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Organizing space for development planning: the case of Jordan
POLITICALGEOGRAPHYQUARTERLY, Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1988, 271-281
Political geography in practice I
Organizing space for development planning: the case of Jordan R. D. HONEY
Department of Geography, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 62242, USA AND S. ABU KHAKMEH
Ministry of Planning, Amman, Jordan ABSTRACT. Jordan's current five-year plan marks a significant break with the past. It emphasizes regional rather than sectoral planning and includes development of a four-tier regional planning system. Key roles are to be played by the Ministry of Planning and local Devdopment Councils consisting of public and private representatives. Implementation will determine whether the government actually decentralizes power or merely deconcentrates it.
Jordan is a small country living beyond its means. Visitors to the vibrant capital of Amman are struck by the high standard of living of the sizable westernized elite. Away from Amman, as well as in the capital's slums, poor people live more humbly, more traditionally. Though a staunchly capitalist state, Jordan has a modicum of planning, articulated every five years in a plan for social and economic development. The current plan ( 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 ) differs markedly from those of the past in that it follows a regional rather than sectoral strategy. The plan incorporates a territorial structure for regional development. It also involves a deconcentration--possibly even a decentralization--of power.1 This paper is an insider's interpretation of the spatial aspects of the plan--how the government created a regional structure to promote economic and social development as well as how this very centralized state dealt with and altered various components of its state apparatus to achieve its ends. 2 The authors endeavour to get below the level of appearances by using their knowledge of how the planning structure was created--including the interests threatened by various aspects of the proposal. T h e H a s h e m i t e K i n g d o m of J o r d a n Understanding Jordan's economic development strategy requires understanding Jordan's political economy (including very significant spatial aspects of that political economy) as well 0260-9827188/03 0271-I1 $03.00 © 1988 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd
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Organizing spacefor development planning in Jordan
as its geopolitical situation. In recent years Jordan has been an island of calm in a sea of turmoil) Jordan's leaders understand the precarious nature of their economy and (conse~ quently) their stability. They view more equitable development (or at least the perception of equity) as a means of maintaining stability. They are also acutely aware of the politicogeographical aspects of their international and domestic situations. Jordan as a country
Nationality in the Arab world is a dualistic phenomenon, with identity both as an Arab (and with the Arab Nation) and as a national of a sovereign state. (Jordan's customs service, for example, divides entrants into three groups: Jordanians; other Arabs; and foreigners). The sovereign countries of the Arab world are basically 20th-centu~ creations, emerging from the vacuum of imperial collapse. They are not nation-states in the conventional sense of a single nation in its own state (Mikesell, 1983). Jordan's sovereignty is the product of three main events. First was the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a consequence of the Great Arab Revolt and World War I (Sachar, 1969; Mousa, 1982). The Turks had, of course, controtled all of Greater Syria, incorporating all the lands of current Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and beyond. The second main event was the emergence of the Hashemites as the chief Arab military force in what became Jordan (Kedourie, 1978; Mousa, 1978). Of some significance in this largely Muslim land is that the Hashemites trace their lineage back to the Prophet, Mohammed (Harris, 1958). The third major event was the British Mandate through which Britain actually ruled in the area until after World War LI(Drysdale and Blake, 1985). Britain, through its usual imperial strategy of indirect rule, solidified the hegemony of the Hashemites. The product of these events is a country with strong self-identity within the family of Arab states. The most important geo-political fact in Jordan's existence is location next to Israel; indeed, the history of the two since independence has been of rancour, well-documented elsewhere. 4 For present purposes a few significant points will suffice. First, East Bank Jordan has been burdened by an influx of Palestinian refugees, once when Israel proclaimed its independence and emerged triumphant in the 1948 war, then again when Israel occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank in 1967. Second, Israel retains control of the West Bank and has annexed East Jerusalem. Since 1967 Jordan's East Bank population has consisted of more Palestinians than East Bank Jordanians. This was a destabilizing factor in Jordan, culminating in civil war in 1970, the eventual result being the expulsion of Yasir Ararat and his Palestine Liberation Organization. The Arab League in 1974 recognized the PLO as 'the sole legitimate representative' of the Palestinian people. Nevertheless, even through the occupation, Jordan continues to provide a range of public services to Palestinians on the West Bank, as well as to Palestinians in refugee camps in Jordan. Contemporary Jordan is basically pro-Western and moderate, caught between the blindly pro-Israeli stance of its sometimes ally and protector, the United States, and the doggedly anti-Israeli attitudes of most Arabs, including Jordanians. (Jordan's frequent peace initiatives are constrained by the political realities within the country and within the Middle East, but that is another tale.) Jordan as a place
Jordan's development strategy is closely tailored to the country's geographical reality. Jordan is a small country with a rapidly growing population of close to 3 000 000 and an East Bank area of almost 100000 square kilometers (about the same as Hungary or the
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273
American state of Indiana). The country has three distinct and quite significant physiographic regions. The eastern three-quarters of the territory is virtually uninhabited desert, or Badia. The western edge of the country is the rift valley, or Ghor as it is known locally, that contains the Jordan River and Dead Sea, extending south to the port of Aqaba. The Ghor is important for irrigated agriculture and mineral production, and Aqaba, as the nation's only seaport, is vital. Most of the people live in the narrow strip of highlands running the full length of the country, north-south between the Ghor and the Badia. Rainfall is greater in the northern highlands, as is population density. Jordan's population is expected to double in 20 years. The annual population growth rate of 3.5 percent during the 1960s and 1970s was one of the highest in the world. In addition, Jordan has had a 5 percent annual net immigration rate thanks largely to the influx of Palestinians from the occupied territories. More recently the immigration rate has stayed up because of the return of skilled Jordanian workers laid off because of declines in oil production in the Arabian Gulf. Jordan's population is highly concentrated. Metropolitan Amman, when defined to include neighboring towns with strong commuting links, has well over 1 000 000 people and a disproportionate share of the nation's jobs and wealth (see Table 1 ). Aside from Zarqa, a satellite of Amman, the next largest city is Irbid with about 150000 residents. Most of the towns with populations above 10 000 are in the north. Government officials are concerned about the growing gap in material standard of living between Amman and the rest of the country, and they are determined to reverse the trend. This is a formidable task. Most Jordanians are Sunni Muslims and Islam is the state religion. Christians constitute TABLE ~[. Urban hierarchy in Jordan
City 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.
Amman Zarqa* Irbid Russeifa" Baq'ah* Salt" Aqaba Madaba Ramtha Wadi Seer* Suwaileh* Shniller* Maffaq* Quaismeh" Tafileh Sahab" Mshairfeh" Karak Ma'an Jarash Ghazzeh Mokhayyam Jbaiha* Kofranjah
1985 population (O00s)
2000 population (O00s)
913 336 143 63 54 41 35 35 33 31 31 29 26 19 15 15 14 14 13 12 11 10 10
1513 481 242 107 84 66 62 57 54 56 55 46 40 33 22 23 23 22 20 20 15 18 14
Source: Jordan TelecommunicationsCompany • Within commutingdistance of Amman
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Organizing spacefor development planning in Jordan
a 15 percent minority, however, and their rights are guaranteed: Partly through traditional tolerance and partly through governmental repression. Jordan has to date evaded the excesses of Islamic fundamentalism. Drinking--taboo to Muslims but not Jordan's Christians--is open and legal, except during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan)
Power relationships in Jordan Though Jordan is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, the king is indeed the true power in the country, appointing the cabinet, controlling the militaw, and generally governing. In his long reign he has learned to weld the other powers in the country, paying great attention to the interests of competing factions. His cabinets, for example, balance the many constituencies within the Kingdom--some posts for Christians, some for Circassians, and so forth. Part of his success is utilization of tribal leaders. 6 The urban economic elite is often synonymous with the tribal elite. This is especially so for tribes profiting from the sale of land (at greatly inflated prices) around Amman. Jordan is evolving into a capitalist society but with land a major means of wealth. Modern exchange is the norm in Amman. Among Arab countries Jordan has the highest level of education. Foreign degrees are common. Education is seen very definitely as the avenue to success. In fact, Jordan has a shortage of manual workers even though its economy has a shortage of jobs for those with higher education. At the same time that Jordanian engineers flock to the Gulf, Egyptians flock to Jordan for work as day labourers. 7 (Economic decline has reduced both of these flows.)
Territorial administration Government below the national level in Jordan is much more local administration than genuinely local government: it administers policies for the central government more than promulgating and executing policies determined by locally chosen representatives (Johnston, 1982; Ghosheh, 1985). Governorates (or provinces) form the highest level of sub-national government. The eight governorates are based on city regions, i.e. the areas of dominance of the largest cities (Dickinson, 1947). The governors are appointed by the central government. Quite significantly, as far as regional development is concerned, they are part of the central government's cabinet. The governors' chief job is to administer central government policy. National funds for local areas filter through the governorates before disbursal. The governorates, on paper at least, are divided into districts and sometimes sub-districts. These, too, are centrally defined and controlled. Towns and villages have locally elected councils and mayors. Typically tribal groups are represented. These councils have very modest budgets and powers. Real power, both political and economic, is concentrated in Amman.
The spatial economy Buoyed by the rising prosperity of its oil-rich neighbors in the 1970s, Jordan's economy suffered when oil prices collapsed in the mid 1980s. For years the major source of foreign exchange in Jordan has been remittances from Jordanians working abroad. These have decreased sharply with the oil recession. Similarly, Jordan's Arab neighbors have not purchased the expected amounts of Jordan's cement, phosphate and potash. In addition, grants from Arab donors, whether for Palestinian refugees or more generally, have shrunk.
R. D. HONEYAND S. ABU KHARMEH
275
TABLE 2. Distribution of industrial and services establishments among govemorates No. of industrial establishments employing five workers or more
%
No. of services establishments
%
Amman Zarqa Balqa Irbid Maffaq Karak Tafeela Ma'an
1014 195 39 224 28 22 9 53
64.0 12.3 2.5 14.0 1.8 1.4 0.6 3.4
9497 1723 485 247 736 255 1287 35
66.6 12.1 3.4 1.7 5.2 1.8 9.0 0.3
Total
1584
100.0
14272
100.0
Governorate
Source: Jordan's 1986-90 Plan for Economicand Social Development
The sum is a much more precarious economy than Jordanian leaders expected when they promulgated the 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 5 Plan. Domestically the big issue is equity. (Some officials in the Ministry cf Planning even argue for equity at the expense of economic growth.) Employment and business opportunities are concentrated in Amman, and the gap between rich and poor, even in the urban areas, is growing. An examination of the distribution of economic activities proves how skewed in A m m a n ' s favor the spatial economy is (see Table 2). The government is concerned about the unbalanced growth, partly fearing A m m a n ' s success could be selfconsuming but even more that differences between center and periphery will reach a point that only in the center would people be able to achieve a high quality of living. 8
Planning in Jordan While Jordan does not have a planned economy in the Soviet sense, it does have national planning, in part to nationalize the development aid coming from oti~er Arab states, North America and Europe, in part in an effort to manage both the economy and social welfare. The 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 Plan for Economic and Social Development is the country's fifth national plan. The others were basically sectoral, establishing investment priorities and policies within each sector. They suffered from a paucity of regional coordination. The current plan is emphatically regional, not only in its emphasis on development away from the capital, but also in its establishment of a system of regional planning. The plan is based on five fundamental principles. While the stated principles are clearly for political advantages internally and externally, they are informative. The principles are ( 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 Plan: 102): 1. Jordan is an integral part of the Arab world. (This principle justifies Jordan's aid from other Arab countries, not only to share the burden of the Palestinian refugees but also to share the benefits of oil.) 2. Jordan is committed to individual initiative and the private sector's role in the development process. (This principle coincides with the preferences of both the Reagan Administration and Jordan's economic elite.)
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Organizing spacefor development planning in Jordan
3. Jordan seeks social justice in ensuring a more equitable distribution of income among the various social groups and across regions. (This is an explicit call for greater equity among regions, a clear justification for regional development planning.) 4. Jordan regards international cooperation as fundamental to the process of development. (This is a commitment to reduce economic barriers in order to achieve a more efficient world economy--but also to solidify a claim for Western aid.) 5. Jordan seeks popular participation in planning and development. (This is a commitment to decentralize political power, perhaps a real commitment but clearly an effort to marshal political support.) Following from these principles (especially the third and fifth), a major component of the current plan is the creation of a hierarchical regional planning apparatus with initiative and responsibility at the lower levels to be shared by local residents and staff provided by the Ministry of Planning. This is a real transformation of power relationships with people, or at least local elites, participating directly in regional development decisions. The Ministry, after prolonged internal discussions, included a regional planning structure and regional planning process in the 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 Plan. These are being implemented now. The Ministry defined the role of the planning apparatus as regional development, in particular providing economic opportunities so that people can gain control of their lives. Thought within the Ministry, from the Minister on down, was that small, locally controlled projects were more likely to prove profitable in the long run than the very expensive large projects of the past, e.g. the second cement plant at Tafileh. (As a consequence of the construction of the plant, Jordan has excess capacity during an economic slump.)
Four-tier hierarchy Ministry officials eventually settled on a four-tier planning structure, not surprisingly with a very strong role by the Ministry itself. Before the 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 Plan the Ministry had not really practised regional (in the sense of spatial) planning. The new plan changes that. The Ministry developed a geographical information system, including a Iocational network with all settlements and roads, and collected data both from field surveys and the line ministries. In short, the Ministry is the top tier in the system, operating as the national planning level in the regional planning system. Ministry staff liaise with the line ministries and governorates, as well as conducting a variety of spatial analyses. The Ministry, in conjunction with Jordan's National Geographic Center is preparing a planning atlas that includes plates showing the distributions of public facilities and private enterprises, as well as areas of need. The governorates form the second tier in the regional planning system. Each governorate, in accordance with the plan, is to have a modest planning staff working in conjunction with the Ministry of Planning. The Ministry is to provide requisite data to each governorate and assist in analysis. The govemorates are to update data for Ministry files. The governorate structure is used by the line ministries, so coordination within the governorates will be improved through use of the governorates as regional planning agencies. The third level in the planning hierarchy is subdivisions of the governorates to be known as developmental subregions. This level is to be very important in the planning structure. Each subregion will have a development council consisting of private and public leaders. A small staff will assist each council. The staff is to be linked via the appropriate governorate, to the Ministry of Planning. The development councils are to design strategies for economic development for their subregions. They are to work with international donors as well as
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FIGURE 1. Zarqa development-planning region, sub-regions and development units, showing socio-economicand physical linkages. officials of lending institutions and central government to identify, design and execute projects to expand employment and income in their subregions. Where the Ministry of Planning and governorates have predetermined territories, the subregions are new entities. The Ministry's general criterion for delimiting the territories of the subregions was appropriateness for regional planning (Honey et al., 1985). More specifically, Ministry officials used two kinds of criteria: physiography, because the three physical regions have very different development problems and potential; and the strength of social and economic linkages because areas strongly interconnected should be planned together. A third criterion, which did not prove to be limiting, was that subregions should not cross governorate boundaries. Ministerial officials considered a population threshold requirement, but this was rejected by Ministerial leaders. Given the known location of governorate boundaries and where the physiographic regions change, the task became one of assessing the patterns of linkages among places. Ministry officials used a 30-variable computer algorithm to assess the linkages of each place with other places. The 30 variables included such things as where village children go to school (for each level of school), where villagers receive medical care, where local people work, where shops obtain their supplies, and where farmers get their supplies and sell their products. The linkages revealed a quite consistent three-level hierarchy within each governorate. This hierarchy provided for first-cut definition of subregions by using the second-level locations as subregion centers (see Figure 1 ). Alternative configurations were developed and debated within the Ministry (see Table 3). These took account of other cultural and historical factors, as well as district boundaries. Eventually the Ministry settled on a set of subregions for public consumption. These were then introduced in each governorate for comments and suggestions before determining the final alignments. The Ministry eventually settled on a set of 37 subregions (see Table 4). The lowest level in the planning hierarchy is clusters of villages known as development
Organizing spacefor development planning in Jordan
278
TABLE 3. Proposed development council areas for Jordan
Governorate
Proposed"
Proposed
Aman
Greater Amman Madaba
Balqa
Salt Balqa Baq'ah Basin
Irbid
Irbid Korah Ajloun Jerash Ramtha Irbid Ghor Bani Kenaneh Karak Sail Qatrana Aqaba ma'an Wadi Musa
Greater Amman Madaba Ruseifa Suweilih Sahab Salt North Ghor South Ghor North Balqa Baq'ah Basin Irbid Korah Ajloun Jerash Ramtha Irbid Ghor
Karak
Ma'an
Tafileh
Tafileh
Mafraq
Maffaq Wadi Hamad Zarqa Dulail Azraq
Zarqa
Karak
Aqaba Ma'an Wadi Musa Wadi Arabah Tafileh Bsairah Hassa Mafraq Zarqa Azraq
Source: Honey,et al. (1985) units. The development unit is chiefly a communication conduit conveying local preferences to the development councils at the subregion level. Each development unit is represented on the appropriate development council. Membership in a development unit usually conforms with the third-tier pattern in the linkage analysis. As with the subregions, alternatives were considered, and the public had a chance to voice objections.
Implementation Some governors relished the regional planning system and began implementing it even before approved by the cabinet. Others have been more cautious. The system is being implemented and should be fully operating by the conclusion of the period of the current plan, i.e. the end of 1990. The extent and nature of implementation will reveal the true commitment of central government to decentralization. If central powers retain all important decisions with execution at the local level, the government will have achieved
R. D. HONEY AND S. ABU KHAP,MEH
279
TABLE 4. Regional planning units
Governorate Amman
Sub-regions
Sub-total
Amman Ma'adaba Na'our Sahab-Muwaqqar 4 Zarqa Dulail Azraq 3 Irbid First Irbid Second Ramtha Bani Kananah North Ghors Koura Ajloun Jerash 8 Mafraq North desert 2 Balqa Ghor Balqa Middle Balqa'a Basin 3 Karak Qasr South Mazar Ay Sail Desert 6 Tafeela Bsairah Hassa 3 Ma'an A1-Husseiniah AI-Shoubak Wadi Mousa Desert Aqaba Quwairah Wadi Araba 8
Grand Total
37
Sub-total Zarqa Sub-total Irbid
Sub-total Mafraq Sub-total Balqa Sub-total Karak
Sub-total Tafeela Sub-total Ma'an
No. of development units ! 8 4 2 15 5 i
1 7 5 6 2 3 4 4 6 8 38 6 8 I4 7 7 4 18 i 3 3 i 2 1 11 3 2 1 6 3 1 1 2
zN[o. of villages 52 143 38 25 258 36 7 6 49 28 42 6 21 4 31 53 55 283 76 73 149 25 4O 17 82 38 22 41 6 i0 5 122
1 1 3 15
23 10 3 36 17 6 21 18 13 14 6 9 104
124
1083
280
Organizing spacefor development planning in Jordan
deconcentration. If, on the other hand, the very centralized Jordanian state actually empowers development councils as envisioned in the proposed structure, Jordan could have its first truly significant decentralization of power. Whether either will really generate economic growth in Jordan's hinterland is still another matter. The problems are acute. Certainly one can argue that the people most affected should have a chance to improve their economic well-being. A fear of some critics within the Ministry is that control by distant rulers will simply transfer to the local elite, still leaving the ordinary people impoverished and powerless. If implemented as designed, the regional planning structure would change the political economy of Jordan. Whether such implementation, based on a neo-classical, trickle-down theory as it is, can bring about a better quality of life for the bulk of the inhabitants of rural Jordan, is yet to be seen. Advocates argue that this is the best chance, with a Rawlsian optimism that economic success will improve the lot of the worst off, even if some get rich (Rawls, 1972). 9 Significance Jordan is not an advanced capitalist state with a fully democratic political system. In fact, it is in some ways a feudal society trying to modernize by virtually skipping an industrial phase. In addition, it is a monarchy more than a democracy, i.e. a constitutional monarchy with more emphasis on monarchy than constitution. Nevertheless, central state-local state relationships are instructive, as are the ways the state organizes space. Clearly the Jordanian state, either acting on behalf of the King or by aczions of the King, has maintained order through strong central control. Subnational government has really amounted to local administration rather than genuinely local government (in the sense of locally-chosen people determining important policies). The 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 Plan appears to reverse this, yielding power (and responsibility) to coalitions of local political and business leaders. The local state apparatus of the development councils should be useful to the central state in two important ways. First, they placate petit-capitalist demands for participation in power. Second, they are consistent with the type of society that the regime is trying to build--a contented citizenry in which prosperity is either shared outright or perceived to be attainable by a broad spectrum of people. In terms of spatial organization, the government implicitly concentrated on two quite different organizing principles. By dividing space on the basis of physiography the government adopted a public-choice principle: people in different kinds of places should be able to make different kinds of choices, set different kinds of policies (Koleda, 1971). By joining areas on the basis of interaction patterns the government internalized externalities, bringing together the people whose daily lives are intertwined and therefore whose economic prospects are inseparable (Honey, 1976). All but the smallest contemporary societies organize space into political units, whether genuine organs of local or self-governmem or just territories for administering central government policies and delivering public goods. The ways Jordan does this differ from the ways of Western democracies. Nevertheless, the government of Jordan does organize space. The recent changes in that spatial organization are a partial restructuring of society with a potential of redistributing benefits within the society, possibly regressively, possibly progressively. Notes 1. Deconcentration connotes moving decisions away from the center, even though those making the decisions are still responsible to the leaders in the center. Decentralization connotes actually
R. D. HONEY AND S. ABU KHARMEH
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yielding decisions from the central state to iocally chosen leaders. 2. The authors worked during the period of preparation of the plan in Jordan's Ministry, of Planning, Abu Kharmeh as a staff researcher and analyst, Honey as a consultant. They met with decision-makers of ali levels within the Ministry., as well as with cabinet members and even Crown Prince Hassan, who took a direct and active interest in preparation of the plan. 3. Aside from the significant exception of the Black September civil war in 1970 (and the subsequent expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization), despite an official continuing state of war with Israel, Jordan has in fact been at peace since 1967. The level of violence, even with a small number of assassinations, is well below that of North America and Europe. 4. For two different approaches see Drysdale and Blake (1985) and Laquer (1970). 5. A fascinating sight after the announcement of a new cabinet is the throngs of tribesmen wearing their distinctive headdresses (their own pattern of the traditional kafiyyeh) gathering at the appropriate ministry to congratulate their tribesman on his new appointment. 6. Jordan is also a strongly patriarchical society. The family unit is very strong with fathers exercising dictatorial powers, even over their adult offspring. Offenses committed against an individual are also committed against that person's family. Females have clearly inferior status. 7. Jordan's Muslims are Sunnis, a fact, along with government policy, explaining the absence of photographs of the Ayatollah Khomeini, which, by contrast, have a prominent presence in the nearby Syrian capital, Damascus. 8. Jordanian efforts to provide social services in the countryside are borne out by findings that only a fraction of one percent of the population is more than ten kilometers from a school or health clinic. The government's problem is staffing these facilities (Honey, 1985). All too frequently teachers in remote areas are soldiers completing their compulsory two-year tour of duty. Likewise, health clinics are understaffed, many open only one day a week because physicians refuse to live in remote areas. Jordan has the irony of a physician shortage while having one of the highest rates of physicians per 10000 people of any country. 9. RaMs argues that change that enriches some is just if everyone, even the worst-off person, is better-off as a consequence of the change.
References
DICKINSON,R. E. (1947). City, Region and Regionalism. London: Routledge. DRYSDALE,A. AND BLAKE,G. H. (1985). The Middle East and North Africa. New York: Oxford University Press. GHOSHEH,Z. (1985). Public Administration in Jordan. Amman: University of Jordan Press. HARRIS,G. L. (1958). Jordan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. New Haven: HRAF Press. HONEY, R. (1976). Conflicting problems in the political organization of space. Annals of Regional Science X, 45-60. HONEY, R. ET AL. (1985). Proposed Planning Areas for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Amman: Ministry of Planning. Jo~,4sroN, R. J. (1982). Geography and the State. London: The Macmillan Press. Jordan's 1986-I990 Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986). Amman: Ministry of Planning. KEDOURIE,E. (1978). England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, I914-1921. London: Harvester Press. KOLEDA,M. S. (1971). A public good model of government consolidation. Urban Studies VIII, 103-110. LAQUER,W. (1970). The Arab-Israeli Reader. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books. MOUSA,S. (1978). T. E. Lawrence: An Arab View. London: Oxford University Press. MOUSA,S. (i 982). Jordan: towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, 1841 - 1918. In Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan (A. Hadldl ed.) pp. 385-391. Amman: Department of Antiquities. MNESELL, M. (1983). Cultural political geography. Paper presented to meeting of West Lakes Division AAG, Amana, Iowa. RAwts, J. (1972). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. SacHaR, H. M. (1969). The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-24. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Political geography in practice I
Organizing space for development planning: the case of Jordan R. D. HONEY
Department of Geography, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 62242, USA AND S. ABU KHAKMEH
Ministry of Planning, Amman, Jordan ABSTRACT. Jordan's current five-year plan marks a significant break with the past. It emphasizes regional rather than sectoral planning and includes development of a four-tier regional planning system. Key roles are to be played by the Ministry of Planning and local Devdopment Councils consisting of public and private representatives. Implementation will determine whether the government actually decentralizes power or merely deconcentrates it.
Jordan is a small country living beyond its means. Visitors to the vibrant capital of Amman are struck by the high standard of living of the sizable westernized elite. Away from Amman, as well as in the capital's slums, poor people live more humbly, more traditionally. Though a staunchly capitalist state, Jordan has a modicum of planning, articulated every five years in a plan for social and economic development. The current plan ( 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 ) differs markedly from those of the past in that it follows a regional rather than sectoral strategy. The plan incorporates a territorial structure for regional development. It also involves a deconcentration--possibly even a decentralization--of power.1 This paper is an insider's interpretation of the spatial aspects of the plan--how the government created a regional structure to promote economic and social development as well as how this very centralized state dealt with and altered various components of its state apparatus to achieve its ends. 2 The authors endeavour to get below the level of appearances by using their knowledge of how the planning structure was created--including the interests threatened by various aspects of the proposal. T h e H a s h e m i t e K i n g d o m of J o r d a n Understanding Jordan's economic development strategy requires understanding Jordan's political economy (including very significant spatial aspects of that political economy) as well 0260-9827188/03 0271-I1 $03.00 © 1988 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd
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Organizing spacefor development planning in Jordan
as its geopolitical situation. In recent years Jordan has been an island of calm in a sea of turmoil) Jordan's leaders understand the precarious nature of their economy and (conse~ quently) their stability. They view more equitable development (or at least the perception of equity) as a means of maintaining stability. They are also acutely aware of the politicogeographical aspects of their international and domestic situations. Jordan as a country
Nationality in the Arab world is a dualistic phenomenon, with identity both as an Arab (and with the Arab Nation) and as a national of a sovereign state. (Jordan's customs service, for example, divides entrants into three groups: Jordanians; other Arabs; and foreigners). The sovereign countries of the Arab world are basically 20th-centu~ creations, emerging from the vacuum of imperial collapse. They are not nation-states in the conventional sense of a single nation in its own state (Mikesell, 1983). Jordan's sovereignty is the product of three main events. First was the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a consequence of the Great Arab Revolt and World War I (Sachar, 1969; Mousa, 1982). The Turks had, of course, controtled all of Greater Syria, incorporating all the lands of current Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and beyond. The second main event was the emergence of the Hashemites as the chief Arab military force in what became Jordan (Kedourie, 1978; Mousa, 1978). Of some significance in this largely Muslim land is that the Hashemites trace their lineage back to the Prophet, Mohammed (Harris, 1958). The third major event was the British Mandate through which Britain actually ruled in the area until after World War LI(Drysdale and Blake, 1985). Britain, through its usual imperial strategy of indirect rule, solidified the hegemony of the Hashemites. The product of these events is a country with strong self-identity within the family of Arab states. The most important geo-political fact in Jordan's existence is location next to Israel; indeed, the history of the two since independence has been of rancour, well-documented elsewhere. 4 For present purposes a few significant points will suffice. First, East Bank Jordan has been burdened by an influx of Palestinian refugees, once when Israel proclaimed its independence and emerged triumphant in the 1948 war, then again when Israel occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank in 1967. Second, Israel retains control of the West Bank and has annexed East Jerusalem. Since 1967 Jordan's East Bank population has consisted of more Palestinians than East Bank Jordanians. This was a destabilizing factor in Jordan, culminating in civil war in 1970, the eventual result being the expulsion of Yasir Ararat and his Palestine Liberation Organization. The Arab League in 1974 recognized the PLO as 'the sole legitimate representative' of the Palestinian people. Nevertheless, even through the occupation, Jordan continues to provide a range of public services to Palestinians on the West Bank, as well as to Palestinians in refugee camps in Jordan. Contemporary Jordan is basically pro-Western and moderate, caught between the blindly pro-Israeli stance of its sometimes ally and protector, the United States, and the doggedly anti-Israeli attitudes of most Arabs, including Jordanians. (Jordan's frequent peace initiatives are constrained by the political realities within the country and within the Middle East, but that is another tale.) Jordan as a place
Jordan's development strategy is closely tailored to the country's geographical reality. Jordan is a small country with a rapidly growing population of close to 3 000 000 and an East Bank area of almost 100000 square kilometers (about the same as Hungary or the
R. D. HONEY.~NDS. ABU KHARMEH
273
American state of Indiana). The country has three distinct and quite significant physiographic regions. The eastern three-quarters of the territory is virtually uninhabited desert, or Badia. The western edge of the country is the rift valley, or Ghor as it is known locally, that contains the Jordan River and Dead Sea, extending south to the port of Aqaba. The Ghor is important for irrigated agriculture and mineral production, and Aqaba, as the nation's only seaport, is vital. Most of the people live in the narrow strip of highlands running the full length of the country, north-south between the Ghor and the Badia. Rainfall is greater in the northern highlands, as is population density. Jordan's population is expected to double in 20 years. The annual population growth rate of 3.5 percent during the 1960s and 1970s was one of the highest in the world. In addition, Jordan has had a 5 percent annual net immigration rate thanks largely to the influx of Palestinians from the occupied territories. More recently the immigration rate has stayed up because of the return of skilled Jordanian workers laid off because of declines in oil production in the Arabian Gulf. Jordan's population is highly concentrated. Metropolitan Amman, when defined to include neighboring towns with strong commuting links, has well over 1 000 000 people and a disproportionate share of the nation's jobs and wealth (see Table 1 ). Aside from Zarqa, a satellite of Amman, the next largest city is Irbid with about 150000 residents. Most of the towns with populations above 10 000 are in the north. Government officials are concerned about the growing gap in material standard of living between Amman and the rest of the country, and they are determined to reverse the trend. This is a formidable task. Most Jordanians are Sunni Muslims and Islam is the state religion. Christians constitute TABLE ~[. Urban hierarchy in Jordan
City 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.
Amman Zarqa* Irbid Russeifa" Baq'ah* Salt" Aqaba Madaba Ramtha Wadi Seer* Suwaileh* Shniller* Maffaq* Quaismeh" Tafileh Sahab" Mshairfeh" Karak Ma'an Jarash Ghazzeh Mokhayyam Jbaiha* Kofranjah
1985 population (O00s)
2000 population (O00s)
913 336 143 63 54 41 35 35 33 31 31 29 26 19 15 15 14 14 13 12 11 10 10
1513 481 242 107 84 66 62 57 54 56 55 46 40 33 22 23 23 22 20 20 15 18 14
Source: Jordan TelecommunicationsCompany • Within commutingdistance of Amman
274
Organizing spacefor development planning in Jordan
a 15 percent minority, however, and their rights are guaranteed: Partly through traditional tolerance and partly through governmental repression. Jordan has to date evaded the excesses of Islamic fundamentalism. Drinking--taboo to Muslims but not Jordan's Christians--is open and legal, except during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan)
Power relationships in Jordan Though Jordan is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, the king is indeed the true power in the country, appointing the cabinet, controlling the militaw, and generally governing. In his long reign he has learned to weld the other powers in the country, paying great attention to the interests of competing factions. His cabinets, for example, balance the many constituencies within the Kingdom--some posts for Christians, some for Circassians, and so forth. Part of his success is utilization of tribal leaders. 6 The urban economic elite is often synonymous with the tribal elite. This is especially so for tribes profiting from the sale of land (at greatly inflated prices) around Amman. Jordan is evolving into a capitalist society but with land a major means of wealth. Modern exchange is the norm in Amman. Among Arab countries Jordan has the highest level of education. Foreign degrees are common. Education is seen very definitely as the avenue to success. In fact, Jordan has a shortage of manual workers even though its economy has a shortage of jobs for those with higher education. At the same time that Jordanian engineers flock to the Gulf, Egyptians flock to Jordan for work as day labourers. 7 (Economic decline has reduced both of these flows.)
Territorial administration Government below the national level in Jordan is much more local administration than genuinely local government: it administers policies for the central government more than promulgating and executing policies determined by locally chosen representatives (Johnston, 1982; Ghosheh, 1985). Governorates (or provinces) form the highest level of sub-national government. The eight governorates are based on city regions, i.e. the areas of dominance of the largest cities (Dickinson, 1947). The governors are appointed by the central government. Quite significantly, as far as regional development is concerned, they are part of the central government's cabinet. The governors' chief job is to administer central government policy. National funds for local areas filter through the governorates before disbursal. The governorates, on paper at least, are divided into districts and sometimes sub-districts. These, too, are centrally defined and controlled. Towns and villages have locally elected councils and mayors. Typically tribal groups are represented. These councils have very modest budgets and powers. Real power, both political and economic, is concentrated in Amman.
The spatial economy Buoyed by the rising prosperity of its oil-rich neighbors in the 1970s, Jordan's economy suffered when oil prices collapsed in the mid 1980s. For years the major source of foreign exchange in Jordan has been remittances from Jordanians working abroad. These have decreased sharply with the oil recession. Similarly, Jordan's Arab neighbors have not purchased the expected amounts of Jordan's cement, phosphate and potash. In addition, grants from Arab donors, whether for Palestinian refugees or more generally, have shrunk.
R. D. HONEYAND S. ABU KHARMEH
275
TABLE 2. Distribution of industrial and services establishments among govemorates No. of industrial establishments employing five workers or more
%
No. of services establishments
%
Amman Zarqa Balqa Irbid Maffaq Karak Tafeela Ma'an
1014 195 39 224 28 22 9 53
64.0 12.3 2.5 14.0 1.8 1.4 0.6 3.4
9497 1723 485 247 736 255 1287 35
66.6 12.1 3.4 1.7 5.2 1.8 9.0 0.3
Total
1584
100.0
14272
100.0
Governorate
Source: Jordan's 1986-90 Plan for Economicand Social Development
The sum is a much more precarious economy than Jordanian leaders expected when they promulgated the 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 5 Plan. Domestically the big issue is equity. (Some officials in the Ministry cf Planning even argue for equity at the expense of economic growth.) Employment and business opportunities are concentrated in Amman, and the gap between rich and poor, even in the urban areas, is growing. An examination of the distribution of economic activities proves how skewed in A m m a n ' s favor the spatial economy is (see Table 2). The government is concerned about the unbalanced growth, partly fearing A m m a n ' s success could be selfconsuming but even more that differences between center and periphery will reach a point that only in the center would people be able to achieve a high quality of living. 8
Planning in Jordan While Jordan does not have a planned economy in the Soviet sense, it does have national planning, in part to nationalize the development aid coming from oti~er Arab states, North America and Europe, in part in an effort to manage both the economy and social welfare. The 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 Plan for Economic and Social Development is the country's fifth national plan. The others were basically sectoral, establishing investment priorities and policies within each sector. They suffered from a paucity of regional coordination. The current plan is emphatically regional, not only in its emphasis on development away from the capital, but also in its establishment of a system of regional planning. The plan is based on five fundamental principles. While the stated principles are clearly for political advantages internally and externally, they are informative. The principles are ( 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 Plan: 102): 1. Jordan is an integral part of the Arab world. (This principle justifies Jordan's aid from other Arab countries, not only to share the burden of the Palestinian refugees but also to share the benefits of oil.) 2. Jordan is committed to individual initiative and the private sector's role in the development process. (This principle coincides with the preferences of both the Reagan Administration and Jordan's economic elite.)
276
Organizing spacefor development planning in Jordan
3. Jordan seeks social justice in ensuring a more equitable distribution of income among the various social groups and across regions. (This is an explicit call for greater equity among regions, a clear justification for regional development planning.) 4. Jordan regards international cooperation as fundamental to the process of development. (This is a commitment to reduce economic barriers in order to achieve a more efficient world economy--but also to solidify a claim for Western aid.) 5. Jordan seeks popular participation in planning and development. (This is a commitment to decentralize political power, perhaps a real commitment but clearly an effort to marshal political support.) Following from these principles (especially the third and fifth), a major component of the current plan is the creation of a hierarchical regional planning apparatus with initiative and responsibility at the lower levels to be shared by local residents and staff provided by the Ministry of Planning. This is a real transformation of power relationships with people, or at least local elites, participating directly in regional development decisions. The Ministry, after prolonged internal discussions, included a regional planning structure and regional planning process in the 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 Plan. These are being implemented now. The Ministry defined the role of the planning apparatus as regional development, in particular providing economic opportunities so that people can gain control of their lives. Thought within the Ministry, from the Minister on down, was that small, locally controlled projects were more likely to prove profitable in the long run than the very expensive large projects of the past, e.g. the second cement plant at Tafileh. (As a consequence of the construction of the plant, Jordan has excess capacity during an economic slump.)
Four-tier hierarchy Ministry officials eventually settled on a four-tier planning structure, not surprisingly with a very strong role by the Ministry itself. Before the 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 Plan the Ministry had not really practised regional (in the sense of spatial) planning. The new plan changes that. The Ministry developed a geographical information system, including a Iocational network with all settlements and roads, and collected data both from field surveys and the line ministries. In short, the Ministry is the top tier in the system, operating as the national planning level in the regional planning system. Ministry staff liaise with the line ministries and governorates, as well as conducting a variety of spatial analyses. The Ministry, in conjunction with Jordan's National Geographic Center is preparing a planning atlas that includes plates showing the distributions of public facilities and private enterprises, as well as areas of need. The governorates form the second tier in the regional planning system. Each governorate, in accordance with the plan, is to have a modest planning staff working in conjunction with the Ministry of Planning. The Ministry is to provide requisite data to each governorate and assist in analysis. The govemorates are to update data for Ministry files. The governorate structure is used by the line ministries, so coordination within the governorates will be improved through use of the governorates as regional planning agencies. The third level in the planning hierarchy is subdivisions of the governorates to be known as developmental subregions. This level is to be very important in the planning structure. Each subregion will have a development council consisting of private and public leaders. A small staff will assist each council. The staff is to be linked via the appropriate governorate, to the Ministry of Planning. The development councils are to design strategies for economic development for their subregions. They are to work with international donors as well as
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FIGURE 1. Zarqa development-planning region, sub-regions and development units, showing socio-economicand physical linkages. officials of lending institutions and central government to identify, design and execute projects to expand employment and income in their subregions. Where the Ministry of Planning and governorates have predetermined territories, the subregions are new entities. The Ministry's general criterion for delimiting the territories of the subregions was appropriateness for regional planning (Honey et al., 1985). More specifically, Ministry officials used two kinds of criteria: physiography, because the three physical regions have very different development problems and potential; and the strength of social and economic linkages because areas strongly interconnected should be planned together. A third criterion, which did not prove to be limiting, was that subregions should not cross governorate boundaries. Ministerial officials considered a population threshold requirement, but this was rejected by Ministerial leaders. Given the known location of governorate boundaries and where the physiographic regions change, the task became one of assessing the patterns of linkages among places. Ministry officials used a 30-variable computer algorithm to assess the linkages of each place with other places. The 30 variables included such things as where village children go to school (for each level of school), where villagers receive medical care, where local people work, where shops obtain their supplies, and where farmers get their supplies and sell their products. The linkages revealed a quite consistent three-level hierarchy within each governorate. This hierarchy provided for first-cut definition of subregions by using the second-level locations as subregion centers (see Figure 1 ). Alternative configurations were developed and debated within the Ministry (see Table 3). These took account of other cultural and historical factors, as well as district boundaries. Eventually the Ministry settled on a set of subregions for public consumption. These were then introduced in each governorate for comments and suggestions before determining the final alignments. The Ministry eventually settled on a set of 37 subregions (see Table 4). The lowest level in the planning hierarchy is clusters of villages known as development
Organizing spacefor development planning in Jordan
278
TABLE 3. Proposed development council areas for Jordan
Governorate
Proposed"
Proposed
Aman
Greater Amman Madaba
Balqa
Salt Balqa Baq'ah Basin
Irbid
Irbid Korah Ajloun Jerash Ramtha Irbid Ghor Bani Kenaneh Karak Sail Qatrana Aqaba ma'an Wadi Musa
Greater Amman Madaba Ruseifa Suweilih Sahab Salt North Ghor South Ghor North Balqa Baq'ah Basin Irbid Korah Ajloun Jerash Ramtha Irbid Ghor
Karak
Ma'an
Tafileh
Tafileh
Mafraq
Maffaq Wadi Hamad Zarqa Dulail Azraq
Zarqa
Karak
Aqaba Ma'an Wadi Musa Wadi Arabah Tafileh Bsairah Hassa Mafraq Zarqa Azraq
Source: Honey,et al. (1985) units. The development unit is chiefly a communication conduit conveying local preferences to the development councils at the subregion level. Each development unit is represented on the appropriate development council. Membership in a development unit usually conforms with the third-tier pattern in the linkage analysis. As with the subregions, alternatives were considered, and the public had a chance to voice objections.
Implementation Some governors relished the regional planning system and began implementing it even before approved by the cabinet. Others have been more cautious. The system is being implemented and should be fully operating by the conclusion of the period of the current plan, i.e. the end of 1990. The extent and nature of implementation will reveal the true commitment of central government to decentralization. If central powers retain all important decisions with execution at the local level, the government will have achieved
R. D. HONEY AND S. ABU KHAP,MEH
279
TABLE 4. Regional planning units
Governorate Amman
Sub-regions
Sub-total
Amman Ma'adaba Na'our Sahab-Muwaqqar 4 Zarqa Dulail Azraq 3 Irbid First Irbid Second Ramtha Bani Kananah North Ghors Koura Ajloun Jerash 8 Mafraq North desert 2 Balqa Ghor Balqa Middle Balqa'a Basin 3 Karak Qasr South Mazar Ay Sail Desert 6 Tafeela Bsairah Hassa 3 Ma'an A1-Husseiniah AI-Shoubak Wadi Mousa Desert Aqaba Quwairah Wadi Araba 8
Grand Total
37
Sub-total Zarqa Sub-total Irbid
Sub-total Mafraq Sub-total Balqa Sub-total Karak
Sub-total Tafeela Sub-total Ma'an
No. of development units ! 8 4 2 15 5 i
1 7 5 6 2 3 4 4 6 8 38 6 8 I4 7 7 4 18 i 3 3 i 2 1 11 3 2 1 6 3 1 1 2
zN[o. of villages 52 143 38 25 258 36 7 6 49 28 42 6 21 4 31 53 55 283 76 73 149 25 4O 17 82 38 22 41 6 i0 5 122
1 1 3 15
23 10 3 36 17 6 21 18 13 14 6 9 104
124
1083
280
Organizing spacefor development planning in Jordan
deconcentration. If, on the other hand, the very centralized Jordanian state actually empowers development councils as envisioned in the proposed structure, Jordan could have its first truly significant decentralization of power. Whether either will really generate economic growth in Jordan's hinterland is still another matter. The problems are acute. Certainly one can argue that the people most affected should have a chance to improve their economic well-being. A fear of some critics within the Ministry is that control by distant rulers will simply transfer to the local elite, still leaving the ordinary people impoverished and powerless. If implemented as designed, the regional planning structure would change the political economy of Jordan. Whether such implementation, based on a neo-classical, trickle-down theory as it is, can bring about a better quality of life for the bulk of the inhabitants of rural Jordan, is yet to be seen. Advocates argue that this is the best chance, with a Rawlsian optimism that economic success will improve the lot of the worst off, even if some get rich (Rawls, 1972). 9 Significance Jordan is not an advanced capitalist state with a fully democratic political system. In fact, it is in some ways a feudal society trying to modernize by virtually skipping an industrial phase. In addition, it is a monarchy more than a democracy, i.e. a constitutional monarchy with more emphasis on monarchy than constitution. Nevertheless, central state-local state relationships are instructive, as are the ways the state organizes space. Clearly the Jordanian state, either acting on behalf of the King or by aczions of the King, has maintained order through strong central control. Subnational government has really amounted to local administration rather than genuinely local government (in the sense of locally-chosen people determining important policies). The 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 Plan appears to reverse this, yielding power (and responsibility) to coalitions of local political and business leaders. The local state apparatus of the development councils should be useful to the central state in two important ways. First, they placate petit-capitalist demands for participation in power. Second, they are consistent with the type of society that the regime is trying to build--a contented citizenry in which prosperity is either shared outright or perceived to be attainable by a broad spectrum of people. In terms of spatial organization, the government implicitly concentrated on two quite different organizing principles. By dividing space on the basis of physiography the government adopted a public-choice principle: people in different kinds of places should be able to make different kinds of choices, set different kinds of policies (Koleda, 1971). By joining areas on the basis of interaction patterns the government internalized externalities, bringing together the people whose daily lives are intertwined and therefore whose economic prospects are inseparable (Honey, 1976). All but the smallest contemporary societies organize space into political units, whether genuine organs of local or self-governmem or just territories for administering central government policies and delivering public goods. The ways Jordan does this differ from the ways of Western democracies. Nevertheless, the government of Jordan does organize space. The recent changes in that spatial organization are a partial restructuring of society with a potential of redistributing benefits within the society, possibly regressively, possibly progressively. Notes 1. Deconcentration connotes moving decisions away from the center, even though those making the decisions are still responsible to the leaders in the center. Decentralization connotes actually
R. D. HONEY AND S. ABU KHARMEH
281
yielding decisions from the central state to iocally chosen leaders. 2. The authors worked during the period of preparation of the plan in Jordan's Ministry, of Planning, Abu Kharmeh as a staff researcher and analyst, Honey as a consultant. They met with decision-makers of ali levels within the Ministry., as well as with cabinet members and even Crown Prince Hassan, who took a direct and active interest in preparation of the plan. 3. Aside from the significant exception of the Black September civil war in 1970 (and the subsequent expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization), despite an official continuing state of war with Israel, Jordan has in fact been at peace since 1967. The level of violence, even with a small number of assassinations, is well below that of North America and Europe. 4. For two different approaches see Drysdale and Blake (1985) and Laquer (1970). 5. A fascinating sight after the announcement of a new cabinet is the throngs of tribesmen wearing their distinctive headdresses (their own pattern of the traditional kafiyyeh) gathering at the appropriate ministry to congratulate their tribesman on his new appointment. 6. Jordan is also a strongly patriarchical society. The family unit is very strong with fathers exercising dictatorial powers, even over their adult offspring. Offenses committed against an individual are also committed against that person's family. Females have clearly inferior status. 7. Jordan's Muslims are Sunnis, a fact, along with government policy, explaining the absence of photographs of the Ayatollah Khomeini, which, by contrast, have a prominent presence in the nearby Syrian capital, Damascus. 8. Jordanian efforts to provide social services in the countryside are borne out by findings that only a fraction of one percent of the population is more than ten kilometers from a school or health clinic. The government's problem is staffing these facilities (Honey, 1985). All too frequently teachers in remote areas are soldiers completing their compulsory two-year tour of duty. Likewise, health clinics are understaffed, many open only one day a week because physicians refuse to live in remote areas. Jordan has the irony of a physician shortage while having one of the highest rates of physicians per 10000 people of any country. 9. RaMs argues that change that enriches some is just if everyone, even the worst-off person, is better-off as a consequence of the change.
References
DICKINSON,R. E. (1947). City, Region and Regionalism. London: Routledge. DRYSDALE,A. AND BLAKE,G. H. (1985). The Middle East and North Africa. New York: Oxford University Press. GHOSHEH,Z. (1985). Public Administration in Jordan. Amman: University of Jordan Press. HARRIS,G. L. (1958). Jordan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. New Haven: HRAF Press. HONEY, R. (1976). Conflicting problems in the political organization of space. Annals of Regional Science X, 45-60. HONEY, R. ET AL. (1985). Proposed Planning Areas for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Amman: Ministry of Planning. Jo~,4sroN, R. J. (1982). Geography and the State. London: The Macmillan Press. Jordan's 1986-I990 Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986). Amman: Ministry of Planning. KEDOURIE,E. (1978). England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, I914-1921. London: Harvester Press. KOLEDA,M. S. (1971). A public good model of government consolidation. Urban Studies VIII, 103-110. LAQUER,W. (1970). The Arab-Israeli Reader. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books. MOUSA,S. (1978). T. E. Lawrence: An Arab View. London: Oxford University Press. MOUSA,S. (i 982). Jordan: towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, 1841 - 1918. In Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan (A. Hadldl ed.) pp. 385-391. Amman: Department of Antiquities. MNESELL, M. (1983). Cultural political geography. Paper presented to meeting of West Lakes Division AAG, Amana, Iowa. RAwts, J. (1972). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. SacHaR, H. M. (1969). The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-24. New York: Alfred Knopf.