More on backward anaphora and discourse structure

Journal of Pragmatics North-Holland

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Norman

321

8 (1984) 321-327

ON BACKWARD

MACLEOD

ANAPHORA

AND DISCOURSE

STRUCTURE

*

Anita Mittwoch (1983) has persuasively argued that backward anaphora is to be analyzed pragmatically, in terms of its role in discourse structure. Mittwoch’s characterizations are here supplemented with various observations: that backward anaphora permits a separation of the nominal functions of existential assertion and denomination (or, where backward anaphora involves a clause, a separation of factors usually associated with a main clause - assertedness and propositionality); and that specific cases of backward anaphora may be instances of a very general feature - the avoidance of pronominal forms in topical or peak sentences or clauses.

Anita Mittwoch (1983) has persuasively argued that backward anaphora (or, in traditional terms, cataphora) is not a matter of sentence grammar, to be explored with the concepts of syntax and semantics, but is, instead, a feature of discourse structure requiring to be analyzed pragmatically. As Mittwoch herself says (1983: 130), “whatever constraint is here involved is not a rule of sentence grammar but a pragmatic rule for the appropriate use of sentences”. Mittwoch considers two forms involving (and tolerating, even without contextual preparation) backward anaphora - sentences coordinated with but, and sentences containing a subordinate adverbial clause in final position. Dealing with examples of both types, Mittwoch comes to overlapping characterizations: that in the first case, backward anaphora functions as a marker of pragmatic subordination, the backwardly anaphoric correlation of two (conjoined) main clauses picking out only the second as “the speaker’s main point, which is to determine the subsequent course of the conversation” (1983: 133); and that in the second case, extending the first characterization, backward anaphora correlates a syntactically subordinate clause and a preceding main clause with the effect of identifying the subordinate clause as something now asserted by the speaker, rather than (as normally) presupposed, thus downgrading the main clause as potentially the site of a speaker’s or a writer’s main point in relation to the subsequent course either of a conversation or of a text. In the difficult task of seeking “generalizations

about syntactic

* Author’s address: Norman MacLeod, Department of English burgh, David Hume Tower, Edinburgh, EH8 9JX, Scotland. 0378-2166/84/$3.00

0 1984, Elsevier Science Publishers

Language,

B.V. (North-Holland)

or semantic

University

of Edin-

features that correlate with one clause becoming pragmatically subordinated to another”, Mittwoch (1983: 134) notes “certain contributing factors” which are variously

illustrated

by Mittwoch

from a set of sentences

(1))(15):

(1) I haven’t seen him yet but John is back. (2) I had it a moment ago but now I can’t find the damn kqv. (3)

I haven’t got one but an electric drill would be handy for this job.

(4)

I’ve sold mine but shures are going up.

(5) There isn’t any but this fruit salad could to with a dash of brandy.

(6) He hasn’t joined 0 but he often attends meetings of the Astrolinguistics Society. (7) I don’t believe it but John swears he bud u premonition of the accident. (8) This may be a silly question but I always thought that backward unuphoru was culled cutuphora. (9) He was too polite to say so but he obviously wanted US to go. (10) He didn’t tell you 0 himself but John is leuuing. (11) I didn’t 0 but I had a strong urge to hit him ouer the head. (12) Don’t tell him 0 but I bumped into John’s cur this morning. (13) I don’t mind 0 but why are you driving so slowly. (14) You needn’t do it right away but could you tidy up before you go. (15) Don’t tell me 0 if you don’t want to but where were you lust night. Mittwoch’s contributing factors are: (i) a strong tendency to overt or implicated negativity in the first of the pair of clauses, a factor connected perhaps (for Mittwoch) with the possible role of the first clause in removing points that might hamper the understanding of the main predication; (ii) a tendency - no more -- for the first clause to be past in temporal reference, while the second (main) clause is either present or future; and (iii), a tendency for the cataphoric pronominal form not to occur in subject position in its clause, perhaps because (following a suggestion of Reinhart 1976) pronominalization is a sign of the non-topicality of the position so occupied. A cataphoritally-structured

utterance

not exhibiting

any of these characteristics

ple (16) He’s buck but I huuen’t seen John yet)

is unlikely

(for exam-

to be viable in any

context. These possibilities may (at least in part) simply be artifacts of Mittwoch’s examples - she herself cautions that the observations “are based on the examples that readily occurred to me, and are therefore inevitably subjective” (1983: 134). Constructions like those exemplified by Mittwoch are very characteristic of certain journalistic styles - particularly as exhibited in American news magazines such as Time and Newsweek, and perhaps other similar publications as well. In these sources, such constructions are typically found in text- or article-initial position. Thus, consider the following examples cited by Sorensen

N. Macleod / Backward amphora

(1981:

153)

who notes these as examples

and discourse structure

323

that come “at the beginning

of an

article”: (17) (18)

He may not represent the US at the United Nations anymore, but that does not mean that Andrew Young has slowed his pace . . . (Time). They cover Peking and Paris and most points in between. But last week, the staff of the prestigious,

employee-operated

making news instead of reporting Examples (17) and (18) occur settings, full nominal reference

it.

newspaper

Le Monde

was

(Newsweek).

without any preparatory contexts. is made in the clause that stands,

In such from the

point of view of discourse structure, as the main or most topical predication. This is what gives these examples their cataphoric character: but this cataphoric

character

later-occurring basic business

is involved

nally in the referential preceding

with another

significant

factor.

It is that

full nominals are freed (within their own sentences) of existential assertion since this has been achieved

clauses

functions

(or sentences).

the

from the pronomi-

of He (17) and They (18) in their respective In other words,

it is possible

to regard

the

later full nominals as only naming and not also as establishing the existence of the individual or group referred to. This means that the later full nominal positions

are available,

characterizing

content

if need be (cf. (18)), to be packed with informative appropriate

to occurrence

It would be wrong to assume that the ‘heavy’

and

as part of a main predication. NP of the main predication

in

(18) is late because it is ‘heavy’: rather, things are the other way round. Since it occurs late and correlated with a cataphoric pronoun, and thus is freed from the business

of asserting

or conveying

the existence

of the entity referred

to,

the NP the staff of the prestigious, employee-operated newspaper Le Monde is only involved in the task of naming the entity, and so can be as detailed and non-restrictively specific as is required. Indefinite generic noun phrases interact with a cataphoric order of pronoun and noun in an interesting way which also seems to involve the separation of the naming (or identifying) phrase. Thus, while examples like (19) and (20):

and existence-asserting properties of a noun (again from, or adapted from, Sorensen 1981)

(19)

If a traueller followed the road that turned west of Ephel Dhath, he would come in time to a crossing. (Tolkien, Lord of the Rings). (20) A man had to do exactly what he was told, when he was in uniform.

make reference to a traveler or a man in the sense of ‘some traveller or other’, ‘any (particular) traveller’ or of ‘some man’, ‘any (particular) man’, with indeterminate rather than indefinite reference, and with the (anaphoric) pronoun he making reference to that (or some) particular man/ traveller, cata-

324

N. h4ucleod

/

Backward

anaphora

and discourse

phoric variants of (19) and (20) show very interesting forms (19’) and (20’)

structure

differences.

Thus, in the

(19’) If he followed the road that turned west of Ephel Duath, u trauelfer would come in time to a crossing. (20’) {z:‘,” } he was in uniform a man had to do exactly what he was told . . (Monsarrat, The Cruel Sea). the following NPs a traueller, a man, have the sense of ‘every traveller’, ‘every man’ - that is, they retain their indefinite generic reference; and the cataphoric pronominal in each case seems merely a substitute for the occurrence of the full NP without carrying any deictic sense itself. Behind these various facets of (19), (19’), (20) and (20’) we can observe the following regularities: (i) in the anaphoric cases, (19) and (20) the full noun phrase identifies and asserts the existence of the indeterminate individual referred to and the following pronoun refers back to the complete sense of the full nominal; (ii) on the other hand, in the cataphoric cases, (19’) and (20’) the pronoun seems merely a shorthand substitute for the form of the full noun-phrase, and the business of existential assertion and identification (or naming) is divided, respectively, between pronoun and full nominal. What is particularly interesting about the cataphoric cases (19’) and (20’) where the tasks of existential assertion and naming or description are separated, is that such an arrangement seems very apt for statements where a conditional or circumstantial clause specifies the particular setting against which a following indefinite generic description has a particular point. Only when the nominal describes - but does not assert the existence of - the kind being referred to, does the full force of the generic nature of the remark come across: and that is with the cataphoric arrangements of (19’) and (20’). With the alternative anaphoric forms (19) and (20) the remark made comes across as relating to a specific instance of something generic, rather than directly as a generic statement. When we return to consider Mittwoch’s examples (l)-(15) bearing in mind the possibility that a cataphoric arrangement across a hut-coordination separates the denominative and existentially assertive functions between a noun and its cataphoric pronoun, we find that such an observation is appropriate in those cases that are relevant - that is, (1) (2) (3), (4), (5) and possibly (6) ~ and that in each of these examples the existence of the entity referred to is crucially a matter of language rather than something directly verifiable from reality: that is, the speaker is talking of someone or something that has not been seen, or that has been sold or lost, or which is not available, and whose existence therefore is something postulated by the speaker rather than given by (and observable or verifiable from) the situation that the speaker’s remarks bear on.

N. Macleod

/

Backward

anaphora

and discourse

strucfure

325

There is about all these examples of Mittwoch’s - not only (l)-(6) but the remainder (7)-(19, as well - a quality of disinterest, or of the speaker remarking on something that is or has been only of academic interest either to the speaker or to the individual identified by the subject NP, or understood as the subject. Thus, in all of the examples (7)-(15) - in specially different ways in the last three cases (13)-(15) - the cataphorically-postponed full clause involves the speaker or somebody referred to or implicated in the previous clause, and involves or amounts to a predication or remark which one or other, speaker or subject, relates to in a provisional way. The remarks all involve some kind of surmise or are otherwise conditional. In each case the clause presents a proposition that has not achieved - or been presented as - an asserted proposition with a positive (or at least a definite) truth-value. Thus, typically, the prefatory anaphoric clause involves some expression cancelling some basic property or ingredient of a communicative situation. This factor is particularly clear in (13)-(15) which involve coordinations between illocutionarily-different clause types, where the preparatory clause discounts or cancels some factor normally pertinent to the communicatively-appropriate use of the sentence-type associated with the second conjunct. Similarly, though not so prominently, with examples (7)-(12): typically these involve reference to the pointlessness or absence of speech or communication: the one that does not (11) involves a metaphorical reference (a strong urge) derived from spoken communication. It seems plausible to conclude that, in pragmatic terms, the cataphoric coordination of some prefatory pronoun or substitute and a full clausal form involves the cancellation, or restriction, of the usual assertion of the proposition involved in the full clause. If this is so, then the pragmatic qualities of examples (l)-(6), where the cataphorically-postponed item is an NP (that is, a reference), and examples (7)-(19, where the cataphorically-postponed item is a clause (that is, a predication), are on a par: the cataphoric arrangement of (l)-(6) separates the (usually unified) functions of identifying (naming), and of asserting existence; while in (7)-(15) cataphora permits a separation of factors usually involved together in a main clause - its being (treated as) asserted and its propositionality. Examples like (7) and (12) are particularly germane here. In (7) the full clause is complementary to a main verb swears, a verb whose meaning (especially in non-first person or non-positive uses) involves the assertion of qualities normally assumed to hold for a complement, or for anything one says _ earnestness, conviction, and affirmativeness on the part of the speaker. The use of swear seeks to compensate for, or draws attention to, the absence of these properties - or at least their likely suspension - in the complement. Swear draws attention to the fact that the speaker is saying or claiming that what is said is true: normally it goes without saying that anything in the form of a main clause (the complement of swear, for instance, occurring on its own

without the superordinate swear-clause) is asserted by the speaker as true (or, where relevant, as false). Constructions of the illustrated cataphoric type may have a particular idiomatic aptness with swear, given contemporary attitudes. Thus one of the real-life examples cited by Sorensen (1981: 148) structurally recalls Mittwoch’s example (7): (21) As to my own story, I have tried to do so, but I cannot swear that I have always told the truth . (Knowles, Trust un Englishmun). In example (12), the prefatory clause draws attention to the limited, conspiratorial circumstances under which the proposition of the full clause is mentioned. The present speaker and hearer are either disinterested in the assertion of this proposition (hearer) or interested in its non-assertion to John (speaker). Again, the usual assertivity available to a main clause is here attenuated, or conditional, or cancelled. The second kind of general case of backward anaphora considered by Mittwoch involves a cataphoric link between a main clause and a following subordinate adverbial (usually temporal) clause. Backward anaphora here, Mittwoch correctly notes, is connected with identifying the subordinate clause as potentially topical in relation to the subsequent discourse - or, in the terms Mittwoch uses, dominant. Thus Mittwoch interestingly suggests that in examples (22) and (23): (22) We were all talking about him when John walked into the room. (23) We all talked about him after John had left the room. the greater acceptability of (22) “correlates with the fact that a when-clause that follows a main clause can itself exhibit main clause properties, especially when the main clause has past progressive and the when-clause simple past” (1983: 138). In support of this claim, that a subordinate clause can be an independent assertion (a main or topical predication, in discourse terms), Mittwoch instances the occurrence of presentative word-order inversion in examples similar to (22) - in (24), for instance: (24) We were all smoking

pot when in walked

the teacher.

In (24), with stress on in, the teacher walking in is presented as the new development, which is seen as coinciding with our being smoking pot. (24) could not be used to report the more usual (or regular) sense of our smoking pot coinciding with the teacher’s walking in. The presentative structure of the subordinate clause in (24) is only one of several positional variations that can occur as signals of the assertability of the subordinate clause, as a main predication, superseding the preceding main

N. Mucleod

clause. Other structure:

cases

/

involve

(25) We were all smoking or the interpolation

Buckwurd

the

adoption

and dmourse

of a

structure

321

Who. .6ut..?

interrogative

pot when who walked in but the teacher?

of a checking,

(26) We were all smoking walked in.

onaphora

hearer-prompting

pot when ~ wouldn’t

negative you believe

question: it? - the teacher

A factor which seems to be relevant to the construction of such examples, where cataphoric order co-occurs with a final when-clause, is that main or most topical predications (from a discourse point of view) are not characterized by the occurrence of pronominal or substitutive forms. Thus in a form like (27) which would be most appropriate in a narrative striving for some effect of immediacy, (27) I’d just started

running

for it when the bus pulled away from the stop.

the cataphoric order allows full lexicalization to occur in the subordinate clause. This is an arrangement which then expresses or correlates with the speaker’s attempt to re-create the original sense of surprise associated with the occurrence primarily referred to - the departure of the bus. In an example like (27) the distribution of pronoun and full noun seems to be connected with the topic that the speaker particularly wants to draw attention to. A factor of this kind - where choice of pronoun or full noun is optional and involved with the identification of a particular clause as topical is relevant to all instances of cataphora. It is worthwhile recalling here a suggestion of Hinds (1977) that the choice of a pronoun or full NP is often entirely optional and connected with the identification of a peak sentence within each paragraph or paragraph segment. According to Hinds, there is one peak sentence per paragraph or paragraph segment: full NPs occur in peak sentences (or clauses), pronouns in non-peak sentences (or clauses).

References Hinds, John, 1977. Paragraph structure and pronominalization. Papers in Linguistics 10: 77-99. Mittwoch, Anita, 1983. Backward anaphora and discourse structure. Journal of Pragmatics 7: 129-139. Sorensen, Knut, 1981. Some observations on pronominalization. English Studies 62: 1466155. Reinhart, Tanya, 1976. The syntactic domain of anaphora. Unpublished MIT doctoral dissertation. Macleod (b. 1940) is Lecturer in the Department of English Language in the University of Edinburgh. His main interests are: stylistics (particularly the analysis of the language of fiction), text structure, and English grammar. His article: Some further observations on pronominalization in English, is forthcoming in Engfish Studres. Norman