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Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology
The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Druguns (editors) 0 Elseuier Science k'u blishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986
427
MICROGENESIS AND GENERAL SYSTEMS I N PSYCHOLOGY Kazimierz Obuchowski Polish Academy of Scienccs Poznafi, Poland
INTRODUCTION We are presently witnessing a rapid development of psychological research focused upon the discovery and description of mechanisms and determinants of responses that go beyond merely stimulus-related predictions. This research covers a wide range of topics like cognitive, emotional, motivational, and preconscious processes, concept formation, and their psychophysiological correlates, all of them in interaction with situational contexts. At the same time, a strong tendency is manifest to overcome the existing fragmentation of psychology. This trend finds expression in research hypotheses trying to combine various psychological phenomena. Hence, this area of psychologica research generates new ideas while simultaneously i t returns to some of the older and seemingly torgotten or neglected concepts. The introduction of subliminal stimulation techniques allows us, for example, to study the intuitive superego concept of Freud and to develop methods for stuaying clinical problems of anxiety related to social orientation. It has been shown that projective techniques can reveal fundamental aspects of personality, and that they can be useful, for example, in helping us understand creativity as an integrated characteristic partaking of the elements of conscious and prcconscious perception. New possibilities have emerged and the idea of microgenetic research has evolved from "going beyond the information given" towards a more general approach which Draguns describes in the following manner: "While differing in their
.
theoretical and empirical objectives, these approaches. .are broadly concerned with events that transpire between the presentation of a stimulus and the formation of a stabilized response to it and are, as such, germane
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to microgenesis in the classical sense of the term.. .The essential hallmark of microgenesis is a sequence of directly observable events between the presentation of a stimulus and the formation of a stable response.n (Draguns, 1984, pp.3-4) A detailed analysis of the most recent studies indicates that the above mentioned '!directly observable events" often turn out to be rather complex hypothetical constructs, such a s heuristic strategies or defense mechanisms. Microgenesis thus increasingly appears to be a domain of psychology which takes a most lively interest in integrated and complex psychological concepts. The field of microgenesis thus manifests a considerable assimilating power, not only witn respect to phenomena often ignored by general psychology, such a s consciousness, personality, situational context, etc., but also in relation to the attempts to construct general systems of psycnological processes, as, tor example, in Norman Uixon's (1984) model. In the present paper I want to outline two theories with a quite different background which, however, might be useful for the interpretation of the results of microgenetic research. The first theory aims at the development of a kind of grammar of psychological processes and has been called "Code-Emotions Theory , I 1 while the second one represents a preliminary attempt to unify general psychology and psychology of personality into a single model called "Integrated Model of the Processes of Psychological Regulation - (IMP)" which includes the Code-Emotions Theory,
THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE CODE-EMOTIONS THEORY The basic assumption of the present concept is that the totality of psychological processes serve human survival. The process of anticipating events and of accommodating onel8 skills and one's Ifblueprints of action" to the actual results is a condition of survival. Perception, thinking, memory, emotions, and motivation, distinguished early in the history of psychology, can now be regarded as different aspects of the realization of the same process. Their regularity does not so much consist of an adequate reflection of reality nor of logical problem-solving as of their relevance for the specific interests and functioning of a person. Thus perceptual reflection of realities might be true in some cases while in others a blurring seems to take place due, for example, to processes of generaliza-
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tion. In some cases it is appropriate to interpret a given event without reference to a person's experience, while in others personal experience may play a prominent role, Table 1 Schema of t h e Code-Emotions lheory CODES -
RULES
Simultaneous spatio-temporal
RESULTS
Explorative, a l t e r n a t i v e c r e a t i -
Creative
vity (illumination, insight)
operations
Linear operations on t h e h i e r -
Models of t h e world ( l i n e a r
Hierarchic
creativity)
a r c h i c a l l y organized concepts
P r i n c i p l e s of t h e higher nervous
P i c t u r e of the world ( s t o r e of
Policoncrete
concrete d a t a )
activity
S t a t i s t i c s of experience
Preorganization of data. Last
Monoconcrete
b a r r i e r a g a i n s t entropy
-------
CONCRETE CODES
Maximization of economy
Minimization of economy.
Minimal u t i l i z a t i o n of concrete
Maximal u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e conc r e t e experience
experience The r e s u l t s of system functioning
The r e s u l t s of system function-
a r e less r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of empi-
ing a r e more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of empirical r e a l i t y .
rical reality.
"he p r e d i c t i o n of f u t u r e r e a l i t y
The p r e d i c t i o n of f u t u r e r e a l i t y
i s worse.
is better.
Positive
emotional
professes
determine
that
abstract
codes
will
be
preferred.
Negative
emotional
processes
determine
that
concrete
codes
will
be
preferred.
Activation determines f l e x i b i l i t y ( o r f i x a t i o n ) i n s e l e c t i o n of t h e codes.
If we call such systems of perception
and information processing
"codes" we have to assume that the human brain is capable of grasping the
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world in terms of various codes. None of them is better or worse in general terms. They differ with respect to their objectives. Thus they can only be applied properly or improperly. Traditionally, two groups of codes can be distinguished: concrete and abstract (cf. Goldstein & Gelb, 1920). Concrete codes serve a rather mechanical anticipation and consist of attempts to extrapolate the future from experience, Conditioned reflexes are instances of the basic mechanism of this extrapolation. The adequacy of mechanical anticipation depends on the degree to which a new situation is similar to an already known one, and on the speed with which one should respond to the new situation. The rules of mechanical anticipation can be genetically determined. Abstract codes serve the purpose of creative nnticipation which consists of a conceptualization of the future not necessarily based on concrete individual experiences. The adequacy of the creative anticipation depends on how well we know the rules by which reality is changed and on how well these changes are socially accepted. Creative anticipation is the better form of anticipation in all cases in which the reality to be predicted is distant in time and/or differs qualitatively from the known reality. In particular cases we may also transform reality according to our expectations. The rules of creative anticipation are always learned. Based on principles given elsewhere (Obuchowski, 1982a) at least two kinds of concrete and abstract codes may be distinguished (cf. Table 1).
CONCRETE CODES MONOCONCRETE CODE
With the help of a monoconcrete code we register a statistical relation between two phenomena according to the principle: the more frequently an event appears together with another one, the greater is the probability that both will also occur together in the future. One of the assumptions of the code-emotions theory is that each intellectual operation is a more or less conscious act of interpretation. Only operations at a level of the monoconcrete code can be performed without an internal representation of the task, running, as they do, automatically, on the basis of associative probabilities. Due to this characteristic a monoconcrete code can be "the last ditch" resistance against the danger of dis-
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integration of the psychological regulation processes of a person who, for example, may, in the case of a frontal lobe lesion, lose the ability to undertake and pursue certain tasks o r , when focusing on some task, may fail to perform that activity independently from another activity which was once superncially linked to it. Let us, for example, take a smoker who, upon lignting a candle, attempts to put the lit candle to his mouth. POLICONCRETE CODE
hlased on the polyconcrete code, reality is registered as a "picture." The picture is a relatively stable one. It is coded in the cerebral cortex and is entirely formed by events which once coexisted in time and had a very specific value for the individual. Conditioned reflexes are such units. The area in which organization and processing of information is accomplished due to the utilization of a polyconcrete code, includes all those numerous regularities which were discovered by Pavlov and his followers. Pavlov presented metaphorically what we just described a s a "picture." A picture in a given situation is strongly connected to the current functions of individual strivings. It is possible that other pictures of reality can activate a person's hunger, o r his fright, o r impulses to explore the environment, etc. A polyconcrete picture thus cannot be separated from the situation in which the individual finds himself. Generalization leads basically to the false perception of a picture enabling the individual to recognize an object similar to A as A . One should expect that generalization would increase when the actions of an individual aimed at the satisfaction of his needs become less successful. Negative emotions and the accompanying increase in activation are the signals for inefficient action. It may thus be said that emotional processes are the elements which activate and intensify the mechanism of generalization. This has been confirmed in a number of empirical studies. Inefficiency of an act which should, in t u r n , become intensified a s the picture is falsified through generalization, is compensated for by a broadening of the scope of responses instead of transfer. The mistake caused by an improper recognition of an event is reduced when the components of a picture belonging to the subordinate elements of the structure become blurred first. Since reality changes primarily in subordinate details, the more significant elements being the more stable ones. the possibility of a false response is also diminished. Generalization also leads to broader anticipations. It can be demon-
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strated that a picture may become anachronistic with respect to the reality in which it was crcated. Its anachronism depends on the time range of the anticipation. We can safely hypothesize that the less a picture of a given reality is differentiated, the more adequately for various states of reality will it be anticipated further into the future. This sketchy prcsentation of the mechanisms of functioning in a polyconcrete code can supply the basis for psychological concepts of neurosis, psychosis, and changes of functioning in difficult situations.
ABSTRACT CODES H I E R A R C H I C CODE
With the help of a hierarchic code we register reality a s a model or a set of models of a random order of generality. The model is based on concepts that are not signs of any concrete designations. They are only classes referring to designations (actual or invented ones) characteristic for the abstract criterion - for example, types of objects, processes, symbols, functions, properties, etc. In order for a given concept to be employed in a hierarchic code, at least one other concept of the same meaning but different range - for example, triangle-equilateral triangle, red-purple , etc. - is necessary. In this manner each concept can form hierarchic organizations with other concepts. A model having no actual equivalent is also a hierarchic organization. A s the model is distant from situational determinants, i t provides for far-reaching predictions for situations which are not deducible from the existing reality. A concept of creativity may imply that we can create realities which are "actually improbable," or that we can make them probable by means of appropriate actions, or that we can at lcast prepare ourselves for their appearance. The above statement does not imply that creativity is just the 'kreation of the improbable." That would lower the value of creativity for a person's actual functioning in the world, reducing it to the category of an artistic creativity. Not wanting to diminish the value of a r t , it can nevertheless be stated that creativity as an instrument of pragmatically oriented daily actions differs very much from creativity with free alternatives. Pragmatic creativity according to the hierarchic code must be expressed within a framework of definite rules.
Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology Any model always contains some arbitrariness, though.
433
Subjective-
ly, it leaves us insecure to a certain degree, and we tend to base our practical action on pictures which are the results of a mechanical anticipation rather than the results of a model. Thus, particularly in uncertain or difficult situations, there is a tendency to use pictures instead of models or to give pictures at least an auxiliary role (for instance, as concretizations of hypotheses). The reverse can also happen. The picture described in a very free manner may for some time acquire the role of a model, i.e. become characterized by sufficiently general conceptual categories to make i t impossible for us to reduce it to any concrete picture. Since it is not a part of a theoretical network, it remains a kind of empty label. With the help of a model one can obtain quite new, creative, qualitatively different solutions of problems, even predictions. However, this is just a single, quite limited type of creativity. The limits stem from the verbal form of the model. Creation can also assume a linear form. It seems to me that this is not the way to accomplish a creation of completely new concepts which are an alternative to that which we know already. The hierarchic code allows only for straightforward linear creation. Alternative creation requires a different code. C R E A T I V E CODE
The above mentioned limitations of the hierarchic code stimulated the seiirch for another code which would be an instrument of anticipation neither restricted to a simple reproduction of experience nor obtained by conscious linguistic operations based on definite rules of thinking. Among the essential postulates for such a new code would be the possibility of simultaneous processing of different data which cannot be grasped as semantic units within the concept of a linear language. Two questions arise in this context: 1. Are there data which would indicate a possibility of performing intellectual operations with the help of pictures, and not words, which
could be characterized as a process of thinking taking place outside the limits of consciousness? 2. Are there any data which point to the way in which a translation
of the results of a creative process from this hypothetical code into
a hierarchic one is accomplished? (Surely it is not very probable that such a translation is a direct one, as the followers of an intuitive view of creative thinking secm to suggest. 1
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Both questions can be answerod in the affirmative. Though any nnswers are far from complete, a few basic theses will be articulated in the following pa-agraphs: ( a ) Therc are mnny instances from daily expericnces which would indicatc that the meaning of sentcnces we utter is coded in the system of information from which we somehow "decode" i t . This decoding nay
lead to confusing results. We sometimes change the contents of our utterances fecling that "this is not what I wanted to say." This €eeling
01
dispRrity between wliat had been formulated and what should
have becm formulated docs not refer only to the formal aspects of such an utterance, but also to i t s meaning. ( b ) In some organic disorders, such as semantic aphasia, a patient is
unablc to select words for contents which have to be spelled out, There a r e , however, reasons to believe that the contents "exist" beyond linguistic structurcs and that cognitive operations are performed with their help, ( c ) There are numerous self-reports of many cre,ltive scientists (cf.
Hodamard, 1049) who say that, before they had solved the problem, they had
21
fcccling of a IIEeneral direction" and knew precisely where
the solution was and what was relevant for i t . The others felt at lcflst that the decisive stage of creative problem-solving had been accomplished outside of their consciousness and that they were unable to reconstruct its course. ( d ) On the basis of the hypothetical characteristics of n crentive code, we may assume that thc results of this multidimensional process should be given originally in the guise of a picture, i . e . , it should be t-ansferrcd to a polyconcrete code. It is subsequently decoded and trans?ated into a hierarchic one. Our data with respect to the phases of incubation cind illumination in ciwitive processes can confirm this hypothesis. There arc ~ l s oreasons to assume that there is a lasting network of ir.formation in the brain which is supefior to all information structures organized with the help cf the conc-ete and hiororchic codes. What has been descrihed hr\re as a creative code is a manner of organizing the totality of informetion found in the human brain. Under specific conditions these data can be distinguished as simple association, pictures, or models.
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REGULA TlVE FUNCTIONS OF THE EMOTIONAL PROCESSES
The model of organization of the cognitive processes presented in the preceding pnragraphs (cf. also Obuchowski, 1980b) would remain incomplete if we failed to reveal those psychological processes which determine which code is to be chosen in a given concrete situation. There are no reasons to believe that the choice in this case is a conscious one. It is also improbable that a person is free to choose the best code from the point of view of human survival. We have to postulate the existence of an independent system of steering for the cognitive processes. This system has to register nothing but the positive and negative subjective states and the intensity of these psychological states. In reference to the neurophysiology of emotions, to the evolution of the emotional processes, and to the role of emotions in the functioning of people and animals, the following conclusions can be drawn: 1. Three separate emotional processes can be assumed : activation, negative emotion and positive emotion. They differ with respect to their physiological characteristics, are generated b y separate brain structures, and have bcen formed at different stages in phylogenesis. 2 . The negative emotion is a process generated in a situation of di-
rect failure, of limited orientation, of danger. It may easily be demonstrated that the concrete codes in this situation are more secure since they furnish a key to a more precise utilization of the concrete situational experience. Abstract codes are more risky, and their advantages can be first perceived only after some time has elapsed. Thus i t can be assumed that the process of a negative emotion acts exclusively as an activatior of the concrete codes. The only situation which is suited to allow a person to employ abstract codes is the situation of complete security, perfect orientation in a situation of concrete, continuous success. In this case positive emotion is an activator, 3. The intensity of negative and positlve characteristics of a situation
is responsible for activation. It is easy to theoretically deduce and empirically confirm that a high intensity of activation results in the blocking of cognitive processes at a given level of code. As soon as a high activation level becomes stabilized, however, a new phenomenon, the facilitation of functioning, appears. This can be defined as a narrowing down of the information from the external world, both, in the
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case of positive emotion where it is the result of a renunciation of concrete data, and in the case of negative emotion where it is the result of excessive generalization making it impossible to differentiate the stimuli. In the case of an excessive lowering of activation, which indicates a low value of the situation, 'a person usually switches into the concrete code as the more economic one.
THE INTEGRATIVE MODEL FOR THE PROCESSES OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL REGULATION (IMP) Any reasonable attempt to explain a given psychological mechanism requires a precise description of the task of this mechanism. While constructing the code-emotions theory, I assumed that this task, based on brain processes, is the anticipation of events. The distance of the postulated anticipation is a varying criterion for the efficiency of the brain. I have assumed that the longer the temporal distance of anticipation the higher the cost paid for its validity. But this is not a linear relation. History of science seems to indicate that the validity of long-distance anticipation increases rapidly i f a good theory of high complexity is available. The code-emotions theory indicates that i f the brain is an instrument for anticipating events, then the efficiency of this instrument depends on the selection of an appropriate code for this task on the basis of an individual's experience. Apart from code selection, the general orientation of the whole system towards internal data processing or towards external search for data also plays an important role. The above mentioned mechanics of tuning the instruments to the task, so that our experience will be used in an optimal way and not disrupt the
process of adaptive anticipation, do not sufficiently explain the choice of the direction of an activity, its stabilization or changes, nor do they explain the functioning of evaluational standards. Thus the mechanisms in question are applicable to the explanation of the phenomena which psychology of personality deals with, i.e. of those which go beyond the scope of psychological reality accounted for by the code-emotions theory. A person becomes conscious of some phenomena and elaborates concepts to account for them. Part of his knowledge about renlity remains outside of his consciousness,
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At this point we must introduce the principle of regulation, related both to simple activities which are the subject for general psychology and to complex personal conduct. The concept of regulation is not an internal one. I conceive of the standard of regulation as being external with respect to the elements of the system, sharing with them only its genesis. The standard of regulation is more than a product of the system. The whole human psychological system is a product, not only of cerebral organization, but also of subjective experience combined with the experience of others, the patterns of culture, and of the individual strategies of data processing. The standards of psychological regulation are thus actually generated by a broader variety of phenomena than the individual psychological unit which articulated them. We have now to proceed to the construction of a model of psychological regulation that is more complex than the once popular concept of homeostasis. The construction of the model i s , however, not completely finished, and I shall limit myself to the explanation of the core scheme and some of its consequences (cf. Table 2 and
Fig. 1). Let me begin with the element (1) called l'Motive.lf I have previously expressed (Obuchowski, 1982a) the idea that any consciously attempted activity becomes possible only after the program and task of a specific activity or conduct are consciously articulated. A Motive in the IMP model is a precondition for any organized activity. In our model the Motive thus links the whole structure of the processes of psychological regulation to the Environment (8) and the Results (7). The Motive closes the circuit of psychological regulation mechanisms of integrating external situations. The Standard of the Regulative Processes ( 2 ) is defined as the state of things which an individual considers to be his or her desired degree of performance in the organization of the task, according to his more or less rigid inner control. If a Standard of Regulation happens to be strongly task-related, the activity results in a definite external or internal state. If the rigid inner control (compulsion) is the Standard of Regulation, the external results of the activity arc negligible as long as only inner tension is reduced. We are dealing with two different motivational mechanisms, the first one being oriented towards the achievement of some definite product, the second one being a typical mechanism of tension reduction. A Standard of Regulation can therefore be clearly formulated and linked to one's own tasks and it is then an expression of the intentional self.
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The Directional Regulator ( 3 ) is particularly complex. Within the theory of developmental personality (cf. Obuchowski, 1980a, 1981), the Directional Regulator is an element of personality and considered a Programming System which is connected with different states of consciousness; or better, it ascribes various data to various states of consciousness, though, according to the model, only knowledge and emotional attitudes can be accorded the status of being conscious or unconscious.
Table 2 The Integrative Model of the Psychological Regulative Processes (components) 1. MOTIVE
7, THE RESULTS OF ONE'S OWN ACTIVITY
The formula8.
THE EXTERNAL SITVATION
tion of the 2. STANDARD OF THE REGULATIVE PROCESSES
aim and the
Task Organization
program of the
Compulsion
task oriented
3. DIRECTIONAL REGULATOR
activity
a. Cultural Paradigms (supraconsciousness) b. Knowledge
-
abstract and concrete 5 . CODE OF REGULATIVE OPERATIONS
(consciousness, unconsciousness) C.
Emotional Attitudes
-
abstract and concrete
Creative Code
(consciousness, unconsciousness)
Hierarchic (abstract) Code
d. Background Motivation (passive unconsciousn.)
Policoncrete Code
e. Defense Mechanisms (active unconsciousness)
Monoconcrete Code Simple Unconditioned Reflex
4. OPERATIONAL REGULATOR
Reactivity (by Strelau)
6.
Emotional Stability (by Eysenck) Introversion-Extraversion (by Eysenck or in Perceptual Organization (approach in Ro or
MODIFIERS OF THE CODE Activation
RO)
Negative Emotion Positive Emotion
cognitive style) Productivity (R in R" or number of the themes in TAT) Trait Anxiety (questionnaire or Ro or.. .) General Intelligence Special Abilities
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Knowledge and attitudes cover the greatest part of individual data organisation, i . e . , structures that give individual answers to questions referring to specific reality-related stimuli. Knowledge includes both, the pictures acquired through experience, and the models referring to deeper hidden characteristics of the world.
OIRECTIONAL
0REGULATOR
-
*
@
COOE OF REGULATIVE OPERATIONS
.
Figure 1 Zhe Integrative Model of the Psychological Regulative Processes (IMP).
Attitudes are expressions of emotional preferences, both a s results of some concrete experience (emotional conditioned reflexes) and a s a results of self-reflections about the world and ourselves. Cultural paradigms occupy a separate position. They are composites of ideas (!la just world"), acquired from a given culture without our control. We become aware of their existence only in those historical periods when they undergo some transformations. We do not manipulate these cultural paradigms consciously nor do they belong to the contents of consciousness. Those cultural paradigms o r archetypes should be granted a separate state
- that
of "supraconsciousness
.
Their supraindividual ontological status
links them more closely with social consciousness phenomena than with individual ones.
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In the fourth edition of "Psychology of Human Strivings" (Obuchowski, 1982b) background motivation has been outlined as a manifestation of inborn drives. We assume that a s a result of inhibiting effects of the learning processes in ontogenesis, these biological drives cannot be directly manifestea in normal adult behavior. Background motivation, in contrast to defense mechanisms, does not seem to influence perception or memory. This enables u s to ascribe to such motivation a separate state of consciousness, that of "passive unconsciousness11a s opposed to "active unconsciousness." Defense mechanisms, as defined by Freud and a s investigated by several contributors to this volume, act as unconscious psychological regulators and can actively modify the course of conscious psychological activity. In the the theory of personality development (cf. Obuchowski, 1980a, 19811, the Operational Regulator ( 4 ) has been included in the so-called basic system. I t is composed of those personality aspects which we traditionally count among the formal ones. They can be regarded a s indicators of various functional characteristics of brain tissue and of brain organiza-
tion influencing the processes of psychological regulation.
They decide
both the preference in the selection of operations and the course of these operations. Their number in the model has not been speciried but can be limited by assuming that categories like introversion, reactivity, or the cognitive styles are only different indicators of the same brain properties. For instance, reactivity is, according to Strelau (1983), preference with respect to the intensity of stimulation. Thus reactive persons, like the introverts, limit Stimulation, which should influence their cognitive style. Also trait anxiety, according to code-emotions theory, should influence the input of external data and preferences for the policoncrete code, which in turn should result in a compensatory generation of a greater number of internal concrete data in the operational memory. The whole model of IMP is composed of 8 elements (cf. Figure l ) , the most central being the Standard of Regulation ( 2 ) . Functionally the most heavlly burdened, i.e., the one with the largest number of interconnections: 3 input and 3 output routes, is the Directional Regulator ( 3 ) . The Code of Regulative Operations (5) has 2 input and 3 output routes. The Operational Regulator ( 4 ) has 2 output routes and 1 input route linking it with the Environment ( 8 ) . We may assume that the number of input routes compared to the output routes is an indicator of the operational power of a specific component of the model. While Moditiers of the Code ( 6 ) and
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Standard of Regulation ( 2 ) are equal with respect to the operational power, the Directional Regulator (3) and the Code of Regulation ( 5 ) have a stronger impact on the operational functions according to IMP. The Operational Regulator ( 4 ) and Motive (1) have more instrumental functions in the operations. All eight IMP components can fulfill executive functions, i . e . , they all have at least one input and one output route. The elements 7 and 8 play a particular role. They have been included in the IMP in order to stress the constant presence of the Environment in which a person functions and to point out the vital role of feedback from the results of an individual's activity.
What do the arrows in the model mean? Where do they come from and what determines their number and direction? The IMP does not give a complete representation of the flow of data between the various components and, accordingly, i t cannot throughout all subsystems be used as a flow chart. The arrows and their direction indicate only that a specific state of a given subsystem must be preceded b y a specific state of another subsystem. The types of connections and their number have been determined by an analysis of empirical data from various areas of psychology. IMP is an attempt at a synthesis of different theoretical standpoints. It allows the prediction of research results in various areas. The model was not constructed to account for results in subliminal stimulation experiments, for example. Nevertheless, it rollows from the IMP tnat we should expect data rrom subliminal stimulation to reach 3 only when certain conditions are mct in 4 . They can be blocked, for example, if 4 is characterized by a high degree of trait anxiety. A low anxiety threshold should, according to code-emotions theory, block the route of external data input and lead to an increase in the orientation towards internal data changing the standard ot regulation and the motivational state. This might help us explain results indicating that subjects with low anxiety are more oriented towards physical properties of the world and high-anxiety subjects more towards social ones. An interesting result has been obtained by Obuchowska (1971) upon studying two groups of children. One was composed of children with clinical symptoms of failure anxiet y , while the control group included children who responded adequately to failure. Neurotic anxiety over failure manifested itself in such behavior
K. Obuchowski
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as fear of submitting properly executed classwork for evaluation, inability to continue a game of chess in spite of winning, etc. Children from both groups completed first a jig-saw puzzle which posed no problems for untrained children. Then the conditions were changed in such a way as to make successful completion impossible. The experimenter told the children that when he would be able to predict that their way to the solution would be wrong he would flash a lamp. Children from the normal group responded with a number of changing moves when the light was flashed. Neurotic children responded with the same changes even before the lamp was flashed, and after a few trials of this kind, the changes occurred immediately after the task had been started. This means that children with anxiety over failure responded in a way to the Environment which did not result from the properties of the Environment, but from the properties of the Directional Regulator, i.e., from internal data. Dixon's model (Dixon, 1 9 8 1 ; cf. also Dixon & Henley, Chapter 2 ) indicates that the integration of subliminal and supraliminal information is performed at the level of physiological mechanisms. According to the IMP conventions, the Operational Regulator corresponds also to the physiological level. The study by Hentschel and Schneider (cf. Chapter 10) demonstrated that defense mechanisms can moderate the ability to integrate subliminal and supraliminal data, indicating, in terms of IMP, the participation of the Operational Regulator, We may, hypothetically, assume that a psychological core of creativity is based at a physiological level on 4 , and not on 3 or 5 , because creative individuals demonstrate a high degree of integration of conscious and subconscious data (cf. the study by Smith, Carlsson, 8 Danielsson. Chapter 11). According to IMP, one should expect that in spite of blocking of data between 4 and 3 , 6 - including the basic emotional responses - will be activated. It' this is the case, we should encounter changes of mood and other consequences of an influence of emotions, as well as an overall activation of psychological processes, all as a result of nonassimilated subliminal information, i.e., of blocked data processing from 4 to 3. It is thus probable that the route 8-4-6-5-3-2-1 is actually being employed. There are numerous examples for changes in autonomic reations, sensation thresholds, perceptual attitudes (cf. Dixon, 1981) occurring as a consequence of confronting subjects with subliminal data. (8)
In microgenetic experiments, the expected features of the environment are obscured and appear novel and strange. External inputs are un-
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structured at first and are, moreover, directly or indirectly threatening. The principal motive (1) for behavlor in compliance witn instructions is, for most subjects, the recapture of meaningful structured impressions (erfort after meaning), even when the result ('0 of this effort is still far from perfect. Only in the course of serial presentation is convergence of subjective outputs and objective inputs increasingly experienced. 'The standard of the regulative processes ( 2 ) is directed outward, toward a performance that is adequate to the situation; internally, its objective is the reduction of tension and reconstitution of internal balance. In a multitude of percept-genetic studies, the moderating influence of the personality-specific functional features of the Operational Regulator ( 4 ) has been demonstrated. In the contributions to the present volume, there are numerous instances that impressively document the operation of this influence. The Directional Regulator (3) is, according to percept-genetic and psychodynamic assumptions, for the most part restricted to the operation of defense mechanisms which influence the subjects' pertormance by obstructing the awareness of threatening stimuli and by simultaneously preventing their veridical perception. The inactive unconscious of the culturally shared assumptions has barely been investigated in microgenetic experiments. The pursuit of this line of investigation would provide an opportunity to derive new hypotheses for microgenetic research from the IMP model. In the normal mode of ascending presentation in percept-genesis, the subject is at first confronted with a task which proceeds from severe (limited orientation, in Obuchowski's, 1982, terms) to gradually decreasing restriction of information. Under these circumstances, the utilization of concrete codes ( 5 ) should be favored. Even though percept-genetic protocols have not been categorized along these lines, published case studies with protocols seem to suggest the utility of such an interpretation. The experimental situation, however, under no circumstances favors the use of creative codes. This is quite different in the case of inverted percept-genesis. There, a paradigmatic rethinking becomes possible ( 6 : Modifier of the Code), the attainment of objective meaning and the security thereby achieved providing a greater amount of freedom for multidimensional information processing (creative code), For this situation, the moderating influence of the Operational Regulator ( 4 ) with its formal principles of operation and of the Directional Regulator ( 3 ) is clearly illustrated in several studies of this volume.
K.Obuchowski
444
On the whole, the IMP model appears to be well suited to at least partly provide an alternative explanation of microgenetic assumptions. If an attempt were to be made to represent thc discrete phases of the perceptgenetic progression in terms of all the elements of this model, a number of
.
additional variables, e ,g , the parallel processes of activation and the positive and negative emotional states, would need to be controlled. Even at the present stage of theoretical analysis, however, connections between the IMP model and microgenesis become apparent. These links could be empirically examined in a concrete experiment. In principle, the IMP provides a closed circuit of the progression from input to output which lends itself to the specirication of each of the phases of percept-genesis. Proceeding from the assumption, however, that differences are more clearly delineated in the comparison or longer segments, one could divide the progression into bigger chunks, corresponding perhaps to three thirds of the perceptual process. Such a mode of division into three or four segments prior to the
.
veridical recognition of the stimulus has been undertaken bcfore The IMP model then places only limited demands for the modiIication of the typical experimental microgenetic sequence. Its true advantage lies in the opening of new perspectives from which, in the optimal case, new meaningtul formulations of hypotheses for applied research may result. It is possible that further analysis of empirical data will make additional modifications of IMP necessary. However, the results collected so far seem to justify its public presentation and release for analysis and critical scrutiny. Its basic structure at least seems defensible. The aim of the present paper was not to persuade the reader that IMP is a perfect model, but to demonstrate some promising possibilities of an interpretation of results from microgenesis and subliminal stimulation from a very different point of view.
445
Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology
REFERENCES Dixon, N. (1981). Preconscious Processing. Chichester: Wiley. Dixon, N.
(1984). The conscious-unconscious
understanding.
In G.J.W.
Smith, W.D.
interface:
Contribution t o a n
Frohlich, & U.
Hentschel (Eds.),
From Private to Public Reality (pp. 55-66). Bonn: Bouvier. Dixon, N., 8 Henley, S., (this volume, chapter2). subliminal
Personality
factors
and
perception.
Draguns, J.G. (1984). Microgenesis by any other name. In W.D. Frohlich, G.J. W. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & U. Hentschel (Eds.), Psychological Processes in Cognition and Personality (pp. 3-17). Washington: Hemisphere.
Goldstein, K., & Gelb, A. (1920). Psychologische Analysen hirnpathologischer
Faille. Leipzig: Barth. Hadamard, J. (1949). An Essay on the Psychology of Invention in t h e Mathe-
matical Field. Princeton: University of Princeton Press. Hentschel, U. & Schneider, U. (this volume, chapter 10). Psychodynamic personalit y correlates of creativity. Obuchowska
I.
(1971). Psychological mechanisms of anxiety and failure in
children. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 2, 115-118. Obuchowski, K. (1980a). Einige Probleme der entwicklungsfahigen Personlichkeit. In A. Kossakowski (Ed.), Psychologie im Sozialismus (pp. 153-169). Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften.
Obuchowski, K. (U980b). Regulative functions of emotional processes. In Congress Report of the 4th Meeting of Psychologists from the Danubian Countries: Problems of the Regulation of Activity (pp. 131-139). Budapest: Publishing House of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Obuchowski, K. (1981). Personality and Effectivity. Wroclaw: Ossolineum. Obuchowski, K. (1982a). Orientierung und Emotion Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaf ten.
Obuchowski , K.( 1982b).F%ychologia d e h ludekich Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe (4th ed.). Smith, G., Carlsson, I., & Danielsson, A. (this volume, chapter 11). Identification with another person: Manipulated by means of subliminal stimulation. Strelau, J. (1983). Temperament Press.
-
Personality
-
Activity. London: Academic
427
MICROGENESIS AND GENERAL SYSTEMS I N PSYCHOLOGY Kazimierz Obuchowski Polish Academy of Scienccs Poznafi, Poland
INTRODUCTION We are presently witnessing a rapid development of psychological research focused upon the discovery and description of mechanisms and determinants of responses that go beyond merely stimulus-related predictions. This research covers a wide range of topics like cognitive, emotional, motivational, and preconscious processes, concept formation, and their psychophysiological correlates, all of them in interaction with situational contexts. At the same time, a strong tendency is manifest to overcome the existing fragmentation of psychology. This trend finds expression in research hypotheses trying to combine various psychological phenomena. Hence, this area of psychologica research generates new ideas while simultaneously i t returns to some of the older and seemingly torgotten or neglected concepts. The introduction of subliminal stimulation techniques allows us, for example, to study the intuitive superego concept of Freud and to develop methods for stuaying clinical problems of anxiety related to social orientation. It has been shown that projective techniques can reveal fundamental aspects of personality, and that they can be useful, for example, in helping us understand creativity as an integrated characteristic partaking of the elements of conscious and prcconscious perception. New possibilities have emerged and the idea of microgenetic research has evolved from "going beyond the information given" towards a more general approach which Draguns describes in the following manner: "While differing in their
.
theoretical and empirical objectives, these approaches. .are broadly concerned with events that transpire between the presentation of a stimulus and the formation of a stabilized response to it and are, as such, germane
K. Obuchowaki
428
.
to microgenesis in the classical sense of the term.. .The essential hallmark of microgenesis is a sequence of directly observable events between the presentation of a stimulus and the formation of a stable response.n (Draguns, 1984, pp.3-4) A detailed analysis of the most recent studies indicates that the above mentioned '!directly observable events" often turn out to be rather complex hypothetical constructs, such a s heuristic strategies or defense mechanisms. Microgenesis thus increasingly appears to be a domain of psychology which takes a most lively interest in integrated and complex psychological concepts. The field of microgenesis thus manifests a considerable assimilating power, not only witn respect to phenomena often ignored by general psychology, such a s consciousness, personality, situational context, etc., but also in relation to the attempts to construct general systems of psycnological processes, as, tor example, in Norman Uixon's (1984) model. In the present paper I want to outline two theories with a quite different background which, however, might be useful for the interpretation of the results of microgenetic research. The first theory aims at the development of a kind of grammar of psychological processes and has been called "Code-Emotions Theory , I 1 while the second one represents a preliminary attempt to unify general psychology and psychology of personality into a single model called "Integrated Model of the Processes of Psychological Regulation - (IMP)" which includes the Code-Emotions Theory,
THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE CODE-EMOTIONS THEORY The basic assumption of the present concept is that the totality of psychological processes serve human survival. The process of anticipating events and of accommodating onel8 skills and one's Ifblueprints of action" to the actual results is a condition of survival. Perception, thinking, memory, emotions, and motivation, distinguished early in the history of psychology, can now be regarded as different aspects of the realization of the same process. Their regularity does not so much consist of an adequate reflection of reality nor of logical problem-solving as of their relevance for the specific interests and functioning of a person. Thus perceptual reflection of realities might be true in some cases while in others a blurring seems to take place due, for example, to processes of generaliza-
Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology
429
tion. In some cases it is appropriate to interpret a given event without reference to a person's experience, while in others personal experience may play a prominent role, Table 1 Schema of t h e Code-Emotions lheory CODES -
RULES
Simultaneous spatio-temporal
RESULTS
Explorative, a l t e r n a t i v e c r e a t i -
Creative
vity (illumination, insight)
operations
Linear operations on t h e h i e r -
Models of t h e world ( l i n e a r
Hierarchic
creativity)
a r c h i c a l l y organized concepts
P r i n c i p l e s of t h e higher nervous
P i c t u r e of the world ( s t o r e of
Policoncrete
concrete d a t a )
activity
S t a t i s t i c s of experience
Preorganization of data. Last
Monoconcrete
b a r r i e r a g a i n s t entropy
-------
CONCRETE CODES
Maximization of economy
Minimization of economy.
Minimal u t i l i z a t i o n of concrete
Maximal u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e conc r e t e experience
experience The r e s u l t s of system functioning
The r e s u l t s of system function-
a r e less r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of empi-
ing a r e more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of empirical r e a l i t y .
rical reality.
"he p r e d i c t i o n of f u t u r e r e a l i t y
The p r e d i c t i o n of f u t u r e r e a l i t y
i s worse.
is better.
Positive
emotional
professes
determine
that
abstract
codes
will
be
preferred.
Negative
emotional
processes
determine
that
concrete
codes
will
be
preferred.
Activation determines f l e x i b i l i t y ( o r f i x a t i o n ) i n s e l e c t i o n of t h e codes.
If we call such systems of perception
and information processing
"codes" we have to assume that the human brain is capable of grasping the
K. Obuchowski
430
world in terms of various codes. None of them is better or worse in general terms. They differ with respect to their objectives. Thus they can only be applied properly or improperly. Traditionally, two groups of codes can be distinguished: concrete and abstract (cf. Goldstein & Gelb, 1920). Concrete codes serve a rather mechanical anticipation and consist of attempts to extrapolate the future from experience, Conditioned reflexes are instances of the basic mechanism of this extrapolation. The adequacy of mechanical anticipation depends on the degree to which a new situation is similar to an already known one, and on the speed with which one should respond to the new situation. The rules of mechanical anticipation can be genetically determined. Abstract codes serve the purpose of creative nnticipation which consists of a conceptualization of the future not necessarily based on concrete individual experiences. The adequacy of the creative anticipation depends on how well we know the rules by which reality is changed and on how well these changes are socially accepted. Creative anticipation is the better form of anticipation in all cases in which the reality to be predicted is distant in time and/or differs qualitatively from the known reality. In particular cases we may also transform reality according to our expectations. The rules of creative anticipation are always learned. Based on principles given elsewhere (Obuchowski, 1982a) at least two kinds of concrete and abstract codes may be distinguished (cf. Table 1).
CONCRETE CODES MONOCONCRETE CODE
With the help of a monoconcrete code we register a statistical relation between two phenomena according to the principle: the more frequently an event appears together with another one, the greater is the probability that both will also occur together in the future. One of the assumptions of the code-emotions theory is that each intellectual operation is a more or less conscious act of interpretation. Only operations at a level of the monoconcrete code can be performed without an internal representation of the task, running, as they do, automatically, on the basis of associative probabilities. Due to this characteristic a monoconcrete code can be "the last ditch" resistance against the danger of dis-
Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology
43 1
integration of the psychological regulation processes of a person who, for example, may, in the case of a frontal lobe lesion, lose the ability to undertake and pursue certain tasks o r , when focusing on some task, may fail to perform that activity independently from another activity which was once superncially linked to it. Let us, for example, take a smoker who, upon lignting a candle, attempts to put the lit candle to his mouth. POLICONCRETE CODE
hlased on the polyconcrete code, reality is registered as a "picture." The picture is a relatively stable one. It is coded in the cerebral cortex and is entirely formed by events which once coexisted in time and had a very specific value for the individual. Conditioned reflexes are such units. The area in which organization and processing of information is accomplished due to the utilization of a polyconcrete code, includes all those numerous regularities which were discovered by Pavlov and his followers. Pavlov presented metaphorically what we just described a s a "picture." A picture in a given situation is strongly connected to the current functions of individual strivings. It is possible that other pictures of reality can activate a person's hunger, o r his fright, o r impulses to explore the environment, etc. A polyconcrete picture thus cannot be separated from the situation in which the individual finds himself. Generalization leads basically to the false perception of a picture enabling the individual to recognize an object similar to A as A . One should expect that generalization would increase when the actions of an individual aimed at the satisfaction of his needs become less successful. Negative emotions and the accompanying increase in activation are the signals for inefficient action. It may thus be said that emotional processes are the elements which activate and intensify the mechanism of generalization. This has been confirmed in a number of empirical studies. Inefficiency of an act which should, in t u r n , become intensified a s the picture is falsified through generalization, is compensated for by a broadening of the scope of responses instead of transfer. The mistake caused by an improper recognition of an event is reduced when the components of a picture belonging to the subordinate elements of the structure become blurred first. Since reality changes primarily in subordinate details, the more significant elements being the more stable ones. the possibility of a false response is also diminished. Generalization also leads to broader anticipations. It can be demon-
K. Obuchowski
432
strated that a picture may become anachronistic with respect to the reality in which it was crcated. Its anachronism depends on the time range of the anticipation. We can safely hypothesize that the less a picture of a given reality is differentiated, the more adequately for various states of reality will it be anticipated further into the future. This sketchy prcsentation of the mechanisms of functioning in a polyconcrete code can supply the basis for psychological concepts of neurosis, psychosis, and changes of functioning in difficult situations.
ABSTRACT CODES H I E R A R C H I C CODE
With the help of a hierarchic code we register reality a s a model or a set of models of a random order of generality. The model is based on concepts that are not signs of any concrete designations. They are only classes referring to designations (actual or invented ones) characteristic for the abstract criterion - for example, types of objects, processes, symbols, functions, properties, etc. In order for a given concept to be employed in a hierarchic code, at least one other concept of the same meaning but different range - for example, triangle-equilateral triangle, red-purple , etc. - is necessary. In this manner each concept can form hierarchic organizations with other concepts. A model having no actual equivalent is also a hierarchic organization. A s the model is distant from situational determinants, i t provides for far-reaching predictions for situations which are not deducible from the existing reality. A concept of creativity may imply that we can create realities which are "actually improbable," or that we can make them probable by means of appropriate actions, or that we can at lcast prepare ourselves for their appearance. The above statement does not imply that creativity is just the 'kreation of the improbable." That would lower the value of creativity for a person's actual functioning in the world, reducing it to the category of an artistic creativity. Not wanting to diminish the value of a r t , it can nevertheless be stated that creativity as an instrument of pragmatically oriented daily actions differs very much from creativity with free alternatives. Pragmatic creativity according to the hierarchic code must be expressed within a framework of definite rules.
Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology Any model always contains some arbitrariness, though.
433
Subjective-
ly, it leaves us insecure to a certain degree, and we tend to base our practical action on pictures which are the results of a mechanical anticipation rather than the results of a model. Thus, particularly in uncertain or difficult situations, there is a tendency to use pictures instead of models or to give pictures at least an auxiliary role (for instance, as concretizations of hypotheses). The reverse can also happen. The picture described in a very free manner may for some time acquire the role of a model, i.e. become characterized by sufficiently general conceptual categories to make i t impossible for us to reduce it to any concrete picture. Since it is not a part of a theoretical network, it remains a kind of empty label. With the help of a model one can obtain quite new, creative, qualitatively different solutions of problems, even predictions. However, this is just a single, quite limited type of creativity. The limits stem from the verbal form of the model. Creation can also assume a linear form. It seems to me that this is not the way to accomplish a creation of completely new concepts which are an alternative to that which we know already. The hierarchic code allows only for straightforward linear creation. Alternative creation requires a different code. C R E A T I V E CODE
The above mentioned limitations of the hierarchic code stimulated the seiirch for another code which would be an instrument of anticipation neither restricted to a simple reproduction of experience nor obtained by conscious linguistic operations based on definite rules of thinking. Among the essential postulates for such a new code would be the possibility of simultaneous processing of different data which cannot be grasped as semantic units within the concept of a linear language. Two questions arise in this context: 1. Are there data which would indicate a possibility of performing intellectual operations with the help of pictures, and not words, which
could be characterized as a process of thinking taking place outside the limits of consciousness? 2. Are there any data which point to the way in which a translation
of the results of a creative process from this hypothetical code into
a hierarchic one is accomplished? (Surely it is not very probable that such a translation is a direct one, as the followers of an intuitive view of creative thinking secm to suggest. 1
K. Obuckowski
434
Both questions can be answerod in the affirmative. Though any nnswers are far from complete, a few basic theses will be articulated in the following pa-agraphs: ( a ) Therc are mnny instances from daily expericnces which would indicatc that the meaning of sentcnces we utter is coded in the system of information from which we somehow "decode" i t . This decoding nay
lead to confusing results. We sometimes change the contents of our utterances fecling that "this is not what I wanted to say." This €eeling
01
dispRrity between wliat had been formulated and what should
have becm formulated docs not refer only to the formal aspects of such an utterance, but also to i t s meaning. ( b ) In some organic disorders, such as semantic aphasia, a patient is
unablc to select words for contents which have to be spelled out, There a r e , however, reasons to believe that the contents "exist" beyond linguistic structurcs and that cognitive operations are performed with their help, ( c ) There are numerous self-reports of many cre,ltive scientists (cf.
Hodamard, 1049) who say that, before they had solved the problem, they had
21
fcccling of a IIEeneral direction" and knew precisely where
the solution was and what was relevant for i t . The others felt at lcflst that the decisive stage of creative problem-solving had been accomplished outside of their consciousness and that they were unable to reconstruct its course. ( d ) On the basis of the hypothetical characteristics of n crentive code, we may assume that thc results of this multidimensional process should be given originally in the guise of a picture, i . e . , it should be t-ansferrcd to a polyconcrete code. It is subsequently decoded and trans?ated into a hierarchic one. Our data with respect to the phases of incubation cind illumination in ciwitive processes can confirm this hypothesis. There arc ~ l s oreasons to assume that there is a lasting network of ir.formation in the brain which is supefior to all information structures organized with the help cf the conc-ete and hiororchic codes. What has been descrihed hr\re as a creative code is a manner of organizing the totality of informetion found in the human brain. Under specific conditions these data can be distinguished as simple association, pictures, or models.
Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology
435
REGULA TlVE FUNCTIONS OF THE EMOTIONAL PROCESSES
The model of organization of the cognitive processes presented in the preceding pnragraphs (cf. also Obuchowski, 1980b) would remain incomplete if we failed to reveal those psychological processes which determine which code is to be chosen in a given concrete situation. There are no reasons to believe that the choice in this case is a conscious one. It is also improbable that a person is free to choose the best code from the point of view of human survival. We have to postulate the existence of an independent system of steering for the cognitive processes. This system has to register nothing but the positive and negative subjective states and the intensity of these psychological states. In reference to the neurophysiology of emotions, to the evolution of the emotional processes, and to the role of emotions in the functioning of people and animals, the following conclusions can be drawn: 1. Three separate emotional processes can be assumed : activation, negative emotion and positive emotion. They differ with respect to their physiological characteristics, are generated b y separate brain structures, and have bcen formed at different stages in phylogenesis. 2 . The negative emotion is a process generated in a situation of di-
rect failure, of limited orientation, of danger. It may easily be demonstrated that the concrete codes in this situation are more secure since they furnish a key to a more precise utilization of the concrete situational experience. Abstract codes are more risky, and their advantages can be first perceived only after some time has elapsed. Thus i t can be assumed that the process of a negative emotion acts exclusively as an activatior of the concrete codes. The only situation which is suited to allow a person to employ abstract codes is the situation of complete security, perfect orientation in a situation of concrete, continuous success. In this case positive emotion is an activator, 3. The intensity of negative and positlve characteristics of a situation
is responsible for activation. It is easy to theoretically deduce and empirically confirm that a high intensity of activation results in the blocking of cognitive processes at a given level of code. As soon as a high activation level becomes stabilized, however, a new phenomenon, the facilitation of functioning, appears. This can be defined as a narrowing down of the information from the external world, both, in the
K. Obuchowski
436
case of positive emotion where it is the result of a renunciation of concrete data, and in the case of negative emotion where it is the result of excessive generalization making it impossible to differentiate the stimuli. In the case of an excessive lowering of activation, which indicates a low value of the situation, 'a person usually switches into the concrete code as the more economic one.
THE INTEGRATIVE MODEL FOR THE PROCESSES OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL REGULATION (IMP) Any reasonable attempt to explain a given psychological mechanism requires a precise description of the task of this mechanism. While constructing the code-emotions theory, I assumed that this task, based on brain processes, is the anticipation of events. The distance of the postulated anticipation is a varying criterion for the efficiency of the brain. I have assumed that the longer the temporal distance of anticipation the higher the cost paid for its validity. But this is not a linear relation. History of science seems to indicate that the validity of long-distance anticipation increases rapidly i f a good theory of high complexity is available. The code-emotions theory indicates that i f the brain is an instrument for anticipating events, then the efficiency of this instrument depends on the selection of an appropriate code for this task on the basis of an individual's experience. Apart from code selection, the general orientation of the whole system towards internal data processing or towards external search for data also plays an important role. The above mentioned mechanics of tuning the instruments to the task, so that our experience will be used in an optimal way and not disrupt the
process of adaptive anticipation, do not sufficiently explain the choice of the direction of an activity, its stabilization or changes, nor do they explain the functioning of evaluational standards. Thus the mechanisms in question are applicable to the explanation of the phenomena which psychology of personality deals with, i.e. of those which go beyond the scope of psychological reality accounted for by the code-emotions theory. A person becomes conscious of some phenomena and elaborates concepts to account for them. Part of his knowledge about renlity remains outside of his consciousness,
Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology
437
At this point we must introduce the principle of regulation, related both to simple activities which are the subject for general psychology and to complex personal conduct. The concept of regulation is not an internal one. I conceive of the standard of regulation as being external with respect to the elements of the system, sharing with them only its genesis. The standard of regulation is more than a product of the system. The whole human psychological system is a product, not only of cerebral organization, but also of subjective experience combined with the experience of others, the patterns of culture, and of the individual strategies of data processing. The standards of psychological regulation are thus actually generated by a broader variety of phenomena than the individual psychological unit which articulated them. We have now to proceed to the construction of a model of psychological regulation that is more complex than the once popular concept of homeostasis. The construction of the model i s , however, not completely finished, and I shall limit myself to the explanation of the core scheme and some of its consequences (cf. Table 2 and
Fig. 1). Let me begin with the element (1) called l'Motive.lf I have previously expressed (Obuchowski, 1982a) the idea that any consciously attempted activity becomes possible only after the program and task of a specific activity or conduct are consciously articulated. A Motive in the IMP model is a precondition for any organized activity. In our model the Motive thus links the whole structure of the processes of psychological regulation to the Environment (8) and the Results (7). The Motive closes the circuit of psychological regulation mechanisms of integrating external situations. The Standard of the Regulative Processes ( 2 ) is defined as the state of things which an individual considers to be his or her desired degree of performance in the organization of the task, according to his more or less rigid inner control. If a Standard of Regulation happens to be strongly task-related, the activity results in a definite external or internal state. If the rigid inner control (compulsion) is the Standard of Regulation, the external results of the activity arc negligible as long as only inner tension is reduced. We are dealing with two different motivational mechanisms, the first one being oriented towards the achievement of some definite product, the second one being a typical mechanism of tension reduction. A Standard of Regulation can therefore be clearly formulated and linked to one's own tasks and it is then an expression of the intentional self.
K. Obuchowski
438
The Directional Regulator ( 3 ) is particularly complex. Within the theory of developmental personality (cf. Obuchowski, 1980a, 1981), the Directional Regulator is an element of personality and considered a Programming System which is connected with different states of consciousness; or better, it ascribes various data to various states of consciousness, though, according to the model, only knowledge and emotional attitudes can be accorded the status of being conscious or unconscious.
Table 2 The Integrative Model of the Psychological Regulative Processes (components) 1. MOTIVE
7, THE RESULTS OF ONE'S OWN ACTIVITY
The formula8.
THE EXTERNAL SITVATION
tion of the 2. STANDARD OF THE REGULATIVE PROCESSES
aim and the
Task Organization
program of the
Compulsion
task oriented
3. DIRECTIONAL REGULATOR
activity
a. Cultural Paradigms (supraconsciousness) b. Knowledge
-
abstract and concrete 5 . CODE OF REGULATIVE OPERATIONS
(consciousness, unconsciousness) C.
Emotional Attitudes
-
abstract and concrete
Creative Code
(consciousness, unconsciousness)
Hierarchic (abstract) Code
d. Background Motivation (passive unconsciousn.)
Policoncrete Code
e. Defense Mechanisms (active unconsciousness)
Monoconcrete Code Simple Unconditioned Reflex
4. OPERATIONAL REGULATOR
Reactivity (by Strelau)
6.
Emotional Stability (by Eysenck) Introversion-Extraversion (by Eysenck or in Perceptual Organization (approach in Ro or
MODIFIERS OF THE CODE Activation
RO)
Negative Emotion Positive Emotion
cognitive style) Productivity (R in R" or number of the themes in TAT) Trait Anxiety (questionnaire or Ro or.. .) General Intelligence Special Abilities
Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology
439
Knowledge and attitudes cover the greatest part of individual data organisation, i . e . , structures that give individual answers to questions referring to specific reality-related stimuli. Knowledge includes both, the pictures acquired through experience, and the models referring to deeper hidden characteristics of the world.
OIRECTIONAL
0REGULATOR
-
*
@
COOE OF REGULATIVE OPERATIONS
.
Figure 1 Zhe Integrative Model of the Psychological Regulative Processes (IMP).
Attitudes are expressions of emotional preferences, both a s results of some concrete experience (emotional conditioned reflexes) and a s a results of self-reflections about the world and ourselves. Cultural paradigms occupy a separate position. They are composites of ideas (!la just world"), acquired from a given culture without our control. We become aware of their existence only in those historical periods when they undergo some transformations. We do not manipulate these cultural paradigms consciously nor do they belong to the contents of consciousness. Those cultural paradigms o r archetypes should be granted a separate state
- that
of "supraconsciousness
.
Their supraindividual ontological status
links them more closely with social consciousness phenomena than with individual ones.
K. Obuchowski
440
In the fourth edition of "Psychology of Human Strivings" (Obuchowski, 1982b) background motivation has been outlined as a manifestation of inborn drives. We assume that a s a result of inhibiting effects of the learning processes in ontogenesis, these biological drives cannot be directly manifestea in normal adult behavior. Background motivation, in contrast to defense mechanisms, does not seem to influence perception or memory. This enables u s to ascribe to such motivation a separate state of consciousness, that of "passive unconsciousness11a s opposed to "active unconsciousness." Defense mechanisms, as defined by Freud and a s investigated by several contributors to this volume, act as unconscious psychological regulators and can actively modify the course of conscious psychological activity. In the the theory of personality development (cf. Obuchowski, 1980a, 19811, the Operational Regulator ( 4 ) has been included in the so-called basic system. I t is composed of those personality aspects which we traditionally count among the formal ones. They can be regarded a s indicators of various functional characteristics of brain tissue and of brain organiza-
tion influencing the processes of psychological regulation.
They decide
both the preference in the selection of operations and the course of these operations. Their number in the model has not been speciried but can be limited by assuming that categories like introversion, reactivity, or the cognitive styles are only different indicators of the same brain properties. For instance, reactivity is, according to Strelau (1983), preference with respect to the intensity of stimulation. Thus reactive persons, like the introverts, limit Stimulation, which should influence their cognitive style. Also trait anxiety, according to code-emotions theory, should influence the input of external data and preferences for the policoncrete code, which in turn should result in a compensatory generation of a greater number of internal concrete data in the operational memory. The whole model of IMP is composed of 8 elements (cf. Figure l ) , the most central being the Standard of Regulation ( 2 ) . Functionally the most heavlly burdened, i.e., the one with the largest number of interconnections: 3 input and 3 output routes, is the Directional Regulator ( 3 ) . The Code of Regulative Operations (5) has 2 input and 3 output routes. The Operational Regulator ( 4 ) has 2 output routes and 1 input route linking it with the Environment ( 8 ) . We may assume that the number of input routes compared to the output routes is an indicator of the operational power of a specific component of the model. While Moditiers of the Code ( 6 ) and
Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology
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Standard of Regulation ( 2 ) are equal with respect to the operational power, the Directional Regulator (3) and the Code of Regulation ( 5 ) have a stronger impact on the operational functions according to IMP. The Operational Regulator ( 4 ) and Motive (1) have more instrumental functions in the operations. All eight IMP components can fulfill executive functions, i . e . , they all have at least one input and one output route. The elements 7 and 8 play a particular role. They have been included in the IMP in order to stress the constant presence of the Environment in which a person functions and to point out the vital role of feedback from the results of an individual's activity.
What do the arrows in the model mean? Where do they come from and what determines their number and direction? The IMP does not give a complete representation of the flow of data between the various components and, accordingly, i t cannot throughout all subsystems be used as a flow chart. The arrows and their direction indicate only that a specific state of a given subsystem must be preceded b y a specific state of another subsystem. The types of connections and their number have been determined by an analysis of empirical data from various areas of psychology. IMP is an attempt at a synthesis of different theoretical standpoints. It allows the prediction of research results in various areas. The model was not constructed to account for results in subliminal stimulation experiments, for example. Nevertheless, it rollows from the IMP tnat we should expect data rrom subliminal stimulation to reach 3 only when certain conditions are mct in 4 . They can be blocked, for example, if 4 is characterized by a high degree of trait anxiety. A low anxiety threshold should, according to code-emotions theory, block the route of external data input and lead to an increase in the orientation towards internal data changing the standard ot regulation and the motivational state. This might help us explain results indicating that subjects with low anxiety are more oriented towards physical properties of the world and high-anxiety subjects more towards social ones. An interesting result has been obtained by Obuchowska (1971) upon studying two groups of children. One was composed of children with clinical symptoms of failure anxiet y , while the control group included children who responded adequately to failure. Neurotic anxiety over failure manifested itself in such behavior
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as fear of submitting properly executed classwork for evaluation, inability to continue a game of chess in spite of winning, etc. Children from both groups completed first a jig-saw puzzle which posed no problems for untrained children. Then the conditions were changed in such a way as to make successful completion impossible. The experimenter told the children that when he would be able to predict that their way to the solution would be wrong he would flash a lamp. Children from the normal group responded with a number of changing moves when the light was flashed. Neurotic children responded with the same changes even before the lamp was flashed, and after a few trials of this kind, the changes occurred immediately after the task had been started. This means that children with anxiety over failure responded in a way to the Environment which did not result from the properties of the Environment, but from the properties of the Directional Regulator, i.e., from internal data. Dixon's model (Dixon, 1 9 8 1 ; cf. also Dixon & Henley, Chapter 2 ) indicates that the integration of subliminal and supraliminal information is performed at the level of physiological mechanisms. According to the IMP conventions, the Operational Regulator corresponds also to the physiological level. The study by Hentschel and Schneider (cf. Chapter 10) demonstrated that defense mechanisms can moderate the ability to integrate subliminal and supraliminal data, indicating, in terms of IMP, the participation of the Operational Regulator, We may, hypothetically, assume that a psychological core of creativity is based at a physiological level on 4 , and not on 3 or 5 , because creative individuals demonstrate a high degree of integration of conscious and subconscious data (cf. the study by Smith, Carlsson, 8 Danielsson. Chapter 11). According to IMP, one should expect that in spite of blocking of data between 4 and 3 , 6 - including the basic emotional responses - will be activated. It' this is the case, we should encounter changes of mood and other consequences of an influence of emotions, as well as an overall activation of psychological processes, all as a result of nonassimilated subliminal information, i.e., of blocked data processing from 4 to 3. It is thus probable that the route 8-4-6-5-3-2-1 is actually being employed. There are numerous examples for changes in autonomic reations, sensation thresholds, perceptual attitudes (cf. Dixon, 1981) occurring as a consequence of confronting subjects with subliminal data. (8)
In microgenetic experiments, the expected features of the environment are obscured and appear novel and strange. External inputs are un-
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structured at first and are, moreover, directly or indirectly threatening. The principal motive (1) for behavlor in compliance witn instructions is, for most subjects, the recapture of meaningful structured impressions (erfort after meaning), even when the result ('0 of this effort is still far from perfect. Only in the course of serial presentation is convergence of subjective outputs and objective inputs increasingly experienced. 'The standard of the regulative processes ( 2 ) is directed outward, toward a performance that is adequate to the situation; internally, its objective is the reduction of tension and reconstitution of internal balance. In a multitude of percept-genetic studies, the moderating influence of the personality-specific functional features of the Operational Regulator ( 4 ) has been demonstrated. In the contributions to the present volume, there are numerous instances that impressively document the operation of this influence. The Directional Regulator (3) is, according to percept-genetic and psychodynamic assumptions, for the most part restricted to the operation of defense mechanisms which influence the subjects' pertormance by obstructing the awareness of threatening stimuli and by simultaneously preventing their veridical perception. The inactive unconscious of the culturally shared assumptions has barely been investigated in microgenetic experiments. The pursuit of this line of investigation would provide an opportunity to derive new hypotheses for microgenetic research from the IMP model. In the normal mode of ascending presentation in percept-genesis, the subject is at first confronted with a task which proceeds from severe (limited orientation, in Obuchowski's, 1982, terms) to gradually decreasing restriction of information. Under these circumstances, the utilization of concrete codes ( 5 ) should be favored. Even though percept-genetic protocols have not been categorized along these lines, published case studies with protocols seem to suggest the utility of such an interpretation. The experimental situation, however, under no circumstances favors the use of creative codes. This is quite different in the case of inverted percept-genesis. There, a paradigmatic rethinking becomes possible ( 6 : Modifier of the Code), the attainment of objective meaning and the security thereby achieved providing a greater amount of freedom for multidimensional information processing (creative code), For this situation, the moderating influence of the Operational Regulator ( 4 ) with its formal principles of operation and of the Directional Regulator ( 3 ) is clearly illustrated in several studies of this volume.
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On the whole, the IMP model appears to be well suited to at least partly provide an alternative explanation of microgenetic assumptions. If an attempt were to be made to represent thc discrete phases of the perceptgenetic progression in terms of all the elements of this model, a number of
.
additional variables, e ,g , the parallel processes of activation and the positive and negative emotional states, would need to be controlled. Even at the present stage of theoretical analysis, however, connections between the IMP model and microgenesis become apparent. These links could be empirically examined in a concrete experiment. In principle, the IMP provides a closed circuit of the progression from input to output which lends itself to the specirication of each of the phases of percept-genesis. Proceeding from the assumption, however, that differences are more clearly delineated in the comparison or longer segments, one could divide the progression into bigger chunks, corresponding perhaps to three thirds of the perceptual process. Such a mode of division into three or four segments prior to the
.
veridical recognition of the stimulus has been undertaken bcfore The IMP model then places only limited demands for the modiIication of the typical experimental microgenetic sequence. Its true advantage lies in the opening of new perspectives from which, in the optimal case, new meaningtul formulations of hypotheses for applied research may result. It is possible that further analysis of empirical data will make additional modifications of IMP necessary. However, the results collected so far seem to justify its public presentation and release for analysis and critical scrutiny. Its basic structure at least seems defensible. The aim of the present paper was not to persuade the reader that IMP is a perfect model, but to demonstrate some promising possibilities of an interpretation of results from microgenesis and subliminal stimulation from a very different point of view.
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