NASA, ozone, and policy-relevant science

research

policy

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Research Policy 24 (1995) 747-760

NASA, ozone, and policy-relevant science W. Henry Lambright The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NK, USA Syracuse Research Corporation, Merrill Lane Syracuse, NY 13210, USA Final version received March 1994

I. Introduction

Is science prematurely introduced into policy deliberations before it is ready? Or is science too slow to be used when it can do some good? Who is to say? The issue of "readiness of knowledge" for policy decision is raised in a number of contexts but perhaps most visibly today in the environmental field. Here, scientists perform research that identifies potential environmental and public health risks, and the risks give way to policy in the form of regulations affecting industry and the general public. Critics of environmental regulation say the science is incomplete, noncredible, and raises risks that may be false (Abelson, 1993; Whelan, 1993; Foster et al., 1993). Those who favor regulation say the science is ready enough, and that the call for "more research" is but an excuse for inaction. It is not just scientists who push the introduction of science; many policymakers pull for information, at least information that suits their value preferences. Where science is govern-

' This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation u n d e r Grant No. D1R-9009827. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. Also, the author wishes to express appreciation to Professor Trevor J. Pinch, Cornell University, for his helpful comments and recommendations.

ment-sponsored, these conflicting pressures are particularly prone to operate. Acid rain has been criticized as a case where government-research money was wasted because there was no link between research performed and policy made. Critics of this case suggest the same result will ensue in the field of global climate change (Rubin et al., 1991-92). The readiness of science is thus a particularly growing and contentious issue in environmental policy. A recent highly celebrated case in point is ozone policy (U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, 1991; U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 1991; Parson, 1993). In 1973, two university-based scientists propounded an astounding theory that certain chemicals--chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the kind used in common aerosol cans, refrigerants, computer solvents, and the like --could deplete the ozone layer surrounding the earth. Such depletion would let in more ultraviolet light, thereby increasing skin cancers and causing other damaging effects. Fourteen years later, in 1987, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was signed and international controls placed on the production of these and related chemicals, such as halons. In subsequent years, these controls were strengthened, and in November 1992, 87 nations in Copenhagen agreed to phase out the manufacture of CFCs and other harmful compounds by the end of 1996.

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Ozone depletion has been hailed as "a beautiful case study of science and public policy working well" (Stevens, 1993). For critics, ozone depletion is a negative case study, because it shows how a "scam" can be perpetrated on the world. There is a backlash taking place against ozone science because critics say that science was prematurely or falsely used to get industry and the public to change their behavior at incalculable cost. It is said to be an example of what happens over and over again when science is pushed into policy before it is fully ready. An unlikely coalition of critics, including conservative political talk-show personality and best selling author Rush Limbaugh, has arisen (Limbaugh, 1992; Taubes, 1993). They aim to open up the ozone issue for revision. The reason it is possible for ozone policy to be both extravagantly praised and harshly condemned at once is its visibility as a global issue and reach in compelling economic change. A multibillion dollar industry is being transformed. The principal US diplomat who negotiated the Montreal Protocol gives much credit to science. He says policy was "science driven" (Benedick, 1991). What does it mean for policy to be "science driven?" Under "conventional" or "research science" procedures, there is a slow process of scientific performance, peer review, publication, and dialogue within science before scientists, as a community, reach consensus (Jasanoff, 1990). It usually takes a relatively long time before concurrence is reached. In policy-relevant science, different processes operate. What scientists do depends on what policymakers need. What policymakers do, depends in part on what scientists can provide. Debates among scientists take place often through the media rather than scientific journals. Consensus-forming processes are speeded up by special mechanisms, and actions are taken by policymakers on the basis of what may be very tentative technical agreements based on limited data. It is correct to say policy can be "sciencedriven," it may also be correct to say science is "policy-pulled." The result is a model in which science is performed, agreement is negotiated by special mechanisms, and knowledge is transferred

to policymakers. Everything is done with more urgency than under research science. Policy-relevant science is often accelerated science. It may skip some of the steps associated with research science. This can hurt its credibility, especially where the policy to which science is oriented is also regulatory science (Jasanoff, 1990). There have been many instances of policy-relevant science in environmental regulation over the years, starting with nuclear power in the 1960s. In the 1970s and afterward, the agenda was filled with disputes over water and air pollution, drinking water contamination, pesticides, and toxic dump sites. A number of recent cases were analyzed by the National Academy of Engineering (Uman, 1993). What was found was that three factors influenced how quickly or how well technical information was incorporated into regulatory policy. These were: "the extent to which the new information threatens the status quo; the degree of uncertainty of the scientific data; and the involvement of the public or legislators in the decision" (Davies, 1993, p. 252). There were innumerable gaps between science and policy, and the policy product was often flawed by the dynamics of the process. Ozone depletion contrasts with much other experience. Most observers regard it as a rare success in terms of global environmental regulation, rather than scam perpetrated by scientists and bureaucrats. While it remains somewhat controversial, ozone depletion policy clearly moved significantly from instability in the early 1980s to a point of relative closure in the mid-1990s. A critical factor in the process was the way policyoriented science was managed.

2. The social construction of o z o n e science

The case of ozone policy illuminates important elements of what is called social constructionism in science. Social constructionism is a body of research that argues that society shapes scientific theory and technological artifacts (Pinch and Bijker, 1984). It examines specific societal interests, and sees how their values shape what some have argued were autonomous activities. One

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school of social constructionism examines key actors (actor-network theory). How do particular actors construct networks of other actors to forward their interest, as they relate to science and technology? What factors help and impede them (Law and Callon, 1988; Callon, 1987)? In the case of policy-relevant science, an actor tries to match what scientists can provide with what policymakers n e e d - - i n a form they can understand when they need it. This is an iterative process, and entails understanding of limits on both sides. Science does not necessarily determine policy, but it can "modulate" it (Bernabo, 1993). The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was the principal institutional actor constructing the network of scientists and users in the ozone case. It spent $1.4 billion on ozone depletion research and development ( R & D) between FY 1975 and FY 1993 (NASA, 1993). It missed discovering the ozone hole over Antarctica in 1985, but responded quickly to accelerate and reorient research and network-building. N A S A did not control decision making, but it built alliances among researchers and was a "boundary spanner" between researchers and policymakers. It is helpful to conceive of the various actors in the network in terms of roles. They are researchers, users, and managers. Relationships among these parties are distant under research science conditions. But under a policy-relevant science model, relationships intensify and the manager plays a coalition-building role, making the parts converge in a common direction. These relationships take place in a political environment that can help or hinder what the manager wishes to do. This environment includes elected officials, environmentalists, and industry. Social constructionism is complementary to much innovation theory. The latter provides concepts of 'technology (or science) push' and 'need (or user) pull.' There are examples of loose and close 'coupling' in the relations between those who push and those who pull (Rothwell, 1992). Students of innovation give emphasis to 'actors,' especially 'entrepreneurs' or product 'champions', who play leadership roles in the innovation (or 'networking') process. In government, such en-

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trepreneurs are policy entrepreneurs (Doig and Hargrove, 1990). The policy entrepreneurs of concern here are research managers, and their means of expression is through science, and its link to policy change. To understand how an ozone science program was constructed to be useful to policymakers, we will examine the research manager's role over the history of NASA's relation to the ozone controversy. That history can be seen as having evolved over stages: (1) awareness by NASA of need for research and policy answers; (2) formal adoption of a research program; (3) implementation; (4) reorientation; and (5) continuing science-policy dialogue. Such a focus provides insights as to how boundary spanning between science and policy can be more possible and durable. It contributes to social constructionist theories, which have concentrated more on the building of networks for science or technology than between science and policy. It points up the contingent nature of the question of speed in science. The issue is not whether there is an absolute basis on which the 'readiness of knowledge' for policy decisions can be judged. The issue is whether science is 'ready enough' from the standpoint of the research manager and the larger network linking science and policy. Finally, it suggests a way to compare the ozone case with other instances of policy-relevant science. Success and failure in knowledge-utilization depend not only on the quality of the science, but also the skills of the research manager/policy entrepreneur.

3. Awareness of need

The issue of ozone depletion emerged in the 1960s, when some scientists and environmentalists worried that high-flying supersonic transports would injure the ozone layer. This sparked federal research, but when the U.S. SST was killed in 1971 and the European program (Concorde) ran into financial obstacles to growth, interest subsided. In 1973, however, two University of California at Irvine atmospheric chemists, Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina, concluded that

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it was not SSTs that constituted a threat, but CFCs used in mundane commercial products, such as aerosol sprays, refrigerators, air conditioners, and computers. Going through conventional research-science channels, Rowland and Molina published their theory of ozone depletion in the peer-reviewed journal Nature. Scientific debate began. Under the research science model, Rowland and Molina would have debated their case strictly within the scientific community. But they crossed the line from research science to policy-relevant science when they drew policy implications from their research and became public advocates. At the fall 1974 meeting of the American Chemical Society, Rowland and Molina called for a ban on domestic uses of aerosol propellants, then constituting half the nation's consumption of CFCs. The science was still very much "contested" at this point. As environmentalists called for action, policymakers were uncertain how to respond. NASA and other agencies saw a need for research.

4. Adopting a research program

In June 1975, Congress directed NASA to "develop and carry out a comprehensive program of research, technology, and monitoring of the phenomena of the upper atmosphere so as to provide for an understanding of and to maintain the chemical and physical integrity of the earth's upper atmosphere." Why NASA? One reason was that there were advocates of NASA in Congress who saw the ozone issue as requiring NASA's earth observational (satellite) capability. Another reason was that these advocates (like NASA itself) saw a need for new NASA missions. Having completed Project Apollo, NASA now had the Shuttle program, but it needed additional programs to maintain itself.

5. I m p l e m e n t i n g a science program

In response to the legislation, James Fletcher, NASA Administrator, organized an " U p p e r At-

mosphere Research Program" (UARP) within the agency. This was conceived as a long-term R & D effort. The research was relatively basic, generally performed by academic scientists. The development was geared to new satellites and sensors, and involved NASA's own laboratory centers and industry. For most of the period covered by this paper the ozone R & D program was under the auspices of the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA). NASA recruited earth scientists (especially atmospheric chemists) to run the overall program. The initial budget was substantial: $23 million overall, with approximately $7.5 million devoted to the non-satellite science component (Tilford, 1993; NASA, 1993). N A S A may have designed the atmospheric program on a research science model, but Congress in 1977 reminded the agency it wanted more. In that year, Congress amended the Clean Air Act and required NASA to prepare biennial reports to Congress and the concerned regulatory agencies on the status of upper atmospheric research, with particular reference to ozone. In other words, Congress was saying that it wanted something more than basic science in a NASA context. It was a user of research and it wanted answers. The fact that this amendment came not in a space act but in the Clean Air Act, meant that Congress was "pulling" NASA toward uses in environmental policy, with the administrative agency as user being the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). But bureaucracies tend to do what their organizational routines propel them to do. Relating to environmental policy and EPA were not in NASA's tradition. Developing new satellites was, and hence in 1978 NASA initiated development of a new satellite specifically designed to detect and analyze stratospheric ozone, the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS). This new technology, projected to cost hundreds of millions and taking years to develop, was, de facto, the centerpiece of NASA's ozone program. The non-satellite researchers continued to address largely basic issues geared to understanding stratospheric dynamics. This was what NASA, as research manager, thought was responsible behavior. There were many theories extant about

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ozone d e p l e t i o n - - i f there was depletion. To be policy relevant, there first had to be general understanding of atmospheric chemistry. 5.1. E P A as user

EPA was not about to wait. It moved according to a very different timetable. The congressional and media pressure on EPA was extreme, and the Carter Administration was friendly to environmental interest groups. EPA took the general position: if in doubt, regulate CFCs. Whereas the industry position was, if in doubt, conduct further research. EPA argued, at a minimum, that aerosol spray cans be banned. Why take the risk? There were ready alternatives and some manufacturers were already switching. In 1978, EPA banned CFCs in aerosols. In 1981, it announced its intention to freeze all CFC production at the 1979 level. This meant that EPA was considering further regulation that would ban uses of CFCs in refrigerators, air conditioners, and computer solvents. These were much more complicated issues than aerosol cans because there were no ready alternatives, and industry was far more resistant. Also, the science justifying the need for regulation was still very much debated, and not just by industry. Many reputable scientists were skeptical of the Rowland-Molina theory. In 1981, the political environment of science and regulation changed with the Reagan Administration. EPA did not move ahead on the comprehensive CFC policy it had proposed. The Reagan Administration intended to protect industry from premature regulation. Its position was to delay further CFC regulation, pending research results that would clarify the science. The NASA budget actually went up for ozone R & D in the early Reagan years, while EPA's staff working on ozone regulation was cut. As for industry, many firms which had begun R & D programs to find replacements for CFCs in their products now put such efforts on hold. There were those in NASA who wanted to provide more "science-push" for policy. In August 1981, Donald Heath, a satellite scientist, said satellite records showed a 1% decline in ozone.

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But he could not prove this loss had any connection to CFCs. EPA was not impressed. It called the findings "mildly suggestive." Heath backed off: " T h e r e were many questions, but I still believed it was real. There was so much opposition to it I sort of let it die. I thought I'd wait a while" (Roan, 1989, p. 98). Thus, within the United States in the first four years of the Reagan Administration, there was little user pull from EPA. NASA did not push from the science side. The research was basic, and the development of the new ozone satellite (UARS) was taking years. There was little connection between research and policy use. 5.2. User-pull f r o m outside the US

While the political environment essentially discouraged policy linkage between NASA and EPA, there were developments outside the United States that were exerting a pull on NASA to provide more policy-relevant information. The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), under the leadership of Mostafa Tolba, was making ozone its priority issue. Tolba was both a user and a broker between the UN and various European governments concerned with ozone. The US somewhat ambivalently agreed to participate in international discussions regarding ozone. Having adopted the aerosol ban, the US had an interest in having other nations go at least that far. But it did not want to extend international regulation to the point that domestic regulation would be expanded. Other nations had a range of views. The result, in March 1985, was the Vienna Convention, which called upon nations to take "appropriate measures" to protect the ozone layer, sharing of research data, and agreement to have later negotiations with the aim of arriving at a legally binding protocol by 1987 (Benedick, 1991, p. 45). Within NASA, Robert Watson, head of the science (i.e., non-satellite) component of the ozone R & D program, saw an opportunity. These international negotiations meant there was a possible user in the loop, whereas there was not much pull within the US. Also, it was clear to Watson that having NASA presenting informa-

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tion to a group of non-US users might be suspect. He had to get other foreign scientists aboard for maximum credibility. In 1984, he launched "a remarkable cooperative international scientific venture" (Benedick, 1991, p. 14). His aim was to address ozone depletion as an international issue, and provide a consensus scientific view to government-in-general. Quite consciously, he enrolled many sponsoring organizations, including the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, UNEP, World Meteorological Organization, West German Ministry for Research and Technology, and the Commission of European Communities. He involved 150 scientists from 11 nations in an international assessment of the ozone problem. The results of this work were not published until early 1986. By the time the report based on the assessment came out, there was a considerable audience, because of an intervening event of enormous importance.

6. Reorienting research In May 1985, the journal Nature published the findings of Joe Farman, leader of a British antarctic research group. Using ground-based equipment at a particular site, Farman detected in October 1984 a 40% ozone loss over Antarctica. Following the model of research science, Farman had kept quiet about his findings, written an article and gone through standard peer review processes. Once out, however, the scholarly article was widely reported to more general audiences. The discovery dumbfounded ozone researchers, policy users, and the managers-NASA. How could NASA, with all its technology, have missed the hole? It did not seem possible. It turned out that the satellites were geared to global effects not Antarctica, and were programmed to disregard extremely anomalous measurements. NASA reprogrammed its technology, checked the data, and in August confirmed Farman's findings. While initially embarrassed, NASA showed that satellites had a distinctive technical utility. When the NASA satellites "looked," they could

see the scale of the "ozone hole." The hole was the size of the continental United States (Roan, 1989, p. 132). There was also a political utility to satellites. NASA could dramatize the problem to the general public via visual images. "NASA's satellite image--the swirling dark hole surrounded by bands of color--was shown repeatedly on evening newscasts." It conveyed a fearsome message that "shook many policymakers into action by early 1986" (Roan, 1989, p. 142).

6.1. Toward policy-relevant science The political environment within the US suddenly changed dramatically. Watson took the lead within NASA for adapting to the new situation by reorienting existing work under his aegis and concentrating that effort on Antarctica. Prior to the ozone hole's discovery, the NASA research had asked very general questions, such as why is the stratosphere dry? Under what conditions do CFCs reach the stratosphere and what do they do when they get there? In the process of a decade's work, NASA had built capacity in terms of an ozone science community. Now the time had come to put that capacity to work (Watson, 1993). In January 1986, the international scientific assessment NASA had launched in 1984 completed its report. The report said: "What was once mainly based on theoretical predictions is now being confirmed by observations." Indicating caution about the causes of the ozone hole, the scientists nevertheless asked whether the hole could be "an early warning of future changes in global ozone." If CFC emissions continued at 1980 rates, the report said, the average amount of ozone would fall 4.9 to 9.4% by the middle of the next century (Roan, 1989, pp. 142-143). In the wake of the ozone hole, EPA reappeared as a user. In June 1986, Lee Thomas, EPA Administrator, appearing before Congress, stated that "some intervention" by government to address the buildup of man-made gases, specifically CFCs, now appeared to be necessary "even while there is scientific uncertainty" (Roan, 1989, p. 152). NASA decided to help narrow the uncertainty by changing its research strategy. Working closely

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with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), an agency in the Department of Commerce which had its own relatively small ozone research program, NASA moved to a "crash" program aimed to determine whether CFCs caused the antarctic ozone hole. The principal organizers were Robert Watson and Daniel Albritton, head of NOAA's Aeronomy Laboratory in Boulder, Colorado. The two men assembled a thirteen-person team of scientists to go to Antarctica in August and September, the months when the ozone hole was most extreme. Funding for what was called the National Ozone Expedition (NOZE) came mostly from NASA, but there was also money from NOAA, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA). Susan Solomon, a N O A A scientist and the only woman involved in NOZE, was chosen as project leader.

6.2. Announcing findings By October, N O Z E was ending and the question was whether to study the data at length and go through the research-science route to making findings known (i.e. publication in peer reviewed journals) or announce preliminary results right away. It was decided that there was too great a public interest to wait. Indeed, Farman had received some criticism for not sounding the alarm prior to publication of his ozone hole discovery. Hence, a press conference was held via satellite from Antarctica and Solomon declared: " W e suspect a chemical process is fundamentally responsible for the formation of the hole" (Roan, 1989, p. 172). There were scientific proponents of alternative explanations for the ozone hole and they immediately reacted negatively. Industry also complained that this judgment was premature. In November 1986, critics of N O Z E aired their views in a special edition of Geophysical Research Letters. The technical dispute raged throughout 1986 and into 1987. Meanwhile, policymakers both at the international and national levels again moved forward, this time at a faster pace. In December 1986, international negotiations on ozone resumed in Geneva, Switzerland, after

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a seventeen-month hiatus from the Vienna accord. Watson and Albritton were appointed science advisers to the US delegation, which included State Department and EPA officials. In June 1987, Congress initiated hearings. NASA spoke with two voices. Heath, from the satellite component of the NASA program, said that the satellite data showed ozone over the planet had fallen 4% over a seven-year period. Watson, the research leader, was more cautious. He said the global ozone losses had not yet been detected. The disagreement within NASA, much less that among scientists in general, was a detriment to policymaking internationally or domestically.

6.3. Facilitating scientific consensus and knowledge transfer

Because he was the federal manager with the most money for ozone research, an adviser to the US delegation seeking an international position, and in open dispute with a NASA colleague over evidence for global depletion, Watson was anxious to reach some "closure" on ozone science. Coordinating closely with Albritton, Watson moved on two fronts. First, he organized another large international scientific study to assess existing data on global effects. Second, he launched a second antarctic expedition to settle the CFC issue in that particular site. This second expedition was called the Airborne Antarctic Ozone Experiment. Watson wanted to "throw everything" into this effort. The cost would be $10 million, funded mostly by NASA, but with NOAA, NSF, and CMA again sharing expenses. The difference between this expedition and the 1986 N O Z E was that, with more time to prepare, there would be more scientists mobilized and far more equipment used. The equipment issue was significant. Satellite data helped and so did ground-based data. But what was determined to be really needed were measurements taken right in the stratosphere where ozone began to disappear, approximately thirteen miles above the Earth. There was only one aircraft available that could fly that high, a civilian version of the U - 2 spy

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plane called the ER-2. NASA had this plane for certain experimental work. Watson had to bargain with other components of the agency for use of the plane and he emphasized that normal bureaucratic procedures had to give way to policy need. "Look," he said, "this isn't just a science problem. It's a problem that has important policy implications that a lot of people care about" (Roan, 1989, p. 183). Watson got his ER-2. Now he had to have a new instrument the plane could carry to measure the chemical reactions thirteen miles above the Earth. He had been funding James Anderson of Harvard for years. Now he asked him to use what he had learned by designing an appropriate instrument, and provided $400 000 for the task. In August 1987, the Airborne Antarctic Ozone Experiment got under way. Sixty scientists from different nations were involved. The expedition was headed by Estelle Condon of Ames, the NASA Center from which Watson had borrowed the ER - 2 , In addition to the E R - 2, the expedition had balloons, satellites, a D C - 8 flying laboratory, and other equipment. Never before had the stratospheric chemical reactions and minute concentrations of gases over Antarctica been so carefully and precisely studied (Benedick, 1991, p. 108). As the scientists did their work, Watson and Albritton were in a position to accelerate knowledge transfer to policymakers. They were research managers, and they were also policy advisers, an additional linkage role. They also consciously cooperated to speed transfer. As one took time to advise the US delegation in Europe or brief policymakers in Washington, the other performed the necessary administrative work to facilitate progress in the antarctic research (Aibritton, 1993).

6.4. The montreal protocol, 1987 The international negotiations now had an urgency of their own. Those involved became increasingly familiar with the scientific issues, what the scientists knew, did not know, and worried about. They heard about the theories, models,

and probabilities. Watson and Albritton had to communicate in ways the "policy users" could understand and not come across as having a particular pet theory they were pushing. The ozone hole was very much on the minds of the negotiators (Albritton, 1993). But they decided the pace of policy should not be delayed by the pace of 'settling' the ozone science matter. That is, there were a host of economic, political, and legal matters in addition to the scientific considerations, and these could be dealt with, if there was a will to do so. Antarctica was seen as a warning. At the same time, it was determined that industry could find substitutes for CFCs. There was a technological fix possible. Industry was willing to go along if the rules of the international playing field were equal for all players. There were various issues that had to be hammered out, or avoided among the nations. Thus, in September 1987, before the Airborne Antarctic Ozone Experiment was over, the diplomatic process reached agreement on the Montreal Protocol, which called for cutting CFC production 50% by the year 2000. A total of 43 nations signed the accord. This was a comprehensive policy, much more extensive than the aerosol ban of 1978. It dealt with a number of the most destructive CFCs and CFC uses. In reaching agreement, negotiators assessed the risks, both technical and economic. Quite conscious that more information would be coming from the antarctic expedition, and other scientific research, they agreed to meet again and amend the Protocol if new information made that necessary. The following month, October, members of the Airborne Expedition concluded a review of their findings. Again, a public announcement was made. As the expedition members saw it, evidence showed ozone decreased in the stratosphere as chlorine monoxide increased. This was evidence based on observation, not theory. The indications were strong, the expedition leaders said, that chemicals, not natural atmospheric dynamics, were the prime culprit in the ozone hole. The message presented was that almost half the ozone layer over Antarctica had disappeared during the months of August and September 1987,

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with evidence strongly indicating CFCs were to blame. In November, an international scientific assessment panel, called Ozone Trends Panel, convened. This was the panel Watson had organized following his embarrassing clash with Heath before Congress. The Panel included over 100 scientists of worldwide renown from different countries, many holding competing theories. They postponed the issue of global ozone loss and gave attention to evaluating the antarctic findings. They concluded that the results of the Airborne Antarctic Ozone Experiment were persuasive that CFCs were indeed at fault. The combination of Montreal Protocol and Ozone Trends Panel assessment seemed to mark a turning point for policy and science.

7. Continuing science-policy dialogue In March 1988, the U.S. Senate unanimously ratified the Montreal Protocol. In the same month, Watson again convened the Ozone Trends Panel. The Panel was now to consider the global effects issue. It concluded that the satellite instruments had suffered some degradation, and the satellite data were suspect because of that fact. However, there were data from ground-based stations in the Northern Hemisphere which the Panel found reliable. These instruments indicated losses of 1.7 to 3% over the Northern Hemisphere. This finding, made public, was another bombshell. The media again raised the visibility of the issue. The implication was that inhabited areas in the north were now at risk. DuPont, the world's largest CFC manufacturer, which had resisted scientific reports condemning CFCs thus far, now announced it would cease manufacture of CFCs as soon as substitutes became available. Other companies followed suit. This meant that companies would shortly be competing to sell substitutes and market competition would become a factor in the displacement of ozone-destroying chemicals along with the pressure of regulation. On April 5, President Reagan signed the protocol, stressing that it created incentives for new technologies (Roan, 1989, p.

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230). In August, EPA ordered domestic CFC reductions conforming to the terms of the Protocol. The scientific findings about Antarctica and northern ozone depletion caused the nations that had convened in Montreal, plus additional participants, to schedule new talks earlier than originally planned. Again, Watson and Albritton served as science advisers to the US delegation. In 1990, the London Amendments strengthened the Montreal Protocol, calling for a total ban on most CFCs by the year 2000. Representatives from ninety-two nations signed the amended Protocol. In September 1991, NASA launched UARS, originally the pacing element of NASA's ozone R & D program. But the surprise of the ozone hole had forced NASA to reorient its priorities and use non-satellite research and equipment not even contemplated at the outset, such as the ER-2. Policy could not wait for UARS. But now that UARS was available, even more technology could be deployed to detect ozone depletion. In October, NASA, NOAA, and others launched an Airborne Arctic Stratospheric Expedition. This was the third expedition and it utilized a full range of technology (Kerr, 1992). At this point, NASA stepped up the pace of policy-relevant science even further. With previous expeditions, it had performed research and then announced findings. On February 3, 1992, with the expedition not complete, NASA announced in a news conference that an ozone hole might be opening up in the winter over the northern hemisphere that would be far worse than previously thought. This hole would be 'exposing people and plant life to higher levels of harmful ultraviolet radiation from the sun.' The news conference sparked New York Times and Washington Post editorials that demanded faster phase-out of CFCs. Senator A1 Gore spoke in Congress and warned President Bush of "the prospect of a hole over Kennebunkport." Time magazine gave the cover story to "Vanishing Ozone: The Danger Moves Closer to Home." The Senate voted unanimously to speed up the phase-out (Lemonick, 1992; "Press Release Ozone Hole," 1992).

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Watson and Albritton meanwhile briefed President Bush's Science Adviser, D. Allen Bromley. Bromley spoke to Bush. The President conferred also with EPA Administrator William Reilly, and DuPont. Then, in February, Bush did in fact call on US industry to speed up its phase-out of the most serious CFC contaminants by 1996, four years ahead of schedule.

7.1. Political backlash This policy was scarcely made, however, when NASA had to say it was wrong. Ozone loss was coupled in its severity with extreme cold, and when a sudden warm spell hit, the loss held at less than 10 percent, rather than the 40 to 50 % that was originally feared. The Wall Street Journal castigated NASA, complaining editorially about premature release of findings. It called this "science policy via press release." NASA claimed it went ahead "because there's so much public interest." An agency spokesman declared: "This system worked the way it was supposed to--we provided the information and the policymakers made their decision" ('Press Release: Ozone hole', 1992). In April (when the arctic expedition was officially over), NASA provided more scientific explanations as to why the dire prediction it made did not occur. But these only fueled more complaints, especially from conservative quarters. "Money, in part, may explain NASA's rush to get the 'evidence' of a likely ozone hole out 2 months, before the arctic research project closed," said the Washington Times. Talk-show host Rush Limbaugh called the original NASA press conference a 'scam.' Limbaugh was emerging as the most visible critic of ozone depletion theory and NASA. In his best-selling book, The Way Things Ought To Be, Limbaugh asked: "What could be more natural than for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), with the space program winding down, to say that because we have this unusual amount of chlorine in the atmosphere we need funding? Obviously, we have to research this. But first we have to 'inform' the public." During summer 1992, the presidential cam-

paign politicized ozone depletion further, with vice-presidential candidate Gore tarring Bush's environmental record, and Bush ridiculing Gore as the 'ozone man'. The controversy notwithstanding, there was evidence that the Montreal Protocol was working, in the sense that the steady build-up of ozone depleting chemicals in the atmosphere was slowing. Albritton declared: "It is encouraging to see the first atmospheric signs of public policy choices. Of course, it doesn't mean we're out of the woods yet." Jessica Matthews, of the World Resources Institute, a leading environmentalist, declared that the Montreal Protocol had been "politically and environmentally an extraordinary success story" ('An easing of threat to ozone is reported,' 1992). Critics, abetted by NASA's premature announcement, sought to reopen policy by casting aspersions on the science. But the basic policy issue was treated by most participants as history. Industry scrambled to find replacements. The momentum was strong, as environmentalists pressed for displacing all ozone-destroying chemicals. In November 1992, 87 nations agreed in Copenhagen to tighten the Montreal Protocol a second time (Kerr, 1993). They would phase-out the worst offenders among the CFCs four years ahead of schedule, by 1996, in effect, adopting the US policy that had been triggered by an incorrect prediction. In August 1993, scientists reported that the build-up of the industrial chemicals most responsible for depleting the Earth's protective ozone layer had slowed substantially. Here was a case, many said, where science and policy worked together (Stevens, 1993). 7.2. Change in policy and management This science-policy momentum was strengthened with the election of Clinton and Gore in 1992. What was 'politically correct' in ozone depletion shifted. One consequence was that NASA's Watson was rewarded with a new assistant directorship for environment at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. On the other hand, one of Watson's scientific critics, William Happer, Department of Energy research chief, was asked to leave by the new

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administration (Goodwin, 1993). Another consequence was that NASA was itself reshaped in part by its ozone experience. In 1993, with UARS now regularly monitoring the planet's ozone health, NASA decided to develop new high-flying airplanes specifically for ozone studies. The lessons from the three polar expeditions were clear: a critical place to study the ozone layer was within the ozone layer. Ground-based balloons and satellites were needed, but had their limits. The E R - 2 was a great success, but was a single-engine plane that put its pilot at great risk in the unfriendly antarctic or arctic setting. The best technology lay with remotely piloted (i.e. high-flying, unmanned) planes, called drones (Taubes, 1993). The NASA Administrator, Daniel Goldin, in April 1993, said that NASA had gotten out of balance in its emphasis on satellites as the key technology for ozone research. A satellite cost $100 million and more. A drone, once in production, would cost $1.5 million. It was noteworthy also that Goldin restructured N A S A so that ozone depletion work was part of a new 'Mission to Planet Earth' division. This earth-oriented R & D component was rapidly becoming as significant in spending as traditional astronomy and space science. He also pushed for closer relations with EPA. NASA regarded EPA as a "customer," said Goldin. EPA cited the ozone experience as a 'breath-taking demonstration' that NASA really could indeed help it make policy (Lawler, 1992). In building a network of relationships to make research relevant to ozone depletion policy, NASA was itself being transformed.

8. Conclusion What lessons can be drawn from the ozone depletion example? And how do they relate to other cases of policy-relevant science? 8.1. Other experience

As indicated in the Introduction, a recent analysis of factors influencing the pace of using technical information in environmental regulation

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cited three key variables: (1) extent to which the new information threatened the status quo; (2) degree of scientific uncertainty; and (3) involvement of legislators and the public in decisionmaking. The first factor will cause great resistance by vested interests in the status quo. The second reduces the credibility and force of science as a driver of policy and the third introduces a variable that may speed or slow policy in spite of science (Davies, 1993). With respect to ozone depletion, scientific knowledge threatened that part of the chemical industry that produced CFCs. The change implied was considerable and brought about opposition. However, there were technological alternatives to CFCs and the producers were relatively few in number. While significant, change in CFCs was relatively simple compared with, say, modification of the fossil fuel industry in the face of the greenhouse effect. As for the question of legislative and public involvement, this may have been a determining factor in the aerosol ban of 1978. But key actors in the executive branch (e.g. NASA, NOAA, EPA, State Department) kept the initiative on policy after the ozone hole discovery, with the help of the international community. It is the second factor, the narrowing of scientific uncertainty, that makes the ozone depletion case particularly interesting from the standpoint of policy-relevant science. Not only was scientific disagreement rapidly transformed into relative scientific consensus in the period 1985-1987, the knowledge produced by the consensus worked in tandem with policymaking. This places the ozone depletion experience in great contrast with another case of policy-relevant science, acid rain. Like ozone depletion, the acid rain research program was established to be useful to policymakers. It constituted a six-agency effort that lasted a decade and cost one-half billion dollars. While the research informed the policy debate, it proved largely irrelevant to the writing of the Clean Air Act of 1990. The Act included provisions calling for more expensive regulatory actions than the acid rain research indicated were needed. But the timing of the policy process and that of the research process in

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this case were disconnected (Rubin et al., 19911992). The principal difference between acid rain and ozone depletion lay with the management of these two programs. The acid rain program was permitted to drift into a decidedly science-oriented mode with little communication to the policy world or relevance to its questions. There was interagency bickering that hurt coordinated decision making and delayed the program. There was a succession of three research managers, with the second costing the program considerable credibility with policymakers and scientists by his actions and words (Roberts, 1991a and 1991b; Rubin et al., 19911992). On balance, acid rain provides more negative than positive lessons in how to bring knowledge to bear on public policy. In contrast, ozone depletion is an example of relatively effective policyrelevant science. 8.2. Ozone depletion Whatever the motivations (bureaucratic incentive vs. 'public interest') NASA provided and organized a push to accelerate the movement of science into policy at a critical moment. It could not have done that had it not had a steady, well-funded program prior to the time it moved. But the way it acted, the strategies, proved for the most part opportune. Those strategies lend strength to the concept of actors shaping networks to accomplish large goals. They point up once again the importance of entrepreneurial leadership, and boundary spanning (Rothwell, 1992). They also show that in seeking change, actors will themselves be changed. Finally, the strategies suggest that while they have their strengths, policy-relevant strategies also have drawbacks that can be problematic for research policy. 1. Alliance-building. One strategy was interagency alliance. NASA had a mandate and money, and might have been tempted to go it alone to maximize credit. But N O A A also had requisite authority and some money for ozone research. NSF was also involved, as was industry. Watson, in defining the NASA strategy, especially at the

time of the expeditions, sought participation of other agencies and consciously shared credit as necessary. Albritton later called Watson the most 'ecumenical' Washington science administrator he knew. This strategy was critical to getting resources from other actors, especially NOAA, which had the in-house personnel who could be brought to bear on the antarctic ozone hole issue quickly. The researchers with which Watson worked were primarily university personnel and could not be as easily mobilized. 2. Targeting research. A second strategy was targeting research for answers. NASA's ozone program was designed to be long-term, steady, and globally-oriented. Its money went primarily to satellite development, rather than ozone research. But in a NASA context a 'secondary' research priority can still be ample. The fact was that satellites 'missed' the ozone hole, and UARS was not ready to be deployed. Once it saw its error, NASA reoriented its approach; it focused on getting answers at a particular place, using the most appropriate people and equipment available to get the job done. The problem, not the technology, drove the approach. NASA targeted research on the ozone hole, managed a crash program, and came up with an imaginative technological strategy to get answers. A general, relatively basic research program became a targeted program organized in the mode of 'expeditions'. 3. Creating assessment mechanisms. A third research policy was to accelerate international scientific assessment. Accelerating science for ozone policy required pushing for closure on what the research findings coming out of the N O Z E and Airborne expeditions meant. There was no consensus after the 1986 expedition; there was debate. Hence, not only did NASA and its allies reorient what was done in Antarctica for the 1987 Airborne expedition, but NASA deliberately used an international assessment body it had organized, the Ozone Trends Panel, to get a measure of agreement on what these findings meant. By including different points of view on the Panel, NASA helped coopt critics. By including international representation both in those performing and assessing the research, NASA made it more likely that the research and assessment would be

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credible and acceptable to foreign nations engaged in policy negotiations. 4. Tight coupling. To accelerate transfer of knowledge required tight coupling among managers, researchers, and users. It helped enormously that an additional role was added to that of the managers. They were policy advisers to the Montreal Protocol US delegation. They gained the confidence of the users and were careful not to go beyond what they believed the science would say. The users were driven by many factors, but science advice was available and it made a difference according to the chief US diplomat (Benedick, 1991). There was both a science push and policy pull working in tandem. There was mutual learning. 5. Communicating to the public. The fifth strategy is the most problematic. It involves communicating the threat to the lay public and political establishment. NASA announced findings after the N O Z E expedition, but ran into vocal scientific controversy in part because it had not gone through traditional research science channels. It announced results after the Airborne Expedition also. However, after the Airborne expedition, it also quickly had an independent scientific body assess the NASA evaluation. In this case, the NASA findings were deemed credible by the scientific community because a mechanism permitting scientists-in-general (including critics of the chemical theory of ozone depletion) to participate was created. Decision making was speeded up, but was legitimated. In the case of the arctic expedition, NASA announced findings before the expedition was complete. Because policy was triggered by predictions overtaken by natural events, NASA lost face, and damaged its ozone science credibility. Thus are revealed three different strategies in communication, with three different results. Because policy-relevant science pushes the limits of what is known, or can be agreed upon, it does not go through the conventional science processes of review, which are inevitably much slower. Being relevant to policymakers means being timely from their perspective. Being timely may mean being premature, or basing assessments on incomplete research, from the scien-

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tists' point of view. Also, when the organization pressing the accelerator on science and its communication is a federal agency seeking new missions, the research becomes open to charges that it is motivated by bureaucratic ambition. Science by press conference may speed up its use but can also burn the provider and policy users if the information proves faulty. All of this makes it easier for critics to reopen the larger policy debate by casting aspersions on the science. There are thus benefits and costs to linking science to public policy. In the case of ozone depletion, the benefits appear to have outweighed the costs. Given the plethora of environmental issues now on the agenda where science is ahead of policy, or policy ahead of science, it is helpful to have an example where knowledge and decision making were closely coupled. NASA's strategies for making science relevant to policy worked for the most part. As a policy actor, it successfully built a network for accomplishing research, and transferring it to policy users in a way that proved quite satisfactory for most parties. The positive lessons outweigh the negative.

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