Opportunistic customer complaining: Causes, consequences, and managerial alternatives

International Journal of Hospitality Management 31 (2012) 295–303

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International Journal of Hospitality Management journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijhosman

Opportunistic customer complaining: Causes, consequences, and managerial alternatives Melissa A. Baker, Vincent P. Magnini ∗ , Richard R. Perdue Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech, 362 Wallace Hall, Blacksburg, VA 24061, United States

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Keywords: Money back guarantee Opportunistic complaining Service failure Service recovery

a b s t r a c t Should a hospitality firm yield to a customer complaint that is suspected [or even known] to be opportunistic? While the answer to this question varies based upon numerous factors, this conceptual article synthesizes multiple streams of empirical research to enumerate: (1) customer-centric, firm-centric [such as the influence of firm size], and relationship-centric determinants of opportunistic customer complaining; (2) means of detecting whether a complaint is opportunistic [such as through employee knowledge of operations]; and (3) potential consequences to the firm of yielding and not yielding to opportunistic complaints. © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Opportunistic behavior encompasses seeking self-interest with guile (Ping, 1993), exploiting opportunities with little consideration for principles or consequences, choosing the path of what can rather than what should happen in a scenario, and taking advantage, often unethically, of any circumstance of possible benefit (Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010). Therefore, in a service recovery context, an opportunistic complainer is an individual who “may not be a chronic gold digger, but rather just someone who recognizes an opportunity to take financial advantage of a company’s service failure and recovery efforts” (Berry and Seiders, 2008, p. 34). In other words, these individuals voice fictitious complaints to service providers with the goal of receiving compensation for their make-believe service failures. According to this description, these customers’ transactions with the service provider do not entail them experiencing a service failure or dissatisfaction, but rather involve them voicing complaints in attempts to receive discounted or free items (Prim and Pras, 1999; Reynolds and Harris, 2005). References to the study of opportunistic complainers can be found in literature dating back at least three decades. Russo (1979), for example, acknowledges the action undertaken by some consumers to unjustly complain for their own gain. Day et al. (1981) also discuss ‘fake complaints’ and Jacoby and Jaccard (1981) refer to the existence of complaints from satisfied users who deliberately fabricate problems. Despite the growing corpus of research building upon these seminal articles (e.g. Reynolds and Harris, 2009; Wirtz

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 540 231 8425. E-mail address: [email protected] (V.P. Magnini). 0278-4319/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ijhm.2011.06.004

and McColl-Kennedy, 2010), the studies containing key findings and theories that can be applied to understanding and managing opportunistic complaint scenarios in the hospitality sector are largely fragmented across numerous bodies of literature. Further, while customer complaint behavior is a rather popular topic of study in the hospitality literature (Oh et al., 2004), most of this information has never been synthesized or even applied to an opportunistic complaining context. While it is nearly impossible to accurately estimate the extent of opportunistic customer complaining within the hospitality sector, recent research finds that frontline associates routinely encounter customers who are perceived as overly demanding and difficult (Kim, 2008). Moreover, narrow profit margins coupled with the generous service failure redress tactics that are practiced by many hospitality firms in recent years (Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010) deem this topic worthy of attention. To fill this gap in our knowledge, the purpose of this article is to synthesize research findings from diverse disciplines to provide preliminary answers to the following questions: (1) Which customer, firm, and customer–firm relationship factors spawn opportunistic customer complaining in the hospitality industry? (2) What negative consequences can be triggered when a hospitality provider yields to [or refuses to yield to] an opportunistic complainer? (3) What measures can be adopted to reduce the likelihood of opportunistic complaining in hospitality firms? (4) How can it be determined if a complaint is valid or opportunistic; and should line-level hospitality employees be empowered to make this determination? (5) If the firm knows [or suspects] a complaint to be opportunistic, how should the provider react? Addressing these issues provides managerial guidance to practitioners, but also makes a modest incremental contribution to theory development

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Table 1 Determinants of opportunistic complaint behavior. Customer-centric drivers of opportunistic complaint behavior Customer financial greed (see Reynolds and Harris, 2005) Customer personality traits: assertiveness and attitudes towards complaining (see Andreasen, 1988) Customer oppositional cultural model (see Ringberg et al., 2007) Firm-centric drivers of opportunistic complaint behavior Generous/liberal redress practices (see Harris and Reynolds, 2003) Firm size (see Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010) Relationship-centric drivers of opportunistic complaint behavior Customer possesses low justice perceptions (see Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010) One-time transaction (see Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010)

because this article draws upon theories and empirical findings from hospitality, management, marketing, psychology, and sociology to lend novel insight into these issues. 2. Potential drivers of opportunistic customer complaining 2.1. Customer-centric drivers of opportunistic customer complaining As listed in Table 1, opportunistic complaining is sometimes driven by financial greed (Reynolds and Harris, 2005). That is, an individual may engage in opportunistic complaining simply because s/he is greedy and is hoping to be compensated by the firm. Such greed is cited by Bernstein (1985) and Rensik and Harmon (1983) as a primary determinant of certain forms of deviant customer behavior such as shoplifting, fraudulent retail returns, and opportunistic complaining. In addition to greed, opportunistic complaining is also correlated with particular personality traits. In order to address the personality characteristics that influence an individual’s propensity to voice an opportunistic complaint, we must first consider his/her willingness to voice a valid [non-opportunistic] complaint. Seminal research conducted by Andreasen (1988) brings forth a ‘personality model’ which supports the notion that in addition to experiencing feelings of dissatisfaction, customers are either prone or restrained from voicing a complaint according to their personalities. In concert with Andreasen’s seminal research, a host of researchers throughout the past two decades identify personality and psychological variables that drive complaint behavior; namely: assertiveness (Bolfing, 1989) and attitude towards complaining (Kim et al., 2003). Assertiveness is manifested in how confident someone portrays him/herself. In other words, assertiveness sends signals of an achievement-orientation and a disposition of self-reliance (Ellis et al., 1978). Generally, assertiveness is thought to be correlated with propensity to voice a complaint(s) to a product or service provider (Bolfing, 1989) and can also, therefore, be thought to be associated with propensity to voice an opportunistic complaint(s) as well. Next, regarding attitude towards complaining, in the context of valid complaining, it can be described as a dissatisfied individual’s tendency to seek compensation for the dissatisfaction (Richins, 1982, 1983, 1987; Bearden and Mason, 1984). Individuals who possess a more favorable attitude towards complaining are more prone to voice their complaints to the firm (Kim et al., 2003). The current research extends this logic to suggest that a positive correlation also exists between complaining attitude and propensity to voice opportunistic complaints. Since personality characteristics are often associated with other types of deviant behavior such as dishonesty (Wirtz and Kum, 2004) and digital piracy (Al-Rafee and Cronan, 2006), the current research suggests that these variables should be considered when deter-

mining a person’s likelihood of voicing an opportunistic complaint. Hence, the following proposition is offered: P1. An individual’s propensity to engage in opportunistic complaining behavior is positively correlated with his/her financial greed. P2. An individual’s propensity to engage in opportunistic complaining behavior is positively correlated with his/her: (a) assertiveness; and (b) attitude towards complaining. Extending this logic, this research also turns to recent cultural models research (Ringberg et al., 2007) for a key consumer-centric determinant of opportunistic complaining behavior. Whereas a cultural model perspective is integrated into some consumer behavior research (Brumbaugh, 2002; Holt, 1998), it is largely absent in services marketing and almost entirely lacking in the service failure recovery research and hospitality literature (Ringberg et al., 2007). Cultural models are psychological paradigms that govern most daily interactions, including social, professional, and personal dealings (Ringberg et al., 2007). Each thought community is identified by the specific interpretive strategy or cultural model that the individual applies to make sense of a particular issue. These are enabled and confined by the larger socio-cultural settings within which people exist and through which they traverse (Ringberg et al., 2007). By understanding which models consumers apply to a service context, researchers may glean an enhanced understanding of consumer-centric drivers of opportunistic complaint behavior. According to the research of Ringberg et al. (2007) individuals possess either the relational, utilitarian, or oppositional cultural model. The oppositional cultural model involves a consistently aggressive position towards providers in the wake of self-relevant goods or service failure. Oppositional consumers believe that service providers would not hesitate to take advantage of, coerce and control them given the opportunity (Ringberg et al., 2007). In reference to the oppositional customers, daily encounters and social norms often prevent outright antisocial behavior. However, in the case of a service context, the maintenance of social norms cannot sustain the disrespect that the customer has for the provider firm. A unique aspect of the oppositional cultural model is the notion of control and not wanting to be at the mercy of the provider. This customer perceptive is that all providers are cunning, and the consumer–provider interaction represents a temporary armistice in which both parties vie for control (Ringberg et al., 2007). This cultural model resembles a deeply held ideology, which associates customer opposition with ideological predispositions that lead consumers to be less sympathetic and susceptible to developing and maintaining social ties (Holt, 2002). Oppositional customers remain affable and show no obvious signs of antagonism until the moment of a self-relevant transgression, which prompts more deep-seated cultural models. The adversarial nature of the oppositional cultural model stems from a larger current of consumer distrust and discontent with commercial providers (Holt, 2002). Oppositional customers are emotional and often angry (Ringberg et al., 2007); thus, based upon this research it appears that oppositional customers are more apt to engage in opportunistic complaining than those that are classified in the relational or utilitarian cultural models. In fact, recent research conducted by Gelbrich (2010) also offers evidence of a potential connection between anger of customer misbehavior. Specifically, in an experimental design study in a hotel context, Gelbrich (2010) empirically demonstrates that negative emotions such as anger can spawn retaliatory behaviors. Research also suggests that such oppositional customers may engage in opportunistic complaining as a means of impressing other customers present in the servicescape (Marquis and Filiatrault, 2002) or eliciting sympathy from them (Alicke et al., 1992). In some circumstances, oppositional customers may even

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hope to be viewed favorably by onlookers by communicating the message that they are too sophisticated for the service being provided (Alicke et al., 1992). Other oppositional customers may be motivated to voice opportunistic complaints because they gain pleasure from negative reactions sometimes expressed by onlookers (Goodwin and Spiggle, 1989). Lastly, Kowalski (1996) contends that sometimes opportunistic complaints are generated in consumers’ attempts to ‘one-up’ each other. Thus, the following proposition is offered: P3. Individuals who possess oppositional cultural models are more likely to engage in opportunistic complaining behavior. 2.2. Firm-centric drivers of opportunistic customer complaining Firms are regularly confronted with complaining customers and researchers afford ample attention to the critical stage of complaint handling, which is argued to truly determine a firm’s customer orientation (Homberg and Furst, 2005). For example, research strongly suggests that, under the appropriate conditions, an excellent service recovery can potentially increase customer satisfaction and loyalty beyond the degree before a failure (De Matos et al., 2007; Magnini et al., 2007). Therefore, scores of both popular press and academic articles exist that offer guidance to firms in how to orchestrate effective service failure recovery initiatives (e.g. Karande et al., 2007; Orsingher et al., 2010). Nevertheless, since service failure recovery research often assumes common expectations exist regarding the appropriate emotional reactions of individuals during service transactions (Hochschild, 1979, 1983), managerial focus on the area may, in some cases, be triggering incremental opportunistic complaining. Again, many studies assume that customers monotonically act in both a functional and a good-mannered way during exchanges; however, considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that customers routinely behave negatively and often disrupt otherwise functional encounters (Reynolds and Harris, 2009). A plethora of contemporary research highlights the value of customer complaints and stress that customer complaints should be welcomed and encouraged by an organization (Bennett, 1997; Prim and Pras, 1999; DeWitt and Brady, 2003; Snellman and Vihtkari, 2003). However, much of this research assumes that customers do not knowingly complain without cause (Harris and Reynolds, 2004). The concentration within the service failure literature on service recovery is predominately based on the assumption that service has genuinely failed and that the motivations driving customer complaints are essentially legitimate. Furthermore, much of the service research presumes that dissatisfaction is the foremost consequence of service failure, and therefore the primary motivation driving subsequent customer complaining behaviors (Reynolds and Harris, 2005). Research on customer complaining has almost entirely focused on the benefits to the firm of top-rate recoveries, largely overlooking any attention to the negative ramifications. As a consequence of these extolled benefits, liberal redress policies such as 100 percent money back guarantees are becoming more commonplace in the hospitality industry (Zeithaml and Bitner, 2003). Such generous return policies may even lead to otherwise non-opportunistic customers acting opportunistically, because the rewards for opportunism are high (Chu et al., 1998). Nevertheless, it must be recognized that customers are more likely to engage in opportunistic complaining when the benefits, such as financial compensation outweigh the costs, such as the difficulty of making the complaint (Harris and Reynolds, 2003). In other words, liberal organizational policies may be inadvertently encouraging and creating opportunities to engage in dysfunctional behaviors (Reynolds and Harris, 2005). Customers may be prone to voice an increased number

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of opportunistic complaints through word-of-mouth and positive reinforcement induced by psychological rewards obtained through the complaining process of venting (Bennett, 1997). To summarize these discussions, while the hospitality industry often treats the customers as royalty, in some respects some customers may have transformed into dictators and that the development of a customer focus can sometimes prove detrimental (Harris and Reynolds, 2004). Recent research has argued that there has been too much emphasis on consumer satisfaction, which has been detrimental to business. More specifically, a network of social deformity has manifested because business models have aspired to attain too much customer satisfaction, which has, in turn, caused some customers to behave in opportunistic manners (Yani-deSoriano and Slater, 2009). Therefore, the following proposition extends from these discussions: P4. Opportunistic customer complaining behavior is more likely to occur in firms that have liberal redress practices than in firms that have conservative ones. Interestingly, in addition to the above evidence that suggests that liberal redress practices spawn opportunistic complaints, the size of the firm may also intervene to influence this type of customer misbehavior (see Table 1). Specifically, Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy (2010) explore opportunistic complaining in a series of in-depth interviews and experimental designs across multiple service contexts and find that customers are more prone to be opportunistic when transacting with large firms as opposed to small ones. Sykes and Matza, 1957 denial of injury neutralization theory can be used to explain this finding. That is, when transacting with large firms, individuals may be more prone to engage in opportunistic complaining because they believe that their behavior causes insignificant harm to the large firm (i.e. they invoke a ‘denial of injury’ mentality). To summarize: P5. Opportunistic customer complaining behavior is more likely to occur in large firms than in small firms. 2.3. Relationship-centric drivers of opportunistic customer complaining In any customer–firm relationship the former continually assesses and updates his/her justice perceptions regarding the relationship. In such a relationship the three types of justice are distributive, interactional, and procedural (Homans, 1961; Thibault and Wallker, 1975; Bies and Moag, 1986). Distributive justice involves the perceived fairness of an actual outcome of a process (Palmer et al., 2000). Interactional justice encompasses the manner in which an individual is treated throughout a process (Sparks and McColl-Kennedy, 2001). Procedural justice addresses the perceived fairness of a process (Sparks and McColl-Kennedy, 2001). Regarding the relationships between these forms of justice and opportunistic customer complaining, Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy (2010) find significant correlations (see Table 1). Specifically, they report that when customers are experiencing lower levels of distributive, procedural and interactional justice they are more prone to engage in opportunistic complaining. Thus, the following proposition is offered: P6. Opportunistic complaining behavior is more likely to occur within the context of a customer–firm relationship in which the customer possesses low justice perceptions as opposed to high justice perceptions. Further regarding the specific relationship between a customer and a firm, emerging research suggests that opportunistic complaining is more likely to occur in a one-time transaction scenario as opposed to occurring within the context of an established customer–firm relationship (Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010). It

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appears that the fostering of trust through the passage of time is one explanation for this moderating influence of relationship context (Salamon and Robinson, 2002). Also, dual concern theory suggests that relationship exchange partners possess higher concern for each other than one-time transaction actors (Rahim, 1983) and emotional costs associated with behaving in an opportunistic fashion are often higher in relationships than in one-time transactions (Wirtz and Kum, 2004). Lastly, recent research conducted by Mazar et al. (2008) find that opportunistic behaviors are more detrimental to the customer’s self-concept within the context of a relationship than so in a transaction. P7. Opportunistic complaining behavior is more likely to occur within the context of a one-time transaction than in a longer term customer–firm relationship.

3. Identifying and addressing opportunistic customer complaining 3.1. Reducing the likelihood of opportunistic customer complaining As discussed in the previous section, opportunistic complaining is most likely to occur in large firms because some customers perceive that the redress costs associated with complying with these requests are insignificant in large corporate structures (Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010). Therefore, firms (particularly large ones) should consider communicating to customers the dollar estimates of particular efficiency initiatives. For instance, towel reuse signage in hotel guestroom bathrooms should not only extol the environmental benefits of towel reuse, but also provide a monetary estimate of how much money the company saves through the implementation of the program. In another example, a small placard can communicate the estimated energy and cost savings realized through the use of energy efficient windows. In other words, firms [particularly large ones] should communicate to customers that dollars and cents do matter in their operational decision-making. Doing so might help negate the injury neutralization theory which suggests that large firms do not experience significant consequences when opportunism is sought. Further, because opportunistic complaining is positively correlated with customers’ perceptions of all three forms of organizational justice [distributive, procedural, and interactional] (Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010), firms must continually derive and refine techniques of managing customers’ justice perceptions. Studies that examine ways in which firms can influence customers’ perceptions of organizational justice are vast, but specific factors such as rapport building appear to be particularly useful in reducing occurrences of opportunistic complaining. Nevertheless, a fundamental truism common across extant literature is that an accurate picture of drivers of customers’ perceptions of organizational justice can only be gleaned through qualitative and quantitative customer-focused research iterations. Customer complaining behavior in general is influenced by the customer–service provider relationship (Cheng and Lam, 2008). Within the context of the current conceptual framework, since opportunistic complaining is positively associated with perceptions of organizational justice, rapport building between the customer and service provider is also vital in deterring such behavior. Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal (1990) contend that individuals feel a rapport when “they ‘click’ with each other or [believe that] the good interaction [is] due to ‘chemistry”’ (p. 286). More specifically, Gremler and Gwinner (2000) empirically identify two dimensions of the rapport construct: (1) an enjoyable interaction; and (2) perceptions of personal connection.

With regard to rapport, since opportunistic complaining is reduced in situations characterized with commitment, loyalty, trust, and high personal contact (Wirtz and Kum, 2004) it is advised that firms derive practical ways on their frontline to enhance customer–provider rapport. For example, training customer contact associates in the art of customer face recognition and name recall can bolster rapport building (Magnini and Honeycutt, 2005). Further, training service providers in a broad array of both verbal [e.g. appropriate follow-up questions] and nonverbal tactics [e.g. leaning forward when being spoken to] that can be used to communicate to customers that they are being listened to also aids rapport development even in the event of a one-time transaction (Noe et al., 2010). Further, establishing an adequate level of rapport could aid in transactions nested within the context of firms that choose to have liberal redress policies. In other words, rapport building should reduce incidence of customers attempting to abuse liberal redress policies. 3.2. Determining if opportunistic customer complaining is occurring in a given scenario Conventional wisdom suggests that service providers are in the best position to determine whether a complaint is legitimate if they possess the best possible understanding of their service offerings. Detailed and intricate understanding of the service operation and servicescape deems it more likely in many circumstances to determine if a customer is bending the truth in hope of a generous redress (Karande et al., 2007). For instance, if a hotel front desk associate is knowledgeable about which end of a particular corridor the housekeeping staff begins on, how long it typically takes to complete a room, and the dependability and accuracy of the staff assigned to a particular floor, then s/he is in a better position to detect an opportunistic complaint than a front desk associate who does not possess that knowledge. In a face-to-face encounter, a customer’s body language also sends a host of telling signals when s/he is being deceitful. Decreased eye contact and eye rubbing are both signals of deception (Pease and Pease, 2004). Likewise, the increase in blood pressure that occurs when lying often causes the individual’s face to redden and also spawns him/her to scratch his/her nose or neck and pull at his/her collar (Pease and Pease, 2004). It is also not uncommon for liars to place their hands partially over their mouths because their body is subconsciously attempting to suppress the deceitful words (Pease and Pease, 2004). Evidently, it is also quite possible that the opportunistic complaint is not voiced in person but rather via e-mail or snail-mail (Reynolds and Harris, 2005). Throughout the past decade a number of researchers have attempted to derive reliable means by which to detect deception in such written language (e.g. Yoo and Gretzel, 2008; Newman et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2004). Many of these researchers have arrived at the realization that reliably detecting such deception in written language is no easy task, yet one technique does appear to be gaining some traction in the literature. Specifically, in a series of controlled experiments, Newman et al. (2003) found that subjects who are deceptive use fewer first person singular words such as “I” and “my” in their writing. The sparse use of these terms is thought to be a marker of deception in which the deceiver is experiencing guilt over the unethical behavior (Newman et al., 2003; Vrij, 2000). 3.3. Reacting to an opportunistic customer complaint Perennial question #1: Who makes the determination to yield or not to yield? A modern trend in hospitality service failure scenarios is for the frontline associates to be empowered to make redress decisions without needing approval from management (Magnini

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and Ford, 2004). Such service failure recovery empowerment expedites the resolution process and increases the ownership of the provider in the resolution process and follow-through. However, in the circumstance of a suspected opportunistic complaint should the frontline associate possess the same level of empowerment and be able to determine whether or not the firm should yield to the opportunistic complaint? Like the question posed in the previous paragraph, this one also does not have a one-size-fits-all solution. Nevertheless, given the psychological strain that addressing opportunistic complaints can place on frontline providers (Harris and Reynolds, 2003), such complaints might be better addressed by managers, but again, it is hoped that practitioners will digest the streams of research synthesized in this review and make a determination regarding this issue that best suits their particular operations. For example, research indicates that a line-level employee’s comfort with empowerment evolves through the span of his/employment (Lee et al., 2011); therefore, hotel departments with high turnover rates [e.g. restaurant outlets], might consider entrusting the opportunism determination to management. Conversely, departments with lower turnover rates [e.g. concierges] might delegate the opportunism determination to the associate. Perennial question #2: To yield or not to yield? It is not possible to provide an answer to this question as it depends upon the confluence of numerous situational factors. It is hoped by the authors, however, that the information synthesized in this literature review provides practitioners with useful guidance in addressing this question. Nevertheless, regardless of this decision, service providers should practice proper task conflict framing when reacting to complaints. As Beverland et al. (2010) describe, task conflict framing entails the service provider opting to use language that focuses on the tangibles of the reported problem as opposed to dialogue that could potentially instigate emotion-laden conflicts between parties. Stated differently, task conflict framing focuses “on the material aspects of the dispute” (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994, p. 194). Such task conflict framing increases the likelihood that the parties will reach a practical outcome in a calm and rational manner (Beverland et al., 2010). In other words, since no one-size-fits-all solution is possible, managers will need to analyze the customer, firm, and customer–firm relationship characteristics in the particular circumstance to determine the appropriate response for a particular scenario. Therefore, the next section of this article enumerates potential implications associated with yielding and with not yielding. 4. Implications of opportunistic customer complaining 4.1. Possible negative ramifications of yielding to an opportunistic complaint As depicted in Fig. 1, in addition to the obvious financial cost of compensation incurred by the hospitality firm, yielding to an opportunistic complaint may result in more of the same complaint behavior from both the given customer and from others (Reynolds and Harris, 2005). Social learning theory posits that behavior results from the interaction of people and situations where learning can take place vicariously through observing the effects of other people [employees] on the social environment [service encounter] (Bandura, 1977). The service encounter situation parallels other social situations in that individuals have the opportunity to observe and learn from the behavior of other people through ongoing interactions (Yi and Gong, 2008). People sometimes learn to exhibit dysfunctional behavior by watching others act in a similar manner (Bandura, 1977). Such a contention is grounded within the theory of planned behavior which posits that individuals often look to others when determining acceptable behavioral norms (Ajzen, 1991). In other words, learning takes place vicariously by customers through

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viewing the effects of other customers. Kowalski (1996) verifies the contagion of complaints where customers hear others complaining, sparking feelings. Even if the complaining behavior itself is not contagious from customer A to customer B, knowing that the firm has given in to an opportunistic complaint could trigger feelings of resentment towards the firm. Based on the social learning theory, dysfunctional customer behavior is argued to have a negative effect on some customers who replicate such behavior, which may come in the form of imitated complaints (Harris and Reynolds, 2003). The likelihood of voice success refers to consumers’ perception of an organization’s willingness to remedy their problems without hassle (Hirschman, 1970). Customer complaint behavior theory taken from the interpersonal services context indicates that consumers are most prone to voice when they perceive a successful complaint outcome to be likely (McKee et al., 2006; Priluck, 2003). Conversely, consumers are unlikely to voice when they anticipate that their efforts of complaining are in vain (Folkes and Kotsos, 1986; Tax and Brown, 1998). If voice is expected to achieve consumers’ goals, such as receiving monetary reimbursement, the perceived ease of voice will be strengthened (Robertson and Shaw, 2009). By extension of a customer’s likelihood of voice success, they will expect the complaint process to go well and are anticipated to have little doubt that it will be easy to complain. This logic is in line with the halo effect (Robertson and Shaw, 2009). The more consumers complain the more confident they are to do so (Blodgett et al., 1995). Through word-of-mouth and positive reinforcement induced by psychological rewards obtained through the complaining process of venting, customers may affectively learn to complain (Bennett, 1997). Customers can learn to become complainers over a period of time due to accrued complaint successes (Andreasen, 1988). Thus, oppositional consumers, in particular, are likely to engage in opportunistic complaints when the perceived utility of complaining is high (Kowalski, 2002); hence, firm compliance could initiate a snowball effect. In other words, opportunistic complaining can be contagious, particularly when factoring in the influence of word-of-mouth extolling the benefits of making false complaints (Robertson and Shaw, 2009). When organizations allow the customer to always be right, allow ease in voice behavior, and pacify the behavior through financial compensation, the propensity to voice unjust complaints may increase. Second, even though it is actually the customer that is acting unethically, complying with such behavior may contribute to the deterioration of integrity and ethics within the firm. Berry and Seiders (2008, p. 37) contend that “companies must acknowledge the unfair behavior of certain customers and manage them effectively. . .denying the existence and impact of unfair customers erodes the ethics and fairness upon which great service companies thrive.” Evidently, ethical behavior is a component of nearly all corporate philosophy and/or mission statements in the hospitality sector. Thus, stressing to all internal constituencies that they must internalize these principles, but occasionally make exceptions to them in opportunistic complaint handling sends a message of insincerity with respect to the tenets of corporate philosophy. Third, the digital revolution has changed the dynamics of the consumer and has provided the forum to speak more loudly and to a greater audience about complaints (Yani-de-Soriano and Slater, 2009). Forums for internet complaining are powerful media tools because of the vast communication capabilities they offer consumers (Harrison-Walker, 2001). E-word-of-mouth can take place in many forms such as web-based opinion platforms, discussion forums, negative websites, social websites, and news groups (Zheng et al., 2009). Furthermore, an increasingly large number of websites exist which tout ways to complain successfully to different service firms in order to gain compensation, often through opportunistic complaints. The number of consumer complaint websites and sto-

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Fig. 1. Managing complaint opportunism.

ries contained therein, have increased in response to the number of internet users and possess the potential for mass communication (Nasir, 2004). The impact of social media and e-word-of-mouth are increasingly deserving of attention from both business and marketing practitioners and researchers, especially as it is found to have a strong impact on customers due to ease of access (HennigThurau et al., 2004) and dissemination possibilities. If opportunistic complaints are becoming a new motive in services, then managers should re-think the way they manage and market satisfaction in order to help ensure that customers enact ethical behavior, which demonstrates the appreciation of the customer-relationship value system (Yani-de-Soriano and Slater, 2009). 4.2. Possible negative ramifications of not yielding to an opportunistic complaint As the customer lifetime value literature clearly demonstrates, certain customers are perennial money losers as they cost more to serve than the revenues they generate (Sheth and Sisodia, 1999;

Venkatesan and Kumar, 2004). Nevertheless, conventional wisdom suggests that if the squeaky does not get oiled it will likely continue to squeak [and may even worsen] affecting those within earshot. Customers do affect one another indirectly by being part of the environment or more directly through specific interpersonal encounters (Bitner, 1992; Grove and Fisk, 1997; Lovelock, 1994). Overt forms of dysfunctional acts may be capable of affecting the consumption experience of those customers in close proximity (Reynolds and Harris, 2009). Stated differently, negative consumer behavior is a significant phenomenon which affects the experience of all consumers. Thus, those consumers who are not misbehaving themselves are often victimized by others’ misconduct (Fullerton and Punj, 2004). According to this logic, some may contend that there may be potential merit in complying with a redress request based upon a complaint that is known to be opportunistic in an attempt to silence the complainer in both the servicescape and in subsequent word-of-mouth communications. Similarly, the squeaky wheel that does not receive oil could continue to voice the same complaint or other complaints louder

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or even exhibit other forms of oppositional behavior. This continued misbehavior can trigger employee dissatisfaction and burnout which are known consequences of emotional labor surrounding frontline service interactions (Diefendorff and Gosserand, 2003). Again, the prevailing assumption inherent to the studies that embrace customer orientation is that customers will behave in a manner that is both rational and functional (Reynolds and Harris, 2006). However, this assumption conflicts with contemporary research that demonstrates that norm-breaking deviant behaviors not only present but are also commonplace. However, there is a range of potentially harmful, unintended consequences of triggering further misbehavior through non-compliance to a redress request. Such consequences can include reduced tolerance of employees towards customer complaints of both a legitimate and opportunistic nature (Kowalski, 1996). Related to the consequences enumerated above, potentially triggering oppositional behavior can impact the provider on a deeper emotional level. Service providers can be adversely impacted by such oppositional behaviors both emotionally and physiologically. As illustrated in Fig. 1, research provides convincing evidence of the potential effects of customer behaviors on the role stress and emotional labor of service providers (BenZur and Yagil, 2005). In addition, dysfunctional customer behavior was found to lead to feigned emotional display, most often to pacify oppositional customers (Harris and Reynolds, 2003). Just as individuals are essentially social, so are their emotions. Emotions are inextricably bound up with other people and participate in the social worlds. Emotional lives are not independent of the context in which they occur and one of the most powerful emotional contexts people participate in is the organizational work context (Rafaeli and Worline, 2001). Emotional dissonance occurs when expressed emotions conform to organizational norms but clash with true feelings (Rafaeli and Sutton, 1987). Immediate consequences of emotional dissonance are job dissatisfaction and emotional exhaustion (Abraham, 1999). What employees experience and feel is found to be a product of certain organizational qualities. Lastly when opting not to comply with an opportunistic complaint, the possibility always exists that the customer will take the complaint up the chain of command (Strauss and Hill, 2001). For example, the customer will move the complaint from a line-level associate to a manager; or from a unit manager to a representative at the corporate headquarters. While complaint recipients in these scenarios can often detect the opportunism associated with the nature or particulars of the complaint, the possibility always exists that the recipient may reprimand the underling for not pacifying the customer before the complaint gained upward traction. Knowing this possibility places additional psychological stress on the service provider when opting not to comply with the customer. To return to the previous analogy, not oiling a squeaky wheel does bring about some uncertainty.

5. Conclusions and future research While it is not possible to accurately gauge the extent of opportunistic customer complaining within the hospitality sector, recent research finds that frontline associates routinely encounter overly demanding and difficult customers (Kim, 2008). In addition, narrow profit margins coupled with the generous service failure redress tactics that are practiced by many hospitality firms in recent years (Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010) deem this topic worthy of attention. From a customer-centric perspective, the streams of research synthesized in this review indicate that a customer’s personality traits influence his/her propensity to engage in opportunistic

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complaint behavior. For example, those possessing an oppositional cultural model appear to be more prone to exhibit such tendencies. From a firm-centric point of view, a heavy emphasis on a customer orientation and generous redress initiatives invite opportunism. Likewise, in concert with the tenets of the denial of injury neutralization theory, opportunistic complaining is more apt to occur in large firms than in smaller ones (Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010). Finally from a relationship-centric lens, firm-customer relationships in which the customer perceives high levels of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice are less likely to be marked with opportunistic complaining than the opposite circumstances (Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010). Also, anchored with dual concern theory (Rahim, 1983), longer relationships are less susceptible to opportunism than one-time transactions. Yielding to a complaint that is thought to be opportunistic is associated with the financial cost of the redress initiative (Miller et al., 2000), but also social learning theory suggests that it might invite more of the same behavior from that customer and from others (Reynolds and Harris, 2005). To use a common analogy: when blood is scented, the sharks come out. Interestingly, recent research also finds that complying with customer behavior that is thought to be unethical may also contribute to the deterioration of integrity and ethics within an organization’s cultural climate (Berry and Seiders, 2008). In addition, the digital revolution has changed the dynamics of consumers’ complaining behavior and has provided them with the forum to reach more ears (Yani-de-Soriano and Slater, 2009). Conversely, not yielding to an opportunistic complaint could cause the given customer to voice the same complaint louder or retaliate in other ways. Fueling the fire of a customer who is willing to engage in unethical behavior can place sizable strain and emotional labor on those service providers who have the displeasure of interacting with him/her (Harris and Reynolds, 2003). Furthermore, when opting not to comply with an opportunistic complaint, the possibility always exists that the customer will take the complaint up the chain of command. Knowing this possibility places additional psychological stress on the service provider. Firms can reduce the likelihood of opportunistic complaints from occurring in the first place by communicating to customers that costs do matter to the firm – even in the largest of corporate structures. Hoteliers and restaurateurs alike should also continually engage in both qualitative and quantitative research iterations that identify drivers of their customers’ justice perceptions. In addition, rapport building is a critical process in reducing customer opportunism. For example, training frontline associates in the art of customer face recognition and name recall can bolster rapport development (Magnini and Honeycutt, 2005). Few would dispute that the most ideal way for service providers to determine if a particular complaint in opportunistic is to be wellversed in the intricate operations of their establishments. A number of techniques also exist which can be used to detect deception in face-to-face encounters and in written communications. Likewise, when reacting to a complaint, utilizing task conflict framing bolsters the likelihood that all parties involved will remain in a calm and rational state (Beverland et al., 2010). Considering the emotional labor that addressing opportunistic complaints can place on frontline providers (Harris and Reynolds, 2003), such complaints might be better addressed by managers, but again, it is hoped that practitioners will digest the streams of research synthesized in this review and make a determination regarding this issue that best suits their particular operations. Regarding future inquiry, descriptive research which queries hotel and restaurant operators about their current practices and policies when addressing complaints suspected of being opportunistic would contribute to our current body of knowledge. For instance, do firms mainly reserve such scenarios for managers or

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due line-level employees possess the same sort of empowerment that they typically have in other service failure recovery situations? In a similar vein, if line-level employees witness a manager who refuses to yield to an opportunistic complaint, does this send a signal to the frontline providers that customers are not always right: consciously and/or subconsciously reducing their customer service orientations? Research investigating this issue is ripe for investigation because it has never been addressed in any extant body of literature, but is laden with managerial relevance. It would also be informative to empirically test the propositions contained in this review. As stated by Fisk et al. (2010), “Researching dysfunctional customer behavior is challenging. This area is fraught with difficulties owing to its sensitive nature and potential for bias (p. 423).” With this caveat in mind, consumer opportunism is most often empirically examined through the use of scenario-based experiments (e.g. Wirtz and Kum, 2004; Wirtz and McColl-Kennedy, 2010). In such experiments, subjects read or view a scenario and are queried regarding how they would react. While every research method has limitations, it is thought that if responses generated are kept anonymous then the approach might be associated with minimal response bias. Further, if the surveys that accompany the scenarios measure the appropriate constructs, the resulting data could be modeled to demonstrate interconnections between the variables. Lastly, future work should also consider the intervening influence of ‘degree of opportunism certainty’ in reactions to complaints. That is, in some circumstances a service provider can be certain that a complaint is ill-founded, but in many scenarios varying degrees of possibilities exist that the customer might be telling the truth. Thus, is a service provider more willing to yield to a customer’s redress request if s/he is only 75 percent certain that the customer is falsifying a claim than if s/he is 95 percent certain? Moreover, what if the provider is 95 percent certain; therefore, does not yield to the redress request – but in reality the customer is voicing a valid complaint? A number of human resources implications are also associated with this issue of determining complaint opportunism. For example, if a customer voices a complaint involving a frontline employee to a manager, who is more credible: the customer or the frontline employee? Again, these issues have never been empirically examined, but are of significant consequence to practitioners.

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