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Media: The coupling of cognition and communication
I)( Poetics 22 (1994) 497-5t)7
t-:l~gEVI ER
Media: The coupling of cognition and communication Siegfried J. S c h m i d t LUMIS-bzstitut, Unirers#iit-GH Siegen, P.O. Box 101240, D-57068 Siegen, Germany
Abstract
In the framework of a constructivist epistemology the argument is developed that the operationally distinct systems cognition and communication are structurally coupled by the media system. Consequently, theories of text, communication, meaning or understanding have to classify how these three systems (cognition, communication, media) operate and interact while preserving their operational autonom:y.
1. Introduction
In scholarly discourses, cognition and communication are, with good reason, sharply distinguished from each other. Cognition is theoretically related to the domain of the brain, while communication is related to the domain of social interactions. Yet ovr experience tells us that communication presupposes cognitive activities and vice versa - a presupposition which is implicit in the notion of understanding. We also know that communication requires 'instruments' or ' m e d i a which must be produce6 (uttered and distributed), received (understood) and post-processed (e.g. commentea on) by competent actors in order for social interaction to take place. Thus we are faced with three conceptually distinguishable domains: cognition, communication, and media - and at the same time we are left with the question of how these domains interact. Although each of these domains has been dealt with for decades by the respective research disciplines, this question remains unanswered, perhaps for the reason that such an answer requires intensive interdisciplinary efforts and presupposes a homogeneous epistemological and methodological basis as well as an appropriate terminological apparatus.
" This paper has been presented at the 3rd IGEL-Conference in Memphis. A more extended argumentation of this subject is now available in German in: S.J. Schmidt, AOgnilit'e .4utonomie und soziale Orientierung. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1994. ()3()4-422X/94/$1)7.()() ,,) i~94 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved SSDI 0 3 1 ) 4 - 4 2 2 X ( 0 4 ) ( ) 0 ( ) 2 3 - 9
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Of course I shall not be able : o solve this problem in what follows. Nevertheless I'll try to outline a possible answer based on a constructivist epistemology.
2. Cognition: A constructive process It seems obvious that our brain has primarily to fulfill the task of producing behavior that guarantees the survival (,f the organism. Normally, behavior is meaningful for an organism, and the brain has to produce this meaningful behavior. Furthermore, we all experience mental states such as perceptions, ideas or sensations as meaningful states. Tod~y~ neuroscientists generally accept that these mental states are consen~ually related to processes in the brain (cf. Roth. 1992: 104). In this rc:,pect cognition ha:~ to be regarded as a biological phenomenon (Mamrana, 1982) determined by the conditions under which biological systems, espccia!!y the central ne~'ous sy.st~.m,- exist and function. Influences from the environment act upon cognitive systems in terms of activations which give rise to so!f-organizing neuronal processes resulting in the cognitive production of ;n¢,,,,-'~+~,~,,. wh~,~, ,-,,.,-,. . . . . ~ ,.,.,. . . . . . .o,,,,.,;a to be ~,~n¢,-,.,,~,,~.,;,,,, for two ,,~+,-,,~" ¢-,~ receptors (sensory organs) signal to the brain the presence or absence of stimuli and their intensity, but they do not indicate their 'nature'. Accordingly, the activities of neuronal cells are not specific regarding the source and nature of the incitations. It follows that all perceptions concerning their modaiities, their primmy and secondary, qualities, and their intensities are not directly connected to the properties of environmental events, but are cognitive constructs, though by no means arbitrary ones (Roth, 1992:119); (b) as Roth explains, the meaning of an event for a cognitive systen~ results from previously constructed, ,system-dependent meani~qgs and from meaning-c,.mtexts, i.e. the system's history of making meaning. Roth conc!udes" "'Meanings produce meaI~hlgs: this is the fundamental self-:eferentialitv of semantics, which constitutes the cognitive organization of the brain" (ibid." 110; my transl.), in other words: meaning can be theoretically modelled in lcv~as ~ it~c .. !icc~, that a physicochemical event triggers inside a cognitive system (ibid.: 11l). Not all neuronal operations lead to conscious states, but nothing becomes conscious in the absence o1! an underlying neuronal process. In the meantime, the constructive activity of the brain's proces~es is a wellaccepted biological hypothesis. Psychologists, too, have since long opted for a similar hypothesis: already in the twenties and thirties Gestalt psychologists such as W. K6hler and W. Metzger showed that visual perception, for example, does not represent the outer world like a photograph. The order consructec~t "" by the perceptual system depends on its own organization and orocedures, and not so much on the outer woIid. This hypothesis is backed, for example, by cases ~;f figure-ground reversibility, the m ,ltistability of forms and directions of motion, by scmatntic and Icxica] ambiguities, and s~ on (l'or details sce Kruse, 1988). Together with many other brain researchers, Roth holds the view that our phenomenal world or actuality is a construct of our cognitive system. Actuality engiobes everything we can experience- sensory perceptions, thoughts, emotions,
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ideas, etc. The differep~tiation of actuality into thre ~, domains, xiz. the environment, the body, and mental states, also results from a se!gdifferent~,~tion of our central nervous system in its ontogenesis. This differentia ion, which is decisive for our surviv:d, happens on ~he basis of our sensorimotoric interact:on wi'h the environmen~, e,~en it these domains appear to us as being oh~ologicaliy di',tif~ct. Tl;e hypothesis of a self-organizing construction c¢, our experiertial world(s) entaii,4 another hyp(thesis, which can be formulated in terms of a ,tistinction betwe,m 'reality' and 'actuality'. 'Actuality' d,:signates our world of experience. 3-'his woI!d is constructed by our real brain, wh,ch is cognitively inaccessible to us since the constr~actor of our actuality cann¢,t be contained in itself. Accordingly, we have to post'alate a strict separadon bet~veen reality, which is ccgnitively inaccessib!~ Out has to be presu, ~, which is constructed by posed as existing a| least for logical reasons, and actual:o, the real brain.
3. Systems and distinctions The essential message of constructivism can also be approached from quite a different angle, namely a logic of distinction. Spencer Brown (1972) has formally characterized perception and knowledge as the introduction ant' processing of distinctions in(to) a previously unmarked space. For Spencer Brown, drawing a distinction (i.e. marking a difference) prepares its designation, which in turn is integrated into a tramework or system of desigm~tions. The first d;,~tinction is a basic operation that cannot be cancelled. It establishes a fundament tl asymmetry. since afterwards we can only observe one side of the distinctio.~; either we continue our operations there, or we apply the distinction to itself. Every observation has a so-called blind spot. That is to say, the distinction applied cannot bc observed at the same time and in the same process of obser~'ation. Only by changing the perspective, i.e. by acting as a second order observer, ca:~ blind spots of a first-order observation be observed - and this at the cost of giving rise to different blind spots that second-order observations make use of. Drawing distinctions depends on observations, and observations depend on observational systems. All distioctions are contingent in the sense that they depend upon systems' activities: "The environment does not contain distinctions. It is like it is" (yon Foerster, 1985: 93; my transl.). But no distinction is drawn arbitrarily, s~nce all systems are determined by the evolution of their species and by previous experiences, by knowledge, memory, emotional orientation and, above all, by language and communication. All these factors together confine the arbitrariness and contingency of the processes whereby we draw and name distinctions. Consequently, we have to draw two conclusions: (1) Perception and cognition introduce syst,~m-dcpendc~lt distinction:; into the c~vi~onmcnt and process these distinctions, but they do not and cannot objectively represent the environment as such. (2) This construction of actualities (or system-dependent worlds of experience) is confined in its contingen~:y and arbitrariness by social systems which
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emerge based on commonly shared (or collective) knowledge, e.g. schemata, genres, rites, discourses, cultural patterns, etc., the enculturation, transmission, and legitimation of which is predominantly realized via communication.
4. Communication The more we have learned about the multifarious aspects of human communication in the la~: decades, the more we have had to realize that communication is a matter of whole human beings, acting in their personal and social situations. We have learned that communication cannot - as technical models of communication claim - be reduced to an exchange of information. Communication has, at least, two faces, for it involves both contents and the social relations between communicators. Communication is not only a matter of offering messages; it also raises the claim that messages are relevant and can rightly call on others' attention and "understanding'. Communication fails when partners consider the mcs, a~e irrelevant or false and when they :eject the claim tier ztttcntion and 'understam|ing" as +mnortinont
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difficult presuppositions. It is not enough to master the language in question. Communicational partners must also mutually presume that they are willing to communicate and that they arc sincere: they have to recognize the type of discourse they are engaged in if they are deciding what is expected in a certain situation: they have to master the rules of genres, styles and metaphors; they have to recognize and realize the social structure of a communicative situation in order to evaluate sequences of role-taking and to master relevant lexical registers; if communicators arc to get a ~ufficiently clear idea of the others' intentions, dispositions, beliefs, emotions, etc., they must also be ablc to realize and to interpret what happens on the non-verbal channel of communication (facial expressions, gesturcs, etc.). People are able to communicate precisely because they do not simply exchange i~-~(c,,.~ ~ti,,~. but because they construct thoughts or information by processing the devices that texts or other media offer. But what the media offer never determines the result a s.pcaker~' ~ has intended in a predictable or causal way. Once we assume that our communication partners are autonomous and self-organizing cognitive systems, communication is a matter of offering and accepting the chance of cognitive changes which come into our conscious awareness in terms of information we can successfully process. Were communication really nothing more than an exchange of information it would be a terrible instrument of social control. In that ca:;e it would be impossible to oppose communication, which would simply overwhelm us. I shall make a few' remarks about communication through the (mass) media, wherc the rct]cxivity o1: percolation, attention, and interaction is missing. As is well known, the print media have in the past made possible an increase in communication. Experience could be accumulated and stored for later use; messages reached a potentially unlimited public; topics and opinions could be highly
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differentiated (for details see e.g. Ong, 1982). The moderr, mass media render the physical presence of communicators more or less dispensable. The reflexivity of perception, attention, and interaction, which is essential to face-to-face communication, is now replaced by two other reflexive structures, namely the reflexivity of expectation and knowledge. Communicators anticipate the expectations of imagined recipients, who in turn reconstruct the expectations of the communicator regarding their own expectations. The establishment of a reflexive knowledge structure leads to a situation in which a recipient knows that the communicator knows what he or she knows. This requires, of course, commonly shared knowledge as well as additional opinions about how to manage and to interpret this knowledge (for details see Merten, 1977: 138).
5. M e d i a a n d t h e c o u p l i n g p r o b l e m
With regard to the discussion of the media I propose to introduce some basic distinctions: ,.,-,,,,,,~,,,;,~,,~l;7,~n ,.,~,,~,.;~! ,.f ,-nm,,.,,,,;,-o,;,.,, t-~ . S °,, natural !o,,~,,,~,,,~o~. - technical devices of communication (e.g. camera, screen, microphone); - the social systems in and by which modern mass media communicational devices are organized and where economic, political, social, technical, and legal aspects of the use o mass media are settled (e.g. broadcasting stations or publishing houses). The~;e may be called media systems. According tc, the relevant technical device, media systcma can be typoic~gized as orint systems, ~roadcast systems, television systems, etc. The sum total of all these media systems forms the global mass media system of a society By means of self-organized interaction, the subsystems of the global media system mutually define their possible functions. This definition is of course historically flexible. According to their internal modes of operation, media systems produce media offerings such as books, films, radio plays, etc., all of which belong to genres and are related to familiar discourses. In modern mass media societies media systems exert an increasing influence on the construction of actuality by individual and s3cial systems for the very reason that they do not simply transfer information. Instead, media systems piuduce public opinion by selecting among possible messages, thereby establishing public domains of information. Media systems suggest - via concentration and emphasis - which topics dominate pubiic communication, thus setting agendas. Only rarely can recipients of the media's offerings compare them to their own experience. The media increasingly stage 'reality' as well as 'fiction' and influence the elaboration of patterns of perception and experience in a ~,,_,._~,'o;~'t,.,by means of the selection, concentration, and staging of media offerings. Finally, media systems produce motives for social and individual constructions of reality; tiley display life~;t~'lcs and mediate emotions and dispositions. Media offerings initiate communication whenever cognitive systems are willing to react to offerings; in other words, the offerings set cognitive processes in motion ~UI
1 1 1 1 1 I..1111~.., ILl. L 1 , . . . / 1 1
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without determining the results. In this respect, media offerings provide a structural coupling of cognition and communication. 'Structural coupling' means that two systems which are operationally closed and therefore unable to couple themselves operationally or to form ,. common :;upersystem can become mutually dependent, i.e. they inilucncc their internal structural formation, and trigger the actualization of internal meaning structures. Structural coupling means that the operations of system 1, in case and insofar as they are observed by a system 2, influence the actualization of structural formations in system 1 (Baecker, 1992). Speaking metaphorically, Luhmann has characterized structural coupling as follows: "Communicative systems can only be stimulated by cognitive systems; cognitive systems automatically pay attention to everything that is communicated 'L,y language" (1988: 839!'.; my transl.). Media offerings couple cognition and communication because they themselves are neither cognitions nor communications, but can be operationally transformed into either system for the purposes of system specific orders or Eigenvalues.
6. On Kommunikat-conslrucfion
At the beginning of this paper | emphasized the distinction between cognition, communication, and media. I tried to provide evidence tk~r modelling these three domains as self-organizing and opci ationally closed systems. Media offerings seem to bridge the gaps between cognition and communicati~m since both domains are, so to speak, invoked in their production; both can transform them into systemspecific operations. Scpar~ttizlg these three ,t~mlains requires that they be described with different terminologies, and this in turn requires the introduction of a number of distincrictus. A first distinctitm distinguishes bctwcci~ media offerings as material givens ({c~:!>. m~>ic,<, c~c:} :~nd as c~v,sciously perceived entities. With regard to texts, conceived as verbal media offerings, the distinction in question can bc expressed as the difference between texts and what we call Kommunikat-bases (cf. Schmidt, 1982). According to the episte~aological hypotheses as developed above, the process of perception has to be modelled as a constructive process (and not as a mere duplication) in which structures are actively built over perceived materials, and semantic properties are attributed to and not simply teken from a Kommunikat-basis. Evidently observers make use of Kommunikat-bas, s in the cognitive construction of 'meaning': but neither texts nor Kommunikat-bases determine this cognitive process in a forecastable way, nor do they sharply constrain their results. In thc terminoh~gy I pr{~pose this process is labeled as Kommunikat-pmduction. Kommunikat-production is theoretically modelled as a complex cognitive process triggered by the perception of texts as Kommunikat-bases. Due to the transitory nature of cognitive processes, Kommunikat-production cannot be reproduced
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identically even if the same text is processed. Normally Kommunikat-productions are not accompanied by (conscious) internal observation -- as long as the process continues without interruptions. At this level texts are not there to be 'understood'; instead they trigger the continuation of cognitive operations. For a cognitive system a text does not contain or transport 'meanings'; instead, the cognitive system attributes 'meanings' to a Kommunikat-basis via cognitive (self-)orientation. These 'meanings' are necessarily subject-dependent (but not subjective). The sequence of cognitive self-orientations is normally influenced by the sequence of perceived components of the Kommunikat-basis, since normally we have learned to read sequentially. Nevertheless, it depends entirely on the cognitive system how this sequence is clustered, which cognitive operations are triggered by the perception of a text, and which emotions accompany this cognitive process. The process of Kommunikat-production is not simply arbitrary. In the course of socialization, text-segmentation and the formation of expectations concerning functions of text-segments (words, phrases, etc.), are highly conventionalized. Thus, for a fluent speaker, the conviction arises that it is the text itself that informs its hermeneutics (see Scherner, 1989). This conviction is the automatic result of successful verbal socialization, for the acquisition of linguistic competence occurs in a long-lasting process which is strictly governed by commands and prohibitions. Learning his or her mother tongue, a child acquires not only a system of signs plus a grammar, but also an extremely sensitive instrument for coupling cognitive, semiotic, and social activities. The child learns to master a language in the total life context, and in so doing, he or she learns to live. The expcrience that others use semiotic materials more or less the same way we do confirms and stabilizes the social regulations of language use, giving it a basis in collective knowledge. Thus we gain the impression that textual elements themselves possess stable "meanings'. This collective knowledge concerning socially acceptable ways of using language, stabilized via reflexivity, serves as a basis for expected inter-individuality of both cognitive and communicative processes. ]~n 3ther words, linguistic socialization and the social self-regulation of communication give rise to the collective fiction that 'normal' communicators make use of language in a similar way. In cases where this mutual expectation is not satisfied, society disposes of three emergency categories: deceit, illness, and art/literature. gommunikat-productions are always integrated into the autopoiesis of a living system. Analytically this process can be characterized by three aspects: a rational aspect of informational self-orientation; an emotional aspect of Lust-Unlust-equilibration; and a pragmatic aspect of evaluating the relevance of cognitive processes for the autopoiesis of the system. These three aspects are interrelated in a self-referential way. From this interrelation emerges what comes to our consciousness as information when we process a text. If we try to characterize in some detail which factors can be analytically distinguished in Kommunikat-production, we might starl by postulating several dimensions which supposedly interact; there are: (1) media offerings, i.e. conventionalized triggers of Kommunikat-production processes;
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(2) dispositional factors related to the life histories of the receivers, e.g. expectations concerning aims and intended subsequent activities, cost-benefit-considerations hypotheses concerning the intentions of producers of media offerings, etc.; requirements concerning a treatment of specific media offerings, biographical, contextual or situational conditions bearing on the process of Kommunikat-construction, and so on; (3) cognitive dispositions, e.g. the state of refinement of respective individual actuality-constructions; memory capacities; informedness regarding special discourses; degrees of tolerance regarding discrepancies and complexity, affective states, interests, etc. (cf. Friih, 1980); (4) conventions, e.g. speech act, literary, and social conventions; (5) strategies, e.g. strategies for establishing macro-structures, inference- and elaboration-strategies, reading strategies, etc. Hov, these kinds of factors interact will vary according to socialization, biographical situation, social status, and so on. It seems re'~sonable to assume that this interplay happens with different degrees of consciousness; in other words, the cognitive system can never fully observe, command, and control this process. If cognitive syst~,rns can reasonably be modelled as autonon,ous systems which are operationally cJosed, then the process of Komraunikat-construction can be modelled in terms of self-organization. Kommunikats result or emerge from a self-referential concatenation of various cognitive operations by which intellectual, affective~ associative and pragmatic components are integrated and at the same time evaluated. Kommunikats are thus attributed to a Kommunikat-basis according to the operative functions conv.ected with its processing in cognitive domains. The concept of language behind what I'm saying can be described as follows: as a system of signs, language is a f.ystem of designated distinctions. Language as a system of designated distinction, s does not copy the ,,'nvironment; instead, it serves as one instrument of the social construction of actuality in or through the individual. In other word.,;, if elements of languaf;e aie used referentially, they actualize kn~wlcdgc arid do not refer to non-lin~'.uistic entities (apart from the restricted case of proper names). Accordingly, the semantics of language may be dcscliI?cd as tt system of tools to connect designat,ed distinctions in(side) cognitive and communicative systems ( = discourses). Insofar and as long as a string of signs cognitively and communicatively triggers such cennective operations in a socially regulated way it is 'meaningful'.
7. Kommunikat vs. lneaning
It follows from my argument that the cognitive processes triggered by the perception of texts (or other media offerings) have been subsumed under tile notion 'Kommunikat'. ,,ks a result, the two concepts traditionally assigned to "cccption, namely "understanding' and ~meaning', are freed for other uses. 1 propose to distinguish between 'Kommunikat' and 'meaning' as follows: whereas Kommunikats are conceived of as the results of cognitive operations, meanings can
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be defined as those communications which communicators consensually (i.e. based on collective knowledge) assign to components of texts or other media offerings. In other words, meanings result from communicative.• interactions according to linguistic rules and conventions i~ specific contc'xts. The question whether ,3r not (subject-dependent) Kommunik~ts are equivalent to (social) meanings cannot be answered since these domains are separate. In both domains the question that really matters is whether' a text has been treated such that cognition and communication can be properly continued, i.e. followed up in such a way that subsequent operations correspond to the e~,pectations of the respective systems. The degree of correspondence defines the de.gre~ of what is traditionally called 'understandins'.
8. On understanding Here we have to realize that the difference between ur, derstanding and misunderstanding does not belong to tile domain of cognition, but to that of communica tion, i.e. that of the external observers of the (implicitly~ presupposed cognitive processes. Consensus regarding Kommunikats can only be established at the le~,el of communication. And thi~ consensus manifests compatibiiities and fulfilled relations between communications, not at all 'objectively correct text-understanding'. Consequently, what is called 'understanding' may be fi.lrther specified as the interface between cognition and communication. This leads us to another important distinctiGn, namely betv, een 'Kommunika~production' and 'understanding', where 'understanding ' is regarded as an observa. liional category. Strictly speaking the one who 'un0erstands' cannot ~ay '! ,~nderstand', unless he or she in a way simulates a communicational situation in which hc or she as an internal observer communicates the difference between operation and observation. Following this line of argumentation the discovery of "the correct meaning' of a text is an implausible goal. Semantic objecl!ivity is not something we should be after. Instead, c,n the level of Kommunikat-produc~ion, we t~' to achieve satisfying cognitive results (or mental states) which we hold to be meaningful, coherent, and appropria'~e, whereas - on the social level of communication - t h e issue is whether listener5 match the expectations of speakers. In this respect, understanding is a social achievement~ Consequently, understanding has to be regarded as a means of social cont:oi over individual cognition. It is an imerplay between cognitive aut~ nomy al:d social regulation, and thus becomes a political fact. Understanding depends on powar-relations and on 'symbolic capital' in the 'ling~listic market' - to evoke the terms ef Bourdieu - which determine who is able to impose his or her communicative expectations on others. As communicating individuals prefer to be understood, they try to anticipate the expectations of their partpers. This renders cognitive processes of Kommunikat-production highly socially imprinted opera' ions. Understanding reinforces cognitive behavior, which leads in turn to successful understanding, This explains, perhaps, why autonomous cognitive systems r~evertheless 'understand each other'.
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9. Two terminologies Summarizing the previously presented arguments we now dispose of two distinct sets of concepts that can be used to analyze cognition, on the one hand, and communication on the other. structural coupling social systems communications
I
u nde rstandi ng meaning ....
[
cognitive systems cognitions
I I Kommunikat
Kom mu n ikat-p rod uct ion
i
m e d ia o ffe r ings ......
I
10. Some consequences for empirical research Although I cannot fully [bresee the consequences of this approach for research in literary studies and in psychology, some of lhe implications are fairly obvious. Science is located at the level of communication, since it is organized as a social system. At this level scientists do not deal with stable realities, but with communicatively stabilized descriptions (in Maturana's terms) of distinctions (in Spencer Brown's terms). 'Empirical research' can bc modelled as the production of logical, pragmatic, and social stabilities (sensu Kruse, 1088) that scientists deal with, as if they were independen~ obiects. In this ~espect empirical research is, of course, possible in psychology as well as in literary studies. But this research does not reveal the 'real nature of consciousness'. Instead it constitutes communicative stabilities consistent with criteria of scientific communication. Whatever contributes ~o the constitution of these stabilities in a substantial way is regarded as a '['act' according to contexts and criteria. The method of "thinking aloud', for example, does not provide 'raw data' from the cognitive domain, but communicative constructs of cognitive operations which are then useful for methodically controlled activities (e.g. content analyses) that are consensually accepted. ]n empirical experiments psychologists t~' to get cognitive ~ystcms to ini~ervene - according to their possibilities and wire,out big time lags - in the system of science. The time-factor is important since cognitive processes are '~qstablc and ephemeral events, whereas communication tries to establish duration and repeatability in order to come back to past conlmunicative events and to 'latch' them o~to actually occurring events.
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Scientific constructs (paradigms, theories, models, concepts) are important insofar as they have effects on scientific communication - their objective truth' is not a question we can decide. With regard to the problem of understanding, this latter consideration implies that theories of understanding become the more empirical the more they methodically and operationally motivate cognitive systems to produce communications, the alleged domain of reference of which is consciousness. A theory of understanding is empirical to the degree that it stabilizes these communications by means of consensual follow-up operations. With respect to interpretation, which is still regarded as the main task of literary scholars, the consequences are far-reaching: talk aoout 'the meaning of literary texts' should be understood as 'talk about social operations called understanding'. In other words, the social construction of the meanings attributed to a literary work o[ art characterizes discourses more than it reveals the work's 'true meaning'. These discourses have to be related to the social system of literature, to its institutions, norms, power structures, and so on. There is no 'innocent' work-immanent interpretation of literature, just as there is no neutral or objective historiography of literature. Literary scholars would, I think, be well advised to realize that their discipline can only become a social science as a branch of general media studies. Whether this advice will be accepted is up to the future.
References Baecker, Dirk, 1992. Die Unterscheidung zwischen Kommunikation und BewuBtsein. In: W. Krohn and G. KiJppers (eds.), Emergenz: Die Entstehung yon Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutung, 217-26X. Flankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Foerster. [teinz yon, 1985. Sicht und Einsicht. Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Vie ~,'eg. Friih, ~,Verner, 198(~. Lesen. Verstehen, Urtcilen. Untersuchungen iJber den Zusammenhang yon Textgestaltung und Textwirkung Frciburg/MiJnchen: Alber. Eruse, Peter, IOSg. Stabilitfit, Instabili!iit, Mullistabilit:,il. Selb,:torganisatio~l und Selbstreferenti,dit:,it in kognitl~,en Sy~,terncn. DELFIN I1, 35-57. Eul~mann, Niklas, 1988. Wle ist BewuJ:Itsein an Kommunikation bcteiiigt? In: H.U. Gumbrccht and K.L. Pfeiffer (eds.), Materialittit der Kommunikation, 884-905. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Maturana. [iumberto R., 1982. Erkennen. Die Organisation und Verk6rperung von Wirklichkcit. Braanschwei~,./Wiesbaden: Vieweg. Merten. Klaus, 1977. Kommunikation. Eine Begrifl's- und ProzeBam~iyse. Opladen: Wcs~deutscher Verlag, Ong, Walt~'r J., 19d2. Orality and literacy. The technologizing of the world, l~mdon/l',,lew Y,~rk: Methuen, Roth, Gcrhar,t, 19~2. Kognition: Die Entstehung von Bedeutung ilu Gehirn. In: W. Krc~hn and G. Ktippers ~ed.,,.). i:.mezgenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutun?, 104- 133. FrJnkiurt//M.: Suhrkamp. Schern,~r, Max, 19d,9. Zur kognilionswissenschaftlichen M~dellicrung des Tcxtverstehcns. Zeitschri[i li.ix germanistische Lir, guistik 17( 1), 94-102. Scilmidt Sieglried J. 1082. F ~undations fi~r the empffical study ol literature. The components, of a basic theo~'. |lamt~ur~,: Bust:e. Spencer Brown, George 1972. L,,ws o[ [orrn ~,2nd edition~. New $c, rk: Julian Press.
t-:l~gEVI ER
Media: The coupling of cognition and communication Siegfried J. S c h m i d t LUMIS-bzstitut, Unirers#iit-GH Siegen, P.O. Box 101240, D-57068 Siegen, Germany
Abstract
In the framework of a constructivist epistemology the argument is developed that the operationally distinct systems cognition and communication are structurally coupled by the media system. Consequently, theories of text, communication, meaning or understanding have to classify how these three systems (cognition, communication, media) operate and interact while preserving their operational autonom:y.
1. Introduction
In scholarly discourses, cognition and communication are, with good reason, sharply distinguished from each other. Cognition is theoretically related to the domain of the brain, while communication is related to the domain of social interactions. Yet ovr experience tells us that communication presupposes cognitive activities and vice versa - a presupposition which is implicit in the notion of understanding. We also know that communication requires 'instruments' or ' m e d i a which must be produce6 (uttered and distributed), received (understood) and post-processed (e.g. commentea on) by competent actors in order for social interaction to take place. Thus we are faced with three conceptually distinguishable domains: cognition, communication, and media - and at the same time we are left with the question of how these domains interact. Although each of these domains has been dealt with for decades by the respective research disciplines, this question remains unanswered, perhaps for the reason that such an answer requires intensive interdisciplinary efforts and presupposes a homogeneous epistemological and methodological basis as well as an appropriate terminological apparatus.
" This paper has been presented at the 3rd IGEL-Conference in Memphis. A more extended argumentation of this subject is now available in German in: S.J. Schmidt, AOgnilit'e .4utonomie und soziale Orientierung. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1994. ()3()4-422X/94/$1)7.()() ,,) i~94 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved SSDI 0 3 1 ) 4 - 4 2 2 X ( 0 4 ) ( ) 0 ( ) 2 3 - 9
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Of course I shall not be able : o solve this problem in what follows. Nevertheless I'll try to outline a possible answer based on a constructivist epistemology.
2. Cognition: A constructive process It seems obvious that our brain has primarily to fulfill the task of producing behavior that guarantees the survival (,f the organism. Normally, behavior is meaningful for an organism, and the brain has to produce this meaningful behavior. Furthermore, we all experience mental states such as perceptions, ideas or sensations as meaningful states. Tod~y~ neuroscientists generally accept that these mental states are consen~ually related to processes in the brain (cf. Roth. 1992: 104). In this rc:,pect cognition ha:~ to be regarded as a biological phenomenon (Mamrana, 1982) determined by the conditions under which biological systems, espccia!!y the central ne~'ous sy.st~.m,- exist and function. Influences from the environment act upon cognitive systems in terms of activations which give rise to so!f-organizing neuronal processes resulting in the cognitive production of ;n¢,,,,-'~+~,~,,. wh~,~, ,-,,.,-,. . . . . ~ ,.,.,. . . . . . .o,,,,.,;a to be ~,~n¢,-,.,,~,,~.,;,,,, for two ,,~+,-,,~" ¢-,~ receptors (sensory organs) signal to the brain the presence or absence of stimuli and their intensity, but they do not indicate their 'nature'. Accordingly, the activities of neuronal cells are not specific regarding the source and nature of the incitations. It follows that all perceptions concerning their modaiities, their primmy and secondary, qualities, and their intensities are not directly connected to the properties of environmental events, but are cognitive constructs, though by no means arbitrary ones (Roth, 1992:119); (b) as Roth explains, the meaning of an event for a cognitive systen~ results from previously constructed, ,system-dependent meani~qgs and from meaning-c,.mtexts, i.e. the system's history of making meaning. Roth conc!udes" "'Meanings produce meaI~hlgs: this is the fundamental self-:eferentialitv of semantics, which constitutes the cognitive organization of the brain" (ibid." 110; my transl.), in other words: meaning can be theoretically modelled in lcv~as ~ it~c .. !icc~, that a physicochemical event triggers inside a cognitive system (ibid.: 11l). Not all neuronal operations lead to conscious states, but nothing becomes conscious in the absence o1! an underlying neuronal process. In the meantime, the constructive activity of the brain's proces~es is a wellaccepted biological hypothesis. Psychologists, too, have since long opted for a similar hypothesis: already in the twenties and thirties Gestalt psychologists such as W. K6hler and W. Metzger showed that visual perception, for example, does not represent the outer world like a photograph. The order consructec~t "" by the perceptual system depends on its own organization and orocedures, and not so much on the outer woIid. This hypothesis is backed, for example, by cases ~;f figure-ground reversibility, the m ,ltistability of forms and directions of motion, by scmatntic and Icxica] ambiguities, and s~ on (l'or details sce Kruse, 1988). Together with many other brain researchers, Roth holds the view that our phenomenal world or actuality is a construct of our cognitive system. Actuality engiobes everything we can experience- sensory perceptions, thoughts, emotions,
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ideas, etc. The differep~tiation of actuality into thre ~, domains, xiz. the environment, the body, and mental states, also results from a se!gdifferent~,~tion of our central nervous system in its ontogenesis. This differentia ion, which is decisive for our surviv:d, happens on ~he basis of our sensorimotoric interact:on wi'h the environmen~, e,~en it these domains appear to us as being oh~ologicaliy di',tif~ct. Tl;e hypothesis of a self-organizing construction c¢, our experiertial world(s) entaii,4 another hyp(thesis, which can be formulated in terms of a ,tistinction betwe,m 'reality' and 'actuality'. 'Actuality' d,:signates our world of experience. 3-'his woI!d is constructed by our real brain, wh,ch is cognitively inaccessible to us since the constr~actor of our actuality cann¢,t be contained in itself. Accordingly, we have to post'alate a strict separadon bet~veen reality, which is ccgnitively inaccessib!~ Out has to be presu, ~, which is constructed by posed as existing a| least for logical reasons, and actual:o, the real brain.
3. Systems and distinctions The essential message of constructivism can also be approached from quite a different angle, namely a logic of distinction. Spencer Brown (1972) has formally characterized perception and knowledge as the introduction ant' processing of distinctions in(to) a previously unmarked space. For Spencer Brown, drawing a distinction (i.e. marking a difference) prepares its designation, which in turn is integrated into a tramework or system of desigm~tions. The first d;,~tinction is a basic operation that cannot be cancelled. It establishes a fundament tl asymmetry. since afterwards we can only observe one side of the distinctio.~; either we continue our operations there, or we apply the distinction to itself. Every observation has a so-called blind spot. That is to say, the distinction applied cannot bc observed at the same time and in the same process of obser~'ation. Only by changing the perspective, i.e. by acting as a second order observer, ca:~ blind spots of a first-order observation be observed - and this at the cost of giving rise to different blind spots that second-order observations make use of. Drawing distinctions depends on observations, and observations depend on observational systems. All distioctions are contingent in the sense that they depend upon systems' activities: "The environment does not contain distinctions. It is like it is" (yon Foerster, 1985: 93; my transl.). But no distinction is drawn arbitrarily, s~nce all systems are determined by the evolution of their species and by previous experiences, by knowledge, memory, emotional orientation and, above all, by language and communication. All these factors together confine the arbitrariness and contingency of the processes whereby we draw and name distinctions. Consequently, we have to draw two conclusions: (1) Perception and cognition introduce syst,~m-dcpendc~lt distinction:; into the c~vi~onmcnt and process these distinctions, but they do not and cannot objectively represent the environment as such. (2) This construction of actualities (or system-dependent worlds of experience) is confined in its contingen~:y and arbitrariness by social systems which
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emerge based on commonly shared (or collective) knowledge, e.g. schemata, genres, rites, discourses, cultural patterns, etc., the enculturation, transmission, and legitimation of which is predominantly realized via communication.
4. Communication The more we have learned about the multifarious aspects of human communication in the la~: decades, the more we have had to realize that communication is a matter of whole human beings, acting in their personal and social situations. We have learned that communication cannot - as technical models of communication claim - be reduced to an exchange of information. Communication has, at least, two faces, for it involves both contents and the social relations between communicators. Communication is not only a matter of offering messages; it also raises the claim that messages are relevant and can rightly call on others' attention and "understanding'. Communication fails when partners consider the mcs, a~e irrelevant or false and when they :eject the claim tier ztttcntion and 'understam|ing" as +mnortinont
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,~nr~ m,~mt o r m n n l o x~ith a e n ~ t n l o Of
difficult presuppositions. It is not enough to master the language in question. Communicational partners must also mutually presume that they are willing to communicate and that they arc sincere: they have to recognize the type of discourse they are engaged in if they are deciding what is expected in a certain situation: they have to master the rules of genres, styles and metaphors; they have to recognize and realize the social structure of a communicative situation in order to evaluate sequences of role-taking and to master relevant lexical registers; if communicators arc to get a ~ufficiently clear idea of the others' intentions, dispositions, beliefs, emotions, etc., they must also be ablc to realize and to interpret what happens on the non-verbal channel of communication (facial expressions, gesturcs, etc.). People are able to communicate precisely because they do not simply exchange i~-~(c,,.~ ~ti,,~. but because they construct thoughts or information by processing the devices that texts or other media offer. But what the media offer never determines the result a s.pcaker~' ~ has intended in a predictable or causal way. Once we assume that our communication partners are autonomous and self-organizing cognitive systems, communication is a matter of offering and accepting the chance of cognitive changes which come into our conscious awareness in terms of information we can successfully process. Were communication really nothing more than an exchange of information it would be a terrible instrument of social control. In that ca:;e it would be impossible to oppose communication, which would simply overwhelm us. I shall make a few' remarks about communication through the (mass) media, wherc the rct]cxivity o1: percolation, attention, and interaction is missing. As is well known, the print media have in the past made possible an increase in communication. Experience could be accumulated and stored for later use; messages reached a potentially unlimited public; topics and opinions could be highly
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differentiated (for details see e.g. Ong, 1982). The moderr, mass media render the physical presence of communicators more or less dispensable. The reflexivity of perception, attention, and interaction, which is essential to face-to-face communication, is now replaced by two other reflexive structures, namely the reflexivity of expectation and knowledge. Communicators anticipate the expectations of imagined recipients, who in turn reconstruct the expectations of the communicator regarding their own expectations. The establishment of a reflexive knowledge structure leads to a situation in which a recipient knows that the communicator knows what he or she knows. This requires, of course, commonly shared knowledge as well as additional opinions about how to manage and to interpret this knowledge (for details see Merten, 1977: 138).
5. M e d i a a n d t h e c o u p l i n g p r o b l e m
With regard to the discussion of the media I propose to introduce some basic distinctions: ,.,-,,,,,,~,,,;,~,,~l;7,~n ,.,~,,~,.;~! ,.f ,-nm,,.,,,,;,-o,;,.,, t-~ . S °,, natural !o,,~,,,~,,,~o~. - technical devices of communication (e.g. camera, screen, microphone); - the social systems in and by which modern mass media communicational devices are organized and where economic, political, social, technical, and legal aspects of the use o mass media are settled (e.g. broadcasting stations or publishing houses). The~;e may be called media systems. According tc, the relevant technical device, media systcma can be typoic~gized as orint systems, ~roadcast systems, television systems, etc. The sum total of all these media systems forms the global mass media system of a society By means of self-organized interaction, the subsystems of the global media system mutually define their possible functions. This definition is of course historically flexible. According to their internal modes of operation, media systems produce media offerings such as books, films, radio plays, etc., all of which belong to genres and are related to familiar discourses. In modern mass media societies media systems exert an increasing influence on the construction of actuality by individual and s3cial systems for the very reason that they do not simply transfer information. Instead, media systems piuduce public opinion by selecting among possible messages, thereby establishing public domains of information. Media systems suggest - via concentration and emphasis - which topics dominate pubiic communication, thus setting agendas. Only rarely can recipients of the media's offerings compare them to their own experience. The media increasingly stage 'reality' as well as 'fiction' and influence the elaboration of patterns of perception and experience in a ~,,_,._~,'o;~'t,.,by means of the selection, concentration, and staging of media offerings. Finally, media systems produce motives for social and individual constructions of reality; tiley display life~;t~'lcs and mediate emotions and dispositions. Media offerings initiate communication whenever cognitive systems are willing to react to offerings; in other words, the offerings set cognitive processes in motion ~UI
1 1 1 1 1 I..1111~.., ILl. L 1 , . . . / 1 1
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without determining the results. In this respect, media offerings provide a structural coupling of cognition and communication. 'Structural coupling' means that two systems which are operationally closed and therefore unable to couple themselves operationally or to form ,. common :;upersystem can become mutually dependent, i.e. they inilucncc their internal structural formation, and trigger the actualization of internal meaning structures. Structural coupling means that the operations of system 1, in case and insofar as they are observed by a system 2, influence the actualization of structural formations in system 1 (Baecker, 1992). Speaking metaphorically, Luhmann has characterized structural coupling as follows: "Communicative systems can only be stimulated by cognitive systems; cognitive systems automatically pay attention to everything that is communicated 'L,y language" (1988: 839!'.; my transl.). Media offerings couple cognition and communication because they themselves are neither cognitions nor communications, but can be operationally transformed into either system for the purposes of system specific orders or Eigenvalues.
6. On Kommunikat-conslrucfion
At the beginning of this paper | emphasized the distinction between cognition, communication, and media. I tried to provide evidence tk~r modelling these three domains as self-organizing and opci ationally closed systems. Media offerings seem to bridge the gaps between cognition and communicati~m since both domains are, so to speak, invoked in their production; both can transform them into systemspecific operations. Scpar~ttizlg these three ,t~mlains requires that they be described with different terminologies, and this in turn requires the introduction of a number of distincrictus. A first distinctitm distinguishes bctwcci~ media offerings as material givens ({c~:!>. m~>ic,<, c~c:} :~nd as c~v,sciously perceived entities. With regard to texts, conceived as verbal media offerings, the distinction in question can bc expressed as the difference between texts and what we call Kommunikat-bases (cf. Schmidt, 1982). According to the episte~aological hypotheses as developed above, the process of perception has to be modelled as a constructive process (and not as a mere duplication) in which structures are actively built over perceived materials, and semantic properties are attributed to and not simply teken from a Kommunikat-basis. Evidently observers make use of Kommunikat-bas, s in the cognitive construction of 'meaning': but neither texts nor Kommunikat-bases determine this cognitive process in a forecastable way, nor do they sharply constrain their results. In thc terminoh~gy I pr{~pose this process is labeled as Kommunikat-pmduction. Kommunikat-production is theoretically modelled as a complex cognitive process triggered by the perception of texts as Kommunikat-bases. Due to the transitory nature of cognitive processes, Kommunikat-production cannot be reproduced
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identically even if the same text is processed. Normally Kommunikat-productions are not accompanied by (conscious) internal observation -- as long as the process continues without interruptions. At this level texts are not there to be 'understood'; instead they trigger the continuation of cognitive operations. For a cognitive system a text does not contain or transport 'meanings'; instead, the cognitive system attributes 'meanings' to a Kommunikat-basis via cognitive (self-)orientation. These 'meanings' are necessarily subject-dependent (but not subjective). The sequence of cognitive self-orientations is normally influenced by the sequence of perceived components of the Kommunikat-basis, since normally we have learned to read sequentially. Nevertheless, it depends entirely on the cognitive system how this sequence is clustered, which cognitive operations are triggered by the perception of a text, and which emotions accompany this cognitive process. The process of Kommunikat-production is not simply arbitrary. In the course of socialization, text-segmentation and the formation of expectations concerning functions of text-segments (words, phrases, etc.), are highly conventionalized. Thus, for a fluent speaker, the conviction arises that it is the text itself that informs its hermeneutics (see Scherner, 1989). This conviction is the automatic result of successful verbal socialization, for the acquisition of linguistic competence occurs in a long-lasting process which is strictly governed by commands and prohibitions. Learning his or her mother tongue, a child acquires not only a system of signs plus a grammar, but also an extremely sensitive instrument for coupling cognitive, semiotic, and social activities. The child learns to master a language in the total life context, and in so doing, he or she learns to live. The expcrience that others use semiotic materials more or less the same way we do confirms and stabilizes the social regulations of language use, giving it a basis in collective knowledge. Thus we gain the impression that textual elements themselves possess stable "meanings'. This collective knowledge concerning socially acceptable ways of using language, stabilized via reflexivity, serves as a basis for expected inter-individuality of both cognitive and communicative processes. ]~n 3ther words, linguistic socialization and the social self-regulation of communication give rise to the collective fiction that 'normal' communicators make use of language in a similar way. In cases where this mutual expectation is not satisfied, society disposes of three emergency categories: deceit, illness, and art/literature. gommunikat-productions are always integrated into the autopoiesis of a living system. Analytically this process can be characterized by three aspects: a rational aspect of informational self-orientation; an emotional aspect of Lust-Unlust-equilibration; and a pragmatic aspect of evaluating the relevance of cognitive processes for the autopoiesis of the system. These three aspects are interrelated in a self-referential way. From this interrelation emerges what comes to our consciousness as information when we process a text. If we try to characterize in some detail which factors can be analytically distinguished in Kommunikat-production, we might starl by postulating several dimensions which supposedly interact; there are: (1) media offerings, i.e. conventionalized triggers of Kommunikat-production processes;
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(2) dispositional factors related to the life histories of the receivers, e.g. expectations concerning aims and intended subsequent activities, cost-benefit-considerations hypotheses concerning the intentions of producers of media offerings, etc.; requirements concerning a treatment of specific media offerings, biographical, contextual or situational conditions bearing on the process of Kommunikat-construction, and so on; (3) cognitive dispositions, e.g. the state of refinement of respective individual actuality-constructions; memory capacities; informedness regarding special discourses; degrees of tolerance regarding discrepancies and complexity, affective states, interests, etc. (cf. Friih, 1980); (4) conventions, e.g. speech act, literary, and social conventions; (5) strategies, e.g. strategies for establishing macro-structures, inference- and elaboration-strategies, reading strategies, etc. Hov, these kinds of factors interact will vary according to socialization, biographical situation, social status, and so on. It seems re'~sonable to assume that this interplay happens with different degrees of consciousness; in other words, the cognitive system can never fully observe, command, and control this process. If cognitive syst~,rns can reasonably be modelled as autonon,ous systems which are operationally cJosed, then the process of Komraunikat-construction can be modelled in terms of self-organization. Kommunikats result or emerge from a self-referential concatenation of various cognitive operations by which intellectual, affective~ associative and pragmatic components are integrated and at the same time evaluated. Kommunikats are thus attributed to a Kommunikat-basis according to the operative functions conv.ected with its processing in cognitive domains. The concept of language behind what I'm saying can be described as follows: as a system of signs, language is a f.ystem of designated distinctions. Language as a system of designated distinction, s does not copy the ,,'nvironment; instead, it serves as one instrument of the social construction of actuality in or through the individual. In other word.,;, if elements of languaf;e aie used referentially, they actualize kn~wlcdgc arid do not refer to non-lin~'.uistic entities (apart from the restricted case of proper names). Accordingly, the semantics of language may be dcscliI?cd as tt system of tools to connect designat,ed distinctions in(side) cognitive and communicative systems ( = discourses). Insofar and as long as a string of signs cognitively and communicatively triggers such cennective operations in a socially regulated way it is 'meaningful'.
7. Kommunikat vs. lneaning
It follows from my argument that the cognitive processes triggered by the perception of texts (or other media offerings) have been subsumed under tile notion 'Kommunikat'. ,,ks a result, the two concepts traditionally assigned to "cccption, namely "understanding' and ~meaning', are freed for other uses. 1 propose to distinguish between 'Kommunikat' and 'meaning' as follows: whereas Kommunikats are conceived of as the results of cognitive operations, meanings can
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be defined as those communications which communicators consensually (i.e. based on collective knowledge) assign to components of texts or other media offerings. In other words, meanings result from communicative.• interactions according to linguistic rules and conventions i~ specific contc'xts. The question whether ,3r not (subject-dependent) Kommunik~ts are equivalent to (social) meanings cannot be answered since these domains are separate. In both domains the question that really matters is whether' a text has been treated such that cognition and communication can be properly continued, i.e. followed up in such a way that subsequent operations correspond to the e~,pectations of the respective systems. The degree of correspondence defines the de.gre~ of what is traditionally called 'understandins'.
8. On understanding Here we have to realize that the difference between ur, derstanding and misunderstanding does not belong to tile domain of cognition, but to that of communica tion, i.e. that of the external observers of the (implicitly~ presupposed cognitive processes. Consensus regarding Kommunikats can only be established at the le~,el of communication. And thi~ consensus manifests compatibiiities and fulfilled relations between communications, not at all 'objectively correct text-understanding'. Consequently, what is called 'understanding' may be fi.lrther specified as the interface between cognition and communication. This leads us to another important distinctiGn, namely betv, een 'Kommunika~production' and 'understanding', where 'understanding ' is regarded as an observa. liional category. Strictly speaking the one who 'un0erstands' cannot ~ay '! ,~nderstand', unless he or she in a way simulates a communicational situation in which hc or she as an internal observer communicates the difference between operation and observation. Following this line of argumentation the discovery of "the correct meaning' of a text is an implausible goal. Semantic objecl!ivity is not something we should be after. Instead, c,n the level of Kommunikat-produc~ion, we t~' to achieve satisfying cognitive results (or mental states) which we hold to be meaningful, coherent, and appropria'~e, whereas - on the social level of communication - t h e issue is whether listener5 match the expectations of speakers. In this respect, understanding is a social achievement~ Consequently, understanding has to be regarded as a means of social cont:oi over individual cognition. It is an imerplay between cognitive aut~ nomy al:d social regulation, and thus becomes a political fact. Understanding depends on powar-relations and on 'symbolic capital' in the 'ling~listic market' - to evoke the terms ef Bourdieu - which determine who is able to impose his or her communicative expectations on others. As communicating individuals prefer to be understood, they try to anticipate the expectations of their partpers. This renders cognitive processes of Kommunikat-production highly socially imprinted opera' ions. Understanding reinforces cognitive behavior, which leads in turn to successful understanding, This explains, perhaps, why autonomous cognitive systems r~evertheless 'understand each other'.
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9. Two terminologies Summarizing the previously presented arguments we now dispose of two distinct sets of concepts that can be used to analyze cognition, on the one hand, and communication on the other. structural coupling social systems communications
I
u nde rstandi ng meaning ....
[
cognitive systems cognitions
I I Kommunikat
Kom mu n ikat-p rod uct ion
i
m e d ia o ffe r ings ......
I
10. Some consequences for empirical research Although I cannot fully [bresee the consequences of this approach for research in literary studies and in psychology, some of lhe implications are fairly obvious. Science is located at the level of communication, since it is organized as a social system. At this level scientists do not deal with stable realities, but with communicatively stabilized descriptions (in Maturana's terms) of distinctions (in Spencer Brown's terms). 'Empirical research' can bc modelled as the production of logical, pragmatic, and social stabilities (sensu Kruse, 1088) that scientists deal with, as if they were independen~ obiects. In this ~espect empirical research is, of course, possible in psychology as well as in literary studies. But this research does not reveal the 'real nature of consciousness'. Instead it constitutes communicative stabilities consistent with criteria of scientific communication. Whatever contributes ~o the constitution of these stabilities in a substantial way is regarded as a '['act' according to contexts and criteria. The method of "thinking aloud', for example, does not provide 'raw data' from the cognitive domain, but communicative constructs of cognitive operations which are then useful for methodically controlled activities (e.g. content analyses) that are consensually accepted. ]n empirical experiments psychologists t~' to get cognitive ~ystcms to ini~ervene - according to their possibilities and wire,out big time lags - in the system of science. The time-factor is important since cognitive processes are '~qstablc and ephemeral events, whereas communication tries to establish duration and repeatability in order to come back to past conlmunicative events and to 'latch' them o~to actually occurring events.
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Scientific constructs (paradigms, theories, models, concepts) are important insofar as they have effects on scientific communication - their objective truth' is not a question we can decide. With regard to the problem of understanding, this latter consideration implies that theories of understanding become the more empirical the more they methodically and operationally motivate cognitive systems to produce communications, the alleged domain of reference of which is consciousness. A theory of understanding is empirical to the degree that it stabilizes these communications by means of consensual follow-up operations. With respect to interpretation, which is still regarded as the main task of literary scholars, the consequences are far-reaching: talk aoout 'the meaning of literary texts' should be understood as 'talk about social operations called understanding'. In other words, the social construction of the meanings attributed to a literary work o[ art characterizes discourses more than it reveals the work's 'true meaning'. These discourses have to be related to the social system of literature, to its institutions, norms, power structures, and so on. There is no 'innocent' work-immanent interpretation of literature, just as there is no neutral or objective historiography of literature. Literary scholars would, I think, be well advised to realize that their discipline can only become a social science as a branch of general media studies. Whether this advice will be accepted is up to the future.
References Baecker, Dirk, 1992. Die Unterscheidung zwischen Kommunikation und BewuBtsein. In: W. Krohn and G. KiJppers (eds.), Emergenz: Die Entstehung yon Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutung, 217-26X. Flankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Foerster. [teinz yon, 1985. Sicht und Einsicht. Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Vie ~,'eg. Friih, ~,Verner, 198(~. Lesen. Verstehen, Urtcilen. Untersuchungen iJber den Zusammenhang yon Textgestaltung und Textwirkung Frciburg/MiJnchen: Alber. Eruse, Peter, IOSg. Stabilitfit, Instabili!iit, Mullistabilit:,il. Selb,:torganisatio~l und Selbstreferenti,dit:,it in kognitl~,en Sy~,terncn. DELFIN I1, 35-57. Eul~mann, Niklas, 1988. Wle ist BewuJ:Itsein an Kommunikation bcteiiigt? In: H.U. Gumbrccht and K.L. Pfeiffer (eds.), Materialittit der Kommunikation, 884-905. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Maturana. [iumberto R., 1982. Erkennen. Die Organisation und Verk6rperung von Wirklichkcit. Braanschwei~,./Wiesbaden: Vieweg. Merten. Klaus, 1977. Kommunikation. Eine Begrifl's- und ProzeBam~iyse. Opladen: Wcs~deutscher Verlag, Ong, Walt~'r J., 19d2. Orality and literacy. The technologizing of the world, l~mdon/l',,lew Y,~rk: Methuen, Roth, Gcrhar,t, 19~2. Kognition: Die Entstehung von Bedeutung ilu Gehirn. In: W. Krc~hn and G. Ktippers ~ed.,,.). i:.mezgenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutun?, 104- 133. FrJnkiurt//M.: Suhrkamp. Schern,~r, Max, 19d,9. Zur kognilionswissenschaftlichen M~dellicrung des Tcxtverstehcns. Zeitschri[i li.ix germanistische Lir, guistik 17( 1), 94-102. Scilmidt Sieglried J. 1082. F ~undations fi~r the empffical study ol literature. The components, of a basic theo~'. |lamt~ur~,: Bust:e. Spencer Brown, George 1972. L,,ws o[ [orrn ~,2nd edition~. New $c, rk: Julian Press.