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Margaret Cavendish and patronage
Margaret Cavendish and patronage Lisa T. Sarasohn Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673) was the first woman to publish on scientific subjects in English. Gender limited Cavendish’s membership in the emerging scientific community; to circumvent this restraint, Cavendish used patronage rituals to establish the legitimacy of her scientific role. Through gifts of her books, and acknowledgement of their traditional authority, Cavendish sought recognition of her status as a natural philosopher from Oxford and Cambridge. At the same time, she challenged the superiority of the new experimental philosophy. She hoped her critique of the modem thinkers would force them to acknowledge her as a peer. Cavendish’s experience demonstrates the role of patronage in the scientific community, and how social conditions limited the role of women in science.
In 1668, Margaret Cavendish, the first woman to publish extensively on scientific subjects in English, dedicated her treatise, the Grounds of Natural Philosophy, ‘To all the Universities in Europe’. She claimed that all books were under their jurisdiction and expressed astonishment that some authors ‘of good note’ did not accept their authority. She, on the other hand, was glad to accept their judgment, for, as she concluded: You are the stars of the first magnitude, whose influence governs the world of learning; and it is my confidence, that you will be propitious to the birth of this beloved child of my brain, who I take the boldness to recommend to your patronage’. By 1668, in fact, the universities of Europe no longer governed the world of learning, or at least those parts of the world inhabited by natural philosophers. In dedicating her work to the universities (see Figure I), and acknowledging their venerable claim to validate learning, Margaret Cavendish was embarking on a patronage strategy. Her tactic revealed not only her own place in the scientific universe, but also how patronage and ideas of scientific community were interacting in the first decade after the establishment of the Royal Society.
The gentleman’s club of the Royal Society Cavendish felt profoundly alienated from the scientific culture of the midcentury in England. Her gender denied her entry to the Royal Society which was, as Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer have pointed out2, constituted as club for gentlemen. As new ideas
Lisa T. Sarasohn is Professor of History at Oregon State University. Her most recent publication is (1996) Gassendi’s Ethics: Freedom in a Mechanistic Universe, Cornell. Her main fields of interest are the history of ideas and the history of science.
130
Endeavour Vol. 23(3) 1999
of scientific community and authority evolved within the Royal Society, Cavendish turned to an older model of social organization to find acceptance for her work and honor for herself. The dedications and prefaces of her many works of natural philosophy, poetry, letters, romances and plays, reveal a sophisticated and self-conscious attempt to gain access to and recognition from the learned community of her time (see Figures 2 and 3), generally by manipulating patronage protocols. She knew that her natural philosophy, which incorporated a theory of matter in motion with a vitalist materialism, needed external validation to be accepted. Such validation could come through patronage3. Patronage was the system of mutual protection, benefits and services that underlay the hierarchical society of early modem Europe4. It defined the relative roles and positions of those who were on the top and those who wanted to rise to the top. Patrons gained status when they had and were acknowledged to have the ability to give protection, including ‘access to tangible and intangible resources’, notably ‘land, office, position, status, and economic opportunity’5. Clients gained all the material benefits offered through patronage, but perhaps more importantly, they gained honor. Patronage ties brought honor to both parties because the status of both patron and client was validated and recognized by being in a position either to give or to be worthy to receive benefits or gifts. In turn, honor, in seventeenth century terms, was a sign of power. Thomas Hobbes, a client of Cavendish’s husband, the Duke of Newcastle, wrote in the Leviathan, ‘To give great gifts to a man is to honour him, because ‘tis buying of protection, and acknowledging of powe9. In a very real way, when Cavendish gave the gift of her book to the universities, she empowered both herself and them. They gained the honor of having their power acknowledged; she gained the honor of the being recognized as a natural philosopher, and a human being capable of thought and action. Cavendish believed that because women
were ‘kept like birds in cages’, they were never given the education men received. Consequently, she lamented, ‘we must needs want the understanding and knowledge [of men] and so consequently [the] prudence, and invention of men; thus . . . we are shut out of all power, and authority . .‘7. In gaining the patronage of the universities, Cavendish would also make her sex worthy of honor and capable of possessing power.
Craving recognition and power Cavendish craved recognition and power in part because she was all too conscious of her own deficiencies (see Figures 2 and 3). She lamented the rudimentary education she had received growing up in the gentry. Until the early 166Os, although she had met Descartes, Hobbes and Gassendi among other natural philosophers, she could claim, ‘I have no acquaintance with old authors, nor no familiarity with the modems, I have received no instructions by learning . ..‘*. Nevertheless, Cavendish made a virtue of necessity, in fact arguing that when modem scholars were so in love with learning and method, they neglected nature. ‘The best natural philosophers are those that have the clearest natural observation, and the least artificial learning’, and can therefore observe nature unobscured by learned notions: they are ‘truly, purely, and rightly natural philosophers’J. In one stroke Cavendish excused her own lack of method, organization and knowledge, and on the other, disparaged other thinkers for just these qualities, and for their dependence on telescopes and microscopes9. This defense of her own reasoning, what she calls a philosophy grounded in sense and reason, also underlay her claim for originality and singularity: her ideas are her own, the ‘child of my brain’ and consequently worthy of honor and acknowledgement. Cavendish did not receive the reception she hoped for from other natural philosophers, even after she began to study their works in the 1660s. Instead, as she reported in her 1664 Philosophical Letters, ‘my named book
0160-9327/99/$ - see front matter 0 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights resewed. PII: SO160-9327(99)01200-4
td MOS’i
THE FAMOUS
UNWERSITY OP
CAMBRIDG.
Figure 1 Dedication to Cavendish’s Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, 1666.
of Philosophy [Philosophical and Physical Opinions71 was accused of obscurity and intricacy’lo. Consequently, she decided to make her meaning clearer in her next volume, while at the same time criticizing the ideas of Hobbes, Descartes, Henry More and Van Helmont. She hoped that ‘by so doing, I have done that, which I would have done unto me; for I am willing to have my opinions contradicted as I do contradict others’ir. In other words, Cavendish, at the same time that she separated herself from other thinkers, from
whom she expected derision, aho sought to be treated in the same manner they treated each other. She longed to be part of the same crowd, who she knew would not take her seriously - even though, at the same time, she disparaged their claims to be true natural philosophers. Her attitude towards her fellow investigators of nature was, to say the least, complex and inconsistent. Cavendish understood that if other natural philosophers would engage her in debate, they would therefore recognize her status as one of themselves, and would treat her with the honor such status deserved: they would acknowledge her power. In her Observations on Experimental Philosophy9 (Figure 4), her most ambitious scientific treatise, Cavendish wrote: I am ambitious of finding out the truth of nature, as an honourable dueler is of gaining fame and repute; for as he will fight with none but an honourable and valiant opposite, so I am resolved to argue with none but those which have the renown of being famous and subtle philosophersi2. Cavendish hoped that she would be taken seriously and seriously challenged by the most subtle and famous natural philosophers: their challenge meant her acceptance, but she knew that such an outcome was unlikely because of her sex. They will perhaps think me an inconsiderable opposite, because I am not of their sex, and therefore strive to hit my opinions with a side-stroke, rather covertly, than openly and directly’*. A question of freedom Indeed, Cavendish insisted that her ability to debate ideas with men was a basic question of freedom. Cavendish argued:
Duchekof Newcafile, cfihu Osalavnrlovr upon EXPEKliUENTAL
Figure 3 Prefactory poem by William Cavendish Duke of Newcastle to Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, 1666.
jurisdiction of the universities in the world of learning; a jurisdiction that Cavendish herself willingly and happily embraced. By privileging the authority and preeminence of the university, Cavendish hoped to subvert the efforts to keep her out of the community of natural philosophers. In particular, Cavendish emphasized the ‘civility’ of the university. She wrote, ‘If a right judgment, and a true understanding, and a respectful civility live any where, it must be in learned universities’. Without their approval, she continued, she would ‘receive so much courtship from the sage society as to bury me in silence’7.
--_-_
and since, in natural philosophy, opinions have freedom, I hope these my opinions may also enjoy the same liberty and privilege that others have, which without great injustice nobody can deny me17.
Figure 2 Frontispiece to Margaret Cavendish’s Poems or Several Fancies, 1668.
The scientific world, according to Cavendish, should be characterized by the free flow of ideas, articulated by individuals who had the freedom to do what they want. In the seventeenth century, lack of restraint, the ability to do what one wanted, was an essential characteristic of the notion of freedom, a privilege associated with free men and gentlemeni3. Freedom was a mark of status and a mark of power. In arguing that her ideas should be accorded the same hearing as others’ ideas, Cavendish implicitly claimed the honor, status, freedom and power of her male counterparts. As in the actual world she was denied this status, Cavendish embarked on her most tangible patronage strategy: an appeal to the universities of Europe, and particularly to the University of Cambridge (Figure 1). As we saw above, Cavendish professed herself astonished that there are ‘some authors of good repute’ who were unwilling to accept the
PHILO,SOPHT.
OB.SERUATIONS UPON
EXPERIMENTAL
PH1LOSOPHYa To whichis added, THE
DESCRIPTION OFA NewBlazingWorld. __--________.WRITTEN
By the ThriieNoble, IlluCnws, andExccllmr
PRINCESSE, THE
Duchefsof Newcaftle, _....._.-.-- -__ L 0
Prinred
N
D
0
N.
by /% Mawell, tn theYear, ,666. --_-__.._
Figure 4 Title page of Cavendish’s Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,
1666.
Endeavour Vol. 23(3) 1999
131
The university as the moderator of civility or polite conversation had the power, according to Cavendish, to admit her within that civilization of the learned. Without its legitimizing power, Cavendish recognized, she would not be courted or included within the society of the sage. The only means of recognition and honor she could gain would be, therefore, through the patronage of the university. As a client in need of a protector, Cavendish elevated the status of the patron she sought, claiming that they were the stars that governed the whole world of the learned. This recognition, in turn, gave that patron - the university the power to elevate her own status and honor. Mutual benefits of patronage The Vice Chancellor of Cambridge wrote to Cavendish in 1668, that the present age ‘will not judge us to be nobodies who such an accomplished Princess hath not refused to make not only the perusers, but even the moderators and judges of her works’14. The implication of Cavendish’s patronage strategy is that since the modem philosophers do not recognize the paramount authority of the schools, they cease to be legitimate, unlike Cavendish who is a legitimate natural philosopher. But her critique of her fellow students of nature goes beyond denying their legitimacy. In Cavendish’s eyes, they are not only irreverent of authority, they are in rebellion against it. They are introducing civil war into the society of the learned, and against the institutions of modem society. In Observations
upon Experimental
Philosophyg,
Cavendish exclaimed: writers are like those unconscionabl “7 men in civil wars, who endeavour to:, pull down the hereditary man&m of noblemen and gentlemen, to build a, cottage of their own; for, so do they pull down the learning of ancient authors, to render themselves famous in composing books of their own. But though this age does ruin palaces, to make cottages, and universities to make private colleges . . . yet I hope God of his mercy will preserve state, church, and schools, from ruin and destructionrs. The charge that natural philosophers were rebels was a grave one during the Restoration, when Charles II had just regained his throne from the rebels and regicides who had governed England during the Civil War. Whether Cavendish made this charge as part of a patronage strategy, or because she actually thought the action of the modem natural philosophers was inimitable to social order, is difficult to determine. It is possible, she was motivated by both concerns. Cavendish, as the wife of an exiled Royalist duke, believed that hierarchy was necessary within society, although her feminism sometimes revealed a more egalitarian attitude. Nevertheless, it was convenient for her to believe in hierarchy in the world of learning,
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where the universities were the font of authorityr6. Thus, she expressed the hope that ‘the universities’ several studies may be, like several magistrates, united for the good and benefit of the whole commonwealth, nay, the whole world’t7. In this case, the implication is that the modem philosophers are disrupting not only the community of the learned, but are a political danger in the commonwealth that must be contained by the magisterial powers of the university.
I wish from my soul, I might be so happy as to have some means or ways to express my gratitude for your magnificent favours to me, having done me more honour then ever I could expect, or give sufficient thanks for: But your generosity is above all gratitude, and your favour is above all merit, like as your learning is above contradiction: And I pray God your University may flourish to the end of the world21.
New colleges and old universities Once again, we are brought back to the problem of power and who possesses it. Cavendish’s patron, the university, needed to possess the power and authority to legitimize her work and acknowledge her status as a natural philosopher, and, at the same time, control and delegitimize the power and position of the modem thinkers. Cavendish equated the pulling down of palaces to make cottages with the ruin of the universities to make private colleges. This may be an express reference to Gresham College where the Royal Society had been meeting, or to the several proposals to create research colleges, which were circulating in the early 1660s. In 1667, a year after
Notes and references Cavenclish,M. (1668) Grounds of Natural Philosophy, sigs. A2r, A2v, A. Maxwell. I have modernized Cavendish’sspelling and grammar for the sake of clarity Shapin, S. and Schaffer,S. (1985)Leviathan
Observations
on Experimental
Philosophy
was written, the Royal Society itself undertook a project to fund a private college with subscriptions from the general publicI*. Cavendish had attended a meeting of the Royal Society in 1667 as an observer. While Cavendish viewed several experiments, including the weighing of a vacuum, and expressed herself to be ‘full of admiration’, her role in the encounter was entirely passiverg. She was treated as a noble visitor, not as a fellow investigator of nature. Her visit did not translate into support for the institution. Later in 1667, when she was asked to subscribe to a building fund for the new college, she declined the honor20. Thus, at the same time Cavendish was seeking the patronage of the universities to validate her work and reify her status as a natural philosopher, the Royal Society was seeking her patronage to build their new college, but certainly not in return for granting her the honor of being considered one of them. Her only alternative for entrance to the scientific community was to subvert the claim of authority represented by the new practitioners and new institutions of learning. Cavendish believed power should remain in the hands of the traditional hierarchical authority of the universities. Such patrons would find their own honor and status acknowledged in the suit of their client, who would in turn benefit from their fairness and sense of justice, and would not condemn her out of hand because she was a woman, Through this strategy, finally, the authority of the old is vindicated, the presumption of the new is dismissed, and Cavendish’s honor and status is vindicated. And so, in 1664, she wrote to the University of Cambridge:
and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, Princeton University Press
On Cavendish’s natural philosophy, see Sarasohn. L.T. (1984) Huntington Library Quarterly 47,289-307
On patronage, see Biagioli, M. (1993) Galileo Courtier: The Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolutism, University of Chicago Press Peck, L.L. (1990) Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Modem England, pp. 3 and 57, Unwin Hyman Tuck, R. (ed.) (1991) Leviathan, p. 64,
Cambridge University Press Cavendish, M. (1655) Philosophical And Physical Opinions, William Wilson Cavendish, M. (1655) Philosophical And Physical Opinions, Epilogue, William Wilson Cavendish, M. (1666) Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, sig. A3v, A. Maxwell 10 Cavendish M. (1664) Philosophical Letters: or Modest Reflections Upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy, maintained By several Famous and Learned Authors of this Age, Expressed by way of Letters, p. 3, no
publisher given 11 Cavendish, M. (1664) Philosophical Letters,
sig. Blr, A. Maxwell 12 Cavendish, M. (1666) Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, sig. B3v, A. Maxwell 13 Shapin, S. (1994) A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England, pp. 40-52, University of Chicago
Press 14 Various Authors (1678) A Collection of Letters and Poems: Written by Several Persons of Honour and Learning, Upon Divers Important Subjects, to the Late Duke and Dutchess of Newcastle, p. 28, Langley
Curtiss 15 Cavendish, M. (1666) Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, sig. B2r. A. Maxwell 16 On hierarchy in Cavendish’s thought, see Sarasohn, L.T. (1984) Huntington Library Quarterly 47,289-307 17 Cavendish, M. (1666) Philosophical Letters,
sig. A2r, A. Maxwell 18 Hunter, M. (1989) Establishing the New Science: The Experience of the Early Royal Society, pp. 156-157, Boydell Press 19 Mintz, S.I. (1952) Journal of English and German Philology 51, 186-176 20 Hunter, M. (1989) Establishing the New Science: The Experience of the Early Royal Society, pp. 171, Boydell Press 21 Cavendish, M. (1666) Philosophical Letters,
sig. Alv, A. Maxwell
In 1668, Margaret Cavendish, the first woman to publish extensively on scientific subjects in English, dedicated her treatise, the Grounds of Natural Philosophy, ‘To all the Universities in Europe’. She claimed that all books were under their jurisdiction and expressed astonishment that some authors ‘of good note’ did not accept their authority. She, on the other hand, was glad to accept their judgment, for, as she concluded: You are the stars of the first magnitude, whose influence governs the world of learning; and it is my confidence, that you will be propitious to the birth of this beloved child of my brain, who I take the boldness to recommend to your patronage’. By 1668, in fact, the universities of Europe no longer governed the world of learning, or at least those parts of the world inhabited by natural philosophers. In dedicating her work to the universities (see Figure I), and acknowledging their venerable claim to validate learning, Margaret Cavendish was embarking on a patronage strategy. Her tactic revealed not only her own place in the scientific universe, but also how patronage and ideas of scientific community were interacting in the first decade after the establishment of the Royal Society.
The gentleman’s club of the Royal Society Cavendish felt profoundly alienated from the scientific culture of the midcentury in England. Her gender denied her entry to the Royal Society which was, as Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer have pointed out2, constituted as club for gentlemen. As new ideas
Lisa T. Sarasohn is Professor of History at Oregon State University. Her most recent publication is (1996) Gassendi’s Ethics: Freedom in a Mechanistic Universe, Cornell. Her main fields of interest are the history of ideas and the history of science.
130
Endeavour Vol. 23(3) 1999
of scientific community and authority evolved within the Royal Society, Cavendish turned to an older model of social organization to find acceptance for her work and honor for herself. The dedications and prefaces of her many works of natural philosophy, poetry, letters, romances and plays, reveal a sophisticated and self-conscious attempt to gain access to and recognition from the learned community of her time (see Figures 2 and 3), generally by manipulating patronage protocols. She knew that her natural philosophy, which incorporated a theory of matter in motion with a vitalist materialism, needed external validation to be accepted. Such validation could come through patronage3. Patronage was the system of mutual protection, benefits and services that underlay the hierarchical society of early modem Europe4. It defined the relative roles and positions of those who were on the top and those who wanted to rise to the top. Patrons gained status when they had and were acknowledged to have the ability to give protection, including ‘access to tangible and intangible resources’, notably ‘land, office, position, status, and economic opportunity’5. Clients gained all the material benefits offered through patronage, but perhaps more importantly, they gained honor. Patronage ties brought honor to both parties because the status of both patron and client was validated and recognized by being in a position either to give or to be worthy to receive benefits or gifts. In turn, honor, in seventeenth century terms, was a sign of power. Thomas Hobbes, a client of Cavendish’s husband, the Duke of Newcastle, wrote in the Leviathan, ‘To give great gifts to a man is to honour him, because ‘tis buying of protection, and acknowledging of powe9. In a very real way, when Cavendish gave the gift of her book to the universities, she empowered both herself and them. They gained the honor of having their power acknowledged; she gained the honor of the being recognized as a natural philosopher, and a human being capable of thought and action. Cavendish believed that because women
were ‘kept like birds in cages’, they were never given the education men received. Consequently, she lamented, ‘we must needs want the understanding and knowledge [of men] and so consequently [the] prudence, and invention of men; thus . . . we are shut out of all power, and authority . .‘7. In gaining the patronage of the universities, Cavendish would also make her sex worthy of honor and capable of possessing power.
Craving recognition and power Cavendish craved recognition and power in part because she was all too conscious of her own deficiencies (see Figures 2 and 3). She lamented the rudimentary education she had received growing up in the gentry. Until the early 166Os, although she had met Descartes, Hobbes and Gassendi among other natural philosophers, she could claim, ‘I have no acquaintance with old authors, nor no familiarity with the modems, I have received no instructions by learning . ..‘*. Nevertheless, Cavendish made a virtue of necessity, in fact arguing that when modem scholars were so in love with learning and method, they neglected nature. ‘The best natural philosophers are those that have the clearest natural observation, and the least artificial learning’, and can therefore observe nature unobscured by learned notions: they are ‘truly, purely, and rightly natural philosophers’J. In one stroke Cavendish excused her own lack of method, organization and knowledge, and on the other, disparaged other thinkers for just these qualities, and for their dependence on telescopes and microscopes9. This defense of her own reasoning, what she calls a philosophy grounded in sense and reason, also underlay her claim for originality and singularity: her ideas are her own, the ‘child of my brain’ and consequently worthy of honor and acknowledgement. Cavendish did not receive the reception she hoped for from other natural philosophers, even after she began to study their works in the 1660s. Instead, as she reported in her 1664 Philosophical Letters, ‘my named book
0160-9327/99/$ - see front matter 0 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights resewed. PII: SO160-9327(99)01200-4
td MOS’i
THE FAMOUS
UNWERSITY OP
CAMBRIDG.
Figure 1 Dedication to Cavendish’s Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, 1666.
of Philosophy [Philosophical and Physical Opinions71 was accused of obscurity and intricacy’lo. Consequently, she decided to make her meaning clearer in her next volume, while at the same time criticizing the ideas of Hobbes, Descartes, Henry More and Van Helmont. She hoped that ‘by so doing, I have done that, which I would have done unto me; for I am willing to have my opinions contradicted as I do contradict others’ir. In other words, Cavendish, at the same time that she separated herself from other thinkers, from
whom she expected derision, aho sought to be treated in the same manner they treated each other. She longed to be part of the same crowd, who she knew would not take her seriously - even though, at the same time, she disparaged their claims to be true natural philosophers. Her attitude towards her fellow investigators of nature was, to say the least, complex and inconsistent. Cavendish understood that if other natural philosophers would engage her in debate, they would therefore recognize her status as one of themselves, and would treat her with the honor such status deserved: they would acknowledge her power. In her Observations on Experimental Philosophy9 (Figure 4), her most ambitious scientific treatise, Cavendish wrote: I am ambitious of finding out the truth of nature, as an honourable dueler is of gaining fame and repute; for as he will fight with none but an honourable and valiant opposite, so I am resolved to argue with none but those which have the renown of being famous and subtle philosophersi2. Cavendish hoped that she would be taken seriously and seriously challenged by the most subtle and famous natural philosophers: their challenge meant her acceptance, but she knew that such an outcome was unlikely because of her sex. They will perhaps think me an inconsiderable opposite, because I am not of their sex, and therefore strive to hit my opinions with a side-stroke, rather covertly, than openly and directly’*. A question of freedom Indeed, Cavendish insisted that her ability to debate ideas with men was a basic question of freedom. Cavendish argued:
Duchekof Newcafile, cfihu Osalavnrlovr upon EXPEKliUENTAL
Figure 3 Prefactory poem by William Cavendish Duke of Newcastle to Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, 1666.
jurisdiction of the universities in the world of learning; a jurisdiction that Cavendish herself willingly and happily embraced. By privileging the authority and preeminence of the university, Cavendish hoped to subvert the efforts to keep her out of the community of natural philosophers. In particular, Cavendish emphasized the ‘civility’ of the university. She wrote, ‘If a right judgment, and a true understanding, and a respectful civility live any where, it must be in learned universities’. Without their approval, she continued, she would ‘receive so much courtship from the sage society as to bury me in silence’7.
--_-_
and since, in natural philosophy, opinions have freedom, I hope these my opinions may also enjoy the same liberty and privilege that others have, which without great injustice nobody can deny me17.
Figure 2 Frontispiece to Margaret Cavendish’s Poems or Several Fancies, 1668.
The scientific world, according to Cavendish, should be characterized by the free flow of ideas, articulated by individuals who had the freedom to do what they want. In the seventeenth century, lack of restraint, the ability to do what one wanted, was an essential characteristic of the notion of freedom, a privilege associated with free men and gentlemeni3. Freedom was a mark of status and a mark of power. In arguing that her ideas should be accorded the same hearing as others’ ideas, Cavendish implicitly claimed the honor, status, freedom and power of her male counterparts. As in the actual world she was denied this status, Cavendish embarked on her most tangible patronage strategy: an appeal to the universities of Europe, and particularly to the University of Cambridge (Figure 1). As we saw above, Cavendish professed herself astonished that there are ‘some authors of good repute’ who were unwilling to accept the
PHILO,SOPHT.
OB.SERUATIONS UPON
EXPERIMENTAL
PH1LOSOPHYa To whichis added, THE
DESCRIPTION OFA NewBlazingWorld. __--________.WRITTEN
By the ThriieNoble, IlluCnws, andExccllmr
PRINCESSE, THE
Duchefsof Newcaftle, _....._.-.-- -__ L 0
Prinred
N
D
0
N.
by /% Mawell, tn theYear, ,666. --_-__.._
Figure 4 Title page of Cavendish’s Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,
1666.
Endeavour Vol. 23(3) 1999
131
The university as the moderator of civility or polite conversation had the power, according to Cavendish, to admit her within that civilization of the learned. Without its legitimizing power, Cavendish recognized, she would not be courted or included within the society of the sage. The only means of recognition and honor she could gain would be, therefore, through the patronage of the university. As a client in need of a protector, Cavendish elevated the status of the patron she sought, claiming that they were the stars that governed the whole world of the learned. This recognition, in turn, gave that patron - the university the power to elevate her own status and honor. Mutual benefits of patronage The Vice Chancellor of Cambridge wrote to Cavendish in 1668, that the present age ‘will not judge us to be nobodies who such an accomplished Princess hath not refused to make not only the perusers, but even the moderators and judges of her works’14. The implication of Cavendish’s patronage strategy is that since the modem philosophers do not recognize the paramount authority of the schools, they cease to be legitimate, unlike Cavendish who is a legitimate natural philosopher. But her critique of her fellow students of nature goes beyond denying their legitimacy. In Cavendish’s eyes, they are not only irreverent of authority, they are in rebellion against it. They are introducing civil war into the society of the learned, and against the institutions of modem society. In Observations
upon Experimental
Philosophyg,
Cavendish exclaimed: writers are like those unconscionabl “7 men in civil wars, who endeavour to:, pull down the hereditary man&m of noblemen and gentlemen, to build a, cottage of their own; for, so do they pull down the learning of ancient authors, to render themselves famous in composing books of their own. But though this age does ruin palaces, to make cottages, and universities to make private colleges . . . yet I hope God of his mercy will preserve state, church, and schools, from ruin and destructionrs. The charge that natural philosophers were rebels was a grave one during the Restoration, when Charles II had just regained his throne from the rebels and regicides who had governed England during the Civil War. Whether Cavendish made this charge as part of a patronage strategy, or because she actually thought the action of the modem natural philosophers was inimitable to social order, is difficult to determine. It is possible, she was motivated by both concerns. Cavendish, as the wife of an exiled Royalist duke, believed that hierarchy was necessary within society, although her feminism sometimes revealed a more egalitarian attitude. Nevertheless, it was convenient for her to believe in hierarchy in the world of learning,
132
Endeavour Vol. 23(3) 1999
where the universities were the font of authorityr6. Thus, she expressed the hope that ‘the universities’ several studies may be, like several magistrates, united for the good and benefit of the whole commonwealth, nay, the whole world’t7. In this case, the implication is that the modem philosophers are disrupting not only the community of the learned, but are a political danger in the commonwealth that must be contained by the magisterial powers of the university.
I wish from my soul, I might be so happy as to have some means or ways to express my gratitude for your magnificent favours to me, having done me more honour then ever I could expect, or give sufficient thanks for: But your generosity is above all gratitude, and your favour is above all merit, like as your learning is above contradiction: And I pray God your University may flourish to the end of the world21.
New colleges and old universities Once again, we are brought back to the problem of power and who possesses it. Cavendish’s patron, the university, needed to possess the power and authority to legitimize her work and acknowledge her status as a natural philosopher, and, at the same time, control and delegitimize the power and position of the modem thinkers. Cavendish equated the pulling down of palaces to make cottages with the ruin of the universities to make private colleges. This may be an express reference to Gresham College where the Royal Society had been meeting, or to the several proposals to create research colleges, which were circulating in the early 1660s. In 1667, a year after
Notes and references Cavenclish,M. (1668) Grounds of Natural Philosophy, sigs. A2r, A2v, A. Maxwell. I have modernized Cavendish’sspelling and grammar for the sake of clarity Shapin, S. and Schaffer,S. (1985)Leviathan
Observations
on Experimental
Philosophy
was written, the Royal Society itself undertook a project to fund a private college with subscriptions from the general publicI*. Cavendish had attended a meeting of the Royal Society in 1667 as an observer. While Cavendish viewed several experiments, including the weighing of a vacuum, and expressed herself to be ‘full of admiration’, her role in the encounter was entirely passiverg. She was treated as a noble visitor, not as a fellow investigator of nature. Her visit did not translate into support for the institution. Later in 1667, when she was asked to subscribe to a building fund for the new college, she declined the honor20. Thus, at the same time Cavendish was seeking the patronage of the universities to validate her work and reify her status as a natural philosopher, the Royal Society was seeking her patronage to build their new college, but certainly not in return for granting her the honor of being considered one of them. Her only alternative for entrance to the scientific community was to subvert the claim of authority represented by the new practitioners and new institutions of learning. Cavendish believed power should remain in the hands of the traditional hierarchical authority of the universities. Such patrons would find their own honor and status acknowledged in the suit of their client, who would in turn benefit from their fairness and sense of justice, and would not condemn her out of hand because she was a woman, Through this strategy, finally, the authority of the old is vindicated, the presumption of the new is dismissed, and Cavendish’s honor and status is vindicated. And so, in 1664, she wrote to the University of Cambridge:
and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, Princeton University Press
On Cavendish’s natural philosophy, see Sarasohn. L.T. (1984) Huntington Library Quarterly 47,289-307
On patronage, see Biagioli, M. (1993) Galileo Courtier: The Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolutism, University of Chicago Press Peck, L.L. (1990) Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Modem England, pp. 3 and 57, Unwin Hyman Tuck, R. (ed.) (1991) Leviathan, p. 64,
Cambridge University Press Cavendish, M. (1655) Philosophical And Physical Opinions, William Wilson Cavendish, M. (1655) Philosophical And Physical Opinions, Epilogue, William Wilson Cavendish, M. (1666) Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, sig. A3v, A. Maxwell 10 Cavendish M. (1664) Philosophical Letters: or Modest Reflections Upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy, maintained By several Famous and Learned Authors of this Age, Expressed by way of Letters, p. 3, no
publisher given 11 Cavendish, M. (1664) Philosophical Letters,
sig. Blr, A. Maxwell 12 Cavendish, M. (1666) Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, sig. B3v, A. Maxwell 13 Shapin, S. (1994) A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England, pp. 40-52, University of Chicago
Press 14 Various Authors (1678) A Collection of Letters and Poems: Written by Several Persons of Honour and Learning, Upon Divers Important Subjects, to the Late Duke and Dutchess of Newcastle, p. 28, Langley
Curtiss 15 Cavendish, M. (1666) Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, sig. B2r. A. Maxwell 16 On hierarchy in Cavendish’s thought, see Sarasohn, L.T. (1984) Huntington Library Quarterly 47,289-307 17 Cavendish, M. (1666) Philosophical Letters,
sig. A2r, A. Maxwell 18 Hunter, M. (1989) Establishing the New Science: The Experience of the Early Royal Society, pp. 156-157, Boydell Press 19 Mintz, S.I. (1952) Journal of English and German Philology 51, 186-176 20 Hunter, M. (1989) Establishing the New Science: The Experience of the Early Royal Society, pp. 171, Boydell Press 21 Cavendish, M. (1666) Philosophical Letters,
sig. Alv, A. Maxwell