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On the interaction between State and Private Sector
Asselain, and P. Pouillert give applications to methods of classification of cancer patients. F. W. Roush Mathlematical Social Sciences Alabwta State University Montgomery, Alabama 36195 U.S.A.
F. VomWinden. On the Interaction between State and Private Sector. Amsterdam: Nor#h-Holland, 1983, 288 pages, $40.50.
The author constructs models of a nation involving both the government and the private market economy and their intferrelationships such ;as taxation, voting, party platforms, and bureaucratic expansion. Although some models of a political business cycle are in the literature, I am not aware of any as comprehensive as those in this book. Chapter 2 gives a static, equilibrium model involving for the state the interest of government workers in their salary as well as the national economy, balanced budget. Businesses maximize after-tax profits using demand for labour and capital. There is a Stackelberg equilibrium with the state the dominant player. The remaining models are dynamic. Chapter 3 introduces time into a similar model involving also labour and product markets. Conditions for full employment and unemployment equilibria are discussed, and numerical simulations are presented. When the state or bureaucracy is dominant, cycles occur. Chapter 4 takes up a model which. begins with the individual instead of groups. The placleof a utility function is here represented by what the author calls an interest
function which is usually assumed to be ;aproduct of powers of more b&c functions. Four classes are considered: labour, capital, government workers, and the unemployed. Conditions for equilibrium are discussed, and numerical experiments a.re presented. This Beavessome problem as to how the strategies of individuals are related to those elf groups (cooperative game theory) since each affects the other. This is partiaIIy dealt with in Chapter 5 by considering voting, party behavior, and coalition formation. Chapter 6 gives numerical experiments on a model incorporating ideas from the other chapters. In one experiment a downturK\ in a SO-period cycle occurred during the latter part of the time a capitalist party a!:tasin power. Changes in government tended to occur after tax increases in response to debt. Chapter 7 deals with pressure groups and Chapter 8 is a conclusion. F. W. Roush Mathematical Social Sciences Alabama State University Montgomery, Alabama 36195 U.S.A.
F. VomWinden. On the Interaction between State and Private Sector. Amsterdam: Nor#h-Holland, 1983, 288 pages, $40.50.
The author constructs models of a nation involving both the government and the private market economy and their intferrelationships such ;as taxation, voting, party platforms, and bureaucratic expansion. Although some models of a political business cycle are in the literature, I am not aware of any as comprehensive as those in this book. Chapter 2 gives a static, equilibrium model involving for the state the interest of government workers in their salary as well as the national economy, balanced budget. Businesses maximize after-tax profits using demand for labour and capital. There is a Stackelberg equilibrium with the state the dominant player. The remaining models are dynamic. Chapter 3 introduces time into a similar model involving also labour and product markets. Conditions for full employment and unemployment equilibria are discussed, and numerical simulations are presented. When the state or bureaucracy is dominant, cycles occur. Chapter 4 takes up a model which. begins with the individual instead of groups. The placleof a utility function is here represented by what the author calls an interest
function which is usually assumed to be ;aproduct of powers of more b&c functions. Four classes are considered: labour, capital, government workers, and the unemployed. Conditions for equilibrium are discussed, and numerical experiments a.re presented. This Beavessome problem as to how the strategies of individuals are related to those elf groups (cooperative game theory) since each affects the other. This is partiaIIy dealt with in Chapter 5 by considering voting, party behavior, and coalition formation. Chapter 6 gives numerical experiments on a model incorporating ideas from the other chapters. In one experiment a downturK\ in a SO-period cycle occurred during the latter part of the time a capitalist party a!:tasin power. Changes in government tended to occur after tax increases in response to debt. Chapter 7 deals with pressure groups and Chapter 8 is a conclusion. F. W. Roush Mathematical Social Sciences Alabama State University Montgomery, Alabama 36195 U.S.A.