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Mindfields: What science can tell us about good and bad
Commentary
THEA BRINE
Mindfields A. C. Grayling
Our mirror on morality THE technological applications of science can create serious ethical dilemmas at both ends of the moral scale – in our efforts to destroy one another and those to save one another. We have weapons so sophisticated that they can kill people without damaging buildings; we also have medical technology so expensive its use has to be rationed, forcing us to choose who shall live. These are just two of very many examples. They are not the work of science itself, but of political and social decisions about the use we make of science. When science – usually, social science – addresses itself directly to
morality, it does not do so to solve moral problems but to investigate the nature and sources of moral sentiments and attitudes. This is an empirical proceeding, aimed at discovering and describing facts, not a “normative” proceeding aimed at telling us what we should think and do. Yet empirical inquiry can have a major impact on normative considerations, and current research in neurology appears to be doing just this. In particular, it can be applied to one of the most vexing problems in moral philosophy: the problem of relativism. What neurology reveals about brain function
might already have refuted relativism and established the ground for saying that the basis of morality is shared by all humans. If so, this is a truly major result. Moral relativism is the view that there are no universal truths about what is right and wrong, but rather that what counts as such in each different society is determined by its own traditions, beliefs and experience. Since these can differ markedly among societies, it follows that different societies can have quite opposite views about what is right. And this, says the relativist, means there is no objective ground for deciding between them. This view seems compelling when we consider such contrasts as different societies’ views about, say, polygamy or homosexuality. The motive for relativism is the worthy one of avoiding the arrogance of cultural imperialism as practised by dominant societies in the past, as they colonised other peoples and imposed moralities upon them. Relativists wish to assert the equal dignity and validity of different societies and their moral outlooks, even when they clash with one’s own. The neurological research that undermines moral relativism concerns the function of mirror neurons in the brain. Located in the motor cortex, mirror neurons activate in sympathy with what
“Mirror neurons underwrite the ability to recognise what others suffer”
their owner perceives in the activity and experience of others. When we see someone else acting in a particular way – smiling, yawning, weeping or grimacing, for example – the neurons associated with these actions in one’s own motor cortex fire in response. Their activation provides a model of what that person is experiencing, giving us a form of direct insight into other people’s states of mind. This strongly suggests that the ability to understand others, read their intentions, interpret their emotional states, predict their behaviour and respond appropriately – the very basis of social capacity itself, and thus of morality – is linked to the involuntary modelling of others that mirror-neuron activity makes possible. Some researchers hypothesise that malfunction in these neurons might be a factor in autism, one of whose major symptoms is the inability to engage socially with others. There are also strong links between mirror neurons and language capacity, humans’ chief social tool. The essential point is that mirror neurons underwrite the ability to recognise what helps or distresses others, what they suffer and enjoy, what they need and what harms them. This means that the ultimate basis for moral judgement is hard-wired – and therefore universal. So even when customs differ, fundamental morality does not; and if two societies differ over what they consider to be moral, one of them must just be plain wrong. G
Enigma Magic magic No. 1492 Adrian Somerfield I ASKED Albert and Berkeley to find 3 x 3 magic squares (i.e. containing nine different positive integers with the sum in each row, each column and main diagonal the same). 50 | NewScientist | 3 May 2008
They each found one. I then asked them to replace numbers with letters using A = 1, B = 2, and so on. Both their squares contained the letters M,A,G,I,C, but only in Albert’s case was one of those letters at the centre of the square. (a) Which other four letters were used in Albert’s square?
(b) Which other four letters were used in Berkeley’s square? In each case, give the letters in alphabetical order. £15 will be awarded to the sender of the first correct answer opened on 4 June. The Editor’s decision is final. Please send entries
to Enigma 1492, New Scientist, 84 Theobald’s Road, London WC1X 8NS, or to enigma@ newscientist.com (include your postal address). The winner of Enigma 1486 is Steve Millar of Waterdown, Ontario, Canada. Answer to 1486 1 in X chance 9 red balls; 6 coloured balls www.newscientist.com
THEA BRINE
Mindfields A. C. Grayling
Our mirror on morality THE technological applications of science can create serious ethical dilemmas at both ends of the moral scale – in our efforts to destroy one another and those to save one another. We have weapons so sophisticated that they can kill people without damaging buildings; we also have medical technology so expensive its use has to be rationed, forcing us to choose who shall live. These are just two of very many examples. They are not the work of science itself, but of political and social decisions about the use we make of science. When science – usually, social science – addresses itself directly to
morality, it does not do so to solve moral problems but to investigate the nature and sources of moral sentiments and attitudes. This is an empirical proceeding, aimed at discovering and describing facts, not a “normative” proceeding aimed at telling us what we should think and do. Yet empirical inquiry can have a major impact on normative considerations, and current research in neurology appears to be doing just this. In particular, it can be applied to one of the most vexing problems in moral philosophy: the problem of relativism. What neurology reveals about brain function
might already have refuted relativism and established the ground for saying that the basis of morality is shared by all humans. If so, this is a truly major result. Moral relativism is the view that there are no universal truths about what is right and wrong, but rather that what counts as such in each different society is determined by its own traditions, beliefs and experience. Since these can differ markedly among societies, it follows that different societies can have quite opposite views about what is right. And this, says the relativist, means there is no objective ground for deciding between them. This view seems compelling when we consider such contrasts as different societies’ views about, say, polygamy or homosexuality. The motive for relativism is the worthy one of avoiding the arrogance of cultural imperialism as practised by dominant societies in the past, as they colonised other peoples and imposed moralities upon them. Relativists wish to assert the equal dignity and validity of different societies and their moral outlooks, even when they clash with one’s own. The neurological research that undermines moral relativism concerns the function of mirror neurons in the brain. Located in the motor cortex, mirror neurons activate in sympathy with what
“Mirror neurons underwrite the ability to recognise what others suffer”
their owner perceives in the activity and experience of others. When we see someone else acting in a particular way – smiling, yawning, weeping or grimacing, for example – the neurons associated with these actions in one’s own motor cortex fire in response. Their activation provides a model of what that person is experiencing, giving us a form of direct insight into other people’s states of mind. This strongly suggests that the ability to understand others, read their intentions, interpret their emotional states, predict their behaviour and respond appropriately – the very basis of social capacity itself, and thus of morality – is linked to the involuntary modelling of others that mirror-neuron activity makes possible. Some researchers hypothesise that malfunction in these neurons might be a factor in autism, one of whose major symptoms is the inability to engage socially with others. There are also strong links between mirror neurons and language capacity, humans’ chief social tool. The essential point is that mirror neurons underwrite the ability to recognise what helps or distresses others, what they suffer and enjoy, what they need and what harms them. This means that the ultimate basis for moral judgement is hard-wired – and therefore universal. So even when customs differ, fundamental morality does not; and if two societies differ over what they consider to be moral, one of them must just be plain wrong. G
Enigma Magic magic No. 1492 Adrian Somerfield I ASKED Albert and Berkeley to find 3 x 3 magic squares (i.e. containing nine different positive integers with the sum in each row, each column and main diagonal the same). 50 | NewScientist | 3 May 2008
They each found one. I then asked them to replace numbers with letters using A = 1, B = 2, and so on. Both their squares contained the letters M,A,G,I,C, but only in Albert’s case was one of those letters at the centre of the square. (a) Which other four letters were used in Albert’s square?
(b) Which other four letters were used in Berkeley’s square? In each case, give the letters in alphabetical order. £15 will be awarded to the sender of the first correct answer opened on 4 June. The Editor’s decision is final. Please send entries
to Enigma 1492, New Scientist, 84 Theobald’s Road, London WC1X 8NS, or to enigma@ newscientist.com (include your postal address). The winner of Enigma 1486 is Steve Millar of Waterdown, Ontario, Canada. Answer to 1486 1 in X chance 9 red balls; 6 coloured balls www.newscientist.com