Metropolitan deconcentration, socio-political fragmentation and extended suburbanisation: Brazilian urbanisation in the 1980s and 1990s

Geoforum 32 (2001) 437±447

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Metropolitan deconcentration, socio-political fragmentation and extended suburbanisation: Brazilian urbanisation in the 1980s and 1990sq Marcelo Lopes de Souza a

Department of Geography, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Received 5 November 1999; in revised form 27 November 2000

Abstract The aim of this paper is to discuss the phenomena of socio-political fragmentation of urban space, extended suburbanisation and metropolitan deconcentration, which have been important features of Brazilian urbanisation since the 1980s (metropolitan deconcentration partly since the 1970s). At the beginning it pro®les the recent evolution of the country's economy, in order to make sense of the worsening situation in terms of exclusion and violence in big Brazilian cities since the 1980s. Against this background, recent trends both in terms of socio-spatial segregation and social con¯ict within cities (formation of enclaves dominated by drug tracking organisations and self-segregation of the elites as a response to this) and in terms of the growing attractiveness of areas outside the biggest metropolises (extended suburbanisation and metropolitan deconcentration) are analysed. The main focus is the socio-political dimension of Brazilian urbanisation in the 1980s and 1990s, which has been undervalued by analysts. Ó 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction The metropolitanisation process, which is usually identi®ed as a severe development problem in Third World countries, has received attention on the part of urban geographers, sociologists and economists as well as that of planners for some decades and from di€erent viewpoints. For much of the time we were accustomed to treat Third World urbanisation as though the concentration of people and economic potential in just a few cities is a permanent phenomenon. Within this analytical framework, metropolitan growth appeared as an urgent problem, that was being steadily fed through migration from the countryside and through natural demographic increase. Metropolitanisation came to represent the highest and most distressing stage in developing countries' urbanisation, which would have to be contained. q This text synthesises some of the outcomes of two research projects: `Drug Tracking and its Socio-Spatial Impacts on Brazilian Cities' (1994±1997) and `Contemporary Challenges towards the SocioSpatial Development in the Brazilian Metropolises' (1997±1999), both funded by the Brazilian Research Council (CNPq). E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Lopes de Souza).

However, as far as Brazil is concerned, these presumptions have proved to be no longer realistic. From certain pioneering works which were carried out in the 1980s, which under the inspiration of Harry Richardson's well-known theory, defended the thesis that a `polarisation reversal' was going on in Brazil already since the former decade (see, for instance, Redwood III, 1984), to some detailed works by Brazilian researchers (Martine, 1992; Diniz, 1993, 1995; Santos, 1993; Cano, 1997; Martine and Diniz, 1997), the literature has re¯ected, in the framework of investigations on the processes of industrial concentration and deconcentration in Brazil, the growing complexity of the urbanisation pattern of that country. It is true that problems and con¯icts become more and more grave everywhere, above all in the two biggest metropolises ± S~ao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. However, it is precisely in these metropolises that the demographic growth rates have declined remarkably. The same decline in the demographic growth rate is happening in the regional metropolises too, although to a lower degree. Although this decline can be welcomed as an alleviation in relation to the quantitative pressure, in fact it is a symptom of the existence of important qualitative problems ± a symptom of a true metropolitan crisis ±,

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even keeping in mind that no municipality can grow at a high rate inde®nitely. This fall in population growth is associated not only with a decrease in the fertility rates due to an increasing presence of women in the labour market, but also to the increasing loss in attractiveness of the two biggest metropolises to migrants as well as to various economic activities. In any case, it must be stressed that neither Rio de Janeiro nor S~ ao Paulo are metropolises which are growing rapidly in the context of a feverish metropolitanisation. Since the 1980s, the real challenge is, in fact, to tackle the socio-spatial problems of demographically stagnating metropolises which are more and more a€ected by factors of external diseconomies of all types. In particular, the biggest metropolises are nowadays experiencing a `decline' (involucß~ ao), to use milton Santos (1993) expression. This `metropolitan decline' means a generalised deterioration in the quality of life. It contributes to a metropolitan deconcentration (desmetropolizacß~ ao relativa, i.e. literally `relative demetropolitanisation') at the national level (see Martine, 1992; Santos, 1993), in the context of more general changes which have stimulated, since the 1970s, a deconcentration of industrial employment opportunities as well as a deconcentration of urbanisation (Martine, 1992; Diniz, 1993, 1995; Cano, 1997; Martine and Diniz, 1997). In relation to metropolitan deconcentration, this expression neither presupposes a general decline of metropolitanisation in Brazil, as Santos (1993) stressed, nor absolute population losses in individual metropolises. In fact, what is happening is that metropolitanisation is more and more associated with the rise of new metropolises, rather than the growth of old ones. However, the problems of the largest metropolises, which ®nd their most dramatic expression in the phenomenon which I have called `socio-political fragmentation of the urban space' (see Souza, 1995a,b, 1996, 1997), should not be underestimated. Also the trends towards an `extended suburbanisation', which occurs at the same time as `metropolitan decline', should not be neglected. Various models have been proposed in the last 20 years in order to make more understandable the relationships between some crucial global economic transformations (third industrial revolution, economic and ®nancial globalisation etc.), on the one hand, and urban

growth, on the other. `World city' (Friedmann and Wol€, 1982), `informational city' (Castells, 1989) and `global city' (Sassen, 1991) are the labels which designate the most fashionable models in the recent years, along with `post-Fordist city' (see, for instance, Marcuse, 1997). However, apart from other de®ciencies (see, in this respect, Storper, 1997), all these models have to do basically with cities in the so-called developed world; the sources of inspiration of such studies have been the great metropolises of the central capitalist countries, above all New York, London and Tokyo. Even if the reality of (semi)peripheral countries is considered, as in the work of Friedmann and Wol€, their particularities are not deeply discussed. The usefulness of these e€orts for the analysis of `Third World' cities is thus limited, despite the common features of cities in `developed' and `underdeveloped' countries in the context of an increasingly globalised world. Consequently, this paper will discuss the phenomena of `socio-political fragmentation of urban space', extended suburbanisation and metropolitan deconcentration as a contribution to the analysis of Brazilian urbanisation in the 1980s and 1990s. 2. The economic background In spite of some oscillations, the 1980s were characterised in Brazil by an economic stagnation which had strong negative e€ects on the level of employment and, consequently, on the poverty level. As Baltar et al. (1997, p. 93) summarised in the 1980s ``. . . the impetus of employment generation in the context of a development process, which was typical of the former decades, was interrupted''. In fact, the deterioration of the socioeconomic conditions would have been even worse in the absence of some of what Baltar et al. called `compensatory phenomena', such as the ``very slow growth of the urban population, especially in the large cities'' (1997, p. 94). This slow population growth (see Table 1) implied, in reality, an alleviation of the pressure generated by the demand for employment in the big cities. What had happened was a negative feedback: the economic crisis and the increasingly impacting factors of external diseconomies (among them urban violence itself) decisively

Table 1 S~ ao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro: rates of annual growth (%)a

Metropolitan region of S~ao Paulo Municipality of S~ ao Paulo (metropolitan nucleus) Metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro Municipality of Rio de Janeiro (metropolitan nucleus) a

Source: IBGE (1982, 1993, 1995, 1997).

1960±1970

1970±1980

1980±1991

1991±1996

5.53 4.89 3.62 2.70

4.45 3.67 2.45 1.82

1.88 1.16 1.03 0.67

1.46 0.40 0.77 0.26

M. Lopes de Souza / Geoforum 32 (2001) 437±447

contributed to a reduction of the attractiveness of the metropolis of S~ ao Paulo and even more of the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro to migrants over the course of the 1980s, as an e€ect of the bad prospects in the labour market and also due to the deterioration of the quality of life in general (Cano, 1997). Low rates of demographic growth since the 1980s are in truth cold comfort, for they cannot evade either the fact that the metropolises have not only lost attractiveness to low-income migrants from poor regions such as the Northeast, but also pressurized the middle classes to leave ± who represent a relatively small part of the urban population, even in the richest and most industrialised metropolises, but who represent the most skilled labour force with the biggest spatial mobility. In addition, poverty was, in spite of this alleviation, one of the most pervasive problems in the 1980s. According to Rocha (1995b, pp. 226±229, 240±241), based on the PNAD database,1 it seems that the level of absolute poverty remained more or less stable in the 1980s ± apart from the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro, where it increased from 27.2% to 32.7% of the metropolitan population between 1981 and 1990 as a re¯ection of local factors. However, misery (a sub-set of absolute poverty) increased in various metropolitan areas, including those where the percentage of absolute poor people (as a whole) declined: S~ ao Paulo (from 4.1% to 4.7% of the metropolitan population), Belo Horizonte (from 6.6% to 7.7% of the metropolitan population), and Curitiba (from 3% to 3.6% of the metropolitan population) (Rocha, 1995b, pp. 226±229). Be that as it may, relative poverty became more severe, i.e. the income disparity became even worse. According to Rocha, both the decrease in migratory ¯ows and fecundity rates and the increasing percentage of people who take part in the labour market can be taken as factors which contributed to avoid a rise in the absolute poverty level in the metropolises: ``more people have worked, although under conditions of increasing informality, low productivity and decreasing income'' (Rocha, 1995b, p. 244). Rocha herself underlines, though, that ``[o]bviously it is a negative evolution, for this implies reduction of leisure and care for the family without compensation in relation to the income''. What happened was that, in order to avoid absolute poverty, many people had to take a second job, either formal or informal. Furthermore, one must not neglect that the 1980s was a decade in which the importance of the illegal economy (above all drug tracking) experienced an enormous growth in various big Brazilian cities.

1

PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicõlios ± National Household Sampling Survey) is a statistical survey which is undertaken every year by Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

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Despite the stabilisation of in¯ation at a low level since the implementation of the Plano Real, the 1990s does not seem to have been a much better decade than the previous one. The selective introduction of technologies both sectorally and geographically which are typical of the Third Industrial Revolution, along with `¯exible accumulation' and `¯exible working relations', all of which are contained in a framework of the increasing opening of the Brazilian economy to the global market, characterises the `productive re-structuring' which Brazil has experienced since the 1990s. One of the e€ects of this transformation has been the increasing productivity of Brazilian industry. However, this has not been the only e€ect. As far as the labour force is concerned, this re-structuring has led to important negative impacts: unemployment (especially in the industrial sector) and growing informality in the labour market. Additionally, one must not forget institutional aspects, such as the trend towards a reduction in the contribution of the state to the social welfare (see Baltar et al., 1997; Cacciamali and Bezerra, 1997; Salm et al., 1997; Portugal and Garcia, 1997). A gradual process of exclusion of workers from the formal sector is going on, which usually corresponds at the same time to an exclusion of these workers and their families from a satisfactory quality of life. To say that does not neglect the fact that absolute poverty and even income inequalities decreased after the introduction of the Plano Real (Rocha, 1997). However, as the economist Sonia Rocha herself noted, the redistributive impacts of monetary stabilisation had a limited reach: ``[h]ence'', wrote the economist, ``the creation of jobs and increase in labour income, especially regarding the lowest income groups, depend again on the capacity to carry out investments, on the economic growth rate which can be reached, and on their e€ects in terms of the creation of jobs and redistribution of labour income'' (Rocha, 1997b, p. 13). In light of the trends which were mentioned above, which are related not only to Brazil, but to changes occurring at the global level, there is apparently no place for much optimism. ``Increasingly, unemployment comprises of people who have still not been (or only in a precarious form)incorporated into the labour market, as well as people who were made redundant by virtue of the disappearance of activities'' (Dedecca, 1997, p. 75). Bearing this in mind one can note with Dedecca (1997, pp. 74± 75), that the present-day situation is di€erent both from that existing at the time of the industrial revolution in Europe ± where there were plenty of people who were expelled from the countryside as well as from handicraft activities, which were being destroyed by the capitalist mode of production and replaced through salaried work ± and from that during the times of crisis at the end of the 19th century and in the 1930s ± where it was reasonable to expect a re-absorption of a large part of those

440

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people who were made redundant over the course of the recovery of the economy. In contrast to these situations, Brazilian industrial production experienced a new wave of growth after the long crisis during the `lost decade' (the 1980s) and the recession at the beginning of the 1990s ± however, the level of employment stagnated (Cacciamali and Bezerra, 1997, p. 31). The class structure has changed over the course of the decrease in percentage of formal workers and the growing precariousness of the work conditions of most people. 3. `Metropolitan decline': from the growing importance of informal labour to the `socio-political fragmentation of urban space' 3.1. Poverty, exclusion and illegal strategies of survival This section will consider the relationships between work, poverty, and exclusion in contemporary big Brazilian cities, especially in the two biggest metropolises. It is not my intention to underestimate the di€erences which exist from region to region and from metropolis to metropolis, due to di€erences regarding the level of absolute and relative poverty and the level of industrialisation. Nevertheless, it is possible to o€er some comments, within the framework of which, I will try to point out some common features. In a semiperipheral country like Brazil, which is at the same time socially `underdeveloped' and relatively industrialised, the working class, in the sense of Karl Marx's de®nition ± salaried workers, above all manual workers in the industrial sector, from whom surplusvalue is extracted ± is quantitatively less relevant than in advanced industrial economies and geographically highly concentrated. Furthermore, skilled industrial workers are a relatively privileged group among the urban poor; often they reach a standard of life which is almost comparable with that of the Brazilian middle class, thus becoming relatively integrated in a consumerist society. In contrast to that, one can easily see that the importance of informal labour (employees not ocially registered and self-employed people not covered by social security) is growing in Brazil ± not only quantitatively (see Table 2), but also from a socio-political standpoint. The relative importance of the industrial working class ± which was never very important due to the incomplete and geographically concentrated nature of the Brazilian industrial sector ± becomes even less signi®cant, while informal-sector employment, including its criminal side, becomes more and more relevant. The growing importance of informal labour implies several negative aspects; for example, the fact that an increasing number of employees are excluded from legal guarantees (social insurance, unemployment bene®ts,

Table 2 Labour market indicators in Brazilian metropolitan areas, 1981 and 1990 (%)a Indicator

1981

1990

Informal employment Informal self-employment

25 59

28 66

a

Source: Adapted from Rocha (1995, pp. 390, 394) De®nitions: (a) Informal employment: percentage of employees without a work permit in relation to the total number of employees; (b) informal self-employment: percentage of self-employed who do not contribute to the social security system in relation to the total number of self-employed.

paid holidays, `thirteenth cheque', and so on). From a socio-political standpoint, the most remarkable aspect of this evolution is the increasing importance of criminal strategies of survival, above all drug-tracking. Of course, it is very dicult even to estimate the number of those involved with drug- tracking among the poor; however, it is not dicult to perceive that this criminal sector of informal labour is not irrelevant, especially in the biggest metropolises.2 In this respect, it is worthwhile to pay attention to the following impressive statement of William da Silva Lima, the so-called `Professor' (`Teacher'), a famous drug dealer who, since the 1980s, has been in jail: I go into the shanty towns and see determined children, who smoke and sell marijhuana. In the future they will be three million teenagers, and they will kill you [the policemen] on the street corners. Do you realise the meaning of that ± three million teenagers and ten million unemployed people with weapons in their hands? How many Bangu I, II, III, IV, V will be necessary in order to lodge this mass? (apud Amorin, 1993, p. 255)3 Metropolitan areas in contemporary Brazil, are still places par excellence for the concentration of wealth, despite the relative deconcentration of industry and urbanisation (see below), which also correspond to the spatial deconcentration of wealth. However, the deconcentration of activities and the out¯ow of highly quali®ed professionals to medium-sized cities makes 2 I have myself co-ordinated a research project about the sociospatial impacts of drug tracking on Brazilian cities between1994 and 1997, in the context of which it was possible to gain a realistic picture of this situation. In Rio de Janeiro in particular both formal and informal leaders of favelas were interviewed (®eldwork included in Rio observation and interviews in sixteen favelas). See, particularly, Souza (1996, 2000). 3 William da Silva Lima is one of the Comando Vermelho's founders, which is Rio de Janeiro's most notorious drug tracking organisation. This statement was recollected by a detective in Rio de Janeiro's AntiKidnapping Unit. Bangu I and II are high security penitentiaries on the periphery of Rio de Janeiro.

M. Lopes de Souza / Geoforum 32 (2001) 437±447

even clearer that the metropolises concentrate poverty and social con¯icts too. Urban poverty in Brazil is, as stressed by Rocha (1995b), primarily a metropolitan one, which is to a large extent concentrated in Rio de Janeiro and S~ ao Paulo.4 This is a poverty which is associated with the functioning of the actual dynamic centre of Brazil's economy; in this way, it is a mirror of the transformations of the most dynamic sectors of Brazilian economy and its negative impacts on the labour market. It is not accidental that one of the basic features of this metropolitan poverty is a high unemployment level as well as a high percentage of households which are run by women (Rocha, 1995b). Nowadays, shanty town formation and proliferation of poor, peripheral semi-legal settlements (loteamentos clandestinos), which are the most pervasive spatial symbols of urban poverty in Brazil, are impressive not only by virtue of the ®gures which are associated with them, but also due to their complexity and socio-political signi®cance. As far as favelas are concerned, the most impressive aspect, since the 1980s, has been their increasing territorialisation5 by drug-tracking organisations.6 Favelas have a great logistical signi®cance for drug dealers who operate within the circuit of retail sales of drug in various Brazilian metropolises. Undoubtedly, the excessive highlighting of favelas by the media leaves retail drug dealers who are not based in favelas in the shadows (for example, dealers who distribute drugs on the basis of retail sale in various parts of the formal city, like res-

4 I'm speaking in terms of absolute ®gures: 19.73% of all favelahouseholds in Brazil, that is 225,870 households, were in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro in 1991, and 12.45% of all favelahouseholds, that is 142,528 households, were in the municipality of S~ao Paulo in the same period, whereas 142,324 households (12.43% of all Brazilian favela-households) were in Recife (Northeast of the country). However, 46.6% of all households of the municipality of Recife were located in favelas in 1991, whereas `only' 14% of all households of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro and 5.6% of all households of S~ao Paulo were in favelas in the same period (source: IBGE, 1993). 32.7% of the population of Rio de Janeiro and 22.2% of the population of S~ ao Paulo were regarded as poor in 1990 (absolute poverty), whereas 48.5% of the population of Recife were considered as poor in the same period (source: IBGE/PNAD [Special Tabulations] apud Rocha, 1995, p. 385). 5 I take the term territorialisation from the seminal work of Robert Sack (1986), as well as from others, more recent contributions. It means both a process of exercising territoriality by an individual or group and a process of expressing his/her/their own identity (or supporting ideological discourses) with reference to territories. Territoriality is, for Sack, `the attempt by an individual or group to a€ect, in¯uence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control of a geographic area'. (Sack, 1986, p. 19) Precisely this geographic area is, for him, a territory (Sack, 1986, p. 19). 6 Under `drug tracking organisation' I do not mean a single gang, which usually controls only one or a few favelas, but the very loose organisations (in fact, a kind of mutual help networks) known as `comandos'. See, about this question, Souza (1996, 2000).

441

taurants, night-clubs, schools and universities, and middle-class ¯ats), not to mention the role of the wholesalers who operate at a regional, national and even international levels and who, of course, do not live in shanty towns. However, favelas are, for many reasons, the places that have su€ered directly with the problem of territorialisation on the part of organised groups of drug trackers (see Souza, 1995a,b, 1996, 2000). The case of Rio de Janeiro is particularly grave. The end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s can be assumed, in Rio as well as in other cities, as a historical benchmark regarding the aforementioned territorialisation process. The increase which has contributed to a kind of `fragmentation', the understanding of which requires the consideration both of the `illegal territories' which are controlled by `parallel powers' (i.e., favelas which are controlled by a group of drug-trackers) and of spaces in the formal city. My own perception of the process which in Rio de Janeiro takes the form of `fragmentation' has its origin in an interview with a leader of a favela of the North Zone of the city (Morro do Ceu) (Souza, 1995a,b, 1996, 1997). In this interview, which occurred in 1994, the community leader said that Rio de Janeiro was in the middle of a transformation, in the context of which favelas, which were up until the 1980s more or less `open' ± that is, individuals who lived in di€erent favelas could visit each other without problems or restrictions, ± became more and more `closed' (``the communities are becoming closed'', as he put it literally), and the mobility between two favelas controlled by rival drug-tracking organisations became relatively dicult. The reason for that was the fact that for the favela inhabitant, other favelas increasingly became territories which were controlled by drug-trackers who were rivals of those who controlled his or her own community. Rivalry between gangs as well as between comandos (loose organisations which comprise many smaller gangs) a€ects the spatial mobility of favela inhabitants, in so far they take the risk of facing hostility and menace when they visit people in other favelas. According to the aforementioned leader, only in their own community can a favela inhabitant enjoy some safety, since drug dealers do not allow ordinary crimes (like robbery or rape) within their territories ± for the sake of their `business', as unnecessary violence would lead to social instability as well as to too much public exposure of the community at hand. (However, although thieves and rapists who practice crimes against ordinary favela inhabitants are usually severely punished by drug dealers, they themselves sometimes behave in a brutal manner towards ordinary favelados. The role of drug dealers as `safety guarantors' is thus relative.) It is important to underline that since the interview with the mentioned leader of a favela-association of the

442

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North Zone of Rio, who demonstrated an interesting perception of a very important aspect of the process which I have named `socio-political fragmentation of urban space' ± namely the increasing control of favelas by drug-tracking gangs and organisations ± his perception is con®rmed by several other interviews with favela-leaders of Rio de Janeiro. As far as the restriction of the spatial mobility of shanty town residents is concerned, one among various good examples was given by a community leader of another favela of the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro (Morro do Adeus), who noted that it was virtually impossible for her and leaders of neighbouring favelas to develop co-operation, since their communities were under in¯uence of rival drug traf®cking organisations, which made even the possibility of them gathering together and promoting meetings very dicult (Souza, 1996). Let us now consider the non-segregated spaces, which are also relevant to be taken into account in order to have an integral picture of socio-political fragmentation of the space in a metropolis such as Rio de Janeiro and S~ao Paulo. The same community leader of Morro do Ceu called all the spaces which correspond to ordinary districts and neighbourhoods in the `formal city' as `areas neutras' (`neutral areas'). This expression sounds a little strange in principle, but his intention was clear: for him these spaces are, from the standpoint of public safety, dangerous spaces, `no-man's land'. Neutral areas do not have protection against criminality other than that o€ered by the state by means of the police. Despite the fact that the state has the legal monopoly in violence, it is steadily challenged by drug dealers, who are responsible for the formation of several `territorial enclaves' in the city; furthermore, the state is not able to o€er safety in the streets and other public spaces of the `ordinary' neighbourhoods. However, an important element remains in the shadows: the condomõnios exclusivos, that is the luxury apartment complexes of the upper middle-class and bourgeoisie. These antipodes of the favelas were not considered by the favela-leader in his interesting statement; however, they should not be regarded as `neutral areas', as will be explained in the following section. 3.2. The self-segregation of the urban elites The phenomenon of the fall of the public individual, examined by Richard Sennett (1977) bearing in mind that it is based on the European and US-American experience, is far from being unknown in Brazil (Souza, 1997). Sennett examined the decline of public culture ± as well as of public spaces ± since the last century, a process which has occurred in parallel with the rise of an `intimate society' in Europe and the USA. The following passage is particularly illuminating:

Localism and local autonomy are becoming widespread political creeds, as though the experience of power relations will have more human meaning the more intimate the scale ± even though the actual structures of power grow ever more into an international system. Community becomes a weapon against society. . .). (Sennett, 1977, p. 339; italics are mine.) In truth, the Brazilian version of this process is particularly grave, by virtue of Brazil's socio-spatial and historical particularities as a semiperipheral country: extreme violence, segregation of the poor and self-segregation on the part of the urban elites. It is not possible to avoid a comparison between the situation pictured by Sennett and the Brazilian experience regarding self-segregation. In Brazil, increasing violence and its consequence, namely deterioration of the `social climate' in the context of daily life, have undermined the possibilities to exercise full citizenship. The increasing number of private security agents ± usually badly trained and badly paid ± who protect anything from banks to private residences, are often themselves responsible for hurting and killing innocent people. In addition to that, the police have a very bad image among the population, due to their corruption and inability to control criminality. As a result of this, the inhabitants of big Brazilian cities, especially those who live in S~ao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, feel unsafe in public spaces, which become `neutral areas' in the previously mentioned sense. From the standpoint of members of the urban elites in the two biggest metropolises, self-segregation based on condomõnios exclusivos seems to be a solution for this problem. In truth, various factors have contributed to the rise of condomõnios exclusivos as an elitist urban habitat, the best symbol of self-segregation which has reached a high sophistication in S~ao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro: (1) an urban landscape increasingly characterised by poverty and informality; (2) deterioration of quality of life in traditional elite districts, by virtue of infra-structure saturation, too high building density and pollution; (3) the wish for a greater `social exclusivity' on the part of the elites; (4) the desire to live in an environment with natural amenities (clean beaches, lagoons, and the like) and non-polluted; (5) search for safety. It is this last, with the increasing rates of violent crime and the `feeling of lack of safety' more or less realistically related to the objective criminality which has probably been the most important factor causing self-segregation, at least since the mid-1980s (Souza, 2000). In the metropolitan region of S~ao Paulo, self-segregation is best symbolised through the residential complex of Alphaville, which is located partly in the municipality of Barueri and partly in the municipality of Santana de Parnaõba. As far as the metropolis of Rio de

M. Lopes de Souza / Geoforum 32 (2001) 437±447

Janeiro is concerned, the condomõnios exclusivos of Barra da Tijuca (a huge district within the municipality of Rio de Janeiro itself) are the best examples of `middle-class ghettos', to employ one of Sennett's expressions, or of `exclusionary enclaves'.7 The wish of the Brazilian elites for self-isolation, leaving behind them what is ugly or threatening, constitutes a kind of escapism, instead of a moral commitment to the city as a whole. What is more: it is a hypocritical escapism, since the elites cannot renounce the help of those who they try to ban from their immediate landscape as neighbours, but who are at the same time useful for them as servants, security agents, and the like in the condomõnio itself (and of course as workers in general in the city outside the walls of the condomõnios). And what about the `neutral areas'? First of all, it is clear that civility ± de®ned by Marcuse (1997, p. 264) as ``the activity which protects people from each other and yet allows them to enjoy each other's company'' ± declines there. In the wake of this decline even citizenship ± understood in its broader sense of `social citizenship', that is the e€ective possibility to exercise basic rights and liberties ± is undermined. The possibility of the full exercise of certain basic rights which are tied to the notion of citizenship presupposes room for manoeuvre which shrinks under circumstances marked by prejudice, fear and violence. The right of unrestricted movement, for example, can be severely restricted by the fear of becoming the victim of an assault in public spaces, and the liberty of free association is increasingly restricted by most drug dealers who control a large proportion of Rio de Janeiro's favelas. However, the escapism of S~ ao Paulo's and Rio de Janeiro's urban elites is not restricted to condomõnios exclusivos. Huge, sophisticated, luxury shopping centres are also a part of their typical way of life. Luxury shopping centres are not so closed to strangers as condomõnios exclusivos, though, as low-income people can be found in some of them ± for instance, young people looking for some diversion. However, since the prejudices of the Brazilian urban middle- and upper-classes

7 This expression is taken from Marcuse (1997), who analysed the trends and new patterns of segregation in US cities. Brazilian condomõnios exclusivos ®t better his de®nition of exclusionary enclaves than his de®nition of `citadels'; for him, the di€erence between citadels and exclusionary enclaves is that ``the former serve to dominate and protect bastions of power and in¯uence [such as Trump Tower], and the latter serve simply to protect groups feeling vulnerable, by excluding those di€erent from themselves [such as Beverly Hills] Marcuse, 1997, p. 247). However, condomõnios exclusivos seem to be, in truth, a mixture of both, due to the fact that in Brazil the relative poor are not a minority, but comprise the large majority of the urban population (even if the middle classes are not so unimportant as one would think, especially in the more industrialised metropolises of the South and Southeast).

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associate poor people, especially favelados and blacks, with potential robbers and unpleasant people in general, one of the expectations on the part of the urban elites regarding shopping centres is that the lower-classes are kept outside. Although it is hardly possible to do it openly or directly, since shopping centres are not just private property like residential areas, people who are regarded as undesirable visitors are steadily monitored, sometimes even threatened and humiliated by security agents. Socio-political fragmentation of urban space is the ®nal outcome of all these phenomena. Excluded enclaves at the bottom of the socio-spatial hierarchy (favelas) proliferate and become increasingly dominated by drugtracking organisations, whereas self-segregation (exclusionary enclaves: condomõnios exclusivos), at the top of the socio-spatial hierarchy, becomes increasingly complex. Public life as well as public safety declines in a dramatic way (transformation of public spaces, and of `normal' districts and neighbourhoods at large, into unsafe, `neutral areas'). As we can see this socio-political fragmentation of the space is not just a new term for residential segregation, but a complex phenomenon which comprises both the transformation of poor, segregated areas into illegal territorial enclaves in an increasing number of favelas under the control of drug trackers, and self-segregation, which is to a large extent a response of privileged residents to growing insecurity in `normal' districts and neighbourhoods. This process is well represented both in Rio de Janeiro and in S~ao Paulo, despite the fact that territorialisation of favelas by criminals is more evident in Rio. Self-segregation has been in existence in both metropolises since the mid-1970s. In other Brazilian metropolises and big cities this fragmentation still is incipient.

4. From `metropolitan decline' to `extended suburbanisation' and metropolitan deconcentration As has already been stated in the introduction, metropolitan deconcentration does not have anything to do with a general decrease in the intensity of metropolitanisation in Brazil, and even less with absolute demographic losses in individual metropolises.8 Actually metropolitanisation becomes increasingly associated with the rise and growth of new metropolises, e.g. Campinas and Santos (in the state of S~ao Paulo), among 8

There were 13 cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants in 1980, whereas there were 16 cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants in 1991 (sources: CNDU and IBGE [Population Censuses] apud Motta et al., 1997). No metropolis experienced a decrease in its total population ± not even Rio de Janeiro, which grew from 9,814,574 inhabitants in 1991 to 10,192,097 inhabitants in 1996 (that is an annual growth rate of 0,77%, the lowest among the metropolises) (source: IBGE, 1997).

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others, while the demographic growth rates fall in the `old metropolises' (S~ ao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, Recife, Fortaleza and Belem), especially in the two largest.9 The intensity of internal migrations, which was a€ected in the 1980s by the economic crisis (the total ¯ow of migrants decreased from 16 million in the 1970s to 10 million in the 1980s), has increased again recently; however, S~ ao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are no longer the important magnets they were in former decades. Now some regional metropolises (especially Curitiba) as well as prosperous new metropolises and some other large and intermediate cities (above all in the southern states of Santa Catarina and Paran a and in the state of S~ ao Paulo) seem particularly attractive to migrants (see Cano, 1997; Andrade and Serra, 1998). The percentage of Brazilians who live in the two largest metropolises has decreased;10 although the importance of the other metropolises is still increasing (Recife is the only exception), despite the fall in their rates of growth. The growth rate of the metropolises (considering only the `old metropolises') was 7.8% between 1991 and 1996 ± higher than the country's average (7.0%), but signi®cantly lower than the intermediate cities' average (9.8%) (see Andrade and Serra, 1998, p. 24). Beyond the typical condomõnios exclusivos, middle class `escapism' began to express itself in other ways in the 1980s. At the metropolitan level, it is possible to ®nd both in S~ ao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro an embryonic form of `extended suburbanisation', which is well known in Europe and the USA (see Gaebe, 1987). In the context of such an `extended suburbanisation' middle-class people tired of the problems of the metropolitan core (violence, trac congestion, and the like), but at the same time unwilling or unable to move to a condomõnio exclusivo, begin to see the rural-urban fringe as an alternative; the result of this is an expansion of the metropolis itself. As far as the state of S~ ao Paulo is concerned, living in a medium-sized city relatively close to the metropolis is already a reality for many people. This is a strategy in order to avoid metropolis-related problems and, at the same time, keep the possibility of commuting to the metropolis. In some situations, for example when people

move to Campinas, it would be inaccurate to speak about `extended suburbanisation', since Campinas is itself a metropolis, however a much smaller one than the metropolis whose core is the city of S~ao Paulo. Nevertheless, considering Maria Adelia de Souza's suggestion regarding what she called a `macrometropole paulista' (Souza apud Santos, 1993, p. 75) ± which comprises a big area and includes the old metropolis of S~ao Paulo as well as the new metropolises of Campinas and Santos ± it is reasonable to understand Campinas as constituting part of this `macrometropolis'. Surely even in the case of Campinas there is some similarity to the phenomenon of `extended suburbanisation'. Also at a supralocal level one can observe, particularly in the state of S~ao Paulo, the attraction which is exerted upon individuals and ®rms by cities located outside the traditional metropolises. Middle-class migrants (highly quali®ed employees) increasingly try to escape from the most problematic urban areas; on the other hand, the fact that intermediate cities are increasingly attractive to ®rms (opening of new branches or factories as well as of new enterprises) has been evident for a number of years.11 Certainly, the demographic growth of these cities is not only related to the middle classes, but also to low-income migrants who feel attracted by the prosperity of those cities: between 1991 and 1995 610,000 nordestinos (people from the Northeast) migrated south, 79% of them to the state of S~ ao Paulo (Cano, 1997, p. 129). Cities such as Joinville, in the state of Santa Catarina (annual growth rate 1970± 1991: 5.34%), or Americana (annual growth rate 1970± 1991: 4.39%) and Sorocaba (annual growth rate 1970±1991: 3.84%), in the state of S~ao Paulo, are good examples of economically dynamic centres outside metropolitan areas (for a more detailed picture see Andrade and Serra, 1998). In S~ao Paulo, the deconcentration of urbanisation and industry is comparatively easy, by virtue of the good infrastructure in most areas of the state, such as the prosperous region of Ribeir~ao Preto in the Northeast of the state. In contrast, it is not so easy to ®nd good infrastructure in other parts of the country, especially outside the rich regions in the South and Southeast of Brazil. This picture of dynamic intermediate cities and emerging metropolises, in the state of S~ao Paulo as well as in some other comparatively prosperous regions,

9

Curitiba is also an `old metropolis' (that is a metropolitan region ocially implemented in the 1970s), but it is an exception: its growth rate showed a slight increase between 1991 and 1996 in comparison with the earlier period (1980/1991): 2.38% regarding 1991±1996 and 2.29% regarding 1980±1991 in the municipality of Curitiba and 3.40% regarding 1991±1996 and 3.03% regarding 1980±1991 in the metropolitan region as a whole (IBGE, 1995, 1997). 10 While in 1970 7.6% of the Brazilian population lived in Rio de Janeiro's metropolitan region, in 1980 it was still 7.6%, but in 1991 it was 6.6%. While in 1970 8.7% of the country's population lived in S~ao Paulo's metropolitan region, in 1980 it was 10.6% and in 1991 10.4%.

11

Empirical evidence for this has been cited both by academic researchers and by the press. As far as the academic research is concerned, detailed analysis and empirical evidence can be found, for example, in Diniz (1993, 1995), Cano (1997) and Martine and Diniz (1997). Interesting statements of middle-class people who changed big metropolises for smaller cities in prosperous regions of the country can be found, for instance, in Folha de S~ao Paulo, 19.10.1997 (`Executivos aderem a onda migrat oria') and Veja, 11.3.1998 (`A boa vida no interior').

M. Lopes de Souza / Geoforum 32 (2001) 437±447

precisely represents a di€usion of the phenomenon of urbanisation in Brazil. The rise of new centres of attraction, including new metropolises such as Campinas, Santos (state of S~ ao Paulo) and Vit oria (state of Espõrito Santo), along with the low growth rate of the old metropolises seem to justify the expression metropolitan deconcentration. As was previously stated, both individuals and ®rms are increasingly ready to change a metropolis for an intermediate or even small city (not necessarily located close to a metropolis). On the one hand, it is not the industrial ®rms alone, particularly as far as highly modern technology is concerned, which are responsible for the creation of most of the new jobs, since they are extremely capital-intensive and stimulate the replacement of workers with machines. On the other hand, important industries which locate or relocate12 outside metropolises contribute to the improvement of the local and sub-regional economy ± from smaller industries which produce speci®c components to various trades and services ± so that they are very able to induce the creation of new jobs. Undoubtedly, improvements in the ®eld of transportation and communication have led to a `time-space compression', or radical reduction of the importance of geographical distance, which in turn lays the foundations for a deconcentration of activities. However, this deconcentration of activities is neither generally followed by an economic deconcentration nor by a decentralisation of management/control. Oliveira et al. (1998) showed in a recent study that industrial activity in the state of S~ ao Paulo is economically not only highly concentrated, but also that the concentration in terms of capturing of pro®ts, has increased ± the economic crisis of the 1980s, in truth, a€ected ®rms quite di€erently, since the biggest ®rms even saw an increase in their pro®ts in that period. As far as the decentralisation of management/control is concerned, it is important to underline that there is no evidence that the metropolis of S~ ao Paulo ± by far the most important central place in Brazil ± has experienced a decrease in its power and in¯uence to the bene®t of smaller cities. Obviously, the spatial deconcentration of industrial activity stimulates a deconcentration of job creation and, to some extent, of urbanisation, as well as of certain factors of a good quality of life. However, this does not necessarily imply a reduction in the power of the metropolis of S~ ao Paulo. That is precisely the reason why Marcuse (1997, p. 220) described this process as `centralised deconcentration'.

12

It should be noted that industrial deconcentration in Brazil, in contrast to what happens in countries such as England or the US, ``(. . .) generally results from the manipulation of new investments, and not from the relocation of existing production units'' (Martine and Diniz, 1997, p. 217).

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The state of Rio de Janeiro still corresponds to the second most important central place in Brazil. However, its chronic economic crisis as well as problems with its infrastructure (the quality of which is inferior to that of the state of S~ao Paulo) make the deconcentration of activities and of opportunities for job creation much less signi®cant than in the state of S~ ao Paulo. In truth, the few signi®cant, recent cases of industrial development in the state of Rio de Janeiro, outside its metropolitan region, are related to locational choices on the part of big ®rms whose headquarters lie outside of the state and even of the country, and not to the relocalisation of ®rms previously located in the metropolis. Volkswagen's and Peugeot's assembly lines, respectively, in the cities of Resende and Porto Real (Valley of Paraõba area), are the best examples to date. Nevertheless, the metropolitan decline in Rio de Janeiro, which is at least as signi®cant as that which occurs in S~ao Paulo, has stimulated a trend in the context of which middle-class people take advantage of the improvement of commuting possibilities (for example, due to the Linha Vermelha highway) in order to move to smaller cities which are located relatively close to the metropolitan core, but which o€er a better quality of life in some respects, for instance in terms of safety. Research has shown that a number of people left Rio de Janeiro for the municipality of Marica (which is located at the fringe of the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro) in the 1990s, and there is evidence that the city of Petr opolis (which belonged to the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro until the 1980s) is another good example of a city close to the nucleus of the metropolitan region of Rio which has attracted many middle-class families since the 1980s (Souza, 2000). The expression `expanded suburbanisation' seems to be very appropriate in both cases. As far as the old regional metropolises are concerned (Porto Alegre, Curitiba, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, Recife, Fortaleza and Belem), most of them also show falling demographic growth rates, as well as signs of socio-spatial `decline' in the sense used by Milton Santos. Even in Curitiba, which is a clear exception in relation to demographic dynamics, problems and con¯icts have increased and an embryonic socio-political fragmentation of the urban space can be observed.

5. Conclusions The Brazilian economy, as well as other aspects of Brazilian society, has experienced important transformations in recent years. The spatial implications of these processes have also been quite signi®cant. Restructuring of production in the wake of `third industrial revolution'

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and post-Fordism reached Brazil in the 1990s has contributed to a deconcentration of industrial activity ± as well as of job creation opportunities and urbanisation ± which has been taking place since the 1970s in the state of S~ao Paulo. Moreover, the worsening situation in terms of factors of negative external economies in the metropolises, especially in the two biggest ones, has also contributed to a reduction in attractiveness of these metropolises for individuals and ®rms. Population growth has slowed down in the principal metropolitan areas compared to more rapid growth in newer urban centres. At the same time, the di€usion of the new communication and transportation technologies has contributed to the attractiveness of intermediate and even small cities, particularly in the state of S~ ao Paulo (along with other parts of the Southeast) and also in the South, where infrastructure as well as social indicators are much better in comparison to the rest of the country. At the same time, most parts of the North, Northeast and Centre-West are becoming more and more marginalised. As far as the metropolises are concerned, they become increasingly problematic, unsafe spaces, particularly S~ ao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Although Rio de Janeiro still is the second most important central place in Brazil, and although S~ ao Paulo's importance becomes even greater and greater ± after all, S~ ao Paulo and Rio house the headquarters of the principal private and state enterprises ± both metropolises are increasingly characterised by remarkable contrasts. Beside wealth and `modernity', various expressions of poverty and con¯ict (including their `modern' forms, such as the relatively organised crime which is associated with drug tracking) can be found there. More than a simple worsening of residential segregation, what happens in Brazil's two biggest metropolises can be termed a socio-political fragmentation of the urban space. Thus, both at the level of the metropolis and at the regional and national levels, we can observe that socio-spatial disparities are not becoming less signi®cant in the wake of an increasing adjustment in terms of economic regulation of the Brazilian economy to global trends ± quite the opposite. The model of socio-political fragmentation of the urban space ± which should be considered within a broader framework, namely along with discussions of extended suburbanisation and metropolitan deconcentration ± is a necessary further step regarding discussions about social `decline' in the metropolises. It is also a contribution to the analysis of the socio-spatial dynamics in Brazilian metropolises and of some of the most grave facets of Brazilian urbanisation in the 1980s and 1990s. Acknowledgements I would like foremost, to thank Prof. M arcio Valencßa (Department of Geography of the Federal University of

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