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New settlements and community benefits: Public and private responsibilities
Journalof Rural Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3. pp. 257-265, Printed in Great Britain
1993
0743-0167193 $6.00 + 0.00 Pergamon Press Ltd
New Settlements and Community Benefits: Public and Private Responsibilities Susan Boucher Department
of Geography,
University of Bristol, U.K.
Abstract - This paper aims to develop a framework for approaching the negotiation of planning gains - private sector contributions towards public facilities - from the perspectives of both planning authorities and developers. Previous assessments of planning gain have located it within corporatist modes of intervention, planners and of legitimate A case study
which demands various assumptions about the relationship between developers. A comparison of the arguments used to define the bounds gain suggests an alternative model of competing professional cultures. of proposals for new settlements in the countryside is used, in order
that the specific way in which the rural local state tackles the issue of developer contributors may be assessed.
Introduction
Despite reduced levels of activity in the housebuilding industry in the early 199Os, planning gain continues to generate concern amongst both local authorities and the development industry. Attempts by government to divert some of the increases in land values conferred by planning consent back into the public purse have featured in various guises since 1947, including Uthwatt’s betterment levy of the post-war era and the Community Land Scheme of the 1970s. Under the Conservative administrations of the 198Os, this demand resurfaced. The specific form which this has taken needs to be interpreted against the backcloth of ‘rolling back the state’. The emergence of a pro-development policy context (Flynn et al., 1990) has run hand-in-hand with the gradual transference onto industry of at least partial responsibility for infrastructure provision, accompanying the privatisation of key services such as the water industry. At the same time many local authorities, forced - by reduced budgets - away from more traditional roles of provider into that of enabler, have looked towards securing developer contributions to fund the new infrastructure required by development. Thus those who wish to develop land must increasingly bear the full cost of doing so, and one of the key means through which this takes place is negotiation with the local state to determine appropriate levels and types of provision. This is particularly significant in the case of social infrastructure recreational, community and
Over the last 10 years or so, proposals for new settlements have permeated much of rural England. Plans for private sector ‘new country towns’, typically between 1000 and 4000 dwellings, have been most numerous in the outer South East, but have also encompassed East Anglia and the Midlands (Warwickshire, Leicestershire and Staffordshire). By 1990 most shire counties had received at least one proposal and well over half had addressed the issue in recent reviews of Structure Plans (Amos, 1990). The focus of this paper is the negotiation of provision by prospective developers of a range of items of social infrastructure, described variously as ‘community benefits’, or ‘planning gains’. At its simplest, this may include areas of public open space, but may extend to sports facilities and community buildings (Elson, 1990). The machinery of implementation usually takes the form of a planning agreement under Sector 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, but the Act does not itself spell out what local planning authorities and developers may legitimately agree upon. The content of agreements is regulated to some degree by advice on the constitution of ‘reasonable’ provisions contained in Department of the Environment (DoC) circulars, although as with other aspects of British legislation, there remains considerable scope for local discretion. 257
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Susan
educational facilities, for which there are much less well-rehearsed practices, when compared with issues of physical infrastructure such as highway improvements or water supply. Developer contributions towards social infrastructure have tended to fall within the ambit of ‘planning gains’; that is, items which can be argued to be justified in terms of ‘good planning’ but which in themselves are not required in order for the development to be sustained physically. Other examples of ‘gains’ are nature conservation initiatives, affordable housing and, much more rarely, contributions towards measures such as retraining. What differentiates planning gain from previous mechanisms of betterment recoupment is the contestation of public and private spheres of responsibility which it invokes (Whatmore and Boucher, 1993); decisions about what is provided are no longer the exclusive province of the public authority. The paper reports on research in progress on the negotiation of developer contributions from proposals for new settlements in one part of Britain, the rural county of Cambridgeshire in East Anglia, focusing in particular on the provision of social infrastructure. Its objective is to show how the outcome of planning gain negotiations may be influenced by the conceptions of the legitimate scope of planning gain held by different groups of actors. Planning gain has been heavily scrutinised within the assessprofessional press; the limited theoretical ment which has been carried out has cast it within a However, this analytical corporatist framework. framework obscures the particular representations of appropriate public and private roles in the land development process and the means by which such representations take place, This paper puts forward an alternative understanding which emphasises the activity of land development professionals in influencing the outcome of negotiations, arguing for competing rather than convergent professional cultures within the local state and the development industry. First, though, the problematic status attributed to gain within the planning system, and the efforts by central government to regulate it, are examined. The regulation
of planning
gain
Planning gain has been characterised as an aberrant feature of the planning system, implying the making of a ~~~~ pro quo in order to achieve an extraneous benefit, rather than an assessment of the land-use planning merits or otherwise of a proposal (Heap and Ward, 1980). Underpinning this approach is a
Boucher representation of planning as a set of procedures driven by adherence to written rules and which therefore sees bargaining as a form of rule-breaking. An alternative and less abstracted approach sees negotiation between key groups of actors within the loose political and legal constraints of a plan document as the fundamental basis of interaction in planning (Claydon, 1990; McDonald, 1989). This activity may also be structured by rules of practice, rather than rules codified in written form, which are built up within the successive experiences of individuals. The negotiation of agreements, though, has been regarded as a quite separate process from the bargaining inherent in development control, which relates essentially to securing modifications to submitted proposals. Gain has been presented as a ‘fuzzy’ concept with which planners must grapple without a clear sense of their objectives or the means of achieving them (Lichfield, 1992; Reade, 1982). This unease about planning by agreement is reflected in recent efforts by central government to clarify its status. The proper scope of planning gain has been a point of contention between government and the development industry. The contents of a planning agreement should be reasonably related to the development in both scale and kind, and may now include social, educational, recreational, sporting or other community provision (DOE, 1991). In the case of new settlements. developers are expressly expected to finance all or most of the new infrastructure, road improvements and similar requirements directly related to the scheme (DOE, 1992). Previously, the type of infrastructure appropriate for developer contributions had not been elucidated, but appeared to be more limited in extent, seeking expressly to prevent the financing of facilities more properly funded through taxation (DOE, 1983). The broadening of government guidance, and a succession of diverse interpretations in the courts (Purdue et al., 1992), suggests that no single frame of reference for the definition of the reasonableness of a direct relationship between development and planning obligation would now seem to prevail.
Constructing developers
the relationship
between planners
and
From an economic restructuring perspective, private sector new settlements are seen to represent the search by capital for new and as yet unexploited opportunities on greenfield sites. The essential role of the state is to enable the realisation of this transformation through, for example, maintaining the provision of public goods, which are unsuitable for private appropriation (Harvey, 1985). Through
New Settlements
and Community
ensuring that private investment does not proceed in the absence of these supporting services, and through granting the interests of organised capital privileged access to decision-making, the state assumes a corporate role in the economy (Simmie, 1981). Translating this argument into the microsociology of planning, Reade (1982) argues that where planners work closely with the private sector (exemplified by the negotiation of planning agreements) they will tend to develop a shared subculture in which assumptions and perceptions become common to both groups about, for example, the constitution of ‘public interest’. Others, such as politicians and members of the public, are largely excluded from discussions, even though planning gains may subsequently perform a useful legitimising tool for local councillors to justify giving the goahead to substantial new development (Short et al., 1987). Certainly planning gain negotiations are typically led by small teams of local authority officers with a relatively high degree of autonomy. In approaching the public policy-making process, the role of the professional has tended to be subsumed into the generality of the state apparatus (Dunleavy, 1981). Both pluralist and corporatist approaches regard outcomes as contingent upon struggles between mobilised groups which downplays the influence of networks of individual professionals. In rural areas, for example, planning policies of restraint may indeed have worked to the benefit of specific sectional interests, but policy goals of countryside preservation, for example, may also exhibit a wider symbolic relevance (Rydin and Myerson, 1989). Particular constructions of appropriate forms of development, and means of securing implementation, embedded within professional ideologies, are a key mechanism in understanding precisely how this broader acceptance is perpetuated (McAuslan, 1980). The risk of policy failure in Dunleavy’s model of ideological corporatism (as distinct from the classic interest corporatism) stems from the gradual integration of professional ideology with the interests of capital. This is echoed in Reade’s (1982) concern with planning gain, that the absence of a robust conception - centred chiefly on gain as a redistributive mechanism - fuels the likelihood of planners merely serving financial and property interests. Within some local authorities at least, though, clear ideas of the objectives of seeking developer contributions to physical and social infrastructure have evolved. In turn, this may reflect more deeply grounded variations in the relationship between market and state, generating a range of local planning styles (Brindley et al., 1989). Although
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local planning policies are formulated within the constraints of central government advice, there is considerable variation amongst authorities in the extent to which planning gain policies are codified into a written form, and the language employed in this formalisation (Healey et al., 1991). Distinct but coherent rationales for gain - often described as community benefit or planning advantage - can be identified in local planning documents (Healey et al., 1992). For some authorities, contributions are regarded as a method of securing contributions to the implementation of planned development; elsewhere, it may aim to secure compensation for the adverse impacts of development within a particular locality, or finally requiring the payment of a local development charge to contribute towards the attainment of broader community development objectives. The ways in which such policies are regarded by the development industry have been much less thoroughly explored. The rationales for planning gain which Healey et al. identify are derived from scrutiny of planning documents, and as such represent the official discourse. There is a need to look beyond officers and elected members as agents of the local state, towards the professionals in the private sector, in development companies and consultancies, with whom public officials and representatives have to increasingly interact, in order to understand how far the rationales are legitimated by the arguments of developers and also local politicians. Opposition to planning gain policies on the part of developers cannot be simply assumed on the basis that any contributions will dent profit margins. This is for two reasons: first, developers will aim to extract the cost of providing community facilities when negotiating an option agreement with a landowner, and hence it constitutes a development cost (Fordham, 1993). Second, within the housebuilding industry, recognition is given to the ‘added value’ which the provision of a community facility can bring to a development (Coates, 1993). This theme will be taken up further through the empirical material. Before doing so, however, the methodological basis of the present study will be examined a little further. Developing
a framework
for analysis
Taken in isolation, the text of policies, or even what is recorded in the application file, does not always generate much insight into the attitudes and values which underpin discussion between officers and applicants. Detailed negotiation, which determines what is ultimately provided, is contingent upon the way in which individuals derive, through their own
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interpretations of written rules and through accumulation of experience, codes or definitions of what constitutes a legitimate strategy. The status of rules and what rule-following means has come under considerable scrutiny within philosophical analysis. Van Gunnersten (1976), for example, contends that rules are not the basis of orderly human interaction, but themselves form part of an ongoing social order which is constantly being re-enacted. The reproduction of social life through the following and recreation of various categories of rule is a central plank in Giddens’ (1984) conceptualisation of the linkage between individuals and the broader social system (structuration). Structure in Giddens’ terms has no independent existence outside of the knowledge of individuals engaged in their day-to-day activities, and does not correspond to institutions or organisations which constrain the actions of individuals. This might appear to cause difficulties in seeking to translate some of the important insights which Giddens proffers about the construction of social action to an analysis of local decision-making. As Gregson (1987) points out, objects, including people, are just as much a part of structures as they are autonomous agents because they have specific relations to and within these structures and roles such functionalism is unwhich they ‘perform’; acceptable in ‘real’ structuration. Thus, for example, a land development manager may be an employee share-holder, a professional planner and a local conservation volunteer. Inevitably, empirical research, dependant upon categorisation and the assumptions which it demands, is unable to avoid projecting onto individuals the interests of the professional role which they take on. It has been suggested that an application of structuration to research on the land development process would take the form of an assessment of the way in which agencies, organisations and individuals define and implement strategies in relation to the rules of action which they acknowledge, the resources available to them and finally the ideas and ideology which they assert in determining and justifying their strategies (Healey and Barrett, 1990). This approach has been applied to the experience of lay witnesses at a public local inquiry (Hutton, 1986); of particular concern in this paper is what happens when different sets of strategies encounter one another. Brief mention must be made at this stage of the use of the term ‘professional’. It has been generally reserved for occupations with a homogeneous identity and a shared set of values or goals. In this paper, the term ‘professional’ includes those working in development companies and planning consultancies, many of whom are members of a professional body and with local government experience. In practice, the exercise of professional
Boucher judgement will be mediated to a greater or lesser extent by commercial or corporate concerns, in the same way that political considerations may affect the possibilities for action available to local authority officers. With this caveat in mind, then, the argument which this paper seeks to amplify through the case-study material in the following sections is that the type and extent of planning gain which is negotiated may be usefully approached by considering how individual actors interpret and recreate rules of planning practice which are an integral part of professional culture.
New settlements: experience
background
to the Cambridgeshire
The Cambridgeshire case is relatively unusual in that a new settlement was accepted by the local authorities as the most appropriate means of accommodating projected population increases. Land values were high, giving plenty of scope for negotiation between land owners and development companies, and the Cambridge subregion had become a highly desirable location. In early 1989 the Replacement Cambridgeshire Structure Plan was approved. It made provision for one new settlement initially accommodating 2000 dwellings by the end of the Plan period in the year 2001 on the A45 route running east-west around Cambridge, and one smaller development (reaching 1500 dwellings by the year 2001) on the A10 to the north of the city. By the late 198Os, over 20 proposals had been put forward for a new settlement. The applicants ranged from locally based firms of housebuilders to regional and national companies with a diversity of development interests. Four schemes (on three sites) on the A10 eventually became the subject of called-in planning applications, as did two proposals on the A45 to the east of Cambridge and six to the west of the city. The northernmost and eastern proposals fell within East Cambridgeshire district, whilst the remaining sites lay in South Cambridgeshire District. South Cambridgeshire is comprised of a dense network of small villages encompassing the city, and has experienced pressure for new development as a consequence of the rapid expansion of high technology employment and its spin-off effects. The district favoured a new settlement on the eastern side of Cambridge as a means of dispersing development away from Cambridge, whereas a settlement on the western side would be attractive to commuters and would compound the traffic problems on the singlecarriageway section of the A45. By comparison, East Cambridgeshire district, centred on Ely to the north of Cambridge and stretching into the Fens, has not benefited greatly from the economic activity in
New Settlements
and Community
the southern part of the county. The district supported a new settlement in its area as a means of encouraging future growth in a traditionally less prosperous part of the region. The local planning authorities were directed not to determine the applications, and public local inquiries were held in 1989 and 1990 to consider first the A10 applications and second the A45 proposals. The Cambridgeshire case study was selected because of the large number of proposals submitted, which generated approximately 40 interviews to be held with key individuals involved in the called-in applications. These included officers from the local authority planning and legal departments, district and parish councillors, development company land managers and planners, and planning consultants. Individuals were selected primarily on the basis of the proofs of evidence submitted to the inquiry. Supplementary written material was also consulted, principally the Inspector’s report to the Secretary of State. In order to maintain confidentiality, none of the individuals or organisations interviewed have been identified by name or by reference to a specific proposal site. The situation of several large-scale proposals effectively competing for consent was a unique event and well outside the normal experiences of all those involved. One of the central objectives of this paper is to flesh out some of the rules of practice through which legitimate gain is defined. In the next section, a model of competing professional cultures is put forward. The key ideas articulated are reproduced in diagrammatic form below (Fig. 1). CULTURE
events were generated by the interviewees which cannot always be reconciled. The empirical material which follows will focus on the A45 proposals and inquiry. The events in the new settlement case study in which this paper occurred before the most recent guidance on planning agreements was issued in late 1991. Defining planning gain: standards versus taxes The first point to examine is the meanings attributed to ‘planning gain’ because this is critical to understanding the basis of the delineation of the boundaries of legitimate ‘gain’. A distinction tended to be drawn by planners between planning gain and the notion of requirements or standards which new development is expected to meet; in the extract below from a discussion with a planner, gain is defined as a benefit proffered by the developer not sought by the local authority: a planning gain to me is something that [is] a gratuitous offer, where a developer offers something over and above what is strictly required. I’d rather talk about something like planning requirements or infrastructure and community requirements as being what can be strictly justified (planning officer). In this formulation, illegitimate gain cannot exist; similarly, the purpose of planning agreements was defined by another local authority officer as a means of mitigating the impact of a development on existing services: We regard them [planning agreements] as a package of benefits which are intended to ameliorate any adverse effect of development and we don’t want to see it going beyond
GAIN
Market (private)
State (public)
status justification linkage beneficiary state as .
price functionality site consumer provider
requirement sustainability community locality enabler
Figure 1. Developer
contributions: elements of competing professional cultures.
Use is made of the discussions held with local government officers, developers, consultants and local members. It should be made clear here that interview material has been selected in order to demonstrate relevant points, and cannot therefore purport to represent a complete analysis of the discussions, and that individuals were speaking in a personal capacity and not on behalf of any organisation. In addition, a large number of accounts of
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that (legal officer).
In contrast, planning gain may have a quite separate and specific meaning from a requirement or obligation, as one applicant explained: Planning gain is effectively a tax on the enhanced value given to land by the planning system, such taxation to be used locally for the general benefit of the community, which is an illegitimate tax because it does not relate directly to the development from which it is derived (developer).
‘Being reasonable’: approaches between gain and development
to the relationship
At the time of the inquiries, neither district planning authority had prepared formal guidance on the type of developer contributions to be made through planning agreements for different sizes of development proposal (the so-called ‘shopping list’), nor a
Susan Boucher
262
framework of ‘planning advantages’ or ‘community benefits’ to be sought where appropriate. South Cambridgeshire district, which had placed its draft Local Plan on deposit prior to the opening of the inquiry, had not produced specific guidance on developer contributions to infrastructure, although the emerging local plan contained various standards for provision of community and recreational facilities. Subsequently, East Cambridgeshire district issued Supplementary Planning Guidance to accompany its Local Plan, adopted in September 1991, which specified the size thresholds triggering developer contributions for a wide range of facilities. South Cambridgeshire district accepted the document as providing useful guidance in appropriate circumstances. The Cambridgeshire Replacement Structure Plan indicated that developers would be expected to make provision in terms of sites and buildings for community facilities and to cover construction costs in proportion to the scale of the development. This requirement was not itself incorporated into the approved policy, appearing instead in the accompanying text and not therefore carrying the weight accorded to a defined policy. The county council had provided applicants with details of the type and extent of contributions sought as the applications progressed; this included primary and secondary education facilities, a library, an elderly persons’ day centre and a police station. East Cambridgeshire district thus appears to have sought to formalise the status of developer contributions to a greater degree than have the other authorities. In the absence of written specification, particular attention needs to be directed to how it is that various types of developer contribution come to be regarded as acceptable. One interviewee characterised the current situation as follows: [the] planning gain process doesn’t really have any rules and if you’re looking at it from a professional point of view it’s wonderful that there aren’t rules because it enables me to have a job negotiating these things on behalf of developers (planning consultant). Negotiation of planning part of practice within one
developer
agreements is an established the development industry; as
interviewed
explained:
they [local authority officers] are seasoned professionals, you can to some degree take it that your starting point isn’t going to be dramatically far away from one another - we know what they’re likely to expect, they know our initial stance you’ve got, well, hardly rules, you’ve got a basic form of logic that we all know. If they [the planning authority] ask for too much they’re not going to get it (developer). How
much
is ‘too much’
will be explored
further
in
the following section. The boundary between what was deemed reasonable provision and what is unreasonable, and the arguments which are used to classify different items of gain accordingly, was drawn differently amongst applicants and the local authorities. Whilst there was a unanimity amongst the applicants that adequate provision should be made for physical infrastructure, the level of social infrastructure put forward varied amongst the applicants. All the applicants made a form of provision for some or all of the following: a community centre or village hall, a church or ecumenical centre, a library, a health centre or day centre, primary school, and sports facilities ranging from bowling greens to tennis courts and all-weather pitches. The level of contribution did vary, however; some applicants had earmarked a site for the future construction of most of the facilities at the authority’s expense, whereas others were prepared to provide a building or make a partial contribution towards the cost of the construction. Fewer applicants had set aside land or buildings for a police and fire station, which had been sought by the local authorities. The Inspector appeared reluctant to pass judgement on substantial areas of social infrastructure provision, deeming this to be a political decision, and made it clear that he would comment only on the adequacy of the provision of social infrastructure where a functional nexus could be demonstrated between the new settlement and the proposed benefit. This was defined essentially as physical infrastructure, although primary schools were included within its scope. The provision of secondary education and a park-and-ride scheme between the new settlement and Cambridge, which were both put forward by the local authorities, proved much more contentious. Although some applicants stated that they were prepared to make contributions to secondary education, there was considerable opposition amongst many other developers to this proposal. The justification for the contribution was framed in the following terms by one interviewee: I think the one thing that appeared to be a sort of stumbling block, which a lot of those who had been in local government before, in the past, hadn’t really appreciated [was that] local authorities are now regarded more as enablers rather than providers, therefore it can’t be assumed that we can build the schools, the roads and everything (planning officer). The
Inspector
had
reasoned
that
provision developers, at a village exist in the Council as law to pro-
such
could not be reasonably requested of since the demand for additional places college (i.e. secondary school) would area in any case, and that the County Education Authority were required by
New Settlements vide an adequate service. This echoed put forward by one applicant:
and Community
the objection
From our point of view, I think everything beyond the physical infrastructure can realistically be called gain and should be negotiated with that in mind. If a development would contribute a 15 per cent increase in school pupils, that it should contribute 1.5per cent of the cost of a new school would seem reasonable. The cost of a completely new school should come out of the public purse. [But] we’re not creating the people to Iive in these houses and I’m not sure why those 15 per cent should be funded by a landowner, but I think its a generally accepted form that that would be the case, but to fund an existing deficiency would be outside the acceptable bounds (developer).
In his decision letter, however, the Secretary of State expressly disagreed with the Inspector over the secondary school issue, referring to the new advice contained in Circular 16/91 which includes education as a legitimate subject of planning agreements. In respect of the park-and-ride scheme, intended to alfeviate additional traffic pressures piaced on Cambridge, the Inspector concluded that whilst it was legitimate for the autho~ty to take into account the potential traffic impact on the city and to expect some appropriate mitigation by the applicants, the proposals were not sufficiently directly related to the development as to be properly taken into account in the assessment of the relative planning merits of competing schemes. The Secretary of State did not demur from this assessment. Who gains? Representations of the public interest Part of the argument examined in the earlier part of this paper was that planning by agreement operates through the exclusion of its supposed beneficiaries. The procedural aspect of negotiations in the Cambridgeshire proposals were clearly the province of professionals. The inquiry brought together numerous individuals who knew each other well, and it was described by almost all those interviewed as an enjoyable event from a social and professional perspective. At any point all those who were not giving evidence would be grouped together in a side room off the main hall. The numbers involved were not inconsiderable. For example, each applicant engaged a team of consultants to present evidence at the inquiry. Planning consultants have tended to be neglected within land-use planning research, although they play a key role in mediating dialogue between officer and developer. Local members had very limited involvement in the negotiation of the content of the planning agreements, reflecting the normal practice of officers conducting negotiations. In one district, for
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example, members were given a short presentation by each applicant and agreed an overali ranking of the various schemes in the district. It would appear that the applicants tended to regard approaches to individual councillors as inappropriate because of the magnitude and complexity of the issue involved. Meetings between developers and parish councils appeared to take place only if sought by the parish. The parish councils gave evidence at the inquiry individually, but had also formed into two collective organisations representing the eastern and western sides of the county. One group also engaged professional assistance from a local firm of planners. The parishes expressed concerted opposition to a new settlement, and their statements of case make almost no reference to the adequacy of the contributions proffered for social infrastructure. The relationship between an applicant and one of the parish organisations was characterised in the following terms: Although we were perfectly friendly and on a nodding acquaintance over lunch during the inquiry, we were in a sense at arms length . . . we did not deploy arguments to try and trim either up or down what the council had negotiated with [the developers] . . we were never lobbied by [the developers] (parish councillor).
This detachment would seem to derive from a concern that acceptance of what is presented by the developer as community benefit would be conflated with an acceptance of the new settlement as a strategic solution for the accommodation of growth in a rural area. As another parish councillor explained: we’ve got quite a lot of small settlements that are almost below the critical level so therefore planning gain in its widest sense should incorporate a situation where there is a gain given back, there were enough new children coming in to keep the school going . there was a lot of noise made about how many playing fields they [the developers] were going to put [up], and the church hall and all the rest of it . . . we said yes that’s all fine but it is a completely different thing to us from the strategic argument (parish councillor).
From the perspective of the applicant, the advantage of the provision of community facilities through the planning process, rather than through a local or central system of taxation is the ability which it confers to be able to ensure that the occupants of a development are the beneficiaries of the social infrastructure, rather than the contributions disappearing into some form of general fund. The creation of goods for the consumers of the development was expressed in terms of a responsibility which the developer or landowner possessed with regard to the future occupants of the development.
Susan Boucher
264
Unless you put something back in to that community, to make a community, you’re never going to sell a house. It has to be capable of working and when you’re doing a new settlement you have got to build the infrastructure in, you’ve got to put [in] the facilities that people want, or you’re going to have houses stuck out the middle of nowhere . so yes, you have got to be socially
responsible,
undoubtedly
(developer).
This is also an outcome which accords with the local planning authority’s concern to justify the imposition of a contribution in terms of a placespecific
of social infrastructure is a development cost, and the efforts of local authorities to impose this on the suggest that the whole development industry, question of planning gain is not a transitory phenomenon contingent upon a buoyant land market; rather, the debate looks set to run and run.
linkage:
I, and the Council I think, feel most comfortable with the notion of matters [included in a planning agreement] the need for which are brought about by the development itself. When it comes to some sort of nebulous contribution to . a 1 per cent contribution to improving recreational facilities in the district, I don’t think we’d be very comfortable with that (planning officer).
Conclusion With the rejection by the Secretary of State in March 1992 of all eight proposals on the A4.5, contrary to the Inspector’s recommendation in favour of one of the schemes, prospects for a new village in the Cambridgeshire countryside became much more remote. Since the infrastructure packages were first assembled, land values have fallen sharply, thereby intensifying the struggle between different interests over the appropriation of the surplus arising from the grant of planning consent. The usefulness of a framework which seeks to link structure and agency, as advocated by Healey and Barrett (1990), lies in drawing attention to the different readings of these structural forces constructed by individual actors. The negotiation of social infrast~cture provision, at least in the Cambridgeshire new settlement case study, is a highly professionalised activity in which representatives of the public have limited involvement. The production of community benefits through the planning agreement process assigns private interests a key role in the definition of public interest, although the Cambridgeshire experience would suggest that this is not a responsibility which is uniformly welcomed. Thus planning by agreement would not seem to have created a shared subculture between planners and developers which generates a consensual view of the boundaries of public and Amongst developers, private responsibilities. legitimate areas of contribution would seem to be limited largely to physical infrastructure, whereas amongst local authorities this nexus is defined quite differently in relation to the broader social impact of development proposals. The recent advice from central government, emphasising that the provision
Acktlowledgemerzts - I would like to thank everyone who gave up their time to be interviewed; Dr Sarah Whatmore for much valuable discussion on the ideas on which this research is based; and all those who attended the Annual Conference of the Rural Economy and Society Study Group (1992) for their questions and interest.
References
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pros and cons - or, how much can the system stand? Journal of Planning and Environment Law 631-637. Hutton, N. (1986) Lay Participation in a Public Local Inquiry. Gower, Aldershot. Lichfield, N. (1992) From community benefit to planning obligations. Journal of Planning and Environment Law 1103-1118. McAuslan, P. (1980) The Ideologies of Planning Law. Pergamon Press, Oxford. McDonald, G.T. (1989) Rural land-use decisions by bargaining. Journal of Rural Studies 5, 325-335. Purdue, M., Healey, P. and Ennis. E. (1992) Planning gain and the grant of planning consent: is the United States test of the ‘rational nexus’ the appropriate solution? Journal of Planning and Environment Law 1012-1024. Reade, E. (1982) Section 52 and corporatism in planning. Journal of Planning and Environment Law 8-16.
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Rydin, Y. and Myerson, G. (1989) Explaining and interpreting ideological effects: a rhetorical approach to green belts. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 463-479. Short, J., Witt, S. and Fleming, S. (1987) Conflict and compromise in the built environment: housebuilding in central Berkshire. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers N.S. 29-42. Simmie, J. (1981) Power, Property and Corporatism. Macmillan, London. Van Gunnersten, H. (1976) The Quest for Control: a Critique of the Rational Centred Rule Approach in Public Affairs. Wiley, London. Whatmore, S. and Boucher, S. (1993) Bargaining with nature: the discourse and practice of planning of ‘environmental planning gain’. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers (forthcoming).
1993
0743-0167193 $6.00 + 0.00 Pergamon Press Ltd
New Settlements and Community Benefits: Public and Private Responsibilities Susan Boucher Department
of Geography,
University of Bristol, U.K.
Abstract - This paper aims to develop a framework for approaching the negotiation of planning gains - private sector contributions towards public facilities - from the perspectives of both planning authorities and developers. Previous assessments of planning gain have located it within corporatist modes of intervention, planners and of legitimate A case study
which demands various assumptions about the relationship between developers. A comparison of the arguments used to define the bounds gain suggests an alternative model of competing professional cultures. of proposals for new settlements in the countryside is used, in order
that the specific way in which the rural local state tackles the issue of developer contributors may be assessed.
Introduction
Despite reduced levels of activity in the housebuilding industry in the early 199Os, planning gain continues to generate concern amongst both local authorities and the development industry. Attempts by government to divert some of the increases in land values conferred by planning consent back into the public purse have featured in various guises since 1947, including Uthwatt’s betterment levy of the post-war era and the Community Land Scheme of the 1970s. Under the Conservative administrations of the 198Os, this demand resurfaced. The specific form which this has taken needs to be interpreted against the backcloth of ‘rolling back the state’. The emergence of a pro-development policy context (Flynn et al., 1990) has run hand-in-hand with the gradual transference onto industry of at least partial responsibility for infrastructure provision, accompanying the privatisation of key services such as the water industry. At the same time many local authorities, forced - by reduced budgets - away from more traditional roles of provider into that of enabler, have looked towards securing developer contributions to fund the new infrastructure required by development. Thus those who wish to develop land must increasingly bear the full cost of doing so, and one of the key means through which this takes place is negotiation with the local state to determine appropriate levels and types of provision. This is particularly significant in the case of social infrastructure recreational, community and
Over the last 10 years or so, proposals for new settlements have permeated much of rural England. Plans for private sector ‘new country towns’, typically between 1000 and 4000 dwellings, have been most numerous in the outer South East, but have also encompassed East Anglia and the Midlands (Warwickshire, Leicestershire and Staffordshire). By 1990 most shire counties had received at least one proposal and well over half had addressed the issue in recent reviews of Structure Plans (Amos, 1990). The focus of this paper is the negotiation of provision by prospective developers of a range of items of social infrastructure, described variously as ‘community benefits’, or ‘planning gains’. At its simplest, this may include areas of public open space, but may extend to sports facilities and community buildings (Elson, 1990). The machinery of implementation usually takes the form of a planning agreement under Sector 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, but the Act does not itself spell out what local planning authorities and developers may legitimately agree upon. The content of agreements is regulated to some degree by advice on the constitution of ‘reasonable’ provisions contained in Department of the Environment (DoC) circulars, although as with other aspects of British legislation, there remains considerable scope for local discretion. 257
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Susan
educational facilities, for which there are much less well-rehearsed practices, when compared with issues of physical infrastructure such as highway improvements or water supply. Developer contributions towards social infrastructure have tended to fall within the ambit of ‘planning gains’; that is, items which can be argued to be justified in terms of ‘good planning’ but which in themselves are not required in order for the development to be sustained physically. Other examples of ‘gains’ are nature conservation initiatives, affordable housing and, much more rarely, contributions towards measures such as retraining. What differentiates planning gain from previous mechanisms of betterment recoupment is the contestation of public and private spheres of responsibility which it invokes (Whatmore and Boucher, 1993); decisions about what is provided are no longer the exclusive province of the public authority. The paper reports on research in progress on the negotiation of developer contributions from proposals for new settlements in one part of Britain, the rural county of Cambridgeshire in East Anglia, focusing in particular on the provision of social infrastructure. Its objective is to show how the outcome of planning gain negotiations may be influenced by the conceptions of the legitimate scope of planning gain held by different groups of actors. Planning gain has been heavily scrutinised within the assessprofessional press; the limited theoretical ment which has been carried out has cast it within a However, this analytical corporatist framework. framework obscures the particular representations of appropriate public and private roles in the land development process and the means by which such representations take place, This paper puts forward an alternative understanding which emphasises the activity of land development professionals in influencing the outcome of negotiations, arguing for competing rather than convergent professional cultures within the local state and the development industry. First, though, the problematic status attributed to gain within the planning system, and the efforts by central government to regulate it, are examined. The regulation
of planning
gain
Planning gain has been characterised as an aberrant feature of the planning system, implying the making of a ~~~~ pro quo in order to achieve an extraneous benefit, rather than an assessment of the land-use planning merits or otherwise of a proposal (Heap and Ward, 1980). Underpinning this approach is a
Boucher representation of planning as a set of procedures driven by adherence to written rules and which therefore sees bargaining as a form of rule-breaking. An alternative and less abstracted approach sees negotiation between key groups of actors within the loose political and legal constraints of a plan document as the fundamental basis of interaction in planning (Claydon, 1990; McDonald, 1989). This activity may also be structured by rules of practice, rather than rules codified in written form, which are built up within the successive experiences of individuals. The negotiation of agreements, though, has been regarded as a quite separate process from the bargaining inherent in development control, which relates essentially to securing modifications to submitted proposals. Gain has been presented as a ‘fuzzy’ concept with which planners must grapple without a clear sense of their objectives or the means of achieving them (Lichfield, 1992; Reade, 1982). This unease about planning by agreement is reflected in recent efforts by central government to clarify its status. The proper scope of planning gain has been a point of contention between government and the development industry. The contents of a planning agreement should be reasonably related to the development in both scale and kind, and may now include social, educational, recreational, sporting or other community provision (DOE, 1991). In the case of new settlements. developers are expressly expected to finance all or most of the new infrastructure, road improvements and similar requirements directly related to the scheme (DOE, 1992). Previously, the type of infrastructure appropriate for developer contributions had not been elucidated, but appeared to be more limited in extent, seeking expressly to prevent the financing of facilities more properly funded through taxation (DOE, 1983). The broadening of government guidance, and a succession of diverse interpretations in the courts (Purdue et al., 1992), suggests that no single frame of reference for the definition of the reasonableness of a direct relationship between development and planning obligation would now seem to prevail.
Constructing developers
the relationship
between planners
and
From an economic restructuring perspective, private sector new settlements are seen to represent the search by capital for new and as yet unexploited opportunities on greenfield sites. The essential role of the state is to enable the realisation of this transformation through, for example, maintaining the provision of public goods, which are unsuitable for private appropriation (Harvey, 1985). Through
New Settlements
and Community
ensuring that private investment does not proceed in the absence of these supporting services, and through granting the interests of organised capital privileged access to decision-making, the state assumes a corporate role in the economy (Simmie, 1981). Translating this argument into the microsociology of planning, Reade (1982) argues that where planners work closely with the private sector (exemplified by the negotiation of planning agreements) they will tend to develop a shared subculture in which assumptions and perceptions become common to both groups about, for example, the constitution of ‘public interest’. Others, such as politicians and members of the public, are largely excluded from discussions, even though planning gains may subsequently perform a useful legitimising tool for local councillors to justify giving the goahead to substantial new development (Short et al., 1987). Certainly planning gain negotiations are typically led by small teams of local authority officers with a relatively high degree of autonomy. In approaching the public policy-making process, the role of the professional has tended to be subsumed into the generality of the state apparatus (Dunleavy, 1981). Both pluralist and corporatist approaches regard outcomes as contingent upon struggles between mobilised groups which downplays the influence of networks of individual professionals. In rural areas, for example, planning policies of restraint may indeed have worked to the benefit of specific sectional interests, but policy goals of countryside preservation, for example, may also exhibit a wider symbolic relevance (Rydin and Myerson, 1989). Particular constructions of appropriate forms of development, and means of securing implementation, embedded within professional ideologies, are a key mechanism in understanding precisely how this broader acceptance is perpetuated (McAuslan, 1980). The risk of policy failure in Dunleavy’s model of ideological corporatism (as distinct from the classic interest corporatism) stems from the gradual integration of professional ideology with the interests of capital. This is echoed in Reade’s (1982) concern with planning gain, that the absence of a robust conception - centred chiefly on gain as a redistributive mechanism - fuels the likelihood of planners merely serving financial and property interests. Within some local authorities at least, though, clear ideas of the objectives of seeking developer contributions to physical and social infrastructure have evolved. In turn, this may reflect more deeply grounded variations in the relationship between market and state, generating a range of local planning styles (Brindley et al., 1989). Although
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local planning policies are formulated within the constraints of central government advice, there is considerable variation amongst authorities in the extent to which planning gain policies are codified into a written form, and the language employed in this formalisation (Healey et al., 1991). Distinct but coherent rationales for gain - often described as community benefit or planning advantage - can be identified in local planning documents (Healey et al., 1992). For some authorities, contributions are regarded as a method of securing contributions to the implementation of planned development; elsewhere, it may aim to secure compensation for the adverse impacts of development within a particular locality, or finally requiring the payment of a local development charge to contribute towards the attainment of broader community development objectives. The ways in which such policies are regarded by the development industry have been much less thoroughly explored. The rationales for planning gain which Healey et al. identify are derived from scrutiny of planning documents, and as such represent the official discourse. There is a need to look beyond officers and elected members as agents of the local state, towards the professionals in the private sector, in development companies and consultancies, with whom public officials and representatives have to increasingly interact, in order to understand how far the rationales are legitimated by the arguments of developers and also local politicians. Opposition to planning gain policies on the part of developers cannot be simply assumed on the basis that any contributions will dent profit margins. This is for two reasons: first, developers will aim to extract the cost of providing community facilities when negotiating an option agreement with a landowner, and hence it constitutes a development cost (Fordham, 1993). Second, within the housebuilding industry, recognition is given to the ‘added value’ which the provision of a community facility can bring to a development (Coates, 1993). This theme will be taken up further through the empirical material. Before doing so, however, the methodological basis of the present study will be examined a little further. Developing
a framework
for analysis
Taken in isolation, the text of policies, or even what is recorded in the application file, does not always generate much insight into the attitudes and values which underpin discussion between officers and applicants. Detailed negotiation, which determines what is ultimately provided, is contingent upon the way in which individuals derive, through their own
260
Susan
interpretations of written rules and through accumulation of experience, codes or definitions of what constitutes a legitimate strategy. The status of rules and what rule-following means has come under considerable scrutiny within philosophical analysis. Van Gunnersten (1976), for example, contends that rules are not the basis of orderly human interaction, but themselves form part of an ongoing social order which is constantly being re-enacted. The reproduction of social life through the following and recreation of various categories of rule is a central plank in Giddens’ (1984) conceptualisation of the linkage between individuals and the broader social system (structuration). Structure in Giddens’ terms has no independent existence outside of the knowledge of individuals engaged in their day-to-day activities, and does not correspond to institutions or organisations which constrain the actions of individuals. This might appear to cause difficulties in seeking to translate some of the important insights which Giddens proffers about the construction of social action to an analysis of local decision-making. As Gregson (1987) points out, objects, including people, are just as much a part of structures as they are autonomous agents because they have specific relations to and within these structures and roles such functionalism is unwhich they ‘perform’; acceptable in ‘real’ structuration. Thus, for example, a land development manager may be an employee share-holder, a professional planner and a local conservation volunteer. Inevitably, empirical research, dependant upon categorisation and the assumptions which it demands, is unable to avoid projecting onto individuals the interests of the professional role which they take on. It has been suggested that an application of structuration to research on the land development process would take the form of an assessment of the way in which agencies, organisations and individuals define and implement strategies in relation to the rules of action which they acknowledge, the resources available to them and finally the ideas and ideology which they assert in determining and justifying their strategies (Healey and Barrett, 1990). This approach has been applied to the experience of lay witnesses at a public local inquiry (Hutton, 1986); of particular concern in this paper is what happens when different sets of strategies encounter one another. Brief mention must be made at this stage of the use of the term ‘professional’. It has been generally reserved for occupations with a homogeneous identity and a shared set of values or goals. In this paper, the term ‘professional’ includes those working in development companies and planning consultancies, many of whom are members of a professional body and with local government experience. In practice, the exercise of professional
Boucher judgement will be mediated to a greater or lesser extent by commercial or corporate concerns, in the same way that political considerations may affect the possibilities for action available to local authority officers. With this caveat in mind, then, the argument which this paper seeks to amplify through the case-study material in the following sections is that the type and extent of planning gain which is negotiated may be usefully approached by considering how individual actors interpret and recreate rules of planning practice which are an integral part of professional culture.
New settlements: experience
background
to the Cambridgeshire
The Cambridgeshire case is relatively unusual in that a new settlement was accepted by the local authorities as the most appropriate means of accommodating projected population increases. Land values were high, giving plenty of scope for negotiation between land owners and development companies, and the Cambridge subregion had become a highly desirable location. In early 1989 the Replacement Cambridgeshire Structure Plan was approved. It made provision for one new settlement initially accommodating 2000 dwellings by the end of the Plan period in the year 2001 on the A45 route running east-west around Cambridge, and one smaller development (reaching 1500 dwellings by the year 2001) on the A10 to the north of the city. By the late 198Os, over 20 proposals had been put forward for a new settlement. The applicants ranged from locally based firms of housebuilders to regional and national companies with a diversity of development interests. Four schemes (on three sites) on the A10 eventually became the subject of called-in planning applications, as did two proposals on the A45 to the east of Cambridge and six to the west of the city. The northernmost and eastern proposals fell within East Cambridgeshire district, whilst the remaining sites lay in South Cambridgeshire District. South Cambridgeshire is comprised of a dense network of small villages encompassing the city, and has experienced pressure for new development as a consequence of the rapid expansion of high technology employment and its spin-off effects. The district favoured a new settlement on the eastern side of Cambridge as a means of dispersing development away from Cambridge, whereas a settlement on the western side would be attractive to commuters and would compound the traffic problems on the singlecarriageway section of the A45. By comparison, East Cambridgeshire district, centred on Ely to the north of Cambridge and stretching into the Fens, has not benefited greatly from the economic activity in
New Settlements
and Community
the southern part of the county. The district supported a new settlement in its area as a means of encouraging future growth in a traditionally less prosperous part of the region. The local planning authorities were directed not to determine the applications, and public local inquiries were held in 1989 and 1990 to consider first the A10 applications and second the A45 proposals. The Cambridgeshire case study was selected because of the large number of proposals submitted, which generated approximately 40 interviews to be held with key individuals involved in the called-in applications. These included officers from the local authority planning and legal departments, district and parish councillors, development company land managers and planners, and planning consultants. Individuals were selected primarily on the basis of the proofs of evidence submitted to the inquiry. Supplementary written material was also consulted, principally the Inspector’s report to the Secretary of State. In order to maintain confidentiality, none of the individuals or organisations interviewed have been identified by name or by reference to a specific proposal site. The situation of several large-scale proposals effectively competing for consent was a unique event and well outside the normal experiences of all those involved. One of the central objectives of this paper is to flesh out some of the rules of practice through which legitimate gain is defined. In the next section, a model of competing professional cultures is put forward. The key ideas articulated are reproduced in diagrammatic form below (Fig. 1). CULTURE
events were generated by the interviewees which cannot always be reconciled. The empirical material which follows will focus on the A45 proposals and inquiry. The events in the new settlement case study in which this paper occurred before the most recent guidance on planning agreements was issued in late 1991. Defining planning gain: standards versus taxes The first point to examine is the meanings attributed to ‘planning gain’ because this is critical to understanding the basis of the delineation of the boundaries of legitimate ‘gain’. A distinction tended to be drawn by planners between planning gain and the notion of requirements or standards which new development is expected to meet; in the extract below from a discussion with a planner, gain is defined as a benefit proffered by the developer not sought by the local authority: a planning gain to me is something that [is] a gratuitous offer, where a developer offers something over and above what is strictly required. I’d rather talk about something like planning requirements or infrastructure and community requirements as being what can be strictly justified (planning officer). In this formulation, illegitimate gain cannot exist; similarly, the purpose of planning agreements was defined by another local authority officer as a means of mitigating the impact of a development on existing services: We regard them [planning agreements] as a package of benefits which are intended to ameliorate any adverse effect of development and we don’t want to see it going beyond
GAIN
Market (private)
State (public)
status justification linkage beneficiary state as .
price functionality site consumer provider
requirement sustainability community locality enabler
Figure 1. Developer
contributions: elements of competing professional cultures.
Use is made of the discussions held with local government officers, developers, consultants and local members. It should be made clear here that interview material has been selected in order to demonstrate relevant points, and cannot therefore purport to represent a complete analysis of the discussions, and that individuals were speaking in a personal capacity and not on behalf of any organisation. In addition, a large number of accounts of
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that (legal officer).
In contrast, planning gain may have a quite separate and specific meaning from a requirement or obligation, as one applicant explained: Planning gain is effectively a tax on the enhanced value given to land by the planning system, such taxation to be used locally for the general benefit of the community, which is an illegitimate tax because it does not relate directly to the development from which it is derived (developer).
‘Being reasonable’: approaches between gain and development
to the relationship
At the time of the inquiries, neither district planning authority had prepared formal guidance on the type of developer contributions to be made through planning agreements for different sizes of development proposal (the so-called ‘shopping list’), nor a
Susan Boucher
262
framework of ‘planning advantages’ or ‘community benefits’ to be sought where appropriate. South Cambridgeshire district, which had placed its draft Local Plan on deposit prior to the opening of the inquiry, had not produced specific guidance on developer contributions to infrastructure, although the emerging local plan contained various standards for provision of community and recreational facilities. Subsequently, East Cambridgeshire district issued Supplementary Planning Guidance to accompany its Local Plan, adopted in September 1991, which specified the size thresholds triggering developer contributions for a wide range of facilities. South Cambridgeshire district accepted the document as providing useful guidance in appropriate circumstances. The Cambridgeshire Replacement Structure Plan indicated that developers would be expected to make provision in terms of sites and buildings for community facilities and to cover construction costs in proportion to the scale of the development. This requirement was not itself incorporated into the approved policy, appearing instead in the accompanying text and not therefore carrying the weight accorded to a defined policy. The county council had provided applicants with details of the type and extent of contributions sought as the applications progressed; this included primary and secondary education facilities, a library, an elderly persons’ day centre and a police station. East Cambridgeshire district thus appears to have sought to formalise the status of developer contributions to a greater degree than have the other authorities. In the absence of written specification, particular attention needs to be directed to how it is that various types of developer contribution come to be regarded as acceptable. One interviewee characterised the current situation as follows: [the] planning gain process doesn’t really have any rules and if you’re looking at it from a professional point of view it’s wonderful that there aren’t rules because it enables me to have a job negotiating these things on behalf of developers (planning consultant). Negotiation of planning part of practice within one
developer
agreements is an established the development industry; as
interviewed
explained:
they [local authority officers] are seasoned professionals, you can to some degree take it that your starting point isn’t going to be dramatically far away from one another - we know what they’re likely to expect, they know our initial stance you’ve got, well, hardly rules, you’ve got a basic form of logic that we all know. If they [the planning authority] ask for too much they’re not going to get it (developer). How
much
is ‘too much’
will be explored
further
in
the following section. The boundary between what was deemed reasonable provision and what is unreasonable, and the arguments which are used to classify different items of gain accordingly, was drawn differently amongst applicants and the local authorities. Whilst there was a unanimity amongst the applicants that adequate provision should be made for physical infrastructure, the level of social infrastructure put forward varied amongst the applicants. All the applicants made a form of provision for some or all of the following: a community centre or village hall, a church or ecumenical centre, a library, a health centre or day centre, primary school, and sports facilities ranging from bowling greens to tennis courts and all-weather pitches. The level of contribution did vary, however; some applicants had earmarked a site for the future construction of most of the facilities at the authority’s expense, whereas others were prepared to provide a building or make a partial contribution towards the cost of the construction. Fewer applicants had set aside land or buildings for a police and fire station, which had been sought by the local authorities. The Inspector appeared reluctant to pass judgement on substantial areas of social infrastructure provision, deeming this to be a political decision, and made it clear that he would comment only on the adequacy of the provision of social infrastructure where a functional nexus could be demonstrated between the new settlement and the proposed benefit. This was defined essentially as physical infrastructure, although primary schools were included within its scope. The provision of secondary education and a park-and-ride scheme between the new settlement and Cambridge, which were both put forward by the local authorities, proved much more contentious. Although some applicants stated that they were prepared to make contributions to secondary education, there was considerable opposition amongst many other developers to this proposal. The justification for the contribution was framed in the following terms by one interviewee: I think the one thing that appeared to be a sort of stumbling block, which a lot of those who had been in local government before, in the past, hadn’t really appreciated [was that] local authorities are now regarded more as enablers rather than providers, therefore it can’t be assumed that we can build the schools, the roads and everything (planning officer). The
Inspector
had
reasoned
that
provision developers, at a village exist in the Council as law to pro-
such
could not be reasonably requested of since the demand for additional places college (i.e. secondary school) would area in any case, and that the County Education Authority were required by
New Settlements vide an adequate service. This echoed put forward by one applicant:
and Community
the objection
From our point of view, I think everything beyond the physical infrastructure can realistically be called gain and should be negotiated with that in mind. If a development would contribute a 15 per cent increase in school pupils, that it should contribute 1.5per cent of the cost of a new school would seem reasonable. The cost of a completely new school should come out of the public purse. [But] we’re not creating the people to Iive in these houses and I’m not sure why those 15 per cent should be funded by a landowner, but I think its a generally accepted form that that would be the case, but to fund an existing deficiency would be outside the acceptable bounds (developer).
In his decision letter, however, the Secretary of State expressly disagreed with the Inspector over the secondary school issue, referring to the new advice contained in Circular 16/91 which includes education as a legitimate subject of planning agreements. In respect of the park-and-ride scheme, intended to alfeviate additional traffic pressures piaced on Cambridge, the Inspector concluded that whilst it was legitimate for the autho~ty to take into account the potential traffic impact on the city and to expect some appropriate mitigation by the applicants, the proposals were not sufficiently directly related to the development as to be properly taken into account in the assessment of the relative planning merits of competing schemes. The Secretary of State did not demur from this assessment. Who gains? Representations of the public interest Part of the argument examined in the earlier part of this paper was that planning by agreement operates through the exclusion of its supposed beneficiaries. The procedural aspect of negotiations in the Cambridgeshire proposals were clearly the province of professionals. The inquiry brought together numerous individuals who knew each other well, and it was described by almost all those interviewed as an enjoyable event from a social and professional perspective. At any point all those who were not giving evidence would be grouped together in a side room off the main hall. The numbers involved were not inconsiderable. For example, each applicant engaged a team of consultants to present evidence at the inquiry. Planning consultants have tended to be neglected within land-use planning research, although they play a key role in mediating dialogue between officer and developer. Local members had very limited involvement in the negotiation of the content of the planning agreements, reflecting the normal practice of officers conducting negotiations. In one district, for
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example, members were given a short presentation by each applicant and agreed an overali ranking of the various schemes in the district. It would appear that the applicants tended to regard approaches to individual councillors as inappropriate because of the magnitude and complexity of the issue involved. Meetings between developers and parish councils appeared to take place only if sought by the parish. The parish councils gave evidence at the inquiry individually, but had also formed into two collective organisations representing the eastern and western sides of the county. One group also engaged professional assistance from a local firm of planners. The parishes expressed concerted opposition to a new settlement, and their statements of case make almost no reference to the adequacy of the contributions proffered for social infrastructure. The relationship between an applicant and one of the parish organisations was characterised in the following terms: Although we were perfectly friendly and on a nodding acquaintance over lunch during the inquiry, we were in a sense at arms length . . . we did not deploy arguments to try and trim either up or down what the council had negotiated with [the developers] . . we were never lobbied by [the developers] (parish councillor).
This detachment would seem to derive from a concern that acceptance of what is presented by the developer as community benefit would be conflated with an acceptance of the new settlement as a strategic solution for the accommodation of growth in a rural area. As another parish councillor explained: we’ve got quite a lot of small settlements that are almost below the critical level so therefore planning gain in its widest sense should incorporate a situation where there is a gain given back, there were enough new children coming in to keep the school going . there was a lot of noise made about how many playing fields they [the developers] were going to put [up], and the church hall and all the rest of it . . . we said yes that’s all fine but it is a completely different thing to us from the strategic argument (parish councillor).
From the perspective of the applicant, the advantage of the provision of community facilities through the planning process, rather than through a local or central system of taxation is the ability which it confers to be able to ensure that the occupants of a development are the beneficiaries of the social infrastructure, rather than the contributions disappearing into some form of general fund. The creation of goods for the consumers of the development was expressed in terms of a responsibility which the developer or landowner possessed with regard to the future occupants of the development.
Susan Boucher
264
Unless you put something back in to that community, to make a community, you’re never going to sell a house. It has to be capable of working and when you’re doing a new settlement you have got to build the infrastructure in, you’ve got to put [in] the facilities that people want, or you’re going to have houses stuck out the middle of nowhere . so yes, you have got to be socially
responsible,
undoubtedly
(developer).
This is also an outcome which accords with the local planning authority’s concern to justify the imposition of a contribution in terms of a placespecific
of social infrastructure is a development cost, and the efforts of local authorities to impose this on the suggest that the whole development industry, question of planning gain is not a transitory phenomenon contingent upon a buoyant land market; rather, the debate looks set to run and run.
linkage:
I, and the Council I think, feel most comfortable with the notion of matters [included in a planning agreement] the need for which are brought about by the development itself. When it comes to some sort of nebulous contribution to . a 1 per cent contribution to improving recreational facilities in the district, I don’t think we’d be very comfortable with that (planning officer).
Conclusion With the rejection by the Secretary of State in March 1992 of all eight proposals on the A4.5, contrary to the Inspector’s recommendation in favour of one of the schemes, prospects for a new village in the Cambridgeshire countryside became much more remote. Since the infrastructure packages were first assembled, land values have fallen sharply, thereby intensifying the struggle between different interests over the appropriation of the surplus arising from the grant of planning consent. The usefulness of a framework which seeks to link structure and agency, as advocated by Healey and Barrett (1990), lies in drawing attention to the different readings of these structural forces constructed by individual actors. The negotiation of social infrast~cture provision, at least in the Cambridgeshire new settlement case study, is a highly professionalised activity in which representatives of the public have limited involvement. The production of community benefits through the planning agreement process assigns private interests a key role in the definition of public interest, although the Cambridgeshire experience would suggest that this is not a responsibility which is uniformly welcomed. Thus planning by agreement would not seem to have created a shared subculture between planners and developers which generates a consensual view of the boundaries of public and Amongst developers, private responsibilities. legitimate areas of contribution would seem to be limited largely to physical infrastructure, whereas amongst local authorities this nexus is defined quite differently in relation to the broader social impact of development proposals. The recent advice from central government, emphasising that the provision
Acktlowledgemerzts - I would like to thank everyone who gave up their time to be interviewed; Dr Sarah Whatmore for much valuable discussion on the ideas on which this research is based; and all those who attended the Annual Conference of the Rural Economy and Society Study Group (1992) for their questions and interest.
References
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