Natural complex vs. natural system

ARTICLE

Natural

Complex vs. Natural

System

Elias L. Khalil

I draw an ontological distinction between two types of natural forms which are isomorphic across physics, biology, and human sciences. The first type, “natural complex,” depicts purposeful forms involved in organic interaction. Examples include atoms, cells, organs, organisms, populations of organisms, households, firms, tribes, and nations. The second type, “natural system,” depicts chaotic forms involved in topographic interaction. Examples include climates, water turbulence, geodynamics. ecosystems, and stock markets. I examine six dimensions which juxtapose the two natural forms. With respect to canons, natural complex is governed by “rules,” while natural system by “principles.” In regards to interaction, the former is “organic,” while the latter “topographic.” In relation to arrangement, the former is exemplified by “configuration,” while the latter by “pattern.” With respect to spatial arrangement. the former is typified by “organization,” while the latter by L’structure.” In regards to temporal arrangement, the former is characterized by “process,” while the latter by “dynamics.” In relation to hierarchy, the former is distinguished by “complexity,” while the latter by “complicatedness.”

Introduction According to a Latin adage “nomen est numen,” to name is to know. That is, the naming of things is the first act of understanding. Drawing distinctions among objects is the hallmark of the original logic of forms developed by the mathematician G. Spencer-Brown (1979). To wit, proper naming would eliminate many scientific controversies. I offer in this paper a taxonomy of sister categories like principles/rules, configuration/pattern, organization/structure, process/dynamics, andcomplexity/complicatedness. This taxonomy is intended to highlight the different facets of natural form which a researcher confronts in his or her investigation. This exercise involves more than just a taxonomy. It offers a meaning to the sister categories through a conceptual distinction between two radically different types of natural forms, viz., ‘ ‘natural complex ’ ’ and “natural system. ’ ’ Natural complexes arise as a result of organic interaction among the members which constitute the form in question. Examples of such complexes include molecules, cells, organs, organisms, house-holds, populations, firms, tribes, and nation-states. In contrast, natural systems arise as a result of topographic or Elias L. KhaJil. Ohio State University, Journal of Social and Biological ISSN: 0140-1750

Manstield

Swucrures 13(1):11-31.

Copyright Q 1990 by JAJ Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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quasi-chaotic interaction among the components which make up the form in question. The examples cited above like cells, firms, and nation-states are also characterized by topographic interaction. However, topographic interaction is most dominant in natural systems like climates, financial markets, air/water currents, ecological communities, etc. That is, the same natural form, like cell, economic society, or population of organisms could exhibit the characters of both natural complex and natural system. Consequently, it could be studied simultaneously as a natural system and a natural complex, depending on the interest of the investigator. Thus, there is a need for two distinct scientific apparatuses within each discipline. The conflation of natural complex and natural system is pervasive enough to hinder proper discourse within disciplines. Hardcore neo-Darwinian theory, e.g., explains the evolution of natural complex (i.e., population of organisms) as the result of randomness--an idea appropriate for non-purposeful ecosystems. Orthodox neoclassical economics,’ likewise, explains away technological innovations as basically serendipitous and desultory events-an idea seemly for non-purposeful market systems (see Khalil, 1990a). Put differently, the two orthodoxies treat the organism and the firm as primarily passive entities. It is true that the organism and the firm exhibit some natural-system aspects and act passively. However, they are mostly natural complexes. A distinction between natural system and natural complex would put a stop to the hegemony of analytical tools exclusively suited for the study of natural systems. A delineation of the two natural forms is imperative for any sound theorizing within any discipline-not to speak of cross- and transdisciplinary intercourse. In part III, the main body of the paper, I contrast the two natural forms with respect to six earmarks. This begs a preliminary question: what do I mean by “natural form?” In part II, I explicate that natural form is a selficonstitutive thing like a storm system or an organism. This is in opposition to “artificial form” like a spider’s web or a chair. The two forms, however, have something in common: They are real categories as opposed to fictional categories. That is, they represent something outside the figment of the human mind, unlike fictional categories like standards of measure. Thus, in part I, I commence the discussion with the difference between “real category” and “fictional category.” Figure 1 summarizes the nomenclature explicated throughout the paper.

I. Real Category vs. Fictional Category A category is “real” when it represents an existing object outside the human mind. For example, the category “a cat,” “a typewriter,” or “Mr. Bell’s physical capacity” denotes a real thing. A real thing is not only what is actual and has sharp boundaries, but also what is potential and has fuzzy borders like physical capacity. In contrast, a category is “fictional” when it is devised expressly to classify things and facilitate human manipulation of objects. Thus, fictional category is a figment of the mind. For example, the category “ounce,” “X axis,” or “reptile” denotes a fictional thing.* The distinction between real and fictional categories is an attempt to come to grip with a controversy as old as philosophy itself: are categories like mathematical theory, biological taxon, chair, ecosystem, and the spirit of a nation real or just nominal-fictional categories? At one extreme, the universalists, epitomized by Plato, treat indiscriminately any category as a real one. At the other extreme, the nominalists, typified by William of O&ham and

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Complex vs. Natural

System

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CATEGORY ’ CATEGORY

FICTIONAL

vs. REAL

CATEGORY

’ ARTIFICIAL

FORM

vs.

NATURAL

F RM 9 I

NATURAL 1 Canons: 2 Interaction:

5 Temporal

vs. NATURAL

Principles

vs. Rules

Organic

3 Arrangement: 4 Spatial

COMPLEX

Configuration Organization

Arrangement: Arrangement:

Process i. Development ii. Evolution Complexin/

6 Hierarchy:

Figure I.

SYSTEM

vs. Topographic vs. Pattern vs. Structure vs. Dynamics vs. Maturation vs. Transformation vs. Complicatedness

The nomenclature.

Thomas Hobbes, view confusingly any category as a fictional one, i.e., just a nomen (name) fabricated by the mind. However, the truth is somewhere in between the extreme poles. I only chart here a preliminary solution to this old controversy-enough to prepare us for the delineation of natural complex and natural system. If a category refers to a specific thing like “Mr. Smith,” “Hurricane Hugo,” “Manhattan Bridge, ” “the spirit of the people during the French Revolution,” or “the World Bank,” the category would be a real one. In contrast, if a category is generic like “individuals whose last name is Smith,” “bridges,” “storms,” “women,” or “commercial banks,” the category would be a fictional one. So, a category might be real or fictional depending on whether it expresses an object with real boundaries, or a taxonomic device created for human convenience. To illustrate further, the class of men who are married after being divorced twice would be a real category if it refers to a club or an association which binds them together. Otherwise, it is an arbitrary category which might be useful for statistical purposes and public policy. Likewise, the category “mammals,” “primates,” “homo sapiens sapiens,” or any taxon is a fictional abstraction which denotes a set whose constituents share only a family resemblance. However, “a band of Siberian tigers,” “a violin,” “a baboon family,” “a tribe,” “the Rocky Mountains ecosystem,” “the Nile river,” or “a nation” is a real category since it refers to a form with existing boundaries-disregarding how penumbral they are. Such boundaries are not figments of the imagination to classify things, but rather real contours since they (including a violin) contain interaction or relationship within them. In contrast, the category “universities,” “teenagers,” “plants,” “capitalists,” “poor people,” or “senior citizens” is as fictional as the category “men with beards and sun glasses.” The category “capitalists” would no longer be fictional if it is found that the constituents of that category affect-even unintentionally-each other’s behavior as a result of being proprietors of capital stock. Likewise, the category “men with beards and sun

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glasses” would no longer be fictional if it is discovered that such men do not act out of particular needs and whimsical tastes, but rather affected by fads in respect to beards and glasses. That is, a taxonomic class becomes a real one when interaction-intentional or chaotic-among its constituents occurs for reasons which are not incidental to what define the class. For example, the interaction between men with beards and glasses would not qualify the category to be a real one if the interaction occurs because they are also engineers. Put tersely, if constituents of a category do not act in consort, by virtue of common feature or boundary, the category would be fictional. One may turn out to be mistaken about the judgment passed concerning a category. For instance, “teenagers” might be a real category; or “a nation” (like Lebanon) might be a fictional one. These are empirical questions which reasonable researchers might disagree over. Such disagreement does not invalidate but rather affirms the conceptual distinction between real and fictional categories. In other words, differences of judgments assume that some categories are figments of the fancy, while others represent real forms. To wit, I do not want to convey the impression that fictional categories have to be disposed of. To the contrary, they are necessary for practical ends. Unfortunately, however, they could become treacherous when the end is intellectual, rather than practical. Theologians and theoreticians, insulated in their ivory towers, are most susceptible victims of their own conceptual constructs. They are vulnerable to excessive reification, since they do not listen to the realism of the non-experts.

II. Natural Form vs. Artificial

Form

Real categories, as opposed to fictional ones, represent “forms.” A form is a real thing because its constituents are connected within a sharp or less-than-sharp boundary, rather than by a mere family resemblance. The etymology of the word “form” in Greek is Eidos, Schema, and Morphe, and in Latin Forma. As defined by L. Whyte (1973, p. 14), the word means “the qualities which make any thing what it is.” If this definition is accepted, the history of science and philosophy amount to the search, in disparate ways, for first principles which give origin to the variety of forms. A real thing which has an inner life or dynamics is called a “natural form.” For example, the economy of Sweden, the Amazon ecosystem, Tom’s duck, or a brain cell is a natural form since it is characterized by an intrinsically formed arrangement. In contrast, a real thing which is inert, whose existence is continuously contingent on natural forms, or its constituents are united by an extraneous agency is called “artificial form.” For example, the president’s chair, Robert’s cabin, the foreman’s car, the teacher’s false teeth, Aunt Mary’s wholesome salad dressing, or the secretary’s computer is an artificial form since it is characterized by an extrinsically formed design. This distinction between natural and artificial forms do not follow Aristotle’s. He defines artifacts strictly as any form, like a chair, which is human-made, while animals and rivers are natural forms. Broadly speaking, this is an anthropocentric definition. Such definition creates conceptual problems since, on the one hand, animals like beavers and birds also construct artificial objects, viz., dams and nests. On the other hand, humans engenderinadvertently or intentionally-forms which gain dynamics and life of their own like unintended markets and firms. Contrary to Aristotle, while these forms are human-made, they are not artifacts like chairs.

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Complex us. Natural

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The connections and boundaries of natural forms are different from those of artificial forms. The boundary of the economy of a village, e.g., is less-than-sharp because, on the one hand, it interlaces with the economy of other plants and animals, which together form the ecosystem. On the other hand, the village is a member of a clan which, in turn, might be a member of a tribe. In contrast, the boundary of a car or a nest is sharp because it is a tool made to serve its manufacturer. So, the pieces of an artificial form have to be precisely designed in order to deliver predictable service. One might object and raise the point that while a person or a cell is a natural form, its boundary is as sharp as that of a suitcase. In fact, a person has no strict borders, i.e., it is interlaced with its surrounding, like any natural form. This is not too obvious because human observers are deceived by the particular perspective they occupy in nature. Since humans are bound by their size, some might be led to think of themselves and anything smaller than them as absolutely autonomous with sharp boundaries. While anything larger than themselves, e.g., like fums or governments, as being an artificial form constructed by absolutely free and consenting adults. If one abstracts from the peculiar standpoint of humans, artificial forms would look sharper in comparison to natural forms. However, vocational knowledge, which creates artificial forms, is not as sharp. This is so because vocational knowledge is susceptible to improvements through trial and error. Such knowledge of the artificial, however, is different from the knowledge of the natural. The leitmotif of the medical, legal, accounting, management, engineering, educational, and other practical professions is “what works must be right.” In contrast, knowledge of the natural pursues truth irrespective of its practical immediacy. Contrary to a widespread misconception, knowledge of the natural lags behind the knowledge of the artificial. The steam engine was invented two thousand years ago. Moreover, at the time of its full-scale employment in the industrial revolution, there was no understanding of its theoretical underpinning. The second law of thermodynamics was elaborated decades later. Much more recently, superconductors have been successfully composed to conduct electricity at relatively higher temperatures-contrary to the prediction of theoretical physics. Another example, most drugs and traditional medicine are used without knowing how they fight diseases. Mathematics is the quintessence of the sciences of the artificial. The concepts of number, dimension, shape, space, infinity, limit, etc., are contrived abstractions devised in order to enable humans to manipulate their surroundings and manufacture artificial forms. The computer code (or what is wrongly called ‘language’) and artificial intelligence might be superior in certain ways to natural language and mind, but so far have failed to replicate most mental processes, even the simplest ones. According to H. Dreyfus (1979) and J. Searle (1984, 1990), this failure is impossible to rectify (cf. Crick, 1989; Marr, 1982; Heelan, 1983; Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, pp. 83-94). Gestalt psychologists (Kohler, 1969; Asch, 1968; see also Pribram et al., 1974) have prided themselves on the discovery that brains, even of pigeons, view a phenomenon as a connected whole. Contrary to H. Simon’s (1962) thesis, it is inappropriate to import the sciences of the artificial in order to study natural forms. Simon’s notion of hierarchy in machines (like watches) as a metaphor of natural hierarchy has distorted and confused many later discussions. So far I have almost exclusively discussed human-made artificial forms. To avoid anthropocentricism, we should include also other artificial forms. For example, a bird’s nest, a beaver’s dam, a bear’s den, a spider’s web, and a honeycomb are artificial forms manufac-

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tured by natural forms. A home stands in relation to its builder in a similar fashion to the way a nest stands with respect to its constructor. Both houses lack an inner dynamic to qualify them to be called natural forms. Furthermore, artificial forms extend beyond what is produced at the level of individuals. There are forms which are manufactured at lower levels, like the organ and the cell, which are qualified to be called also artificial forms. For example, natural pesticides are produced by cells of plants which protect them from humans and pests (Ames & Gold, 1989). Other artificial forms include synthetic macromolecules manufactured by B-cells, fats, hair, claws, scales, fur, etc. These artificial forms act as food, tools, or weapons for protection. They are artificial since they lack an intrinsically formed or self-constituted arrangement which characterize, e.g., cells. The distinction between natural and artificial forms is more intricate than what has been suggested so far. Forms which are created, at any level, by other forms are not necessarily artificial. For example, cells generated by cell division, progenies produced by parents through sexual or asexual procreation, and firms initiated by established ones are natural forms. This is the case because they are not tools whose function is continuously contingent on the agency of the founder. Even forms which are created by other forms through sexual selection, genetic engineering, and selective breeding (e.g., the generation of dogs from wolves) are natural forms, since they are autonomous. Human intervention to change the traits of mice and corn, or create a new species of bacterium, is not enough to qualify the product as an artificial form. Viruses also intervene in the machinery of cells to create new forms, which are not artificial. Humans could intervene to create other kinds of forms which are not artificial, like an induced rain storm. Also, computer simulations of storms, climates, and financial markets are not artificial forms since they have their own momentum. Thus, what qualifies a form to be artificial is not the criterion of being a product of another form. Rather, the criterion is being a tool that functions for other forms, i.e., has external referents. This raises the question about the status of other products like human language and animal communication which are hard to classify unambiguously. While they are modes of intercourse, they are not artifacts because they are not tools or forms with sharp boundary. They are natural forms since they embody autonomous dynamics and carry symbolism with less-than-sharp meanings. A language has a life very much like the spirit of a tribe or the mood of a nation. Similarly, a dog’s bark, Plato’s Republic, Tchaikovsky’s Concerto No. 1, a people’s covenant, etc., are natural forms since their meaning is not self-contained, but rather depends on interpreters. It amounts to conceptual muddleheadedness to use, without qualification, the sciences of the artificial in order to study natural forms. Such use amounts to the reduction of natural form, like the economy, into a sharply bounded, contrivedly designed pieces. Such use is committed since it is seductive; humans are mostly familiar with their own creations like clocks and computers. It is crucial to realize the limitation of artificial sciences. TO sum up, I have drawn distinctions between, on the one hand, real categories and fictional categories, and, on the other hand, real categories which represent artificial forms and real categories which denote natural forms. In the rest of the essay I focus on natural forms.

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III. Natural Complex vs. Natural System There are two types of natural forms, which are not sharply distinguished by workers in many disciplines, and even overlooked by theoreticians who work across disciplines like J. Miller (1978), K.E. Boulding (1978, 1981), and S. Sllthe (1985, 1989). When the constituents of natural form relate to each other organically, like the departments within a firm or organs within an organism, it is dubbed “natural complex. “3 In contrast, when consti’tuents of a natural form relate to each other topographically, like economic agents in a market or species in a community of species, it is called “natural system.” To wit, the distinction between natural complex and natural system is not along the line which supposedly divides living and non-living things. Natural complex could be a nonliving thing like a molecule; and natural system could be constituted of living actors like a market or ecosystem. Natural complex presents itself to us as a form whose members are nonseparate from each other. Like an individual, which literally means “non-individual,” natural complex cannot be divided or dissected without changing the identity. Each member undertakes a particular function which organically complements the function of others within an organized division of labor. Together, members achieve a common project according to a specific principle. That does not mean their unity is free of conflict. These conflicts, however, are ‘family disputes.’ Besides the configuration of a firm or a university, other examples include a human family, a monkey, a monkey’s lungs, a tribi, an elephant, an elephant’s stomach, a bacterium, a school of fish, a nation-state, a cell of a cat’s liver, a parliament, IBM, the U.S. Supreme Court, an economics department, a pack of wolves, a slug’s nervous system, a dog’s skin, and Tokyo National Bank. In contrast, natural system presents itself to us as a form whose constituents are separate (but not independent) from each other: Each component acts as an external and arbitrary impetus to or a constraint upon other constituents according to a rule which varies depending on the particular natural system under study. While components are separate, they form a chain-like integrity which cannot be divided. Therefore, it is also considered an individual, but not one whose components are nonseparate from each other. A natural system is an individual in the sense that a component is a topographically defined impetus or constraint for the network of components. Besides the competitive constituents of human economy, other examples of natural systems include water or sound waves, a cluster of galaxies, a set of ripples of sand on a beach, a ferromagnet, plate tectonics, the global chain of volcanos, the solar system, the cycles of nitrogen, oxygen, ozone, and phosphate, aquatic life in a reef, and an ecosystem.4 As the following six sections elucidate, there are six earmarks, summarized in Figure 1, which may assist us in drawing an unambiguous distinction between natural complex and natural system: (1) the type of canons which natural form goes by, (2) the kind of interaction which parts of natural form are involved in, (3) the sort of arrangement which emerges from the interaction of parts of natural form, (4) the spatial appearance of such arrangement, (5) the temporal appearance of such arrangement, (6) and the type of hierarchy which characterizes natural form.

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ELIAS L. KHALIL 1. Canons: Principles vs. Rules

One way of distinguishing between natural complex and natural system is by differentiating between their canons of behavior. There are two types of canons. When canons act as final cause, they are called “principles,” which organize the functioning of natural complex. A principle is penumbral and has multiple meanings in the abstract. Thus, there is a need for a concrete context to make it meaningful. When canons act as efficient cause, they are named “rules,” which regulate the operation of natural systems.’ A rule is precise and unambiguous; there is no need for a concrete context to provide an interpretation.6 The distinction between principles and rules is of prime importance. For instance, in regards to economic policy, there are two types of government action: one which fosters the principle of purposeful capital accumulation, and the other which regulates the market via rules in order to increase efficiency. F. Hayek (1973) has failed to draw such distinction. Given the profundity of Hayek’s views, one is allowed to trace his confusion of the two policies to his conflation of principles with rules. I have borrowed the fine distinction between principles and rules from the legal scholar R. Dworkin (1977). He has eloquently argued that some laws are an embodiment of moral principles like the freedom of speech, the right to private property, and the right to abortion. What groups these canons together is that they are individualist penumbral precepts, which are most usually in conflict with other equally valid communal principles like the right of the community to maintain its cohesion. In contrast, other laws are a system of rules like the size of jury, zoning regulation, the number of witnesses in contracts, and traffic laws. What unites those canons together is that they are precise technical rules, which are hardly in conflict with other rules. Another distinction is that while principles are pursued as a matter of principle or for their own sake, rules are implemented for other reasons. Rules do not have to be devised. They could arise spontaneously. Examples of spontaneous rules include the segmentation of cities and regions according to income, race, and ethnic background; they also include the differentiation of crowds in parties according to gender, age, and professional interest. Even when traffic rules are not spelled out by City Hall, the outcome is not necessarily chaos. For example, the flow of pedestrians at lunch hour up and down Fifth Avenue in Manhattan follows rules which are not devised by City Hall. For the same reason, in times of blackout, the flow of motor vehicles is not anarchic after allowing for a period of adjustment. It seems that such moving objects would be channelled according to spontaneously emerging rules. The flow of currents in natural systems like oceans and the atmosphere is subject to the same kind of spontaneously emerging canons. I call these canons “rules,” as different from “principles,” in the sense that they are cause-and-effect laws without purpose. A rule usually specifies the cause which precedes the effect following Aristotelian efficient causality. Thus, the components of a natural system are governed by rules, and so interact for no goal. The rules which govern the flow of pedestrians and cars do not arise for a purpose, but rather for efficiency, physical constraint. In fact, traffic rules are indifferent to the purposes of pedestrians and cars. Although each pedestrian seeks to attain a goal, this does not make the whole traffic flow a purposeful natural complex. Although games (e.g., chess, basketball, and cards) combine purposeful principles and rules, they are different from traffic flow. A game is a natural complex since the whole interaction has a purpose or drive. While rules stipulate what is exactly non-permissible in a

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game, they do not specify the game like they do specify traffic flow. The game is specified by the general drive to win, which could be achieved through diverse strategies, as long as the rules are observed. To wit, the general drive to win is separate from the rules which govern the game. This is the case since rules can only coordinate activity, which is not enough to integrate the energies of the diverse members of the game. While coordination by rules is imperative for the conduct of basketball game or firm, it is insufficient to engender a game or a firm. At best, rules could engender well-coordinated traffic, which could be thin or bustling. The design of the best rules does not entail a bustling economy, like it does not entail a bustling traffic. Thus, there is a need for an inspiring principle or drive which acts as an organizing behavioral locus in order to actualize thi potentiality of natural complex. Since natural system, like traffic flow, is not typified by potentiality, the two natural forms diverge on the question of prediction. In fact, the unpredictability of natural system arises for different reasons from the unpredictability of natural complex. The former is the result of human’ignorance of all the pertinent factors at play. Ignorance is the outcome either of too many degrees of freedom, like too many molecules in fluid turbulence, or of insensitivity to initial conditions, like the tossing of a coin. The other kind of unpredictability arises from the fact that the capability of natural complex is non-determined since it is a potential which undergoes metamorphoses, and hence reacts differently to the same stimulus. That is, if the Universe is solely a natural system, as Pierre Laplace has assumed, the failure to predict its behavior would arise merely from ignorance of the momentum and location of every particle. This entails that while the universe is determined, it is unpredictable. In contrast, if the universe is a natural complex, its unpredictability would arise from nondeterminism. As alluded to above, principles, unlike rules, cannot be applied to the letter, since they are usually in conflict with each other. The right to private property. e.g., may come into conflict with the right to a livelihood, or the right of women to choose abortion with the right of the community to choose otherwise, or the right to free speech with the right of society to maintain decency and moral values. Thus, there are no ultimate and categorical answers to such questions; each case almost needs individual attention and deliberation. In other words, principles cannot be ironclad rules (see Khalil. 1989b). Even the ones expressed in mythologies, religious doctrines, and constitutions cannot specify exact commands of what to do (even though it might appear so to the uninitiated). This is so because principles come into conflict in concrete situations. Thus, principles. by definition, are subject to interpretation and development with the accumulation of experience. There are, though, always fundamentalist legal scholars or theologians who argue against interpretation; they advocate the treatment of principles as rules. They read texts literally and prohibit deviations from what seems as canons of strict regulation-even in order to accommodate new circumstances. Analogous to such fundamentalist exegetes, orthodox microbiologists. ethologists, and hard-core neo-Darwinian evolutionists treat the nuclear DNA as a set of rules. It is true that some genes act as instructional codes or rules. Albeit, nuclear genes. for the most part, function in teams, which are crafty and self-seeking. Genetic codes or rules are precise commands of what is permissible and what is not, i.e., explicit chains of cause and effect. In contrast, genetic principles are fuzzy potentials. To put it differently. genetic codes execute orders somewhat similar to the on/off switching of a circuit in the operation of artificial

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forms. In contrast, genetic principles provide primeval potentials for the proliferation of a variety of concrete organizations and processes. Therefore, microbiologists who treat all genetic DNA as only a set of codes or rules are expectedly puzzled at the ability of the immune system to generate millions upon millions of antibodies-certainly more than the quantity of genes in the DNA molecule. Similarly, ethologists who regard behavior as ultimately arising from fixed repertoires are also surprised at the ability of living matter to exhibit new behavioral strategies. Likewise, evolutionists who explain the emergence of a new species as capricious genetic mutations (i.e., a mere change of rules) are consequently confounded by the non-arbitrariness of the direction of evolution, viz., the rise of complexity. Orthodox evolutionists explain it away in this manner: Nature selects the more complex because it is usually the more fit. To sum up, the juxtaposition of genetic codes and genetic principles is isomorphic to the juxtaposition of traffic laws and the freedom of speech principle. While natural system -which characterizes some aspects of the DNA molecule and human society-is regulated by rules, natural complex-which features other aspects of natural form-is organized by principles. 2. Interaction:

Organic vs. Topographic

A second way of distinguishing natural complex from natural system is through the kind of “interaction.” When a part can not be defined separately from others, it is involved in “organic interaction,” which characterizes natural complex, like national economy, firms, cells, organisms, etc. In contrast, when a part can be defined separately (but not independently) of the whole, it is involved in “topographic interaction,” which characterizes natural systems, like markets, air turbulence, ecological communities, etc. The common connotation of the word “organic” (from which I would like to distance my position) is the subserviency of the member to the purpose of the whole. In other words, there is supposedly a well-defined project followed by the whole, like a firm or an organism, which is determined a priori. The function of members is presumed to be a priori function of the project of the whole. In contrast, in my usage, the word “organic” means, on the one hand, each member of the whole has its own project which maintains a relative autonomy from the project of the parent natural complex; and, on the other hand, each member’s project is not a priori determined before entering into interaction with other members of the firm or the organism. Thus, the word “organic” denotes that the project of the member is neither a function of the whole, nor reduced to the member in-itself, i.e., in abstraction of the whole. Let us examine, for example, an economics department in a university. This natural complex is constituted by its faculty members that includes a chairperson. Each professor has a different project. One specializes, e.g., in microeconomic theory, another in international trade, and a third in the economics of health care. These diverse projects, as a result, give a direction to the department as a whole. These projects, however, are not uniquely fixed, and hence should not be the start of an assessment of the orientation of the department. The particular projects are influenced by the general need of the department. Thus, while the general project of the department is influenced by the particular purposes of its members, these particular purposes are, in turn, affected by the project of the department. Thus, the economics department is a flexible natural complex in the long run. The department is flexible as well in the short run. If a teacher cannot fulfill his or her particular

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project, another member could act as a substitute; each member of the department has, besides a particular specialization, a general ability to undertake, with various degrees of dexterity, all other functions in the department. Either long- or short-term flexibility exhibits an organic interaction which I call “particular/general” division of labor. Another name is “incompleteness,” which denotes that neither the member’s project nor the whole’s is complete without the other. In contrast, topographic interaction involves efficient causation. That is, the whole does not, to start with, have a unifying project or purpose. Although each component, e.g., trader on the New York Stock Exchange, has a project of her or his own, the market as a whole does not. Traders do not have the general ability to take the function of others, since they are not working for a common purpose. While they use information efficiently, efficiency is hindered because of the unique topographic location of each trader. I call this archetypal feature of natural system: “interdependence. ’ ’ Interdependence makes market prices persistently different from efficient prices-ones which reflect equal returns on investment, i.e., equilibrium. Such disequilibrium is an unintended outcome of chaotic interaction hindered by the interdependence of topographically restrained traders. Topographic interaction is the combination of chaotic interaction and inertial hindrances resulting from interdependence. Likewise, in open thermodynamic systems, heat energy moves from hotter to colder regions as a result of chaotic motion of molecules. However, the movement of heat energy is inefficient since molecules are hindered by topography. Such inefficiency or disequilibrium is prolonged indefinitely if the natural system is open to intense influx of energy and matter. In such cases, chaotic motion is hindered by inertia resulting from interdependence. To state the gist of the matter, such natural systems drift towards outcomes as a result of topographic interaction. This is far different from organic relations which bind organelles in a cell and departments in a firm. 3. Arrangement: Configuration

vs. Pattern

The outcome of interaction is the rise of arrangement, which provides a third way of distinguishing natural complex and natural system. While the arrangement which arises from organic interaction is called “configuration,” the one which arises from topographic interaction is dubbed “pattern.” While a configuration is usually a purposeful elaboration of a simpler one, a pattern arises spontaneously out of constrained chaos. That is, the forces behind the rise of configuration are different from those behind patterns.’ The work of Ilya Prigogine and his collaborators (1972, 1980, 1984) provides an account of the rise of patterns which they call “dissipative structures.” Patterns like the convection cells in the Benard phenomenon and oscillation of chemical reactions appear in nonlinear systems which are far-from-equilibrium. The states of optima in spin glass also illustrate the spontaneous rise of patterns. Such patterns emerge as a compromise between the conflicting forces which molecules experience-given that the system is kept away from equilibrium by virtue of being open to injections of energy/matter from the environment. The conflict arises because molecules, on the one hand, tend to move randomly, and, on the other hand, tend to stay in their topographic location, frustrated by the pulling of their neighbors. In contrast, the work of F. Varela (1976, 1979; see also Zeleny, 1980, 1981) on the self-production of natural complexes, which he calls “autopoiesis,” provides a good start

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for understanding the functioning of biological configuration. Such configuration, like cells, behave purposefully to maintain their identity in spite of the fact that their constitutive members are replaced many times during the life-time of the natural complex. Likewise, an organism or a nation acts purposefully to maintain its identity despite the incessant turnover, respectively, of cells or individuals. To put it succinctly, the principles of purposefulness and autonomy which characterize configurations ate distinctly different from chaotic atttactots which typify patterns. Configurations are distinguished by organic division of labor, while patterns by clustered topography. 4. Spatial

Arrangement:

Organizarion

vs. Srrucrure

Leibniz regards space as the arrangement of coexistence. Interacting parts of natural form show such spatial coexistence. The spatial dimension of configuration is dubbed “organization,” and of pattern “structure.” The organization, e.g.. of cells exhibits division of labor among its constituent members. Organisms ate also constituted of organs with different specializations which form otganization through organic interaction. A population of organisms is differentiated into particular tasks which are coordinated through organic interaction as well. In general, natural complexes ranging from molecules and cells to organisms and populations have unique spatial configutation ot organization.’ In contrast, the structure exhibited, e.g., by a hurricane shows unmistakable boundary, with an ‘eye’ mote or less in the center of it. Such a structure, like all other vortices of natural systems, may not be perfectly symmetrical. but its boundary is nevertheless detectable. Another example: pedestrian traffic unintentionally forms into structure through topographic interaction. Natural systems tanging from ecosystems. international trade, weather, and riots of people to chemical reactions and stock markets have spatial pattern ot structure. The dimensions of the geographical spread of structures vary a great deal, depending on the natural system in question. Thus, the spatial dimension of natural complex as in cells should be distinguished from the spatial extent of natural system as in storms. 5. Temporal

Arrangernew:

Process

vs. Dynamics

For Leibniz, time is the arrangement of succeeding events. Interacting parts manifest their connection in the temporal flow of events. The temporal dimension of configuration is named “process,” and of pattern “dynamics.” i. Process: Developtnent vs. Evolution: There ate two kinds of processes: continuous process, which is dubbed “development.” and discontinuous process, which is called “evolution.” One aspect of development is the continuous strive for growth. The every-day, developmental process of production and growth assures the steady identity of the configuration. The outcome, though, is not growth along a straight path. Although developmental growth is continuous, a configuration like a cell undergoes distinct phases of development. Cells develop from the phase of inception. birth. robust youth. and adulthood to decline and

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decay. Although each development is unique, organs, organisms, and population of organisms proceed also along similarly distinct developmental phases. Phases of developmental growth is different from another aspect of development, the unfolding of general functions into particular and more specialized functions, which I do not discuss in the essay. In regards to phases of development, they are mainly the result of two opposing forces, viz., the drive to grow and rising obstacles to growth. The driye for growth is a purposeful principle in the life of natural complex. However, obstacles to growth emerge, and eventually succeed, despite the struggle of natural complex to reverse them. Obstacles to growth include the depletion of inputs and senescence, which cannot be elaborated on within the scope of this essay. Evolution is the discontinuous unfolding of a configuration into a new one. I call such a qualitative change a shift of “regime” or “scheme.” A regime or scheme includes organizational aspects and know-how, like technology or genotype, depending on the natural complex at hand. The new regime or scheme usually retains the main outline of the old one, but in a more sophisticated way. That is, punctuated process is nor a total break with the past. Rather, it is ‘business-as-usual’ carried out at a higher level of differentiation. To note, breaks with the past are of different magnitude. When the break is moderate, it is called “microevolution;” when it is radical, it is named “macroevolution.” While time flows in a discontinuous manner in evolutionary processes, it flows in a continuous manner in developmental processes. In either time flow, the process is irreversible at the theoretical level. That is, unlike dynamics, it is impossible, even theoretically, for a natural complex to become younger or devolve. Since such temporal change of configuration, process, is irreversible, I suggest calling it “historical,” in order to distinguish it from temporal change of pattern, dynamics. ii. Dynamics: Maturation vs. Transformation: There are two kinds of dynamics: shortterm dynamics named “maturation,” and long-term dynamics denoted “transformation.” Examples of maturation include hurricane which unambiguously exhibits a cycle over its brief duration (which should not be dubbed “life,” since it would engender confusion with living natural complex.) Winds gradually feed on each other, gather speed, and dissipate after reaching a common peak. Storms do not appear and disappear suddenly. They also do not maintain a constant strength throughout. There is a recognizable cyclical pattern to their formation which lasts a few days. Although the cyclical fluctuation of the Earth’s magnetic field lasts a few centuries, it is the outcome of geodynamic auto-feedbacks, which is similar to atmospheric auto-feedbacks (Bloxham & Gubbins, 1989, p. 68). Ecosystems and human market undergo maturation dynamics as well, which resemble each other in substantive ways. A vegetation in the ecosystem or product in the market diffuses as a result of feedbacks. Eventually, though, the natural system becomes saturated, which stifles further growth. The saturation is the result of the rise of competition over time, while opportunities are more-or-less limited. I call this maturation dynamics “the derived law of structure.” Although they overlap and influence each other, maturation dynamics of natural system are totally different from developmental processes of natural complex. In contrast, transformational dynamics stretch over longer periods of time. They are not cyclical, but rather uni-directional. They include the change of weather on Earth or other planets over millions of years, and the change of how frequently the Earth’s magnetic poles reverse themselves over hundreds of millions of years (Bloxham & Gubbins, 1989, p. 71).

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Transformational dynamics usually supersede the impasse faced by matured systems. In ecosystems, this is called succession, where a new reign of vegetation replaces an old one. In the human market, this is called product innovation, where a younger industry takes over an older one. In this manner, the growth of ecosystems or markets is re-initiated. Although they overlap and affect each other, transformational dynamics of natural system are radically distinct from evolutionary processes of natural complex. To state more explicitly, processes (development and evolution) and dynamics (maturation and transformation) are radically distinct. Dynamics flow as a consequence of topographic feedbacks in natural systems; while processes are the life span of natural complexes as they purposefully struggle to harness resources from the environment. In other words, there is a difference between the dynamics behind the maturation of markets and the transformation of industries, on the one hand, and the processes behind the development and evolution of firms and nations, on the other. Another difference between processes and dynamics is in regard to irreversibility. Dynamics engender events which are irreversible. Albeit, such irreversibility is the result of probabilistic, and not theoretical, reasons. In contrast, events engendered by processes of development and evolution are irreversible in the theoretical sense. Since dynamics arise from topographic interaction, it is possible, rheoreticafly, for a storm to reverse itself, although highly improbable at the statistical level. Since processes arise from organic interaction, it is impossible theoretically for an adult to develop into a baby, or an evolutionary process to reverse itself (in the literal sense). Thus, as I indicated earlier, I suggest reserving the term “historical” to the description of temporal change which is irreversible even at the theoretical level. 6. Hierarchy: Complexity vs. Complicatedness

Almost any natural form is a whole constituted by parts. For example, firm is made up of different departments; cell is composed of membrane, nucleus, organelles, etc. Furthermore, vortex is comprised of smaller vortices, an ocean wave of smaller waves, and the global climate of regional ones. All these parts are, in turn, wholes which are made up of smaller parts. An artist may conceive the universe like Chinese dolls, where natural forms are inside other natural forms, and so on. Natural forms, therefore, have different levels of hierarchy. For example, General Electric Co. has greater levels of hierarchy than Hilland Farm in Vermont, and, likewise, the global ecosystem is more hierarchical than the Australian tropical forest. The word “hierarchy” is scantly used in academic discussion, probably because it connotes aristocratic and eschatological justification of political inequality. The word “hierarchy,” though, is most helpful; it resuscitates our flat knowledge of the world. There are two kinds of hierarchies: When a natural complex is member of a larger natural complex, like a firm within the national economy, it is called “complexity.” When a natural system is constituent of a larger natural system, like a community within the ecosystem, it is called “complicatedness. ” Examples of complexity include tribe that is composed of clans, families, individuals, organs, cells, etc. Likewise, a firm is characterized as a complexity since it is composed of departments, each of which includes divisions that are, in turn, made up of laborers. The rise of a new level of hierarchy or complexity signifies an increase of division of labor or, what is

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Complex vs. Natural

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25

called by biologists, differentiation. The forces behind the rise of complexity are the same as those behind evolution. So, one should dedicate most care to the explication of these forces in order to avoid confusing them with the forces responsible for the rise of complicatedness. In contrast, air turbulence, an example of complicatedness, is a natural system which is composed of local air turbulences, which each in turn is composed of smaller ones. Another example of complicatedness is the ecosystem of the Amazonian rain forest, which is composed of many different patterns, each of which is in turn composed of lower level patterns. Similarly, a market is characterized as complicated since it is geographically parceled from the global scale to the county scale, and temporally subjected to dynamics of different duration of time.g A complicatedness is a huge pattern, composed of smaller-scale patterns, and so on. A complexity is a huge configuration, composed of smaller configurations, and so on. The degree of complicatedness is gauged by the hierarchy of the natural system in question. The degree of complexity is measured by the levels of the natural complex under focus. It is fruitful to distinguish between complexity and complicatedness. Otherwise, one would conflate the complicatedness of the market with the complexity of institutions and the complicatedness of the ecosystem with the complexity of populations and organisms.

Conclusion In a casual reflection, Boulding (19851986, p. 3) recognizes the difference between natural complex and natural system. Boulding identifies Miller’s (1978) work as the epitome of that branch of general systems research interested in physiology and social organization, or what I call “natural complex.” In contrast, Boulding identifies his (1978) work as representing the other branch of general system research which is interested in ecological and market dynamics, or what I dub “natural system. ” Boulding expresses the hope that these two branches of scientific discourse will be united some day in the future, since they seem to him “highly complementary.” I have registered so far that it is imperative to keep natural complex and natural system distinct. It is true that human economies or biological forms exhibit simultaneously systemand complex-like behavior. This does not mean that the discourses about the two types of behavior should be united. Rather, it means that human economies or biological forms should be approached by two separate discourses. That is, each discipline should be divided into two distinct apparatuses, in order to handle separately the complex- and system-like behavior of natural forms within the scope of the discipline. In place of the traditional distinction between social, biological, and physical sciences, I suggest a distinction between the science of complexes and the science of systems. Let me suggest the terms “complexology” and “systemology” for the two distinct sciences. To note, besides what has been elucidated above, there is one more difference between complexology and systemology. While complexology deals with phenomena isomorphic in a substantive sense, systemology deals with phenomena isomorphic only in a formal or mathematical sense. With respect to complexology, the laws which govern the organization and processes of cells are, substantively, about the same laws which govern organisms and populations of organisms. This is so because each natural complex is either made of or constitute another complex; and hence they have substantively isomorphic constitution. In

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regards to systemology, the laws which govern the structure and dynamics of air turbulence resemble only formally the laws which govern ecosystems and human markets. This is the case because the equilibrating forces in air turbulence are purely based on chaotic interaction of molecules, while in the latter they are based on purposeful activity of economizing on the part of organisms and economic agents. Thus, unlike natural complexes, the isomorphism among some natural systems is merely mathematical. Accordingly, metaphors could signify two distinct types of similarities. When a metaphor highlights a feature in one natural system by appealing to another natural system, it highlights in many cases (but not all) an analogy. In contrast, when a metaphor points out a characteristic in one natural complex by appealing to another natural complex, it usually shows an homology. Needless to add, when a metaphor is used UCTOSS natural system and natural complex, it is definitely analogical. The distinction between analogous and homologous metaphors can save us from plenty of misunderstanding. To start with, though, why is it crucial to make a distinction between natural complex and natural system? With respect to the economics discipline, economists across the ideological divide (excluding institutionalists) have conflated government intervention in the functioning of the price system with the efforts of the state to build institutional and technological infrastructures which underpin the price system. While the former intervention attempts to regulate or set the rules of the economy as natural system, the latter intervention builds institutions which are the embodiment of principles of the economy as natural complex. Utopian socialists and laissez-faire economists have wrongly treated the argument against price/wage controls and other rules as identical to the argument against the building of institutional infrastructures by government. Moreover, public choice theorists, like J. Buchanan and G. Tullock (1962), have reduced principles, including the provisions of the constitution, to mere rules, similar to the ones which regulate traffic and where to vote (see Khalil, 1987, 1989b). Furthermore, the conflation of natural complex and natural system by neoclassical economists (e.g., Williamson, 1985) has led to the view of the fii as a black box, made to minimize market transaction costs (see Khalil, 1990a). Thus, the rise of complexity has been seen by orthodox economists as the rise of corporate size at the expense of market transaction. This, however, could only account for the fluctuation of the size of corporation vis-a-vis the market, while complexity could have as well stayed constant. More recently, there has been a concerted effort by orthodox economists to discuss evolution of economic complexity through tools borrowed from non-linear dynamics of chaos theory (Anderson et al., 1988; see also Allen in Dosi et al., 1988). These tools, though, are appropriate only for the study of the economy as a natural system. The result has been the conflation of economic configuration with economic pattern. Another tendency, led by N. Georgescu-Roegen (197 1; cf. Faber et al., 1987), has based its prediction of the doomsday of civilization on the absolute degradation of resources and the environment, which is presumably premised on the second law of thermodynamics (the entropy law). The entropy law, however, is only valid in natural systems, and, moreover, the waste which humans produce has no relation to the tendency of entropy (chaos) to rise. Waste produced by humans is a subjectively-defined variable, while entropy is an objectively-defined one (see Khalil, 1989a, 199Oc). The identification of human production with the entropy law is the outcome of the conflation of natural complex and natural system.

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27

With respect to the biological sciences, the conflation of natural complex and natural system has led neo-Darwinian theorists, and especially R. Dawkins (1976), to treat the organism as a black box, a mere medium for genes to reproduce themselves (see Khalil, 1990a). Furthermore, the conflation has led scores of scientists (Schrodinger, 1944; Prigogine, 1980; Brooks & Wiley, 1986; Vogel, 1988; and passim, Weber et al., 1988) to explain social and biological configuration and its evolution as a pattern (“dissipative structure”) which arises as a result of chaotic thermodynamics. That is, an organism is putatively constituted by the same forces which give origin to the Benard convection cells in a pot of boiling water or the ripples of sand on beaches. The view of biological configuration as a pattern of low entropy is the extent to which workers are ready to sink into muddleheadedness in order to avoid the recognition that some natural forms behave according to principles; i.e., they are self-seeking (see Khalil, 1989~). As a corollary to the treatment of natural complex as natural system, the distinction between evolution and transformation has been blurred. Not only evolution has been treated as an entropic phenomenon by D. Brooks and E. Wiley (1986), but also ecological transformation is treated as an evolutionary ascendancy by R. Ulanowicz (1986, 1989).” Even ecologists (e.g., Allen & Starr, 1982; Sdlthe, 1985; O’Neill et al., 1986) whose work is informed by the hierarchy perspective fail to distinguish between complicatedness, which characterizes species, communities, ecosystems, etc., and complexity, which characterizes genes, cells, organisms, etc. I would need a large volume to document how pertinent literatures in the past few decades have mutilated natural complexes by poking them with tools only appropriate for the study of natural systems. Sometimes, other tools, like information theory and neural nets, are even more limited, since they are applicable only to artificial forms such as communication equipment and artificially intelligent machines. In this manner, researchers have denied that natural complexes are penumbral and purposeful. I suspect that the specter of teleology and the quest for exactitude, which permeate the scientific milieu, are behind the treatment of natural complex as natural system. Such a treatment has hindered efforts for constructing a proper theory of development and evolution of natural complex.

Acknowledgments This article is extracted from the “Introduction” of my doctoral thesis, “Foundations of Natural Economics” (The New School for Social Research, 1990). An earlier version was accorded the 1988 Sir Geoffrey Vickers Memorial Award by the International Society for Systems Sciences (formerly ISGSR). I would like to thank Kenneth E. Boulding, Stanley S&he, Craig Miller, Mike Pantzar, Enefiok Ekanem, Paul Levinson (the editor), and two anonymous referees. The usual cavaet applies.

Notes 1. I identify neoclassicaleconomics as strictly microeconomics, which does not include any variety of Keynesian economics.

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2. My definition of fictional category matches what J. Miller (1978, p. 16) calls “conceptual. system.” Albeit, I do not distinguish between what he calls “concrete system” and “abstract system” (Miller, 1978, pp. 17-20). 3. I have borrowed the term “natural complex” from the American philosopher J. Buchler (1966; seeSinger, 1976, 1983). Buchler’s approach is in the tradition of processphilosophy, developed in the 20th century by H. Bergson (1913), A.N. Whitehead (1929, 1933), and G.H. Mead (1959). However, processphilosophy, generally speaking, has failed to draw the distinction between natural complex, which Whitehead calls “organism,” and natural system. 4. According to J. Lovelock (1979, 1988), the global ecosystem should be considered as a supra-organism, i.e., as a natural complex. He employs the name of the Greek goddessof Earth, Gaia, in order to highlight the organic unity of all living forms on Earth. In this manner, the atmosphere acts as the skin of the supra-organism,the water cycle as the bodily fluid, and birds as the lungs. Even if findings confirm such a view, it should not affect the conceptual distinction between natural complex and natural system. 5. In another paper (Kbalil, 1989b), I develop the implication of the distinction between principles and rules in regardsto ethics and ideology. Elsewhere(Khalil, 1990b), I focus more closely on the penumbral character of principles with respect to human conduct. 6. The distinction of rules and principles is somewhat analogous to the demarcation drawn by vitalists between the canons which non-living and living matter go by. Although, I take it a step beyond vitalism; non-living matter could also act according to principles and living matter could as well act according to rules. 7. I choosethe word “pattern” over “order” or “low entropy” becausethe latter terms connote that the system, like a snow flake, is at equilibrium. However, patterns describe arrangements which arise only in far-from-equilibrium systems.In order to eliminate confusions, I propose to reserve the word “order” to denote exclusively the degree of orderlinessof systemsat equilibrium, while the word “pattern” expressesstrictly the spontaneousarrangementswhich could emerge in open, disequilibrium systems. 8. I do not consider speciesor a higher taxon a natural complex. They are fictional categories devised for classification purposes. While a population of lions or deer is a natural complex because they interact beyond the need for sexual reproduction. These are still hotly debated issues (see the specialissue of Biology and Philosophy, April 1987, vol. 2(2) on whether “species” is an individual, i.e., a natural complex). Their resolution is an empirical matter, and so should not affect the conceptual distinction between natural complex and natural system. 9. B. Mandelbrot (1983), a mathematician, coined the term “fractal” to denote such hierarchical complicatedness.Mandelbrot, who is even receiving an attention from the press, dedicated his life work to devise simple geometric rules which could describe a pattern repeated at different scales. He noted that clouds, coastlines, lightning, and snow crystal are crooked or fragmented at degreeswhich are almost identical at all scales.The degree of fragmentation is called the “fractal dimension.” As an illustration, if a lightning has a fractal dimension of 1.21 at a scale of one yard, it also has about that dimension at a scale of a mile or an inch. He attempted to apply the fractal concept to the prices of stocks. He found that the fluctuations of prices over a day, a year, and a century have a more-or-less identical temporal pattern (Mandelbrot, 1963). That is, the vacillations of prices of stocks is a pattern within a larger pattern which forms a complicatedness, 10. When J. Lovelock (1979, 1988) arguesthat the global ecology is a supra-organism,or what I call natural complex, he is stating a factual claim. That is, he claims that living things are not related to each other chaotically. This implies that he makes a conceptual distinction between natural complex and natural system. In contrast, when Ulanowicz discussesascendancy,he doesnot make the distinction, even implicitly, between natural complex and natural system.

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Simon, H.A. (1962) “The Architecture of Complexity. ” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, December, 106(6), 467-482. Singer, B. (1976) “Introduction: The Philosophyof JustusBuchler.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Spring, 14(l), 3-30. Singer, B. (1983) Ordinal Naturalism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Justus Buchler. London: Associated University Presses. Spencer-Brown, G. (1979) Laws of Form. New York Dutton. Ulanowicz, R.E. (1986) Growth and Development: A Phenomenological Perspective. New York: Springer-Verlag. Ulanowicz, R.E. (1989) “A Phenomenologyof Evolving Networks.” Systems Research, 6(3), 209-217. Varela, F. (1976) “On Observing Systems.” CoEvolution Quarterly, Summer, 26-3 1. Varela, F. (1979) Principles of Biological Autonomy. New York: Kluwer. Vogel, J.H. (1988) “Evolution asan Entropy Driven Process:An EconomicModel.” SystemsResearch, 5(4), 299-312.

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