Negotiating successful technology implementation a motivation perspective

ELSEVIER

J. Eng. Technol. Manage. 13 (1996) 29-53

Journal of ENGINEERINGAND TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT JET-M

Negotiating successful technology implementation A motivation perspective Terri L. Griffith + College of Business and Public Administration, 405 McClelland Hall, Unicersity of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA

Abstract A framework based on expectancy theory, equity theory, and integrative negotiation strategies is proposed for improving the success rates of technology implementations. Negotiation strategies can be used to create integrative solutions such that the incentives to use the technology are distributed most effectively. Many of the current approaches to technology implementation focus on increasing the ease of use of the technology by lowering organizational and/or technological barriers blocking implementation success, An additional approach is to increase motivation to use the technology. Ease of use must be combined with making technology use desirable to the users. Implementers who approach implementation as an integrative negotiation will be best able to structure successful solutions. Kevwords: Technology implementation; Negotiation; Motivation: User participation

1. Theoretical framework Organizations are using technological innovation as a strategy to enhance their competitive position (McFarlan, 1984; Porter and Millar, 1985; Reddy, 1990; Sproull and Goodman, 1990). Unfortunately, in some technologies, an estimated 50 to 75% of implementations fail (Majchrzak, 1988). Although the technological component of sociotechnical systems (Pasmore, 1988; Trist and Bamforth, 1951) may work as advertised, one study of 2000 U.S. companies found that 40% of new office technology implementations had not achieved the intended benefits. Interestingly, less than 10% of

* Corresponding author. Fax: (602) 621-5857: E-mail: [email protected]. 0923-4748/96/$15.00 Copyright © 1996 XXXX. Published by Elsevier Science B.V. PII S0923-4748(96)00004-5

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these implementation failures were the result of technical problems; instead most occurred for "human and organizational" reasons, such as poor technology management (Bikson and Gutek, 1984). This paper focuses on an early stage of technology management, the implementation process where the technology is brought into use (Rogers, 1987). A framework based on expectancy theory, equity theory, and integrative negotiation strategies is proposed for improving the success rates of technology implementations. The primary argument is that technology implementation will succeed when it is perceived by the participants to be in their best interest. The failure rate of technology implementation suggests that this statement may not be as obvious at it seems. Negotiation strategies can be used to create integrative solutions such that the incentives to use the technology are explicitly addressed and distributed most effectively. Implementation includes any processes undertaken to institutionalize a new technology as a stable part of the organization (Ettlie, 1984; Lucas, 1991; Tornatzky and Johnson, 1982). Implementation follows adoption (e.g., Dean, 1987) where the decision to implement a particular technology is made; implementation is bounded by institutionalization, at which point the technology has become part of the status quo. Implementation as presented here is separate from system design (though systems created in-house may begin implementation during design) and is part of "change-over," where the system is transferred to the users (e.g., Edstr~im, 1977). (This definition is also consistent with that of Rogers (1987) where implementation is described as the "innovation" being put into use.) This definition of implementation does not assume that the technology is static, but does distinguish changes made to a given technology (e.g., Leonard-Barton, 1988) from adoption and acknowledges that assumptions are made about implementation (i.e., outcomes of implementation success) during the adoption period. Implementation success is assumed to include knowledge of the technology, use of the technology, attitudes toward the technology, and normative consensus among the participants regarding the value of the technology (Goodman and Griffith, 1991). These indicators were created with the understanding that, over time and the evolution of the technology, some indicators will be more important than others. For example, before the technology is up and running, knowledge may be the appropriate indicator. Normative consensus, on the other hand, is not appropriate until some large portion of the organization has been involved with the technology. The cost of a new technology implementation failure can range from a few hundred dollars for a basic personal computer equipped with public domain software, to well over $1.5 million for just one laser dimensional measuring device in an auto assembly plant. However, the hardware/software cost of these technologies is only the beginning. Implementation failure can also cost organizations in terms of employee hours for installation, scrap during early use, training, trust, and lost opportunities. Specific examples of technologies where this negotiation/implementation model could apply include (but are not limited to): computer-aided manufacturing (e.g., Beatty and Gordon, 1988); robotics (e.g., Argote et al., 1983); computerized group decision support tools, software and hardware (Nunamaker et al., 1991); and electronic mail (e.g., Sproull and Kiesler, 1986). Although the focus of this paper is on new technology

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implementation (because of its current strategic importance), many of the following arguments hold for any complex organizational change. Much of the extant implementation literature has considered organizational implementation activities, such as, top management support, training, and culture (e.g., Bikson, 1987; Bikson et al., 1987; Ettlie, 1984; Lewis and Seibold, 1993; Tornatzky et al., 1983; Zammuto and O'Connor, 1992). The current paper takes the view that much of the success of implementation process takes place at the level of the individual and so this paper emphasizes individual level factors in implementation success (such as individual level rewards for using the technology and/or dyadic and small group processes between constituencies). Although technological and broader organizational issues are clearly important to technology implementation (e.g., Gasser, 1986: Goodman and Griffith, 1991; Markus, 1983; Rogers. 1987; Zmud and Cox, 1979), the current paper will deal with such issues only as they play a role in terms of motivation. Please note that this is a choice of levers, not one of exclusion - the broader issues are clearly important, but a motivational approach will be the lever examined here. Some prior work on technology implementation has examined individual level processes. Beatty and Gordon (I 988) provide a list of causes of implementation failures, including overconfidence and misguided locus on the part of management and users individual level variables. They suggest that high hopes, hidden costs, hasty decisions, failure to perceive true benefits, and chronic fire fighting are often found at the root of implementation failures. Besides highlighting implementation problems, Beatty and Gordon (1991) identified the critical behaviors necessary for achieving full integration in C A D / C A M implementations. The behaviors were pathfinding, problem-solving, and implementing. In a three year observation of ten organizations, they found that effective fulfillment of all three behaviors was necessary for success. Being effective was defined as. "conscious and skillful attention to the issues and behavior required" (p. 84, emphasis added). Although this approach cues implementers to the need to pay attention to the implementation process, it is relatively abstract advice and does not signal how this attention should be used in terms of organizational prescriptions. Similarly, Goodman and Griffith (1991) provide a multi-dimensional model of the implementation processes and outcomes necessary for implementation success, This model includes processes of socialization, commitment, reward allocation, feedback/redesign (adaptation) and diffusion. The first three processes involve individual behavior while feedback/redesign and diffusion are issues of organization structure. Goodman and Griffith suggest an ideographic approach whereby, for a given technology and setting, the methods and levels of these processes will have to be adjusted. Although their model acknowledges the importance of individual level processes, the operationalization of these processes (such as types of rewards, or specific tbrms of socialization) can be specified only after the particular technology and setting are identified. To apply this model, we need better understanding, and perhaps better generalization, of these mechanisms. This paper examines the reward allocation process and approaches implementation at the level of individual motivation. Formal organizational reward systems related to technology use have been found to positively affect worker acceptance of the technology (Leonard-Barton, 1987), the degree to which technology is incorporated into work

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(Bikson, 1987), and attitudes toward the technology (Mainiero and DeMichiell, 1986; Markus, 1983). Rewards intrinsic to the technology (i.e., increased accuracy, reliability, modifiability; better human-computer interface, greater availability of equipment, enjoyment from using the technology) can have effects in addition to the extrinsic rewards of formal organizational systems (Bikson, 1987; Davis et al., 1992; Rivard, 1987). Implementing technology is much like leading a horse to water - although a technology is provided, whether the user will accept the technology is a function of motivation. Markus and Keil (1994) provide an example of a technically viable information system that failed as a result of poor user motivation. The users were not motivated to do what the system enabled them to do, and additionally, the system made it more difficult for the users to do what they were motivated to do. To summarize, a user may not need the technology, a user may not think the particular technology suits his or her needs, or a user may think that if use is made of the technology, noxious events are likely to result. To implement a technology requires that any barriers be lowered, and that prospective users believe that the particular technology fulfills some need of theirs without causing undue hardships.

2. The motivation perspective This paper proposes an approach to implementation which uses negotiation strategies to build the motivation to use and support a new technology. Expectancy theory (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964) and equity theory (e.g., Adams, 1963) help a manager understand the " c o s t / b e n e f i t " calculations that prospective users are likely to make in deciding whether to use a new technology and have been used successfully in the context of information system implementation (Burton et al., 1992; DeSanctis, 1983; Joshi, 1990). Expectancy theory and equity theory highlight the importance of prospective participants' need fulfillment in successful implementation. Integrative bargaining strategies that assume the possibility of a " w i n / w i n " negotiation (e.g., Neale and Bazerman, 1991) provide the fuel for implementation. Integrative bargaining should help managers understand where to find resources to fulfill prospective users' needs. Although it may seem obvious that implementation success can be understood by an examination of the self-interest of the participants, prior work has not addressed the underlying processes for achieving the most efficient and effective distribution of technology rewards. Rogers (1987, 1995), for example, provides a broad model of the diffusion of innovation. He emphasizes the role of uncertainty-reduction in the diffusion process and examines a large set of dependent variables. The current work is consistent with Rogers' approach, but where Rogers uses communication and uncertainty-reduction as the mediating variable between the innovation, the change process, and the organization, the current work looks more directly at motivation factors that may be closer to organizational action (while acknowledging that communication and uncertainty-reduction serve as antecedents to motivation outcomes). This is not the first work to take a motivation approach. Others have used motivation theory to address the use of particular systems, but the model presented here goes

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beyond prior examinations of expectancy theory and equity theory for technology use (Burton et al., 1992; DeSanctis, 1983; Joshi, 1990) by (1) including relationships between the variety of participants involved in an implementation; (2) describing how both expectancy theory and equity theory can inform implementation efforts; (3) and by providing the mechanism for bringing these motivational approaches to bear, that is, by linking the dynamics of negotiation to the motivational models. The use of negotiation tactics as an implementation technique seems to be a unique application within technological change processes. Although Robey and his colleagues (Newman and Robey, 1992; Robey and Farrow, 1982; Robey et al., 1989, 1993) have studied the role of user/implementer conflict and conflict resolution in technology design and introduction, their work stresses the relationships between user participation, influence, conflict, and conflict resolution. They do not study the internal processes of the conflict resolution (such as how the conflict could be resolved through specific strategies) or use system success as an outcome variable. In Robey and his colleagues' work, final outcomes were either conflict resolution itself (Robey and Farrow, 1982; Robey et al., 1989) or project team success (Robey et al., 1993) - both of these are outcomes regarding the group's processes, rather than the system outcomes. Robey and his colleagues have a different perspective on the context of conflict than that presented here. They imply that the context of user involvement in system design and introductions is generally distributive, meaning that if one side gains, the other must lose (Newman and Robey, 1992, p. 102; Robey et al., 1989, p. 1174). Although some issues at stake in a system implementation are certainly distributive, they may be combined in such a way as to create solutions that are integrative when viewed as a whole. (Types of issues and how they may be combined are discussed below.) Additionally, the model proposed here goes a step further by discussing integrative solutions for s y s t e m s u c c e s s (e.g., knowledge of the system, positive attitudes toward the system, and system use (e.g., Goodman and Griffith, 1991)), rather than using a goal of compromise and effective relationships within the project team and other participants ("project success" - e.g., Newman and Robey, 1992, p. 110). Relationships may be critical for the successful implementation of the system, but the current work will explicitly consider the outcomes of the system's implementation, rather than the antecedent outcome of positive relationships.

Expectancy t Evaluations ~ Inte~,rative Ne~,otiation Approach Motivation to ~ Use/Support the Technology

Identification of Interests ] Trading-off Preferences [ Post-Implementation [ Reevaluation Equity ] ¢ Evaluations /

Fig. 1. Motivationperspective.

Implementation ] Success

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What follows is a review of expectancy theory, equity theory, and the negotiation process. Fig. 1 provides a summary of the overall approach. "Building block" propositions will be presented first. These propositions are not new to the literature, but provide a starting point for the development of new ideas and are a first hurdle for any test of the theory. More integrative propositions, those that summarize the key points of the motivation/negotiation approach to technology implementation, will be extended from this foundation. A hypothetical case of a Group Support Systems (GSS) implementation is presented to illustrate the negotiation approach in a complex setting. The result is a theoretical understanding of the connections between negotiation processes, levels of value and fairness, and subsequent motivation for the successful implementation of a technology. (Readers familiar with expectancy theory and equity theory may want to read the propositions and then move to Section 2.3.) The first and guiding proposition summarizes the above discussion of motivation: Propostion 1. Technology implementation success is the result of the motication of participants to see the technology succeed because it fulfills their own needs (e.g., Burton et al., 1992; DeSanctis, 1983; Goodman and Griffith, 1991; Joshi, 1990; Rogers, 1987). Subsequent propositions will address the various mechanisms underlying the connection between negotiation, motivation, and implementation success. 2.1. Expectancy theor3, The basic premise of expectancy theory relates to an individual's belief that engaging in a particular activity will result in attaining desired outcomes (e.g, Vroom, 1964). There are three components to this model: expectancy, instrumentality, and valence. A critical insight in expectancy theory is that reality regarding the connection between performance and rewards is important only as the basis for the perceived connection between performance and rewards. Individuals will act based on their beliefs, not necessarily reality. All three components of expectancy theory, expectancy, instrumentality, and valence, are perceptions. Expectancy. Expectancy is the perceived relationship between levels of effort and levels of performance on the task. Expectancy can be thought of as a probability - the perceived odds of particular actions being followed by predicted outcomes. If participants in the implementation believe that effort will not result in success with the technology, then expectancy is low and the overall level of motivation to use the technology will be proportionately reduced. Participants who believe that their efforts will result in increased success with the technology (expectancy is high) should be most motivated to apply their effort. Examples of ways to induce high expectancy include training, selection of users with extant high skill levels, technology designs that give users control over the outcomes of the system, or any other technique that increases the perception among users that their efforts will result in technology success. Low expectancy will result from technological systems whose outcomes are influenced by chance events (such as, organizational politics, electrical current variation, phone-line

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quality, etc.) where users cannot see a direct link between their own actions and success with the technology. Instrumentality. Instrumentality is the perceived cause-effect relationship between levels of performance and levels of consequences/'or performance. Instrumentality can also be thought of as a correlation - the relationship between performance and the receipt of consequences (Vroom, 1964, pp. 16-18). Participants who do not perceive a positive connection between success with the technology and the attainment of valued rewards will apply less effort to the implementation than will participants who confidently see a direct, positive connection between success with the technology and subsequent rewards. If past implementations have resulted in attaining stated outcomes, instrumentality would be higher than in an organization where stated outcomes were never realized. Valence. Valence is the anticipated satisfaction resulting from an individual's behavior. Valence is the combination of all the perceived values of all the consequences resulting from the action, weighted by the relationship between action and each particular consequence (instrumentality) (e.g., Wanous et al., 1983). In an implementation, valence is the combination of the perceived value of all the outcomes resulting from success with the technology, weighted by the confidence that these outcomes will actually result from technology success. Technologies that are confidently expected to fill a critical need, and are not costly to use. should have high valence. A simple version of the expectancy model has the following form: Effort

= E ~ ( Vk I k), k=l

where Vk is the valence of a particular consequence; I k is the relationship between performance and the reality of gaining the particular consequence; E is the probability of success on the task; and Effort is the predicted level of motivation to attempt the task. Although the functional form of expectancy theory model has been the cause of much debate (see Wanous et al., 1983 for a brief review), there is ample evidence that expectancy theory is an excellent descriptive theory when studied (1) within subject, (2) under conditions where there are few situational constraints, (3) where there are multiple alternatives, and (4) when the choices are discrete (Wanous et al., 1983). Expectancy theory highlights the mechanisms behind the choices that users, implementers, and managers make during a technology implementation. Expectancy theory suggests that individuals' decisions are made based on the value of the technology (value being a combination of the perceived costs and benefits, weighted by an individual's belief that these costs and benefits will actually be awarded) weighted by the perceived probability that effort will lead to successful use. Managers and implementers can play a strong role in increasing users' motivation to use a technology by: (1) selecting technologies that are useful to users; (2) reducing costs to users by eliminating barriers; (3) providing training that increases users' chances for success; and (4) realistically evaluating and promoting the possibility for technological and organizational rewards such that confidence in outcomes is high. The following proposition summarizes the role of expectancy theory in a technology implementation:

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Proposition 1,1. Prospectiue participants will be motiuated to use and support the new technology when they perceiue technology use to haue high L,alue (ualence), clear, positiue relationships between effort and performance (expectancy), and clear, positiue relationships between performance and outcomes (instrumentality) (Burton et al., 1992; DeSanctis, 1983).

2.2. Equity theory Equity theory is useful for describing whether using the technology is worth it, given the input needed to achieve success and subsequent outcomes. Although expectancy theory can be said to subsume equity theory in that perceptions of costs and benefits influence valence (Campbell and Pritchard, 1976; Lawler, 1968, 1973), the purpose of the current model is to find motivational levers for successful implementation. As such, expectancy theory and equity theory will be dealt with separately, in line with the ideas of Adams (1963), Harder (1991), and Pinder (1984). Equity theory makes explicit the mechanisms individuals use to determine the overall value of costs to benefits. Equity theory also highlights the social nature of implementation as equity is determined by an individual's comparison of personal inputs and outcomes with those of other people in similar situations (Goodman, 1974), or those of the organization (Goodman, 1974; Joshi, 1990). Inputs. Inputs are the things that the individual brings to the task. These can include knowledge, skills, abilities, effort, and productivity. An important feature is that inputs are whatever the individual belieL,es they are bringing to the task. Implementation participants will consider their relevant experiences, skills, individual effort, and success as their inputs. Outcomes. Outcomes are the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards/punishments that result from the given level of inputs. These can be pay, recognition, type of work, satisfaction, etc. Again, outcomes are whatever the participants believe they get, given their inputs. Participants in an implementation are likely to be looking for intrinsic and extrinsic rewards contingent on their performance with the technology. Successful use of the technology may bring them status, enjoyment, job security, a n d / o r extra pay. The mechanism that creates motivation within equity theory is the individual's judgment of equity in the system. When the system is judged by the participant to be inequitable, tension is created that can only be relieved by a change that creates equity. Equity is determined by comparing your own input/outcome ratio with that of a comparison other. Comparison other. The comparison other is likely to be a person similar to the individual doing the evaluation (e.g., Goodman, 1974), resulting in comparisons on similar topics. Additionally, equity can be calculated in terms of perceived equity with the organization, that is, that the organization's input to outcome ratio is equal to that of the individual's (Goodman, 1974; Joshi, 1991). The amount of tension formed in the system is relative to the level of equity. High levels of inequity result in high levels of motivation to reduce inequity. Equity restoration can take several forms: actual change in inputs or outcomes on either side of the equation (participant's or comparison other's), cognitive (perceptual) changes in inputs or outcomes on either side of the

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equation (participant's or comparison other's), changing the comparison other, or retreating from the situation (e.g., Adams, 1963). The general form of the model is: ~2Op ~20,, 9

E1,,

El,, '

where Ie are the perceived inputs provided by the focus person; Op are the outcomes resulting from the inputs; I, are the inputs that the focus person perceives are provided by the comparison other; and Oo are the outcomes that the focus person perceives result from the comparison other's inputs. Again, although the specific form of equity theory has caused a flurry of discussion similar to that of expectancy theory (Moschetti, 1979; Romer, 1977; Samuel, 1978; Walster et al., 1976), as a descriptive theory the results are clear: individuals are motivated to take action when inequity exists, thus, participants evaluate the overall marginal benefit and equity in the context of the implementation. If participants believe that an inequitable situation exists, there will be motivation to restore equity. This can take the form of either perceptual or real adjustments until an equitable evaluation is reached. A microchip manufacturing setting provides as example (Northcraft, 1993). The organization had been having trouble with chip breakage when employees would pick-up the chips using tweezers. Without consultation with the employees, the organization installed vacuum hoses for the employees to use to pick-up the chips. The employees saw this as an attempt to increase their workload (increase their inputs) without any subsequent increase in their outcomes. The equity analysis shows the organization gaining in outcomes (fewer broken chips, more output) while the employees were doing more work. The employees "retaliated" by tying the expensive vacuum hoses into "bows," reducing the implementers' outcomes (work slowdown, cost of the hoses), increasing their own outcomes (fun), and reducing their own inputs (back to the slower form of working). Proposition 1.2 summarizes the role of equity theory: Proposition 1.2. Prospectire participants will be motirated to use and support the new technology when they perceice that technology use is equitably rewarded cis a ris other participants and the organization (Joshi, 1990). Expectancy theory and equity theory provide the background for understanding motivation within the individual, but applying motivation theory when multiple actors are necessary to achieve desired outcomes requires an understanding of negotiation. Implementation is an orchestration of multiple organizational actors (i.e., users, implementers, managers, vendors, etc.) all trying to serve their own needs (Grudin, 1988). Negotiation provides a useful model for specifying this orchestration. 2.3. Negotiation

Negotiation is a process whereby the involved parties decide on what each will give and take in an exchange between them (Rubin and Brown, 1975). Thus, negotiation is an

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Table 1 Examples of distributive, integrative, and congruent issues Issue

Preference

Pay

No pay for new skills Some pay for new skills Full pay for new skills

Training

During work After hours

Training

Some users trained All users trained

Training

At the organization At the vendor's site

Distributive

Integrative b

Managers

Users

+ 500 ~ +0 - 500

- 500 +0 + 500

Managers

Congruent Users

+ 200

50 -10

+50 -10

- 10 + 200

-

10

Managers

Users

+

-

100

+ 100

100 + 100

Arbitrary units representing preferences. b An overall integrative solution (incorporating all of the issues) would include a compromise on the amount of pay for training (e.g., split the difference, some pay for new skills), integration on the form of training (e.g., training after hours for all users), and acceptance of the congruent issue (e.g., training at the vendor's site).

interpersonal process between dependent parties who must allocate resources. In an implementation, negotiations will determine the roles played by users, implementers, and managers. Negotiated outcomes can also determine the levels of each of the motivation parameters (e.g., value, inputs, etc.). The relationship between negotiation and motivation can be seen in Fig. 1. Issues are the elements of the negotiation. A negotiated outcome can be built from just one issue or many. Issues can be distributive, integrative, or congruent - depending on how they are valued by the participants in the negotiation (Neale and Bazerman, 1991). Table 1 provides a summary of the three kinds of issues and how they can be combined for mutual benefit. A distributice issue is one where the parties place equivalent value on the issue and each prefers opposite outcomes. Money is often a distributive issue. A user might want to be paid for learning new skills, while management may view paying for extra skills as a loss. A distributive negotiation strategy is one where all the issues are believed to be distributive, part of a "fixed-pie" a w i n / l o s e proposition where one party's gain is another party's loss. Compromise is the best outcome when faced with a distributive set of preferences. However, if the parties value the issues differently (i.e., what is important to the implementer is not important to the users, and vice versa), then integration may be possible. Integratir'e issues exist when the parties place different value on the issues of the negotiation, although the parties still prefer opposite outcomes. To be integrative, these issues must be combined such that each party will accept losses on the issues which are least important to them, in order to gain on the issues that are most important to them. For example, it may be very important to the users that all users are provided with training. For implementers, the number of people trained may not make much of a difference, although there is some cost. Implementers may think it is very important that training be provided after hours, although users may not want to stay late. If users are -

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less concerned about staying late than they are about who receives training, then an integrative solution exists. Implementers will train all users after hours. A distributive solution (compromise) might have trained some, but not all users, late in the day. This solution meets neither sides' needs on the issues. An integrative strategy is one where the resources are believed to be part of an expanding pie - a proposition where the correct allocation can leave each of the parties better off through creative problem solving, creation of value, and a distribution of resources built on interests and needs rather than positions (Pruitt, 1983). These strategies will be discussed below. Besides integrative and distributive issues, congruent issues are also possible where all parties' preferences for a particular outcome are the same. A congruent issue would exist within the above situation if both the implementers and the users wanted all the training classes to take place at the vendor's site. Although it would appear to be simple to make everyone happy in the presence of congruent issues, issues which are in fact congruent are often perceived to be distributive (Thompson and Hastie, 1990). Sets of integrative issues are also often incorrectly assumed to be distributive (Thompson and Hastie, 1990). Negotiated outcomes contain a strong component of perceived value, similar to both equity and expectancy theories. Each party has a perception regarding the value of each of the issues, both for themselves, and the value believed to be placed on each of the issues by each of the other parties. Successful negotiation is the result of an allocation of resources where all the parties believe they have received their best alternative and the Pareto optimal distribution of resources has taken place (Neale and Bazerman, 1991, p. 187). This distribution results in an outcome where the parties have jointly gained the most available in the negotiation. This type of outcome can result in maintained relationships and stable solutions (Pruitt, 1983). Unsuccessful negotiations are the result of resource allocations that are sub-optimal. Often these outcomes are the result of negotiators adopting a distributire negotiation strategy where an integratit~e negotiation strategy would have identified a solution with greater joint outcomes. Combining issues in an integrative way requires understanding the preference structure between and within issues and being able to take advantage of this preference structure for the best joint outcome. A distributive negotiation (one which cannot be integrated) might contain only one issue, for example, money. If no other issues are at stake, then a win/win solution is not possible - each party will gain/lose the specified amount. An integrative solution could be round if additional issues were added to the context. For example, in a negotiation over a vendor providing training, the issues might be price, timing, and place. Although price might be distributive (the vendor wants the highest price, the customer wants the lowest price, and they both consider price the most important issue), timing and place of the training could be integrative. It might be that the vendor is very busy during September (the time when the customer would like the training) and has no facilities for doing training at the customer's site (where the customer would like to have the training). However, if the customer is much less concerned with location of the training, and much more concerned with the timing, and if the vendor is much more concerned with the location and much less so with the timing - an integrative solution can be reached. Both the vendor and the buyer will relent on the issue that they care the least about in exchange for the issue that they care

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the most about. The integrative solution is that they split the difference on price (the distributive issue) and trade-off on the integrative issues such that the training takes place in September at the vendor's site. The implementation of technology is sufficiently complex that most implementations will consist of a multitude of issues. Current research on implementation acknowledges that users' and implementers' perceptions regarding the technology play a critical role for success, and that users and implementers may have quite different perceptions of value (Goodman and Griffith, 1991; Griffith and Northcraft, 1993, 1995; Lind and Zmud, 1991; Sproull and Hofmeister, 1986). Thus, the structure of most implementations assures that integrative solutions are possible and suggests the following: Proposition 2. Integrative negotiation strategies will increase the overall value and

equity of the technological system. This proposition summarizes the goal of integrative solutions: the creation of value. If 40% of technology implementations fail, then 60% seem to be successful. However, this proposition suggests that even the successful implementations could have increased value if a negotiation strategy that considered needs and interests were undertaken. Current successful implementations may be the result of compromises rather than collaboration, where parties have "split the difference" rather than "trade-off." The result may be solutions that work, but that have overlooked opportunities for mutual gain. Although negotiating integrative solutions should be in the best interests of the parties, reaching an integrative solution is a complex process. Understanding the value of integrative solutions and taking an integrative approach can not always assure that an integrative solution will be found. Not all situations have integrative potential (Neale and Bazerman, 1991) and there are a multitude of perceptual biases which can obscure integrative solutions (Pinkely et al., 1995). Integration is possible when there are multiple issues within the context of the negotiation, when the preference ordering of these issues vary across issues for each party, and when the preference ordering of these issues are similar within issues. Additionally, integration requires that the parties understand that this is the form of the issues and preference ordering (Pinkely et al., 1995). Finally, as described below, an integrative solution will not result in implementation success if even the best agreement (integrative) is not better than no agreement at all. If the BAIT (Best Alternative to Implementing the Technology) is better than implementing the technology, the implementation will not be successful. In the diffusion of innovation literature this can be found in Rogers' discussion of an innovation's relative advantage over extant methods (Rogers, 1987, 1995). In the negotiation literature, Neale and Bazerman (1991) extending Raiffa's work (Raiffa, 1982), have identified three basic sets of information necessary to apply a decision-analytic approach (such as taken here) to negotiation. The first is to know what happens if a negotiated agreement is not reached. This is the "Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement" (BATNA) (Fisher and Ury, 1981). When implementing technology, we can use the term BAIT in order to emphasize the technological outcome. The BAIT provides a lower bound against which to judge alternatives. It may be that the proposed technology does

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not provide greater value than the BAIT, and so the technology cannot be expected to be successful. Information, such as the BAIT, is the key to creating integrative solutions. Implereenters need to know what information they need to have, and they need to know how to use this information to structure solutions that users believe are in their own best interests (the point of integratice solutions is that such an outcome will also be in the implementers" best interest). Getting this information and structuring the solution are necessary strategies for implementation success. (Later, a third strategy will be proposed which makes implementation even more dynamic.) The next section will describe the necessary information, ways to acquire it, and summarize methods for structuring integrative implementation solutions. Neale and Bazerman (1991) note that three categories of information are necessary for creating integrative solutions. Beyond the BAIT, knowledge of interests (as opposed to positions) is necessary for a successful implementation. Fisher and Ury (1981) describe a position as the stated requirement that one party is demanding of the other ( " I can't settle for less than $65,000 a year"). An interest is what the party really needs, whether or not it is publicly stated ("What I really need is to be able to put my kids through college and pay my bills"). Working from interests, rather than positions, provides more opportunities for creating integrative agreements ($50,000 and a tuition waiver may provide an integrative solution) and so successful implementations. Analyzing an implementation from the perspective of positions (rather than more basic interests) may not provide enough flexibility to create the trade-offs necessary for integration. Propositions 2.1-2.3 follow from this understanding of interests: Proposition 2.1. Implementations based on an understanding of interests (not positions) inuolued in the implementation create integratiue solutions. Proposition 2.2. Implementations based on an understanding of interests (not positions) incolced in the implementation create ualue. Proposition 2.3. Implementations based on an understanding of interests (not positions) incolued in the implementation maintain equip'. Preference weighting information - the relative importance of each issue for each party - is the third category of information important for reaching an integrative solution (and so the creation of value and subsequent motivation for use). Without this "weighting" information, it is difficult to find the trade-offs that may be necessary to reach the integrative agreement. To summarize:

Proposition

2.4. Implementations utilizing preference weighting information create integratiue solutions.

Proposition 2.5. Implementations utilizing preference weighting information create l:alue.

42

Proposition 2.6.

T.L. Griffith/J. Eng. Technol. Manage. 13 (1996) 29-53 Implementations utilizing preference weighting information maintain

equip'.

Thus, the three categories of information function as follows: BAITs provide the bottom line, knowing all the interests (rather than stated positions) generates flexibility, and knowing the relative importance of the issues helps to place value on the alternatives such that issues can be traded-off. This information may be generated or discovered by: 1. Building trust and sharing information. 2. Asking lots of questions. 3. Giving away some information. 4. Making multiple [linked] offers simultaneously. 5. Searching for post-settlement settlements.(Neale and Bazerman, 1991, pp. 29-32) Numbers 1 through 3 approach information gathering directly. Users are often the best source for information about their own preferences. Numbers 4 and 5 make use of the idea that negotiation is a dynamic process. Additional information can be gained as solutions are presented to users. By creating multiple packages of solutions (e.g., "How about either (a) training all users, after working hours, (b) training some users, during the day, (c) training some users, after working hours") the relative value of the different issues can become clear as the options are discussed, Post-settlement agreements (Bazerman et al., 1987; Raiffa, 1985), or post-implementation reevaluations, allow the additional information gained once a solution has been found to positively influence the remainder of the process. The parties can use the initial solution, unless a better one is found later. The reality of working through the solution and using the technology will surface new information, or re-value the old issues such that a more mutually beneficial solution can be reached. Committing to post-implementation reevaluations is a commitment to both feedback and redesign and to the continued adaptation of both the technology and the organization. Goodman and Griffith (1991), Leonard-Barton (1988), and Tyre and Orlikowski (1994) note the importance of organizational mechanisms to promote continued adaptation. They suggest that needed changes are much less likely to occur without specific organizational support. Thus: Proposition 2.7. Post-implementation reecaluations will result in continued deL,elopment of t,alue and equi O, and, hence, continued implementation success. Although all of these methods help to create opportunities for integrative solutions, there may be situations where the " p i e " cannot be increased, However, technology implementation is sufficiently complex that these techniques should often find integrative opportunities. 2.4. Tacit L's. express agreements

Earlier a third strategy for creating integration in implementation was mentioned. This dynamic strategy emphasizes the process of negotiating between the participants.

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The methods described above do not require that an actual negotiation (mutual discussion and agreement) take place. It is possible for implementers to structure integrative solutions that are so clearly in the best interests of participants that users will certainly want to participate - without directly involving the users in the decision process. Such solutions result in tacit agreements. All the strategies described here are based in negotiation theory, but implementation success does not actually require that a negotiation take place. If implementers are able to gain the necessary information and structure appropriate solutions, express agreement is not required for implementation success. However, there may be additional benefits to be gained if express negotiation is undertaken (beyond information gathering and structuring integrative solutions). The implementation can be approached as a true negotiation between the relevant parties roughly defined as: users, managers, implementers, and vendors. Although the tacit agreements reached when an integrative solution is unilaterally proposed should result in success (similar to Thompson, 1991), the process of actually negotiating the solution may result in even better solutions. More precisely:

Proposition 3.0. Express negotiations between members of different constituencies will increase the t,alue of the outcomes.

Proposition 3.1. Express negotiations bem'een members of different constituencies will result in more equitable solutions.

Proposition 3.3. Express negotiations between members of different constituencies will increase the likelihood of implementation success.

The solutions obtained from an express negotiation may be better than those obtained from tacit agreement because of either superior information or greater commitment. Superior information will be gained through a more dynamic information gathering process. Increased commitment could result from publicly being involved in the process (Hartwick and Barki, 1994; Locke and Schweiger, 1979; Salancik, 1977). Outcomes will also improve if all relationships important to the implementation are provided for in the solution (e.g., Goodman and Griffith, 1991). While implementers and managers may have the authority to implement by edict for the users, other constituencies often play important roles in complex negotiations. Thus, for a particular implementation we must identify who must be motivated before we use motivation and negotiation as the basis for understanding how to successfully implement new technology: Is it just the users? Implementation is a complex organizational process with participation at both the individual and group levels. As previously noted, individual users, implementers (those controlling the implementation process and information), managers, and vendors all may play important roles. Motivation becomes an issue of finding integrative solutions that motivate all classes of participants. An example is provided below.

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3. Motivation through integration Having summarized the internal mechanisms of expectancy theory, equity theory, and integrative solutions, the next step is to bring these mechanisms together. Earlier it was stated that expectancy theory and equity theory provide the background for understanding motivation within the individual, however, it has also been noted that multiple constituencies are necessary for implementation success. For example, Goodman and Griffith (1991) note that the allocation of rewards across the different roles involved in the implementation should facilitate the acquisition of information about the technology. Implementers and vendors are often in the key positions to provide critical information to technology users (important to the users' motivation), but we can expect implereenters and vendors to provide the information only if such arrangements are consistent with the reward processes of the implementers and vendors. Although expectancy theory and equity theory may provide predictions given a particular reward structure, the structure itself must first be part of an integrative solution. Expectancy theory, equity theory, and integrative methods can be used as a set of levers for designing and improving an implementation. Integrative solutions are necessary for both creating individual motivations to support the technology and to create the organizational infrastructure necessary to sustain the technology, its users, and supporters. A model of the relationships between these concepts has been provided in Fig. 1. The negotiation strategies described above play their key role by highlighting the links between technology use and rewards, and through the development of value in general. If it is clear that the relationship between using the technology and gaining organizational rewards is weak, then users, managers, and implementers will all be better served if stronger relationships are created - perhaps by increasing the organizational commitment to the process. For the individual user, a focus on interests rather than positions may uncover overlooked rewards following from the technology. When interests are assessed relative to other users, this will assist in reducing feelings of inequity that would result from inflated perceptions of outcomes for other users. Knowing the BAIT insures that users are always presented with alternatives (at least the BAIT versus the proposed technology) and highlights the value of the alternatives to using a particular technology. (On the other hand if the value of the BAIT versus the new technology is too great, it may lure the users away from the new technology.) Given that the inputs to both expectancy and equity theories are perceptual, negotiation techniques can play a very strong role in the development of the component parts of these motivation models. Between users, managers, implementers, vendors, etc., communication about preferences will help not only in developing rewards (valence) for the individuals, but also serve to create acceptable relationships between the different constituencies (e.g., vendors/implementers). If rewards have not been structured equitably (acceptably), then implementation failure may be the result. The following is a description of the situation in a multi-million dollar implementation of a laser measurement system in an automotive assembly plant: In the vision case, there were jurisdictional disputes between the tool makers and maintenance personnel over responsibilities for the vision system. There was no

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integrative reward system to induce cooperative behavior. Because these two groups disagreed on who was responsible for maintenance activities when major breakdowns did occur, maintenance was less responsive, and down-time of the vision system increased. Down-time, in turn, decreased the benefits of the system and its utilization (Goodman and Griffith, 1991, p. 280). This suggests that not only do the negotiations between constituencies have direct effects within those constituencies, but they have downstream effects on individual value and use as well. This can be stated as:

Proposition 4. Integrative agreements between members of different constituencies will support the technology infrastructure and, hence, implementation success. Early acknowledgment of the breadth of skills and resources needed to support technology implementation will help to avoid problems resulting of technological determinism. Complex technologies are very much sociotechnical systems that must be managed from both the technical and human sides with an understanding that the effects work in both directions (e.g., Goodman et al., 1990; Orlikowski, 1992). Agreements that specifically acknowledge relationships between constituencies are more likely to focus effort on important social system issues (e.g., Locke and Latham, 1984).

4. Group support systems: An example of negotiating successful implementation Although Fig. 1 appears simple, a delineation (beyond that provided above) of a general model for applying the negotiation approach is inappropriate. Different technologies will create different contexts for the implementation and, hence, different links will be critical in different settings (Goodman and Griffith, 1991). Instead, the following is a hypothetical case (highlighted with anecdotal evidence where possible) which will allow us to view a possible set of linkages in a particular sociotechnical setting. The weakness of this example is that it is not a test of the proposed model. However, the case does serve to illustrate the approach in preparation for future empirical work. Group support systems (GSS) are networked computer systems that allow group members to interact and use computerized techniques to improve their group process. Depending on the network and the particular system, groups using a GSS may work in the same place, or be distributed such that a meeting could be held with participants from all over the world. This hypothetical case will be based on the GroupSystems ~ GSS (for a complete description of the features of this particular GSS, please see Vogel et al., 1988). This particular technology was chosen as it has an especially broad set of constituents who must interact for the system to be used. At least four types of people are active in a GroupSystems implementation: users, managers, vendors, and facilitators. Users will be those people involved in the meeting. Managers may be involved in the meeting, but also may be making the decision about whether or not to hold a meeting using this technology. Additionally, managers may be involved in the pre-meeting process where the facilitator plans the timing of the agenda

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and the use of the supporting tools. Facilitators provide two roles in this technology (one or more people may be used to fill these roles): Group Process Facilitation and Technical Facilitation. Group Process Facilitators guide the group and determine which tools to use when (e.g., brainstorming assistance, voting, group writing). Technical Facilitators are in charge of the technology and carrying out the technical changes required by the Group Process Facilitator. Vendors may also play a role as they service the technology, provide initial training for the facilitators, and provide notification when technical updates become available. One of the first steps in an implementation is to define success. A clear understanding of success can lead to better assessment of values, interests, and outcomes. As discussed earlier, indicators of implementation success include: knowledge of the technology, use of the technology, attitudes toward the technology, and normative consensus among the participants regarding the value of the technology (Goodman and Griffith, 1991). There are particular outcome characteristics that have been developed for GSS. In general, it is believed that GSS reduce project time-to-completion, increase group member satisfaction (Nunamaker et al., 1989, 1991), increase idea generation (Connolly et al., 1990; Jessup and Tansik, 1991), and improve group processes (Zigurs et al., 1988). A GSS that is unable to reach these goals has a lower level of success than a GSS that is able to reach these goals. If these are the organizational goals for the GSS, then a motivational system supporting these goals should be developed. The next section outlines the processes involved in an implementation where integrative solutions create an effective motivational system. Following the adoption of GroupSystems, facilitator training at the vendor's site is generally the next stage. There are at least three sets of motivations that need to be considered at this point. First, the vendor must be motivated to provide quality training during this on site visit. Goodman et al. (1985) studied a robotic installation where there were no penalties for a vendor who disengaged before the technology was up and running. Not surprisingly, without an agreement that was contingent on completing the process, the implementation failed. In a GSS setting, the vendor is interested in receiving (for example) future business from the client, information back from the current client that can be used for design enhancements, and in using the current client as a reference for future clients. The vendor is also interested in providing the necessary training at the least cost a n d / o r in the least amount of time. The client is interested in receiving the best training possible, probably in the least amount of time, and at the lowest cost to the client. The client is also interested in the quality of future support from the vendor. For this particular GSS, the contracted training is publicized as three days at the vendor's site. The negotiation model would suggest that all of the above interests should be stated at the adoption and the most mutually beneficial agreement developed. Such an agreement might take advantage of the fact that speed is a congruent issue (both parties are interested in quick training), and then develop integrative trade-offs between the other issues. For example, being a reference is probably a minor issue to the client, but a major issue to the vendor; quality of training is probably the most important issue to the client, and the difference between "great" and " O K " training is minor to the vendor; providing information for design enhancements is a minor issue to the client, but a major

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one to the vendor; and finally, both groups are interested in the sale of future products, but vary on their preferences for price. Combinations of interests can be created for mutual benefit, if all the interests are on the table at once. The client may agree to be a reference, provide feedback data, and to consider future products - if the vendor agrees to upgrade the quality of training and guarantee a certain cap on future prices. Had each of these issues been approached separately, or without an understanding of the interests behind them, a much less successful agreement might be reached. There are at least two other relationships to consider during the stage of vendor training. The relationship between management and the people who receive the vendor training (and, thus, become facilitators) requires that management selects facilitators and that these individuals participate. Additional relationships exist between those people who were not selected for facilitator training (i.e., users), management, and the new facilitators. Regarding the relationship between facilitators and management, facilitation is both an honor and a lot of work. People considering whether or not to learn to facilitate should consider their BAITs before they agree. If they do not accept the training, what will be the result? Do they like their current responsibilities and will there be problems if they decline this opportunity? Management should have considered both the BAITs of the people they are inviting to participate and their own BAITs. What happens if their selections do not agree to participate'? What might be done to "sweeten" the pot if the BAIT alternative is too alluring'? Both management and "facilitators-elect" should be asking questions at this stage. As more information is presented it may become clear that additional information is needed, or that additional motivators are necessary to make the solution attractive. By providing information, management is helping to clarify the instrumentalities and outcomes available in the process. The "facilitators-elect" may find that additional information about the training is helpful for them to clarify the expectancies regarding their abilities to fulfill the role. It may be that the facilitators are most concerned about job security, while management is most concerned about having the most qualified facilitators for the job. A solution where facilitators are guaranteed their extant job responsibilities for one year, in exchange for receiving the training and running the technology could prove an integrative solution. The relationship between management, facilitators, and those people not chosen (possible users) complicates the rest of the implementation. Users can perceive the new facilitators as similar others who have just received a valuable outcome from the organization. Users can reduce feelings of inequity by discounting the value of the GSS, discounting their own value to the GSS process, or withholding their cooperation from the implementation effort. All of these behaviors would reduce the chance of implementation success. However. integrative solutions that motivate the users on behalf of the GSS can result if those left in the user category are involved in the early stages. Management and facilitators need user cooperation and interest for a GSS to function. Users must attend meetings using the technology, and engage and participate during the meetings. The technology itself reduces the ability to use external means to enforce individual behavior since a key feature of the GSS is its ability to keep inputs anonymous (Connolly et al., 1990). Instead, a solution should be reached that is beneficial for management, facilita-

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tors, and users. A solution which is mutually beneficial may remove the need for monitoring user behaviors in order to provide contingent rewards or punishments - if the contingent rewards and punishments follow automatically from appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Once again, the basic strategies of negotiation help to develop this solution. Alternatives are developed through giving and getting information. Expectancy is increased as users come to understand what they need to do to use the GSS to their advantage. Instrumentality is clarified through discussions with management and facilitators. Valence is increased as new rewards are uncovered (perhaps users find it beneficial to have anonymous input into meetings) or created through negotiated changes in the sociotechnical system. Analyzing BAITs for all the parties will uncover the cost of not using the GSS (perhaps slower meetings, slower project development and subsequent loss of market share). Full information might also uncover that the facilitators' outcomes, as perceived by the users, are exaggerated. Inequity which might result in counter productive behaviors will be resolved simply through sharing of information. Working for integration through multiple/linked offers and agreeing to reevaluate after initial implementation (post-settlement settlements) will also play a role. Users may value input into the structure of the GSS meeting, while facilitators may find this creates extra work. Facilitators and users may both prefer to increase stability by working with the same people over many sessions - facilitators could be linked to a few groups and work with them over time. Facilitators may prefer certain types of GSS tools due to familiarity and functionality and these may not be the tools that provide the most advantage to the users. All these issues can be traded off once the various interests have been discovered. Post-implementation reevaluation can come into play if management, facilitators, and users agree that the GSS will be used until some other, better method can be found - or that the use a n d / o r form of the GSS will be adapted as experience provides additional information. Again, this provides more flexibility between the constituencies and, therefore, should result in better solutions and better implementation.

5. Negotiating successful implementation Motivation provides the mediating mechanisms that make negotiated solutions useful. Individuals are motivated on behalf of the technology when using the technology serves their own interests and needs. Mutually beneficial, sustaining solutions are the results of motivating individuals by sharing information, creating value, and trading off low value for high value needs. Changes can be made in either the organizational or the technological components of the system (e.g., Adaptive-Structuration Theory, DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). GSS are complex technologies involving several constituencies and a great deal of flexibility in their use and, thus, this negotiation approach was simple to apply in that context. However, with work, almost any organizational use of high technology can be viewed this way - the technology, the organization and its structures can be adapted to support the successful use of the technology. Electronic mail, robotics, and C A D / C A M systems all are flexible technological systems requiring the cooperation of a diverse set of constituencies and individuals. Integrative implementation solutions

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should be possible given that flexibility is the hallmark of high technology. Similarly, other complex organizational changes could also be viewed in light of this model. The following is a summary of the activities suggested for negotiating successful implementation. The key is to gather and combine information such that the use of the technology results in situations that are motivating for all involved groups. The steps include: Definition of implementation success. Identification of the constituencies. For each constituency: - Identification of issues. - Identification of interests within issues. - Identification of preferences within issues. - Identification of BAITs. Integrative combination of issues between constituencies (preferably, an express negotiation). Post-implementation reevaluation to dynamically manage the sociotechnical system.

6.

Future

research

The framework used here suggests a set of propositions which can be applied to future research. The creation of successful implementation solutions is the result of using negotiation strategies to increase individual levels of motivation. Although prior research (Burton et al., 1992; DeSanctis, 1983; Joshi, 1990) has looked at components of motivation as related to technology use, future research should take a more integrative approach which acknowledges the links between constituencies in technology use. Propositions 1, 1.1, and 1.2 were building blocks; Propositions 2 through 4 examine the dynamics of a negotiated implementation and are the unique contributions of this work. Future research should first validate the building block propositions and then address the broad question, ~'How do negotiation behaviors enhance the probability of implementation success'?" This research may proceed in two ways. One strategy is to assess extant implementations, the relationships between negotiation behaviors as defined here, and level of implementation success. Better still is to track a variety of negotiation behaviors, subsequent levels of motivation, and resultant implementation success. The first strategy requires either an archival or other retrospective methodology where primary and secondary sources are queried about the progression and outcomes of the implementation (e.g., which negotiation techniques - if any - were used, participants' perceptions of value and motivation, and technology use and satisfaction). The second strategy, a longitudinal approach, is less susceptible to issues of perceptual bias. Either field experiment (where negotiation is manipulated such that it is used in some implementations, but not in others), or field study (where different negotiation techniques evolve without control, but are measured by the researcher) methods allow the implementation to be studied in real time. Before and after measures of value and motivation provide the

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opportunity to clearly study the links between negotiation techniques and implementation outcomes. Subsequent research may also identify specific methods of negotiation a n d / o r information gathering to use during technology implementation. Answers to questions such as how best to gather preference information (interview, questionnaire, etc.) will push the application of implementation negotiation to a more functional level.

7. Conclusions Goodman and Griffith (1991) suggest that the reward allocation process is critical to implementation. This paper has extended this view to provide an understanding of the underlying mechanisms that work within the reward allocation process. Here, negotiation strategies are used to develop implementation processes which are in line with expectancy and equity theories of motivation. It is suggested that implementers approach the technology change process as they would a negotiation, by looking at the variety of interests and motivations for those involved in the implementation. Implementers can uncover information regarding participants' needs to create integrative solutions that result in tacit agreement and technology use. These solutions may include information dissemination, creating different reward structures, or changing the way the technology is used. If implementers also engage in express negotiations with participants, even greater value may be uncovered and commitment may be created as well. Maintaining this approach throughout the long-term use of the technology should increase the likelihood of its continued success.

Acknowledgements Many thanks to Gregory Northcraft, Terry Connolly, and Suzanne Weisband for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript.

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