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Options in czechoslovakia
STUDIES
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Options
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in Czechoslovakia
Early in September 1968 Studies in Comparative Communism sent a circular letter to some leading Czech and Slovak communist intellectuals, asking them two questions:
1. Should Czechoslovakia have resisted with armed force in 1938 and 1968? 2. How do you assessthe lessonsof passive resistance in Czechoslovakia for the future of your country and the future of Europe? We are printing here a selection from their answers. As most of them have written from Czechoslovakia or wish to return (and in some caseshave already returned) to Czechoslovakia, all names and addresseshave been omitted. A Symposium
From
Prague
State sovereignty and national independence are the marks of a sovereign people; they have been the fundamental characteristics of the social and political life of Europe during the last century. The sovereign people of Czechoslovakia not only endeavored to further their own national interests but also tried to create a humanitarian, European concept of socialism. The Czechoslovak people could have and should have fought to defend these fundamental qualities of European culture, their national independence and the sovereignty of their state, for these must never be surrendered if any meaning is to remain in the claim that all power belongs to the people. Arguments of a military nature for the defense of Czechoslovakia are far more complicated than the legal ones but they do exist, and they appear clear as soon as we stop being hypnotized by the geographical position of our country. In certain circumstances it is imperative to accept the alternative of fighting, even
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in the most unfavorable conditions, for the defense of state sovereignty, national independence and the freedom of the people all have a value of their own, independent of the result of the battle. This is the main argument for the use of armed resistance, a reason that was well understood by little Finland in 1940, just as it was understood by the Hussites five hundred years ago, or by David when he faced Goliath. In an extreme situation, when basic human rights are in danger, a nation or an individual must fight even if there is no chance of victory. The second argument for the defense of Czechoslovakia may be derived from the character of the military operations themselves whose murse could not be foretold and could not exclude the possible emergence of new factors and changed prospects. The country’s armed resistance could have created a political crisis in Moscow, the results of which might have annulled the consequences of the military intervention. A grave mistake on the part of the reformist leadership
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was its unwillingness to risk a complete break with the Soviet Union and its failure to prepare the country for the alternative of war. If the Soviet aggressors had been forced to risk an open war in central Europe they would certainly not have dared to intervene. However, as they were not confronted with this sort of question, they had only to cope with the problem of whether or not they should occupy a defenseless country. The third case in favor of armed resistance comes from the old experience that retreat before a fascist aggressor has always been a basic political and military mistake. Unfortunately there is no other way of resisting an aggressor’s military attack than by military means. The occupation of Czechoslovakia has always served as a prologue to an attack on western Europe, and every appeasement policy has, in the end, shown itself to be a graver mistake than armed conflict. How sure are we that the Third World War did not begin with the occupation of Czechoslovakia? In the summer of 1968 it was quite justifiable, in terms of international law, to prepare the country for armed defense; it was also militarily feasible and it was morally necessary. The moral consequences of occupation for our nation will be as serious as its military consequences, i.e., the restriction of its sovereignty; for no nation can tolerate having its backbone broken every twenty years. Moral and spiritual disaster is bound to follow in the wake of the military tragedy and the acceptance of a new reality. Eventually a “realistic” line in politics must result in camouflaged collaboration with the occupying forces, and that done in total betrayal of the nation. The logic of history is cruel. In defending democratic socialism we would in no way have been defending a utopian cause. We would have fought
for the future of Europe, for the fundamental rights of man as a free being. Never before have we been so near the ideals cherished by the greatest men of our country, never before have we been so close to Europe-and to Marx-as in the summer 1968! Never before have we participated so much in the making of history! Yet at the critical moment we abandoned consistency, abandoned the fight, abandoned the meaning of our history as a European nation which must, at all costs, fight for its freedom if it is not to perish. * * * In face of the superior might of the oncoming tanks, the passive resistance of the people in the August period was as correct and justified as the leadership’s decision not to order armed resistance had been unjustified and wrong. While the people’s resistance was preventing the establishment of a Soviet protectorate, the leading representatives of the Communist Party adopted a tactically suicidal course by making concessions and thereby systematically annihilating the meaning of any resistance coming from the people. It was not the conservative communists nor the Novotny group who best served the occupying force by accepting the Soviet Diktatbut the reformists themselves. The occupying force thus did not have to interfere much in the internal affairs of the country, for it managed to coerce the government into the role of an administrator of Soviet policy; it was in fact turned into the executor of “normalization.” Even during the first critical week, leading Czechoslovak politicians found themselves faced with the alternative of fighting or collaborating. They tried to get around this dilemma by introducing a series of compromises which produced exactly the same consequences as a lost 75
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war-the legalizing of the occupation, the restriction of state sovereignty and the loss of civic freedoms and basic human rights. From the very beginning the Czechoslovak people adopted a posture of resistance to the occupying forces, but the government and leadership of the country tolerated them. It is now only the illusion of national unity and the myth forming around the nation’s heroes, together with the leaders’ personal prestige, which make it impossible for the public fully to understand the true situation: that passive resistance and national unity are really ceasing to exist. A further step toward the disintegration of national unity and the obstruction of the policy of resistance was the legitimization of the occupation by the government. The Czechoslovak National Assembly endorsed the treaty allowing the Soviet troops to stay in the country for an unspecified time and in unspecified numbers. The treaty in no way limits the movement of troops in the country nor does it solve the problem of payment for invasion damages, but it does legalize the military occupation ex posr facto. This in fact means endorsing a permanent occupation of the country and the implementation of the Soviet politicians’ basic aims through the services of the Czechoslovak “reformists.” It is a new Munich, invalid from the very start since it was agreed to under the threat of force. The alternative of passive resistance was, and is, wrong for two main reasons: passivity itself does not create a program and it can only last a short period of time. It dissolves quickly, especially in revolutionary circumstances, when, as is well known, priority must be given to any kind of activity other than retreat. Defensive tactics are the death of any revolutionary movement. Passive resistance has had grave con76
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sequences for the country and the peaple. Its results are the same as those of a military dictatorship imposed on a conquered nation. Passive resistance can only temporarily neutralize popular disaffection; ultimately it must lead to the bitter conclusion that a nation cannot be free unless it is prepared to defend its freedom with arms in hand.
From
Vienna
The two periods-1938 and 1968show certain analogies. There is, first, the problem of the failure of or betrayal by allies, and linked with it is the solution of a contlict situation by way of the lesser evil, in other words by avoiding armed resistance. There is the question of the extent and the limit to which one can give way to a stronger antagonist who is skillfully applying deterrent tactics. For a small country this is a life-or-death decision and therefore too great a gamble. In 1938, when the more powerful countries were all trying to save themselves for awhile by sacrificing other countries to the predator, no attempt at military resistance would have had any long-term prospects of success. In 1968, however, the events, though governed by the decisive military superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries and by the elements of intimidation and surprise, took place in a totally different situation and under totally different circumstances. Of course, one could not expect the West to join in this playing with fire-that would have been quite unrealistic. But in contrast to 1938 there existed other forces which should have taken sides in their own interest, in the
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interest of protecting the ideas of the communist movement. It was a fatal mistake for the numerous communist parties, including the most intluential among them, to content themselves with proclamations condemning and criticizing the intervention; they failed to unite for an effective joint counteroffensive against those forces which had betrayed the ideas of Marxism and by their arbitrary action had in effect buried the international communist movement. Before World War II the communist parties were prepared to remain silent or to make excuses for practices incompatible with the principles of Marxism, practices which were then emerging both in the domestic and the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R.; they did so to maintain a united front against the mortal danger of fascism. The same claim is being repeated today, of course in a different form. In the struggle against imperialism the attempt is made to maintain the fictitious unity of an already divided and shattered international communist movement. One should not, of course, belittle or underrate the efforts by certain communist parties to criticize, to condemn, or to dissociate themselves from the present rebirth of Stalinism-but this does not diminish their responsibility. It is not enough merely to disagree, to criticize the various infringements of Marxism and of international law, the various distortions of and deviations from Marx’s teachings, and the claim to being his only infallible interpreter-in fact, all the things which have given birth to that bastard system, Soviet imperialism. In this situation there is only one way out: to keep one’s own integrity and to renew one’s shaken faith in the ideas of socialism. To save whatever can be saved demands a total break with those communist parties which, by participating in
the intervention or by justifying it, have utterly discredited the communist movement in the eyes of the whole world. Military resistance was no more possible in 1968 than in 1938-less so, in fact-because of the long and entirely unprotected frontiers with the Warsaw Pact countries, because of Czechoslovakia’s total unpreparedness, because of the treacherous nature of the attack and the political complexity of the situation. However, the question remains whether joint action by those communist parties which have condemned the intervention -their uncompromising opposition to Moscow, their unequivocal refusal to participate in a world conference of communist parties, and perhaps their determination to set up a new center of the international communist movement might not have succeeded, even after the event, in substantially influencing the U.S.S.R.‘s policies. By having failed even to make the attempt, those communist parties must bear a large part of the responsibility for the tragedy of Czechoslovakia. * * * One often hears the term “Schweiktype resistance.” This label, which tends to belittle what is really happening, is now almost traditionally attached to features which only here and there reveal the typical character of Schweik. It certainly does not make full allowance for what has been happening in Czechoslovakia since the military intervention. It is probably no exaggeration to say that this form of passive resistance, using as it does a broad scale of means and taking place on a great many fronts, has no parallel in the history of Czechoslovakia. It is important even though it may occur within narrow limits; so far its momentum is undiminished. To an extent never before achieved, it integrates the interests of Czechoslovakia’s two nations on a 77
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE common platform, and defeats the efforts of the invaders. It makes them feel that even a power supported by bayonets will not 6nd matters as easy as its representatives naively supposed-naively because they underestimated the intellectual and moral strength of their opponent. It must of course be expected that as time goes on, the forces which are today leading this resistance will gradually be deprived of their means, and the scope for their activity will be reduced. Also a realistic assessment cannot disregard the fact that certain sections of the public are passive spectators in this dramatic process. Here then lies the danger that a certain apathy and lethargy may gain ground, promoted moreover by growing economic difhculties. In such a situation one cannot speak of victors and vanquished. Even though the jackboot of the stronger now stands on Czechoslovakia’s soil-a soil shaken by internal tremors, a soil beneath which smolder the unquenchable sparks of resistance to those who robbed this country of its freedom to advance along its own road toward a humane and democratic socialism-its victory is but a Pyrrhic victory.
From
Bratidaoa
I was eighteen in 1938 and supported the communist party of the day. Today, I cannot forgive its leaders for having joined in the surrender. I cannot help feeling that we could have fought. This was confirmed at the trials of Hitler’s generals at Nuemberg. Could it have been assumed in the summer of 1968 that one dark night a
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powerful state would invade the territory of its ally, friend and brother? To have envisaged any such attack would have been put down as the product of an overripe imagination, or of anti-Soviet malice. Whence the difference between 1938 and 1968? Mainly this, that Hitler was not our ally but our deadly enemy, and made no secret of it, whereas the CzechoSlovak people regarded the leaders of the “great Russian empire” as comrades with whom they were linked by the ideas of Marx and Lenin, by the ties of Slav brotherhood and socialist humanism, and by the struggle for peace and democracy and the freedom of the oppressed nations and classes. For whole decades a despotic regime has managed to dupe the masses with torrents of lies and fabrications. It is really not surprising that a large part of the public in Russia believed that a counterrevolutionary coup was being prepared iu our country and that we wanted to leave the socialist camp. In those circumstances, any armed resistance would have confirmed the subject masses of the Russian despotism, deceived and bewildered as they were, in their opinion. And what would that have led to? * * * The national leaders of the Czechs, Slovaks and other nationalities in the C.S.S.R. could not, in the given situation, have chosen more wisely than to exercise passive resistance. This form of struggle is yielding certain results. The occupying power has not managed to find a single coherent group able (as distinct from willing, which would have been easier) to collaborate with its military and police-espionage apparatus. It is a form of struggle that helps the whole people to cope with the moral, political and material burden imposed by the occupation forces. At the same time it offers
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clear proof of the viability of the ideas of democratic socialism as contained in the documents of the post-January period, notably the Action Program of the Communist Party. It demonstrates before the whole world that in contrast to that degenerate and despotic pseudo-socialism which is capable of shaking hands with the latest outgrowths of neofascism, there also exists a genuine, democratic and humane socialism which is, moreover, attractive enough to scare the neoimperialists of West and East alike. Who knows how long this resistance can last? Yet, by its struggle the people of Czechoslovakia are keeping alive the embers of the ideals of socialist humanism. Who knows but that tomorrow or the day after, a flame will not burst forth to light the path of the nations toward lasting mutual understanding, social justice and peace; a flame which at the same time will cauterize that scourge of hereditary Russian despotism, a parasite which in our age has drawn sustenance from the finest fruits of human genius?
From
Montreal
I am convinced that the individual, the nation and mankind must always fight for freedom. This requires no proof; it is proved by history and by the world around us. Though experts argue that Czechoslovakia was not militarily capable of fighting in 1938 because she was completely alone, it was wrong, in my view, to have handed over all weapons and goods to the Germans without offering resistance. We discussed this topic for many long hours in the [nazi] concentration camp, and since I was the
only one to survive out of the small group of Czech intellectuals with whom I spent three years of hardship, I am saying this not only for myself but also on behalf of those who failed to return. More people perhaps would have been killed; but it is better for the individual and for the nation to die ritle in hand than to end up in the gas chambers. And if we had fought, there would have been a different division of the world at Yalta and Czechoslovakia would have enjoyed a difIerent position+ne more like that of Yugoslavia. In 1968, in my view, the Czechoslovak army ought to have been mobilized and the frontiers manned. If the Warsaw Five had continued their pressure, a treaty of alliance with Yugoslavia and Rumania could have been threatened and even the prospect of an appeal to the U.N. brandished. But to have fought on August 21 with no proper preparationthat would have been too late. *
*
*
The passive resistance exercised by the Czechoslovak people during and after the invasion has been mainly the result of experiences gained during the preceding eight months, January to August 1968. The public and especially the young people had found their ideals in the principles of freedom, democracy and humanistic socialism. These ideals were embodied in two persons, Svoboda and Dubcek. Something happened which the Russians had not reckoned with and which was unfamiliar to them-the phenomenon of a strong public opinion and a degree of popular unity not dictated from above. This is something which cannot occur without good cause. One of the most important forces guiding and helping people before and during the invasion was the activity of the press, radio and television. The intelligentsia succeeded in molding the people’s opinion 79
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by means of those mass media. Without them resistance could not have lasted so long. Without freedom of the press not only is democracy impossible but a struggle against an occupying power becomes impossible too. It has become clear that the occupying power cannot easily succeed in bringing the people and the mass media over to its way of thinking. But in the long run-that is a different matter. It was wrong, in my view, to legalize the occupation, for sooner or later this must lead to a rupture between the people’s ideals and the people’s representatives. It will always be clear to the public, even if it is forbidden to write the word “occupation,” that it is living in a country where foreign soldiers exercise power. And one must make allowance for material hardships and the weariness that comes with the passage of time. In this phase it is mainly the young people who will carry on the fight. But, as one can see everywhere in the world, youth cannot alter the facts on its own. It is clear that in this Europe of 1968 one country can occupy another without fighting a war. It is also clear that it is possible to fight against tanks with the ideal of unity. Sooner or later this must have its effect on the domestic front in Russia. Thoughts of freedom are infectious, and there is no medicine against them. But it is hard on the Czechoslovak people to have lost wars twice in thirty years without having fought a battle.
From
Brno
If the significance of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the five Warsaw Pact powers were limited to the Eastern bloc, then military resistance by Prague 80
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would have been pointless. Czechoslovakia was concerned with restoring her economy and enlarging the personal freedom of her citizens-two interconnected aims-and these achievements could not have been protected by force. The Czechs and Slovaks might have retained the sensnrion of freedom so long as the fighting went on. But subsequently, however favorable the outcome, the losses of life and material would probably have required limitations of freedom and all the sacrifices made would have become brutally irrelevant. Czechoslovakia was interested in something else too-in creating a new type of socialism more humane, and so more acceptable, than the one that went before it; and this new type of socialism meant precisely the extending of human liberties. Perhaps one might have asked Czechoslovakia to defend this aim, at least as an idea, even at the cost of human lives if necessary. But it does not seem that the SovietPolish-German-Hungarian-Bulgarian attack on Czechoslovakia threatened the idea of this new socialism; on the contrary, it only confirmed the urgency of it. However, Czechoslovakia’s contlict with the five Warsaw Pact powers clearly extends beyond the territory on which the events took place. How does the choice of passive resistance look in a wider context? If August 21 had been the prelude to an inevitable East-West collision, a military response by Czechoslovakia might have hastened it. For her it would have been suicide. Would it have helped the others? Scarcely. Whereas in 1938 Czechoslovakia could have forced Germany to enter the war earlier, and worse armed, and so perhaps have mitigated the tale of tragedy, today both hypothetical opponents are so powerful that any such idea, speculative as it is, loses all
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relevance. Besides, conflict between East and West is not inevitable, however quickly it could become so. Not even in this light, then, can the preference for bloodless resistance to the August occupation be faulted. Any other stance might have been disastrous, not only for Czechoslovakia but for the whole of Europe, if Prague had seriously upset the EastWest balance and so exacerbated EastWest relations. * 1 * The lesson in nonviolent resistance furnished by Czechoslovakia in 1968 would repay study. It is surely obvious that the ultimate aim of mankind is world government. But the tempo at which we are approaching that goal seems to be extremely slow. America and Europe need stimulus from the East to overcome their spiritual stagnation, just as the Third World needs help from America and Europe before it can free itself from economic poverty. The economically advanced part of the globe must accept the rest of the globe, which in this context can be called backward, as an inseparable part of itselfjust as in 1917 the European half of the Russian empire accepted the Asiatic. Of course, there is no question of imitating the forms of Soviet policy. There is a whole spectrum of possible methods for achieving an equalization of living standards between the various parts of the world, from political to military. The 1917 revolution showed one way of doing it. Another and more apposite altemative is what happened after 1945, viz., the spreading of socialism to further European and Asiatic countries. This can be interpreted either as Soviet expansion or as a continuation of the process of linking the two continents by the 1917 method. The important thing is to realize the intensity of effort involved in these two examples, despite the hardships undergone by the participants.
Politicians should regard the present Soviet pressure on Europe as an urgent sign of the need to reinforce efforts toward unifying the world. But even if they do so there will remain a number of conflicts that we shall not be able to avoid, and it is here that the lessons of unarmed resistance would be extremely useful. As soon as we reach the stage of maturity in overcoming barriers between nations-let us hope that moment is not too far off-it will be essential to avoid all needless destruction; the task before us will demand vast investments of energy. Also, the unification of nations will only prove fruitful if they are able both to retain their individual characteristics and to embrace foreign experience. If my argument is correct, Czechoslovakia resolved last year’s August crisis almost optimally. True, her own prospects are not exactly rosy. The method she employed against the occupying forces was original-at least in modem times in Europe. (Ancient China, however, spent centuries resisting aggressive tribes by assimilating them.) It was also untested, and hence imperfect. Though for the first weeks the resistance was excitingly faultless, the fact is that the public had not consciously prepared itself for the techniques of bloodless defense but discovered them spontaneously and so lacked a sufficiently clear picture of their effectiveness. Now, with the renewal of censorship, it will probably never attain such a picture and will gradually abandon these techniques. The consequences of all this may be anything from a return to the lethargy of the period before January 1968, accompanied by further material impoverishment, to acts of retaliation against anyone who tries to avert the danger of the country’s material and spiritual resources being gradually exhausted.
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Zurich
In 1938 I was only ten and my recollections of the period are too hazy for any judgment to be based on them. When I look back on 1968 in Czechoslovakia, I feel that the political skill of most of our statesmen has not, alas, exceeded that of teen-agers. The present situation shows that they were not the right men to exploit the enormous energy of that brilliant djinn which was let out of the bottle at the beginning of 1968. I am afraid it proved to be an aromatic gin which lost its savor in an excess of tonic water and an abundance of genuine Siberian ice cubes. Should Czechoslovakia backin 19687
have
fought
How would you react if a gang of heavily armed thieves broke into your home? If they only wanted to take away your money, your pictures and a few other items of property, you would probably let them go without putting up a fight. But supposing they proposed to settle in your home for the rest of your life, terrorized your whole family and reduced you to penury? If you suspected that there was any such threat, you would certainly do something to meet the attack and if necessary risk your life. I am afraid some Czechoslovak politicians had been informed of rhe invasion in advance (as the facts now revealed would confirm). It will also become apparent in due course that some of the Czechoslovak leaders helped to bring about the occupation by their irresponsible behavior at Ciema nad Tisou. Finally, the best answer to the question of self-defense is the behavior of Yugoslavia, which was directly threatened in the autumn of 1968. But she resolutely prepared for battle, which proved the only effective solution. In this way she 82
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discouraged the potential aggressors, at least for the time being. * * * There can be many subtle nuances in answer to the second question. Passive resistance has a long tradition in Czechoslovakia and in the present situation is the only possible and effective reaction. I only trust that the other states of Europe will not have to undergo Czechoslovakia’s sad experience. As for the practicability of passive resistance in Europe, one can only reply to violence with strength, to gangsters with weapons, and to expansionist moves with complete preparedness. Passive resistance on the part of Europe would mean the defeat of Europe. It would mean the catastrophic end of civilization in its resistance to the greatest ideological fraud in history.
From
Paris
In 1938 Czechoslovakia was sacrificed by the great powers which, as a result of their earlier miscalculation of the political situation, were neither morally nor militarily prepared for an open contlict with nazi Germany. Politically, they required an overt and indefensible act of aggression by the Germans in order to defend, in the eyes of their own people, a clear break with the previous policy of appeasement. Hitler’s “claims” against Czechoslovakia had all too long been represented as more or less justified, so that Czechoslovakia was not the best card to play for political purposes. Militarily the West was, moreover, aware of its own weakness and hoped to postpone the outbreak of hostilities.
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In these circumstances any armed resistance by Czechoslovakia against the nazi occupation would probably have run the same course and led to the same outcome as, later, the Warsaw uprising. A moral victory would have been purchased at the cost of the total devastation of the country, so that the survivors might claim the formal right to sit on the victors’ side at the peace talks without being able to prevent their country from being once more “sold” in the new partition of the world at Yalta. The question is, then, whether there is any such thing as moral victory in a world where the policies of the great powers cast doubt on all moral criteria. Is not the only thing that matters the gain or loss emerging at the final reckoning? If we look at the problem from this angle, we are left with one key question to answer. Would a clear and explicit decision by Czechoslovakia in 1938 to offer armed resistance have deterred Hitler from a military attack? I think this would have been plausible only if the Allies had not been in such a hurry to express their disinterest in the sovereignty of that “small people of whom we know nothing,” as Chamberlain put it. The disinterest of the great powers is a common factor in Czechoslovakia’s postion in both 1938 and 1968. It is hard to be sure whether the Soviet aggression did not meet with a silent understanding on the part of the Western powers. One thing is certain. With its profound effect on world opinion the invasion must have seemed highly beneficial to the whole Western bloc. If that is true, there was again only one question for Czechoslovakia: what would have been the actual result of armed resistance? Could it have delayed or deterred the Soviet Union? Assuredly not. It would merely have enabled the
Russians to cast more doubt on the causes and circumstances of our action, to pretend that they were coping with a “counterrevolution,” to stamp out resistance more brutally and to prevent the erosion of morale among their own troops. I believe that in August 1968 Czechoslovakia did the only correct thing possible. * * * In one respect the second question is mistakenly formulated: it is incorrect to talk of pnssive resistance. Anyone who experienced the “Prague spring” knows that it was marked by anything but passivity. The thousands of resolutions; the mass-signature campaigns; the busy activity of writers and journalists, radio and television; the emergence of effective new organizations like the Club of Committed Nonparty Members (KAN), the organization of former political prisoners (K 23 1) or the Society for Human Rights; the resurrection of bodies abolished after 1948 such as the University Students’ Association, the Scouts, the Sokol, and so on-can one call this “passive resistance”? And then after August 21 came the near-miraculous work of the legal but clandestine radio, which the occupying forces tried all week to silence but without result; the deliberate confusion of signposts on the main roads and the removal of street names in the cities; the regular appearance of free, legal papers despite the occupation of editorial and printing offices; the various ways in which the people repeatedly showed their unanimous will to discourage some politicians while encouraging others-all this can hardly be called “passive resistance.” Nonviolent is not the same as passive. In the past few years Czechoslovakia has become a proving ground for new ideas in a struggle that is gradually spreading over the whole world. This is the struggle for freedom and for basic 83
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human rights, which none of the present political systems can adequately guarantee. The lines of this battle do not run vertically between states, peoples and ideologies, nor even between power blocs and alliances, but horizontally throughout the world between ‘the individual and the power groups represented by authority. In the spring of 1968 Czechoslovakia saw a totalitarian authority brought to its knees by the nonviolent weapons of the spirit. In that small state new methods of democratic action began to function which had only a little while before been dismissed as naive and utopian. This was not the work of loud-mouthed fanatics but of the majority of citizens who, cautious and alive to their strength, had used peaceful means to put pressure on the all-powerful establishment. And these newly discovered methods worked -even in a totalitarian system. Now a serious danger has arisen, not only for the Czechoslovak and other East bloc communist parties, but for political parties everywhere and also for the power elites in modem industrial societies. The proving ground has been occupied, the “weapons tests” have been brought to a halt. And this was achieved through force exercised by a totalitarian “ally,” with the silent approval of the powerful in the “free world.” But the seed can no longer be destroyed; the new possibilities have been recognized; the individual, struggling for his rights, is in the possession of several new weapons which are capable of considerable refinement. This is a lesson which will affect the course of events not only in my country but in the whole world.
From
COMMUNISM Vienna
In 1938 Czechoslovakia had a welltrained and -equipped army and an excellent defense system. The people’s morale was high as proved by the enthusiastic response to the mobilization call. There would have been a fair chance to achieve something by armed resistance since France and Great Britain would probably have come to Czechoslovakia’s aid; indeed, had Czechoslovakia fought, World War II might have ended much sooner than it did. In 1968 too, both the Czechoslovak people #and army would have followed the call to arms instantaneously, although every man, woman and child in the country knew how speedily and completely any armed resistance would have been crushed. Unlike the Hungarians in 1956, the Czechs and Slovaks never expected any armed support from the West and realized why none could be given. It has been argued that even a hopeless fight would have done much for the selfrespect of the nation; it has also been suggested that a people that surrenders without giving battle retains a lasting inferiority complex. Now the Italians have never been noted for spectacular bravery in war, yet there seems to be nothing wrong with their national ego. One must also bear in mind that the Czechs are a highly intelligent and sophisticated people, and intelligence and sophistication are not the paramount qualities of the fighting soldier. To this it may be objected that the Israelis are certainly sophisticated and yet chose to fight. True, but the Arabs were known to be beatable whereas the Russians are not. Nevertheless, the Czechs and Slovaks have no need to hang their heads in shame. It is to their everlasting credit that they let reason prevail over emotion, yet preserved their honor by meeting a
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national disaster of the first magnitude with both dignity and humor. Total passive resistance combined with ridicule was a tactic that had never before been employed by a nation on such a scale and with such telling results (the tirst of the occupying forces had to be recalled after only three days of exposure to this unnerving and demoralizing treatment). The Czechs and Slovaks managed to out of that test with their national honor unblemished; indeed, some of the very people who now say that armed resistance would have been the more honorable course were among those who, like myself, prayed on August 21 and the days that followed that no unpremeditated act might occur that would lead to open battle and cause enormous loss of life and property, laying waste some of Europe’s finest architecture. come
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It is possible that the events of last August have cured the Czechs and Slovaks of their traditional brotherly bickering (which had already diminished greatly during the preceding months). However, when it comes to lessons to be learned by the whole of Europe, I honestly cannot think of any. All forms of submission or resistance to superior force and violence have been known to Europe since the early Christians were thrown to the lions and before. True, the tactic of total passive resistance combined with massive ridicule may be a novelty in history; nonetheless, I am afraid that the great, spontaneous action of the Czechs and Slovaks will go down in history as just a glorious piece of Schweikmanship. However, the last act of the drama still remains to be written. The Russians are past masters at tightening the screws and may go on tightening them until some-
thing snaps. And then, God forbid, the world may yet see Czechs and Slovaksand others, for that matter-fighting for their freedom on a scale that ought to m&e to silence the gloomiest skeptic.
From
Tabor
On the question of military defense I think a comparison between 1938 and 1968 is inappropriate. In 1938 it was obvious that a warlike conflict between the great powers and nazism was inevitable, whereas in 1968 the world had an interest in maintaining peaceful coexistence between the two political systems. In 1938 it was possible for the use of weapons to affect the future course of events in Europe. It is an open question how the aggressive might of nazi Germany would have developed without the extra potential which Hitler gained in the form of Czechoslovak equipment and of our arms industry, which he was able to exploit for his own benefit. In 1938according at least to the analyses of experts with hindsight - Czechoslovakia could have stood out for a fairly long period against a nazi attack. And the moment she had gone to war, Europe would have had no option but to intervene. In 1968 things were quite different. The whole deployment of the CzechoSlovak armed forces was and remains for defense against attack from the West. Czechoslovakia belongs to the military bloc of socialist states. She could not count, and did not count, on any military assistance from her opponents against her own allies. Great-power politics, in a world divided into two spheres of in85
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terest as it has been since the last war and as orthodox doctrine would have it remain, gave Czechoslovakia no hope whatever. The regrettable mistake known as the events of August 21, when the armies of five allies entered the territory of the republic by force, could have had a still more tragic outcome if the Czechoslovak army had resorted to arms. It is perfectly clear that there could be no serious contest between the army of a small country and the overwhelming strength of the whole Warsaw Pact. Moreover, it would have been easy to argue that a counterrevolutionary conspiracy against the allies existed, and to use any resistance as proof of the accusations that the mass media of the Five were disseminating in any case. I am myself convinced-and my view is borne out by the findings of public opinion surveys prior to August 21-that the great majority of the people of Czechoslovakia desired no return to capitalism and that “socialism with a human face,” as the new policy after January 1968 came to be called, was in no way designed to hide a reversion to pre-1948 conditions. On the contrary, the purpose was a genuine fusion of socialism with democratic principles, and only a negligible minority expected this development to lead away from friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. It is quite another matter whether it was entirely necessary to accept the Moscow agreement to the extent that it was accepted; or whether it would have been better to hold out, persevere with passive resistance and consistently demand opportunities for explaining our attitude while preserving complete sovereignty-which would have implied the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovak territory. This question is still much discussed in Czechoslovakia. + + l 86
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The second question too is not quite precisely put. I do not regard the next stage as one of passive resistance, but as a period of great activity linking up closely with that of the “Prague spring” and post-January political trends. It is of course greatly affected by what are termed “contemporary realities” in my country, meaning the consequences of the Moscow agreements. These limit our sovereignty and limit our ability to implement the program which the post-January leaders of the Communist Party had made their aim: socialism, based on Marxist-Leninist theory and oriented toward the creation of a communist society, without however abandoning our country’s humanistic and democratic traditions which had been distorted for twenty years. In the early days after January 1968, and still more of course since the August events, extreme left-wing moves were apparent favoring a return to the system of personal power, dirigiste government and rigid centralism regardless of the will and opinion of most of the public -or indeed of most party members. These efforts have been accompanied by demands for the arrest of opponents and amount in practice to a demand for a reversion to the notorious methods of the fifties. The “activity” I have in mind is designed to ensure that the popular will is not overlooked again, that new injustices are not perpetrated, and that limitations on the freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and other points in the original program are really “temporary” and no more. The rehabilitation of persons unjustly sentenced continues. Further laws are under way whose drafting began before the August invasion, such as that on the courts and public prosecutor’s office, which could and ought to constitute guarantees of civic freedom. There is an endeavor to carry out, albeit
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under far harder conditions, as much as possible of the January program of the party and of the other organizations within the National Front. The situation is all too complex. In my opinion the other European communist parties could lend effective assistance in our effort, particularly those which carry the greatest inlluence and for whom the Czechoslovak example holds the most attraction, and who also in their own interest (if they are to gain instead of losing public trust in their own countries) should denounce the theory of “limited sovereignty” of socialist countries and communist parties. Any passive resistance would be a bad move in CzechoSlovakia. It would leave the field open to groups who would like a return to the old conditions. But what the public has been through in my country forbids such a return, at any rate in the shape already well known and discredited. That, at any rate, I regard as axiomatic, if the international communist movement is to be protected from further blows and collisions. A meeting of communist parties is being prepared for next June. At this meeting I expect great things to happen, provided the Western parties’ delegates adopt our positions and stick up for us even (if need be) in defiance of our own delegates. This affords the only genuine prospect of giving back to our country its full sovereignty and power to decide its own future. I believe in this future and have no doubt that it will be a socialist future.
From
London
Before we pose the first question we must weigh the following considerations which can be epitomized in the form of other and very pregnant questions. Were
the Czechs or their government in 1938, and in 1968, capable of making free and independent decisions, and hence of freely and independently asking and answering the question7 (Not that it would then follow that they were incapable of any answer!) The nature of Czechoslovak dependence was different in 1968 from what it was in 1938. Before August 21, 1968, Czechoslovakia could only in a qualified sense be called a sovereign state compared with the extent to which she could have been called one in 1938, or to which Yugoslavia could today. It is justifiable to ask, then, whether Czechoslovakia in 1968, a mere colony as she in effect was after twenty years of comrnunist indoctrination, was a priori capable of making an effective and conscious decision about her own fate. Until we can answer this question, to put the question of whether Czechoslovakia ought to have defended herself or not is like asking a polio victim why he isn’t walking. The reference to polio is no idle simile, but a tragic comparison. The Czech intelligentsia has become gradually aware of this paralysis as the question of the Czech nation‘s r&on d’e^rre raised its head more and more inexorably after January 1968. True, the attempts to answer it showed an incapacity to break free from the irrational world of Palacky and Masaryk, let alone to espouse the valuable element in Pekar’s realism. What was offered, basically, was the unhistoric myth that the truth will, or ought to, prevail, for no one was abIe to reach forward to the historic reality of a truth forever crucified. The penchant for myths, often decked out with oddments of quasi-realism, is a warning example of the loss of feeling for the significance of history in itself, and an example, moveover, of the inability to ask oneself existential questions. Unless of course we are prepared to take the fact that here, outside the realm of Marxism, the possibility of his87
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tory having significance was at least tentatively considered as evidence of a nascent intellectual revision of values. * * * The passive resistance of the August days-which had nothing in common with the Schweik mentality so triumphant during the German protectoratewas a complete reflection of the historical and power-political situation into which Czechoslovakia had got herself between 1948 and 1968. It showed up only too palpably the tragic inner dialectic of her “paralysis,” the contradiction between the relics of bourgeois freedom and pseudosovereignty, and totalitarian enslavement. To continue the metaphor, we might label 1938 as the beginning of the acute stage of the malady (though the suspicion of a hereditary condition is impossible to discount), and August 1968 as one of the sequelae. Only in the context of this paralytic dialectic does Czechoslovakia, 1968 represent a bridge between East and West. Many features of this dialectic can also be applied to Western Europe. Here too there is a deep contradiction between the longing for active defense and the inability to take any real action, or indeed the impossibility of such action. Indirect evidence of this was shown, for example, by Western Europe’s attitude to the Hungarian rising. Nevertheless it seems to us that the “active passivity” of the postinvasion events (a contradiction in terms, like the cold war), rising out of the dialectic we described and intensified by the hatred and despair of the public that had “nothing to lose,” was a form of resist&me. springing from mere (albeit complete) negation, bereft of any long-term view and, as such, is unimaginable in the context of a free and sovereign state. Where it nevertheless provokes not myely admiration but a desire to imitate, this is a sure sign that something is amiss. “Active passivity” is also linked with the concept of the “unity” of the people. 88
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This too has its dialectic, characterized primarily by the anxiety of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to equate its own active passivity and its own contradictory “unity” with the state of the nation. On the part of the party this equation signifies a collapse of power (the period of Dubcek’s rise in this respect resembles that of the Great Patriotic War), whereas in periods of consolidation the party on the contrary stresses conflicts and class antagonisms. The real position after January 1968 may be put very simply: the CzechoSlovak Communist Party was more and more split in itself, the “people” found more and more common ground. The only road to salvation was for the party to identify itself with this “popular unity” as the fragile basis for a tentative and halting trend toward democracy. This fraternization between party and people in the name of “unity” proceeded under the deceptively noncommittal slogan of “humane and enlightened socialism.” During the August days this false unity under the shadow of the party was welded together by the shock of invading tanks, and the public began zealously to fraternize even with the secret police. But the high point had already passed. Handshakes with the police were not enough to dispel the anxiety that began to corrode popular unity, at which point the party, now firmly in the saddle, began consistently and prudently to draw away from the people. The dialectic of the people-and-party pseudo-unity also underlies the outward dialectic of the “active passivity” of August. The techniques of political combat, developed to a fine art by the communists, collided with one another before the eyes of a bewildered world; a kind of sublimated terror interwoven with passive resistance on the one side, opposing quite overt terror combined with Red
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Army songs on the other. There was no confrontation of clearly outlined opposing forces, but a maze of lines intersecting in an infinitely intriguing dialectic. Two observations, however, suffice, broadly speaking, to cut through the Gordian knot. The first is that the Communist Party is neither able nor anxious to fight against itself (which is compensated for, logically enough, by the mutual recriminations among its members). Second, the Czechs and the great majority of their intelligentsia have become incapable of coping with the residue of 1948 inside themselves; they wander in a circle
of hope and disappointments, spellbound in a world of mere potentialities. An alarming sign of this fact, and of this failure, is the emergence of the young, even the small children, as the last hope of a dwindling nation. But I would warn against any temptation to equate this situation with the psuedo-revolution of youth in the West. There is a fundamental difference here between the utopian privileges claimed by Western youth (which are a purely biological matter) and those claimed by youth in the East, which are related to reality, rooted in history and have to do with the spirit.
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A Comment
by
Evzen Loebl
Could the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia have been predicted? I happen to be one of those who believed that it could not. Why? After the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. in 1956, the Soviet government issued a declaration condemning Stalin’s disregard for the sovereignty of its allies and solemnly pledging itself to a policy of noninterference. This pronouncement was made for good reasons: Stalin’s rule had brought the Soviet Union almost to the verge of economic and political catastrophe; the cold war was an unbearable burden on Soviet society and the concentration of power in the hands of the despot and his apparut had brought about an ossification which threatened to reduce the U.S.S.R. to a second-rate power. A rejection of Stalinist concepts as well as a certain relaxation in the spheres of politics and ideology could, therefore, have been anticipated, though the form, extent and intensity of these changes would have been impossible to predict. The effect of Stahn’s power politics on Czechoslovakia had been decisive. The country’s determination to follow its own road to socialism represented for him a direot challenge to the supremacy of the U.S.S.R. A principle was at stake: it was not merely a question of which road to socialism Cz&rosIovakia would choose, but of whether it would be allowed any independent choice in the matter at all. The means employed to engineer the country’s submission on this point were subtle. It was not sufficient simply to remove those in high office who were in the way; the whole party and government policy had to be 89
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in Czechoslovakia
Early in September 1968 Studies in Comparative Communism sent a circular letter to some leading Czech and Slovak communist intellectuals, asking them two questions:
1. Should Czechoslovakia have resisted with armed force in 1938 and 1968? 2. How do you assessthe lessonsof passive resistance in Czechoslovakia for the future of your country and the future of Europe? We are printing here a selection from their answers. As most of them have written from Czechoslovakia or wish to return (and in some caseshave already returned) to Czechoslovakia, all names and addresseshave been omitted. A Symposium
From
Prague
State sovereignty and national independence are the marks of a sovereign people; they have been the fundamental characteristics of the social and political life of Europe during the last century. The sovereign people of Czechoslovakia not only endeavored to further their own national interests but also tried to create a humanitarian, European concept of socialism. The Czechoslovak people could have and should have fought to defend these fundamental qualities of European culture, their national independence and the sovereignty of their state, for these must never be surrendered if any meaning is to remain in the claim that all power belongs to the people. Arguments of a military nature for the defense of Czechoslovakia are far more complicated than the legal ones but they do exist, and they appear clear as soon as we stop being hypnotized by the geographical position of our country. In certain circumstances it is imperative to accept the alternative of fighting, even
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in the most unfavorable conditions, for the defense of state sovereignty, national independence and the freedom of the people all have a value of their own, independent of the result of the battle. This is the main argument for the use of armed resistance, a reason that was well understood by little Finland in 1940, just as it was understood by the Hussites five hundred years ago, or by David when he faced Goliath. In an extreme situation, when basic human rights are in danger, a nation or an individual must fight even if there is no chance of victory. The second argument for the defense of Czechoslovakia may be derived from the character of the military operations themselves whose murse could not be foretold and could not exclude the possible emergence of new factors and changed prospects. The country’s armed resistance could have created a political crisis in Moscow, the results of which might have annulled the consequences of the military intervention. A grave mistake on the part of the reformist leadership
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was its unwillingness to risk a complete break with the Soviet Union and its failure to prepare the country for the alternative of war. If the Soviet aggressors had been forced to risk an open war in central Europe they would certainly not have dared to intervene. However, as they were not confronted with this sort of question, they had only to cope with the problem of whether or not they should occupy a defenseless country. The third case in favor of armed resistance comes from the old experience that retreat before a fascist aggressor has always been a basic political and military mistake. Unfortunately there is no other way of resisting an aggressor’s military attack than by military means. The occupation of Czechoslovakia has always served as a prologue to an attack on western Europe, and every appeasement policy has, in the end, shown itself to be a graver mistake than armed conflict. How sure are we that the Third World War did not begin with the occupation of Czechoslovakia? In the summer of 1968 it was quite justifiable, in terms of international law, to prepare the country for armed defense; it was also militarily feasible and it was morally necessary. The moral consequences of occupation for our nation will be as serious as its military consequences, i.e., the restriction of its sovereignty; for no nation can tolerate having its backbone broken every twenty years. Moral and spiritual disaster is bound to follow in the wake of the military tragedy and the acceptance of a new reality. Eventually a “realistic” line in politics must result in camouflaged collaboration with the occupying forces, and that done in total betrayal of the nation. The logic of history is cruel. In defending democratic socialism we would in no way have been defending a utopian cause. We would have fought
for the future of Europe, for the fundamental rights of man as a free being. Never before have we been so near the ideals cherished by the greatest men of our country, never before have we been so close to Europe-and to Marx-as in the summer 1968! Never before have we participated so much in the making of history! Yet at the critical moment we abandoned consistency, abandoned the fight, abandoned the meaning of our history as a European nation which must, at all costs, fight for its freedom if it is not to perish. * * * In face of the superior might of the oncoming tanks, the passive resistance of the people in the August period was as correct and justified as the leadership’s decision not to order armed resistance had been unjustified and wrong. While the people’s resistance was preventing the establishment of a Soviet protectorate, the leading representatives of the Communist Party adopted a tactically suicidal course by making concessions and thereby systematically annihilating the meaning of any resistance coming from the people. It was not the conservative communists nor the Novotny group who best served the occupying force by accepting the Soviet Diktatbut the reformists themselves. The occupying force thus did not have to interfere much in the internal affairs of the country, for it managed to coerce the government into the role of an administrator of Soviet policy; it was in fact turned into the executor of “normalization.” Even during the first critical week, leading Czechoslovak politicians found themselves faced with the alternative of fighting or collaborating. They tried to get around this dilemma by introducing a series of compromises which produced exactly the same consequences as a lost 75
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war-the legalizing of the occupation, the restriction of state sovereignty and the loss of civic freedoms and basic human rights. From the very beginning the Czechoslovak people adopted a posture of resistance to the occupying forces, but the government and leadership of the country tolerated them. It is now only the illusion of national unity and the myth forming around the nation’s heroes, together with the leaders’ personal prestige, which make it impossible for the public fully to understand the true situation: that passive resistance and national unity are really ceasing to exist. A further step toward the disintegration of national unity and the obstruction of the policy of resistance was the legitimization of the occupation by the government. The Czechoslovak National Assembly endorsed the treaty allowing the Soviet troops to stay in the country for an unspecified time and in unspecified numbers. The treaty in no way limits the movement of troops in the country nor does it solve the problem of payment for invasion damages, but it does legalize the military occupation ex posr facto. This in fact means endorsing a permanent occupation of the country and the implementation of the Soviet politicians’ basic aims through the services of the Czechoslovak “reformists.” It is a new Munich, invalid from the very start since it was agreed to under the threat of force. The alternative of passive resistance was, and is, wrong for two main reasons: passivity itself does not create a program and it can only last a short period of time. It dissolves quickly, especially in revolutionary circumstances, when, as is well known, priority must be given to any kind of activity other than retreat. Defensive tactics are the death of any revolutionary movement. Passive resistance has had grave con76
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sequences for the country and the peaple. Its results are the same as those of a military dictatorship imposed on a conquered nation. Passive resistance can only temporarily neutralize popular disaffection; ultimately it must lead to the bitter conclusion that a nation cannot be free unless it is prepared to defend its freedom with arms in hand.
From
Vienna
The two periods-1938 and 1968show certain analogies. There is, first, the problem of the failure of or betrayal by allies, and linked with it is the solution of a contlict situation by way of the lesser evil, in other words by avoiding armed resistance. There is the question of the extent and the limit to which one can give way to a stronger antagonist who is skillfully applying deterrent tactics. For a small country this is a life-or-death decision and therefore too great a gamble. In 1938, when the more powerful countries were all trying to save themselves for awhile by sacrificing other countries to the predator, no attempt at military resistance would have had any long-term prospects of success. In 1968, however, the events, though governed by the decisive military superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries and by the elements of intimidation and surprise, took place in a totally different situation and under totally different circumstances. Of course, one could not expect the West to join in this playing with fire-that would have been quite unrealistic. But in contrast to 1938 there existed other forces which should have taken sides in their own interest, in the
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interest of protecting the ideas of the communist movement. It was a fatal mistake for the numerous communist parties, including the most intluential among them, to content themselves with proclamations condemning and criticizing the intervention; they failed to unite for an effective joint counteroffensive against those forces which had betrayed the ideas of Marxism and by their arbitrary action had in effect buried the international communist movement. Before World War II the communist parties were prepared to remain silent or to make excuses for practices incompatible with the principles of Marxism, practices which were then emerging both in the domestic and the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R.; they did so to maintain a united front against the mortal danger of fascism. The same claim is being repeated today, of course in a different form. In the struggle against imperialism the attempt is made to maintain the fictitious unity of an already divided and shattered international communist movement. One should not, of course, belittle or underrate the efforts by certain communist parties to criticize, to condemn, or to dissociate themselves from the present rebirth of Stalinism-but this does not diminish their responsibility. It is not enough merely to disagree, to criticize the various infringements of Marxism and of international law, the various distortions of and deviations from Marx’s teachings, and the claim to being his only infallible interpreter-in fact, all the things which have given birth to that bastard system, Soviet imperialism. In this situation there is only one way out: to keep one’s own integrity and to renew one’s shaken faith in the ideas of socialism. To save whatever can be saved demands a total break with those communist parties which, by participating in
the intervention or by justifying it, have utterly discredited the communist movement in the eyes of the whole world. Military resistance was no more possible in 1968 than in 1938-less so, in fact-because of the long and entirely unprotected frontiers with the Warsaw Pact countries, because of Czechoslovakia’s total unpreparedness, because of the treacherous nature of the attack and the political complexity of the situation. However, the question remains whether joint action by those communist parties which have condemned the intervention -their uncompromising opposition to Moscow, their unequivocal refusal to participate in a world conference of communist parties, and perhaps their determination to set up a new center of the international communist movement might not have succeeded, even after the event, in substantially influencing the U.S.S.R.‘s policies. By having failed even to make the attempt, those communist parties must bear a large part of the responsibility for the tragedy of Czechoslovakia. * * * One often hears the term “Schweiktype resistance.” This label, which tends to belittle what is really happening, is now almost traditionally attached to features which only here and there reveal the typical character of Schweik. It certainly does not make full allowance for what has been happening in Czechoslovakia since the military intervention. It is probably no exaggeration to say that this form of passive resistance, using as it does a broad scale of means and taking place on a great many fronts, has no parallel in the history of Czechoslovakia. It is important even though it may occur within narrow limits; so far its momentum is undiminished. To an extent never before achieved, it integrates the interests of Czechoslovakia’s two nations on a 77
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE common platform, and defeats the efforts of the invaders. It makes them feel that even a power supported by bayonets will not 6nd matters as easy as its representatives naively supposed-naively because they underestimated the intellectual and moral strength of their opponent. It must of course be expected that as time goes on, the forces which are today leading this resistance will gradually be deprived of their means, and the scope for their activity will be reduced. Also a realistic assessment cannot disregard the fact that certain sections of the public are passive spectators in this dramatic process. Here then lies the danger that a certain apathy and lethargy may gain ground, promoted moreover by growing economic difhculties. In such a situation one cannot speak of victors and vanquished. Even though the jackboot of the stronger now stands on Czechoslovakia’s soil-a soil shaken by internal tremors, a soil beneath which smolder the unquenchable sparks of resistance to those who robbed this country of its freedom to advance along its own road toward a humane and democratic socialism-its victory is but a Pyrrhic victory.
From
Bratidaoa
I was eighteen in 1938 and supported the communist party of the day. Today, I cannot forgive its leaders for having joined in the surrender. I cannot help feeling that we could have fought. This was confirmed at the trials of Hitler’s generals at Nuemberg. Could it have been assumed in the summer of 1968 that one dark night a
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powerful state would invade the territory of its ally, friend and brother? To have envisaged any such attack would have been put down as the product of an overripe imagination, or of anti-Soviet malice. Whence the difference between 1938 and 1968? Mainly this, that Hitler was not our ally but our deadly enemy, and made no secret of it, whereas the CzechoSlovak people regarded the leaders of the “great Russian empire” as comrades with whom they were linked by the ideas of Marx and Lenin, by the ties of Slav brotherhood and socialist humanism, and by the struggle for peace and democracy and the freedom of the oppressed nations and classes. For whole decades a despotic regime has managed to dupe the masses with torrents of lies and fabrications. It is really not surprising that a large part of the public in Russia believed that a counterrevolutionary coup was being prepared iu our country and that we wanted to leave the socialist camp. In those circumstances, any armed resistance would have confirmed the subject masses of the Russian despotism, deceived and bewildered as they were, in their opinion. And what would that have led to? * * * The national leaders of the Czechs, Slovaks and other nationalities in the C.S.S.R. could not, in the given situation, have chosen more wisely than to exercise passive resistance. This form of struggle is yielding certain results. The occupying power has not managed to find a single coherent group able (as distinct from willing, which would have been easier) to collaborate with its military and police-espionage apparatus. It is a form of struggle that helps the whole people to cope with the moral, political and material burden imposed by the occupation forces. At the same time it offers
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clear proof of the viability of the ideas of democratic socialism as contained in the documents of the post-January period, notably the Action Program of the Communist Party. It demonstrates before the whole world that in contrast to that degenerate and despotic pseudo-socialism which is capable of shaking hands with the latest outgrowths of neofascism, there also exists a genuine, democratic and humane socialism which is, moreover, attractive enough to scare the neoimperialists of West and East alike. Who knows how long this resistance can last? Yet, by its struggle the people of Czechoslovakia are keeping alive the embers of the ideals of socialist humanism. Who knows but that tomorrow or the day after, a flame will not burst forth to light the path of the nations toward lasting mutual understanding, social justice and peace; a flame which at the same time will cauterize that scourge of hereditary Russian despotism, a parasite which in our age has drawn sustenance from the finest fruits of human genius?
From
Montreal
I am convinced that the individual, the nation and mankind must always fight for freedom. This requires no proof; it is proved by history and by the world around us. Though experts argue that Czechoslovakia was not militarily capable of fighting in 1938 because she was completely alone, it was wrong, in my view, to have handed over all weapons and goods to the Germans without offering resistance. We discussed this topic for many long hours in the [nazi] concentration camp, and since I was the
only one to survive out of the small group of Czech intellectuals with whom I spent three years of hardship, I am saying this not only for myself but also on behalf of those who failed to return. More people perhaps would have been killed; but it is better for the individual and for the nation to die ritle in hand than to end up in the gas chambers. And if we had fought, there would have been a different division of the world at Yalta and Czechoslovakia would have enjoyed a difIerent position+ne more like that of Yugoslavia. In 1968, in my view, the Czechoslovak army ought to have been mobilized and the frontiers manned. If the Warsaw Five had continued their pressure, a treaty of alliance with Yugoslavia and Rumania could have been threatened and even the prospect of an appeal to the U.N. brandished. But to have fought on August 21 with no proper preparationthat would have been too late. *
*
*
The passive resistance exercised by the Czechoslovak people during and after the invasion has been mainly the result of experiences gained during the preceding eight months, January to August 1968. The public and especially the young people had found their ideals in the principles of freedom, democracy and humanistic socialism. These ideals were embodied in two persons, Svoboda and Dubcek. Something happened which the Russians had not reckoned with and which was unfamiliar to them-the phenomenon of a strong public opinion and a degree of popular unity not dictated from above. This is something which cannot occur without good cause. One of the most important forces guiding and helping people before and during the invasion was the activity of the press, radio and television. The intelligentsia succeeded in molding the people’s opinion 79
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by means of those mass media. Without them resistance could not have lasted so long. Without freedom of the press not only is democracy impossible but a struggle against an occupying power becomes impossible too. It has become clear that the occupying power cannot easily succeed in bringing the people and the mass media over to its way of thinking. But in the long run-that is a different matter. It was wrong, in my view, to legalize the occupation, for sooner or later this must lead to a rupture between the people’s ideals and the people’s representatives. It will always be clear to the public, even if it is forbidden to write the word “occupation,” that it is living in a country where foreign soldiers exercise power. And one must make allowance for material hardships and the weariness that comes with the passage of time. In this phase it is mainly the young people who will carry on the fight. But, as one can see everywhere in the world, youth cannot alter the facts on its own. It is clear that in this Europe of 1968 one country can occupy another without fighting a war. It is also clear that it is possible to fight against tanks with the ideal of unity. Sooner or later this must have its effect on the domestic front in Russia. Thoughts of freedom are infectious, and there is no medicine against them. But it is hard on the Czechoslovak people to have lost wars twice in thirty years without having fought a battle.
From
Brno
If the significance of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the five Warsaw Pact powers were limited to the Eastern bloc, then military resistance by Prague 80
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would have been pointless. Czechoslovakia was concerned with restoring her economy and enlarging the personal freedom of her citizens-two interconnected aims-and these achievements could not have been protected by force. The Czechs and Slovaks might have retained the sensnrion of freedom so long as the fighting went on. But subsequently, however favorable the outcome, the losses of life and material would probably have required limitations of freedom and all the sacrifices made would have become brutally irrelevant. Czechoslovakia was interested in something else too-in creating a new type of socialism more humane, and so more acceptable, than the one that went before it; and this new type of socialism meant precisely the extending of human liberties. Perhaps one might have asked Czechoslovakia to defend this aim, at least as an idea, even at the cost of human lives if necessary. But it does not seem that the SovietPolish-German-Hungarian-Bulgarian attack on Czechoslovakia threatened the idea of this new socialism; on the contrary, it only confirmed the urgency of it. However, Czechoslovakia’s contlict with the five Warsaw Pact powers clearly extends beyond the territory on which the events took place. How does the choice of passive resistance look in a wider context? If August 21 had been the prelude to an inevitable East-West collision, a military response by Czechoslovakia might have hastened it. For her it would have been suicide. Would it have helped the others? Scarcely. Whereas in 1938 Czechoslovakia could have forced Germany to enter the war earlier, and worse armed, and so perhaps have mitigated the tale of tragedy, today both hypothetical opponents are so powerful that any such idea, speculative as it is, loses all
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relevance. Besides, conflict between East and West is not inevitable, however quickly it could become so. Not even in this light, then, can the preference for bloodless resistance to the August occupation be faulted. Any other stance might have been disastrous, not only for Czechoslovakia but for the whole of Europe, if Prague had seriously upset the EastWest balance and so exacerbated EastWest relations. * 1 * The lesson in nonviolent resistance furnished by Czechoslovakia in 1968 would repay study. It is surely obvious that the ultimate aim of mankind is world government. But the tempo at which we are approaching that goal seems to be extremely slow. America and Europe need stimulus from the East to overcome their spiritual stagnation, just as the Third World needs help from America and Europe before it can free itself from economic poverty. The economically advanced part of the globe must accept the rest of the globe, which in this context can be called backward, as an inseparable part of itselfjust as in 1917 the European half of the Russian empire accepted the Asiatic. Of course, there is no question of imitating the forms of Soviet policy. There is a whole spectrum of possible methods for achieving an equalization of living standards between the various parts of the world, from political to military. The 1917 revolution showed one way of doing it. Another and more apposite altemative is what happened after 1945, viz., the spreading of socialism to further European and Asiatic countries. This can be interpreted either as Soviet expansion or as a continuation of the process of linking the two continents by the 1917 method. The important thing is to realize the intensity of effort involved in these two examples, despite the hardships undergone by the participants.
Politicians should regard the present Soviet pressure on Europe as an urgent sign of the need to reinforce efforts toward unifying the world. But even if they do so there will remain a number of conflicts that we shall not be able to avoid, and it is here that the lessons of unarmed resistance would be extremely useful. As soon as we reach the stage of maturity in overcoming barriers between nations-let us hope that moment is not too far off-it will be essential to avoid all needless destruction; the task before us will demand vast investments of energy. Also, the unification of nations will only prove fruitful if they are able both to retain their individual characteristics and to embrace foreign experience. If my argument is correct, Czechoslovakia resolved last year’s August crisis almost optimally. True, her own prospects are not exactly rosy. The method she employed against the occupying forces was original-at least in modem times in Europe. (Ancient China, however, spent centuries resisting aggressive tribes by assimilating them.) It was also untested, and hence imperfect. Though for the first weeks the resistance was excitingly faultless, the fact is that the public had not consciously prepared itself for the techniques of bloodless defense but discovered them spontaneously and so lacked a sufficiently clear picture of their effectiveness. Now, with the renewal of censorship, it will probably never attain such a picture and will gradually abandon these techniques. The consequences of all this may be anything from a return to the lethargy of the period before January 1968, accompanied by further material impoverishment, to acts of retaliation against anyone who tries to avert the danger of the country’s material and spiritual resources being gradually exhausted.
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Zurich
In 1938 I was only ten and my recollections of the period are too hazy for any judgment to be based on them. When I look back on 1968 in Czechoslovakia, I feel that the political skill of most of our statesmen has not, alas, exceeded that of teen-agers. The present situation shows that they were not the right men to exploit the enormous energy of that brilliant djinn which was let out of the bottle at the beginning of 1968. I am afraid it proved to be an aromatic gin which lost its savor in an excess of tonic water and an abundance of genuine Siberian ice cubes. Should Czechoslovakia backin 19687
have
fought
How would you react if a gang of heavily armed thieves broke into your home? If they only wanted to take away your money, your pictures and a few other items of property, you would probably let them go without putting up a fight. But supposing they proposed to settle in your home for the rest of your life, terrorized your whole family and reduced you to penury? If you suspected that there was any such threat, you would certainly do something to meet the attack and if necessary risk your life. I am afraid some Czechoslovak politicians had been informed of rhe invasion in advance (as the facts now revealed would confirm). It will also become apparent in due course that some of the Czechoslovak leaders helped to bring about the occupation by their irresponsible behavior at Ciema nad Tisou. Finally, the best answer to the question of self-defense is the behavior of Yugoslavia, which was directly threatened in the autumn of 1968. But she resolutely prepared for battle, which proved the only effective solution. In this way she 82
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discouraged the potential aggressors, at least for the time being. * * * There can be many subtle nuances in answer to the second question. Passive resistance has a long tradition in Czechoslovakia and in the present situation is the only possible and effective reaction. I only trust that the other states of Europe will not have to undergo Czechoslovakia’s sad experience. As for the practicability of passive resistance in Europe, one can only reply to violence with strength, to gangsters with weapons, and to expansionist moves with complete preparedness. Passive resistance on the part of Europe would mean the defeat of Europe. It would mean the catastrophic end of civilization in its resistance to the greatest ideological fraud in history.
From
Paris
In 1938 Czechoslovakia was sacrificed by the great powers which, as a result of their earlier miscalculation of the political situation, were neither morally nor militarily prepared for an open contlict with nazi Germany. Politically, they required an overt and indefensible act of aggression by the Germans in order to defend, in the eyes of their own people, a clear break with the previous policy of appeasement. Hitler’s “claims” against Czechoslovakia had all too long been represented as more or less justified, so that Czechoslovakia was not the best card to play for political purposes. Militarily the West was, moreover, aware of its own weakness and hoped to postpone the outbreak of hostilities.
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In these circumstances any armed resistance by Czechoslovakia against the nazi occupation would probably have run the same course and led to the same outcome as, later, the Warsaw uprising. A moral victory would have been purchased at the cost of the total devastation of the country, so that the survivors might claim the formal right to sit on the victors’ side at the peace talks without being able to prevent their country from being once more “sold” in the new partition of the world at Yalta. The question is, then, whether there is any such thing as moral victory in a world where the policies of the great powers cast doubt on all moral criteria. Is not the only thing that matters the gain or loss emerging at the final reckoning? If we look at the problem from this angle, we are left with one key question to answer. Would a clear and explicit decision by Czechoslovakia in 1938 to offer armed resistance have deterred Hitler from a military attack? I think this would have been plausible only if the Allies had not been in such a hurry to express their disinterest in the sovereignty of that “small people of whom we know nothing,” as Chamberlain put it. The disinterest of the great powers is a common factor in Czechoslovakia’s postion in both 1938 and 1968. It is hard to be sure whether the Soviet aggression did not meet with a silent understanding on the part of the Western powers. One thing is certain. With its profound effect on world opinion the invasion must have seemed highly beneficial to the whole Western bloc. If that is true, there was again only one question for Czechoslovakia: what would have been the actual result of armed resistance? Could it have delayed or deterred the Soviet Union? Assuredly not. It would merely have enabled the
Russians to cast more doubt on the causes and circumstances of our action, to pretend that they were coping with a “counterrevolution,” to stamp out resistance more brutally and to prevent the erosion of morale among their own troops. I believe that in August 1968 Czechoslovakia did the only correct thing possible. * * * In one respect the second question is mistakenly formulated: it is incorrect to talk of pnssive resistance. Anyone who experienced the “Prague spring” knows that it was marked by anything but passivity. The thousands of resolutions; the mass-signature campaigns; the busy activity of writers and journalists, radio and television; the emergence of effective new organizations like the Club of Committed Nonparty Members (KAN), the organization of former political prisoners (K 23 1) or the Society for Human Rights; the resurrection of bodies abolished after 1948 such as the University Students’ Association, the Scouts, the Sokol, and so on-can one call this “passive resistance”? And then after August 21 came the near-miraculous work of the legal but clandestine radio, which the occupying forces tried all week to silence but without result; the deliberate confusion of signposts on the main roads and the removal of street names in the cities; the regular appearance of free, legal papers despite the occupation of editorial and printing offices; the various ways in which the people repeatedly showed their unanimous will to discourage some politicians while encouraging others-all this can hardly be called “passive resistance.” Nonviolent is not the same as passive. In the past few years Czechoslovakia has become a proving ground for new ideas in a struggle that is gradually spreading over the whole world. This is the struggle for freedom and for basic 83
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human rights, which none of the present political systems can adequately guarantee. The lines of this battle do not run vertically between states, peoples and ideologies, nor even between power blocs and alliances, but horizontally throughout the world between ‘the individual and the power groups represented by authority. In the spring of 1968 Czechoslovakia saw a totalitarian authority brought to its knees by the nonviolent weapons of the spirit. In that small state new methods of democratic action began to function which had only a little while before been dismissed as naive and utopian. This was not the work of loud-mouthed fanatics but of the majority of citizens who, cautious and alive to their strength, had used peaceful means to put pressure on the all-powerful establishment. And these newly discovered methods worked -even in a totalitarian system. Now a serious danger has arisen, not only for the Czechoslovak and other East bloc communist parties, but for political parties everywhere and also for the power elites in modem industrial societies. The proving ground has been occupied, the “weapons tests” have been brought to a halt. And this was achieved through force exercised by a totalitarian “ally,” with the silent approval of the powerful in the “free world.” But the seed can no longer be destroyed; the new possibilities have been recognized; the individual, struggling for his rights, is in the possession of several new weapons which are capable of considerable refinement. This is a lesson which will affect the course of events not only in my country but in the whole world.
From
COMMUNISM Vienna
In 1938 Czechoslovakia had a welltrained and -equipped army and an excellent defense system. The people’s morale was high as proved by the enthusiastic response to the mobilization call. There would have been a fair chance to achieve something by armed resistance since France and Great Britain would probably have come to Czechoslovakia’s aid; indeed, had Czechoslovakia fought, World War II might have ended much sooner than it did. In 1968 too, both the Czechoslovak people #and army would have followed the call to arms instantaneously, although every man, woman and child in the country knew how speedily and completely any armed resistance would have been crushed. Unlike the Hungarians in 1956, the Czechs and Slovaks never expected any armed support from the West and realized why none could be given. It has been argued that even a hopeless fight would have done much for the selfrespect of the nation; it has also been suggested that a people that surrenders without giving battle retains a lasting inferiority complex. Now the Italians have never been noted for spectacular bravery in war, yet there seems to be nothing wrong with their national ego. One must also bear in mind that the Czechs are a highly intelligent and sophisticated people, and intelligence and sophistication are not the paramount qualities of the fighting soldier. To this it may be objected that the Israelis are certainly sophisticated and yet chose to fight. True, but the Arabs were known to be beatable whereas the Russians are not. Nevertheless, the Czechs and Slovaks have no need to hang their heads in shame. It is to their everlasting credit that they let reason prevail over emotion, yet preserved their honor by meeting a
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national disaster of the first magnitude with both dignity and humor. Total passive resistance combined with ridicule was a tactic that had never before been employed by a nation on such a scale and with such telling results (the tirst of the occupying forces had to be recalled after only three days of exposure to this unnerving and demoralizing treatment). The Czechs and Slovaks managed to out of that test with their national honor unblemished; indeed, some of the very people who now say that armed resistance would have been the more honorable course were among those who, like myself, prayed on August 21 and the days that followed that no unpremeditated act might occur that would lead to open battle and cause enormous loss of life and property, laying waste some of Europe’s finest architecture. come
*
+
+
It is possible that the events of last August have cured the Czechs and Slovaks of their traditional brotherly bickering (which had already diminished greatly during the preceding months). However, when it comes to lessons to be learned by the whole of Europe, I honestly cannot think of any. All forms of submission or resistance to superior force and violence have been known to Europe since the early Christians were thrown to the lions and before. True, the tactic of total passive resistance combined with massive ridicule may be a novelty in history; nonetheless, I am afraid that the great, spontaneous action of the Czechs and Slovaks will go down in history as just a glorious piece of Schweikmanship. However, the last act of the drama still remains to be written. The Russians are past masters at tightening the screws and may go on tightening them until some-
thing snaps. And then, God forbid, the world may yet see Czechs and Slovaksand others, for that matter-fighting for their freedom on a scale that ought to m&e to silence the gloomiest skeptic.
From
Tabor
On the question of military defense I think a comparison between 1938 and 1968 is inappropriate. In 1938 it was obvious that a warlike conflict between the great powers and nazism was inevitable, whereas in 1968 the world had an interest in maintaining peaceful coexistence between the two political systems. In 1938 it was possible for the use of weapons to affect the future course of events in Europe. It is an open question how the aggressive might of nazi Germany would have developed without the extra potential which Hitler gained in the form of Czechoslovak equipment and of our arms industry, which he was able to exploit for his own benefit. In 1938according at least to the analyses of experts with hindsight - Czechoslovakia could have stood out for a fairly long period against a nazi attack. And the moment she had gone to war, Europe would have had no option but to intervene. In 1968 things were quite different. The whole deployment of the CzechoSlovak armed forces was and remains for defense against attack from the West. Czechoslovakia belongs to the military bloc of socialist states. She could not count, and did not count, on any military assistance from her opponents against her own allies. Great-power politics, in a world divided into two spheres of in85
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terest as it has been since the last war and as orthodox doctrine would have it remain, gave Czechoslovakia no hope whatever. The regrettable mistake known as the events of August 21, when the armies of five allies entered the territory of the republic by force, could have had a still more tragic outcome if the Czechoslovak army had resorted to arms. It is perfectly clear that there could be no serious contest between the army of a small country and the overwhelming strength of the whole Warsaw Pact. Moreover, it would have been easy to argue that a counterrevolutionary conspiracy against the allies existed, and to use any resistance as proof of the accusations that the mass media of the Five were disseminating in any case. I am myself convinced-and my view is borne out by the findings of public opinion surveys prior to August 21-that the great majority of the people of Czechoslovakia desired no return to capitalism and that “socialism with a human face,” as the new policy after January 1968 came to be called, was in no way designed to hide a reversion to pre-1948 conditions. On the contrary, the purpose was a genuine fusion of socialism with democratic principles, and only a negligible minority expected this development to lead away from friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. It is quite another matter whether it was entirely necessary to accept the Moscow agreement to the extent that it was accepted; or whether it would have been better to hold out, persevere with passive resistance and consistently demand opportunities for explaining our attitude while preserving complete sovereignty-which would have implied the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovak territory. This question is still much discussed in Czechoslovakia. + + l 86
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The second question too is not quite precisely put. I do not regard the next stage as one of passive resistance, but as a period of great activity linking up closely with that of the “Prague spring” and post-January political trends. It is of course greatly affected by what are termed “contemporary realities” in my country, meaning the consequences of the Moscow agreements. These limit our sovereignty and limit our ability to implement the program which the post-January leaders of the Communist Party had made their aim: socialism, based on Marxist-Leninist theory and oriented toward the creation of a communist society, without however abandoning our country’s humanistic and democratic traditions which had been distorted for twenty years. In the early days after January 1968, and still more of course since the August events, extreme left-wing moves were apparent favoring a return to the system of personal power, dirigiste government and rigid centralism regardless of the will and opinion of most of the public -or indeed of most party members. These efforts have been accompanied by demands for the arrest of opponents and amount in practice to a demand for a reversion to the notorious methods of the fifties. The “activity” I have in mind is designed to ensure that the popular will is not overlooked again, that new injustices are not perpetrated, and that limitations on the freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and other points in the original program are really “temporary” and no more. The rehabilitation of persons unjustly sentenced continues. Further laws are under way whose drafting began before the August invasion, such as that on the courts and public prosecutor’s office, which could and ought to constitute guarantees of civic freedom. There is an endeavor to carry out, albeit
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under far harder conditions, as much as possible of the January program of the party and of the other organizations within the National Front. The situation is all too complex. In my opinion the other European communist parties could lend effective assistance in our effort, particularly those which carry the greatest inlluence and for whom the Czechoslovak example holds the most attraction, and who also in their own interest (if they are to gain instead of losing public trust in their own countries) should denounce the theory of “limited sovereignty” of socialist countries and communist parties. Any passive resistance would be a bad move in CzechoSlovakia. It would leave the field open to groups who would like a return to the old conditions. But what the public has been through in my country forbids such a return, at any rate in the shape already well known and discredited. That, at any rate, I regard as axiomatic, if the international communist movement is to be protected from further blows and collisions. A meeting of communist parties is being prepared for next June. At this meeting I expect great things to happen, provided the Western parties’ delegates adopt our positions and stick up for us even (if need be) in defiance of our own delegates. This affords the only genuine prospect of giving back to our country its full sovereignty and power to decide its own future. I believe in this future and have no doubt that it will be a socialist future.
From
London
Before we pose the first question we must weigh the following considerations which can be epitomized in the form of other and very pregnant questions. Were
the Czechs or their government in 1938, and in 1968, capable of making free and independent decisions, and hence of freely and independently asking and answering the question7 (Not that it would then follow that they were incapable of any answer!) The nature of Czechoslovak dependence was different in 1968 from what it was in 1938. Before August 21, 1968, Czechoslovakia could only in a qualified sense be called a sovereign state compared with the extent to which she could have been called one in 1938, or to which Yugoslavia could today. It is justifiable to ask, then, whether Czechoslovakia in 1968, a mere colony as she in effect was after twenty years of comrnunist indoctrination, was a priori capable of making an effective and conscious decision about her own fate. Until we can answer this question, to put the question of whether Czechoslovakia ought to have defended herself or not is like asking a polio victim why he isn’t walking. The reference to polio is no idle simile, but a tragic comparison. The Czech intelligentsia has become gradually aware of this paralysis as the question of the Czech nation‘s r&on d’e^rre raised its head more and more inexorably after January 1968. True, the attempts to answer it showed an incapacity to break free from the irrational world of Palacky and Masaryk, let alone to espouse the valuable element in Pekar’s realism. What was offered, basically, was the unhistoric myth that the truth will, or ought to, prevail, for no one was abIe to reach forward to the historic reality of a truth forever crucified. The penchant for myths, often decked out with oddments of quasi-realism, is a warning example of the loss of feeling for the significance of history in itself, and an example, moveover, of the inability to ask oneself existential questions. Unless of course we are prepared to take the fact that here, outside the realm of Marxism, the possibility of his87
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tory having significance was at least tentatively considered as evidence of a nascent intellectual revision of values. * * * The passive resistance of the August days-which had nothing in common with the Schweik mentality so triumphant during the German protectoratewas a complete reflection of the historical and power-political situation into which Czechoslovakia had got herself between 1948 and 1968. It showed up only too palpably the tragic inner dialectic of her “paralysis,” the contradiction between the relics of bourgeois freedom and pseudosovereignty, and totalitarian enslavement. To continue the metaphor, we might label 1938 as the beginning of the acute stage of the malady (though the suspicion of a hereditary condition is impossible to discount), and August 1968 as one of the sequelae. Only in the context of this paralytic dialectic does Czechoslovakia, 1968 represent a bridge between East and West. Many features of this dialectic can also be applied to Western Europe. Here too there is a deep contradiction between the longing for active defense and the inability to take any real action, or indeed the impossibility of such action. Indirect evidence of this was shown, for example, by Western Europe’s attitude to the Hungarian rising. Nevertheless it seems to us that the “active passivity” of the postinvasion events (a contradiction in terms, like the cold war), rising out of the dialectic we described and intensified by the hatred and despair of the public that had “nothing to lose,” was a form of resist&me. springing from mere (albeit complete) negation, bereft of any long-term view and, as such, is unimaginable in the context of a free and sovereign state. Where it nevertheless provokes not myely admiration but a desire to imitate, this is a sure sign that something is amiss. “Active passivity” is also linked with the concept of the “unity” of the people. 88
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This too has its dialectic, characterized primarily by the anxiety of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to equate its own active passivity and its own contradictory “unity” with the state of the nation. On the part of the party this equation signifies a collapse of power (the period of Dubcek’s rise in this respect resembles that of the Great Patriotic War), whereas in periods of consolidation the party on the contrary stresses conflicts and class antagonisms. The real position after January 1968 may be put very simply: the CzechoSlovak Communist Party was more and more split in itself, the “people” found more and more common ground. The only road to salvation was for the party to identify itself with this “popular unity” as the fragile basis for a tentative and halting trend toward democracy. This fraternization between party and people in the name of “unity” proceeded under the deceptively noncommittal slogan of “humane and enlightened socialism.” During the August days this false unity under the shadow of the party was welded together by the shock of invading tanks, and the public began zealously to fraternize even with the secret police. But the high point had already passed. Handshakes with the police were not enough to dispel the anxiety that began to corrode popular unity, at which point the party, now firmly in the saddle, began consistently and prudently to draw away from the people. The dialectic of the people-and-party pseudo-unity also underlies the outward dialectic of the “active passivity” of August. The techniques of political combat, developed to a fine art by the communists, collided with one another before the eyes of a bewildered world; a kind of sublimated terror interwoven with passive resistance on the one side, opposing quite overt terror combined with Red
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Army songs on the other. There was no confrontation of clearly outlined opposing forces, but a maze of lines intersecting in an infinitely intriguing dialectic. Two observations, however, suffice, broadly speaking, to cut through the Gordian knot. The first is that the Communist Party is neither able nor anxious to fight against itself (which is compensated for, logically enough, by the mutual recriminations among its members). Second, the Czechs and the great majority of their intelligentsia have become incapable of coping with the residue of 1948 inside themselves; they wander in a circle
of hope and disappointments, spellbound in a world of mere potentialities. An alarming sign of this fact, and of this failure, is the emergence of the young, even the small children, as the last hope of a dwindling nation. But I would warn against any temptation to equate this situation with the psuedo-revolution of youth in the West. There is a fundamental difference here between the utopian privileges claimed by Western youth (which are a purely biological matter) and those claimed by youth in the East, which are related to reality, rooted in history and have to do with the spirit.
-
A Comment
by
Evzen Loebl
Could the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia have been predicted? I happen to be one of those who believed that it could not. Why? After the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. in 1956, the Soviet government issued a declaration condemning Stalin’s disregard for the sovereignty of its allies and solemnly pledging itself to a policy of noninterference. This pronouncement was made for good reasons: Stalin’s rule had brought the Soviet Union almost to the verge of economic and political catastrophe; the cold war was an unbearable burden on Soviet society and the concentration of power in the hands of the despot and his apparut had brought about an ossification which threatened to reduce the U.S.S.R. to a second-rate power. A rejection of Stalinist concepts as well as a certain relaxation in the spheres of politics and ideology could, therefore, have been anticipated, though the form, extent and intensity of these changes would have been impossible to predict. The effect of Stahn’s power politics on Czechoslovakia had been decisive. The country’s determination to follow its own road to socialism represented for him a direot challenge to the supremacy of the U.S.S.R. A principle was at stake: it was not merely a question of which road to socialism Cz&rosIovakia would choose, but of whether it would be allowed any independent choice in the matter at all. The means employed to engineer the country’s submission on this point were subtle. It was not sufficient simply to remove those in high office who were in the way; the whole party and government policy had to be 89