Forest Policy and Economics 11 (2009) 375–382
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Forest Policy and Economics j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s ev i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / f o r p o l
Not seeing the forest for the trees? The environmental effectiveness of forest certification in Sweden Peter Schlyter a,⁎, Ingrid Stjernquist a, Karin Bäckstrand b a b
Dept. of Physical Geography and Quaternary Geology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden Dept. of Political Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Keywords: Forest governance Swedish forest policy Forest certification Legitimacy Effectiveness Non-state market driven governance
a b s t r a c t Forest certification can be conceived as one of many rapidly growing non-state market driven (NSMD) modes of governance. The environmental effectiveness of forest certification is oftentimes evaluated by indicators such as stringency of standards, degree of participation by key stakeholders, certified area, etc. In political science, forest certification as an NSMD governance arrangement is usually evaluated in terms of the quality of the decision-making procedures (input legitimacy) rather than for its problem solving capacity, i.e. its environmental performance or effectiveness. We conceptualize environmental effectiveness as a function of a standard's environmental stringency and the area covered by the standard, the latter dependent on the degree of social acceptance. Accordingly, the environmental effectiveness of different certification schemes ought to be evaluated taking both the standard stringency and the area certified into account. The forest certification process in Sweden illustrates how forestry history and regional differences affect the development, acceptance and adoption of different certification schemes. Industrial and Northern forestry owners favour the NGO led Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) standards whereas Southern small-scale private forest owners preferred to develop an alternative scheme the Programme for Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC). We demonstrate that there is a bifurcated geographical coverage of the two certification schemes along a north–south divide coupled with a similarity in standard stringency and a high degree of acceptance in their different areas of dominance. Both forest certification schemes display a similar degree of environmental effectiveness — but in different parts of the country and for different types of ownership. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction Swedish forestry is of major economic importance to the country. About 55% of Sweden is covered by forest and more than 95% of the productive forests are used for forestry (National Board of Forestry, 2005). The forestry sector is central in the Swedish economy and the forest industry accounts for 23% of industry turnover, 26% of the industrial employment and 33% of the net export (Petäjä, 2005). Building on previous work, this paper conceptualises forest certification as non-state market driven (NSMD) governance (Cashore, 2002; Cashore et al., 2004, 2007; Bernstein and Cashore, 2004). NSMD governance systems rely on private authority and share many features of other voluntary governance mechanisms, such as self-regulation, corporate social responsibility and public–private partnerships. However, a distinct characteristic with NSMD systems, compared to other forms of voluntary mechanisms, is that NSMD systems set up binding and enforceable rules (Bernstein and Cashore, 2007: 2). Due to its rule setting and rule implementation nature, forest certification, which is a prime example of NSMD, is different from new modes of public– ⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 8 764 78 22. E-mail address:
[email protected] (P. Schlyter). 1389-9341/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2008.11.005
private governance such as international public–private partnerships (Bäckstrand, 2006; Börzel and Risse, 2005), as the latter is voluntary in nature. As a result of the failure to establish a globally binding forest regime in the Rio process, there was a rise in global voluntary forest standards and certification schemes (Dimitrov, 2005; Gulbrandsen, 2003; Humphreys, 1996; Holmgren, 2008; Pattberg, 2005). The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) grew out of civil society frustration with the deadlocked forest negotiations, which primarily concerned forestry practices in tropical areas. Against this background, Sweden, with its boreal forests, was the first country to introduce a nationally based certification based on the FSC standards. Sweden has, as a consequence, in a global perspective, a disproportionate part of the FSC portfolio even though its share of the total certified area have fallen somewhat in recent years; from about 30% of the world's FSC-certified forests in the beginning of the century (Boström, 2003) to 12% (Regional Totals: Forest Management Certifications, 08 October 2007, http://www.fsc-sverige.org). Sweden also remains one of the few countries, where the FSC standard was not marginalized by other competing business-led certification schemes. The private forest-owners in Sweden, who withdraw from the FSC process, opted for the Programme for Endorsement of Forest Certification–PEFC (formerly the Pan European Forest Certification
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Scheme), although this alternative standard did not squeeze out the FSC standard in Sweden (Boström, 2002; Cashore, 2002). This leads to short period of contestation in the media based conflict between FSC and PEFC schemes where the former questioned the environmental effectiveness of the later in the eyes of the public and forest product users. This conflict did not, however, lead to any protracted certification war (Humphreys, 2006). The aim of this paper is to assess the environmental effectiveness or performance of two competing Swedish certification schemes — FSC and PEFC, and to analyse how structural factors, such as forest ownership and biophysical conditions, are tied to the degree of acceptance of different certification schemes. We argue that the environmental effectiveness, along with procedural legitimacy, is a core dimension of the legitimacy of forest certification and other forms of NSMD system. However, environmental effectiveness in biophysical and ecological terms is generally understudied in the growing body of literature on the legitimacy and effectiveness of forestry and environmental governance at large (Bernstein and Cashore, 2004, 2007). Political scientists have primarily focused on procedural legitimacy, which means a focus on transparency, accountability, deliberation and participation in forest governance (Chan and Pattberg, 2008; Gulbrandsen, 2008). While there has been comparative studies on the effectiveness of Swedish and Norwegian forest certification (Gulbrandsen, 2005) as well as the impact of forest certification in general (Visserin Hamakers and Glasbergen, 2007), effectiveness is framed in social scientific terms such as degree of conflict, forest owner participation, etc. Our contribution is an interdisciplinary effort between physical geography, ecology and political science to compare the environmental effectiveness — in biophysical terms — of FSC and PEFC, as well as to analyze key factors conditioning the acceptance of competing forest certification among forest owners. 2. The legitimacy and effectiveness of forest certification In this article we argue that environmental effectiveness of nonstate market driven governance (NSMD), is the core component of the overall legitimacy of environmental policies. The problem-solving capacity of the governance system — effectiveness — has also been branded as output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999), which can be contrasted with the input legitimacy or procedural legitimacy concerning the quality of the decision-making process. We focus on output legitimacy or environmental effectiveness of policies, which along with procedural legitimacy (transparency, inclusion, accountability, participation) represent the pillars of legitimacy. The first section discusses how we conceive of the legitimacy concept in terms of political legitimacy rather than normative legitimacy. Secondly, the focus for the purpose of this study is on output legitimacy (effectiveness) rather than input (procedural) legitimacy. The second section summarises the research on the legitimacy and effectiveness of environmental governance in general and of forest governance and forest certification in particular. The third section presents a model for evaluating environmental effectiveness of forest certification schemes. The final section analyses additional contextual factors contributing to the propensity to adopt forest certification schemes to those presented by Cashore et al. (2004, 2007). 2.1. Political legitimacy Legitimacy is a key— and essentially contested — concept in social science, political theory and philosophy. In order to make the legitimacy concept workable for forest governance, we build on definition of legitimacy as the acceptance of a particular social order, rule, norm or institution by a set of actors or by the community (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Hurd, 1999; Risse, 2006). This represents a notion of political legitimacy, i.e. compliance with rules
and norms is based on if the actors perceive the social order as acceptable (Bernstein, 2005; Bernstein and Cashore, 2007). Transferred to the forest sector, and building upon previous work, political legitimacy of NSMD can be defined as “the acceptance of shared rule by a community as appropriate and justified” (Bernstein and Cashore, 2007: 2). A second interpretation of legitimacy — normative legitimacy — can be derived from norms, values and principles of liberal democracy, such as accountability, transparency, inclusion, and deliberation. Normative legitimacy largely coincides largely with procedural or input legitimacy, which is discussed below. Scharpf (1999) argues that legitimacy has two dimensions: input and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy stems from procedural logic (are standards and norms developed in a transparent, fair, inclusive and accountable manner?). The participatory quality of the decision making process is a central element. Output legitimacy, on the other hand, is associated with a consequential logic and effectiveness (do norms and institutions result in collective problem solving and performance?). It has been argued that high effectiveness or environmental performance (or output legitimacy) in terms of collective problem solving can, compensate for low input legitimacy (Risse, 2006). Lack of effectiveness may prompt a need for greater input legitimacy in terms of transparent and accountable decisionmaking processes or a more acceptable content in a standard. In sum, for the purpose of this study, we argue that political legitimacy, which rests on the approval by actors of the particular norm or rule, is in the end critical for the degree of acceptance of NSMD governance. Effective forest certification builds on support from forest owners. 2.2. Reviewing the research on legitimacy and effectiveness of forest certification The legitimacy of environmental governance at national, local and global levels has emerged as a core concern among scholars in international relations (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Bernstein, 2005), environmental politics (Meadowcroft 2004) and green political theory (Smith, 2003). The “legitimacy turn” in environmental politics has also transpired to the study of new modes of governance and NSMD. The legitimacy of new modes of hybrid governance, such as public–private partnerships (Bäckstrand, 2006; Börzel and Risse, 2005; Schäfferhoff et al., 2007) and private governance mechanisms (Dingwerth, 2007; Pattberg, 2007) has received increasing attention. In particular, forest certification as a form of non-state market driven governance has generated numerous studies on international forest politics (Humphreys, 2006; Holmgren, 2008; Pattberg, 2005), comparative perspectives (Cashore, 2002; Cashore et al., 2004), Swedish forest politics (Boström, 2002, 2003; Elliot and Schlaepfer, 2001) as well as Finnish (Cashore et al., 2007) and Norwegian forest politics (Gulbrandsen, 2003). Forest governance studies have focused on both conceptual work and empirical studies regarding the legitimacy of forest certification as NSMD system (Cashore, 2002; Cashore et al., 2004, 2007). In general, these studies have predominantly highlighted procedural or input legitimacy of forest certification process (Dingwerth, 2007). The issue of accountability in forest certification and standard setting has been highlighted as an important dimension of legitimacy (Chan and Pattberg; Gulbrandsen, 2008). In contrast, environmental effectiveness or output legitimacy has received less attention in the study of forest certification schemes. An exception is a recent article (Gulbrandsen, 2005) that evaluates and compares the effectiveness of Swedish and Norwegian certification schemes. It is recognized that evaluating the environmental effectiveness of certification may be premature since forest certification schemes have been in place for a short time (Gulbrandsen, 2005:128). Hence, the focus is on the institutional dimensions of effectiveness, such as forest owner participation, supply chain, forestry conflicts, public policy instruments and forestry practices (Gulbrandsen, 2005:129). In contrast,
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our article focuses on effectiveness in terms of environmental impacts, which will be discussed in the next section. 2.3. Toward a notion of environmental effectiveness As argued above, we conceptualise effectiveness in terms of the environmental outcome, rather than institutional or compliance effectiveness of environmental policies, which is the predominant approach in political science and environmental politics (Victor et al., 1998; Weiss Brown and Jacobsson, 2000; Young 1999) as well as in forest governance studies (Gulbrandsen, 2005). In political science, environmental effectiveness is primarily focused on policy effectiveness (is the right mix of policies/programs in place to address the environmental problem?), institutional effectiveness (are the required institutions in place to reduce the problems?) compliance effectiveness (do states comply with rules, programs and policies that they adopted?). Furthermore, implementation studies focus on the process of implementation rather than the environmental outcomes of implementation. We operationalise environmental effectiveness to the extent a particular set of rules, norms or institutions leads to an actual improvement in the state of the environment. In line with this, we focus on forest certification as changing facts on the ground toward more sustainable forestry practice and to preserve or improve biodiversity. This relates to our claim that the overall legitimacy of a certification scheme largely rests on its environmental effectiveness in terms of biophysical improvements and strengthened ecological protection. In line with this, we propose that the environmental effectiveness of a certification scheme in a given area can be expressed as: EE = CS × ðFA × CAÞ where EE is environmental effectiveness, CS is the certification standard's stringency, FA total forest area and CA is certification acceptance as a proportion of the forested area. The degree of certification acceptance can be seen as a proxy of political legitimacy as discussed above. This model highlights a number of important aspects. First, that an evaluation of different certification schemes in terms of standard stringency only, is unlikely to provide information of its actual environmental effectiveness. Secondly, that the degree of social acceptance of the standard among forest owners is critical for achieving results as the certified area is dependent on the adoption of any given scheme. In this context, it should be emphasised that the proportion of certified forests to non-certified areas as a national average is not the only factor of interest. On the contrary, this type of statistics could be highly misleading in situations where the distributions of forest types vary considerably between different parts of a country. A relatively high degree of adoption can easily hide the fact that important forest types with limited distribution may be uncertified and, potentially, highly vulnerable. The actual ecological effects of differences between the two Swedish certification schemes are at present not very well known. In functional terms the demands of the standards are largely arbitrary and can be seen as based on ecological common sense rather than detailed knowledge of ecological demands of different biota. An evaluation of the actual differences between the schemes in environmental performance is difficult owing to the fact that they have only been in operation during a relatively short time, whereas what, in most cases, is sought as long-term environmental outcomes (oftentimes not yet expected to be present). Nevertheless, it is possible to make some comparisons: for example, larger set aside percent obviously preserves larger forest areas than a less ambitious standard. Even so, the effect of different set aside ambitions is difficult to assess. We should not, from an ecological point of view, expect a linear relationship between set aside area and, for example biodiversity value. Relatively minor differences between certification schemes are therefore hard to evaluate and ought not to be overemphasised.
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As certification standard ambition times the area covered is what determines the environmental impact both factors ought to be evaluated in order to assess environmental effectiveness. A highly stringent standard with small area coverage due to limited acceptance is not likely to have a large environmental impact. Likewise, a very weak standard with a large coverage will not generate any significant impact. When forest standards with similar stringency in standards are compared, factors affecting the propensity by actors to adopt a particular standard will be critical for the environmental effectiveness in terms of actual area certified. 2.4. To certify or not? The propensity to adopt NSMD governance measures is dependent on a range of structural factors, such as direct economic incentives, perceptions of market risk, and alternative political and regulatory risks, regulatory history, forest history, sociology of ownership, etc. Cashore et al. (2004) have presented a framework where a number of factors are taken into account to explain the adoption or rejection of forest certification schemes, i.e. non-state market driven (NSMD) governance regimes. We find Cashore et al.'s (2004) approach useful in many respects, e.g. in terms of export dependency, vulnerability to market pressure and structure of forest ownership. However, to analyse the Swedish forest certification context, further structural and contextual factors are taken into account. A critical factor is the political legitimacy of the certification process, which affects the willingness among forest owners to adopt certification. In a study of Finnish certification process Cashore et al. (2007) examine reasons behind the failure of FSC to establish itself in Finland, which is contrasted with Sweden where FSC certification had gained considerable acceptance. Similarities in forest types and industrial structure make for a compelling comparative case study. “The Finnish case is an ideal one in which to assess CAN's [Cashore, Auld, Newson 2004] argument because Finnish forest owners, in contrast to their Swedish counterparts, steadfastly rejected the environmental groupsinitiated global forest certification program, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)” (Cashore et al., 2007, p. 3). However, the response from Swedish forest owners to FSC certification was far from an overall acceptance. As a result, an alternative scheme, PEFC, was launched. The choice between forest certification systems in Sweden turns out to be highly dependent on structure of ownership, which is differentiated in geographical terms. The FSC and PEFC certification covers substantial parts of the Swedish forested area, 38% and 25% respectively. In total 63% (or 16,868,903 ha) of the forest lands in Sweden was certified in 2006 (http://www.fsc-sverige.org, http://www.pefc.se/). 3. The north–south divide in Swedish forest ecology and economy Biologically, Swedish forests differ considerably, mainly along a north–south climatic temperature gradient. Tree species, soil characteristics and growth conditions are defined by the climate as well as the possibility to cultivate land. Consequently, private farmers/forest owners have historically dominated in the southern, more fertile part, whereas the northern part was more extensively used until the 19th century (Nilsson, 1990). The European forest zones follow the climate gradient and Sweden contains boreal forests in the northern part, and nemoral and boreal– nemoral forests in the southern part. In the boreal zone, spruce dominates on moist to mesic sites and pine on drier nutrient poor or peaty sites. Birch and aspen are important as a transitory species after wind storm, fire or insect damage but rarely constitute permanent forest outside the mountain areas or along riverine/lacustrine habitats (Jonsell, 2004; Sjörs, 1965, 2004). The mean forest production in this area is about 4 m3/ha/yr, Table 1 (National Board of Forestry, 2008). The forests in the nemoral zone, i.e. the south-western coastal areas and the two southernmost provinces, were dominated from
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Table 1 Forest area and the percent of FSC and PEFC certified area per Swedish forest zones. Forest zone
Forest area ⁎1000 ha
Increment growth milj. m3/yr
Growth m3sk/ha
FSC 2006 (%)
PEFC 2008 (%)
Nemoral zone Boreo–nemoral zone Boreal zone
861 6135
8,1 44,1
9,4 7,1
17 21
50 42
16039
62,1
4,2
52
28
The mean annual increment growth 2001–05 and the growth per ha/yr 2001–05 are also given (http://www.fsc-sverige.org; Magnus Norrby, written information, October 2008; The Swedish National Forest Inventory, 2007).
8000 BC by warmth demanding broadleaved tree species like ash, elm, lime and oak and constituted a continuation of the European westcentral vegetation. During the period 2200–1000 BC farmers changed the landscape from broad-leaved forests to an open landscape with mixed deciduous forest, mainly birch and hazel (Berglund, 1969). As the climate deteriorated around 500 AD, beech became an important forest species promoted by the wetter and cooler summers and the leaching of nutrients from the soil. An increase in distribution was further facilitated by extensive grazing by domestic animals which created sparser forests and heaths (Emanuelsson et al., 2002). Today the forests in this zone are dominated by spruce and pine with a mean growth of 9 m3/ha/yr, Table 1 (National Board of Forestry, 2008). The boreo–nemoral forests occur as a transition between the boreal and the nemoral forest zones. Originally, coniferous species had a limited distribution in the region. Scots pine was largely restricted to poorer sites (Jonsell, 2004; Sjörs, 1965, 2004) and Norway spruce was a relatively late northern immigrant (Lagerås 1997). The mean forest production is 7 m3/ha/yr, Table 1 (National Board of Forestry, 2008). In both the nemoral and the boreal–nemoral regions, the importance for the farmers of vast grazing land including forests continued until the first part of the 20th century. These forests had scant resemblance with either today's dense forests or with natural old growth forests. In contrast, they were much more open and sparsely wooded and dominated by broad-leaved deciduous trees closer to settlements. Furthermore, large areas were more or less treeless heath utilised for grazing since centuries; areas which have been reforested in very recent times (Ekelund and Hamilton, 2001). The
high plant and animal diversity, today protected by forest certification, is a result of a rather complex land use history (not always including forests in the modern sense). Demand for saw timber in Europe from the mid 19th century resulted in the development of a Swedish saw timber industry, initially in the southwestern parts of the country. Demand for saw timber created an alternative value to the use of nemoral and boreo–nemoral forests for grazing Today, the nemoral and boreo–nemoral forests are dominated by conifers and broadleaved deciduous trees occur either intermixed with conifers or as minor forest stands on better soils close to the villages (Jonsell, 2004; Sjörs, 1965, 2004). As a result of the historical land use, the difference in ownership structure also varies along a south–north gradient. Ownership in the south is dominated by small-scale non-industrial owners and in the north by large-scale corporate forestry (state or forest company) (see Fig. 1). The differences in forest holding size between non-industrial owners and industrial owners are also significant (Fig. 2). This dichotomous situation between small forest owners, and the corporate forests has influenced forest policy and government regulation with regard to information, planning requirements, control and enforcement (National Board of Forestry, 2008). 4. Swedish forest legislation from 1900–2008: old or new modes of governance? The Swedish forestry regulation has oscillated between decentralised forest management and more centralised planning. Broadly, two forest governance paradigms can be identified— soft steering and local adaptation vs. centralisation, hard steering and enforcement (Boström, 2002, 2003; Elliot and Schlaepfer, 2001). This largely coincides with international trends from traditional command and control steering to voluntary, flexible, market-based, such as national forest programs, information steering and forest certification (Howlett and Rayner, 2006). These new participatory forest governance practices are captured by the term “new modes of governance” (Treib et al., 2007), that imply a mix of hierarchical and nonhierarchical steering and collaboration between government, market and civil society actors. In analysing Swedish forest governance in a historical perspective, the early 1900s and early 1990s display similarities in the reliance on soft and voluntary governance traditions that in contemporary environmental policy studies are described as
Fig. 1. Ownership of the forest area in the four forest regions of Sweden, ranged from Götaland in the south to N Norrland in the north. N and S Norrland and the northern third of Svealand are within the Boreal zone (National Board of Forestry, 2008).
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Fig. 2. Ownership of the forest area in relation to the size of the forest holding (National Board of Forestry, 2008).
“new modes of governance”. The 1979 Forestry Act represented a break with this tradition toward centralised forest management, and in many respects, epitomizes “old modes of governance” in terms of hierarchical command and control mechanisms. 4.1. Early forest legislation: soft forms of steering Weak regulation of cutting rights and rejuvenation characterised the emerging northern commercial forestry caused parliamentary concern and was the origin of the first modern forestry legislation, the 1903 Forestry Act. In the south, the conflict between the agricultural need for grazing land and an aim of better rejuvenation of forest in order to achieve higher stocking rates existed at all scales. The way forward for the Forestry Boards to achieve better rejuvenations was through soft governance, i.e. information, influence, consultation and education (Elliot and Schlaepfer, 2001; Stjernquist, 1973). This puts the Forestry Boards on more equal footing with the private forest owners as compared with other traditional state authorities (Ekelund and Hamilton, 2001). Local recruitment of Forestry Board personnel further strengthened contacts and legitimacy with the local community and facilitated policy implementation (Stjernquist, 1973). New legislation was introduced in 1923 to promote forest rejuvenation through mandatory rules after final felling, natural disasters and in situations where forest grazing affected rejuvenations. It also contained rules against too early and speculative felling. Much effort on the Forestry Boards' behalf was directed towards reducing the negative impacts of forest grazing and promoting afforestation through forestry education and subsidies to improve forestry in general. For the first time the new law clearly stated that forested land should be used for forest production. This tendency was reinforced in the 1948 Forestry Act (Stjernquist, 1973; Ekelund and Hamilton, 2001). It should be noted that none of the legislation in 1903, 1923 or 1948 was directed towards publicly owned forests, whether owned by the state, church or the municipalities. The effort of the legislation up to 1948 was directed towards the non-industrial forest owners. Much of the debate on regulation had been concerned with fears that small forest owners were neither interested nor sufficiently economically rational to fully utilise the economic potential of the forest. Consequently it was seen as important to inform and educate in order to incorporate forest owners in new modes of economically efficient management (Ekelund and Hamilton, 2001).
4.2. Hard steering, centralization and conflict The next Forestry Act, 1979, reflects that forestry practices had changed since the 1940s and signalled a major change in overall forestry policy and constituted a radical break with the softer steering and participatory approach of earlier legislation. Considerable changes occurred in forestry governance between the 1940s and the 1970s. These changes did not affect forest ownership but forest practices, particularly within the industrial forestry sector. An emerging environmental critique focused initially on the use of DDT and on the growing use of very large clear-felling areas. The first concentrated effort to analyse the wider spectrum of forestry activities did not appear until 1973 when the youth movement of the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SNF) initiated their forestry campaign. The goal of the campaign was to stop environmentally negative practices such as forest fertilization, large monocultures, the use of herbicides, insecticides and exotic tree species and the size of the clear-felled areas (Fältbiologerna, 1973). While popular environmental concerns over forestry grew, government, forest industry and trade unions were during the 1970s increasingly concerned with the risk of reduced supply of forest resources to an expanded forest industry. The proposals of the Forest Political Inquiry (SOU, 1973:14) broke with previous forest policy. The forest sector was no longer to be guided by the sustainability principle (that the forest should be managed as to preserve or increase its production capacity) and all age restrictions on cutting were to be abandoned. Small scale non-industrial forestry was regarded a nonviable in a long term perspective while state or industry ownership was regarded more appropriate (Ekelund and Hamilton, 2001; Stjernquist, 1992). In the meantime a system of combined yearly fees on standing forest and subsidies for felling was proposed to ensure increased deliveries to industry. The proposals faced considerable criticism and a new inquiry was launched. However, political pressure for these type of changes remained strong and the Forest Political Programme written for the Social Democratic Party Congress in 1978 demanded stronger central (state) control over forest resources (Stjernquist, 1992). The proposal for a new Forestry Act delivered in 1978 (SOU, 1978:6) constituted a clear break with previous regulatory traditions in forestry governance. The 1979 Forestry Act emphasised the goal of high and valuable forest production but also stated that nature conservation goals should be
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considered (Appelstrand, 2007). The Act provided the National Forestry Board and the Regional Forestry Boards with far reaching powers to steer the forestry sector as well as to define performance and implementation standards. In addition, the act gave the government competence to levy administrative fines for non-compliance. This top-down administrative competence to prescribe forest management on a very detailed level applied to felling methods, means to achieve old forest felling, the youngest allowable age for felling, felling area size and felling approvals. It was also extended to rejuvenation, rejuvenation method, soil scarification before planting, what constituted the suitable or unsuitable tree species (i.e. to mandatory establish on or remove from a site), and rules on thinning etc. (cf. Stjernquist, 1983). In practice, the legislation change was only targeting the nonindustrial private forest owners as industrial forest companies were assumed to operate their forestry rationally to efficiently supply their industry (Ekelund and Hamilton, 2001). Large-scale industrial forestry was the model to be applied on a national scale irrespective of ownership, holding size and local conditions. The state control over non-industrial forestry was further strengthened 1983 when an obligation to cut old harvestable forest was introduced (Appelstrand, 2007; Stjernquist, 1992). The proportion of old forest that should be cut on a holding was to be decided by the government or relevant government agency. The mandate to apply administrative fines and initiate “needed” forestry operations on private land was matched with the establishment in 1980 of the Strategic Forestry Inventory (ÖSI), which was a system for remote sensing surveillance of nonindustrial forest land to ensure compliance with the new law and its regulations. The 1979 Forestry Act with the 1983 amendments can arguably be interpreted as a near de facto nationalisation of the non-industrial forestry with the owners responsible for policy implementation, (cf. Stjernquist, 1983). The urge to deliver more forest resources is also apparent in the decision of the Swedish Forest Service (Domänverket) to raise the altitudinal cutting limit in northern mountain areas. This decision critically affected old growth natural virgin or semi-virgin forest as significant areas became available for cutting. This set the scene for the still ongoing conflict between environmental and production interests in the mountainous areas in the north. The aim and ethos of the new legislation ran counter to the growing tide of environmental concern and activism in the public debate. Environmental concerns increasingly clashed with the new forest policy — in particular over the cutting of old growth virgin forest in the northern mountain areas. Most of the issues of concern to the environmental movement were direct effects of the change towards centralised forest policy. Elliot and Schlaepfer (2001: 644) analyzes the mobilization of Swedish environmental NGOs to put pressure on the forest industry. Nevertheless, the legislation faced increasing criticism during the 1980s not only from the environmental movement, but also from small forest owners, industry and critics of centralised planning. However, the conflict between the economic interests to supply industry and the conservation interests to preserve forest was reduced as the supply deficit in the Swedish forest sector became reduced during the 1980s (Stjernquist, 1992). 4.3. The return to new modes of governance in Swedish forest legislation In 1990 a parliamentary commission for a new forest law was appointed, which was composed of politicians, representatives from the labour unions, forest industry, forest owners and the leading environmental NGO (Swedish Nature Protection Society). The new 1993 Forestry Act gave the forest owners a high degree of freedom to manage their forests, though it equated nature conservation and production goals. The new Forest Act represented a move from the previous hard steering to soft law mechanisms such as information, education and outreach coupled with a turn to private instruments
such as forest certification (Howlett and Rayner, 2006: 262–263). The ÖSI programme was discontinued and the state forestry administration was reduced substantially (Appelstrand, 2007). Since 1992 the forestry authorities have reinvented themselves in a greener role and promote green issues through surveys of key biotopes for nature protection, development of guidelines for Green Forest Management Plans and educational campaigns like “Greener Forests”. The State Forestry Board's guidelines for a set aside fraction in a Green Forest Management Plan was 5% of the forest area at the enterprise level. 5. Competing and converging forest certification Efforts to develop a Swedish FSC forest certification standard were initiated in 1996 by World Wildlife Fund (WWF). A working group was established with representatives from environmental NGOs, forest industry, forest owners, labour unions, wood consuming industry and Sami organisations (the Sami is an indigenous reindeer herding people in the north of Sweden). As a result a national standard was established 1998 (FSC-Sverige, 2000). However, during the process of standard development the organisation representing the non-industrial forest owners left the process as it regarded the proposed standard as geared to industrial forestry and unsuited to the conditions of the small-scale non-industrial forestry. A further factor was the reluctance to accept a standard that in reality would pre-empt ongoing lawsuits regarding the balance of traditional rights of use between reindeer herding and some of their members in the north (Beland Lindahl, 2001; Cashore et al., 2004). The non-industrial forestry initiated the development of an alternative standard in 1999 – then called the Pan European Forestry Certification (PEFC)1. The PEFC council included representatives from the Forest Owner Association (non-industrial forestry), a diocese of the Swedish Church, Private Independent Sawmills of Sweden, the Forest Machine Entrepreneur Federation, and the Orienteering Sports Council. The PEFC standard was presented 2001 and a modified standard is in force since 2006 (PEFC-Sverige, 2006). Both standards employ a three-chamber model for passing decisions within their governing body. The FSC uses a model where economic, social and environmental stakeholders are equally weighed whereas the PEFC governing body allows a two thirds weight for the forest owner and primary processing industry. The documentation of both standards, as well as forest owner plans required for certification, is available to the public. Mechanisms for conflict resolution between certifier and the forest owner are less clear in PEFC standard. The accreditation process in PEFC scheme ensures independence between standard setter and certifier through a third party whereas FSC itself accredits its certifiers. 6. An effective certification? In general, forest certification in Sweden has gained wide and rapid acceptance. Several factors are likely to have contributed to the success of forest certification in Sweden. Market pressure, economic vulnerability, an integrated forest industry (both with regard to industrial forestry and non-industrial forestry as forest owners associations also own wood handling industry) and advanced forest legislation in an international perspective are important factors. An additional factor was the widespread dissatisfaction among environmentalists as well as within industry and among forest owners with the 1979 Forestry Act's emphasis on detailed regulation, strong oversight, intervention and enforcement. This ran counter with a general wave in society favouring deregulation. If increased environmental ambitions, equating environmental goals with production
1
PEFC is renamed to the Programme for Endorsement of Forest Certification.
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goals, was the price to pay for deregulation and greater freedom in forest management forest owners were clearly prepared to accept that (SOU, 1992:76). Moreover, as has been shown by Stjernquist (1997) there has been a considerable willingness to promote environmental concerns among non-industrial forest owners already before the 1993 legislation. Out of a sample of 253 forest owners in Southern Sweden, taken in 1990, 22% regarded economic yield as their only goal for their forestry, 45% regarded economic yield as the primary goal but environmental concern as a secondary goal, 24% regarded economy and environmental concerns as equally important goals for their forestry, 4% regarded environmental concern as the primary goal and economy as the secondary goal and, 5% regarded environmental concern as the only goal (Table 5 in Stjernquist, 1997). The wide environmental interest among small scale forest owners is also evident in the high participation in the National Board of Forestry's campaign “Greener Forests” where 121 000 forest owners participated in a shorter course and 63 000 in a longer course focused on environmental concerns and practices in small scale forestry. Finally, the official recommendation from the National Board of Forestry for a 5% set aside for environmental reasons if a forest owner opts to make a Green Forest Plan should be seen as a strong hint from the forest authority of a target level to be achieved by the forestry sector in the future. The 5% set aside subsequently reappears as a demand in the FSC and PEFC certification schemes. This illustrates that in this case parts of the NSMD rule development occurred in ‘the shadow of law’ (Börzel and Risse, 2005). Thus, we would argue that additional structural factors to those suggested by Cashore et al. (2004, 2007) are of importance in the certification process and in the choice of certification scheme by different owners. The fact that forestry conditions vary markedly between the northern boreal area and the southern parts of Sweden with clear differences in forest biology, forest history, ownership and regulation history, affect forest owners' perception of the authority, relevance and legitimacy of a certification scheme. This in turn affects the propensity to adopt a particular forest certification option. Large corporate industrial ownership predominates in northern Sweden, while Southern Sweden is characterised by small-scale forest ownership and, through forestry associational memberships, well organised owners. These two types of forestry operate to some extent on different economic time-scales and with different criteria of rationality. The non-industrial forest owner is not guided by the same economic rationality as industry, but tend to factor in forestry in a wider household economy, risk and asset management (Boström, 2002; Stjernquist, 1992). This was the rationale behind the government policy in the 1979 Forestry Act, which was geared to ensure, and if needed to enforce, large felling volumes in the non-industrial forestry. The original FSC scheme put the small forest owners at an economic disadvantage with respect to certification costs as compared to large landowners. Furthermore, the FSC scheme did not take into account that small-scale landowners also belong to, and identify with, the local community and local traditional land-use. Including small forest owners in the same chamber as large-scale industrial owners is in this perspective problematic. Given the differences in forest ecology, forest history and ownership one could argue that the underlying problematisation with a implicit focus on old growth forests (mainly occurring in the north) as well as structure of the FSC certification was geared to large scale industrial forestry (FSC defines small holdings as everything below 5000 ha). Consequently, this was a hindrance for the inclusion of the southern non-industrial forestry. The FSC standard was less fit for the realities of small-scale nonindustrial forestry and thereby lacked legitimacy in their eyes. The failure to attract small non-industrial forest owners to the environmental NGO led FSC initiative can be explained by several factors. Strong forest owner associations were just one. Other factors such as the difficulties to accommodate for the profound differences in outlook on forest resources, forest types, and the historical divide
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between southern non-industrial and northern corporate industrial forestry were of major importance. The environmental effectiveness of a standard is dependent on standard stringency and certified area. The latter in turn is dependent on political legitimacy, i.e. the degree of acceptance and subscription to the standard. The standard stringency of FSC and PEFC is quite similar. This takes into account a comparison between FSC 1998 and PEFC 2001 and between FSC 1998 and the updated PEFC 2006 standard. Beland Lindahl (2001) came to a similar conclusion when evaluating the FSC 1998 and the PEFC 2001 standards for the Taiga Rescue Network NGO. This report found the standards for Southern Sweden were “quite similar” in environmental performance while the standards in middle and, in particular northern Sweden, differed more (Beland Lindahl, 2001: sida). Since 2006 standards have converged further. Currently the FSC 1998 and PEFC 2006 performance standards are, with regard to southern Sweden, close to identical as both systems e.g. demand a general 5% set aside area. There still remains considerable differences between standards in the northern mountain areas where the PEFC standard only requires a 5% set aside if there are key biotopes according to the Regional Forestry Boards surveys on the holding. This can be compared with the more ambitious FSC where all key biotopes are to be set aside. Compared to the 2001 version of the standard the 2006 PEFC standard have added requirements for landscape ecological planning and for controlled burning on parts of large holdings (PEFC-Sverige, 2006). Both standards are similar in their required adjustments to the Sami people's interests but aspects of countryside development concerns are more developed in the PEFC. Both standards undertakes to follow Swedish legislation and international conventions like Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). To sum up, there are differences between the standards but they are marginal, particularly in light of the uncertainties associated to the actual biological effects of these differences on a landscape scale and over time. Statistics on certification under the FSC and PEFC schemes are available and allow comparisons of the total area certified, and to some extent, where these areas are located. In 2006 a total of 9,826,949 ha was FSC certified and 7,041,954 ha by PEFC (http://www. fsc-sverige.org, http://www.pefc.se/). Statistics on certification within FSC and PEFC are not collected on the same geographical basis but comparisons are nevertheless possible. Comparing the degree of adoption of the FSC and PEFC certification schemes in different parts of the country reveals a dichotomous pattern. FSC certification dominates northern Sweden and among larger private and public owners in southern Sweden (cf. Table 1 and Fig. 1). In the Boreal zone 52% of the forested area is FSC certified. In contrast, PEFC certification clearly predominates certified forest in southern and middle Sweden, i.e. the memoral (52%) and boreo-nemoral zones (42%), which are dominated by small-scale non-industrial forest owners. A few large industrial owners are both PEFC and FCS certified. In terms of environmental effectiveness we conclude that both systems have, in most respects, similar standard stringency (albeit with significant differences in the northern mountainous areas). Given our definition of effectiveness, the area covered by a standard becomes critical, however, with the caveat that an analysis of effectiveness must take into account the degree to which different forests types are covered by a certification. Both schemes clearly have a high degree of political legitimacy in their area of dominance and covers substantial areas. Both the FSC and PEFC schemes can be seen as environmentally effective in its respective area of predominance. The PEFC is the less effective certification scheme in the northern and mountainous areas owing both to a less stringent standard and its limited adoption. Similarly, while the two schemes are similar in stringency in southern and middle Sweden, there is a case for arguing that FSC is the less effective scheme, as it does not attract the smallscale forest owners to any larger extent. Given the fact that forest
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types differ between the different parts of Sweden the dichotomous adoption of the certification schemes underlines their limited effectiveness outside their area of dominance. Consequently, it seems more reasonable to regard FSC and PEFC in Sweden less as competing schemes but more as supplementary schemes catering for different forest owners and forest types. Clearly, both FSC and PEFC in Sweden can, in particular in an international perspective, be regarded as highly environmentally effective. An interesting future issue is if tendencies for convergence between FSC and PEFC will continue and attempts to achieve cross certification will succeed. Finally, the environmental effectiveness of a certification scheme does not only rest on standard stringency and certified area. The degree to which environmental practices are accepted, internalised and utilised by e.g. subcontractors employed in forestry operations like thinning, felling also significantly affect performance. In many respects, in particular in Southern Sweden where the FSC and PEFC standards are close to identical, this is probably a more important educational and practical challenge to focus on than marginal differences between standards. References Appelstrand, M., 2007. Miljömålet i skogsbruket — styrning och frivillighet. Lunds Studies in Sociology of Law 26 (Ph.D. Thesis), Sociology of Law, Lund University, Lund. Bäckstrand, K., 2006. Multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development. Rethinking legitimacy, accountablity and effectiveness. European Environment 16 (5), 290–306. Beland Lindahl, K., 2001. The development, standards and procedures of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Pan European Forest Certification scheme (PEFC) in Sweden. Taiga Rescue Network Report 30. Berglund, B.E., 1969. Vegetation and human influence in South Scandinavia during prehistoric time. Oikos. Supplementum 12, 9–28. Bernstein, S., 2005. Legitimacy in global environmental governance. Journal of International Law and International Relations 1 (1–2), 139–166. Bernstein, S., Cashore, B., 2004. Non-state global governance: is forest certification a legitimate alternative to global forest convention? In: Kirton, J.J., Trebilcock, M.J. (Eds.), Hard choices, soft law, voluntary standards in global trade. Environment and social governance. Ashgate, Aldershot. Bernstein, S., Cashore, B., 2007. Can non-state global governance be legitimate? An analytical framework. Regulation and Governance 1, 1–25. Börzel, T., Risse, T., 2005. Public private partnerships. Effective and legitimate tools for transnational governance? In: Grande, E., Pauly, L. (Eds.), Complex Sovereignty. Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twentyfirst Century. University of Toronto Press, Toronto. Boström, M., 2002. Skogen märks — Hur svensk skogscertifiering kom till och dess konsekvenser. Stockholm, SCORE Report 2002:3, Stockholms Centrum för Forskning om Offentlig Sektor. Boström, M., 2003. How state-dependent is a non-state driven rule-making project? The case of forest certification in Sweden. Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 5 (2), 165–180. Buchanan, A., Keohane, R.O., 2006. The legitimacy of global governance institutions. Ethics and International Affairs 20 (4), 405–438. Cashore, B., 2002. Legitimacy and the privatization of environmental governance: how non-state market-driven (NMSD) governance systems gain rule making authority. Governance 15 (4), 503–529. Cashore, B., Auld, G., Newsom, D., 2004. Governing Through Markets — Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority. Yale University Press, New Haven. Cashore, B., Egan, E., Auld, G., Newsom, D., 2007. Revising theories of nonstate marketdriven (NSMD) governance: lessons from the Finnish forest certification experience. Global Environmental Politics 7 (1), 1–44. Chan, S., Pattberg, P., 2008. Private rule-making and the politics of accountability. Analyzing global forest governance. Global Environmental Politics 8 (3), 103–121. Dimitrov, R.S., 2005. Hostage to norms: states, institutions and global forest politics. Global Environmental Politics 5 (4), 1–24. Dingwerth, K., 2007. The New Transnationalism. Transnational Governance and Democratic Legitimacy. Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire. Ekelund, H., Hamilton, G., 2001. Skogspolitisk historia, 2005. Rapport, vol. 8A. Skogsstyrelsen, Jönköping, Sweden. Elliot, C., Schlaepfer, R., 2001. The advocacy coalition framework: application to the policy process for the development of forest certification in Sweden. Journal of European Public Policy 8 (4), 642–661. Emanuelsson, U., Bergendorff, C., Billqvist, M., Carlsson, B., Lewan, N., 2002. Det Skånska Kulturlandskapet. Naturskyddsföreningen i Skåne, Lund. Fältbiologerna, 1973. Skogsbruk och ekologi — fakta om skogen och skogsbrukets miljöeffekter. Fältbiologerna/Natur och Kultur, Stockholm.
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