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Meta-representation and secondary representation
378
News & Comment
TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.5 No.9 September 2001
Letter
Meta-representation and secondary representation Elsewhere in this issue (p. 388) Josep Call summarizes an elegant series of studies in support of the conclusion that chimpanzees use a form of ‘knowledge abstraction’ to solve novel social problems, including those requiring recognition of what competitors may be informed about through having ‘seen’ objects or events. Call rightly notes that this is consistent with the ‘intervening variables’ mental model previously developed by one of us1, the significance of which he recognizes and outlines accurately. However, two issues require refinement if confusion is to be avoided in future discussion of the alternative explanations Call goes on to discuss. ‘...the extent to which either simulation or theory models are correct remains to be empirically established.’
First, Call describes the intervening variables model as ‘a kind of metarepresentational account’. This is correct when ‘meta-representational’ is used as a synonym for ‘second-order’ representations of the kind ‘X thinks that Y knows where the banana is’. This was what Leslie did in considering the origins of theory of mind in children2, and Whiten and Byrne followed this usage in analysing ape cognition3. Perner, however, argued that ‘meta-representation’ should be a term reserved for representation of the concept of representation itself 4. Children are assumed to have achieved this only when they become able to attribute false beliefs, implying a capacity to represent the possibility of mis-representation4. This sense of ‘meta-representation’ has become common in developmental psychology. Perner distinguished three steps in children’s cognitive development, culminating in a capacity for metarepresentation (i.e. the third step)4. Step 1 is characterized by ‘primary representations’ only, that function essentially to represent the world as it is. In the second year, however, Perner postulated the achievement of ‘secondary representation’, which makes use of, yet goes beyond, primary representation. Secondary representation adds the ability to model http://tics.trends.com
hypothetical situations, making possible the entertainment of multiple, simultaneous, mental models. This development is proposed to explain the emergence of a suite of capacities including pretence, means-ends reasoning and the beginnings of mental attribution. In mental attribution, the operation of multiple models means that the child is able to recognize that although she sees or knows about a specific thing, another individual may not. This is the task set in the ape experiments Call describes. Whiten5 and Suddendorf 6 independently suggested that the concept of secondary representation fits not only the level of mental attribution achieved by apes, but is also consistent with other aspects of ape cognition that map to the correlations observed in children’s cognitive development. In a paper published this month7, we examine the evidence for this hypothesis more thoroughly. Although we interpret the data as supporting secondary representation in apes, thus far it suggests that meta-representation in the sense advocated by Perner4 is not achieved. One of the most compelling demonstrations of this is an experiment on false-belief attribution performed by Call et al.8 (not cited in Call’s present paper). By contrast, the case portrayed in Call’s Box 2 Figure (last part) does imply meta-representation of the ‘Perner kind’, for it involves the intentional creation of a false belief. However, an intervening variable that signified only ‘seeing’ or ‘knowing’ (versus ignorance) need not operate at this complex level. It is consistent with secondary representation. There is thus no disagreement between what we and Call have written: his Figure is indeed not consistent with the mentality of apes as demonstrated by current research. The second major issue is Call’s assertion that ‘insight into other’s subjective experience is a key component of the (‘metarepresentational’) account’attributed to one of us1. This is not necessarily the case. The jury still appears to be out on the extent to which intervening variables, as mental states attributed to others, should be thought to contain ‘subjective experiences’ of the person doing the mindreading, even in humans. Some states, of which seeing and knowing are likely examples, might be represented only in the austere terms of their epistemic or information-processing significance. Perhaps if the mindreading process were to operate by mental simulation of others, as some suggest9, the notion of
attributing ‘subjective experiences’ would seem to become more appropriate. Gordon, indeed, has described simulation models as ‘hot’, in contrast to models that postulate that children use a ‘cold’ theory-building appoach to mindreading9. However, Gordon is also at pains to point out that his own simulation model does not rest upon introspection. In any case, the extent to which either simulation or theory models are correct remains to be empirically established. The work Call describes is amongst the most fruitful in the area. Our efforts to clarify some residual but important potential confusions should be read in the context of our broad and emphatic approval for the approaches now being taken. Andrew Whiten* School of Psychology, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife, UK KY16 9JU. *e-mail: [email protected] Thomas Suddendorf School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia. References 1 Whiten, A. (1996) When does smart behaviour reading become mindreading? In Theories of Theories of Mind (Carruthers, P. and Smith, P.K., eds), pp. 277–292, Cambridge University Press 2 Leslie, A.M. (1987) Pretense and representation in infancy: the origins of ‘theory of mind’. Psychol. Rev. 94, 84–106 3 Whiten, A. and Byrne, R.W. (1991) The emergence of metarepresentation in human ontogeny and primate phylogeny. In Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading (Whiten, A., ed.), pp. 267–281, Blackwell 4 Perner, J. (1991) Understanding the Representational Mind, Bradford Books 5 Whiten, A. (1996) Imitation, pretence and mindreading: secondary representation in comparative primatology and developmental psychology? In Reaching Into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes, (Russon, A.E. et al., eds), pp. 300–324, Cambridge University Press 6 Suddendorf, T. (1999) The rise of the metamind. In The Descent of Mind; Psychological Perspectives on Hominid Evolution (Corballis, M.C. and Lea, S.E.G., eds), pp. 218–260, Oxford University Press 7 Suddendorf, T. and Whiten, A. (2001) Mental evolution and development: evidence for secondary representation in children, great apes and other animals. Psychol. Bull. 127, 629–650 8 Call, J. and Tomasello, M. (1999) A non-verbal false belief task: the performance of children and great apes. Child Dev. 70, 381–395 9 Gordon, R. M. (1996) ‘Radical’ simulationism. In Theories of Theories of Mind (Carruthers, P. and Smith, P.K., eds), pp. 11–21, Cambridge University Press
1364-6613/01/$ – see front matter © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S1364-6613(00)01734-4
News & Comment
TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.5 No.9 September 2001
Letter
Meta-representation and secondary representation Elsewhere in this issue (p. 388) Josep Call summarizes an elegant series of studies in support of the conclusion that chimpanzees use a form of ‘knowledge abstraction’ to solve novel social problems, including those requiring recognition of what competitors may be informed about through having ‘seen’ objects or events. Call rightly notes that this is consistent with the ‘intervening variables’ mental model previously developed by one of us1, the significance of which he recognizes and outlines accurately. However, two issues require refinement if confusion is to be avoided in future discussion of the alternative explanations Call goes on to discuss. ‘...the extent to which either simulation or theory models are correct remains to be empirically established.’
First, Call describes the intervening variables model as ‘a kind of metarepresentational account’. This is correct when ‘meta-representational’ is used as a synonym for ‘second-order’ representations of the kind ‘X thinks that Y knows where the banana is’. This was what Leslie did in considering the origins of theory of mind in children2, and Whiten and Byrne followed this usage in analysing ape cognition3. Perner, however, argued that ‘meta-representation’ should be a term reserved for representation of the concept of representation itself 4. Children are assumed to have achieved this only when they become able to attribute false beliefs, implying a capacity to represent the possibility of mis-representation4. This sense of ‘meta-representation’ has become common in developmental psychology. Perner distinguished three steps in children’s cognitive development, culminating in a capacity for metarepresentation (i.e. the third step)4. Step 1 is characterized by ‘primary representations’ only, that function essentially to represent the world as it is. In the second year, however, Perner postulated the achievement of ‘secondary representation’, which makes use of, yet goes beyond, primary representation. Secondary representation adds the ability to model http://tics.trends.com
hypothetical situations, making possible the entertainment of multiple, simultaneous, mental models. This development is proposed to explain the emergence of a suite of capacities including pretence, means-ends reasoning and the beginnings of mental attribution. In mental attribution, the operation of multiple models means that the child is able to recognize that although she sees or knows about a specific thing, another individual may not. This is the task set in the ape experiments Call describes. Whiten5 and Suddendorf 6 independently suggested that the concept of secondary representation fits not only the level of mental attribution achieved by apes, but is also consistent with other aspects of ape cognition that map to the correlations observed in children’s cognitive development. In a paper published this month7, we examine the evidence for this hypothesis more thoroughly. Although we interpret the data as supporting secondary representation in apes, thus far it suggests that meta-representation in the sense advocated by Perner4 is not achieved. One of the most compelling demonstrations of this is an experiment on false-belief attribution performed by Call et al.8 (not cited in Call’s present paper). By contrast, the case portrayed in Call’s Box 2 Figure (last part) does imply meta-representation of the ‘Perner kind’, for it involves the intentional creation of a false belief. However, an intervening variable that signified only ‘seeing’ or ‘knowing’ (versus ignorance) need not operate at this complex level. It is consistent with secondary representation. There is thus no disagreement between what we and Call have written: his Figure is indeed not consistent with the mentality of apes as demonstrated by current research. The second major issue is Call’s assertion that ‘insight into other’s subjective experience is a key component of the (‘metarepresentational’) account’attributed to one of us1. This is not necessarily the case. The jury still appears to be out on the extent to which intervening variables, as mental states attributed to others, should be thought to contain ‘subjective experiences’ of the person doing the mindreading, even in humans. Some states, of which seeing and knowing are likely examples, might be represented only in the austere terms of their epistemic or information-processing significance. Perhaps if the mindreading process were to operate by mental simulation of others, as some suggest9, the notion of
attributing ‘subjective experiences’ would seem to become more appropriate. Gordon, indeed, has described simulation models as ‘hot’, in contrast to models that postulate that children use a ‘cold’ theory-building appoach to mindreading9. However, Gordon is also at pains to point out that his own simulation model does not rest upon introspection. In any case, the extent to which either simulation or theory models are correct remains to be empirically established. The work Call describes is amongst the most fruitful in the area. Our efforts to clarify some residual but important potential confusions should be read in the context of our broad and emphatic approval for the approaches now being taken. Andrew Whiten* School of Psychology, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife, UK KY16 9JU. *e-mail: [email protected] Thomas Suddendorf School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia. References 1 Whiten, A. (1996) When does smart behaviour reading become mindreading? In Theories of Theories of Mind (Carruthers, P. and Smith, P.K., eds), pp. 277–292, Cambridge University Press 2 Leslie, A.M. (1987) Pretense and representation in infancy: the origins of ‘theory of mind’. Psychol. Rev. 94, 84–106 3 Whiten, A. and Byrne, R.W. (1991) The emergence of metarepresentation in human ontogeny and primate phylogeny. In Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading (Whiten, A., ed.), pp. 267–281, Blackwell 4 Perner, J. (1991) Understanding the Representational Mind, Bradford Books 5 Whiten, A. (1996) Imitation, pretence and mindreading: secondary representation in comparative primatology and developmental psychology? In Reaching Into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes, (Russon, A.E. et al., eds), pp. 300–324, Cambridge University Press 6 Suddendorf, T. (1999) The rise of the metamind. In The Descent of Mind; Psychological Perspectives on Hominid Evolution (Corballis, M.C. and Lea, S.E.G., eds), pp. 218–260, Oxford University Press 7 Suddendorf, T. and Whiten, A. (2001) Mental evolution and development: evidence for secondary representation in children, great apes and other animals. Psychol. Bull. 127, 629–650 8 Call, J. and Tomasello, M. (1999) A non-verbal false belief task: the performance of children and great apes. Child Dev. 70, 381–395 9 Gordon, R. M. (1996) ‘Radical’ simulationism. In Theories of Theories of Mind (Carruthers, P. and Smith, P.K., eds), pp. 11–21, Cambridge University Press
1364-6613/01/$ – see front matter © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S1364-6613(00)01734-4