the R2, except that the ⌬R2 follows an F distribution, whereas the difference of the deviance scores, called the scaled deviance, is distributed asymptotically as ␹2 (Nelder & Baker, 1983, p. 347). The deviance score for the regression of outcomes on culture was 1109.0, on norms it was 1030.5, and for outcomes on norms and culture it was 1023.1. The deviance for the null model (with just the intercept and no estimated parameters) is 1148.6. Thus, the scaled deviance (for the unique effect of culture) is 7.4 (1030.5 ⫺ 1023.1), which is significant [␹2(1) ⫽ 7.4, p ⫽ .01], meaning that the additional variable (culture) had a significant unique contribution to the deviance in conflict outcomes. The scaled deviance for the unique effect of norms is 85.9 (1109.0 ⫺ 1023.1), which is also significant [␹2(4) ⫽ 85.9, p ⬍ .001]. The joint contribution of culture and norms to the deviance in outcomes is 125.5 (1148.6 ⫺ 1023.1), [␹2(5) ⫽ 125.5, p ⬍ .001].

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Norms, as would be expected because they are much more proximal to individual behavior than the dummy indicator of cultural group, uniquely account for 68.4% (85.9/125.5) of the deviance in outcomes. Culture uniquely accounts for 5.9% (7.4/125.5) of the deviance in outcomes. And most important, the total contribution of culture to the deviance in outcomes is 39.6 (1148.6 ⫺ 1109.0); of this 39.6 contribution, only 18.7% (7.4/39.6) is not jointly shared with (or mediated by) norms. These results imply that norms explain a substantial portion of the differences in conflict outcomes between American and Hong Kong Chinese dyads.5 However, above and beyond what was accounted for by norms, the culture variable did significantly and uniquely contribute to an explanation of outcomes. Looking at the individual parameter estimates, the unique contribution of culture appears to be due to the comparison of no resolution to integrative outcomes, as here the coefficient for culture was significant (␤ ⫽ ⫺1.7, p ⫽ .05), whereas the culture coefficient was not significant for any other outcome comparison. This finding suggests that H8 is generally supported: Our conflict norms do explain the differences between American and Hong Kong dyads in obtaining integrative, rather than distributive, compromise or go to higher management outcomes. However, our four conflict norms do not fully explain the comparison between no resolution and integrative outcomes. In other words, Hong Kong managers were more likely to leave an issue unresolved than to resolve it integratively, and this American versus Hong Kong difference can only be partially explained by our four conflict norms. DISCUSSION

This study showed significant differences between negotiators from the United States and Hong Kong with respect to conflict norms and conflict outcomes. American negotiators were more likely than their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts to endorse norms of discussing each side’s underlying interests and synthesizing multiple issues. These norms were associated both with resolving a greater number of issues and arriving at more integrative agreements. In contrast, sensitivity to the interests of the collective and concern for authority were norms that were more characteristic of the Hong Kong Chinese negotiators than they were of their American counterparts. Concern for authority, rather than norms for discussing parties’ interests and synthesizing multiple issues, yielded Hong Kong Chinese outcomes that resolved fewer issues and were less integrative than American outcomes, but were more likely to involve higher management. Notably, concern for the collective was not predictive of cultural differences in outcomes, despite prior claims that individualism-collectivism is the most important cultural difference (Triandis, Brislin, & Hui, 1988). 5

One caution here is that the ridge constant for the regression with both norms and culture as predictors was .1, signifying that the algorithm had some difficulty converging. This difficulty is likely due to the multicollinearity between the predictor variables, given that culture has a significant effect on conflict norms (Hypotheses 1–4).

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Perhaps the lack of variance on this norm (see Table 2, ␩2 ⫽ .04) in our study made it a weaker predictor. In this study, sampling from United States and Hong Kong Chinese cultural groups created variance on conflict norms that was related to different patterns of conflict outcomes. We emphasized between-cultural-group differences in conflict management rather than within-cultural-group diversity. We do not mean to imply that individual differences are unimportant or uninteresting; they are simply not the focus of this study. For the most part, our conflict norms accounted for the between-cultural-group differences in conflict outcomes, offering an explanation as to why American negotiators tended to resolve issues integratively while their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts tended to leave issues unresolved or take them to higher management. The exception was that the Hong Kong Chinese tendency to leave issues unresolved rather than resolve them integratively was partially, but not fully, explained by the conflict norms. Hong Kong Chinese negotiators may have had additional concerns that were not measured by our conflict norms and that would help to explain their tendency to leave issues unresolved, such as the need to end the conflict discussion (Tinsley, 1997) or the need to restore harmony (Leung, 1997). There may be other variables that covary with the norms measured here that also account for cultural differences in outcomes. Covariation of explanatory factors is a problem in all research, particularly cross-cultural research because cultural characteristics are not distributed orthogonally across cultures. To be a reasonable alternative explanation, a variable would have to covary with culture or with one of the cultural norms that we measured; it would have to covary with outcomes, and it would have to provide a reasonable theoretical explanation. Age fits some of these criteria for alternative explanations. The Hong Kong Chinese were slightly younger and had less work experience than their American counterparts. We were not able to rule out the possibility that age accounted for cultural differences in outcomes because we did not have individual-level demographic data. However, prior research on American and Hong Kong buyer–seller negotiation norms found no significant age effects (Tinsley & Pillutla, 1998). In addition, is seems theoretically unlikely that our results can be explained by a “youth” factor in Hong Kong because time in a culture (for which age is a proxy) will reinforce cultural norms, thus had the Hong Kong sample been older, cross-cultural differences in conflict management norms are likely to have been exaggerated not diminished. Of course we cannot definitively rule out the possibility that an unidentified variable, which covaries with our explanatory variables (norms), truly explains our variance in outcomes. Just as we relied on prior research on culture and conflict management, future researchers will have these findings to serve as a basis for further delineating the influence of culture on conflict management. As well, our findings are, of course, limited to conflict that has the potential to be resolved integratively. Single-issue conflicts that cannot be subdivided, or conflict management structures that discourage trade-offs or creative solutions, such as the requirement that one issue be resolved at a time, are likely to produce different results.

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Implications for Conflict Theory and Practice Although American negotiators appeared to achieve more integrative outcomes than their Chinese counterparts, there are two important caveats to this finding, both of which offer direction for future research. First, note that “integrative” outcomes are defined as those that provide the two focal parties to the conflict with joint gains (Follett, 1940; Walton & McKersie, 1965) and do not capture any value gained by a larger community. Given that the Hong Kong Chinese negotiators were more sensitive to the concerns of others than their American counterparts, this definition may not be the best measure of a resolution’s “optimality.” Future research might add a component of “gain to the community” to test whether Hong Kong Chinese agreements became more optimal if joint gain included community gains. Second, because Hong Kong Chinese negotiators were particularly sensitive to the concerns of higher management, it would be interesting to compare cultural differences in the context of a third-party conflict exercise. It may be that parties holding norms similar to those of our American sample reach more integrative resolutions (meaning they generate greater joint gain for the parties in conflict) when conflict is resolved between the two focal parties. However, parties who hold norms similar to our Hong Kong Chinese sample may reach more integrative resolutions (that is, they may generate greater joint gain for the collective) when a third party is present. Departing from the usual focus on cultural values, we centered on conflict norms as our explanatory mechanism so that our conclusions might offer more direct and applicable advice to negotiators engaged in intercultural conflict. For example, when an American negotiator is preparing a conflict management strategy, it is less useful to know that a Hong Kong Chinese opponent is likely to hold traditional values that it is to know that this opponent is likely to be concerned about authority. Parties who hold norms similar to those of our American sample should consider that parties from collective, hierarchical, and tradition-bound cultures may think that consulting members of the collective, especially top management, is an appropriate means of managing conflict. Armed with this normative knowledge, the American negotiator can anticipate that his or her counterpart may propose taking an issue to higher management and can decide in advance how to react if this occurs. At the same time, parties who hold norms similar to those of the Hong Kong Chinese participants in our study should consider that parties from individualistic, egalitarian cultures that are open to change tend to believe that discussing parties’ interests and synthesizing multiple issues are appropriate means of managing conflict. Of course, not all members of a cultural group will behave as predicted by the cultural prototype. However, an awareness of differences in conflict norms should help negotiators understand and adjust to the other party’s norms. Because our study demonstrates that norms have a direct effect on a conflict’s outcome, congruence between parties’ conflict norms is likely to lead to outcomes that both parties find acceptable, thereby facilitating implementation.

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APPENDIX

Outcome Coding Protocol

We gave coders a copy of the case, an outline of the seven issues, and the following definitions of the five different outcomes: distributive (an asymmetric division of parties’ positions), compromise, integrative (a creative or contingent outcome), an agreement to take the issue to higher management, or no definitive resolution. Next, we gave coders a coding sheet that listed each of the seven issues of the case with examples of each type of outcome. We instructed coders to code whether an issue was discussed as well as the type of outcome that was reached. For example, regarding the issues of whether the two current students would be interns and who would pay their salary, the following instructions were included in the coding sheet: I. Are the current 2 students part of the Summer Interns Program? 1) Was the issue discussed? yes no 2) How was the issue resolved? a) win for human resources: neither student was part of the summer interns program a⬘) win for engineering: both students were part of the summer interns program b) compromise: 1 student part of the summer interns program or both interns part of the program for half of the summer c) creative: students receive special status as temporary workers (meets human resources’ interest in not having students be interns and engineering’s interest in not having students be part of their permanent staff) c⬘) contingent solution: outcome of this issue coupled with another issue and traded off, for example, both students part of the summer interns program but engineering has to pay for their salaries d) issue taken to higher management: input requested from vice-president or board e) no definitive resolution: some proposals made, but none accepted by other party II. Who will pay the current students’ salaries? 1) Was the issue discussed? yes no 2) How was the issue resolved? a) win for human resources: payment from engineering budget a⬘) win for engineering: payment from human resources budget b) compromise: 1 student paid by each department c) creative: students paid using special temporary workers budget (meets both human resources and engineering interests in not having their division go over budget) c⬘) contingent solution: outcome of this issue coupled with another issue and traded, for example, both students part of the summer interns program but engineering has to pay for their salaries d) issue taken to higher management: input requested from vice-president or board e) no definitive resolution: some proposals made, but none accepted by other party

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