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would be happy to support the authors' proposition that "each myth of nature is a partial representation of reality". On the other hand I have great difficulty in accepting the idea of creating a "grand theory" whereby we can explain the world. Might there not be a risk of the theory itself being made a "way of life", which researchers with the same cultural bias fight to maintain by talking and writing to each other? I agree with the authors when they say that a critical theory worthy of the name must be critical of all biases. I hope this also goes for the "Cultural Theory"! Leif Borgert
University College of Falun, Borliinge
Organisationsbegrepp och begreppsmedvetenhet (Concepts of organization and conceptual consciousness), by Owe L. Johansson (Gothenburg: BAS, 1990), Dissertation, 160 pp., ISBN 91-7246-0849. This dissertation deals with the reification of organizational concepts, and possible ways of avoiding this problem. The author identifies two forms of reification of which it is important to be aware in social science (and in thinking in general). One is the reification of institutions, i.e. the tendency to view social entities as units existing independently of, and above, human actors. In organization theory this problem is evident, for example in talk about the decisions, needs, actions and survival of organizations. Another form of reification is hypostatization, the reification of language, which means that concepts are taken as given and are seen as reflections of external realities rather than as human constructs. Language and reality are confused. Common to both forms of reification is that language and institutions attain a thing-like status, and their character as human products is obscured. Johansson emphasizes that reification in the first sense creates ideological problems, for example by obscuring differences between the interests of different groups in an organization, while the major problem of hypostatization is that it obstructs the critical testing of ideas and understanding. The author's project is a critical-metatheoretical one, guided by an emancipatory cognitive interest aimed at investigating the deeper aspects of theory and concepts. He regards the critique of deology as a vital task for social science something that is certainly not common in (Swedish) dissertions in business administration (as the discipline is called in this country) or management. I see this deviation from the mainstream as positive. In the major part of the book, the author discusses various traditions and schools in social science and organization theory. Reification-oriented variants such as Durkheimian holism and contingency theory are criticized, while Weberian methodological individualism, Weick's social psychology of organizing, and cognitive situationism which focuses on the thinking and sense making processes of actors in a situational context, all win the approval of the author. Johansson treats different versions of system theory. Those versions that emphasize strong dependency relations within the system, thus providing little space for individual autonomy, are criticized by the author for reifying -
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organizations. H e mentions Burns and Stalker, and claims that both their mechanistic and organic models are based on a reified approach. In the organic case, individuals are closely integrated with the organization as a result of shared norms and understandings and, as in the mechanistic case, the organization is seen as self-going. But some versions of system thinking, the author argues, are not committed to such a reification-oriented view. Weick, with his interpretations of organizations as coalitions of autonomous actors, is the best example. Despite his case against reification, Johansson recognizes the need for pluralism in organization theory, and considers all groups and all perspectives should be represented in the discipline. While the management perspective sometimes calls for a reificationoriented perspective, this is to some extent unavoidable and even legitimate. The problem is how to cope with it without falling into the cognitive and ideological traps of reification. In Chapter 5, the author tries to get his two ideals - - pluralism and critique of reification - - to come to terms with one another. Here he talks about perspectivemotivated assumptions, i.e. research assumptions that are based on instrumental and practical needs rather than on the understanding of ontological and epistemological issues. He advocates the development of a regulative conceptual consciousness - - which means that people are aware that concepts are tools for understanding and interpretation and not mirrors of reality, and are consequently not to be confused with that reality. Given such an awareness, people can talk about organizations without falling into the traps of reification. (To the author reification is a cognitive rather than a language problem. So long as reification thinking is avoided, reification in wording can be allowed.) We can, for the sake of convenience, talk about organizations "as if" they were self-going and "real", without actually believing that such is the case. In the developing of a regulative conceptual awareness Brunsson's ideal of research as language creation, Weber's ideal types and Morgan's (among many others') ideas on metaphors all provide valuable impulses. Johansson also stresses the need for micro anchoring organizational concepts, which he feels is best done if researchers avoid functionalist jargon, stress coalitions instead of monolithic organizational images, investigate the extent to which organizations are integrated, and work with network analyses and relations instead of fixed structures. Thus he offers some constructive, albeit not very novel ideas about how to deal with the problem of reification. I had expected to find investigations of different organizational concepts from a reification-critical point of view, e.g. management, organizational structure, work organization and corporate culture, but the author only discusses organization as such as a reification problem. Some of the more interesting nuances of the problem are thus not addressed in the book. I also miss a more thorough treatment of the ideology of reification. It is easy to agree that talking about a particular company's interest may obscure interest differences within the company, but the author goes no further and adds nothing to that already well-known claim. Some illustrations of reification problems in the shape of penetrating interpretations of a number of contemporary organization theory texts could have clarified the nature and scope of the problem better, and would have encouraged more discriminative reflections in his readers. Johansson structures the problem well and treats it in a straightforward manner. The firm anti-reification stance can lead to other problems, to which the author does not pay serious attention. It is easy to avoid reification, but then to fall into the trap of reductionism - - something that can result from focussing on individuals rather than
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institutions. The emphasis on leaders and leadership in much management thinking and literature tends to generate ideologies based on elitism and heroism, and ideas about the Great Man. Another problem connected with the reification issue is that it is often related to the macro--micro theme, and reification easily becomes identified with a macro orientation. Part of Johansson's book unfortunately adopts such a view. Macro equals bad, while micro equals good. But the macro-micro theme does not necessarily have any direct connection with the reification problem. Macro aspects do not automatically involve reified assumptions, nor does a micro approach exclude individuals or groups being treated in a thing-like way (e.g. in behaviourism). The book is fairly short, the writing is clear and to the point. On the whole it demonstrates a satisfactory awareness of the metatheoretical aspects of organization and social science. However, there are examples of eclecticism that weaken the text. Johansson refers approvingly to both Habermas and Popper, and indicates that they go well together. The great differences between these two authors are mentioned only in passing. Johansson also finds support for the idea of weakly integrated systems in Buckley. But Buckley's very abstract, bloodless and self-going system concept seems very different from the strongly non-reificatory approach advocated by Johansson. It also seems to me that there is a contradiction between sympathy for critical theory and an unqualified approval of pluralism. Critical theory is dubious about organization theory developing into a sort of supermarket, offering something for every taste. Despite a number of weaknesses and questionable issues I find this dissertation well worth reading. It is well written and instructive. It includes a number of brief but worthwhile comments on a variety of topics. It addresses an important subject and indicates ways of dealing with it. It makes a contribution to enhancing our awareness of organization concept and it may help to counteract certain cognitive traps associated with reified understandings of organizational phenomena. Mats Alvesson
University of Stockholm