Mobilizing community energy

Mobilizing community energy

Energy Policy 51 (2012) 435–444 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Energy Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol Mo...

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Energy Policy 51 (2012) 435–444

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Energy Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Mobilizing community energy Elizabeth Bomberg a,n, Nicola McEwen b a

University of Edinburgh, School of Social and Political Science, Politics and International Relations, Chrystal Macmillan Building, 15A George Square, Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9LD, United Kingdom University of Edinburgh, School of Social and Political Science, Institute of Governance, 21 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, United Kingdom

b

H I G H L I G H T S c c c c c

Explains how/why community energy groups mobilize and the political dynamics surrounding it. Draws on original qualitative research of 100 community energy groups in Scotland. Identifies two particular sets of resources (structural and symbolic) and their importance. Explains how these resources shape community energy mobilization in Scotland. Provides an original application of resource mobilization theory to the field of energy studies.

a r t i c l e i n f o

abstract

Article history: Received 1 March 2012 Accepted 20 August 2012 Available online 25 September 2012

What explains the galvanising of communities to participate actively in energy projects? How do groups mobilize to overcome the often formidable barriers highlighted in the existing literature? Drawing on original qualitative research of 100 community energy groups in Scotland, including six indepth case studies, we explain how effective mobilization occurs and the political dynamics surrounding such mobilization. To capture these dynamics, we adapt theories offered by literature on social movements, with a particular focus on resource mobilization theories. Applying our adapted framework, we identify two particular sets of resources shaping community energy mobilization: (i) structural resources, which refer to the broad political context structuring and constraining opportunities for community energy mobilization; and (ii) symbolic resources—less tangible resources used to galvanise participants. We investigate to what extent our case study groups were able to draw upon and exploit these resources. We find that structural resources can either facilitate or hinder mobilization; what matters is how state resources are exploited and constraints mitigated. The use of symbolic resources was highly effective in aiding mobilization. Each of the groups examined – despite their considerable variation – effectively exploited symbolic resources such as shared identity or desire for strong, self reliant communities. & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Community energy Resource mobilization Scotland

1. Introduction Community action on energy has increased significantly in the last decade, spurred on not least by concerns about climate change and rising energy costs. Action takes several forms: local campaigns to reduce energy use, neighbourhood solar installation schemes, community-owned wind turbines, the creation and networking of transition towns. As community energy action has increased, so too has the academic study of its key features and development. For instance, extensive work by Gordon Walker

n

Corresponding author. Tel: þ44 0131 650 4248. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (E. Bomberg), [email protected] (N. McEwen). 0301-4215/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.08.045

and colleagues on community energy in the UK (especially in England and Wales) has tracked the growing role of community initiatives in sustainable energy technologies (Walker et al., 2007; 2010; see also Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008). Other analysts studying community action in the UK and abroad have sought to identify the key factors driving community energy initiatives forward. Of these, monetary and environmental incentives for action have received considerable attention (Middlemass and Parrish, 2010; Walker, 2008b). Others have focused on the key barriers to community initiatives on energy, emphasising the many behavioural, financial and technological barriers to action, as well as the opposition many renewables projects face within the community (see Bell et al., 2005; Toke et al., 2008; Warren and Birnie, 2009). Several studies have sought to evaluate different community endeavours and assess their ‘success’ as measured

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in energy production, carbon reduction, norm diffusion or other criteria (see Roberts et al., 2012; Seyfang, 2010). We seek to complement this literature but our remit is distinct. First, our focus is not on the ‘outputs’ of these groups, but on the mobilization that precedes and sustains them. What explains the galvanising of communities to participate actively in energy projects? What resources are most important in facilitating mobilization? How do groups mobilize to overcome the often formidable barriers highlighted in the existing literature? Our focus on mobilization compels us to look not just at financial and technological incentives or costs, but at the wider political context shaping community action. To capture the political dynamics linked to mobilization, we adapt theories offered by literature on social movements, with a particular focus on resource mobilization theories. This focus allows us to explore explanations largely neglected in existing studies of community energy. Second, we aim to fill an empirical gap by using Scotland as a case study. The UK literature has focused overwhelmingly on community energy action in English regions and Wales (Mander, 2008; Smith, 2007; Toke, 2005; Walker et al., 2007). Far less attention has been paid to Scotland despite its distinctive political system and the level of support the Scottish government has given to community energy and renewable energy in general. For instance, the Scottish government has set a preliminary target of achieving 500 MW of community or locally-owned renewable electricity generation as part of its ambitious 2020 targets, which include meeting 100% of Scotland’s demand for electricity from renewable sources. It has encouraged community mobilization through grants and loans scheme and has also sought to play a leadership role in renewables and low carbon technologies from the local to the global stage (see McEwen and Bomberg, 2012). The article proceeds as follows. We first introduce the key concept of mobilization. We present a modified ‘resource mobilization framework’ to capture some of the dynamics neglected in current literature. Section 3 introduces our methodology and background on six case studies of effective mobilization. Section 4 presents our analysis of mobilization based on our case study material. Applying our adapted framework, we identify two sets of resources shaping mobilization: (i) structural resources, which refer to the broader political context structuring and constraining opportunities for community energy mobilization; and (ii) symbolic resources, which are those less tangible resources used to galvanise participants. We argue that two symbolic resources – collective community identity and the quest for autonomy – have been highly conducive to mobilization around energy action, especially related to renewables. No single set of factors – or resources – can explain community energy mobilization, but we argue here that political resource dynamics can play an important – and still understudied – role in facilitating or stymieing energy action at the grassroots level.

2. Understanding mobilization 2.1. Mobilization: Concepts and literature Political mobilization refers to the process of facilitating, motivating and galvanising individuals to actively participate in political or social endeavours (Klandermans, 1988, 1997; see also McCarthy and Zald, 1977). The subject gained particular attention in the1970s as scholars sought to explain the growth and development of a wide range of protest groups mobilizing (especially in western industrialised democracies) around issues concerning the environment, peace and women’s rights. A broad literature on ‘social movement’ theory emerged to explain why

and how these protest movements emerged (see Della Porta and Diani, 2006; Dalton, 1994). The literature had many strands, but all sought to counter traditional theories of protest which tended to explain collective action as a direct response to deprivation, class conflict or economic crisis (Gurr, 1971). Social movement theories adopted a more nuanced view of mobilization, arguing that the mobilization of groups and movements was a complex political process resulting from values, goals and strategies adopted by actors within a multifaceted and often conflictual political context (Canel, 1997). More recently the study of mobilization has expanded to explain not just protest movements, but mobilization of citizens around a wide set issues including temperance (McCammon and Campbell, 2002), pensions (Amenta et al., 2010), climate change (Bomberg, 2012), and community sustainability (Middlemass and Parrish, 2010). In the specific area of community energy, mobilization refers to galvanising communities to support and actively take part in initiatives linked to energy reduction or producing energy from renewable or low carbon sources. Effective mobilization is a precursor to the energy action discussed in many existing studies of community energy. Such mobilization also helps to sustain that action, often in the face of formidable barriers. These barriers may be psychological, including individual attitudes and perceptions. Thus, individual inaction may result from a lack of accurate information and knowledge (Attari et al., 2010), or a feeling that individual action will not make a difference (Jackson, 2005; Burch, 2010). Beyond the individual level, community action must confront collective action problems: the incentive for citizens to participate in energy reduction schemes or microgeneration projects is low because the benefits of action – lower emissions, safer planet, sustainable supply – accrue to everyone not just to direct participants. Individual actors may thus be tempted to free-ride on the efforts of others and behavioural change is needed to overcome such inertia ¨ (Buchs et al., 2011; Burch, 2010; Heiskanan et al., 2010). Community energy action can also be inhibited by technical barriers, including a lack of equipment, technical knowledge and expertise (Walker, 2008b). The most widely identified barrier is the suite of financial constraints holding back community action. Of course, the promise of financial gain – either directly or indirectly through lower fuel bills – can be a powerful mobilizer (Allena et al., 2012; Walker, 2008a), but community groups engaging in community-scale renewables face difficulties raising sufficient capital, especially for the early high-risk costs at the pre-planning stage (see Middlemass and Parrish, 2010; Margolis and Zuboy, 2006; Walker 2008b; Jaffe and Stavins, 1995). Government grants and social investment funds can offset some of the costs and risks, but financial challenges remain, especially when government rules and promises are uncertain or inconsistent (Warren and Birnie, 2009). Yet, in spite of the many barriers groups face, communities have been spurred into action in pursuit of energy goals, and many remain mobilized to overcome these barriers. To explain this mobilization, we draw upon insights from the social movement literature, focusing in particular on theories of resource mobilization. Resource mobilization theorists pay particular attention to the dynamics of mobilization and the resources that underpin it. Rather than focusing on class distinctions, ideology or deprivation as the main drivers motivating protest group members, they borrowed from rational choice approaches to argue that what matters is how groups mobilize resources in pursuit of their cause. According to this framework, mobilization depends less on political grievances or ideology, and more on the presence of resources and expertise to create and sustain the group (Dalton, 1994: 6; see also McCarthy and Zald, 1977). For resource mobilization theorists, the key questions concern how groups identify and exploit material resources (money, skills,

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expertise), how they recruit adherents, and how they navigate political environments (see Walder, 2009: 292; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Dalton, 1994). The ‘navigation of political environment’ is especially crucial to our study. Resource mobilization theory directs attention to the structural or contextual processes that condition actors and their realization of mobilization (McAdam et al., 1996; Kriesi, 2004). These we label ‘structural resources’. They refer both to specific features of a political system, such as the level of state support (in the form of material resources and encouragement), as well as the wider political opportunity structures characterising a political system, including its openness, access to policy-making systems and engagement with state or other policymakers. Groups, in other words, are embedded in a network of political relationships which can facilitate – or hinder – action. The broader structural emphasis offered by resource mobilization expands the narrower focus on those material resources which have received the bulk of attention in existing accounts of community energy. However, the resource mobilization approach has itself been criticized for being too narrow. It largely neglects the less ‘rational’ or instrumental factors shaping mobilization, such as the formation of collective identities, and the construction of meaning and identity. Klandermans (1988) noted how resource mobilization’s focus on material resources meant it missed the interaction that can occur between the political identity of an organization and its potential for resource mobilization. To address this limitation we adapt the resource mobilization framework to incorporate less tangible, ‘symbolic resources’. We draw upon the work of scholars of political social movements (e.g., Goodwin and Jasper, 2002; Della Porta and Diani, 2006) who identify the more subjective dimension of mobilization.1 Symbolic resources refer to non-material resources, such as identity, legitimacy, authority or the quest for autonomy. Such resources hold symbolic value for actors and can be invoked to help mobilize individuals and groups towards a shared goal. We explore the extent to which such resources can help groups mobilize and overcome financial, technological and political barriers hindering collective action in the area of community energy.

3. Case studies and methodology Our analysis draws upon six varied case studies of community groups engaged in energy mobilization across Scotland (see Table 1).2 Three of our cases are based in rural settings, including two in remote island communities, and three are in urban settings. Three can be classed as environmental groups (two are within the Transition Town network—founded primarily for the purpose of reducing their community’s carbon footprint and promoting sustainable lifestyles). The others had no such environmental motivation. The communities from which these groups have emerged also vary in relative affluence. Fintry and Linlithgow are the most affluent, with the lowest percentage of the local population categorised as ‘income deprived’, i.e., in low-income households, while Portobello and Castlemilk and Carmunnock3 1 Some resource mobilization writers do themselves engage with these less tangible resources. Freeman (1979), for example, distinguished between ‘tangible’ and ‘human’ assets. 2 Our project (ENGAGE) forms part of the programme of the UK Energy Research Centre and was supported by the UK Research Councils under Natural Environment Research Council (NE/G007748/1). A systematic analysis of these data is forthcoming. In this paper we use these cases to explore and illustrate themes of mobilization and resources shaping it. 3 Castlemilk and Carmunnock are rather different communities – the former a relatively deprived urban housing scheme and the latter a small affluent village –

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(CCCWPT) rank as the most ‘income deprived’, as defined within the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation.4 Although all the groups have had at least one paid staff member at some point, employment has not been maintained across all cases. Staff have often been in temporary posts tied to time-limited project grants, and in the case of CCCWPT, the staff resource was a secondment from the local regeneration agency. In spite of these variations in geography, demography and aims, each of these groups can be categorised as ‘effective’ examples of mobilization around energy issues. In all but one case, the energy-related projects were the principal focus around which the community mobilized. The exception is North Harris Trust, which was established in 2003 to oversee the 62,000 acre community-owned estate of North Harris. Renewable energy projects became the primary focus of their trading arm, the North Harris Trading Company Ltd, but the responsibilities undertaken by the Trust on behalf of the local community are much broader. Our criteria for effectiveness is based on four indicators: sustained mobilization over a period of years; a coherent organisational structure, with an active membership; engagement with energy-related projects which are at an advanced stage of development or completed; and securing of external finance to support project development and/or implementation. Each of our case study communities has been in existence for between four and ten years. Most are organised as development trusts and all are overseen by a Board of Directors or Management Committee, elected by members derived from the community. Our cases have each embarked upon, and made progress on a variety of projects to install micro- or community-scale generation, and all received external competitive funding to do so. All but two have also engaged in projects to reduce energy demand. Those engaged in projects to reduce energy demand undertook energy awareness and home insulation projects with carbon-reduction outcomes, as directed by the Scottish Government’s Climate Challenge Fund (see below). Some groups, like Transition Linlithgow, Fintry Development Trust and PEDAL, have also been engaged in a range of initiatives to support micro-generation in their communities, including helping residents to identify appropriate microgeneration technologies and negotiating reduced cost bulkbuying schemes with local installers of solar-pv. Of those embarking upon community-owned renewables projects, none has yet come to fruition. Point and Sandwick Development Trust, which was specifically set up to explore options for renewable energy in their community, is (at time of writing) in the final stages of setting up a 9 MW wind farm, having secured planning consent, grid connection, and finance for the project. The North Harris Trust, on the neighbouring Isle of Harris, successfully installed wind turbines to support a community recycling site, but the larger community hydro scheme, which has secured planning consent, has been stalled as a result of an inability to secure grid connection.5 Site problems have also beset the Castlemilk and Carmunnock project to situate a wind farm in a country park on the outskirts of Glasgow. The community group

(footnote continued) but both fall within the same multi-member local authority ward, and the figure in Table 1 is for the ward as whole. 4 Income deprivation is based upon the percentage of people in receipt of a range of social security benefits, including job seekers allowance, income support, low income family tax credits and pensions credits. These are used as a proxy for measuring low income, in the absence of available income data at the neighbourhood level (See Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation, 2009, Annex B). 5 Limited grid capacity is a major issue confronting community and commercial developers in the Western Isles, Argyle and the west highlands. SSE have indicated that there will be no new connections to the grid in the Western Isles until installation of a long-awaited sub-sea interconnector. The earliest expected date is 2015.

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Table 1 Six case studies, key characteristics.

Local authority Population density % of population from low income householdsn Founding datenn Energy project focus Environmentally-focused Land asset n

North Harris Trust (NHT)

Point and Sandwick Development Trust (PSDT)

PEDAL, Portobello Transition Town

Transition Linlithgow

Fintry Develop’t Trust (FDT)

Castlemilk and Car munnock Wind Park Trust (CCCWPT)

Eilean Siar Rural 16%

Eilean Siar Rural 19%

Edinburgh Urban 23%

West Lothian Urban 6%

Stirling Rural 5%

Glasgow Mixed 25%

2003/2004 Supply and demand No Yes

2005 Supply

2005 Supply and demand Yes No

2007/2003 Supply and demand Yes No

2002/2006 Supply

No No

2008 Supply and demand Yes No

No No

Based on local authority multi-member ward of community (source: Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics http://www.sns.gov.uk/).

nn The North Harris Trust was formed in 2003 following a community-led buy-out of the estate. Its trading arm, responsible for all energy-related projects, was set up in 2004. Transition Linlithgow was formed in 2008 as Linlithgow Climate Challenge, and changed its name in 2011. Although Fintry Development Trust was set up in 2007, it was preceded by its trading arm, Fintry Renewable Energy Enterprise (FREE), in 2003. Castlemilk and Carmunnock Wind Park Trust began in 2002 as a steering group, assuming Trust status in 2006.

had secured planning consent for a test turbine, but failed to secure a lease from Glasgow City Council, the landowner, who later sought to manage the project themselves for the benefit of the people of Glasgow. CCCWPT has now turned its attention to other sites within the park which fall within the boundaries of a neighbouring local authority, and in 2012 the group secured public loan funding from the Scottish Government to support pre-planning costs. Only the joint venture embarked upon by the Fintry Development Trust and its trading arm, Fintry Renewable Energy Enterprise, is at the stage of generating income for the community. In this case, the commercial (as opposed to community) development was the focus of the mobilization. After persuading the community council to reject the developer’s offer of community benefit, the group negotiated a community stake (the equivalent of one turbine) in the 15-turbine commercial farm.6 FDT has since been engaged in numerous supply projects, including installing micro-generation in community facilities and developing a community wood fuel scheme. The delays to the community-owned renewables projects illustrate some of the considerable hurdles community groups confront once they are mobilized, including financial, technical, institutional and political barriers. They do not, however, suggest a failure of mobilization which refers to galvanising communities to support and actively take part in initiatives linked to energy reduction or renewables. That these groups have maintained their activity and focus on energy-related projects and goals in spite of these difficulties is testament to their effectiveness not just to become, but to stay, mobilized. To analyse these cases, we employ the comparative method, utilising a most different systems design (Skocpol and Somers, 1980; Anckar, 2008). This enables us to identify common explanations underpinning effective mobilization in spite of the different characteristics of the groups with respect to their geography, population density, wealth and types of energy action. In so doing, we draw upon the resource mobilization framework outlined above. We hypothesise that energy mobilization within each of the community case studies will be facilitated by both structural and symbolic resources. First, we examine the structural and policy context which has supported mobilization, focusing on the policy incentives, the level of support and wider political

6 The somewhat one-sided negotiation necessitated the community to undergo all the pre-planning feasibility studies for the additional turbine, and to secure planning consent. Only then was the developer willing to negotiate, and the project shifted from being a single community turbine, to a one fifteenth share, the loan for which was provided by the developer at commercial rates.

opportunity structures characterising the political system. Second, we examine the non-material, symbolic resources each group has at its disposal, focusing on the presence of a shared community identity and the desire for autonomy for their community as forces of mobilization. We hypothesise that each of the groups examined will have been able to draw upon these symbolic resources in spite of the considerable variation in their other characteristics. The research is based on a combination of documentary analysis related to the policy context and the groups’ activities as well as interviews with group members and officials within the broader local and national policy networks. Fifty-four interviews were conducted, drawing upon semi-structured question formats.7 Interviews with community groups were designed to illicit up-to-date factual information, for example, regarding group activities, resources, membership and funding, as well as each group’s motivation, the barriers and opportunities they encountered, attitudes towards the community, environment, energy use and supply, and their engagement with established energy and policy actors. Interviews with officials were designed to enhance our knowledge of policy developments, to gain insight into the multi-level policy environment, and identify attitudes towards and engagement with community energy groups. Transcripts were systematically analysed to help identify the extent to which group mobilization was shaped by the structural and symbolic resources as discussed below.

4. Explaining effective mobilization 4.1. Structural resources Across Scotland, as elsewhere, groups engaged in communityled energy projects are incentivised and constrained by the political environment and context within which they operate. Drawing on the resource framework introduced above, we use our case studies to identify these broader political factors shaping community mobilization in Scotland. Structural resources refer to the wider political structures or conditions shaping opportunities for collective action. They encompass the level of state support given to community groups, as well as general features of the political system which can 7 An average of six in-depth interviews were conducted for each of the six case studies represented in Table 1.

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condition action. The latter include its general openness, as well as opportunities for access to and engagement with policymakers (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Canel, 1997; Kriesi, 2004). Recognition of the political context highlights overlooked dynamics affecting groups, but it also enhances our understanding of existing factors – especially financial and technological – identified within existing literature as conditioning community action. Community energy in Scotland is conditioned by the multilevel political system in which it takes shape, with policy made at different governmental scales.8 Constitutionally, energy policy and the regulatory framework for all types of energy are reserved to the UK parliament. Regulation of the grid and investment in grid infrastructure is also, ultimately, a UK level responsibility albeit one which has been transferred to the industry regulator. UK-wide initiatives, most notably the Feed-in-Tariff (FiT), have been an important part of the context within which community energy is developed across the UK. One Scottish government official interviewed for our study noted that the introduction of FiTs had created ‘a feeding frenzy’ for community groups seeking to engage in community scale generation in order to capitalize on FiT payments (Interview, Glasgow, August 2011). Even so, uncertainty over the level of FiTs and electricity market reform more broadly may have also inhibited progress on some community energy projects (Interview with community activists, Eilean Siar, May 2011; interview with CES official, May 2011). Increasingly, the policy decisions made by national – and subnational – governments must take place within an EU legislative and regulatory framework. The EU has not (yet) set specific targets or conditions for community engagement, but the ‘20-2020’ targets of the EU’s climate and energy package have set the broad parameters within which member state renewable energy and energy efficiency programmes are developed (European Commission, 2010). In addition, the EU has also provided funding opportunities which have supported community energy mobilization through partnerships with lower level governments.9 Conversely, EU competition rules have been invoked by the UK government to render community groups in receipt of public grant funding towards the capital costs of renewables projects ineligible for Feed-in-Tariff payments. Notwithstanding this national and supranational policy environment, the Scottish government has maximized its constitutional capacity to promote renewable energy and energy efficiency. They have designed a distinctive programme for renewable electricity and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions which exceeds targets set at higher levels. A range of distinctive targets for 2020 have been set, including achieving a reduction in GHG emissions by 42 percent (on 1990 levels), generating the equivalent of 100 percent demand for electricity from renewable sources, and producing at least 500 MW of community or locally-owned renewable energy. This latter target is certainly ambitious in UK terms—the UK government has no such target. However, it will not radically alter the energy market and falls some way short of the level of community ownership among other front-runners in low carbon innovation, especially Denmark and Germany. Officials recognise it as an achievable target, a floor rather than a ceiling. But it amounts to around just three percent of the overall renewable electricity target.

8 For a rich analysis of the implications of multilevel context, see the Dutchled literature on transitions management (Geels, 2002). 9 For example, the Outer Hebrides Community Energy Fund (OHCEF), supported by the European Commission’s LEADER programme and Highlands and Islands Enterprise, offers grant funding to community groups to promote energy awareness, improve energy efficiency in community-owned facilities, or undertake feasibility studies for potential community-owned renewables schemes.

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Resource mobilization theorists draw attention to state resources and how they are marshaled in pursuit of collective goals (Canel, 1997: 16). To help kick-start community energy initiatives, the Scottish government has provided significant grant funding, most notably in the form of the Climate Challenge Fund and the Community and Renewable Energy Scheme (CARES). The former distributed £37.7 million in grants to community groups reducing carbon emissions, including through energy demand reduction and renewable energy initiatives. A further £10 million has been committed annually until 2015. The CARES grant scheme was launched in 2009, with £13.7 million over two years to help communities develop and install small-scale renewable energy projects across Scotland. It has been superseded by a CARES loan fund, a £23 million scheme to support community groups and local businesses with high risk pre-planning costs of renewables projects, and a range of smaller loans available to bring projects to fruition (see CES (Community Energy Scotland), 2012). This loan scheme is specifically intended to support progress towards the 500 MW target. In addition to direct state financial resources, community mobilization can potentially be facilitated by ‘in-kind’ resources afforded to community groups, usually in the form of administrative and technical support offered by agencies funded by the Scottish government or local authorities. The most important is Community Energy Scotland (CES). As well as administering the CARES schemes and a host of other grant schemes, including the Big Lottery’s Growing Community Assets scheme and regionspecific funds, CES advises community groups in developing and managing projects. They help prepare funding applications, and negotiate with other stakeholders, for example, in navigating the planning process or negotiating with the utilities to secure grid connection. CES also provides a bridge between community energy groups and government, acting as an advocate for community energy groups in direct negotiations with government officials. While existing accounts acknowledge the role of state financial (and in-kind) incentives, they can miss the political dynamics underpinning such aid. An examination of financial and other forms of state support for Scottish community renewables reveals the political factors driving government initiatives. Supporting community energy helps to generate support for renewable energy more broadly, and thus indirectly supports the Scottish government’s broader renewables ambitions. In addition, in both small and large scale renewables, the Scottish government clearly has a desire to carve out a distinctive Scottish lead. Promoting its community programmes, the government noted: ‘Scotland is already leading the way in the UK, helping communities across the country own their own energy projects, and to benefit from them’ (Scottish Government, 2011, italics added). Similar claims to ‘leadership’ and innovation are often expressed in other schemes and targets to promote renewable energy in Scotland (see McEwen and Bomberg, 2012). State resources (financial and in-kind) are key, especially for groups (as described in Section 3) less endowed with material resources. But while state support is theoretically available to all, what varies is a groups’ ability to exploit it. Resource mobilization literature directs attention to individual actors or entrepreneurs who can be instrumental in harnessing available resources and getting projects off the ground. In particular, the approach highlights the importance of individual actors able to exploit such opportunities through their knowledge, expertise and connections. Not all community groups are equally endowed, but each of our groups highlighted the importance of such links. For example, one of the groups on Eilean Siar has a former MP and government minister on its board, as well as an elected councillor and an academic specializing in renewable energy. Elsewhere,

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individuals who could combine entrepreneurial skills with network links and expertise were identified as especially important, as indicated in one group member’s description: Our energy man is ace. He knows solar panels but he also knows people. He knows the Findhorn crowd. He knows [solar panel] manufacturers. He knows installers. Not often you get a committed environmentalist and a savvy entrepreneur. He’s both. (Interview, community activist, West Lothian, July 2011). In sum, state support is a core resource, and one generously available in Scotland. Yet while availability of such a resource is crucial, so too is a group’s ability to exploit it. According to resource mobilization theorists structural resources also include wider features of the political system, including its relative openness, access and opportunities for engagement with state actors. These features can be either favourable or unfavourable; crucial is how groups seek to exploit the former and mitigate the latter. For instance, resource mobilization theorists would highlight the structural advantages enjoyed by producer groups (such as energy suppliers) in policy making. In UK energy policy investment and access to energy supply is restricted in a system dominated by a few entrenched regulated companies with close access to decision-makers. It is thus extremely difficult for communities or small producers to influence the policy making networks surrounding energy investment, transmission or access, or development. In Scotland, neither community energy representatives nor community energy advocates were represented within a key network for policymaking, the Forum for Renewable Energy Development in Scotland (FREDS). Similarly, a community voice is notably absent on the government’s Energy Advisory Board.10 Limited access to, or engagement with, key energy policy-makers can stifle mobilization if groups are unclear about rules or policies, or if they have little input in making policies which implicate them. Such outsider status can be ‘de-mobilizing’, and can act as a disincentive for positive local energy mobilization beyond specific protests. But resource mobilization literature also suggests how, for some, the exclusion or outsider status can act as a prod to mobilization. Our cases illustrate that dynamic. Indeed some group members saw themselves as overt ‘challengers’, mobilizing for access into decision-making structures that currently exclude them (Tilly, 1978). One transition member, for instance, noted how the group sought to counter ‘hegemonic forces’ by seeking ‘creative positive space’ within their town instead: ‘[Our group] is trying to take back creative space. We’re doing that locally through practical projects with emblematic power if not political power’ (Interview, community activist, Edinburgh October 2011). Another responded to what they viewed as government underestimation of groups: They’re still of a mindsety that communities are small little things that can only do village hall type stuff for local consumption. They cannot grasp that communities can do commercial scale investment, and deliver it even better (Interview, community activist, Eilean Siar, May 2011). Others we interviewed were not overtly political or challenging (indeed several sought to be apolitical) but they were nonetheless keen to overcome political barriers to entry by mobilizing at the local level. One explained that mobilization around community energy occurred: 10 The latter, co-chaired by the First Minister and Principal of Strathclyde University (an energy expert), includes representatives from SSE, Scottish Power/ Ibadrola, National Grid, Ofgem and large-scale energy producers.

not because there is a big ideological battle going on but because actually you want to live in a neighbourhood that’s a more secure, friendly, healthy place to live; somewhere where the basic way that you judge things is whether it’s making the place a better place to be in, rather than increasing somebody’s balance sheets at the other side of the world. (Interview, community activist, Edinburgh, May 2011). In either case, precisely because groups felt ‘shut out’ by structural barriers they sought to mobilize locally, to ‘act where they can’. Thus while entrenched systems and the ‘exclusion’ they bring might be construed as a barrier to mobilization, it can also act as an incentive for mobilization. Yet for mobilization to occur in these instances some further, less tangible, resources are needed to help groups transcend barriers. We examine these below. 4.2. Symbolic resources Traditional resource mobilization frameworks are useful in highlighting the role of material resources, structural constraints, and how groups seek to navigate or overcome them. But, as explained in Section 2, resource mobilization can be criticized for downplaying the normative and symbolic dimensions of social collective action (Walder, 2009). To capture some of these additional dynamics we introduced the notion of ‘symbolic resources’—non material resources which can facilitate the emergence and activities of community energy groups. We focus on two symbolic resources which are illustrated particularly well in the Scotland case, but are relevant to community energy action more generally. First, we explore the resource of collective identity and suggest how a strong community identity can overcome collective action problems faced by community energy groups. Second, we focus on the search for local autonomy and community sustainability, which have created a highly conducive framework for community action. 4.2.1. Community identity Existing literature explains well how mobilization focused on energy or climate projects is acutely vulnerable to the collective action problem: why should individuals invest time and resources when they can free ride on the efforts of others? But while the barriers are well known, less attention is given to how groups overcome these barriers. Political scientists seeking to understand collective action in the context of such constraints have identified a shared sense of the collective – a shared political identity – as one powerful explanation for mobilization. In simple terms identity refers to the distinguishing characteristics with which individuals identify themselves in relation to others (see Calhoun, 1994). Individuals are embedded in particular political, cultural, social, institutional and ideological contexts and this ‘embedded-ness’ shapes individual and collective political identities. Literature on political identity demonstrates how the construction of identity implies a positive definition of those participating in a particular endeavor (and, often, a negative identity of those opposed). That shared identity brings with it feelings of solidarity towards people with whom one may not be directly acquainted, but with whom one nonetheless shares aspirations and values (Melucci, 1996; Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 95). Such a shared identity allows for greater communication amongst members of the group and helps build relationships of trust (Oberschall, 1993; Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 94). Ostrom (2002) has demonstrated further how communication and interaction between individuals in a specific setting can result in the development of shared norms and patterns of reciprocity necessary to overcome collective action problems. Communication, trust and reciprocity are well known ‘antidotes’

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to the free-rider temptation discussed above. A shared identity and the trust it helps to generate are less tangible but still important resources enabling those concerned to face costs and risk linked to the collective task at hand. These general insights into identity can be applied to the community level by focusing on community identity and its effects. Community identity here refers to place-based identity, emerging from a shared geographic space, history, infrastructure and sense of belonging (Heiskanan et al., 2010; Walker and Devine-Wright, 2010). The intensity of identity varies across communities depending on the strength of that shared history, experience or mutual belonging. For instance, within remote Highland and Islands communities, one often finds a stronger sense of community emerging from a shared history of struggle, remoteness from the centre and greater degree of mutual dependence. Our cases suggest that a community identity can help overcome problems of collective action which might otherwise stymie community energy mobilization. Some literature (see van der Horst, 2008) has suggested community solidarity is a result of energy projects; we suggest here it is a precursor and facilitator of such activity. The effect of community identity is multi-faceted. First, community identity can help provide assurance that others will cooperate, take action, and make similar sacrifices. Typical is a group member’s description of ‘community’ and its impact on action: if, by community, you mean how we came together to take action, to do something, well that’s real. Then the community feel is very powerful. It can overcome lethargy (Interview, community activist, Edinburgh, October 2011). Often such assurances are cemented by pledges or common symbols. In several transition town groups for instance, members pledged to take part in one of the community’s energy saving measures: It’s not an onerous commitment. It’s just a way of saying I’m doing my bit for the communityy It’s about how to benefit the community, how to make our place – the community and the planet – a better place to live in (Interview, community activist, West Lothian June 2011). Similarly, as Walker and Devine-Wright (2010) and Heiskanan et al. (2010) have also shown, an emphasis on a community shared project, especially if it promises transformation of some kind, can be effective in addressing the collective action problem. For several groups a wind turbine represents such a transformation. It suggests, in the words on one community activist: emblematic power if not political power. An example is our wind turbine. Just one. But it’s a powerful sign of a ‘community taking power’; [it is] visible, powerful. Much more powerful than the [food projects] stuff. It’s got symbolic value (Interview, community activist, Edinburgh October 2011). Identity is not only invoked to mobilize groups engaged in promoting renewable energy or energy reduction. A focus on community identity can also be helpful in explaining opposition to energy initiatives, especially wind farms. Warren and Binnie’s (2009) review of literature on opposition to wind farms identified two factors as particularly important in determining whether people support or oppose specific wind farm proposals: local perceptions of the possible impact on community landscape; and whether the community had a personal stake in the development. On the other hand, community ownership can defuse ‘much of the antagonism which attends wind farm development proposals’ (Warren and Binnie, 2009: 102; see also Toke et al., 2008; Walker

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et al., 2010). The importance of community ownership was repeatedly invoked in our interviews. As one community energy activist put it: The whole argument about wind farms, it’s basically an argument about power. For instance I would be totally against a wind farm if it was the Duke of Buccleuch making billions of pounds, but if it’s my local community getting resourced then that’s a different matter (Interview, community activist, Edinburgh, May 2011). Of course ‘community’ itself remains a contested term and another theme to emerge from our case studies was an ‘insideroutsider’ tension, especially in rural communities where the interests of long-term residents keen to ensure the long term sustainability of their community are viewed as contrary to the priorities of ‘outsiders’ (or pejoratively, ‘incomers’) who had settled in the area or purchased holiday homes because of its scenic beauty and tranquillity. According to one local enterprise agency, the latter tended to be particularly sensitive to new developments, especially wind turbines, a view also echoed by some community activists we interviewed in a remote island community (Interview with enterprise official, May 2011; interview with community activist, Eilean Siar, May 2011; for a Welsh example, see Walker et al., 2010). In sum, community identity provides clues to quite different sorts of energy mobilization. On one hand, it is employed by those seeking to halt development. On the other hand it has proven a powerful resource mobilizing community activists to face the costs and risk linked to renewable generation or energy reduction. 4.2.2. Quest for autonomy and community sustainability Closely linked to community identity is the idea of community sustainability and autonomy—the notion that a community can survive on its own, relatively free from dependence on ‘outsiders’ (including government authorities), and enjoy the freedom to make its own decisions, and determine its own future. Like identity, the quest for community autonomy is a symbolic tool which can be invoked to mobilize communities to take action on energy projects despite formidable barriers. In our study we found this search for autonomy to be a powerful incentive for income-generating energy action. First, groups may embark on renewable projects as a way of overcoming dependence on governmental authorities, NGOs or private landowners. They do so in part to gain more control over energy supply and costs, but also to shape community development more broadly. One project officer noted a long term aim of their group’s energy projects: ‘We want to continue with some sort of revenue when [climate challenge] funding ends. It’s about sustainabilityyit’s about standing on your own two feet’ (Interview, West Lothian, June 2011). All groups we encountered – whether north or south, rural or urban – were motivated by a desire for community survival, empowerment and autonomy. Asked about the role of autonomy and community empowerment, one key member of an island Trust noted: That’s really what all this was abouty. I’ve been here so long and seen schools close, plants close, declining [number of ] children, business and employment, people shipping out of the island and it’s helly. It’s just seeing things that have failed and thinking what do you want out of your own community (Interview, community activist, Eilean Siar, May 2011). Groups often invoked this symbolic resource through ‘antiestablishment’ rhetoric, signaling their frustration with the perceived inadequacy of government action, and the need to focus on local sustainability ‘free’ from government dependence.

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For instance, one board member of a community group attempting to set up an urban wind park described the potential income it could generate as: ‘clean money’, because it would generate income for the community which would be free from external conditions: ‘The Trust can make up its own priorities and use the money as it sees fit’ (Interview, community activist, Glasgow, June 2011). Another member of the same group underlined the importance of local input and responsibility: When the wind turbines go up, the idea is that the money is spent locally, kept local, very much focused on what local people want to happen. Who knows better than the people who live here what they need? (Interview, community activist, Glasgow, June 2011). A further illustration of the importance of the autonomy quest is found in the land-owning communities in the Highlands and Islands. The number of energy initiatives here is striking (van der Horst, 2008), but less surprising once the role of self-reliance and autonomy is considered. An expert in the field of community energy noted how land buy-out groups tended to be ‘in the vanguard’ of community energy projects, not least because they are already organised and able to negotiate with their local authority and other key stakeholders (Interview, Dingwall, September 2010). They also share an imperative of generating income for ‘their communities’, and renewable energy offers a new opportunity for such generation. Noted one trust member: Owning community land opens up doors. You can see from that sign on the door where some of the money has gone and where in the future (hopefully) community energy money will goy. The community couldn’t really do that as easily if they just had a turbine because you have to get everybody else’s permission to do everything else.’ (interview, Eilean Siar, May 2011). Our point here is that the groups we studied garnered support for renewable initiatives by calling upon a tradition of selfreliance, and the promise that renewables could bring to communities seeking to maximise their autonomy and resilience. Drawing attention to autonomy is worthwhile not because it alone explains mobilization, but because it is a useful supplement to literature focusing on economic or environmental motivations for energy action. Much of the existing literature identifies environmental motivations and a desire to reduce the community’s carbon footprint as a key driver underpinning collective energy action (Haxeltine and Seyfang, 2009; Seyfang, 2009 Middlemass and Parrish, 2010). On one hand some of the groups in our study were similarly motivated. Many transition town groups11 have as their stated aim the desire to reduce carbon emissions, confront the challenge of peak oil and achieve ‘carbonneutrality’. Others have engaged in carbon counting as a condition of securing public funding from the Scottish Government’s Climate Challenge Fund. However, the aspiration to generate local income and ensure the sustainability of the community emerged as a far more important driver in our study—even among those with environmental motivations. The link is starker still amongst those community groups set up as development trusts(—the largest percentage of community energy projects in Scotland are trusts).. Their first priority is income generation and the sustainability it brings. As one Trust member noted, environmental benefits were important, a real ‘bonus’, but: 11 There are over 30 towns taking part in the Scottish transition town network. See www.transitionscotland.org.

yits income generation; we want income. I think every community does. When Gigha put their 3 turbines up they didn’t put them up to look nice, they put them up to get money to put into other things. (interview, Trust member, Eilean Siar, May 2011). A member of an urban group was just as straightforward. When asked about the main motivations for their community energy scheme, the spokesperson replied that: It’s fabulous that [our scheme] hits environmental targets but ultimately it’s to give the community a voice, and what better way to give a community a voice than having a pot of money and being able to say ‘we don’t need to go to the council for money, we don’t need the lottery, we’ve got our own money (Interview, community activist, Glasgow, June 2011). Taken together, these cases suggest that the key benefits of these projects may have less to do with actual energy outcome and more about an active citizenry able to assert themselves or even ‘challenge dominant discourses’ (see also Mulugetta et al., 2010: 754). In sum, symbolic resources such as identity or autonomy do not alone explain mobilization but they do form part of powerful mix of resources upon which groups can draw.

5. Conclusion It is clear that a wide range of community groups across Scotland are mobilizing around energy projects. We have sought to identify the underlying factors encouraging mobilization. Drawing on a modified resource mobilization framework, we hypothesized, first, that energy mobilization within each of the community case studies would be facilitated by both structural and symbolic resources. Relatedly we hypothesised that each of the groups examined – despite their variation – would be able to exploit less tangible ‘symbolic resources’ such as shared identity or desire for strong, self reliant communities. Our empirical analysis found qualified support for our first hypothesis. State support for community initiatives (and the political reasons for it) are crucial motivators. Our groups were able to draw on support from multiple levels of governance, and Scottish government support in particular. But financial incentives offered by the state can be partially offset by entrenched political and economic interests, closed policymaking systems and embedded practices. Structural resources are not, therefore, inherent facilitators. Successful mobilization depends on how well groups exploit state resources and mitigate those constraints. In all our cases some level of mitigation was present, either through the role of individuals able to navigate systems or personal relationships enabling the sharing of knowledge and expertise. Similarly our investigation of structural factors highlighted the power of entrenched interests in the energy sector and the exclusion it brings. That emphasis is not new (Levy, 2011), but we demonstrated how such exclusion can itself be a driver to action, especially if groups, such as ours, seek to free themselves from a dependence on private landowners or a fickle government. Our empirical investigation supported our second hypothesis. We found that despite varied economic, demographic and geographic differences, all our cases were able to draw on symbolic resources of identity and a quest for greater autonomy. While the latter might be expected in rural remote communities accustomed to self sufficiency, it was also apparent in urban communities in Scotland, including deprived communities keen to generate for their community self sufficiency and ‘clean’ income, that is, income untied to government grants or hand outs. Whereas existing literature on mobilization and participation

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suggests mobilization is less likely in deprived areas, deprivation need not be the death knell for energy mobilization. In some instances (including our own cases) economic deprivation can even be a driver of energy action, provided that action is linked to regeneration projects or attempts to address fuel poverty. This focus on symbolic resources is important because it highlights resources missed by other analyses. But it also draws attention to how groups interact with their political environment, often proactively. In other words, groups are not passive actors simply responding to barriers, but can invoke resources to pursue their political and economic interests. A focus on resources suggests some interesting implications for the practice and study of community energy mobilization. First it suggests that while mobilization is indeed helped by financial resources provided by the state, government finance will not alone sustain community energy action. The latter, we argued, is shaped much more by other structural resources (especially government access and engagement), as well as symbolic resources. That means that if governments do want ‘sustained community involvement’ to enable ‘every community in Scotland to share in the rewards of the green energy revolution’ (Scottish Government, 2011) they need to engage community actors and representatives in decision-making that affects them. Second, we suggest the motivations for community group action on energy need to be better understood by policymakers. For instance, although Scottish government policy and exhortations often invoke environmental aims and benefits for communities, policymakers might instead speak more directly to the motivations of a common identity and autonomy. Indeed, the motivational dynamics underlying our groups’ mobilization (identity, and autonomy resulting in part from income generation) bear a striking resemblance to the Scottish government’s own drive for distinctiveness, identity, and political autonomy. Energy actors at these two levels of governance are striving for similar ends without perhaps realising the symmetry of aims. Third, the implications of our study are significant for commercial policy. Community mobilization is crucial to the fate of future energy development and delivery. Often it is important because of communities’ role as barriers to commercial scale developments, where, for example, communities invoke identity to mobilize against the siting of wind farms or transmission lines. When approval rates for new onshore wind farms in the UK fell sharply in 2011, a spokesman for the renewables industry noted that the main reason was a failure of proponents to ‘adequately engage with local communities’ (quoted in Shankleman (2011), see also Cass et al. (2010)). In other cases, as in those we studied, communities may themselves engage in renewable development which, in turn, might indirectly build support for broader commercial scale renewable developments. Finally, this article will, we hope, encourage scholars of community action to take a broader view of barriers and incentives shaping community mobilization and subsequent action. That activity needs to be understood not just as a behavioural, financial or technical challenge, but as a profoundly political venture shaped and defined by complex and contingent political dynamics. By examining the range of resources and how they build capacity and structure community energy mobilization, scholars will be better able to examine current practice but also its possible transformation.

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