No regrets?

Global Environmental Change 11 (2001) 155}169

No regrets? Economy and environment in Australia's domestic climate change policy process Harriet Bulkeley* Department of Geography, University of Cambridge, Downing Place, Cambridge CB2 3EN, UK Received 15 September 1999

Abstract This paper explores Australia's domestic response to the issue of climate change, and charts the evolution of &no-regrets' as the guiding principle for policy development. The concept of no-regrets encapsulates the ecologically modern idea that addressing environmental problems can bring economic, as well as social and environmental, bene"ts. It is argued that the degree of reconciliation between environmental and economic objectives achieved has been made possible through a progressive narrowing of the scales over which costs and bene"ts are weighed, and the exclusion of the non-material bene"ts of the environment. Tensions between addressing climate change and continuing business as usual, which are far from unique to Australia, remain and continue to limit e!ective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.  2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: No-regrets; Ecological modernisation; Climate change; Australia

1. Introduction In the wake of the Toronto conference &On the Changing Atmosphere' in 1988, and subsequently under the requirements of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992), nation-states have adopted and implemented domestic climate change strategies. This paper examines Australia's domestic climate change policy process and the ways in which it has attempted to reconcile environmental and economic objectives. It is based on research undertaken for a doctoral thesis during 1995}98, which involved analysis of policy materials (documents, drafts, brie"ngs, media releases, press reports) and over 40 semi-structured interviews conducted with non-governmental organisations, representatives of business and industry, economic analysts, and the bureaucracy at local, state and federal government levels. During the course of negotiations towards the Kyoto Protocol, Australia attracted notoriety for its reluctance to accept the need for uniform, legally binding, targets and timetables for reducing emissions of greenhouse * Research Fellow, St. Catharine's College. Tel.: #44-1223-575850; fax: #44-1223-333392. E-mail address: [email protected] (H. Bulkeley).

gases. This, Australia argued, would have a crippling e!ect on the economy, in particular on trade competitiveness, and was therefore unacceptable. Instead, Australia advocated the merits of a &di!erentiated' approach. This concept of di!erentiation was grounded on the belief that each nation-state should bear the same losses of economic welfare in the pursuit of greenhouse gas emission reduction goals. Despite assertions that there was little time for the negotiation of di!erentiated targets (Rowlands, 1997), the "nal Protocol includes targets that e!ectively take into account national circumstances (albeit on an ad hoc basis) and the need for political expediency. Australia is one of only three nation-states granted an increase in emissions over the time period 2008}12, with a target of keeping emissions at 108% of 1990 levels. Although Australia has gained much derision for its position, it is a case that reveals tensions between  While other countries, such as Norway and Japan, have also argued for the principle of di!erentiated targets, these are based on di!erent concepts of a &just' process, emphasising that leniency should be shown to countries which have already achieved a degree of energy e$ciency.  For example from John Gummer, then UK Secretary of State for the Environment at COP-1 in 1995, President Clinton on a visit to Australia in November 1996, and Robin Cook, UK Minister for Foreign A!airs, at the Rio-plus-"ve conference in New York in June 1997.

0959-3780/01/$ - see front matter  2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 5 9 - 3 7 8 0 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 6 4 - 9

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economic goals and (global) environmental objectives which are far from unique. Over the past decade, the mantra of sustainable development, and the concomitant discourse of ecological modernisation, has been that there need be no fundamental contradiction between the pursuit of economic growth and environmental sustainability. The analysis of the Australian climate change policy process presented below indicates that reconciling these objectives is a far from straightforward task. Many explanations have been o!ered to account for Australia's speci"c di$culties in implementing domestic climate change policy measures and meeting international obligations (Christo!, 1998; Lowe, 1994; Taplin, 1994, 1995, 1996; Wilkenfeld et al., 1995). Australia is economically reliant on a number of greenhouse gas emission-intensive industries that have been quick to calculate the potential costs of action, framing the issue in terms of energy policy and trade, which resonated strongly in key sectors of the Australian bureaucracy. Division between those responsible for designing domestic responses, mainly the federal environment portfolio, and those responsible for many of the sectors and regions through which such a strategy has to be implemented, the federal resource, industry and energy departments and state governments, has also proved problematic. The manifold uncertainties surrounding climate change and its long-term nature have contributed to an atmosphere in which there has been a lack of political will to implement even those measures which have had broad-based support (Christo!, 1998; Lowe, 1994; Taplin, 1996; Wilkenfeld et al., 1995). This support has been directed at the principle of no-regrets measures, which in turn have been the subject of sustained debate concerning how to reconcile (what kind of ) environmental objectives with (what kind of ) economic goals. Section 1 of this paper examines how the possibilities for such reconciliation have been articulated under the banner of sustainable development, and the accompanying discourse of ecological modernisation. A spectrum of possible ecologically modern responses, from &weak' to &strong', is envisaged (Christo!, 1996) with which to assess developments in Australian climate change policy. The landscape of domestic climate change policy is also described and the concept of policy networks introduced. Section 2 details initial responses to climate change, orchestrated through the Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) working groups and the Industry Commission, and the National Greenhouse Response Strategy (NGRS)

 A no-regrets measure is one which has economic bene"ts, or at least no economic losses, as well as achieving a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a).  In Australia the term &greenhouse' is used to refer to anthropogenically induced climate change in popular and policy discourse. Throughout this paper these terms are used when citing Australian organisations, programmes, documents and institutions.

(Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a}c). In Section 3, the voluntary industry initiative, the Greenhouse Challenge programme, and the economic modelling conducted by the Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics (ABARE) are considered. In each case, the potential economic costs of action led to the scaling down of the scope of no-regrets measures. Section 4 examines how attempts were made to re-de"ne noregrets during the 1996}1997 review of the NGRS, and the extent to which they re#ect a &strong' interpretation of ecological modernisation. In conclusion, the implications for Australian climate change policy, and for addressing the issue in other developed economies, are drawn out.

2. Ecological modernisation = environment into economy must go? The relation between nature and society is a recurring theme of public, political and academic debates throughout the modern period (Cohen et al., 1998; Hajer, 1995; Macnaghten and Urry, 1998). During the 1980s these debates turned around the concept of sustainable development. Commonly de"ned in terms of `development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needsa (WCED, 1987, p. 43), it has become the mantra of policy debates concerning the environment. With its broad remit, simultaneously to address social, economic and environmental concerns, the concept has been both welcomed and contested as arguments ensue as to what it may in fact entail (Meadowcroft, 1997; Owens, 1994). In the wake of the Rio conference and the agreement of Agenda 21 (Robinson, 1993) the ideal of sustainable development has been worked into almost every conceivable arena, from business plans to national agendas, and is included in the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992), which states as its ultimate objective: Stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a timeframe su$cient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. UNFCCC (1992, Article 2)

Despite such sentiment, the coincident emergence of sustainable development with the stirrings of political recognition of the climate change issue, and common concerns for the global environment and future generations, Cohen et al. (1998) argue persuasively that, internationally at least, neither concept has been e!ectively informed by the other. On the one hand, the issue of

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climate change has been conceived primarily as a problem of the global environment, while on the other hand sustainable development has been seen as a means of addressing human needs and welfare issues alongside reducing environmental degradation (Cohen et al., 1998). However, as detailed below, some key tenets of sustainable development, encapsulated in the attendant discourse of ecological modernisation (Blowers, 1997; Christo!, 1996; Dryzek, 1995; Hajer, 1995, 1996; Mol, 1996; Weale, 1992), have in#uenced the ways in which debates about climate change are constructed and contested. It has been argued that during the 1980s the discourse of ecological modernisation began to gain recognition in western developed economies as the means for achieving sustainable development (Hajer, 1995, 1996; Mol, 1996; Weale, 1992). This discourse can be de"ned as one which `recognises the structural nature of the environmental problematique but none the less assumes that existing political, economic, and social institutions can internalise this care for the environmenta (Hajer, 1995, p. 5). It therefore `concentrates on a process of modernising modernity by repairing a structural design fault of modernity: the institutionalised destruction of naturea (Mol, 1996, p. 305). This, Mol (1996) argues, is achieved by re-embedding the economic sphere of modernity within ecological limits. The central tenet of ecological modernisation, and of sustainable development more broadly, as famously expounded in the Bruntland Report (WCED, 1987), is that there need not be any fundamental contradiction between environmental protection and economic growth. This approach stems partly from the changing character of environmental problems and their appropriate solutions over the last three decades. The crossmedia, inter-national and inter-generational character of some contemporary environmental concerns escapes the capacities of state authorities to &react and cure' on a single-issue basis. The move to a more integrated, &anticipate and prevent' approach involves science in determining acceptable solutions as well as identifying problems, shifts the burden of proof from &damage' to &possibility', conceptualises nature as public good, and argues that &pollution prevention pays' in an attempt to reconcile growth and environment within existing institutions (Hajer, 1995, pp. 26}28). These ecologically modern understandings of the environmental policy problem all re#ect a belief in the `mutually reinforcing environmental and economic bene"ts of increased resource e$ciency and waste minimisationa (Christo!, 1996, p. 477). The vast array of discourses, processes and programmes that can be categorised as &ecologically modern' encompass a wide range of potential values and policy outcomes (Christo!, 1996). At one end of the spectrum, designated &weak' ecological modernisation by Christo! (1996), are the essentially technical endeavours of achieving greater levels of economic and environmental

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e$ciency and the rationalisation of ecological limits within existing institutional structures (Hajer, 1996; JaK nicke, 1990; Mol, 1996). There is little consideration of the displacement of such risks in space and time, or of the non-material aspects of nature}society relations that may be valued (Christo!, 1996). An alternative &strong' (Christo!, 1996) version of ecological modernisation is one in which the re#exivity of modernity (Adam, 1998; Beck, 1992, 1996; Giddens, 1990, 1994) can be considered. This vision of ecological modernisation emphasises the potential of new institutional forums within the public sphere where norms and values concerning the relations between society and nature can be deliberated upon (Dryzek, 1990; Hajer, 1995, 1996; Mol, 1996). However, as Christo! (1996, p. 490) points out, `in general, the extent and nature of institutional changes required to enable a recognition of a discursive and participatory environmental politics (and to accommodate the transboundary and intertemporal nature of environmental risks and impacts) have not yet been adequately explored in the ecological modernisation literaturea. In other words, the promise of strong ecological modernisation, to take into account the non-instrumental values of nature, distant places and future generations, through participation and deliberation, has yet to be fully realised. 2.1. The Australian climate change policy network The need to reconcile environmental objectives with economic goals has been a central preoccupation of Australia's domestic climate change policy since its inception. Since the late 1980s the issue has attracted signi"cant attention from several federal bureaucracies * notably the environment, resources and foreign a!airs portfolios * a few state and local governments, and various economic and environmental interest groups. This situation can best be described with reference to the concept of policy networks (Bulkeley, 2000a, b; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). In Australia a tightly knit resourcebased policy community exists within a wider issue network concerned with the climate change issue. Through this tiered policy network the policy problem is constructed, contested and delimited, as actors struggle to have their understanding of the issue, and concomitant solutions, accepted (Hajer, 1995). Hajer suggests that it is through &storylines' that these understandings are articulated. These function by uniting di!erent elements of physical and social realities into speci"c, closed problems which are given meaning (Hajer, 1995, p. 56). New storylines can, therefore, create political change through the re-ordering of meaning (Hajer, 1995, p. 56; Thompson and Rayner, 1998, p. 325). Coalitions within the policy network are not necessarily based on shared interests and goals, but also on shared terms and concepts through which meaning is assigned to social and physical

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processes and the nature of the policy problem under consideration is constructed (Hajer, 1996, p. 247). This &discourse coalition' (Hajer, 1995) approach draws attention to the ways in which interests, alliances and beliefs about the speci"c issue in question are forged through the policy process. These processes occur within structured institutional contexts that constrain and enable the ways in which policy problems are delimited. Two such discourse coalitions, the resource-based coalition and the &greenhouse action' coalition, can be identi"ed within the Australian climate change policy network (Table 1; see also Bulkeley, 2000a,b). Over the past decade each has advanced di!erent storylines concerning the relation between environmental objectives and economic goals, which have led to con#ict and a measured degree of consensus. The next section examines how the domestic response to climate change was initiated and the emergence of the NGRS (see also Bulkeley, 2000b).

3. Greenhouse responses Impetus to develop a policy approach to climate change in Australia sprang from gathering international momentum surrounding the issue, concerns expressed domestically by the scienti"c community, and increasing attention from governments and interest groups (Bulkeley, 2000b). On the 11th of October 1990, the Federal Government adopted the &Interim Planning Target' (IPT). This target was based on that called for at Toronto and committed the government to aim to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, not covered by the Montreal Protocol, to 1988 levels by 1990, and to cut emissions by a further 20% by the year 2005. Signi"cantly, this aim was accompanied by the caveat that in attempting to reach such targets there should be no adverse e!ect on the Australian economy, and upon trade competitiveness in particular, in the absence of similar action by other countries (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a, c; Lowe,

Table 1 Climate change discourse coalitions Level

Resource-based discourse coalition

Greenhouse action discourse coalition

International

Scienti"c sceptics US resource-based interests

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change International environmental NGOs Supportive national governments (EU) Insurance industries Inter-governmental Committee on Ecologically Sustainable Development Department of Environment, Sport and Territories National Greenhouse Advisory Panel

Commonwealth of Australia Federal Government

NSW Government

Department of Foreign A!airs and Trade Department of Primary Industries and Energy Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics National Greenhouse Advisory Panel Energy Department Transport Department

Local Government


Industries

Greenhouse Industry Network EnergyAustralia Business Council of Australia Electricity Supply Association of Australia Australian Coal Association Resource Companies * BHP, CRA

Green Groups

Science

Commonwealth Scienti"c and Industrial Research Organisation

Environment Protection Agency Sustainable Energy Development Authority Australian Local Government Association Environs Australia Newcastle Environmental Management Department Newcastle Environment Council Sustainable Energy Industry Network of Australia EnergyAustralia

Australian Conservation Foundation Greenpeace Newcastle Greens Wilderness Society WWF Commonwealth Scienti"c and Industrial Research Organisation Australian Medical Association National Greenhouse Advisory Council

Adapted from Bulkeley (1999, p. 65). Some Federal departments have changed both name and portfolio since this research was conducted. The new departments are: Environment Australia (formerly DEST), Department of Science, Industry and Resources (climate change formerly handled by DPIE), and the Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (formerly DPIE).
Outside Newcastle this situation can be very di!erent, as many energy, planning and environment departments also participate in the resourcebased discourse coalition.

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1994, pp. 315}316; Taplin, 1994, p. 145). The initial framing of the relation between the environment and economy in climate change policy indicates that pollution prevention might have a cost. In the early construction of this climate change storyline tensions between economic objectives and environmental values were written into, rather than out of, policy discourses. During 1990}1992 the Federal Government set about exploring possible policy options, and their associated costs and bene"ts, for meeting the IPT. Two major processes of consultation were undertaken, one through the Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) process and the other through the Industry Commission. The processes and conclusions of each attempted to reconcile economic objectives and environmental values in markedly di!erent ways. The NGRS that emerged from these endeavours contains some signi"cant tensions left unresolved by these consultations. 3.1. Ecologically sustainable development The ESD process represented Australia's most concerted attempt to form a broad environmental strategy and to escape endemic environment-economy and intergovernmental con#ict (Downes, 1996; Kinrade, 1995; Lowe, 1994; Papadakis, 1993; Toyne, 1995). During 1990 the Federal Government asked the ESD working groups to form a &Greenhouse working group' and prepare a report, with the remit to assess options for meeting the IPT and the cost-e!ective combinations of doing so. The group met through the remainder of 1990 and 1991 and released its report in late 1991. During its deliberations clear divisions appeared, not as might initially be expected between those aligned on either side of a broad economy * environment divide, but between the &us' and &them' of representatives and bureaucrats, as one participant explained: Within [the non-governmental representatives] there was a broad consensus that greenhouse is a serious problem, that it needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency, and there are a wide range of things that can be done that make economic sense as well as environmental sense. 2In the working group I was on I think there were nine civilians and eight bureaucrats from state and commonwealth agencies. And as a group [the bureaucrats] seemed to think that it wasn't a serious problem, whether or not it was, the public didn't think it was a serious problem and that in general the fact that energy e$ciency measures were not being used was evidence that they did not  The remit of the ESD process was to involve governments, industry, environmental and community through working groups to consider the possibilities for sustainable development in nine sectors of the economy, focusing on the resource and energy sector (Downes, 1996; Kinrade, 1995; Lowe, 1994; Papadakis, 1993). Although the aim of the process was to reconcile environmental and economic goals through consensus building, the selection of issues, participants and agendas limited the ways in which such reconciliation was pursued (Bulkeley, 2000b; Downes, 1996).

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make economic sense. As one bureaucrat said in my presence &If there were energy e$ciency measures that would save money we know they would be implemented through market forces. The fact that they are not being implemented by market forces is evidence that they are not economic'. I actually had the surreal experience of seeing a treasury bureaucrat explaining to the head of Caltex Oil how the market works! Consumers Association, Interview (December 1996)

Despite such di$culties the overall outcome of the ESD process was seen to represent a &remarkable' degree of consensus over the issues to be tackled, and the principles through which to do so (Lowe, 1994; CA Interview; CCB (DSa) Interview; GWG Interview; Toyne, 1995). In particular the `primacy given to market liberalism and the need to incorporate environmental values into the framework of market economicsa (Barns, 1992, p. 201) within the overall ESD process was notable. The degree of consensus achieved was such that the whole process has attained somewhat mythical proportions (Bulkeley, 2000b; Toyne, 1995). Speci"cally, the Greenhouse working group found `that there [were] a large range of actions which would be cost-e!ective on energy grounds alone, so that additional bene"ts in greenhouse gas reduction would be freea (Wilkenfeld et al., 1995, p. 9). In articulating the presence of &no-regrets' climate change policy options, entailing net bene"ts or at least no net costs, the working group recommendations attempt to reconcile economic objectives and environmental values. This was achieved through the formation of a deliberative institution (Dryzek, 1990) in which discussion of problems and possibilities was enabled between members of the climate change issue network traditionally seen to have very di!erent interests at stake. The process and outcomes of the ESD consultation, through calling for precautionary measures to approach a global issue, taking account of future generations and the non-human world, and indicating that pollution prevention could pay, clearly represent an ecologically modern approach to environmental policy-making (Christo!, 1996; Hajer, 1995). However, the working group's recommendations stop short of challenging the relation between energy and the economy, the basis of industrial modernity, a project recognised by the environmental groups as beyond the opportunities o!ered in this context (Downes, 1996, p. 186), instead emphasising the possibilities of action through existing institutional and social structures. The consensus achieved took government representatives by surprise. The sheer number of recommendations made, totalling over 500, provided a di$cult task for governments and bureaucrats who had no clear idea what the end result of the ESD process might be (Toyne, 1995, p. 17). From this morass two documents were drafted: a National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (NSESD) and a National Greenhouse Response Strategy (NGRS) in a convoluted process that e!ectively excluded the original working group participants

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(CCB DS(a) Interview; Kinrade, 1995, p. 88; Lowe, 1994, p. 319; Toyne, 1995). The resulting draft NGRS bore few similarities to the conclusions of the working group, representing instead a minimalist approach advanced by governments and bureaucracies. As one o$cial explained: What happened was that a process which had everyone on board was changed to something hijacked by o$cials and watered down by o$cials2In fact NGOs, green groups, and industry walked out at 10.30 on the "rst morning of a three day conference that was supposed to approve the "nal versions, so disgusted were they with the outcome of the process. There was a general feeling of, why bother? And what happened to the consensus approach? Department of Environment, Sport and Territories, Climate Change Branch (DSa), Interview (May 1996)

In the aftermath of the process discontent was running high. The Institute of Australian Engineers, an organisation not known for its radicalism, issued a press release condemning the report and voicing concern that changing the conclusions of the working groups gave the impression that a small group of o$cials knew better than the wider community what action should be taken (Lowe, 1994, p. 322). These events not only placed doubt over support for the NGRS amongst the participating interest groups, but also severely tested the possibilities of ever reaching such a consensus again. 3.2. Sustaining development During 1991 the Industry Commission had also been asked to comment on the costs and bene"ts of stabilising greenhouse gas emissions for Australian industry. This process took the form of an inquiry with public hearings and submissions from interested parties (Taplin, 1994, p. 145). The Commission's report relied upon the application of &top-down' economic modelling. This approach assumes that the market for energy is essentially perfect, and that behaviour is pro"t-maximising (Jacobs, 1994). Further, the appropriate means for e!ecting reductions of greenhouse gas emissions is assumed to be through a market instrument, such as a carbon tax (Kinrade, 1995, pp. 101}103). The Commission concluded that compliance with the IPT would lead to a reduction of 1.5% in national output, and that while most of the economy would be a!ected the costs would be borne by some sectors and regions more than others. Other studies, conducted by London Economics, which analysed the impacts on key industrial sectors, and the Tasman Institute, have reached similar conclusions (Kinrade, 1995, p. 103; Lowe, 1994, pp. 320}321). However, the Commission found that the calculation of costs and bene"ts was by no means straightforward. They argued that it was di$cult to assess the implications for the economy while future impacts were still surrounded by scienti"c uncertainty. Calculating the

costs of inaction was, therefore, problematic. They also conceded that they had been unable to quantify the economic bene"ts of taking action (Lowe, 1994, p. 320). This stands in stark contrast to the "ndings of the ESD Greenhouse working group that there were a number of no-regrets options that could be taken which would have, at the least, no net economic losses attached. Further, they found that, within policy guidelines which emphasised economic e$ciency, the study could not take full account of environmental or sustainability objectives and that any equity issues involved would have to be left for political judgement (Taplin, 1994). The values of the environment were, therefore, notable for their absence from these calculations. Moreover, the focus on the energy-intensive sector of the Australian economy, signi"cant as it is, does not capture the range of responses to market interventions like a carbon tax, in particular, it neglects those who might pro"t from such a policy measure. Alternative means of reducing emissions are also left out of a calculus dominated by taxation. The Industry Commission conclusion that no measures could be taken which would not incur signi"cant burdens on the Australian economy in general, and speci"c sectors and regions in particular, has to be seen in the light of its methodological approach and narrow remit. It marks a clear departure from the discourse of ecological modernisation, through emphasis on the potential con#ict between economic and environmental goals. Nevertheless, the report and others like it have had a far-reaching in#uence on Australia's climate change response strategy. They have expounded the fears of the large and wellorganised industries, who have in turn attracted considerable support for their concerns from governments, in particular within "nance and development departments where there is considerable sympathy for approaches grounded in &economic rationalism' (Christo!, 1998; Kinrade, 1995). The no-regrets discourse coalition, involving business and environment groups, engendered by the ESD process appears somewhat fragile in this light. 3.3. The National Greenhouse Response Strategy In December 1992, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) adopted the NGRS. Labelled as the "rst phase of an evolving strategy, the NGRS concentrated on the need for &insurance measures' to reduce uncertainties, including research and adaptation, and the implementation of &no-regrets measures' (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a) in the meantime. Although this focus appears to echo the conclusions of the ESD working group, the predominant in#uence of the Industry Commission is evident in that the pursuit of no-regrets is accompanied by some signi"cant caveats: Response measures should be e!ective in furthering the strategy's goal, and be economically e$cient.

H. Bulkeley / Global Environmental Change 11 (2001) 155}169 Response measures should be directed towards the IPT2subject to Australia not implementing response measures that would have net adverse economic impacts nationally or on Australia's trade competitiveness, in the absence of similar action by major greenhouse producing countries. Equity considerations should be addressed by ensuring that response measures meet the broad needs of the whole community and that any undue burden of adjustment potentially borne by a particular sector or region is recognised and accounted for. Commonwealth of Australia (1992a, NGRS, Guiding Principles) In respect of both no-regrets and insurance measures any social and economic costs will be low. First phase measures will meet equity objectives by causing minimal disruption to the wider community, any single industry sector, or any particular geographic region. Commonwealth of Australia (1992a, Characteristics of Measures, NGRS)

This interpretation of no-regrets measures represents a signi"cant deviation from the perspective of the ESD working group that `some industrial decline and closure, and some restructuring, would be necessary to achieve cuts in greenhouse gas emissions but that this would be countered by growth in industry orientated towards energy e$ciency and renewable energya (Taplin, 1996, p. 391). It is clear, therefore, that the principles through, and scales over which the environment and economy are to be reconciled di!er in the NGRS from those articulated in the ESD process. Eckersley (1993) argues that there is in fact a clear failure to link the principles of ESD to policy measures and strategy formation in the NGRS. She suggests that while the National Greenhouse Steering Committee `performed the standard invocation of ESD principles2[they] thereafter applied a di!erent set of principles that were seen to be speci"c to a greenhouse strategya (Eckersley, 1993, p. 59). Despite committing the COAG to the goals and principles of both the NSESD and the UNFCCC, with their invocation of the value of the environment, the NGRS explicitly recognises the primacy of economic objectives in the formation of climate change policy. Notwithstanding reservations about the basis of the NGRS, some members of the policy network considered that the strategy itself included su$cient measures at least to make a start on emission reductions. Recommendations for the various sectors, such as energy, transport and agriculture, placed emphasis on the need to improve the workings of the market through, for example, the provision of more information, the removal of barriers to  Formed in 1992, the functions of this committee were transferred to the Greenhouse Working Group, Intergovernmental Committee for Ecological Sustainable Development from 1994 to 1998 and in 1998, under the National Greenhouse Strategy (Commonwealth, 1998a), to the High Level Group on Greenhouse, Council of Australian Governments.

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e$ciency, and the recognition of the long-term nature of planning to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This possibility of bringing the environment into the economy attracted the most widespread support during the ESD process and formed the basis for the no-regrets storyline. However, the implementation of the NGRS has proved problematic and criticism is widespread. Wilkenfeld et al. (1995) argue that, by early 1995, federal and state governments had failed to implement actions from the NGRS, establish any new strategies or programmes, or assign clear responsibilities to a single authority. Instead, responses were left to ad hoc government processes and commercial decisions. They suggest that actions taken in the energy and resource sectors ran counter to the NGRS in both principle and practice, despite its focus on these sectors (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a; Wilkenfeld et al., 1995). Far from reconciling environment and development objectives anew, the end-result of the NGRS has been to maintain the status quo (Taplin, 1996). Indeed, `there is no evidence that the NGRS has saved one single tonne of greenhouse gas emissions which would not have been saved in any case for other reasons. In other words, there has been no departure from &business as usual'a (Wilkenfeld et al., 1995, p. 4). Central to the di$culties experienced with implementing the NGRS has been an argumentative struggle over what no-regrets actions might mean. As one o$cial explained, the visible hand of economic objectives and interests played a major role in this process of de"nition: No-regrets means that there is a net bene"t, or at least no net cost in greenhouse policies. A lot of people have argued that each measure on its own should not have a cost. That is of course quite diwerent. In the application of greenhouse policy this is the economic caveat, there is also the dislocation caveat * the one about the sectors or areas * in both of these you can see economic dominance. They have the upper hand. Department of Environment, Sport and Territories, Climate Change Branch (DSa), Interview (May 1996)

The way in which no-regrets has been discursively constructed, and delimited, and an hegemonic understanding institutionalised within the climate change policy network has framed the ways in which policy solutions have been sought (Hajer, 1995).

4. Greenhouse challenges By 1994, growing recognition of the shortcomings of the NGRS, coupled with further international policy developments towards a review of the Framework Convention on Climate Change through the Conference of the Parties (COP) process, meant that climate change was "rmly back on domestic and international policy agendas (Christo!, 1998; Taplin, 1994, p. 153). Domestically, the Federal Government attempted to reinvigorate climate change policy with the Greenhouse Challenge

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programme, while the economic analysis conducted by the ABARE engendered an ever more cautious approach to the international negotiations.

My concern is that something like Greenhouse Challenge is not being used as part of a strategic response, but being used as a band-aid and a deferral mechanism. EnergyAustralia, Interview (December 1996)

4.1. Voluntary approaches The debate over the best means to achieve domestic greenhouse gas emission reductions was reopened by Senator Faulkner, then Environment Minister, during 1994 (Taplin, 1996, p. 392). Initially the possibility of implementing a carbon tax was raised. This attempt to explicitly recognise the costs to the environment of the use of fossil fuels did not include a rigorous (cost}bene"t) analysis of the &value' of the environment upon which a price should then be placed. Instead it was a symbolic gesture aimed at providing a source of revenue for the initial investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction measures. Despite the low level at which the proposed tax was to be set, it met with strong opposition and was swiftly shelved. In its wake, with all the appearance of a consolation prize, the resource-based coalition o!ered the government an alternative approach, which would consist of the voluntary implementation by industry of no-regrets measures. The resulting Greenhouse Challenge programme encouraged companies and industry associations to sign up to voluntary, but externally audited, measures in return for publicity for their green credentials. In essence The Commonwealth and industry will work together to put in place cost-e!ective, #exible, voluntary measures that will constitute credible commitments to signi"cant greenhouse gas reductions through improvements in energy and process e$ciency on a continuing basis; and by enhancing greenhouse gas sinks. Commonwealth of Australia (1996a, p. 3)

Not only was the Greenhouse Challenge programme an important means for the energy and resource community to de#ect the debate over a carbon tax; it also provided a key part of the additional Federal Government strategy, Greenhouse 21C. This was introduced in 1995 to promote `the wide range of short and long-term bene"ts that an e!ective response to greenhouse can provide for the economy, as well as the environmenta (Commonwealth of Australia, 1995). The programme has been enthusiastically endorsed by the resource-based coalition, and adopted by over 100 large industries and industry associations to which it is targeted. Members of the greenhouse action coalition are more circumspect about its potential: It is limited to the big end of town, and according to the bottom up stu! that has been done, that is where the least potential is. So you have got to "nd slightly di!erent mechanisms to reach the commercial sector, services, retail, wholesale etc.2and the domestic sector. Greenpeace (b), Interview (December 1996)

Despite such reservations, there is support across the policy network for the no-regrets nature of the programme and the ways in which it is e!ectively extending the period over which economic paybacks for energy e$ciency are seen as worthwhile. Recently a new initiative, Greenhouse Allies, has been launched in order to engage small and medium businesses and communities in Greenhouse Challenge endeavours (Commonwealth, 1998a). The possibility of a carbon tax seems to have refocused minds on the availability of cost-e!ective emission reduction measures, something that the advocates of the neo-classical models of the early 1990s had ignored (CSIRO Interview, 1996; Kinrade, 1995). However, a signi"cant di!erence in the Greenhouse Challenge approach to no-regrets is that the net within which costs and bene"ts are to be assessed has been tightly drawn around individual "rm boundaries. The scales over which values are to be weighed have been reduced from the consideration of economic and environmental objectives at the national level, as proposed by the ESD Greenhouse working group, to the narrow remit of calculable costs and bene"ts for individual companies. Although signatories to the programme are committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, these gains are o!-set against the predicted growth of emissions-intensive activities. While emissions per unit of production are falling, there is no attempt to challenge the rate of increase in production, so that total emissions are set to increase (Commonwealth, 1996). The implications of additional reductions in emissions are not lost on the Australian Government, and any possibilities of limits to growth in emissions are explicitly excluded from the Greenhouse Challenge programme (Bulkeley, 1997, p. 266). The delimitation of no-regrets within the boundaries of individual companies and industry associations, and their containment within a framework that primarily considers the economic costs and bene"ts of emission reduction actions, shows that reconciling economic and environmental values within climate change policy discourse depends on the scales over which such compromises are sought. 4.2. Calculating the costs Like the report of the Industry Commission, the modelling endeavours that inform the Australian international position are explicit in their focus on the impacts of climate change policies on the economy: The model, MEGABARE, is a dynamic general equilibrium model of the world and we've tackled the problem2as a trade problem. We haven't tackled it as an environmental problem,

H. Bulkeley / Global Environmental Change 11 (2001) 155}169 or as an energy problem, we've tackled it as a trade problem2MEGABARE is e!ectively a trade model. Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics, Interview (February 1997)

The MEGABARE model, created by ABARE, attempts to calculate the impacts of emission reduction scenarios on key indicators of economic well being. These scenarios involve either reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 and a further 10% reduction by 2020, or the more stringent reduction to 15% below 1990 levels by 2010 and holding those levels to 2020 (ABARE, 1997a). Their impacts are measured against Gross National Product, population growth, the emissions intensity of economic activity, fossil fuel exports and the emissions intensity of exports (Hamilton, 1997b). These scenarios and indicators were selected for speci"c purposes: The principal that we've been advocating is that, e!ectively, each country should be treated in what we de"ne as a fair way2and we happen to de"ne fairness in terms of percentage reduction in Gross National Expenditure. Our detractors would say to us that &there's a hundred di!erent de"nitions of economic welfare and you've just chosen one'. But what we've tried to do is choose something that's practical, something that's measurable and something that's understandable to most people. Something that you can calculate for most countries out of their national accounts, something that takes account of both the domestic e!ects and the trade e!ects because both those e!ects are very important. And it seems to me that, that you can't really expect to have an international agreement signed that is e!ectively dealing with going to the heart of the ways economies work now2[without] some set of conditions where countries can sign on and feel they're fairly treated and if they don't feel they're fairly treated, then they won't implement. They might sign on the day2but they'll go home and they won't implement and in the end, if that happens, then the outcome is not environmentally e!ective2so we might as well go home and play golf. Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics, Interview (February 1997)

The outputs from this analysis have made startling reading and receive signi"cant press coverage (see, for example, The Australian, 1996, 1997; SMH, 1996, 1997a). The initial calculations made in 1996 suggested that reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 would have the impact of reducing personal savings by A$1900 in net present value terms (Hamilton, 1997b; Parer, 1996a, b). This "gure was revised in April 1997 to suggest that costs of reducing emissions by 10% below 1990 levels by 2020 would be in the order of A$9000 per person (ABARE, 1997b; Hamilton, 1997a). Emission reductions of this magnitude could only be achieved through a reduction of 60% in non-ferrous metal production, of 30% in iron and steel and of 24% in coal output from business-as-usual scenarios (ABARE, 1997a). These "gures, and the methods used to derive them, have been contested. Concerns have been raised by other Australian economists that the basis of the calculations for costs in net present value terms is questionable, re-

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lying as it does on the aggregation of small yearly costs into one "gure, the meaning of which is unclear (Hamilton, 1997a). Moreover, the indicators chosen to show losses of economic welfare represent the areas where the Australian economy may experience economic losses but fail to capture the bene"ts to other sectors of the economy (Hamilton, 1997a, b; Tarlo, 1996). In addition, failing to make any attempt to account for environmental costs and bene"ts, let alone values, is seen to render the analysis incomplete. More insidious are claims that the neutrality of MEGABARE is in doubt, due to funding supplied by the fossil fuel and resource industries. ABARE has been quick to defend the objectivity of their analysis, arguing that receiving funding from a number of government bureaucracies and industry groups does not in#uence the outcome of the model (ABARE, 1997a, b, ABARE, Interview). Despite such claims, the modelling activities of ABARE were submitted for investigation by the Australian Conservation Foundation to the Commonwealth Ombudsman and found to be open to accusations of exclusivity and bias (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998b). ABARE's conclusions continue to be criticised by green groups, certain vocal economists and, somewhat surprisingly, within the ranks of the party in power. Just prior to Kyoto, the branch secretary of Prime Minister Howard's local Liberal party, Robert Vincen, and his political mentor, Sir John Carrick, organised a delegation to persuade the Prime Minister that action on climate change was not necessarily economically crippling (SMH, 1997b). They argued in the national press that the government had received `incomplete and &"ltered' informationa which had `misled the Howard government into believing that tough action on the global greenhouse dilemma can only harm Australia's economya (SMH, 1997b). Whatever the propriety of the support o!ered to the MEGABARE analysis from the resource industries, it is clear that they at least have no quarrel with the indicators chosen and the conclusions

 Hamilton (1997b) uses the Senate Hansard to describe how the proportion of funding derived from industry increased from 28% in 1993}94 to 80% in 1996}97 (see also Commonwealth of Australia, 1998b).  The Ombudsman's report concludes that the funding structure and administrative practices adopted by ABARE are open to accusations of `undue in#uence by vested interestsa (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998b, p. 3). The MEGABARE and GIGABARE committees were found to comprise a limited range of views and expertise, and to be subject to an exclusionary membership fee. This was seen as inappropriate considering the role of ABARE as an independent public research body and that the explanation of the steering committee's role could create expectations of policy in#uence. However, the Ombudsman recognised ABARE's argument that the committees were primarily a mechanism for increasing external funding, as demanded by Federal Government, and called for ABARE to clearly de"ne the role of the committees and make them more publicly accountable (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998b).

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reached. Furthermore, what is particularly striking in the MEGABARE analysis is the emphasis on the incommensurability of economic objectives and environmental values, so much so that no-regrets options seem to have disappeared (Hamilton, 1997a, b): I think there is this real dilemma, in that Australia's [domestic] policy currently is based2almost entirely on no-regrets. And yet when you look at the analysis that we do to2inform our international position, it basically doesn't allow that there are no-regrets options, it says there aren't any, because the models we have can't really handle them. Department of Environment, Sport and Territories, Climate Change Branch (ER), Interview (November 1996)

This apparent contradiction, between the win}win potential articulated in the no-regrets discourse and warnings of the potential economic costs of meeting climate change goals, indicates that integration between all economic and climate change objectives is problematic. Compatibility between these goals is achieved through delimiting both the economic and environmental values at stake and the temporal and spatial scales over which costs and bene"ts are to be weighed. This process has been contested, as each discourse coalition attempts to have their understanding of the problem recognised and acted upon. The next section examines how concepts of no-regrets were re-considered through the formation of the National Greenhouse Advisory Panel and the review of the NGRS conducted in the run up to Kyoto.

5. Re-visiting no-regrets While the battle lines between environmental and economic coalitions seem to have been entrenched during the 1990s, processes of consultation amongst key members of the climate change issue network were also undertaken. In 1994 the National Greenhouse Advisory Panel (NGAP) was established with the speci"c purpose of reviewing domestic climate change policy, and during 1996}1997 a major review, involving various processes of consultation with governments, interest groups and the public, was undertaken. In both cases, the reformulation of no-regrets was central. Despite renewed debate concerning the need to take into account the economic, environmental and social bene"ts of climate change action, and the potential long-term gains, environmental values remain marginal to the policy process. 5.1. Consensus and conyict The similarities between NGAP and the ESD Greenhouse working group include not only its multi-interest, deliberative format, but also some of its participants. In their review of the NGRS, NGAP concluded that while

the strategy itself may have contained some useful measures, the lack of political will to implement them has been a major barrier to progress in emission reductions (NGAP, 1996). Central to this has been the lack of clearly assigned responsibilities and confusion surrounding the form that no-regrets actions should take: NGAP believes the term is open to con#icting interpretations. No-regrets has in many cases been interpreted as no losers, and greenhouse reduction measures with demonstrated national economic bene"ts have been deferred or diluted because some industries or interest groups have perceived themselves to be losers. In those cases where this perception is justi"ed more attention needs to be paid to mechanisms which redistribute bene"ts between &winners' and &losers'. In no other area of public policy does such a restriction apply; instead governments are obliged to weigh up the overall public bene"t in their decisionmaking. National Greenhouse Advisory Panel (1996, p. 53)

During the 1996}1997 review of the NGRS attempts were made to shift no-regrets beyond the limited boundaries, economic bene"ts to individual companies in the (relatively) short-term, within which they had become entrenched during the mid-1990s, as this extract from the draft discussion document illustrates: A no-regrets measure is one which has "nancial, social and environmental bene"ts to the community at large, in addition to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and these bene"ts over time are su$cient to outweigh the direct and indirect costs of the measure. ICESD (1997, p. 7)

The resulting National Greenhouse Strategy re#ects this recasting of no-regrets, and the in#uence of the NGAP formulation, in its guiding principles, one of which is the: Pursuit of greenhouse action consistent with equity and coste!ectiveness and with multiple bene"ts [which]: E Focus on approaches which have "nancial, social and environmental bene"ts to the community. These measures will reduce greenhouse gas emissions and over time outweigh the direct and indirect costs associated with their implementation. Within this framework costs and bene"ts are considered: E 䡩 from a community rather than an individual perspective, though individual impacts need to be recognised and equity considerations addressed E 䡩 over all time frames, including the short, medium and long term E Recognise the need for equity by ensuring that any undue burden borne by a particular sector or region is taken into account in the development and implementation of measures Commonwealth of Australia (1998a, p. 3)

Particularly signi"cant is the re-iteration the environmental objectives of climate change policy, as well as the attempt to stretch the temporal and spatial scales of no-regrets from bene"ts accruing to industries to the wider community, and from the present to some (unspeci"ed) future. However, tensions remain between taking a (inter-)national long-term perspective and ensuring

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that speci"c sectors and regions do not bear too high a cost. Far from delimiting a "xed category of appropriate policy responses the term no-regrets has continually been embroiled in the struggle to de"ne what such measures entail and how economic objectives and environmental values could, and should, be reconciled. The adoption of an essentially &weak' ecological modern interpretation of no-regrets, through NGAP and within the review process, led some members of the greenhouse action coalition to feel that alternative conceptions of the policy problem had been marginalised. Due to all the di!erences the consensus you can get is a weak consensus2in terms of leading edge policies directions * [you are] just not going to get that from NGAP, though it has shifted things slightly forward. Australian Conservation Foundation (b), Interview (February 1997) A: It is interesting, because [Greenpeace] is on the NGAP and [they have] made it really clear that they actually don't take their fundamental line at these meetings, they actually take a much-tempered line. Because otherwise nobody would listen to anything they said, so they have to compromise the whole time. Which is a real shame in a way, but it is also really good in the fact that they recognise that perhaps some of these things are incremental and that they are in the room2 B: I was about to say, they are doing it from within. A: Tolerated from within. ALGA, Interview (November 1997)

Despite these concerns, the NGAP report does contain some suggestions that have a hint of &strong' ecological modernisation about them (Christo!, 1996). Alongside emphasis on the need to maintain strong economic growth and incorporate di!erentiation (NGAP, 1996, p. 50) is a recognition of the possibility of moving beyond no-regrets so that `measures which might involve a moderate economic cost for substantial greenhouse gas reductions could now also be identi"ed and considered for implementation during stage two of the reviewa (NGAP, 1996, p. 54). This implies that the values of mitigating greenhouse (though not explicitly considered) are seen as potentially more signi"cant than &moderate economic costs'. In the package of measures announced shortly before the COP-3, Safeguarding the Future (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998a), which form the core of the National Greenhouse Strategy, Prime Minister Howard conceded that responding to climate change might involve going beyond `a no regrets, minimal cost approach where this is sensible in order to achieve e!ective and meaningful outcomesa (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998a). However, a commitment to a 2% renewable energy target by 2010 is the only measure within the National Greenhouse Strategy speci"cally identi"ed as going &beyond' no-regrets (AGO, 1998), the e!ect of which may be minimal in comparison to recent budgetary cuts in energy prices. The extent to which the

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conclusions and compromises reached through NGAP sway the Federal Government, with whom the resourcebased coalition has more direct in#uence (ACA Interview, 1996; BCA Interview, 1997; Greenpeace Interview, 1996b), is doubtful. 5.2. Valuing the global environment? In stark contrast to the explicit attention given to the economic values at stake in the climate change issue, the values of the environment are rarely considered in detail in Federal Government policy, papers, media releases and speeches. The need to act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is primarily couched in terms of scienti"c evidence and international obligations. The ultimate objective of the FCCC, which includes the aim of allowing `ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate changea (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 2), has formed part of the framework for developing Australian climate change strategies (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a, 1995, 1997, 1998a; ICESD, 1997, p. 7). There has also been some recognition of the potential impacts on nature, society, and especially future generations, if nothing is done to address climate change (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a, 1995, 1997, 1998a). It has been through the storyline of potential impacts, be it to human health, coastal communities, Antarctica or biodiversity, that the greenhouse action discourse coalition has sought to express the environmental values that climate change poses, and to frame the need for no-regrets strategies to take these into account (ACF Interview; CSIRO Interview, 1996; Greenpeace Interviews, 1996). However, this has made little ground in in#uencing the domestic and international policy positions held by the Federal Government, which are dominated by consideration of economic costs and bene"ts. The [green] lobby groups are not terribly e!ective, so they have very little say in this debate.2But when you think about it, it is hard to understand what weapon [they] can use apart from altruism, we should be in this. But they don't have a very e!ective response to the point, well why should we when we only put in 1.4% of the emissions? Department of Environment, Sport and Territories, Climate Change Branch (IR), Interview (November 1996)

The point is clear, what are the moralities involved in addressing global environmental issues? The scope for arguing over the morality of environmental values within the climate change policy process seemed limited to those involved: It has been very hard to "nd moral statements.2the di$culty is to do with a couple of things. One is the ubiquitousness of fossil fuel burning, as against nuclear transport which is still a rare event so you can get outraged about it. Fossil fuels are being burnt every minute of every day in thousands, in fact including cars, millions of locations. Secondly the burning of the fossil fuels and the impacts are removed in place, like the impact isn't

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near by, and in time. So you can't make a moral statement about the impact and the act. When you've got a nuclear fuel transport or a whale being killed or a toxic discharge, the factory and the toxic waste are more or less juxtaposed, and they are happening now. Whereas the CO comes out now and thirty years later  a Paci"c island goes under. Greenpeace (b), Interview (December 1996)

The problems of delimiting, describing and defending environmental values that stretch over space and time in ways which confound the value systems of modernity (the individual, national identity, discount rates and national accounting), and the salience of economic costs and bene"ts, have meant that the environmental values raised by climate change have e!ectively been sidelined within the policy process.

6. Conclusion = no regrets? In the lead up to Kyoto we are seeing a public debate of growing intensity on climate change policy. However, some of the contributors adopt rather extreme positions at both ends of the spectrum. This has fuelled a dangerous misconception that the world faces a stark choice: either we address climate change or we preserve our economies. Yet the truth is that we need not choose between the two * what we can do, and what we need to do, is choose both * and follow the policies which will over time allow us to achieve both. Senator Robert Hill, Minister for the Environment, Speech (1997) Do you think this country is going to knock back a Comalco aluminium re"nery in the state of Queensland because it generates CO emissions? The answer is no.  Senator Parer, Minister for Resources and Energy (Age, 1997)

Integrating environmental values and economic objectives in Australia's climate change policy position, as the statement from the Minister for the Environment, Senator Hill, suggests, has retained a central position in the discourses surrounding the issue for almost a decade. However, as the above discussion has shown, and Senator Parer's remark illustrates, integration between all environmental values and economic objectives, as promised by the panacea of ecological modernisation, has proven impossible. The incorporation of climate change strategy development into the Ecologically Sustainable Development process was undertaken in order to escape the inter-governmental and economy}environment disputes which had previously dogged environmental policy-making in Australia. This process of reconciliation has taken two main forms. First, the formation of deliberative institutions through which consensus over economic and  Recent legislative changes e!ectively hand back power to state governments with respect to all but a handful of environmental issues (of which climate change is not one). Commentators feel this marks a return to the policy-making context of the 1980s and signals the potential for further bitter disputes.

environmental goals might be reached, and second, attempts to price the environment into economic decisions. Although these processes were grounded in the central tenet of ecological modernisation, that there is no inherent contradiction between environmental and economic objectives, they have not achieved the desired reconciliation. Both the ESD greenhouse working group and the NGAP have proved innovative and creative forums for thinking about meeting economic and environmental needs, and the consensus reached over the potential of no-regrets measures has surprised many involved in the climate change issue network. However, what no-regrets should entail has been strongly contested, with each discourse coalition placing di!erent temporal and spatial limits over which to calculate costs and bene"ts. The initial conceptualisation of no-regrets through the ESD process suggested that the costs and bene"ts of implementing climate change policy would be unevenly distributed between regions and economic sectors over time. These scales have been progressively rede"ned through storylines advocated by the resource-based discourse coalition, which insist that the NGRS should not impose any undue (economic) burden on any sector of the economy or region, and that the costs to industry of implementing greenhouse gas emission reduction measures should be calculated on a "rm by "rm basis. In e!ect this has ensured that the implementation of Federal climate change policy has been con"ned to measures that are economically e$cient in the (relatively) short-term, within certain sectors of the energy economy of Australia. While the (monetary) costs and bene"ts to the nationstate, region, economic sector and "rms have been emphasised, there has been little consideration of the noninstrumental, let alone non-calculable, value of present, distant and future environments. The greenhouse action coalition has attempted to draw attention to the value of the environment that is under threat from climate change risks, in order to re-draw the boundaries of no-regrets outside the temporal and spatial referents of modernity * the short-term, the nation-state, the "rm and the individual * though with little success. During the 1996}1997 review of the NGRS attempts were made to again rede"ne no-regrets and widen the scales over which it should be applied. This has e!ectively taken the form of weak ecologically modern visions of no-regrets, which set out to pursue the demand for energy through more e$cient means and stretch the temporal scales over which calculations of costs and bene"ts are made. Oppositional storylines promulgated by the greenhouse action discourse coalition, that advance a case for the development of mandatory energy e$ciency and renewable energy sources, have gained some limited (local) ground (Bulkeley, 2000a,b). However, in neither case have the needs involved in meeting demand for increased energy use been questioned. This is hardly surprising, for as Owens has argued, when demand management moves

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beyond meeting demand more e$ciently it `challenges basic tenets of consumer societies and begs fundamental questions of political philosophya (1997, p. 571). Indeed, it is precisely through the articulation of values in terms of economic calculation, national security and greater e$ciency that such challenges remain muted. The implications of re-de"ning no-regrets for the maintenance of business as usual have not been lost on either the resource-based discourse coalition, who have continually tried to steer policy away from such reformations, or the Federal Government, who have explicitly rejected any measures which threaten the resource-based nature of the Australian economy. Climate change has provided another site in which the resource-based coalition has been able to de"ne and delimit the interests of the Federal Government, and by extension Australian society, as synonymous with their own stake in the continued use of fossil fuels and resource-processing (Newell and Patterson, 1998). However, the challenges of integrating environmental objectives and economic goals are not unique to the Australian situation. Throughout the OECD the fundamental questions posed by climate change, such as whether continued demands for energy, transport and housing are to be met without question, are not far from the surface. In the Australian case, this problem has been thrown into stark relief by the immediacy with which such questions have to be answered. Recent protests in the UK over the imposition of higher taxes on heavy-goods vehicles, and the lack of political will for pursuing the integrated transport strategy developed in 1998, indicate that addressing the use of energy in the transport sector is no easy matter. This paper has argued that while following the path of no-regrets may provide short-term compromises, in itself

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it does not o!er an escape route from fundamental con#icts between economic goals and environmental objectives, for, in any case, there will be winners and losers. Without recognition of these underlying tensions, attempts to tackle climate change will remain super"cial, achieving neither environmental bene"ts nor economic gains. Tackling such con#icts is a di$cult task. It is sobering to note that despite the deliberative processes undertaken in Australia, and their measured degree of success, their "ndings failed to have any signi"cant impact on the ways in which the climate change problem was delimited and measures implemented to address it. Without the political will to take notice of compromises deliberatively won across the issue network, opportunities to implement greenhouse gas emission reductions have been lost and choices for development narrowed. Rather than treat Australia as an isolated example, lessons about the processes undertaken and the problems encountered in responding to climate change could be drawn by other developed economies, in order to respond to con#icts which will arise as the task of reducing emissions becomes increasingly onerous.

Acknowledgements This paper reports "ndings from my Ph.D. thesis. I am grateful for "nancial support for this research project from the University of Cambridge (W.A. Meeks Scholarship, The Smuts Fund and The Philip Lake Fund), and the Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, London (Australian Bicentennial Scholarship). Thanks also to Tim Rayner and Dr. Susan Owens for their useful comments on earlier drafts. Any remaining errors are my own.

Appendix Interviews ABARE ACA ACF ALGA

February 1997 March 1997 February 1997 November 1996

BCA CA CSIRO

March 1997 December 1996 December 1996

CCB (DSa)

May 1996

CCB (ER)

November 1996

CCB (IR)

November 1996

Energy Australia

December 1996

Senior Economist, Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics Greenhouse policy representative, Australian Coal Association Campaigner (b), Australian Conservation Foundation Greenhouse Policy Representatives (a,b) (ICESD), Australian Local Government Association Greenhouse Policy Representative, Business Council of Australia Greenhouse Policy Representative, Consumers Association Senior Climate Scientist (a), Commonwealth Scienti"c and Industrial Research Organisation Domestic Strategy Representative, Climate Change Branch, Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories Economic Analysis Representative, Climate Change Branch, Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories International Strategy Representative, Climate Change Branch, Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories &Pure Energy' Representative, Energy Australia

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Greenpeace

GWG

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May 1996 November 1996 December 1996 January 1997

Climate campaigner (a), Greenpeace Australia Climate campaigner (a), Greenpeace Australia Climate campaigner (b), Greenpeace Australia Domestic Strategy Review Representative (a), Greenhouse Working Group, Intergovernmental Committee on Ecologically Sustainable Development

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