Motivational Bases Of Information Processing and Strategy in Conflict and Negotiation

MOTIVATIONAL BASES OF INFORMATION PROCESSING AND STRATEGY IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

Carsten K. W. De Dreu Peter J. Carnevale

I. Introduction and Overview ‘‘Had we begun negotiations then, I think at least half of the casualties and injuries on both sides could have been avoided . . . (after meeting recently) the Hanoi officials agreed that they also missed these opportunities.’’ (58,000 US soldiers perished, as did 3.8 million Vietnamese.)’’ —Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in a discussion of his book Argument Without End: Searching for Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy, The Brown Daily Herald, Tuesday, April 27, 1999

The death and destruction of unremitting social conflict, and the waste of it, pose a challenge for analysis. For social psychologists, the challenge entails an understanding of underlying processes—cognition, affect, motivation—and, in particular, how these processes play out in negotiation. Negotiation can provide a means of escaping social conflict. It entails a discussion between two or more parties about differences of interest, and its aim is agreement that reconciles incompatible preferences among a set of options. Negotiation has tremendous consequences for social outcomes at all levels of society, including marital satisfaction and child development (Amato & Booth, 2001), work team performance and organizational functioning (Jehn, 1995), community and environment development (Susskind, McKearnan, & Thomas-Larmer, 1999), and international relations (Berton, Kimura, & Zartman, 1999). Much of the social psychological analysis has, in the past two decades, focused on cognitive processes responsible for suboptimal negotiation 235 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 35

Copyright 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. 0065-2601/03 $35.00

236

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

outcomes (for reviews, see Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Thompson, 1990). This work has tended to explain much of what happens in conflict and negotiation in terms of cognitive deficiencies and erroneous reasoning. For example, Neale and Bazerman (1991, p. 170) state that ‘‘a great deal of sub-optimality in negotiated outcomes is attributable to deviations from rationality in negotiators’ cognitive processes.’’ The focus on cognitive processes should not be taken as indicating that motivation and affect are unimportant. In 1960, Thomas Schelling, the economist, introduced the concept of mixed-motive interaction to describe situations in which two or more parties simultaneously experience the motivation to cooperate and compete with each other, and argued that these situations present a particularly difficult cognitive problem. No doubt the decision makers in Hanoi and the United States, in 1968, faced a difficult cognitive problem, a situation that comprised a mixture of cooperative and competitive motivation. Others have argued that disputants want to be consistent and to reduce cognitive dissonance (Ross & Ward, 1995), to protect their face (Brown, 1977), to develop and maintain a positive self-image (Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 1993), to be treated with respect and to obtain a fair distribution of outcomes (Tyler, Huo, & Lind, 1999), and to take other’s perspective to better understand the other (Kemp & Smith, 1994; Pruitt, 1981). Recently the importance of motivation was recognized by Chaiken, Gruenfeld, and Judd (2000, p. 158) in their comment that ‘‘in negotiation . . . motives are likely to be intense.’’ We argue that many of these needs and desires may be subsumed under the header of one of two broad classes of motivation that affect conflict and negotiation, and that will be the focus of the current analysis. Motives that have to do with outcomes, and its distribution between conflict parties, fall under social motivation, or the desire to attain certain distributions of outcomes between oneself and the other party (Deutsch, 1949, 1973; Messick & McClintock, 1968; McClintock, 1977; Pruitt, 1967). Motives that have to do with understanding the task and one’s opponent, to obtain and maintain cognitive consistency, and to reduce dissonance can be subsumed under the broad header of epistemic motivation, or the need to develop a rich and accurate understanding of the world (see Kruglanski, 1989). Ross and Ward (1995) argued that dispute resolution is impeded by naive realism, or the tendency to assume the world is as it is perceived, and ego defensiveness, or the tendency to develop and uphold a positive self-image. We will review recent work to demonstrate that social motive moderates the influence of ego defensiveness and naive realism on information processing and strategic choice in negotiation. Further, we will demonstrate that

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

237

epistemic motives moderate the impact of naive realism and the information processing biases it engenders. This analysis results in a motivated information processing model of negotiation. It captures the influence of many variables—situational features such as power differences or time pressure, and individual differences in social value, cultural background, or need for cognitive closure—on cognitive processes and economic and psychological outcomes in conflict and negotiation. Moreover, it points to four archetypes of disputants in conflict and negotiation—prosocial or selfish misers and prosocial or selfish thinkers. Kelley and Thibaut (1978) argued that to understand behavior in interdependent situations, one needs to consider the structure of the situation within which interaction takes place. Indeed, research has revealed that minor changes in the structure of the task can have important consequences for the way people think and act, as well as for the outcomes from the negotiation (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002; Carnevale & Probst, 1998; De Dreu & McCusker, 1997; Polzer, Mannix, & Neale, 1998; Pruitt, 1967). Accordingly, we begin with a review of the settings and research paradigms to which our analysis applies, to illustrate that in some conflicts and in some negotiation settings some motives are more likely to emerge than in other settings. Subsequently we review past research on cognitive and motivational processes in conflict and negotiation, and we will introduce in more detail ego defensiveness and naive realism as barriers to dispute resolution. In the fourth and fifth sections we discuss the antecedents and consequences of social and epistemic motivation, respectively, and consider their influence on information processing biases and strategic choice. In the sixth section of this chapter we present the motivated information processing model in its entirety, we discuss the possibility that motives change during the negotiation, and we deal with some unresolved issues. We end with a section in which we consider other motives, and alternative models of information processing and strategic choice in conflict and negotiation.

II. Issues, Outcomes, and Tasks in the Study of Conflict and Negotiation The central element of negotiation and related situations is the reward structure, which is the set of alternatives that people must choose among, and the outcomes that are the possible results of these choices. The alternatives in negotiation are represented as the topics under discussion, and can usually be divided into one or more issues that require a decision by the parties.

238

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

A major strength of the social psychological approach to negotiation is the development of laboratory tasks that model issues and that allow tests of causal hypotheses about underlying process. The participants in these laboratory studies are usually undergraduate volunteers. Two or more true participants may deal with each other, or a single participant may (without knowing it) deal with a confederate or a computer program. Communication is sometimes face-to-face, sometimes by means of note passing, and sometimes over a computer network. The tasks are often simplified versions of reality, yet retain key elements of the structure or processes of negotiation. To appreciate the variety of tasks and methods, a bit of history is required. Much of today’s social psychology of negotiation reflects a behavioral science tradition that seeks to develop and test predictive theory about the impact of environmental conditions on negotiator behavior and the impact of these conditions and behaviors on outcomes (see Pruitt, 1981; Rubin & Brown, 1975). There are important early influences from outside social psychology: mathematical models of rational decision making in negotiation developed by economists and game theorists (e.g., Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Raiffa, 1982; Rapoport, 1960; Roth, 1994), and theories about the origins and impact of negotiator tactics developed in particular by industrial relations specialists (Walton & McKersie, 1965) and the economist Schelling (1960). In addition, there have always been books and manuals that provide advice to negotiators (e.g., de Callieres, 1716; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Thompson, 1998), which often serve as useful foils for testing hypotheses. The important role of economic ideas in the social psychology of negotiation is clearly seen in the classic work of Siegel and Fouraker (1960; the former a psychologist and the latter an economist; see Smith, 2001), which played a heavy role in important work by Kelley and Schenitzki (1972). These authors, and others, made an important distinction between negotiation tasks that have a single dimension of value, and multiple dimensions of value (see Kelley, 1966; Beckman, & Fischer, 1967; Froman & Cohen, 1970; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Consider the task used by Kelley et al. (1967), the ‘‘Game of Nines.’’ Here, two people divide 9 points (points that have a real-money equivalent), by holding up cards that show numbers from 1 to 8. If the sum of the two cards held up on any trial is 9 or less, then an agreement occurs, and the agreement is that each person gets the amount showing on their card (e.g., 3 for one person, 6 for the other). If there is no agreement, each gets 0 (or some prespecified minimum). Clearly there is a competitive incentive (I would rather have 6 than 3; or 5 than 4; or 8 than 1) but there is a cooperative incentive as well: we both should prefer any agreement than

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

239

no agreement. Thus the task is mixed-motive in the sense identified by Schelling (1960). A single-issue negotiation task (e.g., the price of a car in a buyer–seller negotiation) has a single dimension of value. Table I shows a single-issue negotiation task that simulates a union–management negotiation. The participants play a role, here a management and a union negotiator dealing with a wage issue. The management negotiator is given the issue chart shown at the top of Table I, and the union negotiator is given the issue chart shown at the bottom. Each chart lists five possible settlement points on the issue, represented by the labels in the column. Next to each label is the value of settlement at that point (numbers typically indexed to money). Each side sees only their own issue chart, but typically they are told they can say anything they want during the negotiation about the charts. As can be seen, the value of each of the five possible settlement points indicates that the parties are dividing a fixed sum of value (in this case, 240), and the task is therefore ‘‘fixed-sum.’’ Note that the existence of a no-agreement alternative with, for example, a value of 0 to both parties, alters the structure of the game, making it ‘‘variable sum’’ (since the outcome values are either 240, or 0; see below). Note also that the role labels on the task have largely been considered unimportant by researchers, and interchangeable (e.g., replace task labels ‘‘union/management’’ and ‘‘wages’’ with ‘‘buyer/seller’’ and ‘‘price,’’ or with

TABLE I The Singe Issue Negotiation: Issue Charts for Management and Union Negotiatorsa Annual raise (%)

(Value)

Management Issue Chart 15 12 9 6 3

(00) (60) (120) (180) (240)

Union Issue Chart 15 12 9 6 3

(240) (180) (120) (60) (00)

a All agreements sum to a constant for the dyad, 240, making the task ‘‘fixed-sum.’’

240

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

‘‘country A/country B’’ and ‘‘territory’’). There is, however, reason to suspect that such labels may have important cuing effects (Rettinger & Hastie, 2001) that can be quite subtle (Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000). Consider a second type of task developed by Siegel and Fouraker (1960), Kelley (1966), and Pruitt and Lewis (1975). Here, there are multiple issues, each having several possible settlement points, and each side having a different preference ordering on which issue is most important. This kind of task allows the development of ‘‘integrative’’ or win–win agreements. The values of the possible outcomes are variable, which means some agreements represent better outcomes for both parties than other agreements. An example is given in Table II. The participants again play roles of management and union negotiators faced with the task of reaching agreement, here on four issues. The management negotiator is given the issue chart shown at the top of Table II, and the union negotiator is given the issue chart shown on the bottom. These charts list five possible settlement points on each issue, as in the task shown in Table I. Again, each side sees only their own chart, and typically they get the instruction that they can say anything to one another about it. As can be seen in the Table II charts, the issue represented on the left is important to one side (has greater value) and not important to the other side (has low value), and the opposite for the issue to the far right. This means that there are many possible agreements, and they vary in their value to the negotiators, both individually and collectively. (This example stems from TABLE II Issue Charts for Management and Union Negotiators a Salary

Vacation days

Annual raise

Medical coverage

Management Issue Chart F70.000 (00) 3 week (00) F65.000 (15) 2.5 week (30) F60.000 (30) 2 weeks (60) F55.000 (45) 1.5 week (90) F50.000 (60) 1 week (120)

15% (00) 12% (60) 9% (120) 6% (180) 3% (240)

100% (00) 80% (100) 60% (200) 40% (300) 20% (400)

Union Issue Chart F70.000 (400) F65.000 (300) F60.000 (200) F55.000 (100) F50.000 (00)

15% (240) 12% (180) 9% (120) 6% (60) 3% (00)

100% (60) 80% (45) 60% (30) 40% (15) 20% (00)

3 week (120) 2.5 week (90) 2 week (60) 1.5 week (30) 1 week (00)

a Agreement values for the dyad vary from 820 to 1160 making the task ‘‘variable-sum.’’ Source: De Dreu, Giebels, and Van de Vliert (1998).

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

241

Pruitt, 1981, and has been widely adopted, e.g., Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985; Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; Thompson & Hastie, 1990.) The two issues in the center of the task have equal value for both parties and, in the parlance of negotiation research, are ‘‘distributive’’ issues; the other two issues that can be traded for one another are called ‘‘integrative.’’ The laboratory paradigm for modeling this form of negotiation is called ‘‘integrative bargaining,’’ reflecting Walton and Mckersie’s (1965) observation that ‘‘Distributive bargaining is the process by which each party attempts to maximize his own share in the context of fixed-sum payoffs. Integrative bargaining is the process by which the parties attempt to increase the size of joint gain without respect to the division of the payoffs’’ (p. 8). Joint gain is reflected in the task in that a settlement of F70 on ‘‘salary’’ and 20% on ‘‘medical’’ provide an outcome that has greater value—to each individual and to the pair together—than an agreement that split these two issues down the middle (joint gain of 800 versus 460 on these two issues). A plethora of laboratory tasks have been devised by psychologists, economists, political scientists, and others for the study of strategic interaction, negotiation, and social conflict (see, for example, Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Rubinstein, 1999). Table III presents a simple taxonomy of such tasks. One aspect of the taxonomy is whether the task models a single dimension of value, or multiple dimensions. The former include one-issue negotiation tasks (as shown in Table I), whereas the latter includes integrative bargaining tasks and its variations (as shown in Table II, including contingent agreement games and the integrative ultimatum game). The other feature of the taxonomy of laboratory tasks is whether the task is a game of agreement or a game of coordination. A game of agreement allows the behavioral act of agreeing, coming to an accord, consensus, TABLE III Taxonomy of Laboratory Tasks for the Study of Mixed-Motive Interaction Coordination games

Agreement games

Single dimension of value

Prisoner’s dilemma Chicken N-Person dilemma Locomotion games Coalition games Trust game Etc.

1-Issue negotiation Ultimatum bargaining

Multiple dimensions of value

Not done

Integrative bargaining Integrative ultimatum

242

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

shared understanding, or to terms that reflect a shared commitment, harmony of opinion, or course of action on the matters at hand. Consider the ultimatum game, where a ‘‘proposer’’ makes an offer of an exchange and the ‘‘responder’’ either accepts or rejects it, then game over (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Agreement games allow nonagreement, which is often determined by one or more participant saying no, withdrawing, or by a deadline reached that terminates negotiation; no agreement implies that the status quo is maintained. Agreements often represent a change in the status quo, for example, terms of an exchange (a new joint venture; change in ownership) or a new common understanding, or new shared perception, belief, attitude, or feeling (Harinck, De Dreu, & Van Vianen, 2000; Rapoport, 1960; Druckman & Zechmeister, 1973; Levine & Thompson, 1996). Games of coordination model one, or a series of many, individual decisions about a distribution of outcomes. These include, as examples, the prisoner’s dilemma-type game (Rubin & Brown, 1975), locomotion and coalition games (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977), and trust games (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). Coordination games typically generate simple response variables. The notion of disagreement is usually not clearly represented, and coordination games typically do not model more than one dimension of value. Nevertheless, studies of coordination games are highly important for understanding strategic interaction; indeed, there is often a structural similarity among games and often one can be transformed into another, for example, negotiation can be seen as a prisoner’s dilemma as well as a game of chicken (Carnevale & Pruitt, 2003; see Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). An important dependent variable in many negotiation studies is the quality of the agreement. Researchers have examined agreements in terms of how much profit a focal party made (individual outcomes), in terms of how much profit both parties made together (joint outcomes), and sometimes in terms of how outcome was distributed between the parties (outcome difference). In essence, these approaches correspond to three basic motivational goals in negotiation, namely to do well personally (egoistic motivation), to do well collectively (prosocial motivation), and to achieve distributive fairness. In addition, researchers have examined agreements in terms of its deviation from some normative standard, such as Pareto Optimality—the point at which no party can do better without the other party doing worse. Interesting discussions about how to code and evaluate negotiation agreements have been published by Tripp and Sondak (1992) and Clyman (1995). Although in theory large discrepancies are possible, empirically joint outcomes appear strongly correlated with more sophisticated and mathematically more complex outcomes measures such as deviations from Pareto Optimality (De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996).

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

243

III. Cognition and Motivation in Conflict and Negotiation Conflict research and theory have been concerned with cognition and information processing long before the cognitive revolution swept its way through social psychology. The early work by Siegel and Fouraker (1960), for example, was strongly concerned with the ways negotiators exchange information, and with its consequences for perception and financial gain. In the 1960s and 1970s, many authors considered how misperceptions contribute to the escalation of conflict (e.g., Hammond, 1965; Jervis, 1976; see also Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2000). Many researchers, including Cross (1977), characterize negotiators as adaptive decision makers who base their strategic choices on expectations about and perceptions of their opponent and who adapt these perceptions when they appear erroneous. The cognitive processes perspective on conflict and negotiation gained momentum with the work by Bazerman and Neale (1983; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Their research built on the seminal work by Simon (1957) on rationality and problem solving, and subsequent studies on biases and heuristics in judgment and decision making by Kahneman and Tversky (1973, 1979). In essence, this work considers negotiation behavior and failure to reach integrative agreements to be a function of the individual’s tendency to rely on cognitive heuristics, and to engage in erroneous reasoning. The heuristics and biases that have been shown to affect integrative negotiation may be due primarily to (1) cognitive limitations that cause erroneous reasoning, (2) ego defensiveness, or the desire to develop and maintain a positive self-image, and (3) naive realism, or the tendency to assume the world as it is perceived (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Ross, 1977; Ross & Ward, 1995).1 In this section we discuss several heuristics and biases that prohibit or undermine constructive negotiation processes, and reduce the likelihood that negotiators reach an integrative agreement. We begin with a discussion of bias due to cognitive limitations, such as anchoring-and-adjustment, and the use of stereotypes. We then move on to bias due to naive realism, and discuss fixed-pie bias and confirmatory information search. Finally, we consider ego defensiveness, and discuss self-serving evaluations of conflict behavior, and reactive devaluation. We will conclude this section with a critical look at the generality of these cognitive and motivational biases, and 1

Cognition and motivation are intimately connected and difficult to separate (Higgins & Kruglanski, 2001; Tetlock & Levi, 1983). Indeed, the biases identified in the (conflict) literature have a cognitive and a motivational component. This notwithstanding, most bias in conflict and negotiation can be distinguished in terms of the relative importance of cognitive limitations, ego defensiveness, or naive realism.

244

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

we will argue that naive realisms and ego defensiveness may, in fact, constitute but one side of the coin in conflict and negotiation.

A. BIAS DUE TO COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS Some bias in human thinking originates in the limitations of otherwise reasonable information-processing strategies. People possess a large amount of suboptimal strategies that they bring to the task of predicting and explaining events (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983). Kahneman and Tversky (1973) identified three types of heuristics that people use to make sense of their complex environment and that lead to suboptimal, even downright incorrect conclusions. These are anchoring-and-(insufficient) adjustment— the tendency to overly rely on an arbitrarily chosen reference point, the availability heuristic—the tendency to overly rely on information that is salient in memory, and the representativeness heuristic—the tendency to make judgments solely based on the most obvious features of the stimulus. Anchoring-and-adjustment and the representativeness heuristic have been shown to be a barrier to constructive negotiation and dispute resolution. 1. Anchoring-and-Adjustment and Gain–Loss Framing Negotiation is all about relative values, and comparison standards have an important influence when it comes to setting one’s aspiration or determining one’s reservation price or limit—the point below which one refuses to concede (Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982). Unfortunately, humans have a tendency to base estimates on irrelevant anchor information, and adjust their estimates inappropriately (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). For example, Northcraft and Neale (1987) showed that real estate agents insufficiently adjust for irrelevant anchor information when providing estimates of real estate value. In their study, real estate agents visited a piece of property currently for sale and then provided an estimate of the value of the property. Each participant was provided with an information package that contained information about the property’s square footage, characteristics of the property, similar property recently sold, similar property currently for sale, and the listing price. Although the actual listing price and appraised value was US$74,900, some real estate agents were provided with a listing price of US$83,900 (12% above the appraised value) and others were given a listing price of US$65,900 (12% below the appraised value). Although real estate agents claimed that they would notice and mark any deviation over 5% as unrealistic, they were substantially influenced by the anchor information provided—those in the low anchor condition appraised the property at

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

245

US$67,811 and those in the high anchor condition provided an appraisal value of US$75,190. Related to anchoring is that people use reference points and code prospective outcomes above the reference point as gains, and those below the reference point as losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In conflict and negotiation, relevant reference points may be an alternative to a negotiated agreement, one’s initial aspiration level, the settlement reached in adjacent markets, or the outcome reached in a previously conducted and highly similar negotiation. People are loss averse—losses loom larger than equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and framing outcomes as losses rather than gains has been shown to make people resistant to concession making (Bottom & Studt, 1993; De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & Van de Vliert, 1994; Kristensen, & Ga¨ rling, 1997; Shalev, 2002). Also, people become more risk-seeking when they frame outcomes as losses rather than gains, and this may translate into more contentious negotiation behavior and less integrative agreements (Bazerman et al., 1985; Bottom, 1998). 2. Stereotypes An instance of the representativeness heuristic that has received quite some attention in the negotiation literature is stereotyping. To predict other’s behavior efficiently, individuals may rely on stereotypes (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Conflict and negotiation research has revealed that individuals rely on stereotypic information when predicting their opponent’s tendency to compete, and the concomitant expectations predict one’s own behavior (Morris, Larrick, & Su, 1999; Ross & Ward, 1995). For example, De Dreu, Yzerbyt, and Leyens (1995) engaged psychology students in a prisoner’s dilemma game, and led them to believe that their opponent majored in business studies, or in theology. Pilot research had revealed that psychology students stereotyped business students as competitive and opportunistic, and theology students as cooperative and ethical. The results of two experiments showed that participants predicted more competition, and made more competitive choices when they believed the other was a business rather than theology student. In a third experiment, they found that participants construed ambiguous information about the other (he is member of a fraternity) as consistent with the stereotype (i.e., the Christian Ethics Club, in the case of a religion major). Such confirmatory construal even strengthened the tendency to compete or cooperate with a business or theology student, respectively. Consistent with this, Kray, Thompson, and Galinsky (2001) found that negotiators not only stereotype their opponent, but sometimes also engage in self-stereotyping, which might explain why gender sometimes does, and sometimes does not affect negotiation.

246

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

B. NAIVE REALISM Some bias originates in the individual’s needs and desires that direct attention, encoding, and retrieval processes. Ross and Ward (1995) trace some of these biases to naive realism—the individual’s tendency to assume that he or she sees the world as it is, and that other rational perceivers will therefore share these perceptions. When others fail to see the world as it is, this either reflects others had different information, are lazy, or biased by ideology or self-interest (Ross & Ward, 1995; see also Keltner & Robinson, 1993; Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995). Naive realism manifests itself in a variety of biases that have been shown to interfere with constructive conflict management and integrative negotiation. An example is optimistic overconfidence, which can lead disputants to forego attempts at settlement, ‘‘believing that time is on their side, and that complete, unilateral victory is just around the corner’’ (Ross & Ward, 1995, p. 266; see also Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Van Boven, Dunning, & Loewenstein, 2000). In the case of arbitration, such optimistic overconfidence may lead both parties to assume that the arbitrator will side with their case, and therefore prefer costly arbitration to constructive negotiation (Ross & Conlon, 2001). 1. Fixed-Pie Assumption A well-known reflection of naive realism that is related to the correspondence bias (Ross, 1977) is the fixed-pie assumption. When parties to a conflict lack information about their opponent’s preferences and priorities, which they often do, they may make a fixed-pie assumption. This means that individuals assume that their own and the other’s preferences are diametrically opposed. Indeed, negotiation research suggests that most people entering a negotiation make such a fixed-pie assumption (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). This shortcut is suboptimal because negotiation settings often contain integrative potential (Pruitt, 1981), and making a fixed-pie assumption leads negotiators to engage in distributive bargaining. They fail to exchange information, and they reach relatively few integrative agreements (e.g., Bottom & Paese, 1997; Harinck, De Dreu, & Van Vianen, 2000; Gelfand & Christakoupoulo, 1999; Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft, 1995; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Thompson, 1991; for a review, see Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). 2. Confirmatory Information Search Naive realism is also reflected in confirmatory information search, in which individuals rely on their own initial beliefs and cognitive structures when searching new and additional information about the task, or about their opponent. Information that is or becomes available during the conflict

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

247

is often the result of the questions disputants ask one another, and the type of questions they ask to gather information may have important consequences for the amount and kind of information that becomes available for subsequent processing. Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994) hypothesize that disputants seek confirmation rather than disconfirmation of their initial beliefs, plans, and strategies: ‘‘By framing questions in ways that could only confirm their hypotheses, both sides would be likely to discover only what they wanted to find’’ (p. 105). Confirmatory information search may easily lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy (Snyder, 1992; Klein & Snyder, this volume) and if the initial hypotheses were incorrect, confirmatory search exacerbates the problems associated with building a strategy on inadequate and incorrect assumptions, beliefs, and cognitive structures (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Consider, for example, the study by De Dreu, Yzerbyt et al. (1995) on the use of stereotypes described earlier. In the prisoner’s dilemma game used in this study individuals experience a strong incentive to reciprocate other’s noncooperative behavior (see Axelrod, 1984). If one party’s noncooperative choice were based on this party’s (erroneous) belief that the other is about to make a noncooperative choice, the party is bound to make a noncooperative choice to protect against other’s (assumed) noncooperativeness. This noncooperative decision is, most likely, reciprocated by other, thereby confirming party’s (potentially erroneous) belief (see also De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2002).

C. EGO DEFENSIVENESS Not all bias can be traced to naive realism. In fact, some powerful deviations from what would be normatively correct or objectively accurate can be traced to the fact that humans are motivated to develop, maintain, and protect a positive self-concept and that, as a result, evaluations of the self are positively biased (e.g., Greenwald, 1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988). It manifests itself in a variety of biases that have been shown to interfere with constructive conflict management and integrative negotiation. Examples that have received much attention in the conflict literature are egocentric assessments of oneself and what one deserves (De Dreu, Nauta, & Van de Vliert, 1995; Paese & Yonker, 2001; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) and reactive devaluation (Ross & Stillinger, 1991; Ross & Ward, 1995). 1. Self-serving Evaluation In social dilemmas, conflict, and negotiation, individuals evaluate themselves as fairer, more moral, and more honest than the average other

248

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

(Kramer et al., 1993; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Rothbart & Hallmark, 1988). Several studies have shown that this selfserving tendency hinders negotiation and the resolution of conflict. Thompson and Loewenstein (1992; see also Paese & Yonker, 2001) showed that negotiators tend to read information about their own and their opponent’s position as suggesting that they deserve more than their opponent. Such egocentric assessment of fairness was related to the duration of impasse. De Dreu, Nauta et al. (1995) examined self-serving evaluation and its consequences in a study involving managers and professional negotiators. Study 1 and 2 revealed that negotiators recalled more constructive and less destructive tactics when asked how they behaved in a recent negotiation, and less constructive and more destructive tactics when asked how their opponent behaved in a recent negotiation. Study 3 revealed that such selfserving recall was related to less integrative negotiation behavior, greater frustration and annoyance, and greater likelihood of future conflict. 2. Reactive Devaluation Reactive devaluation refers to the tendency to reduce the value of a concession or proposal received just because the concession was made or the proposal was offered (i.e., ‘‘they wouldn’t have offered those terms if those terms didn’t advance their interests’’). Ross and Stillinger (1991) describe a study in which American college students were asked to state their opinion about a disarmament proposal, allegedly from the United States, the Soviet Union, or some neutral third party. The terms of this proposal were seen as much more unfavorable (to the United States) when the proposal was attributed to the Soviet Union than when it was attributed to the third party or to the United States. In other words, the same terms in a proposed agreement are viewed entirely differently depending on who proposes it, and are downplayed when being proposed by the adversary.

D. AFTERTHOUGHTS ABOUT NAIVE REALISM AND EGO DEFENSIVENESS Naive realism and ego defensiveness may reflect only one side of the coin. The concepts are useful for explaining the harsh, aggressive, and competitive disputant. The concept of naive realism cannot, however, account for the fact that adversaries sometimes engage in deep and systematic processing of information about the task (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000), or other’s communication (Chaiken et al., 2001). Also, it cannot account for the fact

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

249

that negotiators take other’s perspective so as to better understand why the other acts the way he or she does (Kemp & Smith, 1994), and sometimes develop quite accurate perceptions of the structure of the negotiation (De Dreu, Koole, et al., 2000; Thompson, 1995). The concept of ego defensiveness cannot account for the fact that disputants may be inclined to view their opponent as trustworthy (Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn, 1996), see other’s concessions as genuine and deserving a response in kind (Pruitt & Drews, 1969), and seek a fair distribution of outcomes (Ohbutsu & Kameda, 1998; Tyler et al., 1999). In the next two sections, we introduce social motivation and epistemic motivation as two critical moderators of the biases and heuristics reviewed so far. We will review evidence that suggests that social motives moderate the impact of ego defensiveness and naive realism. Further, we review evidence that suggests that epistemic motives moderate the impact of cognitive limitations and naive realism on information processing and strategic choice in conflict and negotiation.

IV. Social Motivation In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes (1651) pondered why societies and collectivities were able to function at all, if humankind is basically selfinterested. About two centuries later, Adam Smith (1872) sought to solve the Hobbesian problem by his notion of the beneficent ‘‘invisible hand,’’ assuming that private and collective interests tend to correspond rather than conflict. Indeed, Adam Smith basically claimed that collectivities and societies are well-functioning because individuals pursue their self-interest (which in turn enhances collective interest). Decades of theorizing and research within psychology and related disciplines followed, questioning Smith’s idea on two grounds. First, as we have seen in Section II, many settings are structured such that serving one’s immediate, personal interests often harms collective welfare (e.g., Deutsch, 1973; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Nash, 1954; Rapoport, 1960; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). Second, scholars have been questioning whether humans are fundamentally self-interested, or whether they have instead prosocial motives oriented toward the well-being of others (i.e., what Adam Smith called the ‘‘fellow feeling’’) (see, e.g., Batson, 1998; Batson & Shaw, 1991; Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & Van der Kragt, 1989; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). This research on social motives falls into one of three classes. First, there is research, some of which we will review below, that considers the sources of egoistic and prosocial motivation in daily life (Batson, 1998) and in organizational

250

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

settings (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). Second, there is research dealing with the relationship between particular sources of prosocial motivation, such as empathy, and various instances of prosocial behavior such as donating money to UNICEF (for a review, see Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Third, and most relevant for current purposes, there is research examining the influence of egoistic and prosocial motives on cooperation in social dilemmas, conflict, and negotiation. At the outset, social motives were defined as the individual’s preference for a particular outcome-distribution between oneself and the opponent (cf. McClintock, 1977). A variety of social motives can be distinguished, including altruistic, competitive, individualistic, and cooperative (MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976). Many studies on social dilemmas, conflict, and negotiation have, however, relied on the more global distinction between selfish and prosocial motivation (e.g., Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Weingart, Bennet, & Brett, 1993). Selfish motivation comprises both competitive and purely individualistic goals, and prosocial motivation comprises both cooperative and purely altruistic goals. In the case of selfish motivation, individuals try to maximize their own outcomes, and they have no (or negative) regard for the outcomes obtained by their opposing negotiator. Individuals with a selfish motive tend to see the negotiation as a competitive game in which power and personal success are key. Negotiators with a prosocial motive try to establish a fair distribution that maximizes both their own and other’s outcomes; they see the negotiation as a collaborative game in which fairness, harmony, and joint welfare are key. In this section we first review personality characteristics and situations that give rise to selfish or prosocial motives. Subsequently, implications of social motives for strategic choice in negotiation are discussed in terms of three related theories—economic models of bargaining (e.g., Roth, 1994), the theory of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1949, 1973), and dual concern theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Finally, we review recent research on social motives and information processing to argue that social motivation reduces the detrimental influence of ego defensiveness and naive realism in conflict and negotiation.

A. ORIGINS OF SOCIAL MOTIVES Social motives may be rooted in individual differences (Deutsch, 1982; Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Relevant individual differences variables include social value orientations, differences

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

251

in collectivist or individualistic values, need for affiliation, and Machiavellianism. Social value orientation refers to stable preferences for outcome distributions between oneself and another, unknown person (e.g., McClintock, 1977; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). It is usually assessed through a decomposed game methodology (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). Using this methodology, about 50% of the participants in Western societies can be classified as prosocial (i.e., preferring equality and good outcomes for self and other), 40% as individualistic (i.e., preferring good outcomes for oneself while ignoring the other), and 5–10% is classified as competitive (i.e., preferring to gain higher outcomes than the other). Individualistic and competitive participants are often lumped together into one category labeled ‘‘pro-self’’ or ‘‘egoistic’’ (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995). Social value orientation is a central feature of culture. Following the seminal work by Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1989), a distinction has been made between collectivist and individualistic culture. The subscale of the IndCol, the predominant measure of cultural values at the level of the individual that assesses ‘‘vertical individualism’’ (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1998), is all about competition, where respondents indicate their agreement with statements such as ‘‘winning is everything.’’ Probst, Carnevale, and Triandis (1999) found positive correlations between the measure of vertical individualism and the measure of pro-self responding in the decomposed game method, and positive correlations between responses on the collectivism subscales of the IndCol and cooperative responding in decomposed games. Similarly, Hulbert, Correa da Silva, and Adegboyega (2001) found that collectivism was positively associated with a tendency to minimize differences between self and an interdependent other. Individualism was negatively correlated to the tendency to minimize differences. Individual differences variables that are linked to social motivation include the need for affiliation (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989), and the Big-Five concept dimension ‘‘agreeableness’’ (Hofstee, De Raad, & Goldberg, 1992). Individuals scoring high rather than low on agreeableness are rated by their peers as lower on competitiveness (Graziano, JensenCampbell, & Hair, 1996), and they achieve lower economic gain in singleissue negotiations (Barry & Friedman, 1998). Archival and laboratory research by Langner and Winter (2001) revealed a positive correlation between the need for affiliation and willingness to concede in a negotiation. Another individual differences variable that is related to social motivation is Machiavellianism. McHoskey (1999) examined the goals and motivational orientation associated with Machiavellianism. Results showed that Machiavellianism was associated with an emphasis on the extrinsic goal of financial success, and on a control motivational orientation in general. Additional results showed that Machiavellianism was positively associated with

252

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

alienation and antisocial behavior, and negatively correlated with social interest and prosocial behavior. Wilson, Near, and Miller (1998) used a storytelling method to explore aspects of Machiavellianism. They found that individuals who scored high and low on Machiavellianism wrote stories that revealed the cooperative nature of low-Machs and the exploitative nature of high-Machs in particularly sharp focus. Participants who read these stories rejected high-Machs as social partners for most relationships, except when their exploitative skills could be directed against members of other groups. Likewise, Barnett and Thompson (1985) found a negative relationship between Machiavellianism, prosocial reasoning, and prosocial motivation in children. Several studies examined the effects of Machiavellianism in conflict and negotiation. Huber and Neale (1986) studied the negotiation performance and goal setting of novice negotiators. Subjects were randomly assigned to be either buyers or sellers and to attain either an easy, moderate, or difficult goal in a competitive market simulation. Participants assigned difficult goals were more profitable and set harder new goals than those assigned easier goals. Moreover, Machiavellianism had a powerful effect on self-set goals and performance such that high-Machs set higher goals and achieved greater individual profit than low-Machs. In a study on integrative bargaining, Fry (1985) manipulated visual access to assess its effect on the ability of high, low, and mixed Machiavellian bargaining pairs to discover mutually advantageous solutions on a bargaining task. Results showed that visual access interfered with the discovery of jointly profitable solutions in the high-low Mach pairs but had no effect on other dyad combinations. Fry concluded that the personality dynamics of high-low Mach dyads made them particularly vulnerable to low joint bargaining outcomes in face-toface negotiation. Finally, Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, and Smith (2002) studied the behavior of participants in a two-person one-shot constituent game in which subjects face a choice between trust and distrust, and between reciprocation (trustworthiness) and defection. It was found that Machiavellianism predicted reciprocity. Over one-half of those who score low to average on Machiavellianism reciprocate trust, while high-Machs overwhelmingly defected when it was to their advantage to do so. In addition to individual differences, social motives may be cued by instructions from superiors, reinforcement schemes, or social relationships (e.g., Deutsch, 1973; Tjosvold, 1998). For example, Deutsch (1958) used instructions to induce prosocial and selfish motivation. In the prosocial motive condition, participants were instructed to be concerned about the other’s feelings and welfare, and to see the other as ‘‘partner’’ (cf. Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000). In the selfish motive condition, participants were instructed to disregard the other and to do as well for themselves as possible. Other research used monetary incentives to induce social motives.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

253

Participants in prosocial motive conditions are told that payment depends on how well they do as a dyad, whereas participants in the selfish motive conditions are told that payment depends on how well they do personally (see, e.g., Deutsch, 1973). Indirect ways to manipulate social motives are to have negotiators anticipate future interaction with their opponent or not (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a,b), to emphasize shared versus different group membership (Kramer et al., 1993), or to have them negotiate with a friend versus a stranger (Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1984). In a metaanalytical review of the studies on social motivation in integrative negotiation, De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon (2000) contrasted effects on joint outcomes of individual differences (mainly social value orientation), incentives, instructions, and implicit cues (shared group membership, future interaction, friend vs. stranger). All four categories yielded positive and significant effect sizes, indicating that prosocial negotiators achieved higher joint outcomes than selfish negotiators. Importantly, the authors found no significant differences in effect sizes between the four classes. This suggests that for the effects on integrative agreement it does not matter where social motivation comes from.

B. STRATEGIC CHOICE Most research on social motivation has considered its effects on strategic choice. This research has been rooted in one of three dominant theoretical perspectives: Economic models of bargaining, the theory of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1949, 1973), and dual concern theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Traditional economic theories of bargaining assume that individuals try to maximize their individual outcome. In addition, according to this perspective, any apparent prosocial behavior is actually driven by underlying egoistic concerns. The individuals’ persistence in seeking maximum personal gain leads to the dilemma between impasse and seeking acceptable outcomes for all. Because the latter is considered more rational (i.e., some outcomes are better than no outcomes in the case of impasse), the most likely settlement is the solution that satisfies both individuals’ aspirations as much as possible. This solution is the one that fully exploits the available integrative potential. As such, traditional economic theories of bargaining predict that individuals reach integrative agreements regardless of their social motive. They explain failures to realize integrative potential in terms of bias such as fixed-pie perceptions (Schelling, 1960; Thompson, 1990). The theory of cooperation and competition sees social motives as the key to problem-solving behavior and integrative negotiation. It argues that selfish

254

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

negotiators develop distrust, hostile attitudes, and negative interpersonal perceptions (Kramer & Carnevale, 2001). They use persuasive arguments, positional commitments, threats, bluffs, and coercive power to get their way. Prosocial individuals, in contrast, develop trust, have positive attitudes and perceptions, engage in constructive exchange of information, listen, and seek to understand one another’s perspective. As a result, prosocial motivated negotiators are more likely to uncover possibilities for trade-off and to realize integrative potential (Deutsch, 1973; Tjosvold, 1998). Some evidence for these ideas exists. In their meta-analysis, De Dreu, Weingart, et al. (2000) found that when negotiators had a prosocial rather than selfish motive, they engaged in more problem solving and information exchange, and in less contentious bargaining including the use of persuasive arguments, threats, and positional commitments. Cross-cultural research shows similar patterns for collectivist and individualistic cultural values (Gelfand & Realo, 1999; Gelfand & Christakopoulos, 1999). For example, Gelfand and Christakopoulos (1999) found that negotiators with a collectivist background exchanged more information and, therefore, developed more accurate perceptions of each other’s preferences and priorities than negotiators with an individualistic background. Consistent with the seminal work of Blake and Mouton (1964), Pruitt and Rubin (1986) proposed their dual concern theory. It postulates two kinds of concern, other-concern and self-concern, each ranging in strength from weak to strong. Other-concern is closely related to the concept of social motive, with selfish negotiators having weak other-concern and prosocial negotiators having strong other-concern (Pruitt, 1998). Selfconcern is closely related to ‘‘toughness’’ (Bartos, 1974), resistance to yielding (Kelley et al., 1967), and the negotiator’s intransigence to concession making (Druckman, 1994). As Kelley et al. (1967, p. 382) note: ‘‘This resistance is felt by each party at each point throughout the negotiation session and has implications for his concession-making propensities at each point.’’ In dual concern theory, high (versus low) resistance to yielding is usually operationalized by giving negotiators high (versus low) aspirations or limits below which they should not concede (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a; Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Siegel & Fouraker, 1960; Yukl, 1974). A meta-analytical review by Druckman (1994) further showed higher resistance to yielding when negotiators are subject to low (rather than high) time pressure (e.g., Yukl, Malone, Hayslip, & Pamin, 1976), or when they are accountable to constituents rather than to their opposing negotiator (Kramer et al., 1993). Pruitt (1998) reviewed evidence to suggest that negotiators also have high (rather than low) resistance to yielding when prospective outcomes from the negotiation are framed as losses rather than

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

255

gains (e.g., Bottom & Studt, 1993; Carnevale & De Dreu, 2002; De Dreu et al., 1994). Like the theory of cooperation and competition, dual concern theory predicts that when parties have a prosocial rather than a selfish motive they are likely to develop positive interpersonal attitudes and perceptions, to seek understanding of other’s point of view, and to make and reciprocate concessions. However, dual concern theory predicts that differences in behavior and outcomes depend on the negotiators’ level of resistance to yielding. When a prosocial motive is paired with low resistance to yielding, unilateral concession making dominates and parties either accept the other party’s demands or settle on an (obvious) fifty–fifty compromise. When a prosocial motive is paired with high resistance to yielding, however, parties face the dilemma of wanting good outcomes for the other, but not at their own expense. As a result, they concede slowly and engage in various kinds of problem solving (such as exchanging information) that promote the discovery and development of integrative solutions. In a narrative review of the evidence, Carnevale and Pruitt (1992, p. 540) concluded that ‘‘The dual-concern model fits data from (. . .) experimental studies.’’ Likewise, Thompson (1990) concluded that the prediction that high resistance to yielding coupled with high concern for the other party [i.e., a prosocial motive] leads to higher joint outcomes has generally been supported. The meta-analysis by De Dreu, Weingart, et al. (2000) mentioned earlier provided a quantitative evaluation of the theory. The authors concluded that with regard to problem-solving behavior, contentious behavior, and integrative agreements, dual concern theory makes good predictions—social motives affect negotiation behavior and outcomes, but more when resistance to yielding is high rather than low. This is important because accepting that Dual Concern Theory is valid suggests a need to revise traditional economic models of bargaining that assume negotiators are purely self-interested, as well as the theory of cooperation and competition that assumes resistance to yielding is irrelevant. Although the support for Dual Concern Theory is good, the theory fails to deal with the errors and biases in human information processing that affect negotiation and dispute resolution. Below, we will consider in more detail how social motives moderate errors and biases associated with ego defensiveness and naive realism, respectively.

C. NAIVE REALISM RECONSIDERED Research on social motives has traditionally considered strategic choice and outcomes from the negotiation. Recent studies shifted the emphasis

256

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

toward cognitive processes. Several studies suggest that social motives not only influence strategic choice, but also the influence of naive realism. Naive realism is reflected in, among other things, fixed-pie perceptions. A study by Gelfand and Christakopoulou (1999) shows that fixed-pie perceptions are revised during negotiation, especially when negotiators come from a collectivist rather than individualistic culture. When negotiators were Greek (a collectivist culture), they exchanged more information about their preferences and priorities, and thus developed more accurate understanding of the task, than when negotiators were American (an individualist culture). In a similar vein, De Dreu, Koole et al. (2000) showed that revisions in fixed-pie perception during the negotiation were moderately correlated with (self-reported) social motives. The more prosocial motivation negotiators reported, the more they revised their fixed-pie perceptions during negotiation. Carnevale and De Dreu (2002) reported additional evidence that social motives moderate bias due to naive realism. They focused on optimistic overconfidence. In these studies, participants played the role of seller in a simulated bilateral negotiation; a computer controlled the behavior of the opposing negotiator. Half were given an individualistic orientation, and the other half were given a cooperative orientation. The position materials were identical in both conditions and the behavior of the opposing negotiator was held constant. Prior to the end of negotiation, they were asked to estimate the strength of their position relative to the other negotiator’s position, on a five-point scale, from ‘‘I have a much stronger case’’ (1) to ‘‘Both of our positions are equally strong’’ (3) to ‘‘The other negotiator has a much stronger case’’ (5). The negotiators with the individualistic motive rated their position as significantly stronger (M ¼ 2.54) than the opposing negotiator, relative to negotiators with the cooperative motive (M ¼ 3.03). Note that the negotiators with the cooperative motive were virtually at the center on this scale, at level 3, indicating they felt that both side’s positions were equally strong. This suggests that overconfidence may be less of a problem when negotiators adopt a cooperative motive than when they adopt an individualistic motive.

D. EGO DEFENSIVENESS RECONSIDERED There is evidence that social motivation moderates the impact of ego defensiveness. Camac (1992) studied how social value orientation influenced the recall of the values in a prisoner’s dilemma game. Participants were classified as prosocial or selfish, and they subsequently played a prisoner’s dilemma game. Afterward they were shown the dilemma again, with their

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

257

own and other’s payoffs being eliminated, and they were asked to provide as good an estimate of the payoffs as possible. Results showed that accuracy of recall was consistent with the individual’s social value orientation—people with a prosocial value orientation recalled the joint gain in four cells quite accurately, whereas people with a selfish orientation recalled their own gain in the four cells best. This suggests that social value orientation biases attention, encoding, and retrieval processes. A similar conclusion derives from a negotiation study by De Dreu and Boles (1998). They measured individuals’ social value orientation and classified individuals as prosocial or as selfish. Participants believed they would enter a negotiation and they prepared for it by reading the instructions for the standard integrative negotiation task discussed above. At the end of these instructions a list of decision heuristics was presented. The list contained a series of cooperative heuristics and a series of competitive heuristics. Examples of cooperative heuristics are ‘‘share and share alike’’ and ‘‘the other deserves the benefit of the doubt.’’ Examples of competitive heuristics are ‘‘never trust your opponent,’’ and ‘‘your gain is my loss.’’ Participants subsequently engaged in a set of unrelated tasks and then were asked to recall as many decision heuristics as they could. Results showed that prosocial negotiators recalled more cooperative than competitive heuristics, whereas selfish negotiators recalled more competitive than cooperative heuristics. The data reported by Camac (1992) and De Dreu and Boles (1998) dealt with social value orientations that were measured rather than manipulated. Therefore, causality cannot be established and effects may have been driven by unknown third variables. To address this, De Dreu (unpublished observations) conducted an experiment in which social motives were manipulated rather than measured. The methods, materials, and procedures were identical to those used by De Dreu and Boles, except that the measurement of social value orientations was replaced by instructions intended to manipulate social motives. Social motives were manipulated as in previous studies (e.g., Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). One-half of the participants were informed that the more personal profit they would make in the upcoming negotiation, the higher would be their chances of winning a $50 bonus (selfish motive condition). The other half were informed that the more profit they and the other party would make in the upcoming negotiation, the higher would be their chances of winning a $50 bonus (prosocial motive condition). The number of cooperative and competitive heuristics correctly recalled, corrected for the total number of heuristics recalled, was analyzed (total recall did not differ as a function of social motivation). The significant interaction between social motive and type of heuristic recalled is presented

258

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

Fig. 1. Recall of cooperative and competitive decision heuristics as a function of social motive.

in Figure 1. As can be seen, negotiators with a prosocial motive recalled more cooperative and less competitive heuristics, while negotiators with a selfish motive did the reverse. This result is very similar to that obtained by De Dreu and Boles, and rules out doubts about directionality. It clearly shows that social motivation biases encoding and retrieval processes. Another indication that social motives influence individual level cognition derives from a series of studies by Carnevale and Probst (1998). They found that expectations of conflict produced a ‘‘freezing’’ of cognitive schemas. The expectation of conflict reduced general problem-solving abilities, and it restricted categorizations. However, there was an interesting twist. In nonconflict settings, prosocial individuals, compared to competitive and individualistic people, had more inclusive cognitive categories; but competitive people were most likely to alter their thinking in response to the social context. When the social context required competition with others, competitors had low cognitive flexibility. But when competitors were in a context that required cooperation (a need to work with their partner in a between-group competition), they had the greatest cognitive flexibility. Moreover, the social context (cooperation or conflict) influenced how people processed information unrelated to the circumstances that defined the context. In other words, cognitive rigidity in conflict is not simply holding firm, or a reflection of the desire to ‘‘look tough’’ in negotiation. Rather, it suggests an unintentional alteration in underlying cognitive organization in cooperative and conflict situations. Van Kleef and De Dreu (2002) examined how social motives influence information search. In two experiments they studied the questions negotiators ask their opponent as a function of beliefs about the opponent’s personality (cooperative, competitive, unknown) and the negotiator’s own social value orientation (prosocial vs. selfish). In Experiment 1 participants

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

259

selected questions about other’s cooperation or other’s competition from a prewritten list, and in Experiment 2 participants generated questions themselves and these were coded as dealing with the other’s cooperative or competitive tendency. Social motives did not influence the amount of questions asked. However, negotiators engaged in confirmatory search, such that they asked about competition when the other was believed to be competitive and about cooperation when the other was believed to be cooperative. When other’s goals were unknown, negotiators relied on their own orientation—selfish negotiators asked about competition and prosocial negotiators asked about cooperation. The studies reviewed thus far strongly suggest that individuals in conflict and negotiation search for, encode, and retrieve information consistent with their prosocial or selfish motivation. Also, prosocial and selfish negotiators engage in confirmatory information search likely to support their initial assumptions and beliefs. All this suggests that social motive moderates ego defensiveness—selfish negotiators fall prey to motivational biases that strengthen their egocentric tendencies, whereas prosocial individuals appear geared toward equality, consensus, and joint gain. More direct evidence that social motive moderates ego defensiveness derives from a cross-cultural study by Gelfand and colleagues (2001). In three studies they investigated differences in egocentric perceptions of fairness in conflict and negotiation in the United States and Japan. Using a free recall methodology (Messick et al., 1985), Study 1 showed that individualists associated themselves with fair behaviors and others with unfair behaviors to a much greater extent than collectivists. In a study of naturally occurring conflicts, Study 2 illustrated that individualist disputants perceived that an objective third party would view their behavior as much more fair than their counterparts, and this bias was greatly attenuated in collectivist Japan. Finally, a laboratory study of negotiation showed that self-serving biases of fairness were much greater among individualist than collectivist negotiators, and demonstrated that such differences were related to lower negotiation outcomes among individualist negotiators. Thus, ego defensiveness and all it engenders in the case of conflict and negotiation appears to be less of an issue when prosocial and collectivist values dominate. Other evidence that social motive can moderate ego defensiveness comes from research by Carnevale and colleagues on the mere ownership and endowment effects. In these studies, mere ownership—the tendency to overvalue what is in one’s possession—was examined for participants with collectivist and with individualistic values. They replicated the standard individual ownership effect (Beggan, 1992) and endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990) among individualists, but not for collectivists. Collectivists showed a group endowment effect (an effect for

260

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

property owned by the group), but not an individual endowment effect (see Carnevale, 1995).

E. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOCIAL MOTIVES Taken together, research on social motives in conflict and negotiation allows for four conclusions. First, social motives are rooted in individual differences or they are triggered by situational cues, but the origins of social motives do not moderate the effects social motives have in conflict and negotiation. Second, prosocial negotiators engage in more cooperative behavior and exchange more accurate information about preferences and priorities than selfish individuals. Third, naive realism and the biases it entails have less impact on negotiation processes and outcomes when disputants have a prosocial rather than selfish motivation. Fourth, and finally, ego defensiveness and the biases it entails have less impact on negotiation processes and outcomes when disputants have a prosocial rather than selfish motivation. These four conclusions are represented graphically in Figure 2. The top of the figure shows the antecedents to prosocial motivation: at the left are listed person-related, individual differences variables such as social value orientation, collectivist values, need for affiliation, and low levels of Machiavellianism. To the right, we have situation cues that trigger prosocial motivation: cooperative incentives, instructions to cooperate, a history of cooperative interaction, or the expectation of future cooperation, and a shared categorization. The figure further shows that prosocial motivation stimulates a problem-solving approach, including the sharing of information about preferences and priorities; as predicted by dual concern theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), this effect of prosocial motivation on problem solving is strengthened by resistance to yielding. Finally, the figure shows the key notion that prosocial motivation, through its effect on problem solving and exchange of information, reduces the negative impact ego defensiveness and naive realism has on integrative negotiation.

V. Epistemic Motivation ‘‘Continuous effort—not strength or intelligence—is the key to unlocking our potential.’’ —Sir Winston Churchill

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

Person; Individual Differences Pro-social Values Collectivist Values High Need forAffiliation Low Machiavellianism

+

261

Situation Cues: Coop. Incentives Coop. Instructions Coop. Past or Future Shared Categorization

Pro-social Motivation + Resistance to Yielding

+

Problem Solving And Information Exchange -

-

Ego Defensiveness Integrative Negotiation Naive Realism Fig. 2. Antecedents and consequences of social motives for information processing and integrative negotiation.

Thus far we have discussed a variety of heuristics and biases that hinder constructive negotiation and dispute resolution, and we have reviewed evidence showing that social motivation drives the type of information people search and process, thus moderating the detrimental impact of ego defensiveness and naive realism. We have not considered the possibility that individuals may differ, across individuals and across situations, in the extent to which they process available information. Thus far, we have implicitly assumed that individuals process information available, and search for information consistent with the social motivation. However, according to dual process models of human information processing (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Smith & DeCoster, 2001), individuals can choose from two alternative strategies for processing information. The first strategy is to solve logical problems, to evaluate persuasive arguments, or to form impressions of others through a quick, effortless, and heuristic processing of information that rests on well-learned prior associations. Alternatively, individuals may engage in more effortful, deliberate, and systematic processing that involves rule-based inferences. Thus, to deal with

262

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

their cognitively and emotionally taxing situation, negotiators can use a ‘‘quick and dirty’’ strategy when processing information, arriving at usually reasonable approaches to the situation efficiently and effortlessly (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Alternatively, they can try hard to think deeply about the situation, sometimes arriving at qualitatively different approaches than the ‘‘quick and dirty’’ strategy would have suggested. They may engage in deliberate and systematic processing of information about their opposing party’s preferences and priorities, and discover that agreements exist that integrate their own and the other party’s interests (De Dreu, Koole et al., 2000). The extent to which individuals search, encode, and retrieve information depends on their epistemic motivation—the desire to develop and hold accurate and well-informed conclusions about the world. In this section we first review personality characteristics and situations that give rise to low or high epistemic motivation. Subsequently, research is discussed to argue that epistemic motivation helps people overcome their cognitive limitations, and tempers the influence of naive realism in conflict and negotiation.

A. ORIGINS OF EPISTEMIC MOTIVATION Epistemic motivation relates to (lack of) need for cognitive closure, which is central in lay-epistemic theory developed by Kruglanski and associates (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). This theory argues that there exists a single dimension underlying the desire for different kinds of knowledge, termed ‘‘need for cognitive closure.’’ Individuals at the high need for closure end of the continuum are characterized by considerable cognitive impatience, leaping to judgment on the basis of inconclusive evidence and rigidity of thought. At the other end of the continuum, individuals with low need for closure may prefer to suspend judgment, engaging in extensive information search and generating multiple interpretations for known facts. Compared to their low need for closure counterparts, individuals high in need for closure display stronger primacy effects in impression formation, are more prone to the correspondence bias, rely more on existing stereotypic knowledge, and react more negatively to people opposing group consensus (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996, for a review). These findings offer converging evidence for the notion that individuals with high need for cognitive closure may be more likely to use cognitive heuristics in making judgments and decisions than individuals with low need for cognitive closure. The latter instead postpone judgment until they have processed as much information as possible, or until time and energy is depleted.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

263

Epistemic motivation is also related to need for cognition (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Need for cognition refers to the intrinsic motivation for, and enjoyment of, effortful cognitive activities. Individuals with high need for cognition are more attentive to the quality of the arguments in a persuasive communication, and they are less likely than individuals with low need for cognition to be influenced by peripheral cues such as the attractiveness of a communicator (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In a recent study concerning dyadic decision making, members with high need for cognition were viewed by their discussion partners as being more effective persuaders, and as generating more valid arguments than their low need for cognition counterparts (Shestowsky, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1998). Although need for cognitive closure and need for cognition are individual differences variables affecting epistemic motivation, situational cues may influence epistemic motivation as well. Research suggests that epistemic motivation increases when the task becomes more involving (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1989), or when there is process accountability (Tetlock, 1992). Under process accountability, individuals expect to be observed and evaluated by others with unknown views about the process of judgement and decision making (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992). Simonson and Staw (1992) argued that individuals under process accountability tend to engage in preemptive self-criticism, leading to more evenhanded evaluation of decision alternatives and reduced need for self-justification. Indeed, a review of the relevant research suggests that ‘‘accountability attenuated bias on tasks to the extent that (a) suboptimal performance resulted from lack of self-critical attention to the judgmental process and (b) improvement required no special training in formal decision rules, only greater attention to the information provided’’ (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 263). In addition to task involvement and process accountability, epistemic motivation depends on the individual’s relationship with the other, including relative power and sense of interdependence. Fiske (1992) has argued that low power individuals (re)gain control over their situation by paying close and careful attention to their powerful other, so as to accurately predict other’s needs, desires, and possible actions. Several studies in the realm of person perception indeed support this view (e.g., Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000). Gelfand and Christakopoulou (1999) suggest that interdependence can induce a person to be motivated to accurately predict other’s needs, desires, and possible actions, akin to low power individuals. Epistemic motivation also depends on the individual’s level of aspiration. When an individual has a high rather than low aspiration level more prospective outcomes fall below the person’s aspiration and are framed as losses. Framing outcomes as losses increases the tendency to think, as

264

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

indicated by greater time needed for decision making (De Dreu, Emans, & Van de Vliert, 1992), and more systematic information processing (e.g., Dunegan, 1993). In a similar vein, Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, KonarGoldband, and Carnevale (1980) found that higher aspirations produced greater search for and provision of information including competitive statements and problem-solving activities. Thus, it appears that high aspirations induce more epistemic motivation than low aspirations. Finally, sometimes the context undermines epistemic motivation. For example, time pressure reduces epistemic motivation and increases the motivation to reach (cognitive) closure. Kruglanski and Freund (1983) reviewed evidence to suggest that time pressure intensifies the tendency to seek cognitive closure and they showed that individuals are more likely to fall prey to primacy effects, ethnic stereotyping, and numerical anchoring when time pressure is high rather than low. These results suggest that individuals in negotiation may be less likely to engage in systematic information processing when there is high rather than low time pressure because increased time pressure increases the need for cognitive closure. Similar effects may be expected when there is a high level of noise or when individuals become fatigued (for a review, see Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).

B. BIAS DUE TO COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS RECONSIDERED Above, we argued that epistemic motivation affects information processing in negotiation such that higher levels of epistemic motivation lead to more deliberate and more sophisticated information processing. Put differently, it can be predicted that the negotiator’s tendency to rely on cognitive heuristics is moderated by his or her epistemic motivation. Results reported by De Dreu, Koole, and Oldersma (1999) are consistent with this general prediction. These authors examined the influence of need for cognitive closure on anchoring-and-adjustment (Experiment 1) and stereotyping (Experiment 2) in negotiation. In Experiment 1, participants in the high (low) anchor condition were told, prior to negotiation, that some participants in earlier sessions had reached agreements that valued around 11,000 (3,000) points (with 14,000 being the maximum). Results showed that participants made more concessions in the case of low anchor values, but only when they had high need for cognitive closure. In Experiment 2, psychology students were told that their opponent majored in business or in theology. Psychology students hold more competitive beliefs about business majors than about religion majors (De Dreu, Yzerbyt, et al., 1995). Results showed, accordingly, that participants made smaller concessions when the

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

265

opponent was a business student, and this tendency was stronger when participants had high rather than low need for cognitive closure. Recent work by Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) provides another indication that motivating negotiators to consider information carefully moderates their tendency to use heuristic cues in judgment and decision making. These authors conducted three experiments that explored the role of first offers, perspective-taking, and negotiator self-focus in determining distributive outcomes in a negotiation. Across three experiments, whichever party made the first offer obtained a better outcome, suggesting that the first offer in a negotiation provides an important anchor value. In addition, first offers were a strong predictor of final settlement prices. Interestingly, when the negotiator who did not make a first offer focused on information that was inconsistent with the implications of their opponent’s first offer, the advantageous effect of making the first offer was eliminated. Thinking about one’s opponent’s alternatives to the negotiation, one’s opponent’s reservation price, or one’s own target, all negated the effect of first offers on outcomes. Thus, anchoring processes in negotiation are eliminated when negotiators are stimulated to think carefully before proceeding with making offers and counteroffers. We have argued that time pressure and fatigue reduce epistemic motivation and increase reliance on heuristics and erroneous reasoning. De Dreu (2002) tested this idea. In Experiment 1, time pressure (high versus low) was crossed with information about the opponent’s group membership (business student vs. religion student). Individuals placed higher demands when they faced a business rather than a religion student, especially when time pressure was acute rather than mild. In Experiment 2, time pressure was either high or low, and prior to and immediately following the negotiation fixed-pie perceptions were measured. Results showed more accurate perceptions (i.e., less fixed-pie error) at the end of the negotiation and more integrative agreements when time pressure was mild rather than acute.

C. NAIVE REALISM RECONSIDERED The experiments so far examined the extent to which epistemic motivation moderates the reliance on cognitive heuristics provided at the outset of the negotiation. However, the study on time pressure by De Dreu (2002) also suggests that epistemic motivation may reduce the impact of naive realism, as exemplified by (revisions in) fixed-pie perceptions. A study by De Dreu, Koole et al. (2000) considered this possibility in more detail. It was predicted that epistemic motivation helps negotiators to

266

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

release their fixed-pie perceptions. In two experiments, epistemic motivation was manipulated by holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated or not (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Results showed that process accountability reduced fixed-pie perceptions during face-to-face negotiation, and produced more integrative agreements. Also, the accountable negotiators revised their fixed-pie perceptions even when information exchange was held constant; this indicates that the effects were due to the systematic processing of information rather than to a more elaborate search for new information. De Dreu and Van Kleef (2002) provide further evidence for this possibility. In this study, the influence of power on information search strategies was examined. Power was hypothesized to influence epistemic motivation, with low power negotiators having higher epistemic motivation than their high power counterparts (see also Fiske, 1992). High and low power negotiators were, prior to the negotiation, asked to generate questions they would like to ask their opponent, who was displayed as being cooperative or competitive. Results showed that negotiators engaged in less confirmatory search, as indicated by the number of diagnostic rather than leading questions they asked when participants had low power, and the other was seen as competitive. Finally, Kemmelmeier and Winter (2000) had participants read speeches given by Bill Clinton and Saddam Hussein shortly after Iraq military forces had attacked Kurd villages in northern Iraq in 1996. Participants were asked to evaluate these speeches in the role of a military officer or in the role of UN mediator. The idea was that participants in the role of a military officer would adopt a partisan mind-set and view the conflict from the U.S. perspective only. Participants in the role of UN mediator, in contrast, would adopt an accuracy mind-set, and view the conflict from a more distant perspective that allowed multiple views to come into play. Results showed that perceptual distortion was greater when participants had a partisan rather than accuracy mindset. Thus, this study shows that different mindsets influence perceptual distortion in conflict and, thereby, can reduce naive realism.

D. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT EPISTEMIC MOTIVATION The research on epistemic motivation in conflict and negotiation allows for three conclusions. First, epistemic motivation is rooted in individual differences or it is triggered by situational cues. Second, individuals with high epistemic motivation engage in more systematic processing of information and are less influenced by a variety of cognitive heuristics,

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

Person; Individual Differences: Low Need for Closure High Need for Cognition +

267

Situation Cues: Process Accountability Power Disadvantage High Task Involvement High Limit/Aspiration Mild Time Pressure Low Noise & Fatigue

Epistemic Motivation +

Systematic Information Processing and Search

-

-

Cognitive Limitations Integrative Negotiation Naive Realism Fig. 3. Antecedents and consequences of epistemic motives for information processing and integrative negotiation.

including inappropriate anchoring-and-adjustment and stereotyping. Third, negotiators with high epistemic motivation appear less subject to naive realism, because they engage in less confirmatory information search, and revise their fixed-pie assumption more readily. As Figure 3 shows, these processes are expected to result in accurate understanding of the negotiation task, which enhances the likelihood of integrative agreements. The top of the figure shows the antecedents to epistemic motivation: To the left we have listed person-related, individual differences variables such as low need for cognitive closure and high need for cognition. To the right, we have listed situation cues that trigger epistemic motivation: process accountability, a low power position, high task involvement, high limits and aspirations, low levels of time pressure, and low levels of fatigue. The figure further shows that epistemic motivation stimulates deliberate, effortful, and systematic processing of information that is or becomes available during the negotiation. Finally, the figure shows the key notion that epistemic motivation, through its effect on systematic

268

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

information processing, reduces the negative impact cognitive limitations and naive realism on integrative negotiation.

VI. Motivated Information Processing Model of Conflict and Negotiation The work we have reviewed thus far reveals that motivational and cognitive processes often conspire against constructive conflict management and integrative negotiation. But it also reveals that sometimes motivation facilitates a rather constructive and cooperative interaction conducive to integrative agreement. In Figure 4 we summarize this main idea. As can be seen, ego defensiveness, naive realism, and reliance on cognitive heuristics are supposed to reduce the likelihood of integrative negotiation (Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Ross & Ward, 1995). The top part of the figure summarizes our thesis with regard to the effects of prosocial motivation.

Pro-social Motivation +

Resistance to Yielding

+

Information Exchange -

Ego Defensiveness -

Naive Realism

Cognitive Limitations

Integrative Negotiation -

Systematic information processing + Epistemic Motivation Fig. 4.

Motivated information processing model of negotiation.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

269

In interaction with resistance to yielding, prosocial motivation increases the likelihood of a problem-solving approach and high levels of information exchange. A problem-solving approach, in turn, reduces the detrimental effects of ego defensiveness and of naive realism. The bottom part of the figure summarizes our thesis with regard to the effects of epistemic motivation. Because it stimulates the deliberate and systematic processing of information, epistemic motivation is expected to reduce the detrimental consequences of cognitive limitations and of naive realism. Because we have no empirical evidence so far, we do not hypothesize that prosocial motivation reduces the impact of cognitive limitations, or that epistemic motivation reduces the role ego defensiveness plays in integrative negotiation. From Figure 4 it follows that social and epistemic motives appear critical in determining whether conflict escalates into hostile and counterproductive interaction, or instead runs a relatively constructive course with integrative agreements being a likely result. In this section, we develop this idea further and introduce four archetypes of disputants—prosocial thinkers, prosocial misers, selfish thinkers, and selfish misers. Also, we discuss in more depth the interplay between personality and situation variables, and we consider the possibility that motives change during conflict interaction, and converge at the interpersonal level.

A. INTERPLAY AMONG MOTIVES: TOWARD FOUR ARCHETYPES OF DISPUTANTS IN CONFLICT Throughout our analysis and review, we assumed that social and epistemic motivation were independent. That is, a negotiator may be more or less motivated to engage in deliberate and deep processing of information as well as more or less motivated to seek good outcomes for themselves only, or for themselves as well as for the opposing party. The independence assumption holds up empirically. In three different samples, De Dreu et al. (1999, Study 3) examined the relationship between need for cognitive closure and social value orientation. Need for closure was assessed with the Webster and Kruglanski (1994) questionnaire, and social value orientation was assessed using the Kuhlman and Marshello (1975) decomposed game measure. Results showed that need for cognitive closure did not differ as a function of social value orientation in either sample. Comparing the means for prosocials and selfish participants in a meta-analysis, an overall effect size of Cohen’s d ¼ .21 was found. This effect size was small and not significant, and it also appeared that the effect size did not differ across samples.

270

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

Similar conclusions were reached with regard to situation-based epistemic motivation. In two experiments, De Dreu, Koole et al. (2000) manipulated process accountability in a face-to-face integrative negotiation task. Manipulation checks confirmed that negotiators under process accountability had higher levels of epistemic motivation than negotiators not held accountable. In both experiments, process accountability did not influence self-reported social motivation. Thus, it appears safe to conclude that situation-based epistemic motivation is unrelated to measures of social motivation. To say that social and epistemic motivation are independent is not to say that the two have independent effects on strategic choice and the quality of agreements. In fact, the combination of social and epistemic motivation results in four conflict archetypes. These archetypes—the prosocial thinker, the prosocial miser, the selfish thinker, and the selfish miser—derive from the combination of prosocial versus selfish motivation, and high versus low epistemic motivation (see Figure 5). In analogy to the cognitive miser (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), the selfish miser relies on competitive heuristics such as ‘‘your gain is my loss’’ and ‘‘an eye for an eye (. . .).’’ The opposing individual is seen as an opponent who cannot be trusted. He or she engages in ‘‘black–white’’ thinking (Carnevale & Probst, 1998; Judd, 1978), and prominent behavioral options are threats, bluffs, and lies, and failure to reciprocate other’s concessions. The cooperative miser, in contrast, relies on cooperative heuristics such as ‘‘share and share alike’’ and ‘‘other deserves the benefit of the doubt.’’ The opposing negotiator is seen as a partner who deserves good outcomes as well. Prominent behavioral options are unconditional promises, large unilateral concessions, and search for easy fifty–fifty compromises. High epistemic motivation produces thinkers, but what they think about and what information they have to think about is largely determined by their social motivation. Thus, the selfish thinker provides, searches, and stores and retrieves information that helps him or her to further the goal of obtaining good outcomes for oneself, or better outcomes than the other side. The other negotiator is seen as an opponent, who cannot be trusted. Prominent behavioral options are heuristic trial-and-error—making concessions across issues that overall provides one with equal value (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975)—advancing persuasive arguments about why the other should give in, misrepresentation and deception, and so on. The prosocial thinker, in contrast, searches and stores and retrieves information that helps him or her to further the cooperative goal of reaching agreement. The other negotiator is seen as a partner who deserves to be trusted. Prominent behavioral options are providing and asking information about preferences and priorities, making concessions and proposals for settlement, and searching for mutually attractive solutions.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

High

Selfish Thinker

Pro-social Thinker

Low

Selfish Miser

Pro-social Miser

271

Epistemic Motivation

Pro-social

Selfish Social Motivation

Fig. 5. Four archetypes of individuals in conflict as a function of social and epistemic motivation.

De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, and Euwema (2002) tested the interaction of social and epistemic motivation in three experiments crossing social motives (prosocial versus selfish) and epistemic motivation (high versus low). They argued that prosocial (selfish) negotiators tend toward information consistent with their cooperative (competitive) goals and expectations, and the impact of this selective tendency is stronger the more negotiators are motivated to engage in deep and thorough processing of information. This suggests the hypothesis that social motivation affects negotiator cognition and integrative agreements more under high rather than low levels of epistemic motivation. In the study by De Dreu et al. (2002), social motives were manipulated by describing the other party, in the instructions, as either ‘‘partner’’ (prosocial motive condition) or as ‘‘opponent’’ (selfish motive condition). Epistemic motivation was induced by making participants process accountable or not (see De Dreu, Koole et al., 2000). The first experiment by De Dreu et al. (2002) used a recall task previously used by De Dreu and Boles (1998). Results showed that the pattern of results displayed in Figure 1 was more pronounced under high rather than low levels of epistemic motivation. Subsequent experiments used the integrative negotiation task-methodology described in Section II, and results showed that prosocial negotiators engaged in more integrative negotiation, and reached more integrative agreements than did selfish negotiators, but only under high rather than low levels of epistemic motivation. These results together support the

272

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

hypothesis—prosocial negotiators achieve more integrative agreements than selfish negotiators, but only under high levels of epistemic motivation. Put differently: Only prosocial thinkers are likely to attain high joint outcomes.

B. PERSON X SITUATION: HOW USEFUL ARE INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES? As indicated in Figures 2 and 3, some precursors to motivation are rooted in the person (e.g., need for cognition, need for affiliation), and some of them are due to the situation (e.g., power differences, cooperative incentives). Although this is consistent with the Lewinian notion that human behavior is a function of personality, the situation, and the interaction between the two, the place accorded to individual differences in the current analysis contrasts with a consensual tradition in the negotiation literature to negate and whenever possible downplay the importance of personality. For example, Thompson (1990, p. 520) states that ‘‘The scant number of clear relationships observed in this review is consistent with [the] conclusion that there are few significant relationships between personality and negotiation outcomes.’’ Similar conclusions were reached by Rubin and Brown (1975), Carnevale and Pruitt (1992), and more recently by Bazerman et al. (2000). In contrast to the rather pessimistic conclusions reached by reviewers of the negotiation literature, we have been quite successful in obtaining predicted effects of individual differences in social value orientation, in collectivism, or in need for cognitive closure. Perhaps in past research there has been a misfit between the personality variable measured and the dependent variable considered. For example, there is no strong argument as to why the need for cognitive closure should affect concession making, but there is a strong argument as to why it should affect information processing. Thus, although there may be few relationships between individual differences and negotiation, there may be many relationships between certain individual differences and certain aspects of negotiation. Individual differences are also more likely to affect cognition and behavior in weak situations—situations without clearly defined and established norms (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Kenrick & Funder, 1988). Many conflict and negotiation studies are conducted with MBA students. In most MBA classes there may be strong (competitive) beliefs and norms associated with negotiation (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997; Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002), something that may be less the case in the social psychological laboratory where students participate relatively anonymously.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

273

C. SHIFTS IN MOTIVATION Motivational goals are not constant and change as the negotiation cycles through different phases (Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996). For example, social motivation may change when incentive structures are revised, when the likelihood of future interaction changes, or when one comes to like or dislike the opponent. Epistemic motivation may change when time pressure increases or when parties become fatigued. Also, epistemic motivation may change as a function of impasses in negotiation. Negotiators often begin with distributive behavior and, when a costly impasse looms, switch to more integrative strategies (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998; Harinck et al., 2000; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Zartman (1991) refers to ripeness as the point in time at which conflict parties prefer negotiated agreement over the (conflict-laden) status quo. This work suggests that when parties impasse, they reflect upon their current (competitive) strategies, realize these lead nowhere, and that they need to better understand the task and their opponent’s preferences and priorities. One important source of change in motivation is the opponent’s behavior. In fact, it is quite likely that disputants with different levels of social or epistemic motivation converge toward each other in the course of conflict interaction. To reach agreement, parties need to understand each other and, therefore, they are motivated to converge on the same negotiation script (De Dreu et al., 1994; Richter & Kruglanski, 1999). Also, mental representations are intimately intertwined with, and reflected in both verbal and nonverbal communication (De Dreu et al., 1994), and emotions may ‘‘catch on’’ and are adopted by interdependent others through contagion-like processes (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992; Morris & Keltner, 2000). Finally, interdependent individuals have a strong tendency to reciprocate other’s behavior (Gouldner, 1960; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990), and through self-perception this may alter previously held notions about the world. Research has revealed such convergence in goals and concomitant motives. A study by Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) showed that negotiators who start with a different representation of the conflict than their opponent converged in the course of the interaction toward one and the same conflict frame. Furthermore, the classic work by Kelley and Stahelski (1970) revealed that such convergence processes can be asymmetrical. That is, prosocially motivated individuals are more likely to adopt the selfish goals of their opponent than the other way around. Weingart, Brett, and Olekalns (2001) demonstrate, accordingly, that four-person groups containing one selfish negotiator over time become as selfish as groups containing two or

274

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

more selfish negotiators. This suggests that selfish motivation is more likely to dominate and survive than prosocial motivation. Although asymmetry in adaptation of social motives has been wellsupported, we are unaware of research on convergence in epistemic motivation. In fact, in the course of a conflict, epistemic motivation may rise due to the need to avoid a costly impasse, but it may also decline due to increased time pressure, fatigue, and concomitant need for cognitive closure. Further, it may be that one’s high level of epistemic motivation and concomitant deep and systematic processing of information inspires the opponent to ‘‘play along,’’ but it may also reinforce the opponent’s tendency to act as a cognitive miser who needs not think too deeply about the situation. Research is needed to address this issue, in order to inform us whether a prosocial miser is likely to turn into a selfish miser, or into a selfish thinker.

VII. Other Motives and Other Models Social motives and epistemic motivation have been the focus of many studies, but they are not the only motives that influence strategic choice and information processing in conflict and negotiation. Examples of other motives are impression management concerns and a power motive. Also, the model developed in the previous section builds on (parts of) older models that have dominated the conflict and negotiation literature for a long time, and still do. In this section we review research on other motives in conflict and negotiation, and we compare the current motivational analysis to its two scientific parents—dual concern theory and behavioral decision theory.

A. IMPRESSION MOTIVATION AND POWER MOTIVATION In a recent chapter on persuasion in negotiation, Chaiken et al. (2001) considered impression motivation—the motivation to produce and maintain a certain impression for others, including the adversary (see also Wall, 1991). Although much research on impression motivation has been concerned with positive impressions, individuals in conflict and negotiation are sometimes motivated to convey a negative image, the image of someone not to be trifled with. This makes sense because, in some cases, perceived weakness of an adversary may lay the foundation for an attack or exploitation of an adversary (Holsti, 1962; Siegel & Fouraker, 1960). Indeed, negotiators do engage in behaviors to convey such a tough image. They look tough while competing (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981),

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

275

retaliate when attacked (Felson, 1978), and they ‘‘cut their nose to save their face’’ (Brown, 1977; Tjosvold & Sun, 2000). Like social and epistemic motivation, impression motivation is rooted in the individual as well as in the situation. For example, individuals high in self-monitoring are more concerned with image than individuals low in selfmonitoring. Jordan and Roloff (1997) classified negotiators as being high or low in self-monitoring, and found that negotiators scoring high on selfmonitoring engaged more in planning of impression management (e.g., ‘‘be friendly so he’ll think I’m giving him a good deal’’). Also, there is evidence that impression motivation increases when there is accountability to constituents—the need to account to constituents the outcomes one obtained from the negotiation (note the differences with process accountability, where negotiators do not know what is expected from them; Tetlock, 1992). Negotiators under outcome accountability tend to be more competitive with their opponent, presumably because they want to impress their constituents by winning the negotiation (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a,b; Carnevale et al., 1981; Wall, 1977). Similarly, constituent surveillance tends to increase negotiator competitiveness, apparently because negotiators make greater effort to impress their constituents (e.g., Carnevale, Pruitt, & Britton, 1979). Copeland (1994) and Jones (1986) have argued that individuals with a power disadvantage have higher impression motivation than individuals with a power advantage. The idea is that low power individuals may seek situational control by managing positive impressions of themselves (see also Goodwin et al., 2000). Earlier we reviewed research suggesting that power differences influence epistemic motivation. Thus, negotiators with low power have, compared to their powerful opponents, higher epistemic motivation as well as higher impression motivation (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2002). Although impression motivation is considered a core motive in conflict and negotiation, research has focused on strategic choice and ignored information processing effects. An exception is the study by Jordan and Roloff (1997) mentioned earlier. These authors obtained positive correlations between self-monitoring and the variety of strategies and tactics negotiators thought of prior to the negotiation. It appeared that selfmonitoring and concomitant impression motivation made negotiators creative and flexible in their strategic thinking. Consistent with this, Ohbuchi and Fukushima (1997) found self-monitoring to be associated with more integrative negotiation, albeit only when there was mild (rather than acute) time pressure. Integrative behavior can be seen as requiring substantial cognitive flexibility. Conflict and negotiation research has also considered the antecedents and the consequences of power motive. Results suggest that power motive can

276

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

affect negotiation behavior in important ways. Individuals with a high power motive have a strong concern for impact, prestige, and reputation (McClelland et al., 1989). Research has shown, for example, that negotiators with a high rather than low power motive adopt a more exploitative negotiation style, and use physical and verbal aggression more frequently (Winter, 1996). Langner and Winter (2001) coded various statesmen for power motive on the basis of historical documents (e.g., speeches, minutes from meetings, interviews) and related this to conciliatory behavior in the crises with which these historical documents were concerned. Results showed that political parties led by statesmen with a high power motive were less likely to make conciliatory moves than were those led by statesmen with a low power motive.

B. OTHER MODELS Reflecting the fact that there is more than social and epistemic motivation, other models have been proposed. In fact, many studies have centered on dual concern theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Rubin et al., 1994). Other work has considered judgment and decision making in light of behavioral decision theory (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Dual concern theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) has been introduced when we discussed strategic choice as a function of social motives. It predicts strategic choice in negotiation to be a function of the interaction between social motivation and resistance to yielding—prosocial motivation leads to problem solving and high levels of information exchange, especially when negotiators have high rather than low resistance to yielding. Although dual concern theory has received good empirical support, it has been criticized for not providing useful advice (Bazerman et al., 2000; but see De Dreu, Weingart et al., 2000), and for being simplistic and unable to account for conglomerated conflict behavior—the cooccurrence of several strategies such as contending and problem solving at the same time (Van de Vliert, 1997). The current analysis accepts dual concern theory as it is, but adds several critical elements. Dual concern theory makes no predictions about the cognitive consequences of social motives. The current analysis has clarified that social motives bias information processing and search so that information consistent with one’s motive is encoded and retrieved better than information inconsistent with one’s motive. One interesting issue is that several, but not all, of the variables considered as antecedents to resistance to yielding in dual concern theory are considered antecedents to epistemic motivation in the current analysis. For example, time pressure reduces resistance to concession making

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

277

(Carnevale & Lawler, 1986) and epistemic motivation (De Dreu, 2002; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Likewise, high limits and aspirations are considered to raise resistance (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a,b), and they may increase epistemic motivation as well. The question is whether effects of time pressure and aspirations on integrative agreements are mediated by resistance to yielding, by epistemic motivation, or by both. Some variables were argued to increase resistance to yielding and to reduce epistemic motivation. An example is power—a power disadvantage reduces resistance to yielding (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981), but increases epistemic motivation (Fiske, 1992). The question is whether the potentially beneficial effects of epistemic motivation on information processing may be offset by the fact that reduced resistance to concession making leads one to make large and unilateral concessions, thus foregoing integrative agreements. Key facets of behavioral decision theory (Neale & Bazerman, 1991) have been discussed in Section III. In brief, the theory argues that negotiators are bounded in their rationality, have limited cognitive abilities, and therefore are likely to rely on cognitive heuristics that prevent them from reaching integrative agreements. The current motivational analysis can be seen as an extension and elaboration of several of its basic principles. First, behavioral decision theory has been criticized for not taking into account the social context within which conflict and negotiation take place (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Kramer & Messick, 1995; Weingart et al., 1996). The current focus on social motivation provides a way to introduce the social context into the analysis of cognitive processes. Second, following Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983; Ross, 1977; Ross & Ward, 1995) we distinguished between types of bias, and clarified that some of the suboptimal negotiation processes are due to limited cognitive capacity and the need to simplify the complexities of the world around us (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Some of them are due to basic tendencies, including ego defensiveness and naive realism (Ross & Ward, 1995). Furthermore, our analysis revealed two critical moderators—social motivation and epistemic motivation. Compared to a selfish motivation, a prosocial motivation reduces the impact of naive realism and ego defensiveness. Compared to low epistemic motivation, high epistemic motivation reduces the impact of cognitive heuristics, as well as naive realism and the biases to which it gives rise.

VIII. Conclusion In reviewing the social psychological literatures on conflict and negotiation, Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) made a distinction between a

278

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

motivation and strategy perspective and a cognitive processes perspective. The motivation and strategy perspective dominated research between 1960 and the mid-1980s. It was assumed that individuals have difficulty reaching (integrative) agreement because features of the situation, such as power differences, and motivational concerns such as the desire to beat the opponent, conspire against cooperative problem-solving and integrative negotiation (Druckman, 1994). The cognitive processes perspective has been the dominant perspective since the mid-1980s. It is assumed that the negotiators’ inclination to base judgments and decisions on faulty beliefs and inappropriate sources of information, such as the framing of the negotiation outcomes, or momentarily accessible anchor values, prohibits negotiators from reaching integrative agreements. The motivation and strategy perspective and the cognitive processes perspective have long continued to exist and develop in isolation (De Dreu, Koole et al., 2000; Kramer & Messick, 1995; O’Connor, 1997). This is unfortunate because motivation and cognition are difficult to separate (Tetlock & Levi, 1982), and because human behavior is better understood when motivation and cognition are considered together rather than in isolation (Higgins & Kruglanski, 2001). By focusing on social and epistemic motivation, we have taken a first step toward integrating the various research literatures on conflict and negotiation. Our motivational analysis has several other advantages. First, it allows us to understand the influence of many different personality variables and situational features on cognitive and behavioral processes in conflict and negotiation. That is, the influence of individual differences in social value orientation or collectivist values, and the influence of situational features such as incentive structures or the expectation of future interaction, all can be understood in terms of the difference between selfish and prosocial motivation. Likewise, the influence of individual differences in need for cognitive closure or need for cognition, and situational variation in time pressure or power differences, all can be understood in terms of high versus low epistemic motivation. Obviously, there is no simple one-to-one relationship between person and situation variables on the one hand, and social or epistemic motivation on the other. Not all of the effects of time pressure, power differences, or process accountability can be explained in terms of epistemic motivation, and not all the effects of need for affiliation, cooperative future interaction, and shared group membership can be understood in terms of social motives. Nevertheless, the current motivational analysis allows us to reduce the number of predictor variables considerably and to develop a rather parsimonious model of cognition and behavior in conflict and negotiation.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

279

Second, the combination of social and epistemic motivation yields four archetypes of individuals in conflict, and these archetypes may allow disputants, partisans, and third parties assisting in the conflict process to quickly classify disputants’ behavior. Such diagnosis may foster adequate intervention and help parties to redirect the conflict process to run a more constructive course. Third, the current motivational analysis easily connects to the study of affect and emotion in conflict and negotiation. Our discussion thus far, and much of the research on conflict and negotiation, has ignored the role of emotions. However, emotions are key and we echo comments made by Barry (1999): ‘‘as an impetus for and byproduct of social conflict, emotion is potentially central to understanding how individuals think about, behave within, and respond to bargaining situations’’ (p. 94). Emotions involve physiological reactions, action tendencies, and subjective experience (Lazarus, 1991), and they can be considered as an antecedent to, and a by-product of motivation (Frijda, 1993). For example, fear produces the desire to leave the situation, and happiness produces the desire to preserve the situation. Also, receiving lower outcomes than one’s opponent frustrates one’s desire to come out ahead and, hence, produces dissatisfaction (Gillespie, Brett, & Weingart, 2001; Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995). The connection between motivation and affect was clearly seen in the classic conference paper by Kuhlman and Carnevale (1984), which reported that people with a cooperative social value orientation were more likely to display happy facial expressions, and people with a competitive social value orientation were more likely to display angry facial expressions. A related effect was observed by Lanzetta and Englis (1989), that conflict can elicit a counterempathy response, where a smile on an opponent’s face elicits a grimace and vice versa. Studies considering affect and emotion as triggers of behavior have focused on positive versus negative moods and emotions. Although positive affect, empathy, and happiness all appear to induce a prosocial motivation, negative affect, anger, and frustration seem to make people more egoistic and selfcentered. Thus, positive affect increases concession making (Baron, 1990), joint gains (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Carnevale & Isen, 1986), and preferences for cooperation (Baron, Fortin, Frei, Hauver, & Shack, 1990; Forgas, 1998), and negative affect reduces joint gains (Allred, 2000; Allred et al., 1997), promotes the rejection of ultimatum offers (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), and increases the use of competitive strategies (Forgas, 1998). In a similar vein, it may be that surprise enhances epistemic motivation (e.g., Baker & Petty, 1994), whereas fear induced by the opponent’s angry messages appears to reduce epistemic motivation (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2002). Figures 2 and 3 could easily be modified to include affect as a parameter.

280

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

Most of the research on conflict and negotiation has, in the past 20 years, considered cognitive processes, yet ignored the motivational underpinnings and affective consequences of conflict and negotiation. The motivated information processing perspective developed here redresses this one-sided focus. Based on extensive evidence, we have argued that although ego defensiveness and naive realism constitute important psychological barriers to constructive negotiation and dispute resolution, social and epistemic motivation alone and in combination moderate the impact of bias due to cognitive limitations, ego defensiveness, and naive realism. Individuals in conflict and negotiation can be characterized as motivated information processors and, depending on their social and epistemic motives, behave as prosocial or selfish misers, or as prosocial or selfish thinkers. We agree with Sir Winston Churchill when he noted that continuous effort—not strength or intelligence—is the key to unlocking our potential. But the course this unlocked potential takes us depends very much on whether we have a competitive, selfish orientation towards the other party, or instead consider the consequences of our actions for other’s outcomes as well.

Acknowledgments Preparation of this manuscript was supported by a grant from the Netherlands Foundation for Scientific Research (NWO Grant No. 490-22-173) awarded to the first author, and NSF Grant No. SBR-9210536 awarded to the second author. For their help and comments on a previous draft of this article, we thank Bianca Beersma, Don Choi, Wolfgang Steinel, Gerben Van Kleef, Ching Wan, and Mark Zanna.

References Allred, K. G. (2000). Anger and retaliation in conflict: The role of attribution. In M. Deutsch & P. T. Coleman (Eds.), The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice (pp. 236–255). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Allred, K. G., Mallozzi, J. S., Matsui, F., & Raia, C. P. (1997). The influence of anger and compassion on negotiation performance. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 175–187. Amato, P. R., & Booth, A. (2001). The legacy of parents’ marital discord: Consequences for children’s marital quality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 627–638. Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Bacharach, S. B., & Lawler, E. J. (1981). Bargaining: Power, tactics and outcomes. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

281

Baker, S. M., & Petty, R. E. (1994). Majority and minority influence: Source-position imbalance as a determinant of message scrutinity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 5–19. Barnett, M. A., & Thompson, S. (1985). The role of perspective taking and empathy in children’s Machiavellianism, prosocial behavior, and motive for helping. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 146, 295–305. Baron, R. A. (1990). Environmentally induced positive affect: Its impact on self-efficacy, task performance, negotiation, and conflict. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 20, 368–384. Baron, R. A., Fortin, S. P., Frei, R. L., Hauver, L. A., & Shack, M. L. (1990). Reducing organizational conflict: The potential role of inducing positive affect. International Journal of Conflict Management, 1, 133–152. Barry, B. (1999). The tactical use of emotion in negotiation. Research on Negotiation in Organizations, 4, 93–121. Barry, B., & Friedman, R. A. (1998). Bargainer characteristics in distributive and integrative negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 345–359. Bartos, O. J. (1974). Process and outcome in negotiation. New York: Columbia University Press. Batson, C. D. (1998). Altruism and prosocial behavior. In D. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 282–316). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. Batson, C. D., & Shaw, L. L. (1991). Evidence for altruism: Toward a pluralism of prosocial motives. Psychological Inquiry, 2, 107–122. Bazerman, M. H., Curhan, J. R., Moore, D. A., & Valley, K. L. (2000). Negotiation. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 279–314. Bazerman, M. H., Magliozzi, T., & Neale, M. A. (1985). Integrative bargaining in a competitive market. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35, 294–313. Bazerman, M. H., & Neale, M. (1983). Heuristics in negotiation: Limitations to effective dispute resolution. In M. H. Bazerman & R. J. Lewicki (Eds.), Negotiating in organizations, (pp. 51–67). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2002). Integrative and distributive negotiation in small groups: Effects of task structure, decision rule, and social motive. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 87, 227–252. Beggan, J. K. (1992). On the social nature of nonsocial perception: The mere ownership effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 229–237. Ben-Yoav, O., & Pruitt, D. (1984a). Resistance to yielding and the expectation of cooperative future interaction in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 34, 323–335. Ben-Yoav, O., & Pruitt, D. G. (1984b). Accountability to constituents: A two-edged sword. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 34, 283–295. Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122–142. Berton, P., and Kimura, H., & Zartman, I. W. (Eds.) (1999). International negotiation: Actors, structure/process, values. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Blake, R., & Mouton, J. S. (1964). The managerial grid. Houston, TX: Gulf. Bottom, W. P. (1998). Negotiator risk: Sources of uncertainty and the impact of reference points on negotiated agreements. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76, 89–112. Bottom, W. P., & Paese, P. W. (1997). False consensus, stereotypic cues, and the perception of integrative potential in negotiation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 27, 1919–1940. Bottom, W. P., & Studt, A. (1993). Framing and distributive aspects of integrative negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 56, 459–474.

282

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

Brett, J. M., Shapiro, D. L., & Lytle, A. L. (1998). Breaking the bonds of reciprocity in negotiations. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 410–424. Brown, B. R. (1977). Face-saving and face-restoration in negotiation. In D. Druckman (Ed.), Negotiations, (pp. 275–300). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Burnham, T., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. L. (2000). Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 43, 57–73. Camac, C. (1992). Information preferences in a two-person social dilemma. In W. Liebrand, D. Messick & H. Wilke (Eds.), Social dilemmas: Theoretical issues and research findings, (pp. 147–161). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Caporael, L. R., Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M., & Van de Kragt, A. J. C. (1989). Selfishness examined: Cooperation in the absence of egoistic incentives. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12, 683–739. Carnevale, P. J. (1995). Property, culture, and negotiation. In R. Kramer & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Negotiation as a social process. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Carnevale, P. J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2002). Motivational orientation moderates cognitive bias effects in negotiation. Submitted. Carnevale, P. J., & Isen, A. (1986). The influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 37, 1–13. Carnevale, P. J., & Lawler, E. J. (1986). Time pressure and the development of integrative agreements in bilateral negotiations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30, 636–659. Carnevale, P. J., & Probst, T. M. (1998). Social values and social conflict in creative problem solving and categorization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1300–1309. Carnevale, P. J., & Pruitt, D. G. (1992). Negotiation and mediation. Annual Review of Psychology, 43, 531–582. Carnevale, P. J., & Pruitt, D. G. (2003). Negotiation in social conflict. (2nd ed.). Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Carnevale, P. J. D., Pruitt, D. G., & Britton, S. D. (1979). Looking tough: The negotiator under constituent surveillance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 5, 118–121. Carnevale, P. J., Pruitt, D. G., & Seilheimer, S. (1981). Looking and competing: Accountability and visual access in integrative bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 111–120. Chaiken, S., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Judd, C. M. (2000). Persuasion in negotiations and conflict situations. In M. Deutsch & P. Coleman (Eds.). Conflict resolution, New York. Chaiken, S. & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. New York: Guilford. Clyman, D. R. (1995). Measures of joint performance in dyadic mixed-motive negotiations. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 64, 38–48. Copeland, J. T. (1994). Prophecies of power: Motivational implications of social power for behavioral confirmation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 264–277. Cross, J. G. (1977). Negotiation as a learning process. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21, 581–606. de Callieres, F. (1716, reissued in 1963). On the manner of negotiating with princes. (Trans. A. F. White). Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press. De Dreu, C. K. W. (2002). Time pressure and motivated closing of the mind in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Submitted. De Dreu, C. K. W., Beersma, B., Stroebe, K., & Euwema, M. (2002). Motivated information processing in negotiation. In preparation.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

283

De Dreu, C. K. W., & Boles, T. (1998). Share and share alike or winner take all? Impact of social value orientation on the choice and recall of decision heuristics in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76, 253–267. De Dreu, C. K. W., Carnevale, P. J. D., Emans, B. J. M., & Van de Vliert, E. (1994). Effects of gain loss frames in negotiation: Loss aversion, mismatching, and frame adoption. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 60, 90–107. De Dreu, C. K. W., Emans, B. J., & Van de Vliert, E. (1992). Frames of reference and cooperative social decision-making. European Journal of Social Psychology, 22, 297–302. De Dreu, C. K. W., Giebels, E., & Van de Vliert, E. (1998). Social motives and trust in integrative negotiation: Disruptive effects of punitive capability. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 408–422. De Dreu, C. K. W., Koole, S., & Oldersma, F. L. (1999). On the seizing and freezing of negotiator inferences: Need for cognitive closure moderates the use of heuristics in negotiation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 348–362. De Dreu, C. K. W., Koole, S., & Steinel, W. (2000). Unfixing the fixed-pie: A motivated information processing of integrative negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 975–987. De Dreu, C. K. W., & McCusker, C. (1997). Gain-loss frames in two-person social dilemmas: A transformational analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1093–1106. De Dreu, C. K. W., Nauta, A., & Van de Vliert, E. (1995). Self-serving evaluation of conflict behavior and escalation of the dispute. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 25, 2049–2066. De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2002). The influence of power on information search, impression formation and concession making in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. Submitted. De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1995). The impact of social value orientations on negotiator cognition and behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1178–1188. De Dreu, C. K. W., Weingart, L. R., & Kwon, S. (2000). Influence of social motives on integrative negotiation: A meta-analytical review and test of two theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 889–905. De Dreu, C. K. W., Yzerbyt, V., & Leyens, J-Ph. (1995). Dilution of stereotype-based cooperation in mixed-motive interdependence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 575–593. Deutsch, M. (1949). A theory of cooperation and competition. Human Relations, 2, 199–231. Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2, 265–279. Deutsch, M. (1973). The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive processes. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Deutsch, M. (1982). Interdependence and psychological orientation. In V. Derlega & J. Gezelak (Eds.), cooperation and helping behavior (pp. 15–42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Druckman, D. (1994). Determinants of compromising behavior in negotiation: A metaanalysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38, 507–556. Druckman, D., & Zechmeister, K. (1973). Conflict of interest and value dissensus: Propositions in the sociology of conflict. Human Relations, 26, 449–466. Dunegan, K. J. (1993). Framing, cognitive modes, and image theory: Toward an understanding of a glass half full. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 491–503. Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. A. (1987). The relation of empathy to prosocial and related behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 91–119. Felson, R. B. (1978). Aggression as impression management. Social Psychology, 41, 205–213.

284

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1981). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Fiske, S. T. (1992). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. American Psychologist, 48, 621–628. Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum model of impression formation: From category-based to individuating processes as a function of information, motivation, and attention. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.). Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 1–108). New York: Academic Press. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition. New York: McGraw-Hill. Forgas, J. P. (1998). On feeling good and getting your way: Mood effects on negotiator cognition and behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 565–577. Frijda, N. H. (1993). Moods, emotion episodes, and emotions. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (pp. 381–403). New York: Guilford. Froman, L. A., & Cohen, M. D. (1970). Compromise and logroll: Comparing the efficiency of two bargaining processes. Behavioral Science, 30, 180–183. Fry, W. R. (1985). The effect of dyad machiavellianism and visual access on integrative bargaining outcomes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11, 51–62. Fry, W. R., Firestone, I. J., & Williams, D. L. (1983). Negotiation process and outcome of stranger dyads and dating couples: Do lovers lose? Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 4, 1–16. Galinsky, A. D., & Mussweiler, T. (2001). First offers as anchors: The role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 657–669. Gelfand, M. J., & Christakopoulou, S. (1999). Culture and negotiator cognition: Judgment accuracy and negotiation processes in individualistic and collectivistic cultures. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79, 248–269. Gelfand, M. J., Higgins, M., Nishii, L., Raver, J., Dominguez, A., Yamaguchi, S., Murakami, F., & Toyama, M. (2001). Culture and egocentric biases of fairness in conflict and negotiation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 1059–1074. Gelfand, M. J., & Realo, A. (1999). Individualism-collectivism and accountability in intergroup negotiations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 721–736. Gillespie, J. J., Brett, J. M., & Weingart, L. M. (2000). Interdependence, social motives, and outcome satisfaction in multiparty negotiation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 779–797. Goodwin, S. A., Gubin, A., Fiske, S. T., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2000). Power can bias impression processes: Stereotyping subordinates by default and by design. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 3, 227–256. Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. American Sociological Review, 25, 161–178. Graziano, W. G., Jensen-Campbell, L. A., & Hair, E. C. (1996). Perceiving interpersonal conflict and reacting to it: The case for agreeableness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 820–835. Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. American Psychologist, 35, 603–618. Gunnthorsdottir, A., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. (2002). Using the Machiavellianism instrument to predict trustworthiness in a bargaining game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 23, 49–66. Guth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367–388. Hammond, K. R. (1965). New directions in research on conflict resolution. Journal of Social Issues, 21, 44–66.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

285

Harinck, F., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Vianen, A. E. M. (2000). The impact of issue content on fixed-pie perceptions, problem solving and integrative outcomes in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 81, 329–358. Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Rapson, R. L. (1994). Emotional contagion. New York: Cambridge University Press. Higgins, E. T., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2001). Motivational science: The nature and functions of wanting. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Motivational science: Social and personality perspectives (pp. 1–20). New York: Psychology Press. Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences. London: Sage. Hofstee, W. K. B., De Raad, B., & Goldberg, L. R. (1992). Integration of the big five and circumplex approaches to trait structure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 146–163. Holsti, O. R. (1962). The belief system and national images: A case study. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6, 244–252. Huber, V. L., & Neale, M. A. (1986). Effects of cognitive heuristics and goals on negotiator performance and subsequent goal setting. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 38, 342–365. Hulbert, L. G., Correa da Silva, M. L., & Adegboyega, G. (2001). Cooperation in social dilemmas and allocentrism: A social values approach. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 641–658. Jehn, K. (1995). A multimethod examination of the benefits and detriments of intragroup conflict. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 256–282. Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jones, E. E. (1986). Interpreting interpersonal behavior: The effects of expectancies. Science, 234, 41–46. Jordan, J. M., & Roloff, M. E. (1997). Planning skills and negotiator goal accomplishment. Communication Research, 24, 31–63. Judd, C. M. (1978). Cognitive effects of attitude conflict resolution. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22, 483–498. Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., & Thaler, R. (1990). Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1325–1348. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80, 237–251. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263–291. Kasser, T., & Ahuvia, A. (2002). Materialistic values and well-being in business students. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 137–146. Kelley, H. H. (1966). A classroom study of the dilemmas in interpersonal negotiations. In K. Archibald (Ed.), Strategic interaction and conflict: Original papers and discussion, (pp. 67–85). Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies. Kelley, H. H., Beckman, L. L., & Fischer, C. S. (1967). Negotiation the division of reward under incomplete information. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 3, 361–389. Kelley, H. H., & Schenitzki, D. P. (1972). Bargaining. In C. McClintock (Ed.), Experimental social psychology (pp. 298–337). New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 66–91.

286

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. W. (1978). Interpersonal relations: A theory of interdependence. New York: Wiley. Keltner, D., & Robinson, R. J. (1993). Imagined ideological differences in conflict escalation and resolution. International Journal of Conflict Management, 4, 249–262. Kemmelmeier, M., & Winter, D. G. (2000). Putting threat into perspective: Experimental studies on perceptual distortion in international conflict. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 795–809. Kemp, K. E., & Smith, W. P. (1994). Information exchange, toughness, and integrative bargaining: The roles of explicit cues and perspective-taking. International Journal of Conflict Management, 5, 5–21. Kenrick, D. T., & Funder, D. C. (1988). Profiting from controversy: Lessons learned from the person  situation debate. American Psychologist, 43, 23–34. Kimmel, M. J., Pruitt, D. G., Magenau, J. M., Konar-Goldband, E., & Carnevale, P. J. D. (1980). Effects of trust, aspiration, and gender on negotiation tactics. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 9–22. Kramer, R. M., & Carnevale, P. J. (2001). Trust and intergroup negotiation. In R. Brown & S. Gaertner (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology, Vol 4: Intergroup relations (pp. 431–450). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. Kramer, R. M. & Messick, D. M. (Eds.), (1995). Negotiation as a social process. London: Sage. Kramer, R. M., Pommerenke, P., & Newton, E. (1993). The social context of negotiation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37, 633–654. Kray, L. J., Thompson, L., & Galinsky, A. (2001). Battle of the sexes: Gender stereotype confirmation and reactance in negotiations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 942–958. Kristensen, H., & Ga¨ rling, T. (1997). The effects of anchor points and reference points on negotiation process and outcome. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 71, 85–94. Kruglanski, A. W. (1989). The psychology of being ‘‘right’’: The problem of accuracy in social perception and cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 395–409. Kruglanski, A. W., & Ajzen, I. (1983). Bias and error in human judgment. European Journal of Social Psychology, 13, 1–44. Kruglanski, A. W., & Freund, T. (1983). The freezing and unfreezing of lay-inferences: Effects on impressional primacy, ethnic stereotyping, and numerical anchoring. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 448–468. Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: ‘‘Seizing and ‘‘freezing.’’ Psychological Review, 103, 263–283. Kuhlman, D. M., & Carnevale, P. J. (1984). Differences in nonverbal demeanor between cooperators, individualists, and competitors. Paper presented at the 92nd Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Kuhlman, D. M., & Marshello, A. (1975). Individual differences in game motivation as moderators of preprogrammed strategic effects in prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 922–931. Langner, C. A., & Winter, D. G. (2001). The motivational basis of concessions and compromise: Archival and laboratory studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 711–727. Lanzetta, J. T., & Englis, B. G. (1989). Expectations of cooperation and competition and their effects on observers’ vicarious emotional responses. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 543–554. Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

287

Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 255–275. Levine, J. M., & Thompson, L. (1996). Conflict in groups. In T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 745–776). New York: Guilford. Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and decisions. New York: Wiley. MacCrimmon, K. R., & Messick, D. (1976). A framework for social motives. Behavioral Science, 21, 86–100. Mayseless, O., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1987). What makes you so sure? Effects of epistemic motivations on judgmental confidence. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39, 162–183. McClelland, D. C., Koestner, R., & Weinberger, J. (1989). How do self-attributed and implicit motives differ? Psychological Review, 96, 690–702. McClintock, C. (1977). Social motives in settings of outcome interdependence. In D. Druckman (Ed.), Negotiations: Social psychological perspective, (pp. 49–77). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. McHoskey, J. W. (1999). Machiavellianism, intrinsic versus extrinsic goals, and social interest: A self-determination theory analysis. Motivation and Emotion, 23, 267–283. Messick, D. M., Bloom, S., Boldizar, J. P., & Samuelson, C. D. (1985). Why we are fairer than others. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 480–500. Messick, D. M., & McClintock, C. (1968). Motivational bases of choice in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4, 1–25. Morris, M. W., & Keltner, D. (2000). How emotions work: An analysis of the social functions of emotional expression in negotiations. Research in Organizational Behavior, 22, 1–50. Morris, M. W., Larrick, R. P., & Su, S. K. (1999). Misperceiving negotiation counterparts: When situationally determined bargaining behaviors are attributed to personality traits. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 52–67. Nash, J. F. (1954). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18, 155–162. Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1985). The effects of framing and negotiator overconfidence on bargaining behaviors and outcomes. Academy of Management Journal, 28, 34–49. Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1991). Rationality and cognition in negotiation. New York: Free Press. Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. (1987). Experts, amateurs, and real estate: An anchoringand-adjustment perspective on property pricing decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39, 84–97. O’Connor, K. (1997). Motives and cognitions in negotiation: A theoretical integration and empirical test. International Journal of Conflict Management, 8, 114–131. Ohbuchi, K-I., & Fukushima, O. (1997). Personality and interpersonal conflict: Aggressiveness, self-monitoring, and situational variables. International Journal of Conflict Management, 8, 99–113. Ohbutsu, Y., & Kameda, T. (1998). The function of equality heuristic in distributive bargaining: Negotiated allocation of costs and benefits in a demand revelation context. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 34, 90–108. Olekalns, M., Smith, P. L., & Walsh, T. (1996). The process of negotiating: Strategy and timing as predictors of outcomes. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 68, 68–77. Paese, P. W., & Yonker, R. D. (2001). Toward a better understanding of egocentric fairness judgments in negotiation. International Journal of Conflict Management, 12, 97–186. Parks, C. D., Henager, R. F., & Scamahorn, S. D. (1996). Trust and reactions to messages of intent in social dilemmas. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40, 134–151.

288

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123–205). New York: Academic Press. Pillutla, M. M., & Murnighan, J. K. (1996). Unfairness, anger, and spite: Emotional rejections of ultimatum offers. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 68, 208–224. Pinkley, R. L., Griffith, T. L., & Northcraft, G. B. (1995). ‘‘Fixed Pie’’ a` la Mode: Information availability, information processing, and the negotiation of suboptimal agreements. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62, 101–112. Pinkley, R. L., & Northcraft, G. B. (1994). Conflict frames of reference: Implications for dispute processes and outcomes. Academy of Management Journal, 37, 193–205. Polzer, J. T., Mannix, E. A., & Neale, M. A. (1998). Interest alignment and coalitions in multiparty negotiation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 42–54. Probst, T., Carnevale, P. J., & Triandis, H. C. (1999). Cultural values in intergroup and singlegroup social dilemmas. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 77, 171–191. Pruitt, D. G. (1967). Reward structure and cooperation: The decomposed prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 21–27. Pruitt, D. G. (1981). Negotiation behavior. New York: Academic Press. Pruitt, D. G. (1998). Social conflict. In D. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, 89–150). New York: McGraw-Hill. Pruitt, D. G., & Drews, J. L. (1969). The effect of time pressure, time elapsed, and the opponent’s concession rate on behavior in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 5, 43–60. Pruitt, D. G., & Kimmel, M. J. (1977). Twenty years of experimental gaming: Critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. Annual Review of Psychology, 28, 363–392. Pruitt, D. G., & Lewis, S. A. (1975). Development of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 621–633. Pruitt, D. G., & Rubin, J. Z. (1986). Social conflict: escalation, stalemate, and settlement. New York: McGraw-Hill. Raiffa, H. (1982). The art and science of negotiation. Cambridge, MA: Belknap. Rapoport, A. (1960). Fights, games and debates. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Rettinger, D. A., & Hastie, R. (2001). Content effects on decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 85, 336–359. Richter, L., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1999). Motivated search for common ground: Need for closure effects on audience design in interpersonal communication. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1101–1114. Robinson, R. J., Keltner, D., Ward, A., & Ross, L. (1995). Actual versus assumed differences in construal: ‘‘Naı¨ve realism’’ in intergroup perception and conflict. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 404–417. Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.) Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10). New York: Academic Press. Ross, L., & Stillinger, C. (1991). Barriers to conflict resolution. Negotiation Journal November, 389–404. Ross, L., & Ward, A. (1995). Psychological barriers to dispute resolution. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, (Vol. 27, pp. 255–304). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Ross, W. H., & Conlon, D. E. (2000). Hybrid forms of third party dispute resolution: Theoretical implications of combining mediation and arbitration. Academy of Management Review, 25, 416–427.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

289

Roth, A. E. (1994). Bargaining. In J. Kagel & A. E. Roth (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics (pp. 253–348). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rothbart, M., & Hallmark, W. (1988). In-group and out-group differences in the perceived efficacy of coercion and conciliation in resolving social conflict. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 248–257. Rubin, J., & Brown, R. (1975). Social psychology of bargaining and negotiation. New York: Academic Press. Rubin, J., Pruitt, D. G., & Kim, S. (1994). Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement. New York: McGraw-Hill. Rubinstein, A. (1999). Experience from a course in game theory: Pre-and postclass problem sets as a didactic device. Games and Economic Behavior, 28, 155–170. Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press. Shalev, J. (2002). Loss aversion and bargaining. Theory and Decision, 52, 210–232. Shestowsky, D., Wegener, D. T., & Fabrigar, L. R. (1998). Need for cognition and interpersonal influence: Individual differences in impact on dyadic decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1317–1328. Siegel, A. E., & Fouraker, L. E. (1960). Bargaining and group decision making. New York: McGraw-Hill. Simon, H. A. (1957). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69, 99–118. Simonson, I., & Staw, B. M. (1992). Deescalation strategies: A comparison of techniques for reducing commitment to losing courses of action. Journal of Applied Psychology, 77, 419–426. Singelis, T. M., Triandis, H. C., Bhawuk, D. P. S., & Gelfand, M. J. (1995). Horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism: A theoretical and measurement refinement. Cross-Cultural Research, 29, 240–275. Smith, E. R., & DeCoster, J. (2000). Dual process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 108–131. Smith, V. L. (2001). From old issues to new directions in experimental psychology and economics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 428–429. Snyder, M. (1992). Motivational foundations of behavioral confirmation. In M. Zanna (Ed.). Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 67–114). New York: Academic Press. Susskind, L., McKearnan, S. & Thomas-Larmer, J.(Eds.), (1999). The consensus building handbook: A comprehensive guide to reaching agreement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social-psychological perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193–210. Tetlock, P. E. (1992). The impact of accountability on judgment and choice: Toward a social contingency model. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 331–376). New York: Academic Press. Tetlock, P. E., & Levi, A. (1982). Attribution bias: On the inconclusiveness of the cognitionmotivation debate. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 18, 68–88. Thompson, L. L (1990). Negotiation behavior and outcomes: Empirical evidence and theoretical issues. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 515–532. Thompson, L. L. (1991). Information exchange in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 82–90. Thompson, L. L. (1995). ‘‘They saw a negotiation:’’ Partisanship and involvement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 839–853.

290

DE DREU AND CARNEVALE

Thompson, L. L. (1998). The mind and heart of the negotiator. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Thompson, L. L., & Hastie, R. (1990). Social perception in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 47, 98–123. Thompson, L. L., & Hebrec, D. (1996). Lose-lose agreements in interdependent decision making. Psychological Bulletin, 120, 396–409. Thompson, L. L., & Loewenstein, G. (1992). Egocentric interpretations of fairness in interpersonal conflict. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51, 176–197. Thompson, L. L., Valley, K. L., & Kramer, R. M. (1995). The bittersweet feeling of success: An examination of social perception in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 1–26. Tjosvold, D. (1998). Cooperative and competitive goal approach to conflict: Accomplishments and challenges. Applied Psychology, 46, 285–342. Tjosvold, D., & Sun, H. (2000). Social face in conflict: Effects of affronts to person and position in China. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4, 259–271. Triandis, H. C. (1989). The self and social behavior in different cultural contexts. Psychological Review, 96, 506–520. Tripp, T., & Sondak, H. (1992). An evaluation of dependent variables in experimental negotiation: Effects of decision rule, agenda, and aspiration. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51, 273–295. Tyler, T., Huo, Y. J., & Lind, E. A. (1999). The two psychologies of conflict resolution: Differing antecedents of pre-experience choices and post-experience evaluations. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 2, 99–118. Van Boven, L., Dunning, D., & Loewenstein, G. (2000). Egocentric empathy gaps between owners and buyers: Misperceptions of the endowment effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 66–76. Van de Vliert, E. (1997). Complex interpersonal conflict behavior. London: Psychology Press. Van Dyne, L., & Le Pine, J. A. (1998). Helping and voice extra-role behaviors: Evidence of construct and predictive validity. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 108–119. Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W. (2002). Social value orientation, information search, and impression formation in negotiation. International Journal of Conflict Management. Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2002 June). Interpersonal effects of opponent’s emotions in negotiation. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Association for Conflict Management, Park City, UT, 13, 59–77. Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 337–349. Van Lange, P. A. M., & Kuhlman, M. D. (1994). Social value orientations and impressions of partner’s honesty and intelligence: A test of might versus morality effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 126–141. Van Lange, P. A. M., Otten, W., De Bruin, E. M. N., & Joireman, J. A. (1997). Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: Theory and preliminary evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 733–746. Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O (1947). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wall, J. A. (1977). Intergroup bargaining: Effects of opposing constituents’ stance, opposing representative’s bargaining, and representatives’ locus of control. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21, 459–474. Wall, J. A. (1991). Impression management in negotiations. In R. A. Giacalone & P. Rosenfeld (Eds.), Applied impression management, London: Sage.

MOTIVATION IN CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION

291

Walton, R. E., & McKersie, R. (1965). A behavioral theory of labor negotiations: An analysis of a social interaction system. New York: McGraw-Hill. Webster, D., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 1049–1062. Weingart, L. R., Bennett, R. J., & Brett, J. M. (1993). The impact of consideration of issues and motivational orientation on group negotiation process and outcome. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 504–517. Weingart, L. R., Brett, J. M., & Olekalns, M. (2001). Mixed motivational orientations in negotiating groups: Convergence and reaching agreement. Paper presented at the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology 13th Annual Conference, Dallas, TX. Weingart, L. R., Hyder, E., & Prietula, M. J. (1996). Knowledge matters: The effect of tactical descriptions on negotiation behavior and outcome. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 1205–1217. Weingart, L. R., Thompson, L., Bazerman, M. H., & Carroll, J. S. (1990). Tactical behavior and negotiation outcomes. International Journal of Conflict Management, 1, 7–31. Wilson, D., Near, D. C., & Miller, R. R. (1998). Individual differences in Machiavellianism as a mix of cooperative and exploitative strategies. Evolution and Human Behavior, 19, 203–212. Winter, D. G. (1996). Personality: Analysis and interpretation of lives. New York: McGraw-Hill. Yukl, G. A. (1974). The effects of situational variables and opponent concessions on a bargainer’s perception, aspirations, and concessions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 227–236. Yukl, G. A., Malone, M. P., Hayslip, B., & Pamin, T. A. (1976). The effects of time pressure and issue settlement order on integrative bargaining. Sociometry, 39, 277–281. Zartman, I. W. (1991). Regional conflict resolution. In V. A. Kremenyuk (Ed.), International negotiation (pp. 302–314). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.