- Email: [email protected]
One Firm’s Response To Help the Pharmacist
A Community Response to Pharmacy Crime
rate of 39 crimes per 100 pharmacies, while small businesses in general were experiencing an incident rate of 146 crimes per 100 businesses . Based upon this, one might ask why the demands for a federal law were coming from pharmacists, rather than say, gasoline station operators . The answer appears to be that pharmacists, through their professional societies and associations, simply are better organized than other small businessmen . For each pharmacy theft that occurred in St. Louis City and County in 1974, police files were examined and DEA investigators conducted on-site interviews. For a control sample, on-site interviews also were conducted at every pharmacy that was not subjected to a theft in this period . With the assistance of the MITRE Corporation , this information was fed into a computer. A number of interesting patterns emerged from this activity, some of which are-The level of security present in pharmacies not victimized was higher than in those that were. Thus the degree of security present appears to have an effect on incident rate-or, good security can act as a deterrent to crime. -The most significant difference between those that were victimized and those that were not, however , was geographic location. Pharmacies in certain sections of the city were far more heavily victimized than others. (DEA is currently studying these sections vis-a-vis other sections to determine the cause .) -Drugs were not the prime motivating factor in the commission of these crimes . Money was taken in 60 percent of the crimes, while drugs were taken in only 49 percent. Police efficiency was also measured. In 76 percent of the instances studied , response times of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police were within five minutes . Although the data on this subject are scant, a study conducted for the Small Business Administration pOints to an " average" response time of 5. 1 to 8. 1 minutes .' Collectively, St. Louis City and County police had an armed robbery clearance rate of more than 69 percent and a burglary clearance rate of about 23 percent. Thus the particularly high pharmacy crime rate in the St. Louis area did not appear to stem from a deficiency in law enforcement. A frequently heard complaint during the project was that although the police were operating efficiently in arresting the crimi~ Protective Device Systems: Stanford Research In stitute, October 1968 .
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One Firm's Response To Help the Pharmacist The Pharmacy Security Project is an ongoing effort which has been originated by Smith Kline and French Laboratories. Security material which has been developed to date, and is available from SK & F representatives , includes" 10 Rules of Conduct Before, During and After an Armed Robbery, " which includes description forms to use for suspicious persons or thieves; a small poster entitled " Check that DEA Number" which gives the formula for verifying a falsified physician DEA number; a packet of security brochures and informational pamphlets from the Small Business Administration, and a " Warning " sign on forged prescriptions (developed in conjunction with Philadelphia Association of Retail Druggists). In the near future, SK & F plans to publish articles on security in pharmacy journals, develop presentations on pharmacy security to be given at sta te pharmaceutical association meetings, and eventually plans to publish a complete manual on pharmacy security to be distributed to pharmacists.
nals, the courts were not punishing them satisfactorily, or preventing them from continuing to commit these crimes . This prompted DEA to conduct a detailed case analysis on each defendant apprehended as a result of committing the specific crimes under study . The most common cause of armed robbery cases being dismissed (25 percent) was the pharmacist's inability to identify the suspect in a lineup. In only one instance were charges dropped for any other reason . In this instance , it appeared that the defendant was indeed innocent. Of those defendants who were held over for trial, all of them either pleaded or were found guilty. Of those convicted of armed robbery, 78 percent were sentenced to an average of nine years. Of those convicted of burglary, 33 percent received probation , 17 percent were given a short sentence plus probation and 50 percent received an average sentence of five years. Thus, based upon our very limited survey of the court systems in the test area, DEA could find no glaring deficiencies to support the contention that the courts were responsible for the rise in pharmacy crime . An interesting sidelight to this criminal case study is that for the most part these defendants were not drug addicts . Drug
use was high (25 percent), but was generally confined to marijuana and stimulant drugs . This finding , together with the earlier finding that money is more frequently the target than drugs , tends to disprove the belief that pharmacy crimes are committed by drug-starved addicts . This responded to the complaint that the federal government is responsible for the high pharmacy theft rate due to its suppression of illicit drugs. To sum up the findings, theft of drugs from legitimate commerce was becoming a significant source for the illicit drug traffic . These thefts were not occurring at the upper levels of the drug industry, where stringent security was in place, but at the retail level-specifically pharmacies . The pharmacy crime rate, however, appeared substantially lower than the crime rate being experienced by other small businesses . The study did not substantiate any of the reasons cited to justify federal legislation, and in fact tended to disprove them. DEA is still faced with the task, however, of devising a suitable alternative to this legislation . Our study revealed that the degree of security present in the pharmacies visited earlier was quite deficient. Therefore, a major thrust of any suppression program would have to be directed towards lessening this deficiency. It was further concluded that security improvements should be accompanied by increased patrol and investigative activity by local law enforcement. DEA also wished to encourage increased dialogue between the pharmacists and the local police through a joint committee . Based on the foregoing , we launched " Operation PTP" (Pharmacy Theft Prevention). The facets of the program wereGreater Police Involvement- Several meetings were held with police leaders in St. Louis City and County for the purpose of eliciting their cooperation . The pOlice agreed to cooperate by increasing pOlice presence as resources permitted . The officer in charge of the Burglary Prevention Squad of the St. Louis Police Department became a key part of the project-providing guidance and expertise to the pharmacists . Increased Security Within the PharmaciesTwo seminars were held for all area pharmacists with the cooperation of the St. Louis College of Pharmacy . At the seminars, detailed presentations were made on the advantages of good security, what techniques and hardware are available to achieve good security, as well as instructions on how pharmacists can help the police apprehend the perpetrators of these
Journa l of the American Pharmaceutical As sociation
Durrin
Pharmaceutical Postline Not "Ludicrous" To Defend Oneself Dear Sir: I was very disappointed in the obvious oversights in your article "Pharmacists Under the Gun" in the October issue. Like all articles of this type, your basic premises are correct, but you lack some obvious conclusions. Also, unfortunately, like many other similar articles, you regress into altruistic allusions and fall far short of reality. It is true that pharmacy in our drugcrazed society is a dangerous vocation. It is true that society handles this problem as the traditional "hot potato." It is true that basic values in our society have been lost so that there is no right solution to our problem, e.g., the FBI feels that it is a local problem. The local police are people the same as we are, and thus are not psychic
crimes. A professional burglar was brought in from another area of the country to relate the techniques the pharmacists' "adversaries" use in selecting targets, breaking in, getting the maximum amount of loot, and getting away. Specially trained DEA personnel then made on-site security surveys of every pharmacy in the test area. The surveys were done with the pharmacist's consent. At the survey conclusion, a detailed appraisal of the pharmacy's security was given to the pharmacist. During these visits a code number was assigned to each pharmacy. The pharmacist was requested to place the code on all containers of controlled drugs in his pharmacy. In this way, if he becomes a victim of a theft, the police have a greater chance of tracing drugs found in the illicit traffic back to a particular theft. The total impact of these efforts is not known; however, DEA believes that security improvements were made in a considerable number of the pharmacies (an estimated 40 percent), and a "security attitude" was instilled among the pharmacists. PTP Executive Committee-A PTP Executive Committee was established made up primarily of area pharmacy leaders. Also represented on the committee were the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, drug wholesalers and DEA. The committee serves a dual function of communicating within the profession to the rank and file pharmacists and communicating externally with other elements of the community. The
Vol. NS 16, No. 1, January 1976
and cannot contend with the criminal in advance except on TV where everything is possible. Since you have no solution, why condemn as "ludicrous" (your own word) a mandatory course in self-defense in pharmacy schools. Normally, I would not advocate this type of thing myself, but when you must stand and fight, you should be prepared. If any criminal is asked if he could choose a place to rob, all would choose places where there would be no trouble. Since the police can get there only after the crime, that leaves us all alone to face the unpleasant assailant ourselves .. If we could be assured that these people would be satisfied only with material items, I would be the first to say "ludicrous" is a good word. They are, however, not always content. They assault and murder their victims, pharmacists-you and me-with unpleasant regularity.
If enough people take steps to defend themselves, their employees, their ideas and their personal property, the criminal would be less inclined to attack by day. At least robberies at night only lose things and not people. I am not advocating a society of James Bonds or the old west, even though a good measure of that would be a welcome change over the sad fact that the pharmacist is always the loser. There are many ways of self-defense, all the way from training yourself proficiently in the use of currently available weapons, to hiring off-duty police to work in the pharmacy, to having in-pharmacy audible alarms which are deafening. The point is, when the ship is sinking, swim to shore. If you wait to be saved, you'll probably drown.
Committee proved invaluable in making the individual pharmacists aware of the program and what was expected of them. It is currently working on two other activitiesattempting to obtain security equipment at a discount through volume purchasing, and negotiating with area drug wholesalers to extend volume discounts to smaller purchases of controlled drugs. The usual business practice of wholesalers is to discount large orders of drugs. This inevitably leads to excessive stocks of drugs in the phar. macies-making them more lucrative targets. This effort, if successful, will encourage smaller inventories in the pharmacies. Conclusions-Operation PTP has been in effect essentially since January 1975. In the six-month period ending June 30, 1975, armed robberies of pharmacies in the test area were down 46 percent from the same six-month period in 1974. Burglaries of pharmacies were reduced 55 percent in this same period. Pharmacy thefts else-
where in the nation continued to rise in this period. The program is continuing, and there are additional areas yet to be explored. The results which are in, however, lead DEA to the conclusion that Operation PTP has significantly reduced pharmacy crime in St. Louis during the six-month period ending June 30, 1975. The success of this community action program can be credited to the high degree of participation by both pharmacists and police and to the effectiveness of their coordination. A similar program will be made available by DEA to other cities in early 1976. The success of additional programs will depend largely upon the degree of interest and local cooperation. Operation PTP demonstrates that a community-sufficiently motivated and mobilized-can do much on its own to reduce crime, and without the infusion of yet more federal presence. ..
Kenneth A. Durrin
A. Peter Kohl Sharon, Massachusetts
Kenneth A. Durrin, LLB, is chief of the Compliance Investigations Division, Drug Enforcement Administration. He has been in charge of compHance programs at DEA and previously the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs since 1969. A career Federal Investigator since his graduation from Albany Law School, Union University, Durrin has been director of case assistance (1967-68) and chief of accountability investigations (1966-67) for the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control. He also has served as headquarters supervisor specializing in labor union embezzlement cases for the U.S. Department of Labor. Durrin is a member of the American Society for Industrial Security and the International Association of Chiefs of Police .
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rate of 39 crimes per 100 pharmacies, while small businesses in general were experiencing an incident rate of 146 crimes per 100 businesses . Based upon this, one might ask why the demands for a federal law were coming from pharmacists, rather than say, gasoline station operators . The answer appears to be that pharmacists, through their professional societies and associations, simply are better organized than other small businessmen . For each pharmacy theft that occurred in St. Louis City and County in 1974, police files were examined and DEA investigators conducted on-site interviews. For a control sample, on-site interviews also were conducted at every pharmacy that was not subjected to a theft in this period . With the assistance of the MITRE Corporation , this information was fed into a computer. A number of interesting patterns emerged from this activity, some of which are-The level of security present in pharmacies not victimized was higher than in those that were. Thus the degree of security present appears to have an effect on incident rate-or, good security can act as a deterrent to crime. -The most significant difference between those that were victimized and those that were not, however , was geographic location. Pharmacies in certain sections of the city were far more heavily victimized than others. (DEA is currently studying these sections vis-a-vis other sections to determine the cause .) -Drugs were not the prime motivating factor in the commission of these crimes . Money was taken in 60 percent of the crimes, while drugs were taken in only 49 percent. Police efficiency was also measured. In 76 percent of the instances studied , response times of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police were within five minutes . Although the data on this subject are scant, a study conducted for the Small Business Administration pOints to an " average" response time of 5. 1 to 8. 1 minutes .' Collectively, St. Louis City and County police had an armed robbery clearance rate of more than 69 percent and a burglary clearance rate of about 23 percent. Thus the particularly high pharmacy crime rate in the St. Louis area did not appear to stem from a deficiency in law enforcement. A frequently heard complaint during the project was that although the police were operating efficiently in arresting the crimi~ Protective Device Systems: Stanford Research In stitute, October 1968 .
16
One Firm's Response To Help the Pharmacist The Pharmacy Security Project is an ongoing effort which has been originated by Smith Kline and French Laboratories. Security material which has been developed to date, and is available from SK & F representatives , includes" 10 Rules of Conduct Before, During and After an Armed Robbery, " which includes description forms to use for suspicious persons or thieves; a small poster entitled " Check that DEA Number" which gives the formula for verifying a falsified physician DEA number; a packet of security brochures and informational pamphlets from the Small Business Administration, and a " Warning " sign on forged prescriptions (developed in conjunction with Philadelphia Association of Retail Druggists). In the near future, SK & F plans to publish articles on security in pharmacy journals, develop presentations on pharmacy security to be given at sta te pharmaceutical association meetings, and eventually plans to publish a complete manual on pharmacy security to be distributed to pharmacists.
nals, the courts were not punishing them satisfactorily, or preventing them from continuing to commit these crimes . This prompted DEA to conduct a detailed case analysis on each defendant apprehended as a result of committing the specific crimes under study . The most common cause of armed robbery cases being dismissed (25 percent) was the pharmacist's inability to identify the suspect in a lineup. In only one instance were charges dropped for any other reason . In this instance , it appeared that the defendant was indeed innocent. Of those defendants who were held over for trial, all of them either pleaded or were found guilty. Of those convicted of armed robbery, 78 percent were sentenced to an average of nine years. Of those convicted of burglary, 33 percent received probation , 17 percent were given a short sentence plus probation and 50 percent received an average sentence of five years. Thus, based upon our very limited survey of the court systems in the test area, DEA could find no glaring deficiencies to support the contention that the courts were responsible for the rise in pharmacy crime . An interesting sidelight to this criminal case study is that for the most part these defendants were not drug addicts . Drug
use was high (25 percent), but was generally confined to marijuana and stimulant drugs . This finding , together with the earlier finding that money is more frequently the target than drugs , tends to disprove the belief that pharmacy crimes are committed by drug-starved addicts . This responded to the complaint that the federal government is responsible for the high pharmacy theft rate due to its suppression of illicit drugs. To sum up the findings, theft of drugs from legitimate commerce was becoming a significant source for the illicit drug traffic . These thefts were not occurring at the upper levels of the drug industry, where stringent security was in place, but at the retail level-specifically pharmacies . The pharmacy crime rate, however, appeared substantially lower than the crime rate being experienced by other small businesses . The study did not substantiate any of the reasons cited to justify federal legislation, and in fact tended to disprove them. DEA is still faced with the task, however, of devising a suitable alternative to this legislation . Our study revealed that the degree of security present in the pharmacies visited earlier was quite deficient. Therefore, a major thrust of any suppression program would have to be directed towards lessening this deficiency. It was further concluded that security improvements should be accompanied by increased patrol and investigative activity by local law enforcement. DEA also wished to encourage increased dialogue between the pharmacists and the local police through a joint committee . Based on the foregoing , we launched " Operation PTP" (Pharmacy Theft Prevention). The facets of the program wereGreater Police Involvement- Several meetings were held with police leaders in St. Louis City and County for the purpose of eliciting their cooperation . The pOlice agreed to cooperate by increasing pOlice presence as resources permitted . The officer in charge of the Burglary Prevention Squad of the St. Louis Police Department became a key part of the project-providing guidance and expertise to the pharmacists . Increased Security Within the PharmaciesTwo seminars were held for all area pharmacists with the cooperation of the St. Louis College of Pharmacy . At the seminars, detailed presentations were made on the advantages of good security, what techniques and hardware are available to achieve good security, as well as instructions on how pharmacists can help the police apprehend the perpetrators of these
Journa l of the American Pharmaceutical As sociation
Durrin
Pharmaceutical Postline Not "Ludicrous" To Defend Oneself Dear Sir: I was very disappointed in the obvious oversights in your article "Pharmacists Under the Gun" in the October issue. Like all articles of this type, your basic premises are correct, but you lack some obvious conclusions. Also, unfortunately, like many other similar articles, you regress into altruistic allusions and fall far short of reality. It is true that pharmacy in our drugcrazed society is a dangerous vocation. It is true that society handles this problem as the traditional "hot potato." It is true that basic values in our society have been lost so that there is no right solution to our problem, e.g., the FBI feels that it is a local problem. The local police are people the same as we are, and thus are not psychic
crimes. A professional burglar was brought in from another area of the country to relate the techniques the pharmacists' "adversaries" use in selecting targets, breaking in, getting the maximum amount of loot, and getting away. Specially trained DEA personnel then made on-site security surveys of every pharmacy in the test area. The surveys were done with the pharmacist's consent. At the survey conclusion, a detailed appraisal of the pharmacy's security was given to the pharmacist. During these visits a code number was assigned to each pharmacy. The pharmacist was requested to place the code on all containers of controlled drugs in his pharmacy. In this way, if he becomes a victim of a theft, the police have a greater chance of tracing drugs found in the illicit traffic back to a particular theft. The total impact of these efforts is not known; however, DEA believes that security improvements were made in a considerable number of the pharmacies (an estimated 40 percent), and a "security attitude" was instilled among the pharmacists. PTP Executive Committee-A PTP Executive Committee was established made up primarily of area pharmacy leaders. Also represented on the committee were the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, drug wholesalers and DEA. The committee serves a dual function of communicating within the profession to the rank and file pharmacists and communicating externally with other elements of the community. The
Vol. NS 16, No. 1, January 1976
and cannot contend with the criminal in advance except on TV where everything is possible. Since you have no solution, why condemn as "ludicrous" (your own word) a mandatory course in self-defense in pharmacy schools. Normally, I would not advocate this type of thing myself, but when you must stand and fight, you should be prepared. If any criminal is asked if he could choose a place to rob, all would choose places where there would be no trouble. Since the police can get there only after the crime, that leaves us all alone to face the unpleasant assailant ourselves .. If we could be assured that these people would be satisfied only with material items, I would be the first to say "ludicrous" is a good word. They are, however, not always content. They assault and murder their victims, pharmacists-you and me-with unpleasant regularity.
If enough people take steps to defend themselves, their employees, their ideas and their personal property, the criminal would be less inclined to attack by day. At least robberies at night only lose things and not people. I am not advocating a society of James Bonds or the old west, even though a good measure of that would be a welcome change over the sad fact that the pharmacist is always the loser. There are many ways of self-defense, all the way from training yourself proficiently in the use of currently available weapons, to hiring off-duty police to work in the pharmacy, to having in-pharmacy audible alarms which are deafening. The point is, when the ship is sinking, swim to shore. If you wait to be saved, you'll probably drown.
Committee proved invaluable in making the individual pharmacists aware of the program and what was expected of them. It is currently working on two other activitiesattempting to obtain security equipment at a discount through volume purchasing, and negotiating with area drug wholesalers to extend volume discounts to smaller purchases of controlled drugs. The usual business practice of wholesalers is to discount large orders of drugs. This inevitably leads to excessive stocks of drugs in the phar. macies-making them more lucrative targets. This effort, if successful, will encourage smaller inventories in the pharmacies. Conclusions-Operation PTP has been in effect essentially since January 1975. In the six-month period ending June 30, 1975, armed robberies of pharmacies in the test area were down 46 percent from the same six-month period in 1974. Burglaries of pharmacies were reduced 55 percent in this same period. Pharmacy thefts else-
where in the nation continued to rise in this period. The program is continuing, and there are additional areas yet to be explored. The results which are in, however, lead DEA to the conclusion that Operation PTP has significantly reduced pharmacy crime in St. Louis during the six-month period ending June 30, 1975. The success of this community action program can be credited to the high degree of participation by both pharmacists and police and to the effectiveness of their coordination. A similar program will be made available by DEA to other cities in early 1976. The success of additional programs will depend largely upon the degree of interest and local cooperation. Operation PTP demonstrates that a community-sufficiently motivated and mobilized-can do much on its own to reduce crime, and without the infusion of yet more federal presence. ..
Kenneth A. Durrin
A. Peter Kohl Sharon, Massachusetts
Kenneth A. Durrin, LLB, is chief of the Compliance Investigations Division, Drug Enforcement Administration. He has been in charge of compHance programs at DEA and previously the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs since 1969. A career Federal Investigator since his graduation from Albany Law School, Union University, Durrin has been director of case assistance (1967-68) and chief of accountability investigations (1966-67) for the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control. He also has served as headquarters supervisor specializing in labor union embezzlement cases for the U.S. Department of Labor. Durrin is a member of the American Society for Industrial Security and the International Association of Chiefs of Police .
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