Multinational companies performance measurement systems: international perspectives

Management Accounting Research, 1992, 3, 133- 150

Multinational companies performance measurement systems: international perspectives J. B. Coates,* E. W. Davis,* C. R. Emmanuel,? S. G. Longden* and R. J. Stacey* The exercise of control within multinational companies remains largely unknown and yet, national studies now and in the future may be significantly influenced by the mechanisms which parent companies require their subsidiaries to adopt. Central to the process of control is likely to be the performance measurements system. This study of 15 multinational companies reports the design features of control systems by concentrating on the association between performance measurement and corporate objectives, managerial responsibilities and incentives. The initial findings indicate considerable diversity within and between enterprises which have head offices located in different countries.

This paper reports upon the performance evaluation systems of a total of 15 German, U.K. and U.S. multinationals that are compared against a blackcloth of theory provided by Hopwood (1974), Holzer and Schoenfeld (1986), Simons (1989, 1990) and Goold and Campbell (1989). The object of the paper is to provide a holistic analysis of the relationships between corporate missions, objectives, managerial responsibilities and incentive payments of the parent and its subsidiaries, together with the formal performance evaluation system. The intention is not to attribute superior qualities to any one system but merely to improve our understanding of why the system exists and how it is seen to operate. By comprehending practice in a more focused way, the potentially important questions to be asked in developing an explanatory framework can be elucidated. Within this context the present research seeks to discover: (1) the form and design of alternative control systems employed by 15 multinationals with head offices in three countries; (2) the differences, if any, which exist between the multinational companies in controlling their 30 divisions and operating subsidiaries in the home country and abroad; and (3) the use made of control measures and the manner of their application. * Aston Business School, Aston University, Aston Triangle, Birmingham B4 7ET, U.K. t The University, Glasgow, G12 9QQ, U.K. Received 15 May 1991; accepted 19th February, 1992.

0 1992 Academic Press Limited

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Specifically, the research seeks to identify: (i) the corporate mission of the multinational and the objectives of segments of the enterprise; (ii) the measures, both financial and non-financial, which are used to evaluate 'performance'; (iii) the manner in which these measures contribute to planning and control. One aspect of particular concern is how the performance measures relate to corporate strategy or mission. One way of viewing this is to use the approach that Robert Simons (1990) applied to U.S. companies within one industry. This involves interviews at subsidiary or divisional level being conducted to discover whether certain performance measures are used interactively or diagnostically. The former would indicate a strategic use of performance measures, whereas the latter would not. The use of a system interactively produces a cascading effect through the organization. We would expect to find all subordinate managers engaged to some extent in the interactive dialogue which is activated by their superior's attention to the information provided by the system. Simons suggests that the main reason for such a focus is the strategic uncertainties faced by the organization. Another approach is to use the work of Goold and Campbell (1989) as a reference base and to classify our multinational companies by the strategic style of their performance evaluation systems (see Appendix A). 1. Methodology Case study research invariably raises questions as to its validity, especially as to the degree to which the results can be generalized. The main criticism is that the case is representative of nothing but itself and hence leads to unconfirmable conclusions. As a result, it is a research method of the last resort and it can only be used in exploratory stages. However, in recent years, increasing support has been given to the approach as a means of furthering knowledge of business practice in the sphere of accounting and finance (Hopwood, 1983; Scapens, 1990). With reference to the problem of generalizability, Mohr (1985) comments that 'the utility of the case study should not be explored as a general matter, because it may differ with different types of research. . . whether the research is theoretical, evaluative, or associational'. The present research most closely fits Mohr's category of 'associational' research, where 'one is not dealing with a general causal law, even a highly contingent one, but with a vaguely limited association'. 'The aim of associational research . . . is to predict or to explain (understand) Y in some limited population'. Organizations are cited in the examples given as 'populations' and Y, as a variable, could clearly be performance management; 'understanding' is very much the objective. Altogether, 45 managers were interviewed, representing 15 parent multinationals, five each from the U.S.A., U.K. and Germany, and 30 divisions or subsidiaries drawn equally from domestic and overseas spheres of operation. An inevitable and desired feature was that each of the multinationals was large and had significant overseas involvement in several countries. Each participating company was listed in The Times Top 200 or equivalent for their particular country of domicile with the majority falling within the Top 100. In each case, the interview involved a series of common, open-ended questions intended to elicit consistent responses both within and between companies. Following each interview, reports were submitted to individual in-

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terviewees as part of the validation process. Within each multinational, interviews were conducted with three levels of management, beginning with finance directors (or controllers in some cases) at group level, followed by interviews with subsidiary or divisional counterparts. The interview process therefore generated data upon 45 corporate entities and concentrated on descriptions of corporate missions, objectives and subsidiary goals together with aspects of the groups' managerial incentive schemes. All features of the groups' performance measurement systems, whether financial, qualitative or expressed in terms of non-financial quantitative objectives, were of interest together with any potential relationship with formal incentive schemes. Particular attention was directed at the consistency of the objectives and performance measurement system when related to corporate mission statements. When agreed, the interview reports combine to offer a case study of the individual multinational.

2. Criteria for performance evaluation systems Despite an ongoing debate (Lowe and Machin, 1983; Anthony, 1988) as to what is the appropriate design of the control system, there is broad agreement that some form of performance evaluation system is the critical feature in the exercise of effective control, particularly when business enterprises operate across different countries and industries. Some form of comparative indicator is required to guide resource allocation decisions. While the question of internal vertical consistency represents a valid and important target for research, this focus also highlights the strategic nature of the performance measurement system-an aspect of increasing international interest. It was valuable to us to consider how our companies fitted with the scheme adopted by Goold and Campbell (1989) for classifying overall management styles in large companies. The alternative classifications of strategic planning, strategic control and financial control may or may not be revealed by a detailed analysis of the performance measurement system, which is the distinctive feature of our present research. At the same time, Simons' distinction between diagnostic and interactive use of the performance measurement system was helpful in terms of assessing companies' ability to respond to changing environments and aided subsequent classification of their strategic style. On these bases, our analysis relates multinational corporate objectives with the strategic dimensions of their control systems, as implemented and reflected through performance measurement.

3. Multinational companies mission statements Within our 15 multinational companies, the mission statement was usually expressed in terms of general corporate aims, for example, 'maximize shareholder wealth', and often appeared as a simplified outline of corporate strategy. Objectives were specific and usually quantified. Performance measures frequently incorporated the objectives but tended to be broader in scope and occupied a supporting role. Those multinationals that indicated a shareholder commitment in their mission statement usually did so in relation to some other strategy, the most common being in relation to a marketing orientation. In some companies, the emphasis upon marketing and production targets had overtaken that of shareholder wealth maximization, at least in terms of explicit references within the group's mission statement. Evidence from the interviews with

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some subsidiaries suggested that the subsidiaries had greater awareness of the corporate financial objectives that had been set than of the corporate mission, and that this generated differing perceptions between the head office and subsidiary management. For example, the corporate mission of one U.S. company was stated at group level to be 'growth in the market value of stock', whereas a major subsidiary considered it to be survival, with emphasis also on quality products, market share and return to shareholders. In other companies, the view was expressed by subsidiaries that the role of the mission statement was primarily orientated towards shareholders, customers and other external stakeholders, whereas the subsidiaries were concerned with the substance of the annual report. Other subsidiaries did have mission statements of their own, but these were mainly concerned with markets and products rather than profitability.

4. How are mission statements translated into corporate objectives for parent and subsidiaries? Where a shareholder wealth maximization objective was set, it was usually supported by the main financial objective expressed in terms of a proxy such as earnings per share or some other profit based measure. Profit based objectives were usually associated with a measure of growth, normally stated either in financial terms, for example, growth of profits, or in market terms, such as increased market share. In some companies, further reinforcement for the profit based objectives was provided by a group of measures concerned with cash flow, liquidity and financial risk, which were used either independently of, or in combination with growth. When linked to profit and growth they could be considered to form a triangle of objectives or constraints, with each group of measures working to overcome the limitations of the others. One of the U.K. companies in the early 1980s had introduced a system of financial performance appraisal centred upon the rate of return on capital employed. However, subsequent deterioration in the group's liquidity position led to the introduction of the requirement to have a positive cash flow. In combination these measures served to discourage growth and hence, from 1987, growth targets had also been set. Analysis of the basis by which corporate objectives were delegated to subsidiaries indicated that many of these used broadly the same three measures of profitability, growth and cash flow. In cases where a multinational defined profit objectives in terms of earnings per share or return on equity, then it did so by disaggregating funding down to subsidiaries and applying a notional gearing to the capital employed by each subsidiary. Similarly, where the group objective was net profit after interest, delegation to subsidiary level required that interest be calculated by reference to a notional gearing. Gearing and tax effects accounted for differences in the two approaches with ROCE usually being before interest and tax. Such devices inevitably tended to be both artificial and complex, so that it was not surprising to find that some multinationals preferred objectives set in terms of a target return on assets or capital employed. The effect of this, however, was to produce a situation in which the objective of the subsidiary was further removed from the mission of shareholder wealth maximization. If subsidiaries were protected from the effects of interest rate changes and taxation, then this could result in sub-optimal resource allocation decisions for the group as a whole. In contrast, group objectives for growth in sales or market share were more easily delegated to subsidiaries, often being made more specific in terms of markets and products, a process which also applied to liquidity or cash flow measures.

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5. The consistency between objectives and performance measures Within each multinational company, the consistency between the mission statement, objectives and performance measures were gauged and are outlined in Tables 1-3. A general concern with profitability and marketing effectiveness was broadly indicated. However, it was notable that subsidiary and corporate performance measures were not always coincidental. The incidence of a wider range of indicators was apparent at the subsidiary level. Whether these disguise or illuminate the corporate mission and objectives seemed to be a matter of managerial perception.

6. International differences in performance measurement systems: the varying emphasis upon financial stability

A detailed breakdown of individual performance measures for individual companies identified by country are given in Tables 4-6. Both British and U.S. companies used various profit linked performance measures but apparently placed a relatively lighter weight, in contrast to the German multinationals, upon market share. The German companies seemed to put greater emphasis upon return on sales and market share as performance measures. British companies' profit orientated performance measures were set out in more detail, although in some cases, but not all, targets were also set for growth of profits, market share or earnings per share. From Table 4, the U.K. companies relative emphasis on earnings per share may be contrasted with a low emphasis on operating expenses which was favoured by several of the German and U.S. companies. Market share indicators would appear to be fairly commonly used by this sample of companies, whilst gearing and measures of financial stability were confined almost exclusively to U.K. and U.S. companies (Table 5). The employment of non-financial performance measures was more prevalent in some U.S. companies and less widely used elsewhere (Table 6). Explanations for the adoption of such differing emphases in performance measurement systems can, of course, include cultural and structural differences, such as the influence of capital markets, with U.S. and U.K. multinationals being exposed to more stringent short-term performance requirements than German companies. Differences in the level of interest rates and in the capital market structures of the respective economies would help explain British firms' relatively greater preoccupation with financial stability. However, not all the companies of the same country use the same set of indicators and industry sector influences may therefore provide an additional explanation. This impact is difficult to gauge and depends on the extent to which the industry operates globally. Nevertheless, the potential influence of industry characteristics should not be ignored. Given the relatively greater weight placed upon financial stability by British, and to an extent, U.S. firms, the second important question that arises is whether this necessarily leads to a greater short term emphasis in this other aspects of their objectives and performance management systems. All companies, in all countries list profitability as an objective and as a measure of performance. What matters, therefore, is the way in which the system is used.

HO, Head Office; S, subsidiary.

Y

Y

Y Y

Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y

Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y

Y Y

Y

Y Y Y Y

Profitability Growth market share Cash flow liquidity Financial stability Productivity Others

Y Y

U.S.1

U.K.1 U.K.2 U.K.3 U.K.4 U.K.5

Company

Table 3 Summay of principal factors covered by pdonnance measures

Y

Y Y

Y

Y Y

U.S.2

Y Y

Y

Y

Y Y

Y

U.S.3

Y Y Y

Y Y Y

U.S.4

Y

Y Y

Y

Y Y

U.S.5

Y Y

GR1

Y

Y

Y

GR2

Y Y Y

Y

Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

GR3

Y Y Y

GR4

Y

Y Y

GR5

Y

Y

Y

U.S.5

GR1

GR2

GR3

GR4

GR5

HO, Head Office; S, subsidiary.

Y Y

Y Y

Y

Y Y Y

Y

Y Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y Y Y Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y

Y

Y Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y Y

Y

Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y

Y Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y Y

Y

Y

Y Y

Y

Y

Y Y Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

U.S.4

Earnings per share Return on equity Return on capital employed Return on assets Return on sales Sales/lixed assets Gross contribution Profit before interest and tax Profit after interest before tax Profit after interest and capital maintenance Profit after interest and tax Economic value added Operating expenses NPV of future cash Bows

U.S.3

HO S HO S HO S HO S HO S HO S MO S HO S HO S HO S HO S HO S HO S HO S HO S

U.S.2

Profitability

U.S.l

U . K . l U.K.2 U.K.3 U.K.4 U.K.5

Company

Table 4 Breakdown s h i n g main profitability pe$ormance measures used by companies

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7. The strategic stance embodied in multinationals' performance measurement systems

Here our approach has been to seek to classify firms by the overall strategic stance of their performance measurement systems. Previous attempts to classify firms by their strategic style include work by Porter (1980, 1985), Miles and Snow (1978), and, more relevant to our context, Goold and Campbell (1989). We used Goold and Campbell's typology of firms into strategic planners, strategic controllers and financial controllers as a basis for identification of the short-term orientation of our multinationals; emphasis on the non-strategic dimension, i.e. financial control, being construed as 'short-termism'. In the Goold and Campbell analysis of strategic control styles, only strategic planning allows a flexible approach to monitoring and control, while the other two modes of strategic control and financial control indicate varying degrees of tighter control. In constructing the classification for our multinationals as exhibited in Tables 7-9, however, we also incorporated the methodological approach of Roberts Simons to assist in interpreting our firms' strategic dimensions. His distinction between systems as either interactive (strategic) or diagnostic (non-strategic) was useful in our evaluation of the formal and informal aspects of multinationals' performance evaluation systems, particularly when our approach included the relationship between the incentive payment plan and the achievement of budgetary or other corporate performance targets. In the following, we describe the cases of one U.S. multinational and one U.K. multinational to illustrate the extremes of the continuum following Simons' approach, before proceeding to a summary classification of overall strategic style for all 15 MNCs, based on Goold and Campbell. In the U.S. multinational, the emphasis was on achievement of revenue and profitability against plan. At the senior level, quarterly executive business reviews, which included a review of the long range plan and the annual budget, were conducted. At lower levels of management, the reviews were monthly. As far as possible the profit and sales growth mission was consistently applied down to the plant level; revenue, gross margin etc. being shown for individual product lines within manufacturing plants. The managerial incentive reward scheme also supported this emphasis of performance against plan, 60°/o of the bonus being based upon the achievement of planned revenue and asset growth. Using the criteria proposed by Simons, it would appear that the budgeting system was being used interactively by the company. He found that companies that used the budgeting system interactively were those that operated in a competitive, rapidly changing environment where proactive tactics were required to establish and maintain positions of market leadership. This seems to fit well with the U.S. company which operated in a very competitive, high technology industry, and which aimed to be a market leader, while developing primarily financial measures that cascaded down the organization to reward performance consistent with stated corporate objectives. The U.K. multinational also operated in an extremely competitive, volatile market and hence might be expected to use the budgeting system interactively. The incentive scheme was linked to performance against plan, but more emphasis was placed on individual subsidiary performance. Subsidiaries report performance against plan monthly, with reviews only on an exception basis. It would appear, therefore, that the budgeting system was being used diagnostically for most of the time. It was noted, however, that certain performance measures were emphasized at different times e.g.

Style

Monitoring and control

Objectives

Resource allocation

Themes, thrusts and suggestions

Organizational structure and overlap management Planning process

U.K. 1

Long term economic performance Long term strategic and short term financial Flexible, budget comparisons Strategic planning

Extensive, strategic, from centre Strategy statement

Two business streams

Table 7 Strategic control: U . K . companies

Long term strategic and short term financial Flexible, budget comparisons Strategic control

Long term, strategic

Business autonomy stressed

Five management groups, 20 direct reporting businesses Strategic, from ORBS

U.K. 2

Financial control

Very tight

Project based, short term payback Short term financial

Over-riding philosophy of decentralization Mainly annual budgets, bottom up Business autonomy stressed

U.K. 3

Long term strategic and short term financial Flexible, budget comparisons Strategic control

Strategy statement, some business autonomy Long term, strategic

Three sectors, decentralized into divisions Strategic, from sectors

U.K. 4

Strategic control

Flexible

Strategic and medium term financial Long term strategic and short term financial

Strategic at divisional level Divisional autonomy stressed

Three divisions

U.K. 5

Budgets, bottom up

Divisional autonomy stressed Project based, short payback Short term, financial

Tight, against budget

Financial control

Planning process

Themes, thrusts and suggestions Resource allocation

Monitoring and control

Style

Objectives

Four operating groups divisional structure, separate investment centres

U.S. 1

Organizational structure and overlap management

Table 8 Strategic control: U.S . companies

Strategic planning

Corporate mission statement Part of long term strategy Long term, strategic and medium term financial Flexible, against strategic plan

Extensive, strategic

Geographical, 150 subsidiaries, strong staff functions, coordination mechanisms

U.S. 2

Strategic, plus annual plans Strong central leadership Part of long term strategy Long term strategic and medium term financial Emphasis on costs and output. Daily contact Strategic control

Two operational segments, geographical organizati~~l within

U.S. 3

Strategic planning

Flexible, informal

Strong central leadership Part of long term strategy Medium term strategic

Matrix structure: production and marketing, strong staff functions, coordination mechanisms Extensive, strategic

U.S. 4

Strategic control

Tight strategic and financial

Strategic, bottom up and top down Moving towards more autonomy Part of long term strategy Long term strategic and short term financial

Manufacturing and marketing, product groups and geographical

U.S. 5

Extensive, strategic Strong central leadership Part of long term strategy Long term strategic Flexible Strategic planning

Strong central leadership

Part of long term strategy Long term strategic

Flexible, regular Strategic planning

Themes, thrusts and suggestions

Resource allocation

Monitoring and control Style

Objectives

Planning process

Four industry sectors, matrix structure

Four business stress, matrix structure, strong staff functions Extensive, strategic

German 2

Organizational structure and overlap management

German 1

Table 9 Strategic control: Gennan companies

Part of long term strategy Long term strategic and shorter term financial Flexible, informal Strategic planning

At strategic level only, operational business autonomy stressed

Nine groups of companies 'controlled decentralization' Extensive, strategic

German 3

Strategic, consensus building General understanding of group aims, business autonomy stressed Part of long term strategy Long term strategic and shorter term financial Tight, informal Strategic control

Highly decentralized

German 4

Tight Strategic control

Part of long term strategy Long term strategic and shorter term financial

Operational autonomy stressed

Extensive, stiategic

Matrix structure

German 5

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J. B. Coates et al.

over one twelve month period, the emphasis had been on growth of market share, and over a subsequent six month period, on cash flow. For this latter period, the use of the respective performance measures changed from being normally diagnostic (only report exceptions) towards an interactive use (regular reporting and review of these items). Using criteria put forward both by Simons (1989, 1990) Gold and Campbell (1989), and ourselves, we can now examine the overall classification of the strategic orientation of our multinationals' performance measurement systems. When these 15 firms are evaluated within the Goold and Campbell classification, indicated in Tables 7-9, the impression given is that German companies are rather more orientated towards the strategic planning mode or longer term view. However, the participating British and U.S. companies favour a greater emphasis on financiallstrategic control and reinforce this to varying degrees by the wide application of managerial incentive schemes. Hopwood (1974) defines the relationships between the corporate goals, formal evaluation measures, managers' personal gains and resultant behaviour. An important task for general management is to try to ensure that the personal goals of individual managers are congruent with overall corporate goals. One method of achieving this is frequently noted as the linking of formal evaluation systems for managers with incentive reward systems. The German companies tend to adopt a more flexible attitude not only to the design of incentive schemes, but also to whether they are necessary. This may derive from the long-term perspective that these companies take or, in turn, from managerial attitudes to life-long employment with a particular company. A number of German companies used financial performance criteria to evalaute the strategic plan, but not to evaluate subsidiary performance. Indeed, one German manager, while recognizing the need for financial performance measures to plan effectively, doubted their value for effective control. If there is an efficient informal network of communication and feedback, which did indeed seem characteristic of the German companies, the need for more formal financial control measures is reduced. Rather than seelung goal congruence through performance measures, the emphasis shifts towards obtaining it through consensus building. For the British companies, where incentive schemes are more universally applied, the influence of and reliance upon financial performance measures to appraise subsidiary performance suggests an attitude more akin to the management of the group as a portfolio of investments. 8. Summary

This research has reported on both overall design and detailed operation of 15 multinationals in three countries. The initial objective was to discover which measures were actually used to evaluate performance and to explain their context. In making these interpretations, we have concentrated upon traditional measures, both financial and non-financial, and the orientation of different companies towards them. Underlying the features reported here, however, has been a diversity of supporting measures which in themselves are worthy of further investigation. Two approaches have been adopted in our explanation of the contextual significance of the differing traditional measures used. The first was to examine differences in missions, overall objectives and performance measures. The second involved comparison of these companies with classifications of overall management styles previously established by other writers. A particular contribution of this research is that of the additional, important detail gathered from specific examination of the performance

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measurement system between parent and subsidiaries and how this fits within an overall categorization of managerial style. T h e provisional findings of this research may be used as an indication of the short-term orientation of the differing preferences of the various countries represented. W e should note also the differing characteristics of the underlying economies of these multinationals which may constrain firms' performance objectives towards risk minimizing strategies, and as a result produce the phenomenon of 'short-termism' whether real o r perceived (Marsh, 1990), arising from the reaction from companies to the perceived attitudes of financial institutions a n d markets to financial risk and return.

References Anthony, R. N., 1988. The Managaent Control Function, Boston, MA, Harvard Business School Press. Goold, M. and Campbell, A., 1989. Strategies and Styles. The Roles of the Centre in Managing Divmzfid Corporation. Oxford, Basil Blackwell. Hopwood, A. G., 1974. Accounting and Human Behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall. Hopwood, A. G., 1983. On trying to study accounting in the context in which it operates, Accounting, Organisation and Society, 8 , 287-305. Holzer, H. P. and Schoenfeld, H. W., 1986. Managerial Accounting and Analysis in Multinational Enterprises. de Gruyter. Lowe, E. A. and Machin, J. L. F., 1983. New Perspectives in Management Control, New York, Macmillan. Marsh, P., 1990. Short-Termism on Trial. International Fund Managers Association. Miles, R. E. and Snow, C. C., 1978. Organisational Strategy, Structure and Process, New York, McGraw-Hill. Mohr, L. G., 1985. The reliability of the case study as a source of information, in Coulan, R. and Smith, R. (eds). Advances in Infmation Processing in Organizations. Volume 2. London, JAI Press. Porter, M., 1980. Competitive Strategy, London, Free Press. Porter, M., 1985. Competitive Advantage, London, Free Press. Scapens, R., 1990. Researching management accounting practice: the role of case study methods, British Accounting Review, 22 (3), 259-281. Simons, R., 1989. Strategic orientation and top management attention to control systems. Paper presented at the M a n a g m t Control Association Inaugural Conference, London Graduate Business School, March. Simons, R., 1990. The role of management control systems in creating competitive advantage: new perspective. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 15 (1/2), 127- 148.

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Appendix A

Strategic cmtrol styles for Goold and Campbell (1989) Strategic planning

Strategic control

Financial control

Decentralized profit centres; some divisional coordination

Clearly separate, profit centre responsibilities

Objectives

Multiple perspectives, matrix structure, strong staff functions, coordination mechanisms Extensive, strategic Strong central leadership Part of long term strategy Longer term, strategic

Budgets Business autonomy stressed Project based; short payback criteria Short term, financial

Monitoring and control

Flexible

Extensive, strategic Amended; business economy stressed Part of long term strategy Longer term, strategic and shorter term, financial Tight

Organizational structure and overlap management

Planning process Themes, thrusts and suggestions Resource allocation

Very tight