Nuclear power plant control and instrumentation

Nuclear power plant control and instrumentation

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS AND METHODS 161 (1979) 343; © NORTH-HOLLAND PUBLISHING CO. BOOK REVIEWS IAEA Safety Standards, a Code of Practice Safet...

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NUCLEAR

INSTRUMENTS

AND

METHODS

161

(1979)

343;

©

NORTH-HOLLAND

PUBLISHING

CO.

BOOK REVIEWS IAEA Safety Standards, a Code of Practice Safety Series

Title

No.

Governmental organization for the regulation of nuclear power plants. 50-C-S Safety in nuclear power plant siting. 50-C-D Design for safety of nuclear power plants. 50-C-O Safety in nuclear power plant operation, including commissioning and decommissioning. 50-C-QA Quality assurance for safety in nuclear power plants. 50-C-G

The International Atomic Energy Agency established a programme to provide guidance of safety aspects associated with land-based thermal neutron nuclear power reactors using experiences of the more than 200 nuclear power plants presently in operation. In all, fifty books will be published in the form of 45 Safety Guides and five Codes of Practice. The working group was composed of 45 participants from 12 various states. The Codes of Practice are compilations of nuclear safety principles aimed at defining minimum safety requirements that shall be met, whereas the Safety Guides will specify how these requirements can be met. Those five booklets, although thin, cover in distinct, almost judicial terms all reasonable aspects of nuclear power safety requirements through all steps in the Siting, Construction, Commissioning, Operation and Decommissioning of the plant. It considers the protection against natural phenomena as well as man-induced events. Further, the responsible organization and the professional staff

Proc. Int. Symp. on Nuclear Power Plant Control and Instrumentation, Cannes, 24-28 April, 1978 (IAEA, Vienna, 1978). The scope of the symposium covers a wide range of control and instrumentation problems in nuclear power plants and the proceedings give a comprehensive view of the state-of-the-art in the field. The symposium was organized in the following sessions: -

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Experience with Installation, Commissioning and Operation of NPPCI systems Systems for Surveillance of Reactor Components Core Distribution and Control Protection and Alarm Systems New System Architecture

are considered in respect to safety responsibilities. It is suggested that a Regulatory Body is given national authority to guide Operating Organizations at each plant. The Operating Organization selects members of the site personnel to constitute a Plant Management for directing the operation of the plant. The legal status, responsibilities and function of each part of the organization are specified. In the "Design for Safety of Nuclear Power Plants" the concept "Single failure criterion" is introduced. " A n assembly of equipment satisfies the single failure criterion if it is able to meet its purpose despite a single random credible failure assumed to occur anywhere in the assembly. Consequential failures resulting from the assumed single failure are considered to be an integral part of the single failure". Compliance with the criterion is achieved if each safety group and each safety system meets its purpose when the following analyses are applied. " A single failure (and all its consequential failure effects) shall be assumed to occur in sequence at each element of an assembly until all credible failures have been analysed in that assembly. The analyses of each pertinent assembly shall be conducted in sequence until all assemblies and all credible failures have been considered". Actually, one would like to see some other technical devices used in society being analysed in a similar way. It is a matter of course that the IAEA Codes of Practice in Nuclear Power Safety shall be of great value to all professionals carrying the responsibility for Nuclear Power Plants. One is looking forward to see the Safety Guides. BENGT A. LINDSKOUG

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Instrument Techniques Reliability.

General trends that can be identified are e.g. extensive use of miniand micro-computers especially in combination with distributed system architectures. Recent development and improvement in computer performance and reliability also allow computers to be used in new and extended applications - e.g. computerized protection systems of nuclear power plants can now be licenced. Some problems are also taken up relating to the fast development which often causes equipment to become obsolete within a few years after being taken into operation. This necessitates replacement which has to be carefully planned so as not to affect plant availability. RALF ESPEFALT