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Mother or not, mother or what?
Women's Studies Int. Forum, Vol. 17, No. 5, pp. 525-532, 1994 Copyright © 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in the USA. All rights reserved 0277-5395/94 $6.00 + .00
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MOTHER
OR NOT, MOTHER
OR WHAT?
Problems of Definition and Identity GAYLE LETHERBY Coventry University School of Health and Social Sciences, Priory Street, Coventry CVI 5FB, U K
S y n o p s i s - This article draws on feminist theory a n d research and personal experience and considers problems o f definition and identity with specific reference to the experience o f n o n m o t h e r h o o d . In it the author argues that attention to m o t h e r h o o d / n o n m o t h e r h o o d is necessary in any discussion of differences a n d diversity between women.
In Western society, all women live their lives against a background of personal and cultural assumptions that all women are or want to be mothers and that for women motherhood is p r o o f o f adulthood and a natural consequence o f marriage or a permanent relationship with a man. A great deal of social and psychological research has focussed on women and the role of children in their lives and is thus complicit in reproducing societal assumptions about women deriving their identity from relationships in domestic situations and particularly from motherhood within the family. Consequently, 'and how many children have you got?' is a 'natural' question. Social attitudes and institutions support the assumption that women's ultimate role is motherhood and women who do not mother children are still expected to mother others; either vocationally as a teacher or a nurse or within the family as a sister, aunt, daughter, or wife/partner. This article considers problems o f definition and identity in relation to nonmotherhood. In short, I argue that in order to fully respect differences between women, atten-
tion to differences due to m o t h e r h o o d / n o n motherhood is necessary. I draw on feminist theory and research and personal experience. As such, my personal history is relevant. I am a 35-year-old White heterosexual woman. I have no children. After 'trying' for 15 months, I became pregnant early in 1985. At 16 weeks I miscarried. I have not (to my knowledge) been pregnant since. I have never been for tests or treatment. M O T H E R OR W H A T ? Women who are not mothers are defined in relation to their 'lack' of a biological or social caring relationship with children by terms such as 'barren,' 'childless,' 'childfree.' Each o f these words has its own connotation. 'Barren,' the inability to bear young, has implied failure since biblical times, and although the definition o f this word has been generalised to include land which produces little or no vegetation and animals which do not become pregnant in the usual season, the original definition referred exclusively to women (The Oxford English Dictionary, 1973). 'Childless,' implies a person with something missing from their lives whether preceded by the word 'voluntary' or 'involuntary,' although the inclusion o f these may inspire a different set of emotions in others. The former are likely to be viewed as selfish whilst the latter often incur pity. 'Childfree' (in reality the same in consequence as being voluntarily
A n earlier version o f this article was presented at W o m e n ' s Studies UK Conference (July, 1991). The author would like to t h a n k the w o m e n who attended for their comments. In particular, the a u t h o r thanks m e m bers of Staffordshire University, School of Social Sciences' W o m e n ' s Research Group and the two anonym o u s reviewers for their help with earlier drafts. 525
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childless), implies a definite and positive choice: a decision not to have children; this is also considered to be a selfish option. This word also has associations with the word 'carefree,' which, in turn, implies a childlike state. Thus, women who have no children are considered to have no responsibilities and thus to be like children themselves. Relevant here is Pfeffer's (1987, p. 97) comment made in reference to the academic study (feminist and otherwise) of the experience of infertility; that the real question remains u n e x p l o r e d - ' t h a t is why personhood is equated universally with the capacity to reproduce.' Thus, it is clear that social attitudes encourage women to measure their own selfworth in terms of their capacity/desire to mother. This is ironic because motherhood itself has little status in society. As Segal (1987, p. 5) notes: it is women's mothering and nurturing activities, and the social beliefs which support them, which are crucial to the maintenance of women's general subordination and economic dependence. While the virtues of maternal loving and caring are obvious, they have never been materially valued but instead applauded only with the hypocrisy of cheap sentiment. And as Mills (1991, p. 171) adds: For every definition of mother or a mother combination term which contains connotations of love, respect and reverence there seems to be another connoting fear, hatred or disrespect. (original emphasis) Manion (1988) argues that part o f the present low status of motherhood in western society is due to the efforts of feminists themselves who did not want women to have recognition only for their biological capabilities. She adds that unfortunately no real acknowledgement of women as equal persons in society has resulted. But it is equally arguable that 'feminist blaming' is a patriarchal strategy designed to discredit feminists. Women do often feel less than adult and report a deterioration of their sense o f self-worth and personality and a loss of financial independence as part of their experience of motherhood
(Rapoport, Rapoport, & Sterlitz, 1977). However, Baker (1989, p. 90) argues that this is not universal, and the social identity of women in the transition to motherhood is established in comparison with other women and not with men. She adds that the social identity of first time mothers is "not dependent on status comparisons with women in other roles, but on the extent to which motherhood is a chosen activity and the strength o f links with other mothers at this time." Women are only considered 'fit' to mother if they meet the appropriate c r i t e r i a - for instance, as Shawyer (1979, p. 25) notes: The same people who attack childless couples as being "selfish" for not having children are, curiously, often the same people who attack single mothers for being "selfish" by refusing to give theirs away. In 1976, Maclntyre pointed out that although women are considered to be maternal by instinct, this 'instinct' is assumed to only operate in married women. More recently the 'Virgin Birth' issue in Britain is another example of how motherhood is considered to be 'unnatural' for some women. Analysis of the popular and quality newspapers clearly shows that many people only consider women's desire for children to be 'natural' if accompanied by the desire for heterosexual sex (Rumbold, 1991). M O T H E R OR NOT In my experience, as a childless woman in my early 30s currently undertaking research in the area of involuntary childlessness and infertility, many people feel qualified and justified to give advice (without being asked) to others about having childrenJ When to have them, how many to have, why to have them. Perhaps this is because motherhood is a public as well as private experience, affecting as it does the woman, her partner, parents, relatives, and friends practically and (in some cases) in terms of their personal status with others. Consequently, comments along the lines - "you'll regret it if you don't," "don't leave it too late," "just relax and everything will be alright," "it will be the making of your marriage," etc., etc., are common. These imply that women who decide not to
Mother or Not, Mother or What?
have or who are unable to have c h i l d r e n - for various biological, social, material reasons do not reflect on the reasons for and consequences of their voluntary or involuntary childlessness. The decision not to have, or the realisation that having may not be possible, may also cause some pain, and in this case advice will be not only unnecessary and unwanted but cruel. As a woman who is not mothering any children, this is important to my personal experience. At various times over the last 8 or so years I have been given all o f these pieces of advice and as a result have often been incredulous, distressed, a n g r y - s o m e t i m e s all at once. At present I rarely feel uncomfortable with other women, but on several occasions recently, I have been in situations (with women) where I felt that the 'adult woman = mother' equation was taken for granted. At these times I find it difficult to speak up and say that I feel that my (and others) experience is being neglected. This is partly because I fear that women with children will feel that I am belittling their experience (which I am not) and partly because as an involuntary childless women I am frightened that I will be thought 'jealous,' 'bitter,' 'unfulfilled' (which I am not). Feminists have argued that many women feel discrepancies between how they experience the world and the 'official' definition o f their identity regarding sexuality and motherhood, which results in guilt, fear, and anxiety (e.g., Phoenix, Woollett, & Lloyd, 1991; Rich, 1980; Rowbotham, 1973, 1989). This argument is obviously based on a version o f realism as it assumes an objective reality that male theorists have failed to see. Over the last 3 decades a feminist approach has been developed which is concerned with the theoretical importance o f experience, the rejection o f the subject/object split, and the recognition o f the importance of subjectivity and emotion (Stanley, 1990). In the early days of the Women's Liberation Movement, the emphasis was on challenging the myth that motherhood was women's inevitable d e s t i n y - t h a t is, 'the right to choose' was defined in terms o f the right not to have children, and the Women's Movement provided a space for women to voice the negative aspects o f mothering (Rowbotham, 1989). Shulamith Firestone (1971, p.
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223) argued, as a radical feminist, that women's childbearing and childrearing role was the cause of their oppression. She went so far as to argue that women should be freed from the 'tyranny o f their reproductive biology' by any means available. As Rowbotham (1989) argues, many feminists felt that this was alienating to women who want children, and one reaction to this was the development o f a strand (sometimes known as the 'feminist standpoint epistemology' or 'women's experience epistemology'), which argues that society needs to reconstruct reality from the standpoint of women, leading to a total transformation o f society. Therefore, there is an objective reality, and that is the reality experienced by women. Supporters o f this approach, for example, Griffin (1983) and Ruddick (1984) stress that the experience that all women share is their capacity to m o t h e r which makes them closer to nature and more peace loving and caring than men. Taken to their extremes, both these arguments are biologically deterministic. Rowland (1987) argues that Firestone cites women's reproductive role as the cause o f female oppression and not the associated social and economic constraints. Focussing on motherhood as the one thing that women share returns us to the patriarchal definitions of masculinity and femininity that feminists have sought to challenge. Also, Firestone's argument implies that it is self-indulgent of women to dwell on their desire for children. Griffin's and Ruddick's argument may be offensive (to women who choose not to or who cannot have children), as it implies that there is 'only one experience' which, as Flax (1987) argues, can only be built upon the suppression o f voices of persons with experiences unlike those who are in a position to 'define.' This is surely antifeminist in approach, as feminism has always been concerned with 'difference' and diversity. The original emphasis o f modern feminism was on the difference between women and men, whilst more recently, diversity between women has also been recognised as politically important. As MacKinnon (cited by Geiger 1986, p. 335) argues, if feminism is understood as "the theory o f women's point o f view," and if feminist method is understood to be "the collective critical reconstruction of the meaning of women's social experi-
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ence as women live through it," then "this theory must account for the diversity of that experience." And, further, as Geiger (1986) adds: women's conscious perceptions of the experience must constitute our most critical and complex data. Thus, as bell hooks (1986) suggests, feminism is possible not because women share the same experiences, but because it is possible to federate around common resistance to all forms of oppression. Therefore, the aim is not to establish a 'feminist standpoint' as a generator of true stories about social life, but rather feminist oppositions and criticisms o f fake s t o r i e s - t o lead to an understanding of women's lives that both illuminates their lives and is respectful. There is, however, a problem with this approach. How do we know what stories are false if we don't have a feminist standpoint from which to view them? Thus, perhaps it is better to speak, as Stanley and Wise (1990) do, of 'feminist standpoints' or a wider notion of a 'feminist standpoint' that incorporates a number of feminisms. Differences do exist between women so the category 'women' needs careful defining in order to focus on ontological separations as well as similarities. Thus: 'woman' is a socially and politically constructed category, the ontological basis of which lies in a set of experiences rooted in the material world. yet: the experience of 'women' is ontologically fractured and complex because we do not all share one single and unseamed material reality. (Stanley & Wise, 1990, pp. 21-22) In other words, there is a common material reality that all women share that is characterised by inequality, exploitation, and oppression, but women are not all oppressed in the same way. It is therefore important to recognise that whilst oppression is common, the forms it takes are conditioned by race, age, sexuality, and other differences between women. Di Stephano (1990, p. 78) deals with
the complexity of this when she argues that it is necessary to be aware that gender functions as "a difference that makes a difference even if it can no longer claim the legitimating mantle of the difference" (original emphasis). R E S P E C T I N G AMBIVALENCE My argument is that a mere acknowledgement of both voluntary and involuntary 'childlessness' clearly dictates the practical and theoretical necessity to be respectful of diversity of experience whilst recognising that the dominant view in our society is that women's primary function is motherhood. To be respectful o f the lives of women who do not mother children and the lives of those who do, it is necessary to explore the complex nature both of the desire for and experience of motherhood and nonmotherhood. Concerning motherhood, this has already been done. Thus, although there are many strong arguments that support the view that the desire for motherhood is socially constructed (e.g., Chodorow, 1978; Maclntyre, 1976; Wearing, 1984). Sichtermann (1986, p. 23) suggests that "there is some source of influence which is relatively independent o f external conditions." This appears to be dangerously close to arguing for a 'maternal instinct,' but as Rowbotham (1989) reports, a group of French feminists tried to disentangle the culturally conditioned desires and the 'real' desires to discover what women's 'real' attitudes to motherhood were, but they couldn't actually do it. Thus, many writers argue (e.g., Hey, 1989; Sichtermann, 1986) that the desire for motherhood is multidimensional. Included in this is a desire for the biological a n d / o r the social experience of motherhood. This is important to note both in reference to women who mother children within a biologically childless relationship yet still mourn their infertility, and women who feel biologically fulfilled through their pregnancy/childbirth experience yet feel alienated by the social experience of mothering. As previously noted, feminism has also provided a space for women to acknowledge the negative and positive aspects o f being a mother. As Simone de Beauvoir (1960, pp. 232-233) puts it:
Mother or Not, Mother or What?
That the child is the supreme aim o f women is a statement having precisely the value o f an advertising slogan. But the fact remains that unless the circumstances are positively unfavourable the mother will find her life enriched by the child. And in A Feminist Dictionary (Kramarae & Treichler, 1985, p. 90) the entry for child includes: A being and an event "which changes the lives o f most women, opening up previously unimaginable new selves, new areas o f responsibility, delight, exhaustion, anxiety, ambivalence, and physiological change." (Robyn Morgan, 1982, p. 223) Feminists have made the distinction between the institution and the experience of motherhood and further have recognised differences within experiences. The question of motherhood as status, desire, and experience has been addressed by feminism, and ambivalent attitudes and feelings towards motherhood are now taken for granted in academic feminist writing (Phoenix et al., 1991; Rich, 1977; Rowbotham, 1989). However, less attention has been given by feminists to the ambivalence o f the experiences o f 'childlessness' and 'childfreeness.' Why Children (1980), edited by Stephanie Dowrick and Sibyl Grundberg, records women's personal experiences of motherhood and nonmotherhood of children and explores some o f the reasons for these states; yet, as Attar (1987) notes, these accounts are not followed by active feminist debate o f the issues. Writers such as Pfeffer (1987) and Sandelowski (1987, 1990) have been concerned with the ambivalence that women who are 'infertile' feel regarding their status, including the fact that women who seek medical treatment are encouraged to ignore this ambivalence. As far as the medical profession is concerned, the only success is a baby. More discussion and debate are necessary. Referring to my own personal experience again, I find my involuntary 'childless' state ambivalent, both in practical terms (like most women who are 'infertile' I have never been told that it is impossible for me to have a
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child) and in emotional terms. Eight years ago my central aim was to be a mother and I felt that I was only half a woman without a child. Any doubts that I had concerning motherhood I denied. Now I feel very different. Although I still desire motherhood and feel that there is a gap in my life this does not dominate my every thought and action, and I no longer feel a lesser women (or less than adult) for not mothering children. I am also able to accept the equivocal nature o f my des i r e s - t h a t is, a part o f me enjoys the freedom that I have because o f my 'childless' state, and if I do become a mother I know that I will feel opposing emotions in relation to that experience also. A miscarriage, returning to higher education and the relationships that I have developed with the children o f close friends, among other things, have all affected by personal development, and I have no wish to generalise my experience to other women who do not mother children. However, I believe that it is essential that feminism address the experiences of all women with reference to motherhood and nonmotherhood because, as Oakley, McPherson, and Roberts (1984, p. 191) argue, the question of whether or not to have children cannot be dismissed by women with ease because "the potential for motherhood is always inside u s - n o t only women's bodies but their psychologies too." Recognition of this lends support to Gordon (1990, pp. 47-48): Feminism, then, is about the politics of transformation, about seeking the implications of the personal being political. In terms of mothering this means questioning the politics o f reproduction, motherhood as an institution, analysing the complex desires involved in mothering, considering the right o f women not to be mothers and how those who make a positive choice to have children can combine their parenting with other activities, including paid work. (original emphasis) Yes, but this is not enough because as Leroy (1988, p. 92) argues, "You cannot choose when to have c h i l d r e n - y o u can only choose when not to have them." Thus, the experience of involuntary 'childless' women also needs to be central to any discussion. A greater understanding of the lives o f all women who do
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not mother children will lead to a wider understanding of female experience including definitions of women's self-identities. SISTERHOOD AND REDEFINITION
Sandelowski (1990, p. 34) argues that we "live in a cultural milieu that promotes motherhood and subverts sisterhood." Although politically committed to ' s i s t e r h o o d ' - a relationship between women that requires no male i n v o l v e m e n t - feminism has spent much time focussing on 'motherhood,' a relationship that does (even if only though male donation of sperm). Clearly, feminist ethics demands that feminists should consider the reproductive choices and rights of women who do not mother children and the potential consequences of the New Reproductive Technologies. An equally important part o f the analysis should be to consider the whole life experience of such women. (Which is itself affected by the current social and political climate and the place of the New Reproductive Technologies within this.) Focussing solely on reproduction can compound the public view of the 'barren woman' as a failure, negating the rest of her life experience and the experience of those who become social (as opposed to biological) mothers. The life experience of women who do not mother child r e n - either voluntarily or because they have no other c h o i c e - n e e d s to become central to feminist analysis. To do this, feminism needs to address issues of exclusion with the same vigour as issues of oppression. With reference to motherhood (as with other aspects of women's experience) feminists have considered issues of oppression in both a practical and theoretical sense and have been respectful of the fact that women are often able to resist oppression and are only rarely totally powerless; and also of the fact that some women do not experience their lives as oppressive. Reference to the lives of women who do not mother children indicates that exclusion needs to receive more attention. By virtue of their choices of study and activity, feminists themselves have cause some women distress. As Sandelowski (1990, p. 43) argues, the 'infertile' women's desire for what most fertile women have and want is sometimes questioned and interpreted as selfish. Women who do not mother children
are likely to be just as affected by socially (and biologically) constructed 'desires' as women who do mother children. It is likely that they will also feel a sense of exclusion in a society where there are considerable pressures to have children. Thus, it is not enough to say to involuntarily 'childless' women that there are other ways in which women can live fulfilling lives. Nor is the advice of others, such as Hubbard (cited by Sandelowski, 1990, p. 45), who in reference to the New Reproductive Technologies argues that "strong, deep, feminist consciousness raising" is the most "therapeutic" alternative to the "technological fix." In my view this negates the complexity of the experiences of both motherhood and nonmotherhood. Greater attention to and respect for the life experiences women who do not mother children would not only be more appreciative of the negative aspects of the status but also of the positive aspects. This is surely a necessary step in illuminating women's complex identity. Lorde (cited by Spelman, 1990, p. l) notes that: There is a pretence to a homogeneity of experience covered by the word sisterhood that does not in fact exist. (original emphasis) Recognition of the 'differences' of experience dependent on whether women mother children or not is surely part of the process advocated by Spelman (1990) of establishing a concept of 'sisterhood' which celebrates our differences. Central to the feminist analysis of women's experiences of nonmotherhood of children should be consideration of new ways to define this experience. As Spender (1980) and Segal (1987) note, it is necessary to realise that language reflects the centrality of power and authority in society. Thus, language tends to exclude, trivialise, and demean women. The word 'childless' has obvious use in a patriarchal society, and its negative connotations are stressed by religious doctrine, the mass media, etc. Interestingly, 'childfree,' which suggests a positive (if tainted) choice is not recognised by the 'Spellcheck' facility of the Word Processor on which I type this! Perhaps more surprisingly A Feminist Dic-
Mother or Not, Mother or What?
tionary (Krarnarae & Treichler, 1985) has no entry for 'childfree' or 'childless.' Surely this is a serious omission. Feminism should reject the negative connotations o f these terms and work to find new descriptions which are both respectful to women's experiences o f nonmotherhood (which still defines a woman's life in relation to children but at least is more o f a neutral term and less judgemental) and recognise the complex nature o f these experie n c e s - both the positive and the negative aspects. Care needs to be taken to take note o f what women themselves believe to be appropriate. As Manion (1988, p. 192) notes "pointing out to the infertile that they are victims o f false consciousness and should consider themselves 'childfree' instead o f 'childless' may not be appreciated," and it is important to take care not to repeat this instance o f the 'powerful' naming the experience. Any new word/term/explanation o f course needs to include reference to and be respectful o f the differences o f experience mediated by different religious, cultural, and sexual loyalties as well as differences of age, ethnicity, class, and disability. Mills (1991) notes that feminism has reclaimed some words sometimes used in a derogatory way in respect to women and make them 'our own.' This is particularly evident in the names o f feminist publications such as 'Spare Rib,' 'Shrew,' 'Red Rag,' 'Trouble and Strife.' Whilst enjoying this irony, I personally believe that there are situations in which it is not appropriate. For me, at least, nonmotherhood is one o f these situations. Irony can certainly be positive, but feelings of safety and security and inclusion need to come first. Thus, whilst recently reading Mill's (1991, p. 86) book and discovering the origin of the word feminism I felt considerable disquiet:
The w o r d f e m i n i s m dates from the 1850's. It originates in the L a t i n f e m i n a , meaning woman, or properly, 'the suckling one' or 'the sucked one'. (original emphasis) Mills continues: This will have strong resonances for childless females (whether by choice or not) who find that in patriarchal society they
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are treated as if they are not 'real' women because they are not mothers. Yes. Clearly, as Stanley and Wise (1990, p. 21) argue, it is important not to accept and use the category of 'feminism' "in monolithic terms, without fully exploring the a c a d e m i c implications o f the political, ethical and epistemological differences" that exist "'within feminism' as 'between w o m e n ' " (original emphasis). ENDNOTE 1. My current research is concerned with the social, emotional, and medical experiences of infertility and involuntary childlessness. It is predominantly concerned to explore women's experiences. I hope to write more about my empirical work in the future. REFERENCES Attar, Dena. (1987). The controversial feminist. In Gall Chester & Sigrid Nielsen (Eds.), In other words: Writing as a feminist (pp. 30-35). London: Hutchinson. Baker, Deborah. (1989). Social identity in the transition to motherhood. In Suzanne Skevington& Deborah Baker (Eds.), The social identity of women (pp. 84105). London: Sage. bell, hooks. (1986). Sisterhood: Political solidarity between women. Feminist Review, 23, 125-138. Chodorow, Nancy. (1978). The reproduction of mothering (Psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender).
London: Universityof California Press. de Beauvoir, Simone. (1960). The second sex. London: Four Square Books. Di Stephano, Christine. (1990). Dilemmasof difference: Feminism, modernityand postmodernism. In Linda J. Nichoison (Ed.), Feminism/Postmodernism (pp. 63-82). London: Routledge. Dowrick, Stephanie, & Grundberg, Sibyl. (1980). Why children. London: The Women'sPress. Firestone, Shulamith. (1971). The dialectic of sex. London: Jonathon Cape Ltd. Flax, Jane. (1987). Postmodernismand gender relations in feminist theory. Signs, 12, 621-643. Gordon, Tuula. (1990). Feminist mothers. London: Macmillan. Geiger, S. N. G. (1986). Women'slife histories: Method and content. Signs, 11,334-351. Griffin, Susan. (1983). Introduction. In Caldecott & Leland (Eds.), Reclaim the earth (pp. 1-12). London: Women's Press. Hey, Valerie. (1989). A feminist exploration. In Valerie Hey, Catherine Itzin, LesleySaunders, & Mary Anne Speakman (Eds.), Hidden loss: Miscarriage and ectopic pregnancy(pp. 51-74). London: The Women's Press. Kramarae, Cheris, & Treichler, Paula A. (1985).A feminist dictionary. London: Pandora. Leroy, Margaret. (1988). Miscarriage. London: Mac-
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donald and Company (Published in association with the Miscarriage Association). Maclntyre, Sally. (1976). Who wants babies? The social construction of instincts. In Diana Leonard-Barker & Sheila Allen (Eds.), Sexual divisions and societyProcess and change (pp. 150-173). London: Tavistock. Manion, Eileen. (1988). A ms-managed womb. In Arthur Kroker & Marilouise Kroker (Eds.), Body invaders: Sexuality and the postmodern culture (pp. 183-200). London: Macmillan Education Ltd. Mills, Jane. (1991). Womanwords. London: Virago. Oakley, Ann, McPherson, Anne, & Roberts, Helen. (1984). Miscarriage. Glasgow: Fontana. Oxford English Dictionary. (1973). OUP. Pfeffer, Naomi. (1987). Artificial insemination, IVF and the stigma of infertility. In Michelle Stanworth (Ed.), Reproductive technologies: Gender, motherhood and medicine (pp. 81-97). Oxford: Polity Press. Phoenix, Ann, Woollett, Anne, & Lloyd, Eva (Eds.). (1991). Motherhood: Meanings, practices and ideologies. London: Sage. Rapoport, Rhona, Rapoport, Robert N, & Sterlitz, Ziona. (1977). Fathers, mothers and others. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rich, Adrienne. (1977). Of woman born: Motherhood as institution and experience. Virago: London. Rich, Adrienne. (1980). Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence. Signs, 5, 631-660. Rowbotham, Sheila. (1973). Woman's consciousness, man's world. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Rowbotham, Sheila. (1989). To be or not to be: The dilemma of mothering. Feminist Review, 3, 82-93. Rowland, Robyn. (1987). Technology and motherhood:
Reproductive choice reconsidered. Signs, 12, 512528. Ruddick, Sara. (1984). Maternal thinking. In Joyce Treblicot (Ed.), Mothering: Essays in feminist theory (pp. 213-231). Totawa, N J: Rowman and Allanheld. Rumbold, Jill. (1991, March 13). Goodbye to all that. The Guardian, p. 38. Sandelowski, Margarete. (1987). The colour grey: Ambiguity and infertility. Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 19, 70-74. Sandelowski, Margarete. (1990). Fault lines: Infertility and imperilled sisterhood. Feminist Studies, 16, 3351. Segal, Lynne. (1987). Is the future female: Troubled thoughts on contemporary feminism. London: Virago. Shawyer, Joss. (1979). Death by adoption. Auckland: Cicada Press. Sichtermann, Barbara. (1986). Femininity: The politics of the personal. Oxford: Polity Press (English translation). Spelman, Elisabeth V. (1990). Inessential woman: Problems of exclusion in feminist thought. London: The Women's Press. Spender, Dale. (1980). Man-made language. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Stanley, Liz. (1990). Feminist praxis. London: Routledge. Stanley, Liz, & Wise, Sue. (1990). Method, methodology and epistemology in feminist research processes. In Liz Stanley (Ed.), Feministpraxis (pp. 20-60). London: Routledge. Wearing, B. (1984). The ideology of motherhood. London: George Allen and Unwin.
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MOTHER
OR NOT, MOTHER
OR WHAT?
Problems of Definition and Identity GAYLE LETHERBY Coventry University School of Health and Social Sciences, Priory Street, Coventry CVI 5FB, U K
S y n o p s i s - This article draws on feminist theory a n d research and personal experience and considers problems o f definition and identity with specific reference to the experience o f n o n m o t h e r h o o d . In it the author argues that attention to m o t h e r h o o d / n o n m o t h e r h o o d is necessary in any discussion of differences a n d diversity between women.
In Western society, all women live their lives against a background of personal and cultural assumptions that all women are or want to be mothers and that for women motherhood is p r o o f o f adulthood and a natural consequence o f marriage or a permanent relationship with a man. A great deal of social and psychological research has focussed on women and the role of children in their lives and is thus complicit in reproducing societal assumptions about women deriving their identity from relationships in domestic situations and particularly from motherhood within the family. Consequently, 'and how many children have you got?' is a 'natural' question. Social attitudes and institutions support the assumption that women's ultimate role is motherhood and women who do not mother children are still expected to mother others; either vocationally as a teacher or a nurse or within the family as a sister, aunt, daughter, or wife/partner. This article considers problems o f definition and identity in relation to nonmotherhood. In short, I argue that in order to fully respect differences between women, atten-
tion to differences due to m o t h e r h o o d / n o n motherhood is necessary. I draw on feminist theory and research and personal experience. As such, my personal history is relevant. I am a 35-year-old White heterosexual woman. I have no children. After 'trying' for 15 months, I became pregnant early in 1985. At 16 weeks I miscarried. I have not (to my knowledge) been pregnant since. I have never been for tests or treatment. M O T H E R OR W H A T ? Women who are not mothers are defined in relation to their 'lack' of a biological or social caring relationship with children by terms such as 'barren,' 'childless,' 'childfree.' Each o f these words has its own connotation. 'Barren,' the inability to bear young, has implied failure since biblical times, and although the definition o f this word has been generalised to include land which produces little or no vegetation and animals which do not become pregnant in the usual season, the original definition referred exclusively to women (The Oxford English Dictionary, 1973). 'Childless,' implies a person with something missing from their lives whether preceded by the word 'voluntary' or 'involuntary,' although the inclusion o f these may inspire a different set of emotions in others. The former are likely to be viewed as selfish whilst the latter often incur pity. 'Childfree' (in reality the same in consequence as being voluntarily
A n earlier version o f this article was presented at W o m e n ' s Studies UK Conference (July, 1991). The author would like to t h a n k the w o m e n who attended for their comments. In particular, the a u t h o r thanks m e m bers of Staffordshire University, School of Social Sciences' W o m e n ' s Research Group and the two anonym o u s reviewers for their help with earlier drafts. 525
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childless), implies a definite and positive choice: a decision not to have children; this is also considered to be a selfish option. This word also has associations with the word 'carefree,' which, in turn, implies a childlike state. Thus, women who have no children are considered to have no responsibilities and thus to be like children themselves. Relevant here is Pfeffer's (1987, p. 97) comment made in reference to the academic study (feminist and otherwise) of the experience of infertility; that the real question remains u n e x p l o r e d - ' t h a t is why personhood is equated universally with the capacity to reproduce.' Thus, it is clear that social attitudes encourage women to measure their own selfworth in terms of their capacity/desire to mother. This is ironic because motherhood itself has little status in society. As Segal (1987, p. 5) notes: it is women's mothering and nurturing activities, and the social beliefs which support them, which are crucial to the maintenance of women's general subordination and economic dependence. While the virtues of maternal loving and caring are obvious, they have never been materially valued but instead applauded only with the hypocrisy of cheap sentiment. And as Mills (1991, p. 171) adds: For every definition of mother or a mother combination term which contains connotations of love, respect and reverence there seems to be another connoting fear, hatred or disrespect. (original emphasis) Manion (1988) argues that part o f the present low status of motherhood in western society is due to the efforts of feminists themselves who did not want women to have recognition only for their biological capabilities. She adds that unfortunately no real acknowledgement of women as equal persons in society has resulted. But it is equally arguable that 'feminist blaming' is a patriarchal strategy designed to discredit feminists. Women do often feel less than adult and report a deterioration of their sense o f self-worth and personality and a loss of financial independence as part of their experience of motherhood
(Rapoport, Rapoport, & Sterlitz, 1977). However, Baker (1989, p. 90) argues that this is not universal, and the social identity of women in the transition to motherhood is established in comparison with other women and not with men. She adds that the social identity of first time mothers is "not dependent on status comparisons with women in other roles, but on the extent to which motherhood is a chosen activity and the strength o f links with other mothers at this time." Women are only considered 'fit' to mother if they meet the appropriate c r i t e r i a - for instance, as Shawyer (1979, p. 25) notes: The same people who attack childless couples as being "selfish" for not having children are, curiously, often the same people who attack single mothers for being "selfish" by refusing to give theirs away. In 1976, Maclntyre pointed out that although women are considered to be maternal by instinct, this 'instinct' is assumed to only operate in married women. More recently the 'Virgin Birth' issue in Britain is another example of how motherhood is considered to be 'unnatural' for some women. Analysis of the popular and quality newspapers clearly shows that many people only consider women's desire for children to be 'natural' if accompanied by the desire for heterosexual sex (Rumbold, 1991). M O T H E R OR NOT In my experience, as a childless woman in my early 30s currently undertaking research in the area of involuntary childlessness and infertility, many people feel qualified and justified to give advice (without being asked) to others about having childrenJ When to have them, how many to have, why to have them. Perhaps this is because motherhood is a public as well as private experience, affecting as it does the woman, her partner, parents, relatives, and friends practically and (in some cases) in terms of their personal status with others. Consequently, comments along the lines - "you'll regret it if you don't," "don't leave it too late," "just relax and everything will be alright," "it will be the making of your marriage," etc., etc., are common. These imply that women who decide not to
Mother or Not, Mother or What?
have or who are unable to have c h i l d r e n - for various biological, social, material reasons do not reflect on the reasons for and consequences of their voluntary or involuntary childlessness. The decision not to have, or the realisation that having may not be possible, may also cause some pain, and in this case advice will be not only unnecessary and unwanted but cruel. As a woman who is not mothering any children, this is important to my personal experience. At various times over the last 8 or so years I have been given all o f these pieces of advice and as a result have often been incredulous, distressed, a n g r y - s o m e t i m e s all at once. At present I rarely feel uncomfortable with other women, but on several occasions recently, I have been in situations (with women) where I felt that the 'adult woman = mother' equation was taken for granted. At these times I find it difficult to speak up and say that I feel that my (and others) experience is being neglected. This is partly because I fear that women with children will feel that I am belittling their experience (which I am not) and partly because as an involuntary childless women I am frightened that I will be thought 'jealous,' 'bitter,' 'unfulfilled' (which I am not). Feminists have argued that many women feel discrepancies between how they experience the world and the 'official' definition o f their identity regarding sexuality and motherhood, which results in guilt, fear, and anxiety (e.g., Phoenix, Woollett, & Lloyd, 1991; Rich, 1980; Rowbotham, 1973, 1989). This argument is obviously based on a version o f realism as it assumes an objective reality that male theorists have failed to see. Over the last 3 decades a feminist approach has been developed which is concerned with the theoretical importance o f experience, the rejection o f the subject/object split, and the recognition o f the importance of subjectivity and emotion (Stanley, 1990). In the early days of the Women's Liberation Movement, the emphasis was on challenging the myth that motherhood was women's inevitable d e s t i n y - t h a t is, 'the right to choose' was defined in terms o f the right not to have children, and the Women's Movement provided a space for women to voice the negative aspects o f mothering (Rowbotham, 1989). Shulamith Firestone (1971, p.
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223) argued, as a radical feminist, that women's childbearing and childrearing role was the cause of their oppression. She went so far as to argue that women should be freed from the 'tyranny o f their reproductive biology' by any means available. As Rowbotham (1989) argues, many feminists felt that this was alienating to women who want children, and one reaction to this was the development o f a strand (sometimes known as the 'feminist standpoint epistemology' or 'women's experience epistemology'), which argues that society needs to reconstruct reality from the standpoint of women, leading to a total transformation o f society. Therefore, there is an objective reality, and that is the reality experienced by women. Supporters o f this approach, for example, Griffin (1983) and Ruddick (1984) stress that the experience that all women share is their capacity to m o t h e r which makes them closer to nature and more peace loving and caring than men. Taken to their extremes, both these arguments are biologically deterministic. Rowland (1987) argues that Firestone cites women's reproductive role as the cause o f female oppression and not the associated social and economic constraints. Focussing on motherhood as the one thing that women share returns us to the patriarchal definitions of masculinity and femininity that feminists have sought to challenge. Also, Firestone's argument implies that it is self-indulgent of women to dwell on their desire for children. Griffin's and Ruddick's argument may be offensive (to women who choose not to or who cannot have children), as it implies that there is 'only one experience' which, as Flax (1987) argues, can only be built upon the suppression o f voices of persons with experiences unlike those who are in a position to 'define.' This is surely antifeminist in approach, as feminism has always been concerned with 'difference' and diversity. The original emphasis o f modern feminism was on the difference between women and men, whilst more recently, diversity between women has also been recognised as politically important. As MacKinnon (cited by Geiger 1986, p. 335) argues, if feminism is understood as "the theory o f women's point o f view," and if feminist method is understood to be "the collective critical reconstruction of the meaning of women's social experi-
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ence as women live through it," then "this theory must account for the diversity of that experience." And, further, as Geiger (1986) adds: women's conscious perceptions of the experience must constitute our most critical and complex data. Thus, as bell hooks (1986) suggests, feminism is possible not because women share the same experiences, but because it is possible to federate around common resistance to all forms of oppression. Therefore, the aim is not to establish a 'feminist standpoint' as a generator of true stories about social life, but rather feminist oppositions and criticisms o f fake s t o r i e s - t o lead to an understanding of women's lives that both illuminates their lives and is respectful. There is, however, a problem with this approach. How do we know what stories are false if we don't have a feminist standpoint from which to view them? Thus, perhaps it is better to speak, as Stanley and Wise (1990) do, of 'feminist standpoints' or a wider notion of a 'feminist standpoint' that incorporates a number of feminisms. Differences do exist between women so the category 'women' needs careful defining in order to focus on ontological separations as well as similarities. Thus: 'woman' is a socially and politically constructed category, the ontological basis of which lies in a set of experiences rooted in the material world. yet: the experience of 'women' is ontologically fractured and complex because we do not all share one single and unseamed material reality. (Stanley & Wise, 1990, pp. 21-22) In other words, there is a common material reality that all women share that is characterised by inequality, exploitation, and oppression, but women are not all oppressed in the same way. It is therefore important to recognise that whilst oppression is common, the forms it takes are conditioned by race, age, sexuality, and other differences between women. Di Stephano (1990, p. 78) deals with
the complexity of this when she argues that it is necessary to be aware that gender functions as "a difference that makes a difference even if it can no longer claim the legitimating mantle of the difference" (original emphasis). R E S P E C T I N G AMBIVALENCE My argument is that a mere acknowledgement of both voluntary and involuntary 'childlessness' clearly dictates the practical and theoretical necessity to be respectful of diversity of experience whilst recognising that the dominant view in our society is that women's primary function is motherhood. To be respectful o f the lives of women who do not mother children and the lives of those who do, it is necessary to explore the complex nature both of the desire for and experience of motherhood and nonmotherhood. Concerning motherhood, this has already been done. Thus, although there are many strong arguments that support the view that the desire for motherhood is socially constructed (e.g., Chodorow, 1978; Maclntyre, 1976; Wearing, 1984). Sichtermann (1986, p. 23) suggests that "there is some source of influence which is relatively independent o f external conditions." This appears to be dangerously close to arguing for a 'maternal instinct,' but as Rowbotham (1989) reports, a group of French feminists tried to disentangle the culturally conditioned desires and the 'real' desires to discover what women's 'real' attitudes to motherhood were, but they couldn't actually do it. Thus, many writers argue (e.g., Hey, 1989; Sichtermann, 1986) that the desire for motherhood is multidimensional. Included in this is a desire for the biological a n d / o r the social experience of motherhood. This is important to note both in reference to women who mother children within a biologically childless relationship yet still mourn their infertility, and women who feel biologically fulfilled through their pregnancy/childbirth experience yet feel alienated by the social experience of mothering. As previously noted, feminism has also provided a space for women to acknowledge the negative and positive aspects o f being a mother. As Simone de Beauvoir (1960, pp. 232-233) puts it:
Mother or Not, Mother or What?
That the child is the supreme aim o f women is a statement having precisely the value o f an advertising slogan. But the fact remains that unless the circumstances are positively unfavourable the mother will find her life enriched by the child. And in A Feminist Dictionary (Kramarae & Treichler, 1985, p. 90) the entry for child includes: A being and an event "which changes the lives o f most women, opening up previously unimaginable new selves, new areas o f responsibility, delight, exhaustion, anxiety, ambivalence, and physiological change." (Robyn Morgan, 1982, p. 223) Feminists have made the distinction between the institution and the experience of motherhood and further have recognised differences within experiences. The question of motherhood as status, desire, and experience has been addressed by feminism, and ambivalent attitudes and feelings towards motherhood are now taken for granted in academic feminist writing (Phoenix et al., 1991; Rich, 1977; Rowbotham, 1989). However, less attention has been given by feminists to the ambivalence o f the experiences o f 'childlessness' and 'childfreeness.' Why Children (1980), edited by Stephanie Dowrick and Sibyl Grundberg, records women's personal experiences of motherhood and nonmotherhood of children and explores some o f the reasons for these states; yet, as Attar (1987) notes, these accounts are not followed by active feminist debate o f the issues. Writers such as Pfeffer (1987) and Sandelowski (1987, 1990) have been concerned with the ambivalence that women who are 'infertile' feel regarding their status, including the fact that women who seek medical treatment are encouraged to ignore this ambivalence. As far as the medical profession is concerned, the only success is a baby. More discussion and debate are necessary. Referring to my own personal experience again, I find my involuntary 'childless' state ambivalent, both in practical terms (like most women who are 'infertile' I have never been told that it is impossible for me to have a
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child) and in emotional terms. Eight years ago my central aim was to be a mother and I felt that I was only half a woman without a child. Any doubts that I had concerning motherhood I denied. Now I feel very different. Although I still desire motherhood and feel that there is a gap in my life this does not dominate my every thought and action, and I no longer feel a lesser women (or less than adult) for not mothering children. I am also able to accept the equivocal nature o f my des i r e s - t h a t is, a part o f me enjoys the freedom that I have because o f my 'childless' state, and if I do become a mother I know that I will feel opposing emotions in relation to that experience also. A miscarriage, returning to higher education and the relationships that I have developed with the children o f close friends, among other things, have all affected by personal development, and I have no wish to generalise my experience to other women who do not mother children. However, I believe that it is essential that feminism address the experiences of all women with reference to motherhood and nonmotherhood because, as Oakley, McPherson, and Roberts (1984, p. 191) argue, the question of whether or not to have children cannot be dismissed by women with ease because "the potential for motherhood is always inside u s - n o t only women's bodies but their psychologies too." Recognition of this lends support to Gordon (1990, pp. 47-48): Feminism, then, is about the politics of transformation, about seeking the implications of the personal being political. In terms of mothering this means questioning the politics o f reproduction, motherhood as an institution, analysing the complex desires involved in mothering, considering the right o f women not to be mothers and how those who make a positive choice to have children can combine their parenting with other activities, including paid work. (original emphasis) Yes, but this is not enough because as Leroy (1988, p. 92) argues, "You cannot choose when to have c h i l d r e n - y o u can only choose when not to have them." Thus, the experience of involuntary 'childless' women also needs to be central to any discussion. A greater understanding of the lives o f all women who do
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not mother children will lead to a wider understanding of female experience including definitions of women's self-identities. SISTERHOOD AND REDEFINITION
Sandelowski (1990, p. 34) argues that we "live in a cultural milieu that promotes motherhood and subverts sisterhood." Although politically committed to ' s i s t e r h o o d ' - a relationship between women that requires no male i n v o l v e m e n t - feminism has spent much time focussing on 'motherhood,' a relationship that does (even if only though male donation of sperm). Clearly, feminist ethics demands that feminists should consider the reproductive choices and rights of women who do not mother children and the potential consequences of the New Reproductive Technologies. An equally important part o f the analysis should be to consider the whole life experience of such women. (Which is itself affected by the current social and political climate and the place of the New Reproductive Technologies within this.) Focussing solely on reproduction can compound the public view of the 'barren woman' as a failure, negating the rest of her life experience and the experience of those who become social (as opposed to biological) mothers. The life experience of women who do not mother child r e n - either voluntarily or because they have no other c h o i c e - n e e d s to become central to feminist analysis. To do this, feminism needs to address issues of exclusion with the same vigour as issues of oppression. With reference to motherhood (as with other aspects of women's experience) feminists have considered issues of oppression in both a practical and theoretical sense and have been respectful of the fact that women are often able to resist oppression and are only rarely totally powerless; and also of the fact that some women do not experience their lives as oppressive. Reference to the lives of women who do not mother children indicates that exclusion needs to receive more attention. By virtue of their choices of study and activity, feminists themselves have cause some women distress. As Sandelowski (1990, p. 43) argues, the 'infertile' women's desire for what most fertile women have and want is sometimes questioned and interpreted as selfish. Women who do not mother children
are likely to be just as affected by socially (and biologically) constructed 'desires' as women who do mother children. It is likely that they will also feel a sense of exclusion in a society where there are considerable pressures to have children. Thus, it is not enough to say to involuntarily 'childless' women that there are other ways in which women can live fulfilling lives. Nor is the advice of others, such as Hubbard (cited by Sandelowski, 1990, p. 45), who in reference to the New Reproductive Technologies argues that "strong, deep, feminist consciousness raising" is the most "therapeutic" alternative to the "technological fix." In my view this negates the complexity of the experiences of both motherhood and nonmotherhood. Greater attention to and respect for the life experiences women who do not mother children would not only be more appreciative of the negative aspects of the status but also of the positive aspects. This is surely a necessary step in illuminating women's complex identity. Lorde (cited by Spelman, 1990, p. l) notes that: There is a pretence to a homogeneity of experience covered by the word sisterhood that does not in fact exist. (original emphasis) Recognition of the 'differences' of experience dependent on whether women mother children or not is surely part of the process advocated by Spelman (1990) of establishing a concept of 'sisterhood' which celebrates our differences. Central to the feminist analysis of women's experiences of nonmotherhood of children should be consideration of new ways to define this experience. As Spender (1980) and Segal (1987) note, it is necessary to realise that language reflects the centrality of power and authority in society. Thus, language tends to exclude, trivialise, and demean women. The word 'childless' has obvious use in a patriarchal society, and its negative connotations are stressed by religious doctrine, the mass media, etc. Interestingly, 'childfree,' which suggests a positive (if tainted) choice is not recognised by the 'Spellcheck' facility of the Word Processor on which I type this! Perhaps more surprisingly A Feminist Dic-
Mother or Not, Mother or What?
tionary (Krarnarae & Treichler, 1985) has no entry for 'childfree' or 'childless.' Surely this is a serious omission. Feminism should reject the negative connotations o f these terms and work to find new descriptions which are both respectful to women's experiences o f nonmotherhood (which still defines a woman's life in relation to children but at least is more o f a neutral term and less judgemental) and recognise the complex nature o f these experie n c e s - both the positive and the negative aspects. Care needs to be taken to take note o f what women themselves believe to be appropriate. As Manion (1988, p. 192) notes "pointing out to the infertile that they are victims o f false consciousness and should consider themselves 'childfree' instead o f 'childless' may not be appreciated," and it is important to take care not to repeat this instance o f the 'powerful' naming the experience. Any new word/term/explanation o f course needs to include reference to and be respectful o f the differences o f experience mediated by different religious, cultural, and sexual loyalties as well as differences of age, ethnicity, class, and disability. Mills (1991) notes that feminism has reclaimed some words sometimes used in a derogatory way in respect to women and make them 'our own.' This is particularly evident in the names o f feminist publications such as 'Spare Rib,' 'Shrew,' 'Red Rag,' 'Trouble and Strife.' Whilst enjoying this irony, I personally believe that there are situations in which it is not appropriate. For me, at least, nonmotherhood is one o f these situations. Irony can certainly be positive, but feelings of safety and security and inclusion need to come first. Thus, whilst recently reading Mill's (1991, p. 86) book and discovering the origin of the word feminism I felt considerable disquiet:
The w o r d f e m i n i s m dates from the 1850's. It originates in the L a t i n f e m i n a , meaning woman, or properly, 'the suckling one' or 'the sucked one'. (original emphasis) Mills continues: This will have strong resonances for childless females (whether by choice or not) who find that in patriarchal society they
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are treated as if they are not 'real' women because they are not mothers. Yes. Clearly, as Stanley and Wise (1990, p. 21) argue, it is important not to accept and use the category of 'feminism' "in monolithic terms, without fully exploring the a c a d e m i c implications o f the political, ethical and epistemological differences" that exist "'within feminism' as 'between w o m e n ' " (original emphasis). ENDNOTE 1. My current research is concerned with the social, emotional, and medical experiences of infertility and involuntary childlessness. It is predominantly concerned to explore women's experiences. I hope to write more about my empirical work in the future. REFERENCES Attar, Dena. (1987). The controversial feminist. In Gall Chester & Sigrid Nielsen (Eds.), In other words: Writing as a feminist (pp. 30-35). London: Hutchinson. Baker, Deborah. (1989). Social identity in the transition to motherhood. In Suzanne Skevington& Deborah Baker (Eds.), The social identity of women (pp. 84105). London: Sage. bell, hooks. (1986). Sisterhood: Political solidarity between women. Feminist Review, 23, 125-138. Chodorow, Nancy. (1978). The reproduction of mothering (Psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender).
London: Universityof California Press. de Beauvoir, Simone. (1960). The second sex. London: Four Square Books. Di Stephano, Christine. (1990). Dilemmasof difference: Feminism, modernityand postmodernism. In Linda J. Nichoison (Ed.), Feminism/Postmodernism (pp. 63-82). London: Routledge. Dowrick, Stephanie, & Grundberg, Sibyl. (1980). Why children. London: The Women'sPress. Firestone, Shulamith. (1971). The dialectic of sex. London: Jonathon Cape Ltd. Flax, Jane. (1987). Postmodernismand gender relations in feminist theory. Signs, 12, 621-643. Gordon, Tuula. (1990). Feminist mothers. London: Macmillan. Geiger, S. N. G. (1986). Women'slife histories: Method and content. Signs, 11,334-351. Griffin, Susan. (1983). Introduction. In Caldecott & Leland (Eds.), Reclaim the earth (pp. 1-12). London: Women's Press. Hey, Valerie. (1989). A feminist exploration. In Valerie Hey, Catherine Itzin, LesleySaunders, & Mary Anne Speakman (Eds.), Hidden loss: Miscarriage and ectopic pregnancy(pp. 51-74). London: The Women's Press. Kramarae, Cheris, & Treichler, Paula A. (1985).A feminist dictionary. London: Pandora. Leroy, Margaret. (1988). Miscarriage. London: Mac-
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donald and Company (Published in association with the Miscarriage Association). Maclntyre, Sally. (1976). Who wants babies? The social construction of instincts. In Diana Leonard-Barker & Sheila Allen (Eds.), Sexual divisions and societyProcess and change (pp. 150-173). London: Tavistock. Manion, Eileen. (1988). A ms-managed womb. In Arthur Kroker & Marilouise Kroker (Eds.), Body invaders: Sexuality and the postmodern culture (pp. 183-200). London: Macmillan Education Ltd. Mills, Jane. (1991). Womanwords. London: Virago. Oakley, Ann, McPherson, Anne, & Roberts, Helen. (1984). Miscarriage. Glasgow: Fontana. Oxford English Dictionary. (1973). OUP. Pfeffer, Naomi. (1987). Artificial insemination, IVF and the stigma of infertility. In Michelle Stanworth (Ed.), Reproductive technologies: Gender, motherhood and medicine (pp. 81-97). Oxford: Polity Press. Phoenix, Ann, Woollett, Anne, & Lloyd, Eva (Eds.). (1991). Motherhood: Meanings, practices and ideologies. London: Sage. Rapoport, Rhona, Rapoport, Robert N, & Sterlitz, Ziona. (1977). Fathers, mothers and others. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rich, Adrienne. (1977). Of woman born: Motherhood as institution and experience. Virago: London. Rich, Adrienne. (1980). Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence. Signs, 5, 631-660. Rowbotham, Sheila. (1973). Woman's consciousness, man's world. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Rowbotham, Sheila. (1989). To be or not to be: The dilemma of mothering. Feminist Review, 3, 82-93. Rowland, Robyn. (1987). Technology and motherhood:
Reproductive choice reconsidered. Signs, 12, 512528. Ruddick, Sara. (1984). Maternal thinking. In Joyce Treblicot (Ed.), Mothering: Essays in feminist theory (pp. 213-231). Totawa, N J: Rowman and Allanheld. Rumbold, Jill. (1991, March 13). Goodbye to all that. The Guardian, p. 38. Sandelowski, Margarete. (1987). The colour grey: Ambiguity and infertility. Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 19, 70-74. Sandelowski, Margarete. (1990). Fault lines: Infertility and imperilled sisterhood. Feminist Studies, 16, 3351. Segal, Lynne. (1987). Is the future female: Troubled thoughts on contemporary feminism. London: Virago. Shawyer, Joss. (1979). Death by adoption. Auckland: Cicada Press. Sichtermann, Barbara. (1986). Femininity: The politics of the personal. Oxford: Polity Press (English translation). Spelman, Elisabeth V. (1990). Inessential woman: Problems of exclusion in feminist thought. London: The Women's Press. Spender, Dale. (1980). Man-made language. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Stanley, Liz. (1990). Feminist praxis. London: Routledge. Stanley, Liz, & Wise, Sue. (1990). Method, methodology and epistemology in feminist research processes. In Liz Stanley (Ed.), Feministpraxis (pp. 20-60). London: Routledge. Wearing, B. (1984). The ideology of motherhood. London: George Allen and Unwin.