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Marxism, socialism, freedom
JOURNAL
OF COMPARATIVE
ECONOMICS
RADOSLAV SELUCKP, Marxism,
Martin’s
5,
113-
115 (1981)
Socialism,
Freedom.
New York:
St.
Press, 1979. viii + 237 pp., index, $22.50.
The author’s intention is “to offer a general revision of Marxism which would make it possible to re-create, from Marx’s intrinsically contradictory concept, a modern democratic theory of labour-managed systems leading to a rational, humanistic and above all realisable socialism” (p. 117). The book offers a critique of Eastern European socialism on a theoretical plane based upon Selucky’s reading of the classical Marxian works; Selucky is well read in these, and is able to marshal1 an appropriate quotation to bolster every point. It is an oversimplification to say the tension in the argument is between the so-called early, humanistic Marx and the mature Marx as read by Lenin, but perhaps that indicates some of the book’s flavor. The argument is in two parts. The first intends to demonstrate the impossibility of realizing a humanistic, democratic, liberal socialism without using the market; the second part puts forth the author’s model for such a socialist system. The first part is clearer and more tightly argued, at least to this reviewer, and I shall concentrate on it. Marx and Engels believed, as Selucky demonstrates through many quotations, that the market operating on the basis of private property would inevitably generate “exploitation.” (Exploitation is used, without comment, in the Marxian sense, to mean the expropriation of surplus value.) The dilemma is this: it is also the market that has been historically responsible for the individual liberty of participating agents. By abolishing the market, one also thereby abolishes the best guarantee (at least in recent history) of individual freedom. The key point is not the market’s efficiency, but its political prerequisite of freedom. If the market is abolished, power must instead be vested in individuals, which leads to the bureaucratic power of modern socialist regimes. (A Marx quotation from the Grundrisse: “Rob the thing of this social power and you must give it to persons to exercise over persons.“) Why cannot the market be abolished without leading to loss of freedom? There are, in fact, three conditions that bring about markets: (1) scarcity, (2) the social division of labor, and (3) autonomy of agents. Contemporary socialist experiments have attempted to excise (3) by abolishing private property in the means of production. But since (1) and (2) can hardly be abolished by plan, market forces reassert themselves in any case. 113
0147-5%7/81/010113-03$02.00/O Copyright Q 1981 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any fom reserved.
114
BOOK
REVIEWS
(Less abstractly: it is utopian to believe that people will work for social good, and not pursue their self-interest, if these are in conflict, so long as scarcity prevails.) This is the first Marxian error in its prescription to eliminate the market. (A suberror: one does not necessarily eliminate autonomy by eliminating private property. Marx here confused form with content.) The second error involves the confusion in the analogy between the individual factory and society as a whole. Since the factory is operated internally by plan, why cannot society by organized as one big factory, and run according to plan? Here Selucky discusses the crucial distinction between the social and detail division of labor. Workers within one factory, engaged in the detail division of labor, do not produce use-values in process; only at the end of the process does the commodity emerge. Workers in different factories, however, each produce a use-value, eligible for trade. This distinction destroys the analogy between society and the factory. “As long as the social division of labor and scarcity prevail, it would scarcely be possible to eliminate exchange of products in accordance with the principle of equivalence, . . . to overcome man’s objective dependence on exchange-value” (p. 33). Selucky goes on to critique Eastern European socialist variants, in Marxist terms. (1) The worker continues to be a detail worker, and (2) he still works under the pressure of external necessity. These two factors contribute to traditional Marxian alienation. Moreover, the worker is alienated from his wages as well as his labor, because his wages in general do not command the use-values he would like to acquire (no apartments, etc.). Thus objective scarcity increases alienation in spite of the abolition of private ownership. In this discussion, the author seems to overlook one decisive way in which workers in Eastern European countries are liberated from the “pressure of external necessity”-there is fulI employment. Labor power is no longer a commodity in the usual sense as there is essentially no problem in realizing its sale. Selucky also invokes Marxian historical materialism to point out the dilemma of socialist practice. The superstructure is determined by the economic base. As long as the economic base is not sufficiently developed to eliminate scarcity, the superstructure will reflect this: it must develop techniques to resolve competition for scarce resources in society. (Marx and Engels and Lenin all realized this, in stating that the prerequisite for communism is the abolition of scarcity.) Lenin’s solution was to bring the superstructure into harmony with the reality of scarcity with his political theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Selucky claims this is a theory unique to Lenin; for Marx the dictatorship of the proletariat meant something else entirely. The second part of the book discusses political theory, and puts forth the author’s prerequisites for a nonexploitative society. Society must
BOOKREVIEWS
115
“maximize negative freedom” (the freedom from coercion of man by positive freedom” (the freedom to develop one’s man), “maximize creativity, etc.), and “maximize social welfare.” I find this discussion too abstract and at times quite unprecise. (For instance, how can one maximize three things at once? But Selucky on p. 208 informs us opaquely: “A theory may deal with maximization only. Whether maximization evolves into optimization depends on the chosen economic and social policies.“) It seems there is arbitrariness as to what constitutes exploitation. Suppose inequality arises due to the differential ownership of intangible assets (skills) under socialism. Will this not perhaps come to be viewed as exploitative inequality? What are the crucial distinctions between this form of private property and the alienable form? Thus, although the discussion is abstract, it is not sufficiently general. Another example of logical weakness: ‘I. . . self-managed work units maximize income per employee. Hence, the element of labour self-management pursues, by definition, maximization of social welfare” (p. 208). These sentences do not even prove that individual income maximization leads to Pareto efficiency, much less to a social-welfare optimum. Based upon his “democratic revision” of Marxism, Selucky presents a 16-point constitution for democratic socialism. Labor must be the sole source of income; social ownership of the means of production does not reside in the state; the market operates between enterprises, and to satisfy final demand, except for the provision of health, education and welfare services, utilities, the arts, culture, and science; participation in direct management of work units operating in the market derives from work; participation in management of nonmarket enterprises derives from labor, ownership, and consumption of the services in question; etc. Political parties must be of the democratic noncentralist type. While this reader was not convinced that the conclusion (of a democratic, nonexploitative society) followed from the premises, the author must be given credit for having the audacity to suggest a solution. Certainly the critical, as opposed to positive, section of the book is rewarding, in developing a clear and quite general analysis of the contradictions in the Marxian prescription for socialist development. This part of the book undoubtedly derives its strength from the author’s familiarity with the concrete detail of Eastern European socialism. Moreover, since the book is written by one who clearly considers himself a Marxist, it comes across as a serious effort to search for a solution, rather than a “critical criticism” that would be satisfied with an impossibility theorem for the existence of socialism. JOHN Yale New
University Haven, Connecticut
06520
E.ROEMER
OF COMPARATIVE
ECONOMICS
RADOSLAV SELUCKP, Marxism,
Martin’s
5,
113-
115 (1981)
Socialism,
Freedom.
New York:
St.
Press, 1979. viii + 237 pp., index, $22.50.
The author’s intention is “to offer a general revision of Marxism which would make it possible to re-create, from Marx’s intrinsically contradictory concept, a modern democratic theory of labour-managed systems leading to a rational, humanistic and above all realisable socialism” (p. 117). The book offers a critique of Eastern European socialism on a theoretical plane based upon Selucky’s reading of the classical Marxian works; Selucky is well read in these, and is able to marshal1 an appropriate quotation to bolster every point. It is an oversimplification to say the tension in the argument is between the so-called early, humanistic Marx and the mature Marx as read by Lenin, but perhaps that indicates some of the book’s flavor. The argument is in two parts. The first intends to demonstrate the impossibility of realizing a humanistic, democratic, liberal socialism without using the market; the second part puts forth the author’s model for such a socialist system. The first part is clearer and more tightly argued, at least to this reviewer, and I shall concentrate on it. Marx and Engels believed, as Selucky demonstrates through many quotations, that the market operating on the basis of private property would inevitably generate “exploitation.” (Exploitation is used, without comment, in the Marxian sense, to mean the expropriation of surplus value.) The dilemma is this: it is also the market that has been historically responsible for the individual liberty of participating agents. By abolishing the market, one also thereby abolishes the best guarantee (at least in recent history) of individual freedom. The key point is not the market’s efficiency, but its political prerequisite of freedom. If the market is abolished, power must instead be vested in individuals, which leads to the bureaucratic power of modern socialist regimes. (A Marx quotation from the Grundrisse: “Rob the thing of this social power and you must give it to persons to exercise over persons.“) Why cannot the market be abolished without leading to loss of freedom? There are, in fact, three conditions that bring about markets: (1) scarcity, (2) the social division of labor, and (3) autonomy of agents. Contemporary socialist experiments have attempted to excise (3) by abolishing private property in the means of production. But since (1) and (2) can hardly be abolished by plan, market forces reassert themselves in any case. 113
0147-5%7/81/010113-03$02.00/O Copyright Q 1981 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any fom reserved.
114
BOOK
REVIEWS
(Less abstractly: it is utopian to believe that people will work for social good, and not pursue their self-interest, if these are in conflict, so long as scarcity prevails.) This is the first Marxian error in its prescription to eliminate the market. (A suberror: one does not necessarily eliminate autonomy by eliminating private property. Marx here confused form with content.) The second error involves the confusion in the analogy between the individual factory and society as a whole. Since the factory is operated internally by plan, why cannot society by organized as one big factory, and run according to plan? Here Selucky discusses the crucial distinction between the social and detail division of labor. Workers within one factory, engaged in the detail division of labor, do not produce use-values in process; only at the end of the process does the commodity emerge. Workers in different factories, however, each produce a use-value, eligible for trade. This distinction destroys the analogy between society and the factory. “As long as the social division of labor and scarcity prevail, it would scarcely be possible to eliminate exchange of products in accordance with the principle of equivalence, . . . to overcome man’s objective dependence on exchange-value” (p. 33). Selucky goes on to critique Eastern European socialist variants, in Marxist terms. (1) The worker continues to be a detail worker, and (2) he still works under the pressure of external necessity. These two factors contribute to traditional Marxian alienation. Moreover, the worker is alienated from his wages as well as his labor, because his wages in general do not command the use-values he would like to acquire (no apartments, etc.). Thus objective scarcity increases alienation in spite of the abolition of private ownership. In this discussion, the author seems to overlook one decisive way in which workers in Eastern European countries are liberated from the “pressure of external necessity”-there is fulI employment. Labor power is no longer a commodity in the usual sense as there is essentially no problem in realizing its sale. Selucky also invokes Marxian historical materialism to point out the dilemma of socialist practice. The superstructure is determined by the economic base. As long as the economic base is not sufficiently developed to eliminate scarcity, the superstructure will reflect this: it must develop techniques to resolve competition for scarce resources in society. (Marx and Engels and Lenin all realized this, in stating that the prerequisite for communism is the abolition of scarcity.) Lenin’s solution was to bring the superstructure into harmony with the reality of scarcity with his political theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Selucky claims this is a theory unique to Lenin; for Marx the dictatorship of the proletariat meant something else entirely. The second part of the book discusses political theory, and puts forth the author’s prerequisites for a nonexploitative society. Society must
BOOKREVIEWS
115
“maximize negative freedom” (the freedom from coercion of man by positive freedom” (the freedom to develop one’s man), “maximize creativity, etc.), and “maximize social welfare.” I find this discussion too abstract and at times quite unprecise. (For instance, how can one maximize three things at once? But Selucky on p. 208 informs us opaquely: “A theory may deal with maximization only. Whether maximization evolves into optimization depends on the chosen economic and social policies.“) It seems there is arbitrariness as to what constitutes exploitation. Suppose inequality arises due to the differential ownership of intangible assets (skills) under socialism. Will this not perhaps come to be viewed as exploitative inequality? What are the crucial distinctions between this form of private property and the alienable form? Thus, although the discussion is abstract, it is not sufficiently general. Another example of logical weakness: ‘I. . . self-managed work units maximize income per employee. Hence, the element of labour self-management pursues, by definition, maximization of social welfare” (p. 208). These sentences do not even prove that individual income maximization leads to Pareto efficiency, much less to a social-welfare optimum. Based upon his “democratic revision” of Marxism, Selucky presents a 16-point constitution for democratic socialism. Labor must be the sole source of income; social ownership of the means of production does not reside in the state; the market operates between enterprises, and to satisfy final demand, except for the provision of health, education and welfare services, utilities, the arts, culture, and science; participation in direct management of work units operating in the market derives from work; participation in management of nonmarket enterprises derives from labor, ownership, and consumption of the services in question; etc. Political parties must be of the democratic noncentralist type. While this reader was not convinced that the conclusion (of a democratic, nonexploitative society) followed from the premises, the author must be given credit for having the audacity to suggest a solution. Certainly the critical, as opposed to positive, section of the book is rewarding, in developing a clear and quite general analysis of the contradictions in the Marxian prescription for socialist development. This part of the book undoubtedly derives its strength from the author’s familiarity with the concrete detail of Eastern European socialism. Moreover, since the book is written by one who clearly considers himself a Marxist, it comes across as a serious effort to search for a solution, rather than a “critical criticism” that would be satisfied with an impossibility theorem for the existence of socialism. JOHN Yale New
University Haven, Connecticut
06520
E.ROEMER