Moral systems as evolutionary systems: Taking evolutionary ethics seriously

Moral Systems as Evolutionary Systems: Taking Evolutionary Ethics Seriously Franz M. Wuketits

In tbis paper I propose an evolutionary ethics that goes beyond mere description. I argue that the fact that human behavior is biologically constrained can give us some ideas about how to establish moral norms, so that the fact/value distinction in its strict sense is no longer tenable. Taking evolutionary ethics seriously means, after all, looking for possibilities of human beings as a biological species. Biological evolution does not entail any values and moral norms, but in organizing our social life we are well-advised to consider those factors that have channeled our evolution-i.e., not just ask what humans ought to do, but what they are able to do. My vantage point is that moral systems are evolutionary systems.

1. Evolutionary Ethics Yesterday and Today Darwin’s attempt to throw light on the origins of humans and their history led to an evolutionary view of (human) behavior, including moral behavior. In Z%eDescent ofMan (1871), Darwin argued that our intellect and moral sensibi~ty grew from animal behavior by means of natural selection. Thus he founded an evolutions theory of mind, including what is now called “evolutionary ethics” (for details see Richards, 1987). However, he was wary of drawing ethical conclusions from the theory of evolution by natural selection. Particularly, he claimed that moral norms and values are not simply given by naturethat they are not prescribed to us by evolution. Thomas H. Huxley went even further, Like Darwin he was indeed convinced that morality has biological roots, but he maintained that our ethical goals contradict evolution. He stated: Which lies before the human race is aconstant struggle to maintain and improve, in opposition to the State of Nature, the State of Art of an organized polity; in which, and by which, man may develop a worthy civilization, capable of maintaining and constantly improving itself, until the evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon its downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway (1894, p. 45).’ &an~ bf. Wttitetirs,Institut ffir ~~~~~~theo~e,

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Joumd of So&d and Evohionary Sys?tm 16(3)..251-271 ISSN: 0161-7361

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On the other hand, Ernst Haeckel, that indefatigable lighter for an evolutionary world view, defended the position that moral claims have to follow the laws of nature, especially of evolutionary development (Haeckel, 1900, 1905). Likewise, Spencer (1893) argued that there is a general law of evolution and the moral law can be construed according to it: that good refers to “more evolved conduct” and evil to “less evolved conduct.” Such ideas gave rise to Social Darwin&m; the bad reputation of evolutionary ethics is mainly due to this ideology. Despite this u~o~unate result, now is high time to seriously reconsider the evolutionary approach to ethics and to see what biology can tell us about onr moral behavior. “We humans,” writes Ruse (1986b, p. 95), ‘are modified monkeys, not the favored creation of a benevolent God, on the sixth day. The time has therefore come to face squarely our animal nature, particularly as we interact with others.” Indeed, if we stem from the animal kingdom, then this should also find expression in our social ~teractions-Ed indeed it does. Hence, an evolutions ethics would be “at ~~~ an ethics taking cognizance of humanity’s evolutionary past and reconstructing the circumstances under which humans have developed through millions of years” (Wuketits, 1988, p. 462). Proponents of this ethics, however, can be divided into-at least-three main groups (see Alexander, 1987, p. 165-177): a)

b) c)

those who believe that by looking into the evolutionary processes we can know what is “good” and “evil,” because they think that what is “good” in the sense of evolution must be “good” in a moral sense;’ proponents of the view that ethics works-or, has to work-against evolution (T. H. Huxley is the best example); and those who try to avoid the naturalistic fallacy while arguing that biological, evolutionary knowledge can indeed provide a basis for ethics.

I think that many advocates of evolutionary ethics today belong to the third group. None of them wants to be called a Social Darwinis t, but most of them (including myself) would agree to what Ayala (1987, p. 237) puts as follows: Moral codes, like any other cultural systems, depend on the existence of human biological nature and must be consistent with it in the sense that they could not counteract it without promoting their own demise. Moreover, the acceptance and persistence of moral norms is facilitated whenever they are consistent with biologically conditioned human behavior. But isn’t that again the old fallacy? This proposition seems to involve an “ethics according to the nature,” since it seems to encourage the foundation of norms that fit our biological nature. Clearly, should somebody try to convince us that we ought drastically change our sleeping habits and sleep only two hours each day, then most of us for biological reasons would not be able to follow this “moral code.” This example is trivial, the critics of the evolutionary appro h might say, because everybody accepts that our behavior is constrained to a certain 7xtent by biological principles and that as a matter of course every human being needs sleep, food, water, and so on, since otherwise we would not be able to exist. Sometimes, at a basic level of studying human nature, evolu-

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tionists and all those people who are defending evolutionary ethics mi8ht seem to be offering just some information about certain human capacities that delimit the range of ways of behaving and acting (Kruger, 1987). If this-and nothing more-were the very idea of an evolutionary ethics, then there would hardly be anything “ethical” in it. But there are of course more serious issues. Take, for example, human sexual behavior in contrast to the demands of some religions. Biologically, humans are predisposed to have sexual intercourse quite frequently and, in s~iobiolo~~ terms, to spread their genes and thus to increase their fitness. Any moral system that leads to a restriction of our sexual activities and-like Christian ethicscondemns particular aspects of our sexuality is biologically inadequate (Wilson, 1978) and causes conflicts between biology and morality. One gets the impression that the proponents of such moral systems consider our nature as basically evil, so that it has to be corrected or improved. Social Darwinis m and its political consequences have supported this claim. Thus the dilemma has endured: On one side, most people-if they only accepted our evolutionary origins-would admit that our moral capacities too have developed in the course of evolution; on the other side, the majority of people (at least philosophers, but also biologists) continue expressing their belief that nature cannot tell us what we ought to do. Remarkably, many biologists, not~thst~ding eat they are prepared to see biological constraints to moral behavior, argue that we should not relent in our moral efforts (see, for instance, Mohr, 1987; Vogel, 1989): They stand in Huxley’s tradition and disregard the views of Haeckel and Spencer. Then there are those philosophers and philosophers of biology who, like Richards (1986) and Ruse (1986a, b), believe that ethics can indeed be derived from evolution without paying homage to the Social Danvinists. They endorse the propositions given by Wiion (1978) and take modern sociobiology as a starting point; meanwhile some other authors in this field of controversies (e.g., Cela-Conde, 1987) advocate a view that differs from that of sociobiologists. In general, we can say that some proponents of an evolutionary ethics have taken evolution more seriously than others. In this paper I want to show what taking the evolutionary view of morality really seriously means. By doing so, I’ll go further than many other advocates of this in-anycase heretical view. A longer exposition of my arguments is given elsewhere (W~etits, 1993). Here I concentrate on two fund~ent~ propositions: 1. 2.

Morality is basically a biological category (see also Wuketits, 1990a). Moral systems are basically evolutionary systems.

I apply the notion of evolution here in a broader sense, not only as genetic evolution, but also as social and/or cultural evolution. I of course agree to the (trivial) assertion that moral decisions are useful and necessary only in the context of human social and cultural systems, and that nature is indifferent to moral claims. But I argue that (what is less trivial) the facts of nature have a strong impact on the creation of values. “There is no solid wall between the realm of facts and the realm of values, but there are some obstacles” (Voo~~ger, 1987, p. 253). Let’s try to remove some of these obstacles. The most persistent obstacle to a serious evolutionary ethics seems the belief of many people that whenever one connects evolution and morality, the result is necessarily a brand of Social Darwinis m. Also, I think that metaphors like morality of the gene (Ruse, 1984;

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Wilson, 1975), selfish genes (Dawkins, 1976), and similar phrases have somewhat thrown the attempts of evolutionary ethics into the shade and helped establish a “pop” sociobiological version of “ethics,” against which moral philosophers feel forced to rebel. For these and some other reasons, advocates of an evolutionary ethics today are faced with rather the same problems and objections as their forerunners in the nineteenth century. However, now is the time for things to change. Clearly, discussion of the problems in question has been confused by some old controversies that can be considered pointless. Think, for instance, of the nature-nurture controversy that has occupied researchers and theorists in different disciplines for decades. In the meantime, however, we should have learned that, as for example Leyhausen (1974) points out, nurture is very natural, so this controversy has been senseless or at least based on wrong presuppositions. I believe that the development of several fields-including evolutionary biology, ethology, sociobiology, but also the social sciences-has reached a stage that provides a good starting point for a new (or just renewed) evolutionary ethics. In what follows, I shall give a brief sketch of the fundamentals for such an ethics. 2. The Evolutionary Approach to Ethics Reconsidered To make things easy, I distinguish between two groups of moral philosophers, the naturalist ethicists and the ethical nonnaturalists. Hudson (1970, pp. 65-66) characterizes their attitude with the following words: The former believed that moral terms mean, i.e. refer to, certain natural properties of actions or state of affairs, and that these properties can be observed by one or other of the physical senses. Nonnaturalists, by contrast, believed that moral terms mean, i.e. refer to, nonnatural properties which can only be apprehended by moral intuition.

A question for the evolutionary ethicist must be: Where does our moral intuition come from? A first, quick answer is: It developed in the course of our evolution in a family of primates whose members lived in small groups and thus had to adopt, for the sake of the group’s survival, cooperative behavior. This can already be considered as a rough definition of morality. But we have to be more precise. 2. I. Defining Morality To begin with, let me first point out that, as Bischof (1978) remarks, morality is specifically human and cross-cultural, or universally human. This entails at least two propositions: 1. 2.

Morality must be based on genetic evolution. Otherwise one could hardly explain its universality. Morality is apparently absent in non-human living beings and thus has only recently emerged in the evolution of life.

Moreover, we can state: 3.

At least in the case of one species of animals-namely, contributes to the species’ preservation.

our own species-morality

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That morality cannot be separated from the life of any human beings, that it is an integral part of our lives, is a truism-but then we would be well-advised to look for its roots in life, in nature, and not to ascribe its origins to some supernatural principles (see also, e.g., Wuketits, 1985). In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant assumed “that there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely a priori . . . , the conduct of a rational being” (1787/ 1901, p. 489). From an evolutionary point of view, the conduct of “rational beings” is based on pre-rational, “ratiomorphic” behavior. As I stated elsewhere (Wuketits, 199Oc, p. 200), “if our mental capacities result from evolution and if our mind is just a p~~~~ biofunction, then we should think that also our morality can be explained in terms of evolution.” Hence, evolutionary ethics is, in a way, an extension of the evolutionary theory of cognition and knowledge, i.e., evolutionary epistemology.4 Morality is a particular aspect of umentaIity”-the quest for “good” and “evil,” “ri8ht” and “wrong,” is due to our specific mental capacities. I venture to say that what we call “good” in a moral sense refers mainly to-and is not much more than-what ethologists and sociobiologists know under the label of cooperative or altruistic behavior. Note that we tend to esteem animals that take care of their offspring. Some of us are even inclined to speak of moral duties that these animals seem to fulfii, or, at least, would say that they exhibit what Lorenz (1966) called a behavior analogous to mor~ty-not~thst~ding that morality in whatever sense never refers to any species other than Homo sapiens. Taking the risk of being accused of redu~io~m, I do think that we can define morality or the morally good as altruistic behavior. This might seem a contradiction: On one side, we restrict morality to humans, on the other side, altruism is a behavioral trait of any gregarious species. But the other species do not know about their behavior; they are indifferent to “good” and “evil.” But why should we say that altruism in one case counts so much more than in all the other cases? Why should it be moral in the case of our species? 2.2. Altruism and Morality The evolutionary definition of altruism is a very general one: “If a behavior increases the fitness of a recipient at the expense of the actor’s fitness it is termed altruistic” (D. S. Wilson, 1992, p. 61). What has this to do with morality? Guenther Stent, notably a biologist (and not a moral philosopher) has criticized the sociobiologists’ use of the term “altruism,” referring to Dawkins (1976) as follows: In ordinary parlance, ahruism (having the moral value good) refers to regard by one person for the interests of other persons. And sehiihness (having the moraI value bad) refers to disregard of the interests of the others. Dawkins, however, considers ahruism as behavior that increases the weIfare (meaning chances for survival) of someone else to the detriment of the agent’s own welfare.. . But the altruistic or selfish nature of an act bears no direct, or simple relation, to its actual consequences. Hence Dawkins’ notions of ahruism and sehiihness Iie outside the domain of moral discourse (1978, p. 17). I would not say that altruism increases the welfare of an individual to the detriment of the agent’s own welfare, and I am not quite sure whether Dawkins (1976) really thinks

that altruistic behavior increases the welfare of others always at the expense of the being

that behaves altruistically. Any benefactor can profit, in the long run, from his or her generosity, and sociobiologists are well aware of the meaning of reciprocal altruism (Trivets, 1971; Darl@ton, 1978) or, what Kropotkin (1903) already pointed out, mutual aid. However, whether or not Dawkins’ or, generally the sociobiologists’, notion of altruism lies outside the domain of moral discourse is another question. At first glance this seems a mere pragmatic question. In everyday life one hardly uses the term %h.ruism,” but speaks of “help,” “support,” etc. Also, our moral discourse includes an idealixation of certain actions; a person who helps or even saves the life of another person is considered not only morally good, but somehow an ideal according to particular moral standards. The sociobiological or evolutionary use of the notion of altruism gives the impression that what counts is nothing else but genetic fitness and gene frequency, whereas in colon language and in psychology definitions of altruism the motivation of an actor who behaves altruistically (or egotistically, for that matter} plays a major role (D. S. Wilson, 1992). Hence there is a gap between the evolutionary/sociobiological and the everyday/psychological definition of altruism and, fmally, between evolutionary/ sociobiological parlance and moral discourse. But I think one cau easily close this gap by seeing that motivation comes not from nothing, but has deeper evolutions origins. In all societies altruistic behavior is highly esteemed-because it increases the fitness of the society or a group. As Fox (1989), from the point of view of a biologically oriented social scientist, remarked, human kinship systems can be seen as systems of reciprocal altruism I suppose that not only kinship systems in a narrower sense can be seen so, but that this view also applies to more complex societies. Whenever organisms of one and the same species form groups, they not only compete and behave egotistically, but also cooperate and behave ahruistically. When a human mother protects her child from danger, this can be considered basically the same as when a baboon protects its offsp~g from a leopard or when a wild boar protects its young from a human being, and so forth. These, I think, are not mere analogies; the similarity of such behaviors can be seen as homologous. Admittedly, altruism in humans can be much more sophisticated than altruism in other species, and the motivation might be very complex, as any urban society “achieves more complex social interdependence than any of the vertebrates be they baboons or beavers or whatever” (Campbell, 1975, p. 1115). Nevertheless, one can argue that what we nowadays call moral behavior has been “known” in the evolution of living systems for a long period of time as altruism with group-preserving functions. Reciprocal altruism has particular meaning, and this has also beeu described by ethnologists for human “savage” societies (see, e.g., Moods, 1927/1940). The equation “morality = altruism” might be annoying for moral philosophers. To be sure, nobody says that altruistic behavior is always equal to morality, since the notion of morality applies only to humans-i.e., beings having the capacity to consciously reflect about what is good or evil-and certainly does not apply to any other living organism. But why does altruism seem to count more in our species than in others? Biolo~~y it does not count more; it counts more at the cultural level. Through our cultural tradition we have learned that to help other people or even animals-be this with the expectation of reciprocity or, in an ideal sense, without such an expectation, just for the sake of the “good deed”-is morally right. However, as in the case of other species, the capacity of altruism is limited in Homo sapiens. Since for some millions of years hominids lived in comparatively small groups,

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altruistic behavior has been “proved,” so to speak, only among individuals with personal knowledge about each other and in which an in-group/out-group differentiation developed; the consequences of this are known as ethnocentrism, xenophobia, racism, and discrimination (see Reynolds et al., 1987). Studies of children have shown that, aheady at the age of four or five, altruism is conducted mainly in connection with personal friends and rarely extended to others (Crammer, 1988). And, as sociologists (e.g., Meyer, 1987) have pointed out, in regard to the emotional state of a human being there seems an optimal group size beyond which individuals do not feel much sympathy for each other and the character of social interactions changes. Our moral demands go further, of course; we are told, for example, by Christian religion to extend our charity to all people, and Darwin (1871) expressed his hope that future generations will have developed the “social instinct” to an extent that allows a true siblinghood among all humans and an esteem of all the other creatures on this planet. I shall comment on this later. 2.3. Evolution and the Creation of Values Let’s examine, for a moment, the belief of proponents of evolutionary ethics who belong to the first of the previously mentioned groups. Julian Huxley (1947), for instance, though he did not believe in “absolute morality,” did argue “that there exists a scale or hierarchy of values, ranging from simple physical comforts up to the highest satisfactions of love, aesthetic enjoyment, intellect, creative achievement, virtue” (p. 142). Moreover, he stated that “it is only in relation to the evolutionary process as a whole that our ethical standards can be fully generalized, and the system be rounded out to completion” (quoted in Alexander, 1987, p. 165). Julian Huxley, like Darwin (1871) and Lorenz (1966), believed that there is progress in evolution-that, in the last resort, evolution tends toward creating ever-higher organisms and that, in a way, the evolutionary process brings forth phenomena that can be considered good. Our task, therefore, would be to preserve nature and its diversity. One can hardly disagree that we ought to preserve nature and, particularly, the variety of species or, the other way round, that we ought not to destroy our environment. These claims of environmental ethicists require the attention of everybody, and we should be clear by now that if we continue destroying nature we’ll sooner than later destroy ourselves.5 But does our need to protect other species arise because nature per se exhibits values? Wilson (1984) argues that our bond with other species is deeply rooted in our evolution. He discusses a conservation ethics and maintains that “the phylogenetic continuity of life with humanity seems an adequate reason by itself to tolerate the continued existence of apes and other organisms” (p. 130). Similarly, as I argued in another publication (Wuketits, 1984), humans can experience their moral demands as part of evolution and thus find values in nature, even though nature per se does not include values at all. Certainly, it includes values for us. Most of us simply like dogs, cats, and other animals as well as plants-there is obviously a human connection to other species. But how have humans arrived at this? And why? One suspects that there is a good part of selfishness when humans protect other species, for of all living beings Homo sapiens is the greatest exploiter; under our influence countless species have become extinct, and biologists have come to the conclusion that these days one species disappears forever each hour (see, e.g., Verbeek, 1990), because that one species

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requires more and more space and resources. [Editor’s Note 1: But see my “The Extinction of Extin~ion,~~~e~, Septern~r~~o~r 1993, p. 92, in which I argue that insertion into living cells of 8enetic material recovered from extinct species-as from fossils--could make the extinct no longer extinct. This notion has been luridly but not inaptly portrayed in Michael Crichton’s science fiction novel and motion picture, Jurassic Park.-PL] What interests humans most is their own welfare and profit. This is not new, because animals generally are “interested” only in their own survivak never has a polar bear been worried about the other members of its species (except for its own offsp~ng); it is “interested” in its own survival as an individual. Thus, to conclude, we could say that humans have created values by seeing that different objects, living or nonliving, are useful for them-useful not only in a “technical” but also in an aesthetic sense. In other words, we have valued the objects of nature according to our own requirements, and not because we are a priori convinced that these objects are valuable in themselves. The evolutional view, if we really take it seriously, provides no basis for romanticism. Surprisingly, an evolution that is neither good nor evil and that is morally absolutely neutral has brought forth, among millions of species, one species that has created values and is now thinking about what it ought to do to meet its own moral standards. 2.4. Objective Values? Based on the assumption that there are no moral categories in nature, our view dismisses the belief that values are objectively&en. Recently, several authors (Ruse, 1986a; Rottschaefer & Martinsen, 1990; Geiger, 1992) have discussed this issue, and evolutionary ethic&s generally seem to have claimed an ethical relativism. An objectivist approach, at least, “seems impossible, so long as one locates the foundation of morality in some sort of extra-human existence, like God’s will or nonnatural properties” (Ruse, 1986a, p. 254). On the other side, “the very essence of morality is that it is shared and not relative” (Ruse, 1986a, p. 255). What does this mean? If I have moral sentiments and another person does not, morality will not work in the inte~lation between us; if I am constantly cheated by him/her, then my morality will not make much sense, unless I am ambitious and want to demonstrate that I am simply the better person. After all, morality has a practical purpose, and in any social group in which moral reliability is required, each individual relies on the morality of the others (Mohr, 1987). This, however, does not tell us anything about particular values and norms. Morality is indeed universal in humans, for biological reasons, because all members of our species have the same moral capacities based on the same genetic st~ure. Thus, as each human being has ears and eyes, legs and arms, 46 chromosomes, etc., we each also exhibit, one way or another, moral behavior. But norms and values also depend on social and cultural evolution and differ from one society (culture) to another. We find different indicators for this: 1. What counts as a social norm in one society or group can be un~po~ant or unknown to other societies or groups. 2. The norms and values that are shared among the members of one and the same society/ group depend on the particular environment of this society/group.

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Norms and values can change; we follow today ethical rules that differ in some ways from those of, e.g., the ancient Romans. Moral norms are applied, in the fmt instance, to members of one’s own society/ group (ethnocentrism, etc.).

Hence, morality is relative, if not biologically, then with regard to (human) social and cultural evolution. We have lived, as already stated, in small kinship groups that had to fmd their own strategy for survival. Several decades ago, Linton (1955, p. 38) observed that Culture shapes the individual by what a society’s members, acting in accordance with their culture, do to the children. Thus, every society has its own culturally prescribed patterns of care for infants. XIIsome societies they will be swaddled or bound rigidly on a cradle board; in other societies, they will be left ~~~~ by clothing of any sort. In some, they will be kept in aImost constant physical contact with another person, carried astride the mother’s hip or on the back of another child; in others they will have practically no direct physical contact with other individuals. In some societies they will be fed whenever they cry; in others, they will be fed on a rigid schedule or simply at the convenience of the mother.

These differences in infant care are a consequence of societal and cultural differentiation. Universal biological patterns do constrain infant care-an infant cannot be fed, for example, only once per week-but they also leave room for a remarkable variety of habits and customs. The same is true for moral behavior. We can conclude that, although morality is universal, there are no universal norms and values.6 As in the case of language, the disposition for morality is universal in humans, but the norms an ~di~du~ actually follows are decided by his or her society and culture. 2.5. Problems with Progress The above contradicts the belief of progress in evolution. Evolutionary ethicists since Darwin have believed that evolution is progressive and that, as already mentioned, it brings forth something good. Thus, J. Huxley (1957, p. 25) wrote: Whatever may have been the origin of the universe and whatever its final fate, it has in fact shown a certain trend which may properly be called progress. This is discernible within the few hundred million years of its history about which we can draw reasonable conclusions, and can be extrapolated with a high degree of probability into the future about which we

can make reasonable prophecies. Indeed, a posteriori evolution does show certain trends, but we can hardly assume an evolutionary law that forces alI development to bring forth ever-better systems (better for what?) and, finally, leads to a perfect moral being (perfect according to which standards?). Contra all of those who have been convinced that evolution is progressive-and that, consequently, our future is somehow determined-we should accept the notion of an “open evolution” (Wuketits, 1985,1987) and admit that “evolution is going nowhere-and rather

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slowly at that”(Ruse, 1986a, p. 203). [Editor’s Note 2: Nonetheless, such indices as increases in average lifespan-brought on by technological improvements in agriculture, diseasecontrol, etc.-show that human technological/ biological evolution, though open, is indeed “going somewhere,” to wit, creating a progress of sorts, albeit ever uneven and incomplete. See my “Philosophy of Technology vs. Technology” in this Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1, and my Mind at Large, JAI Press, 1988, for more. See also Editor’s Note 1 above for reversal of extinction via gene recovery and splicing technology.-PL] We simply cannot rely on evolution to create ever-better conditions for us and finally to make better (in a moral sense) beings of us. However, the idea of progressive evolution has been very influential and has had a strong impact on ethic&s. Rooted in the old idea of the scah naturae, it has attracted many evolutionists and has found a remarkable expression in Spencer’s “law of increasing heterogeneity”? It has also supported ideological claims, for Social Darwinism rests and relies on progressionism (Flew, 1984, Ruse, 1986a, 1987). One can understand why this idea has been so attractive for moral philosophers: it supplies us with hope of the ultimate good coming, sooner or later, more or less automatically from evolution. But from the point of view of modern evolutionary biology we cannot find any reason to believe in this idea. “The march of progress is,” as Gould (1989, p. 31) indeed remarks, “the canonical representation of evolution-the one picture immediately grasped and viscerally understood by all”; but organic evolution is a complex process, and there is no “vector of progress,” however much we might hope so. And how about progress in social or cultural evolution? This certainly very complex and difficult problemdiscussed in several versions and very often generating biased ot be treated here in adetailed manner. For brevity’s sake, let me just remark answers-cann that insofar as our moral development is concerned (which is one important aspect of social evolution), I cannot see any indications of global progress. Humans today are not less violent than they were in earlier times, they are not less aggressive than were their ancestors, and they still make war. Our civilization has apparently given us but new structures for developing our old egoistic, nepotistic, and aggressive drives. 2.6. The Need for Reorientation Having thus rejected the objectivist perspective in ethics and the idea of progressive evolution, we can provide some lines for reorientation in evolutionary ethics. The following ideas seem to be preponderantly important as a basis for such an ethics: 1. There is no gap between human biology and (human) social (including moral) behavior; sociality is rather part of our biological nature. 2. Thus, the evolution of social (including moral) systems is but one-albeit very important-aspect of human evolution. 3. Morality is nothing unnatural; it follows from specific requirements in human life and can be regarded as a sophistication of phylogenetically old “altruistic programsl 4. Our moral behavior is constrained by the requirements of our lives as a species, whose members-like the members of all the other species-have a particular interest in their survival.

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Organic evolution has favored those strategies (be they egotistic or altruistic) that help their carriers to survive, i.e., to reproduce. Humans have invented “good” and “evil”; by following, one way or another, what we call “good” in a moral sense, we follow mainly altruistic principles. We cannot hope that evolution by itself will automatically bring forth the morally good, we are responsible for setting the standards and finding ways for achieving what we want as moral beings.

Some of these ideas and claims might be trivial, others are not. Taking for granted that morality is indeed just a sophistication of altruistic strategies that are widely spread in the animal kingdom, we arrive at the conclusion that our moral codes follow a natural principle. Could, then, this principle be taken in a normative sense? Or are we going to revive the old naturalistic fallacy? I have to go into further details to show where I actually stand. 3. Taking Evolutiomuy Et&s Seriously 3.1. Nature without Values-Values

from Nature

From my previous statements, we should be clear that I do not see values anywhere in nature, though on the other hand I see values as developed in human evolution and hence aspects of human nature. This, I admit, is a very general statement which at firs glance probably will remain unchallenged. However, once we ask, what is meant by “human nature*?, the situation becomes more complex. We can link a lot to human naturepassions, love, hope, charity, barbarity, and so on-and might be tempted in each case to say “it’s just part of our nature-so what?” In this way we could legitimate almost everything-and would stay close to Social D arwinism. But, as aheady Hume in his Z’keurire of Hwnmr Nature (1738) said, “it must be owned, that heroic virtue, being as unusual, is as little natural as the most brutal barbarity” (see 1972, p. 208). His observation contradicts such preposterous ideas such as we have to act barbarously because such behavior is “natural”. Well, it is not. But how can we know? Notions like “heroic virtue” and “barbarity” are our inventions, and apply only to our own behavior. Even if we were sure that barbarity was a category in nature, however, this would not at all mean that we have to follow it, since in nature we can find other categories that would much more fit our ethical requirements, e.g., infant care, cooperative behavior between individuals, etc. Now, we can distinguish between two levels of evolutionary ethics, a mere descriptive and a normative level. At the descriptive level we can try to find tendencies in human behavior, “universals,” behavioral patterns, that might be considered as fmt steps to morality. For example, we might find out that-as Leinfellner (1974, p. 27) supposes from a gametheoretical point of view-“‘Taking care’is . . . more deeply rooted in man than maximization of his utility”; that humans have evolved to advance the community good (Richards, 1986); that we have a moral attitude of minimal respect for others (Thomas, 1985). Such fmdings have to do not so much with ethics, but rather with human ethology, i.e., they belong to a field that deals not with the justification of moral norms, but with empirically testable phenomena.* Were an evolutionary ethics to rest here, it would tell us indeed a lot of interesting things about our evolution, but practically nothing about what we ought to do.

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At the normative level, however, evolutionary ethics becomes more interesting and challenging. Immediately, we have to face here the classical is/ought distinction and the naturalistic fallacy. With regard to Darwin’s theory, Plew (1978, p. 27) makes the following point: As a purely scientific theory it could not by itself entail any normative conclusions (conclusions, that is, about what ought to be; because it would not, so long as it remained a purely scientific theory, contain any but descriptive premises (premises, that is, about what neutrally is the case, or has been, or will be). It is the more necessary for us to insist upon this categorical distinction: because Darwin did employ some terms which invite normative interpretations, and was occasionally himself led momentarily astray; and because there are today many who would like to dismiss any fact/value distinction as an unfounded and ephemeral eccentricity.

Maybe I am led astray, because I argue that-at least in an indirect way-we can deduce norms from facts, ought from is. Evolution does not prescribe norms, that’s true. We humans have the choice to behave in this or another way, but even in our decisionmaking we are constrained by evolutionary forces, by our very biological nature. Thus, evolutionary ethics would be normative at least in the sense that it tells us, on the basis of our knowledge of evolutionary biology, what we can do. An evolutionary ethics can also tell us, at least in some cases, what we ought not to do in the interest of our own survival. Particularly, we should not-we must notcontinue destroying nature and exterminating other species, because otherwise we will lose the ground under our own feet. This is indeed a normative claim based on facts. The argument runs as follows: 1) nature is the basis of the existence of Homo sapiens; 2) Homo sapiens is a biological species; 3) hence we are interested in our own survival, 4) therefore, for survival’s sake, we have to preserve our (natural) environment. [Editor’s Note 3: Reality is, alas, more complex than the above argument allows. Nature is not only good earth, and trees and flowers, it is all manner of disease and drought and earthquake quite deadly to human beings and many other species. Regarding these negative aspects of nature, our survival is served not by their preservation but their elimination. See the references cited in Editor’s Note 2 above.-PL] So, if the argument that we should preserve nature’s diversity because of its intrinsic value is considered to come from a romantic view of nature-in fact, it does initially come from such a view-and is thus regarded a weak argument, then the “survivalist argument” might be better received by many people. However, I’ll turn to some further aspects of this later. 3.2. Troubles with Sociobiology Let us now look at the sociobiological contribution to ethics. This should not be a side-glance, because sociobiologists have indeed something to say about the issue in question. Evolutionary ethics has been revisited, so to speak, mainly because of the work of Wilson (1975,1978). His claims are bold. He wants to remove ethics, at least temporarily, from the hands of philosophers, and biologize it. This and some of his other claims have, of course, not remained unchallenged. Numerous publications have been directed against Wilson and the sociobiological enterprise. Probably the most vitriolic criticism has come

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from Lewontin et al. (1984), who see sociobiology connected to the movements of the New Right-a bourgeois ideology legitimating inequality, racism, sexism, and other bad demands.’ Thus becoming an ideological debate, the sociobiology controversy often darkens serious scientific propositions (Wuketits, 199Ob). Words can quickly develop an attractive power or, as is more often the case with “sociobiology,” make repugnant what is covered by them. “The greatest distortions,” says Alexander (1987, p. 4), “of the recent advances in evolutionary biology are discussed under the label ‘sociobiology’.” And, as I feel compelled to say, a great distortion of sociobiology is discussed under the label “genetic determinism.” Many seem to be convinced that sociobiology is indeed nothing else but a kind of “gene mythology” (some popular writings on sociobiology do encourage such suspicions) and that their advocates want to establish something like a “genetic fatalism” or, that they are utopians as decades ago East (1927, p. 297) conceded with regard to geneticists: “Doubtless the geneticist is a Utopian in his leisure moments.” According to a widely held view, sociobiologists would be utopians in the sense that they believe in the power of genes-believe in let’s see what the genes will do with us, not only in their leisure moments. To stick to the point: Sociobiologists have paid attention to genetic selection and thus contributed to the controversy about “units” or “levels” of selection (see, e.g. Richardson, 1985). Although this controversy can hardly have an ethical meaning, the supposition that our moral behavior is genetically constrained is a serious challenge for moral philosophy. I do think that sociobiologists have somehow overdone things and that in particular they have advanced a genetic reductionism-certainly the case, e.g., for Dawkins (1976). Thus they have attributed complex systems properties to genes. Speaking, for instance, about selfish genes-and even in a metaphorical sense-gives the impression that characters of behavior that we normally observe only in whole organisms can be found in genes; as if genes were homunculi anticipating or directing behavior at the organismic level. In fact, genes can be neither selfish nor altruistic, neither immoral nor moral. To say that our behavior is genetically constrained is of course one thing; to attribute that same behavior to those functional entities that constrain it is quite another. Yet another problem comes from the reductionistic research strategies of sociobiologists. When applied to humans, sociobiology somehow seems to have less explanatory power than in a nonhuman context. Perhaps sociobiologists have underestimated the complexity of human behavior, which involves more sophisticated cognitive aspects than the behavior of any other organism. Without denying the logic of human sociobiology, I agree with Thompson (1989, p. 107) “that what is needed are theories that relate human behavior to physiology,“and with Meyer (1982) that sociobiology should be linked with theories and results of the social sciences. Nevertheless, sociobiology has been an eye-opener with regard to the faulty notion of evolutionary progress. Classical ethology taught us that an animal’s behavior serves the species’ preservation. Particularly, Lorenz (1966) argued along these lines. He was of course aware that competition was strong among members of one and the same species, but at the same time he was convinced that there existed a restraint of killing in each individual regarding members of its own species. Killing members of one’s own speciesa phenomenon that is displayed by Homo sapiens to a frightening extent-was seen by Lorenz as an expression of degeneration, not to say perversion. However, sociobiologists have found ample evidence for the opposite: in many species we do find killing among

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individuals, especially infanticide. (Vogel, 1989, reviews some of the findings.) Animals indeed appear interested not in their “species” but in their individual survival-or, as the hardcore sociobiologists say, the survival of their own genes. In other words, organisms are egotists and, in the better case, reciprocal altruists or nepotists, because all they “want” is to spread their “personal” genes, to have individual reproductive success. In replacing the older notion of individuals acting on behalf of species preservation-a notion necessary for the incorrect idea of progressive evolution-sociobiologists have thus helped clear the way for a discussion of biological groundings of ethics. Ethical demands that are based on mere hopes might work for some time, but they sooner or later cease to work. They conflict with the very nature of humans.” The individual interest of humans seems to be deeply rooted in evolution. This insight is not new, but sociobiology can help us look at it more carefully and oblige us to think about its possible implications. 3.3. Utility and Altruism One possible implication of the deep rooting of human interests in evolution is this: individual interests of humans differ greatly, therefore humans are constantly involved in conflicts; the task of ethics is to help solve these conflicts. However, as Alexander (1987, p. 194) critically remarks: “Defining morality as self-sacrificing, failing to understand all aspects of indirect reciprocity, and injecting the question of motivation without clarifying how little we understand our own personal motivations and social acts, have caused crucial points to be missed.” But now we understand more. We are able to reconstruct our personal motives at least in some aspects, and we can say that our motives are constrained to a large extent by “biological forces,” among them the force of survival, i.e., reproduction. Whatever we do, we always have some personal utility in mind, although we are not necessarily aware of this. Or, does anyone really believe that, for example, the politician wants nothing else but the welfare of his/ her country or district? Let us be generous and admit that he/ she wants also the welfare of the people living in his/ her country or district; but in the first instance, I venture to say, he/she is interested in his/her personal welfare and success. From a (socio)biological point of view this is not surprising at all. However, we note with interest that many of the traditional ethical systems include a claim of virtues and a demand to help others without expecting reciprocal support. I do not want to speak here about possible exceptions; but usually people expect their (moral) behavior to be reciprocated, and they expect this not so much consciously, but subconsciously-their subconsciousness being constrained by biological forces. What should such reciprocity be wrong? What counts, after all, is that I have helped somebody. Why should I not expect help from him/ her? Or, if I have nothing to expect from a particular person who has profited from my behavior-why should I not expect another type of reward, let’s say the respect and estimation of other people? Why should we follow some ideals that are not at all part of our nature? According to a nonnaturalistic view, our preferences are determined by norms and values that are considered to be something supernatural and unchang6able. In contrast to this idealistic view, an empirically supported ethics-based on our knowledge about evolution and behavior-would include just the opposite, namely the assumption “that preferences have to be given empirically by the empirical preference behavior, and that

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the empirical preference data are the only real bases for the abstract value order* (Leinfellner, 1929, p_ 395). However, the value order would not be any more abstract, if it could indeed be based on empirically testable preference&u MoraI systems are indeed evolutionary systems Which particular moral systems a population or society actually applies depends on the particular requirements of its members; these requirements depend on different factors including the physical conditions under which the population or society has to exist. Here the fact/value distinction in a strict sense is challenged. There arc certain facts in the external world of any human being that do influence the development of values. For example, a ~p~ation liviug in the desert will connect particular values with water and thus develop (moral) norms of the kind “Don% dissipate water,” “Don’t drink too much of it at once,” and so on. Hence we can state that: 1, we evaluate certain facts of the external worI& 2. we derive (moral) norms from this evaluation.

We utilize certain facts of the external world, and especially if resources are not abundant, we seriously expect reciprocity whenever we are prepared to share them with others. Altruism and utility are closely related. Any ethical system that fails to see this wiIl just be building ivory-towers and will fail to engender any moral progress, 3.4. In Search of Pleasure Each of us wants some pIeasure-this is so obvious that it does not ueed further empirical support. We have our liking for this and that, and we try to avoid unpleasant situations; we enjoy many things and events, and we dislike others. Most af us also enjoy helping other people (or animals), and enjoy this even more with respect to people when the help is reciprocated. Animals--except for dogs, horses, and some others-of course can hardly reciprocate our help, but we are pleased to see that we have helped them. This pleasure is also a kind of reciprocity_ Here an evolutionary ethics moves from mere descriptions to prescriptions, from is to ought. Critics of evolutionary ethics and especially of the naturalistic fallacy always Seem to have in mind only the negative applications of naturalism-as if only immoral behavior has been derived from evolution, as if only egotism and competitive behavior are standards, so to speak, for an evolutionary approach to ethics. But we can now state that we can apply our knowledge about our evolution-and our biologicahy constrained preferences-also in a positive sense We can maintain that humans will have a better life-and will behave morally-if they can find pleasure and satisfaction, if they are not restricted too much, if they are permitted to fmd their own personal way to happiness. Here we have to face one serious problem: we are the only species of mammals that lives in mass societies. Our phylogenetic ancestors lived in small kin groups (as a few human tribes and social mammaIs still do). With the neolithic revolution things changed dramatically (see, e.g., Cole, 1970).Humans started to form urban societies, anonymous groups of thousands and millions of individuals. One of the consequences of these processes is alienation. The enlargement of the human groups has not been accompanied by an

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improvement of social instincts, to use Darwin’s notion, and of sympathy for others. Our sympathy is still limited, and this can be regarded, again, as a consequence of our evolution in comparatively small groups (for details see Reynolds et al., 1987). Hence, from the point of view of evolutionary ethics we can argue that forming everbigger social groups is wrong. As long as a group is limited in size and its members know each other personally, moral norms function quite well, particularly on the basis of reciprocal altruism. In large anonymous groups they do not function well; they have to be replaced by more or less rigorous law. Such statements can, of co-, be misinterpreted. To make my point clear, let me say that I do not think that we can-or should-now go back to small groups (since the process of social evolution are, similar to those of organic evolution, irreversible), or, that we would be able to live like Paleolithic people. What I mean is that we should, first, take into account our phylogenetic heritage and, second, try to organize our societies in such a way that this heritage does not influence our social actions negatively. To be sure, our phylogenetic heritage is not simply “bad.” Even if we evaluate it according to some of our today’s moral norms, we will find several behavioral traits coming from our phylogenetic ancestors that are quite “good” (particularly the disposition to cooperate, and be it only for egotistic reasons). What I want to say is that those critics who reject everything with regard to our biology are simply wrong-why should “our biology,” i.e., our phylogenetic heritage, be only bad? After all, the reason for our species’ survival is most probably also due to the fact that humans do cooperate (at least in small groups), take care of others, share food, etc. Furthermore, what seems very important to me is also the fact that humans enjoy social life. To a certain extent, some other animals also obviously partake of social life with pleasure-even of social life with other species (think of the relation of dogs to humans)-but in our species this seems to be most developed. An evolutionary ethics with normative claims could take these considerations as a vantage point. There is absolutely nothing wrong with our obvious search for pleasure, and we can venture to say that a normative evolutionary ethics can claim that we have to organize our social world in such a way that humans simply feel well. This will remind at least the philosophically oriented reader of what Bertrand Russell expressed with the following words: The happy life is to an extraordinary extent the same as the good life. Professional moralists have made too much of self-denial, and in so doing have put emphasis in the wrong place. Conscious self-denial leaves a man self-absorbed and vividly aware of what he has sacrificed, in consequence it fails often of its immediate object and almost always of its ultimate purpose (1930/ 1975, pp. 189-M).

From the viewpoint of evolutionary ethics we can thus claim that joy and pleasure, being deeply rooted in our social evolution, can indeed be taken as constraints for moral norms. In this context I want to make at least three propositions:

1. 2.

Humans ought to cooperate since they have many common problems that can be solved only collectively. Humans ought to behave altruistically, because in this way they will have more pleasure in social life and can expect reciprocity.

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Humans ought to preserve their natural environment, because its destruction will mean a decrease of pleasure and happiness.

Here, I believe, are good reasons for taking evolutionary ethics really seriously and discussing its possible consequences. I am aware that many moralists-especially those who are inclined to idealize human moral behavior-will be taken aback here, because what I am obviously somehow trying to establish are ethical norms on the basis of reward: “you should cooperate and help others, because then (and only then) can you expect pleasure and happiness, since then (and only then) will others be prepared to help you “; “try to preserve nature, because then (and only then) will you gain some pleasure of a particular type”; in other words: “do everything in order to have a pleasant life, or, be moral just because you want to increase your pleasure and happiness.” But how about virtue? Shouldn’t we behave morally because of virtues, shouldn’t we try to be morally good for morality’s sake? To be sure, virtue is an invention of idealistic philosophers and moralists, an a priori moral demand connected with the belief in a benevolent-though sometimes quite violent-God. However, even an advocate of evolutionary ethics might, agnosticism notwithstanding, turn back to virtue (see Mohr, 1987). I do not want to say anything against this here-but how to convince people to act morally? The hint at virtue is not enough. We are faced with the need for argument and understanding. Humans seem to understand best when they are personally concerned and when they are able to feel somehow the (positive or negative) consequences of their behavior. One may think about sociobiologists whatever one wants, but they have convincingly demonstrated the egotistic and nepotistic nature of organisms including humans. Given the deeply rooted egoistic and nepotistic components in our behavior and our constant search for pleasure, we must try to fmd new arguments in ethics, arguments that appeal to our very nature and our drive to survive. Survival can indeed be seen as a value-and what is wrong with that? Conclusion Finally, I am led to draw the reader’s attention once again to Darwin’s belief that we humans will improve our social instincts and expand our sympathies to all members of our own species as well as to other living beings. If we are prepared to see moral systems as evolutionary systems, then we can very well share this hope, since our morality will evolve in the future and thus maybe change our attitude towards others. On the other hand, we must face here some difficulties. Particularly, one can hardly believe that humans will ever be able to embrace each other in an overpopulated world, in which the struggle for existence becomes more and more severe. Humans have never been angels; we have never lived in paradise, But the rapid development of our civilization during the last decades has made the situation even more dramatic. The old principles, especially egotistic behavior, work mercilessly in a world of limited resources. The question arises as to whether we are-in our particular circumstances-addicted to what we judge as immoral behavior: egotism, exploitation of others, destruction of nature, etc.

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In this paper I have made the claim that our ethical systems should be constructed in such a way that they permit a pleasant life, because happy people will be probably better prepared to take care of others, to help and to support others-and to expand their sympathies. This would be in my opinion the strongest possible contribution of an evolutionary ethics to human affairs. However, the question remains of to what extent our civilization, our mass society, will permit the individual his/her development to a happy person prepared to cooperate and not to begrudge other people their pleasure and happiness. Probably we have fust to learn that we humans are members of one and the same species and have common ancestors. Until now, many of us have not learned this. Notes 1. For a recent discussion and defenseof Huxley’s view of evolution and ethics see Williams (1988). 2. This belief, prominently expressed by Julian Huxley, is, in a way, the strict opposite of T. H. Huxley’s view. 3. Especially German authors very often disconnect their conclusions with regard to the very nature of humans from their moral claims. This probably has historical masons and might be due to their respect for traditional, idealistic philosophy that still has an enormous influence in Germanspeaking countries. 4. In this paper I say nothing about evolutionary epistemology (one of my favorite topics); however, I think that the close connection between this epistemology and evolutionary ethics is evident. 5. In this context a recent discussion of Yellowstone National Park is quite interesting (see Rolston, 1990). 6. I am using the term “morality” here in a broad sense, as a disposition of humans to act according to certain distinctions between “good” and ‘evil,” or, better, as the ability to distinguish between “good” and “evil,” whatever “good” and “evil” may concretely mean. 7. These issues are also considered by Midgley (1985), who shows their relations with those beliefs that have turned evolutionary theory practically into a kind of religion. Indeed, one has to distinguish carefully the scientific methods, concepts, and results of evolutionary biology from all those views that have to be regarded as metaphysical interpretations of evolution. 8. Human ethology as an empirical science containing numerous observations has been recently presented in a comprehensive volume by Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1984), who, however, does not stop with observations and empirical data, but does extend “his” discipline to a discussion of sociological, aesthetic, and ethical questions. 9. Not always has Wilson been attacked only in books and papers. At the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, D.C., in February 1978,, one of the demonstrators against sociobiology poured a cup of water on Wilson’s head-an unwilling demonstration of the biological forces in human behavior that Wilson has tried to prove. 10. The same is also true of ideological systems, of any political utopia Needless to say, ideological systems imply ethical claims. 11. From this point of view the plea for ethics as applied science (Ruse & Wilson, 1986), as well as the discussion of evolutionary prescriptions for law (Helsper, 1989), makes even more sense. References Alexander, R. D. (1987). The Biology of Moral Systems. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Ayala, F. J. (1987). “The Biological Roots of Morality.” Biology % Philosophy, 2,235-252.

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Wilson, E. 0. (1984). Biophilia: lhe Human Bond With Other Species. Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press. Wuketits, F. M. (1984). Evolution, Erkenntnis, Ethik: Folgerungen aus der modernen Biologie. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Wuketits, F. M. (1985). Zustand und Bewusstsein: Leben ah biophilosophische Synthese. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe. Wuketits, F. M. (1987). “Evolution, Causality, and Human Freedom: The Open Society from a Biological Point of View,” in Schmid, M. & Wuketits, F. M., eds. Evolutionary Theory in Social Science. Dordrecht, Holland Reidel, pp. 49-77. W&tits, F. M. (1988). “Darwinis m: Still a Challenge to Philosophy.” Zygon, 23,455-467. Wuketits, F. M. (199Oa). “Moral: Eme biologische oder biologistische Kategorie?” Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften, I, 161-168. Wuketits, F. M. (1990b). Gene, Kultur und Moral: Soziobiologie-pro und kontra. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Wuketits, F. M. (199Oc). Evolutionary Epistemology and Its Implications for Humankind. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Wuketits, F. M. (1993). Verdammt zur Unmoral? Zur Naturgeschichte von Gut und B&e. Munich: Piper.

About the Author Franz M. Wuketits, Dr. phil., is a professor (Dozent) for Philosophy of Science with a special regard to biology at the University of Vienna and the University of Graz, Austria. He is author of numerous books and articles about evolution, evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary ethics, and related fields. His most recent book is an account of the meaning of biology for ethics.